

1 Quantum Dynamical Modeling of Competition  
2 and Cooperation between Political Parties: the  
3 Coalition and Non-coalition Equilibrium  
4 Model

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7 **Abstract**

8 We propose a model of parties' dynamical decision-making related  
9 to becoming a member of a coalition or pursuing a competitive strat-  
10 egy. Our approach is based on the mathematical formalism of quan-  
11 tum information theory. The devised model has no direct relation  
12 to quantum physics, only its mathematical apparatus and methodol-  
13 ogy are applied, in particular the quantum probability and the the-  
14 ory of open quantum systems. The latter describes the most general  
15 form of adaptive dynamics of a system interacting with an environ-  
16 ment. In our model the environment is composed of the electorate, or  
17 more specifically the informational bath generated by the parties' elec-  
18 torate, which is a key part of the socio-economic context surrounding  
19 the political party as an decision-making entity. The key feature of  
20 the quantum model is the ability to capture the strong interrelation  
21 of the parties' decision making states, through the notion of entan-  
22 glement. The preferences of different parties evolve simultaneously  
23 and non-separably in the joint information space. We model the ap-  
24 proaching of the state of political equilibrium by using the Markov  
25 approximation of the quantum master equation. Illustrative exam-  
26 ples of numerical simulations are presented to specify, how the model  
27 works operationally.

28 **Keywords:** Political theory; Game theory; Political Coalitions; Non- separa-  
29 bility; Quantum like models; Quantum probability; Entanglement; Quantum  
30 Information Theory; Quantum Master Equation.

## 31 1 Introduction

32 Mathematical modeling of creation of coalitions between political parties  
33 and, more generally, of establishing cooperation with respect to the spe-  
34 cial political and economic issues is by now a well researched field. Generally  
35 speaking, the choices of political parties depend on a number of psychological  
36 and institutional parameters. Different models consider different parameters  
37 as being more salient to the parties' decisions. If one would search to con-  
38 struct a classical stochastic model with multiple loading factors that would  
39 also change over the time dynamics, one would obtain an extremely complex  
40 model. In this contribution, we propose a model that is based on the formal-  
41 ism of quantum information theory (quantum Markovian dynamics). The  
42 advantage of the devised model is that it reduces essentially the complexity  
43 of the classical stochastic models. The model can be potentially adapted  
44 to a variety of political issues, where the parties are uncertain in respect to  
45 cooperation/non-cooperation with other parties on some political matters.  
46 However, as was pinpointed by one of the reviewers of this paper, the topic  
47 of (non)cooperation would require a more scrutinized analysis, where the  
48 party can often cooperate only to a certain degree, involving several issues  
49 on which the party has to decide. In the case of a coalition formation the  
50 party has formally only two choices in the form of yes/no. In this piece of  
51 work we are proceeding on a formal level, by presenting a model that de-  
52 scribes an equilibrium state of the parties that operate in a country with  
53 multiparty political system. The core decisions that these parties have to  
54 make are simplified to the set of two choices *to enter a political coalition*  
55 *(alliance) or to abstain from entering a coalition (alliance)*<sup>1</sup>.

56 In this paper we do not have a possibility to review in detail the "classical  
57 methods" for the investigation of the domain of cooperation and competition,  
58 including the context of coalition formation in politics, see, e.g., monographs  
59 by Davies, Hinich&Ordeshook (1970) and Dhillon (2005) for extended treat-

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<sup>1</sup>In the spirit of information theory we encode each single party's decision state by the so called quantum bits. Each quantum bit is encoding a probabilistic superposition of obtaining some binary (customarily denoted in quantum information theory as zeros or ones) outcomes. This allows us to represent decision states with the choice outcomes in the form of "yes" and "no" with the aid of qubits. This approach, as will be shown, simplifies the model construction essentially.

60 ments. For our purpose, it is important to point out that one of the main  
61 aims of “classical mathematical modeling” is to study the overall existence  
62 and the process of approaching to the states of an *equilibrium* of preferences  
63 for (non)cooperation between parties<sup>2</sup>.

64 Certainly, game theory plays a crucial role in this setting, since coalition  
65 formation is a strategic process that embraces a complexity of factors for each  
66 partaking party. Each party has to consider the preferences and aims of the  
67 other parties, in order to establish its best strategy and ultimately achieve an  
68 optimal equilibrium for all political players involved. For a treatment from  
69 a game theoretic perspective on the coalition formation, consult Greenberg  
70 (1994) and Riker (1962). In his landmark work on political coalitions Riker  
71 (1962) puts forward a well-known theory on political bargaining, stating that  
72 the main aim of each separate party is not to win the support of the largest  
73 amount of voters, but to form a “minimal winning coalition”. According to  
74 the theory, such type of party’s behavior enables it to save its energy and re-  
75 sources that would be spent in an extensive election campaign. In contrary,  
76 more recent works by Greenberg (1994) and Brams&Fishburn (1992) show  
77 evidence on the electorate playing a central role in the formation of party’s  
78 cooperative/non-cooperative strategy. In the later study, Brams&Fishburn  
79 (1992) articulate that voters are active complements in terms of shaping the  
80 strategy of the parties in multi-party political systems. In this respect, the  
81 ultimate aim for the political parties is to form such coalitions that would  
82 satisfy the voters, by bringing a convergence of their political interests and  
83 ideology. For instance, Meffert&Geschwend (2010) carried out a study on vot-  
84 ers in Austria and found out that the voting behaviour of Austrian electorate  
85 displays “non-separability”. The collected statistics showed that Austrian  
86 voters are considering all the election outcomes simultaneously, including the  
87 potential coalition possibilities of the parties. The complex mode of voters’  
88 information processing can establish voting preferences for some political  
89 party, given that it will become a member of a particular coalition. The  
90 victory of the political parties depends on the “message” that the existing  
91 coalition or the potential coalition members convey to the electorate<sup>3</sup>. The

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<sup>2</sup>We highlight that in this work we operate with the words “cooperation” and “non-cooperation”, as conceived in the classical game theory. In the proposed model these terms more precisely denote the acts of “entering a coalition/ alliance” or “not entering a coalition/ alliance”.

<sup>3</sup>An interesting example of the complex interplay of voters’ expectations and the strategies of the political parties is the success of an intricate multi-party coalition, termed “Alliance”. This coalition came to power in Sweden in the 2006 parliamentary elections after 4 center-right parties merged together to oppose the leading party, the Social Democrats. The process of coalition formation was accompanied by various disagreements. Finally, the “Alliance” was able to formulate a joint political program, the so called “Manifesto”. The

92 parties that solely focus on the preferences of voters, the so called “vote  
93 maximizers”, are highly dependent on the voting behavior of the electorate,  
94 see the seminal work by Downs (1957). At the same time, a political party  
95 may place more value on sustaining its ideology, the so called policy seeking  
96 behaviour. The third factor that may determine the strategy of the party is  
97 its aspiration for power, fulfilled by the means of increasing the number of its  
98 cabinet seats. Strom (1990) explored the above factors’ impact on parties’  
99 behaviour, and formalized a ”three factor” theory of coalition formation. De-  
100 spite the orthogonal representation of the three key factors; policy seeking,  
101 cabinet seats seeking and voter support seeking in this spatial model, the  
102 author acknowledges that these factors are often not mutually exclusive but  
103 interconnected i.e., they are non-separably coupled in the process of party’s  
104 decision making. Naturally, the ideology of the party is reflecting the aspi-  
105 rations of the voters as well as its desire for cabinet sits. Consequently, it  
106 becomes not possible for a party to fulfil its goals without the voters support,  
107 in a multi-party democracy. Moreover, the support of voters is vital for the  
108 very existence of the party on the political arena, where the most multi-party  
109 political systems have a requirement of passing an election threshold.

110 We also remark the importance of the timing of the coalition formation,  
111 as often discussed in political literature. A pre-election alliance emerges,  
112 when the parties participate in the elections process as a joint “team”. Sim-  
113 ilarly, after the elections, the power distribution cannot be altered by other  
114 means than by creating a coalition with other parties, in order to form a mi-  
115 nority/majority government. Notable cases of alliances<sup>4</sup> that emerged before  
116 the elections were held are the “Alliance” in Sweden and “Syriza” in Greece  
117 (Widfeldt, 2007; Syriza Party Homepage, 2013). The type of alliance-seeking  
118 behavior can be characterized by the parties’ need to gain the support of vot-  
119 ers as a result of the created image by the alliance members. Conventionally,  
120 in the process of alliance formation, the involved parties search to keep close  
121 their ideological ties on the so called left-right policy axis. In such contexts,  
122 the parties are dependent on the beliefs of voters about their success as an  
123 alliance. As a consequence, the parties search to be perceived by the vot-  
124 ers as a strong and reliable political entity, see a discussion in the Electoral  
125 Knowledge Network (2012). The impact of voters is even more imperative for  
126 the post-election coalition emergence. In some cases the parties are left with  
127 no other options, but to establish a coalition agreement to stay in power.  
128 Many alliances and coalitions, such as the “Grand Coalitions” in Germany,

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success of this multi-party coalition was attributed to the transparency of the conveyed information about their coalition plans and the subsequent supportive voting behaviour of the Swedish electorate. For detailed statistics consult the study by Widfeldt (2007).

<sup>4</sup>Pre-election coalitions are often termed alliances.

129 Italy and the Netherlands, as well as the coalition in the UK, were created  
130 in order to secure cabinet seats for the party members. This strategy enabled  
131 the parties to form a Government with majority seats, see mass-media coverage in  
132 Financial Times (2012), BBC News (2010), (2013), Spiegel Online  
133 International (2013).

134 The coalition formation is a complex process and an optimal equilibrium  
135 has to be established for the whole arrangement of participants. The voters  
136 definitely have a great impact on the strategic planning of their representative  
137 political parties. The voters are effectively shaping the strategy of these  
138 parties through their voting behavior on the election day. However, the  
139 parties that enter a coalition also keep in mind that the voters' support  
140 can swing in favour of another political party, if their interests become  
141 neglected. The party's success in the subsequent elections can be easily  
142 jeopardized.

143 As Downs (1957), p.35, formulated in his milestone work: *... "the main*  
144 *goal of every party is the winning of elections. Thus, all its actions are aimed*  
145 *at maximizing votes."*

146 In the proposed model, the timing of the coalition formation can be tuned  
147 with the aid of appropriate Hamiltonian and Lindblad operators that incor-  
148 porate the internal and external state fluctuations of the parties decision-  
149 making states. At this stage, we will primarily focus on the second type of  
150 coalition formation, the post election coalitions, where the voters' behavior  
151 greatly shapes the final choices of the political parties. In fact, the ultimate  
152 decisions of the parties can be very distinct from their initial preferences<sup>5</sup>  
153 Similarly to classical game-theoretic models, the proposed modeling, based  
154 on the mathematical tools of quantum physics, captures the approaching of  
155 a stable state of a decision equilibrium.

## 156 **1.1 A Note on Non-separability of Political Decisions**

157 Non-separability or strong interrelation of political decisions has been ex-  
158 plored in more recent political studies and spatial representations of such  
159 preferences where devised (Lacy & Niou, 2000; Lacy, 2001; Finke, 2009; Finke  
160 & Fleig, 2013). These studies show that preferences of voters and also Gov-  
161 ernments are often not evolving in isolation; the issues and their outcomes are  
162 not unconditioned and unconstrained, but irreducibly connected with each

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<sup>5</sup>As we can see, the above mentioned examples of coalitions are in a sense "exotic"  
in terms of the very polar ideological position of the coalition members. Despite of the  
initially rival political behavior, these parties can arrive to an equilibrium state of political  
cooperation, at least in a short term perspective. We show how this behavior can be  
captured mathematically in a simulation, see the Figures, 1-2 in section (4.3).

163 other by the decision-making states of the subjects. We briefly outline the  
 164 characteristics of non-separability as defined in political science. We adopt a  
 165 classical definition from Lacy (2001). Non-separability can be also character-  
 166 ized by the different “degrees” of its strength as well as different directions  
 167 of its appearance.

168  
 169 Let  $\mathbf{J} = \{1, \dots, J\}$  be a set of issues. Let  $\mathbf{o} = (o_1, \dots, o_j)$  be a  $\mathbf{J}$ -tuple of outcomes  
 170 across all  $J$  issues. Define  $x$  and  $y$  as mutually exclusive and exhaustive non empty  
 171 subsets of the  $\mathbf{o}$ .  $x'$  is an outcome that differs from  $x$  on at least one issue, and  $y'$   
 172 differs from  $y$  on at least one issue. Now suppose individual  $i$  has a reflexive and  
 173 transitive weak preference relation<sup>6</sup>,  $\succeq_i$ , ordering all  $\mathbf{J}$ -tuples of policy outcomes.  
 174 Then  $i$ 's preferences are:

- 175 • separable iff for all  $x, y, y'$ ,  $(x, y) \succeq_i(x', y)$  and  $(x, y') \succeq_i(x', y')$ .
- 176 • completely non-separable iff for all  $x$  there exists a  $y$  and  $y'$  such that  $(x, y) \succeq$   
 177  $_i(x', y)$  and  $(x', y') \succeq_i(x, y')$ . (Lacy 2001, p. 240)

178 Non- separability reveals a more complex nature of human preferences,  
 179 where in a political context the outcomes of one political issue in sense gen-  
 180 erate preferences for the outcomes of other issues. In contrast to what is of-  
 181 ten assumed in traditional political science studies, preferences are not fixed  
 182 over time and isolated from other decision-making contexts. In political lit-  
 183 erature, this phenomenon has been mainly studied among voters (due to  
 184 the possibility to obtain detailed statistics through surveys and opinion/exit  
 185 polls). Non-separability of governmental and party decisions has not been  
 186 so widely explored at this stage. However, Finke (2009) and Finke & Fleig  
 187 (2013) present statistics on the existence of EU member states' non-separable  
 188 behavior related to several political issues.

189 As mentioned above, we propose for a quantum formulation of the non-  
 190 separability of parties' decision- making states in the context of coalition  
 191 construction, where the preferences of different parties can strongly interre-  
 192 late with each other. The motivation for this development stems from the  
 193 findings elaborated by Zorn & Smith (2011), Khrennikova, Haven & Khren-  
 194 nikov (2014), Khrennikova & Haven (2016) and Khrennikova (2015). These  
 195 studies provide broad argumentation, including empirical evidence on the  
 196 non-classical origins of non-separability, i.e. it is not just about the proba-  
 197 bilistic conditioning of decision outcomes in a Bayesian fashion.

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<sup>6</sup>To establish for a formal representation of a preference relation, economic axioms are serving as building blocks that allow to establish an ordering of preferences. Reflexivity stems from the axiom of preference completeness and pertains to a preference equivalence, where e.g., for outcomes  $x$  and  $y$ ,  $x \sim y$ , iff  $x = y$ .

198 It is worth to mention that the probabilistic features of the quantum  
199 formalism are closely linked to the state space representation. When we talk  
200 about the multifariousness of the representation of preference states and the  
201 classical spatial models of voting resting on the Euclidean (weighted) linear  
202 space, characterized by metric distances between the preference points, we  
203 witness that due to the geometric properties of the Euclidean space this  
204 representation suffers from the constraints of detecting the various specific  
205 features of non-separability, such as its direction. When the direction of  
206 measurement matters we are faced with the violation of the principle of  
207 commutativity. With other words, the direction of non separability should  
208 not play any role, in spatial models, for instance, an outcome  $A$  followed by  
209 an outcome  $B$  would not differ from a different ordering of their realization.  
210 Likewise, the Euclidean space representation of preferences is not coupled  
211 to the probabilistic nature of the outcomes, which lies at the heart of the  
212 quantum representation of the observables. A more comprehensive account  
213 on the similarities and differences of spatial models based on the Euclidean  
214 state space as opposed to the Hilbert space can be found in Khrennikova  
215 &Haven(2016).

## 216 **1.2 Applicability of Quantum Formalism to Decision** 217 **processes**

218 Recently, the mathematical formalism of quantum theory and its method-  
219 ology found a variety of applications beyond physical phenomena: in cog-  
220 nition, psychology, psychophysics, economics, finance, and most recently in  
221 politics. Since the number of publications in this novel field of research in-  
222 creases rapidly and the diversity of applications is vast, we refer only to the  
223 monographs by Busemeyer &Bruza (2012), Haven &Khrennikov (2013) and  
224 references in them. Modeling of decision-making processes in a quantum  
225 framework is becoming an established interdisciplinary field. Some notable  
226 contributions are by Busemeyer, Wang and Townsend (2006), Pothos &Buse-  
227 meyer (2009) and Lambert-Mogiliansky &Busemeyer (2012). This paper can  
228 be considered as a part of this development, namely decision-making pro-  
229 cesses in politics.

230 Inside the quantum-like field, essential efforts were made in the founda-  
231 tional studies, in particular, *on the justification of the applicability of the*  
232 *methods of quantum theory to cognition, psychology and decision-making.*  
233 The main motivation for such applications lies in the complex probabilistic  
234 structure of human decision-making and judgement. Since more than half  
235 a century, when the the foundational “rational economic decision theories”

236 were firstly formalized, psychologists collected experimental statistical data  
237 that exhibited features paradoxical from the viewpoint of classical decision  
238 theories, which rest upon the classical probability theory, see for example,  
239 the seminal experiments carried out by Tversky and Shafir (1992) and Shafir  
240 & Tversky (1992). Various fallacies of human reasoning were discovered,  
241 e.g., conjunction and disjunction effects, order effects and framing effects.  
242 Essentially, one can treat these fallacies as an exhibition of contextuality  
243 of human behaviour, where human judgements and choices are intrinsically  
244 context-dependent. The features of the experimental data can be mathe-  
245 matically formalized as violations of the laws of classical probability theory.  
246 More specifically, the formula of total probability is violated, as well as the  
247 Bayesian updating scheme. As a consequence, Bell's inequality (which deriva-  
248 tion is based on the possibility to represent statistical data, by using a single  
249 classical probability space) is also violated. It is well-known that statistical  
250 data, collected in quantum physical experiments, contravene the laws of clas-  
251 sical probability theory. For example, the basic quantum effect, interference,  
252 demonstrated in the two slit experiment, is probabilistically equivalent to the  
253 violation of the formula of total probability (Feynman and Hibbs, 1965). Due  
254 to the very similar features of psychological and quantum experimental data,  
255 it became natural for the researchers in this field to apply the formalism of  
256 quantum theory interdisciplinary. A particular focus is placed on geometric  
257 properties and probability theory of QM, to model cognitive processes.

258 As a result of the endeavours by the constantly growing "Quantum Cogni-  
259 tion" community members, the statistical data collected in cognitive psychol-  
260 ogy, sociology, and politics was successfully modeled, including the descrip-  
261 tion of aforementioned psychological effects, see e.g., Pothos and Busemeyer  
262 (2009), Asano et al. (2012), Lambert-Mogiliansky and Busemeyer (2012),  
263 Busemeyer and Bruza (2012), Haven and Khrennikov (2013), Busemeyer  
264 et al.(2006), Wang and Busemeyer (2013) and Khrennikova (2014a),(2014b).  
265 Nevertheless, by borrowing the mathematical apparatus of quantum physics  
266 one confronts a following foundational problem, namely: *Can one guarantee*  
267 *that the quantum probabilistic formalism would completely capture the deci-*  
268 *sion making processes of individuals?* It is fair to say that this was the im-  
269 plicit assumption of the modern decision theories under risk and uncertainty  
270 that utilized the classical Kolmogorovian probability theory as a complete  
271 mathematical apparatus for dealing with the involved uncertainties. Simi-  
272 larly, at this stage of development, one cannot guarantee that some of the  
273 surfacing psychological effects or their combinations will be in accord with  
274 the principles of quantum theory. However, one should stress that even in  
275 the quantum physical community, nobody can guarantee that in the future  
276 developments, the present quantum formalism will not be modified e.g., to



277 correspond with the Einstein's general relativity.

278 Another advantage of the quantum formalism is that this is a complete  
279 theory i.e., it is not an ad hoc modification of the classical probability the-  
280 ory<sup>7</sup>. Quantum probability is a theory that is composed of valid and complete  
281 set of rules, such as Born rule. By applying this formalism to cognition, psy-  
282 chology, political studies one doesn't need to construct complicated models,  
283 taking into account all the impact factors. Another complication of the model  
284 construct is related to the impossibility to determine some of the decision-  
285 making factors empirically, at least with a good precision. By representing  
286 the cognitive phenomena with the aid of the quantum formalism one can  
287 talk about the minimization of the complexity that classical theories would  
288 carry, even if the construction of a classical probabilistic model is formally  
289 attainable (i.e., "hidden variables may exist").

290 On the conceptual level, the notions used in quantum theory deeply res-  
291 onate with the heuristics of cognitive modeling. For example, consider the  
292 notion of superposition of states: the majority of psychologists would accept  
293 that human mind can be in a superposition of a few mental states, i.e., the  
294 preferences on some matter are not fixed, but vacillate as time passes. How-  
295 ever, such a qualitative explanation would be merely a heuristic statement.  
296 In contrary, the quantum formalism provides a mathematical justification for  
297 the above mentioned effect. One can allude to formal models, describing the  
298 psychological phenomena (cf. with the Euclidean models used in political  
299 studies, section 1.1) Last but not least, we point to the non-Boolean struc-  
300 ture of quantum logic, which can be mathematically confirmed, e.g., in the  
301 violation of the distributivity and commutativity axioms. The former occurs  
302 for a variety of human judgements, e.g., when the statistical data cannot be  
303 expressed by the means of the formula of total probability. The violation of  
304 commutativity is manifest in an "order effect", whose investigation plays an  
305 important role in psychology. In quantum models this effect is represented  
306 by the means of non-commutative observables.

### 307 **1.2.1 Evolution of the field of "quantum political studies"**

308 Political decision making is a special sphere where humans have to make  
309 many decisions with far-reaching implications for the individuals and the so-  
310 ciety in general. This can involve ballot casting in different types of elections  
311 from local to national. On the party level the involved parties as political

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<sup>7</sup>In a nutshell, the quantum probabilistic framework is able to accommodate statistical data that a classical probability model can. At the same time, the quantum probability is a more general theory than the classical probability theory, which can also contain non-classical phenomena.

312 entities have the responsibilities to strategically plan their political actions,  
313 by taking into consideration all the possible consequences. Of course, the  
314 decisions made in politics are context specific, i.e., it can be difficult to asso-  
315 ciate the political decisions with some concrete payoffs and risks as formalized  
316 by modern decision theories in economics. Nevertheless, traditional political  
317 theory is highly inspired by the modern economic schools and it is naturally  
318 assumed that as the political decisions are taken, the individuals act in a  
319 rational way, by exhibiting a consistency of their preferences (at least in a  
320 short term perspective). If these assumptions of the economic theories hold,  
321 a well defined ranking of political preferences can be established. One should  
322 note that until the more recent contributions, political preferences were rep-  
323 resented as separable in the spatial models in politics. To be more specific,  
324 each political preference would exist on its own, independently (separably)  
325 from other preferences, as conceived in the foundational work by Enelow and  
326 Hinich (1984). At the same time, new pieces of information cause changes in  
327 the existing preferences and degrees of beliefs. As postulated by the norma-  
328 tive choice theories, when the information is uncertain, the decision makers  
329 update their preferences and beliefs in a Bayesian fashion.

330 Decision making in politics, as well as in other social spheres is of a  
331 complex nature and multiple pieces of information have to be considered. In  
332 various decision-making contexts, preferences on different issues are strongly  
333 interrelated (non-separable) as well as the information is not processed in a  
334 classical mode. One may talk about irrationality of human reasoning. At the  
335 same time, one could argue that the traditional models of human reasoning  
336 may have limitations, whereas the quantum formalism provides a worthy  
337 illumination of the observed probabilistic fallacies as well as other paradoxes  
338 of human reasoning.

339 In the “quantum political studies” we highlight pioneering articles by Zorn  
340 and Smith (2011), Khrennikova et al. (2014), Khrennikova (2015), Bagarello  
341 (2015b) and Khrennikova & Haven (2016). The study by Zorn and Smith  
342 (2011) is exploring US electorate’s voting behaviour in the Congress and  
343 Presidential elections, with the focus on the bipartisan tactics of some vot-  
344 ers. This part of the electorate prefers to “put the eggs in different baskets”  
345 (called “ticket splitting” in political literature) by voting, e.g., for Democrats  
346 in the Congress election and at the same time basting ballots for a Repub-  
347 lican President. Zorn and Smith (2011) are interconnecting politics and  
348 quantum formalism, by pointing to the role of quantum entanglement as a  
349 powerful tool for modeling statistical non-separability of voters’ preferences.  
350 This idea was reinforced in Khrennikova (2015) and Khrennikova & Haven  
351 (2016). The authors showed with the aid of statistics on voters preferences  
352 that non-separability cannot be attributed to a simple Bayesian condition-

353 ing and accommodated in a classical probabilistic framework (see the above  
354 discussion on violation of the laws of classical probability). The features  
355 of non-separability emergence indicated that the quantum representation of  
356 observables could serve as a noteworthy alternative. In Khrennikova et al.  
357 (2014) this approach was combined with the theory of open quantum sys-  
358 tems, to capture the time dynamics of voters' preferences as well. This theory  
359 gives the most general mathematical model of the state's adaptive dynamics  
360 of a system interacting with an environment.

361 In a series of papers (Asano , Tanaka, Basieva & Khrennikov, 2011; Asano,  
362 Ohya, Tanaka, Basieva & Khrennikov, 2012; Asano, Basieva, Khrennikov,  
363 Ohya and Yamato, 2013) the theory of open quantum systems, and more  
364 generally quantum adaptive dynamics were applied to model decision mak-  
365 ing. The applications ranged from modeling irrational behavior in games  
366 of the Prisoners Dilemma type to recognition of ambiguous figures (for the  
367 latter work, consult Asano, Khrennikov , Ohya, Tanaka and Yamato, 2014).  
368 These works introduce the concept of a psychological "bath" to describe the  
369 dynamics and stabilization of a mental state to a classical decision-state.  
370 Khrennikova et al. (2014) explored the application of the theory of open  
371 quantum systems to model the bipartisan behaviour of the American elec-  
372 torate, by extending the quantum -like treatment of voters' preference states,  
373 proposed in Zorn and Smith (2011). The first quantum model of creation of  
374 coalitions between political parties, taking into account the impact of the vot-  
375 ers' behavior, was elaborated by Bagarello (2015b). The author applied the  
376 mathematical formalism of quantum field theory to derive dynamical equa-  
377 tions for evolution of parties' preferences for creation of political alliances.

378 In the present study, following the treatment of this subject in Bagarello(2015b),  
379 we propose a model of coalition formation between political parties, by ex-  
380 ploring the quantum entanglement of preferences and aspirations of party  
381 leaders and their electorates<sup>8</sup>. The model could be potentially applied to  
382 more general areas cooperation establishment, with respect to special polit-  
383 ical and economic issues.

384 The "environment" that impacts the behavior of the party as a system is  
385 a complex combination of factors, where the key role is played by the elec-  
386 torate and their preferences. The role of electorate can be more or less crucial  
387 for the formation of the final decision equilibrium depending, on the timing  
388 of the coalition formation. The motivation for deriving these methodological  
389 assumptions comes from the previous findings in this game-theoretic area

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<sup>8</sup>For an extended elaboration on the existence of "pseudo-classical non separability" in decision-making tasks that is mathematically and conceptually reflected in the quantum notion of entanglement, consult Zorn and Smith (2011)

390 of competition and coalition formation, discussed in the Introduction part.  
391 In accordance with the proposed quantum model, the states of preferences  
392 for (non)cooperation of a group of political parties  $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n$  are represented  
393 in a complex Hilbert space. The key point is that these states are strongly  
394 interconnected, i.e., entangled. The preferences of different parties evolve  
395 simultaneously and non-separably in the joint information space. We model  
396 the approaching to the state of political equilibrium by using the Markov  
397 approximation of the quantum master equation. Since the multi-parties'  
398 state is represented in the tensor product of the state spaces for each indi-  
399 vidual party, the dimension of the state space increases exponentially, with  
400 the growth of the number of parties.

401 Coming back to the classical modeling of creation of political coalitions,  
402 we can add that our approach extends the classical Markov dynamics of  
403 approaching the equilibrium state characterizing a yes/no decision of each  
404 party, with respect to a political coalition establishment. We use a more  
405 general Markov dynamics given by the quantum master equation. In some  
406 sense this approach provides a possibility to represent a deeper state of un-  
407 certainty on the political arena, namely the uncertainty expressed by a su-  
408 perposition of alternatives. As was already stressed, another distinguishing  
409 feature of the model is a possibility to represent a deeper non-separability  
410 between preferences of different parties, non-separability in the form of en-  
411 tanglement. One can also rise the issue of contextuality of decisions on the  
412 political arena. Correlations corresponding to entangled states related to  
413 the decisions, irreducibly depend on the political contexts. Coming back to  
414 coalition modeling, one can say that in such states, political parties do not  
415 have their own, intrinsic and fixed preferences for (non)cooperation. Their  
416 preferences are characterized by a contextual complexity, with respect to the  
417 preferences of other parties.<sup>9</sup>

418  
419 The ideas and methods elaborated in this paper, can be considered as  
420 first steps towards the application of the theory of open quantum systems  
421 for mathematical modeling of political decision processes. We hope that  
422 the model and methods developed in this paper, will be applicable to a  
423 variety of problems in decision-making and more specifically, cooperation  
424 and competition cases. The quantum Markov equation that we apply, is  
425 a most widely used approximation of quantum master equation, describing  
426 quantum adaptive dynamics. It also provides the most general scheme of a

---

<sup>9</sup>Contextuality is one of the bridges between the standard quantum theory for physical systems and cognition and psychology, see works by De Barros & Suppes, (2009), Dzhafarov & Kujala (2012), Dzhafarov & Kujala (2013) and Asano et al. (2014).

427 quantum measurement (Zurek, 2003). Hence, it can be considered as an apt  
428 candidate for the decision-making processes. Undeniably, to implement this  
429 mathematical model to collective decision making (where the political party  
430 is considered as a system), one has to justify its applicability. It is well known  
431 that its derivation is based on a set of assumptions on interaction of a system  
432 and an environment. Therefore, by applying this equation one has to make  
433 sure that the assumptions are satisfied. This is especially important to do this  
434 procedure, when applying the quantum Markov equation outside its original  
435 domain of application. Such an analysis was performed by Khrennikova et  
436 al. (2014), in the section “Matching of the Assumptions of Applicability”,  
437 devising the principles of model’s applicability to decision making process in  
438 a social environment. In principle, this procedure could be repeated in the  
439 context of the present work. At this stage, due to the limited scope, we refer  
440 to the aforementioned paper, since exists an essential similarity between the  
441 models for adaptive political decision-making of voters in Khrennikova et al.  
442 (2014) and the present paper.

443 By formulating a novel mathematical model, based on the formalism of  
444 quantum mechanics and quantum information theory, we are aware that the  
445 reader may be not familiar with the mathematical and conceptual formalism  
446 of quantum mechanics (QM) that is used throughout this paper. We briefly  
447 introduce some of the core notions of QM in the next section, 2. The reader  
448 can consult books by Jaeger (2007) and Busch, Grabowki & Lahti (1995)  
449 for an in depth mathematical treatment of the notions introduced in the  
450 following section.

## 451 **2 Brief introduction to quantum formalism**

452 The state space of QM is based on a complex Hilbert space  $H$ , i.e., a complex  
453 linear space, endowed with a scalar product, denoted as  $\langle\psi_1|\psi_2\rangle$  which is  
454 complete with respect to the norm:  $\|\psi\| = \sqrt{\langle\psi|\psi\rangle}$ . Normalized vectors of  
455  $H$ , i.e.,  $\psi$  such that  $\langle\psi|\psi\rangle = 1$ , represent a special class of states of quantum  
456 systems, namely, the *pure states*. A normalized vector determines a pure  
457 state up to the phase factor  $e^{i\theta}$ , i.e., two vectors  $\psi_1$  and  $\psi_2 = e^{i\theta}\psi_1$  determine  
458 the same pure state.

459 To study open quantum systems, i.e., quantum systems interacting with  
460 environment, we also have to consider the so-called *mixed states*. They are  
461 represented by *density operators*, i.e., operators which are Hermitian, positive  
462 semi-definite and trace one. We recall that a linear operator  $\rho$  is Hermitian if,  
463 for any pair of vectors  $\phi_1, \phi_2$ ,  $\langle\rho\phi_1|\phi_2\rangle = \langle\phi_1|\rho\phi_2\rangle$ ; it is positive semi-definite  
464 if, for any vector  $\phi$ ,  $\langle\rho\phi|\phi\rangle \geq 0$ .

465 We remark that a pure state  $\psi$  also can be represented by the density  
 466 operator – the orthogonal projector onto the vector  $\psi$ . Denote it  $\rho_\psi$ . Any  
 467 density operator  $\rho$  can be represented as a weighted sum of such orthogonal  
 468 projectors:

$$\rho = \sum_i q_i \rho_{\psi_i}, \quad (1)$$

469 where  $q_i \in [0, 1]$ ,  $\sum_i q_i = 1$ , and  $(\psi_i)$  are pure states. This expansion leads to  
 470 the interpretation of the mixed state  $\rho$  as representing an ensemble composed  
 471 of quantum systems in pure states  $(\psi_i)$ . The weight  $q_i$  gives the probability  
 472 to pick up a system in the state  $\psi_i$  from this ensemble.

473 In the quantum formalism *observables* are represented by Hermitian oper-  
 474 ators. Consider a state represented by the density operator  $\rho$  and an ob-  
 475 servable represented by the Hermitian operator  $A = \sum_i a_i P_{a_i}$ , where  $(a_i)$   
 476 are its eigenvalues and  $(P_{a_i})$  are projectors onto the corresponding eigen-  
 477 subspaces<sup>10</sup>. The probability to obtain the concrete value  $a_i$  as the re-  
 478 sult of a measurement is given by the Born’s rule, formulated by Born  
 479 (1926).  $p_\rho(a_i) \equiv p_\rho(P_{a_i}) = \text{Tr} \rho P_{a_i}$ . In particular, if  $\rho_\psi$  is a pure state, then  
 480  $p_{\rho_\psi}(a_i) = \langle P_{a_i} \psi | \psi \rangle = \|P_{a_i} \psi\|^2$ .

481 The so called “Dirac’s notations” are widely used in quantum informa-  
 482 tion theory. Vectors of  $H$  (the Hilbert state space) are called *ket-vectors*, they  
 483 are denoted as  $|\psi\rangle$ . Let us restrict our consideration to the case of a finite  
 484 dimensional  $H$  and consider an observable  $A$ . As such, the normalized eigen-  
 485 vectors  $e_i$  of  $A$  form an orthonormal basis in  $H$ . Let  $Ae_i = a_i e_i$ . In Dirac’s  
 486 notation  $e_i$  is written as  $|a_i\rangle$  and, hence, any pure state can be written as  
 487  $|\psi\rangle = \sum_i c_i |a_i\rangle$ ,  $\sum_i |c_i|^2 = 1$ .

488 Qubit states are represented with the aid of some observables with nonde-  
 489 generate spectra having the eigenvalues 0, 1. Denote the corresponding eigen-  
 490 vectors as  $|i\rangle$ ,  $i = 0, 1$ . Then  $|\psi\rangle = c_0|0\rangle + c_1|1\rangle$ ,  $|c_0|^2 + |c_1|^2 = 1$ . Naturally,  
 491 each qubit space is two dimensional.

492 A pair of qubits is represented in the tensor product of single qubit spaces,  
 493 here pure states can be represented as superpositions of four eigenstates:

$$|\psi\rangle = c_{00}|00\rangle + c_{01}|01\rangle + c_{10}|10\rangle + c_{11}|11\rangle, \quad (2)$$

494 where  $\sum_{ij} |c_{ij}|^2 = 1$ . In the same way the  $n$ -qubit state is represented in  
 495 the tensor product of  $n$  one qubit state spaces (it has the dimension  $2^n$ ):  
 496  $|\psi\rangle = \sum_{x_j=0,1} c_{x_1 \dots x_n} |x_1 \dots x_n\rangle$ , where  $\sum_{x_j=0,1} |c_{x_1 \dots x_n}|^2 = 1$ . We remark that  
 497 the dimension of the  $n$  qubit state space grows exponentially with the growth  
 498 of  $n$ .

---

<sup>10</sup>In the finite dimensional case any Hermitian operator can be represented in this form.

499 Consider the tensor product  $H = H_1 \otimes H_2 \otimes \dots \otimes H_n$  of Hilbert spaces  
500  $H_k, k = 1, 2, \dots, n$ . The states of the space  $H$  can be *separable and non-*  
501 *separable*. Non-separable states would be the so called *entangled states*. Let  
502 us start with representing mathematically the non- separable and separable  
503 pure states. The states from the first class, i.e., separable pure states, can  
504 be represented in the form:

$$|\psi\rangle = \otimes_{k=1}^n |\psi_k\rangle = |\psi_1 \dots \psi_n\rangle, \quad (3)$$

505 where  $|\psi_k\rangle \in H_k$ . The states which cannot be represented in this way are  
506 called non-separable, entangled. Essentially, the mathematical representa-  
507 tion of entanglement is very simple, it means an impossibility of tensor prod-  
508 uct factorization.

509 For example, we consider the tensor product of two qubit spaces. In each  
510 of them we select an orthonormal basis, denoted as  $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$ . The corresponding  
511 orthonormal basis in the tensor product has the form  $|00\rangle, |01\rangle, |10\rangle, |11\rangle$ .  
512 Then so called Bell's states (Bell, 1987):

$$|\Phi^+\rangle = (|00\rangle + |11\rangle)/\sqrt{2}; \quad |\Phi^-\rangle = (|00\rangle - |11\rangle)/\sqrt{2}; \quad (4)$$

513

$$|\Psi^+\rangle = (|01\rangle + |10\rangle)/\sqrt{2}; \quad |\Psi^-\rangle = (|01\rangle - |10\rangle)/\sqrt{2} \quad (5)$$

514 are entangled.

515 Now consider a quantum state given by a density operator in  $H$ . This  
516 state is called separable, if it can be factorized in the product of density  
517 operators in spaces  $H_k$  :

$$\rho = \otimes_{k=1}^n \rho_k, \quad (6)$$

518 otherwise the state */rho* is called entangled. We remark that an interpreta-  
519 tion of entanglement for mixed states is even more intricate than for the  
520 pure states.

521 Although the notion of entanglement is mathematically straightforward,  
522 its physical interpretation is one of the main challenges of modern quantum  
523 foundations. In this paper we have no possibility to discuss the problem  
524 of interpretations of entanglement in quantum physics versus cognition and  
525 psychology. We proceed operationally and use entanglement as a mathemat-  
526 ical tool for representation of correlations in *a multi-contextual framework*,  
527 see, e.g., De Barros and Suppes (2009) for a foundational discussion.

## 528 **3 State space of the (non)coalition creation** 529 **model**

### 530 **3.1 One party preference state space**

531 On the political arena each party  $\mathcal{P}_j$  can either prefer to cooperate or not with  
532 other parties,  $\mathcal{P}_i, i \neq j$ . The preference space of  $\mathcal{P}_j$  for cooperation with the  
533 fixed party  $\mathcal{P}_i$  can be mathematically represented (by applying the notations  
534 of QM) as one qubit space  $H$  with the basis  $(|0\rangle, |1\rangle)$  encoding preferences  
535 for (non)cooperation. The dichotomous nature of the outcomes, in the form  
536 of yes/no stems from the requirements dictated by the election procedure in  
537 a multi-party political system. We remind that we treat the cooperation or  
538 non-cooperation in the setting of this model as a decision of some party to  
539 form (not to form) a coalition with some other party(ies). Clearly, a creation  
540 of a coalition does not guarantee that all policies of a party are supported by  
541 other members of the coalition. The process of establishing a coalition can  
542 be very fragile, i.e., if you give up some of your policies you lose the potential  
543 and existing voters as a party. We do not have a possibility to analyze the  
544 whole life cycle of the coalition, thus we treat the agreement (disagreement)  
545 of entering a coalition as a “final destination” of a party’s decision-making  
546 process.

547  
548 One of the main rationales for the quantum-like information description  
549 is that  $\mathcal{P}_j$ ’s preferences can be in the *superposition of non-cooperation and*  
550 *cooperation*. Such superpositions are naturally represented in the quantum  
551 formalism as:

$$|\psi\rangle = c_0|0\rangle + c_1|1\rangle, \quad (7)$$

552 where  $c_0$  and  $c_1$  are complex numbers,  $|c_0|^2 + |c_1|^2 = 1$ . Here  $|c_0|^2, |c_1|^2$  give the  
553 probabilities  $p_0, p_1$  that  $\mathcal{P}_j$  will make the decisions to (non)cooperate. We  
554 remark that complex numbers have not only amplitudes, but also phases,  
555  $c_k = |c_k|e^{i\theta_k}$ . In the quantum formalism the phases, more precisely the rela-  
556 tive phase  $\theta_2 - \theta_1$ , also play an important role. The presence of relative phases  
557 contribute nontrivially to the state dynamics, either the Schrödinger dynam-  
558 ics describing the evolution of the preference state of a party in the isolation  
559 from a “social environment” or the dynamics based on the quantum master  
560 equation taking into account interaction with a “social environment”. Here  
561 the situation differs crucially from say classical Markovian state dynamics  
562 which takes into account only the probabilities  $p_0, p_1$ .

563 For the fixed political party  $\mathcal{P}_j$ , the complete state space for preferences  
564 for (non)cooperation,  $H_j$  is represented (in accordance with quantum infor-



565 mation theory) as the tensor product state space corresponding to preferences  
 566 for other political parties  $\mathcal{P}_i, i \neq j$ . By denoting the latter as  $H_{ji}$  we write

$$H_j = H_{j1} \otimes \dots \otimes H_{j(j-1)} \otimes H_{j(j+1)} \otimes \dots \otimes H_{jn}. \quad (8)$$

567 The dimension of this space is equal to  $d = 2^{n-1}$ . Here  $n$  is the total number  
 568 of political parties under consideration.

569 Such a state space, i.e., reflecting only the preferences of one fixed political  
 570 party for other parties, represents another purely quantum information effect,  
 571 namely, *entanglement*: entanglement of the (non)cooperation preferences of  
 572  $\mathcal{P}_j$  for other parties. The states of the space  $H_{ji}$  can be *separable and non-*  
 573 *separable* (entangled).

574 From the interpretational viewpoint, the notion of entanglement is one  
 575 of the most complicated notions of QM. One of the features of entanglement  
 576 (in the framework of our modeling) is that the party  $\mathcal{P}_j$  cannot treat its  
 577 preferences for (non)cooperation with the parties  $\mathcal{P}_i, i \neq j$ , separately. The  
 578 party  $\mathcal{P}_j$  cannot split its preference state  $|\psi\rangle \in H_j$  into the preference states  
 579 related to individual  $\mathcal{P}_i$ . To proceed to a decision on (non)cooperation with  
 580 the fixed  $\mathcal{P}_i$ ,  $\mathcal{P}_j$  takes into account its possibilities of (non)cooperation with  
 581 all  $\mathcal{P}_k, k \neq j, i$ .

582 The presence of entanglement (non-separability effect) is even stronger in  
 583 the multi-parties preference state space, see section 3.2.

584 Finally, we remark that even separable preference states carry an essential  
 585 degree of quantumness, related to the superposition effect. Suppose that each  
 586 qubit state  $|\psi_i\rangle$  in (7) is superposition of the preferences for non-cooperation  
 587 and cooperation, see (7). Then this state has the form of superposition

$$|\psi\rangle = \sum_X c_X |X\rangle, \quad (9)$$

588 where  $|X\rangle = |x_1 \dots x_{j-1} x_{j+1} \dots x_n\rangle, x_j = 0, 1$  and  $\sum_X |c_X|^2 = 1$ , the numbers  
 589  $|c_X|^2$  give the probabilities  $p_X$  of  $\mathcal{P}_j$ 's decisions on (non)-cooperation with  
 590 other parties. An arbitrary (pure) state  $|\psi\rangle$  of preferences of the political  
 591 party  $\mathcal{P}_j$  for (non)cooperation with the political parties  $\mathcal{P}_i, i \neq j$ , can be rep-  
 592 resented in the form (9). This superposition state also encodes the quantum  
 593 interference effect.

### 594 3.2 Multi-parties preference state space

595 In the light of the previous considerations, we can say that the preferences of  
 596 each party  $\mathcal{P}_j$  for (non)cooperation with other parties can be mathematically  
 597 represented by the tensor product of one qubit state spaces, corresponding to

598 the party's the preferences for (non)cooperation with other individual parties.  
 599 This space was previously denoted as  $H_j$ . The real coalition formation per-  
 600 spective involves the preferences of all parties for each other. The complete  
 601 preference state space for all parties involved, is mathematically represented  
 602 as the tensor product  $H = \otimes_j H_j$ . In the qubit representation its vectors have  
 603 the form:

$$|\Psi\rangle = \sum_{\mathcal{X}} C_{\mathcal{X}} |\mathcal{X}\rangle, \quad (10)$$

604 where  $\mathcal{X} = X_1 \dots X_n$ ,  $X_j = x_1 \dots x_{j-1} x_{j+1} \dots x_n$ ,  $x_j = 0, 1$  and  $\sum_{\mathcal{X}} |C_{\mathcal{X}}|^2 = 1$ .

605 The dimension of this space is equal to  $D_n = 2^{n(n-1)}$ . We remark that  
 606  $D_n$  increases considerably with the increase of the number of parties on the  
 607 political arena. The appearance of one additional party (of the size and  
 608 political influence, such that this party is taken into account by other par-  
 609 ties) increases essentially the dimension of the state space and hence, the  
 610 complexity of the process of decision making. For example,  $D_2 = 4$ , but al-  
 611 ready  $D_3 = 64$ , and the appearance of the fourth party would lead to a state  
 612 space of a very large dimension,  $D_4 = 4096$  (correspondingly, the emergence  
 613 of a fifth party on the political arena, implies a drastic complication of the  
 614 political situation,  $D_5 = 1048576$ ). In the political reality, the state space  
 615 is a proper subspace of  $H$ , because some types of cooperation would be in  
 616 principle impossible.

617 Coming back to the example of coalition creation at the Swedish political  
 618 arena, theoretically, the left parties, such as the Left-party (Vänster partiet)  
 619 and the Social-Democratic party cannot reach to a decision of cooperation  
 620 with the nationalist party- the Swedish democrats and vice versa. This con-  
 621 strain reduces eightfold the dimension of the state space. Further, the two  
 622 leftist parties are typically cooperating with each other on the Swedish polit-  
 623 ical arena. In principle, they can be treated as a single party - the state space  
 624 dimension shrinks by a factor 4. Effectively, simply as the result of the princi-  
 625 ple of disagreement between the leftist and nationalist parties, the dimension  
 626 is reduced by a factor 32. In the case of the existence of five major parties  
 627 this leads to the state space of the dimension  $D'_5 = 32768 \ll D_5 = 1048576$ .  
 628 There can be other political constraints minimizing the state space dimen-  
 629 sion<sup>11</sup>. Nevertheless, even with all these constraints, due to the elevated

---

<sup>11</sup>The Swedish Green Party (Miljöpartiet) cooperates actively with the Social-Democratic party, but, for many questions, its cooperation with the Left-party is impossible; at the same time the Social-Democratic party demonstrates (that is relatively new party to be parliamentary represented) the wish to cooperate with both, the Swedish Green Party and the Left-party. The Swedish Moderate Party (Moderaterna) can in principle cooperate with the Swedish Democrats, but the cooperation with the Left Party is completely excluded. See Widfeldt (2014) for a detailed discussion. Thus, even the

630 dimension of the state space, the task of modeling of the process of ap-  
 631 proaching a consensus between parties (even if they are few of them ) can  
 632 become a complex multi-dimensional mathematical problem.

633 In the preference space  $H$  we again obtain both quantum effects, namely,  
 634 superposition and entanglement. As a result of entanglement, the political  
 635 parties in a sense “lose their individual control over decisions on (non)cooperation  
 636 with other parties.” The decisions of each political party  $\mathcal{P}_j$  are irreducibly  
 637 connected with the possible decisions of other parties.

638 Mathematically, a preference state is separable if it can be represented in  
 639 the form:

$$|\Psi\rangle = \otimes_{j=1}^n |\Psi_j\rangle = |\Psi_1 \dots \Psi_n\rangle, \quad (11)$$

640 where  $\Psi_j \in H_j$ . An entangled state cannot be represented in this way.

641 For  $n \geq 3$ , there exists an another kind of entanglement- the multi-  
 642 partite entanglement, that has new features, absent in the case of bipartite  
 643 entanglement. Its interpretation is even a more complicated task than of the  
 644 bipartite entanglement.

## 645 4 Decision making and state’s dynamics

646 Following the tradition of quantum-like modeling of the dynamical processes  
 647 of decision making, c.f. Busemeyer et al. (2006), Asano et al. (2011), Asano  
 648 et al. (2012), Busemeyer and Bruza (2012), Bagarello (2012), Haven and  
 649 Khrennikov (2013), Pothos and Busemeyer (2013), Khrennikova et al. (2014),  
 650 Bagarello (2015a), Bagarello (2015b) and Khrennikova & Haven (2016) we  
 651 represent the process of establishing of cooperation between political parties  
 652 as a quantum state dynamics. The simplest quantum state evolution is de-  
 653 scribed by the Schrödinger’s equation. It models an evolution of the state  
 654 of a quantum system, which can be treated (at least with some degree of  
 655 approximation) as isolated from the outer informational surrounding. If the  
 656 influence of the environment cannot be neglected, then the state evolution is  
 657 modeled by the quantum master equation. The latter is typically very com-  
 658 plicated, this is why its (quantum) Markovian approximation is very popular  
 659 in many applications.

---

political arena of such a small country as Sweden is characterized by a high complexity of constraints on the information state space. There are of course different factors that can always shift these constrains, for instance, in a situation when totally opposite parties in terms of their policy and ideology come to a cooperation agreement. These types of coalitions can emerge as a result of a strong mutual aspiration for power and the particular timing of coalition formation. Further examples can be found in section 5.

660 We point out that decision-making models based on Schrödinger’s equa-  
 661 tion and the quantum master equation (which describes the nontrivial influ-  
 662 ence of an environment) differ substantially.

## 663 4.1 Decision making process by Schrödinger’s equa- 664 tion

665 We start with a brief mathematical remark to delineate the core features of  
 666 such a construct of a system’s quantum dynamics. Solutions of Schrödinger’s  
 667 equation different from stationary ones are represented as linear combinations  
 668 of imaginary exponents (combinations of sines and cosines). Such linear com-  
 669 binations fluctuate as functions of time and no limit exists for  $t \rightarrow \infty$ . They  
 670 cannot approach a concrete state with the time increasing, i.e.,  $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \psi(t)$   
 671 does not exist.

672 Therefore, in applications to the dynamics of cognitive systems, to make a  
 673 decision, decision makers in the process of coalition creation, e.g., the leaders  
 674 of a political party, would have to intervene into the dynamics of the state  
 675 in an “authoritarian way” leading to a type of “collapse of the state”. It  
 676 is important to discern that such a collapse would be produced by a deci-  
 677 sion of any political party, if their preference states are entangled with the  
 678 preference state of other parties. Decisions of such a type can of course be  
 679 possible and even quite common for parties with very strong leaders or in-  
 680 ternal party spirit. In such a context, decisions (related to establishing a  
 681 coalition with other parties) would be made in isolation, without the adjust-  
 682 ment to the aspirations of the electorate, as well as of the society in whole -  
 683 the so called “common social environment”.

684 Besides of the fluctuating behaviour of the solutions, another problem-  
 685 atic feature of Schrödinger’s dynamics for preference states is that, as was  
 686 already pointed out, it preserves the stationary states of Hamiltonians for-  
 687 ever. Suppose that there are two parties  $\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2$ , then each state space is just  
 688 a qubit space, i.e.,  $H = H_1 \otimes H_2$  is the four dimensional state space. If the  
 689 joint Hamiltonian of the pair of parties  $\mathcal{H}$  has, e.g., the state  $\Psi_0 = |00\rangle$  as  
 690 an eigenstate, i.e.,  $\mathcal{H}\Psi_0 = \lambda_0\Psi_0$ , then the preference state  $\Psi(t)$  will have the  
 691 form  $\Psi(t) = e^{-it\lambda_0/\gamma}\Psi_0$ , where  $\gamma$  is a factor determining the time scale of the  
 692 dynamics (if the  $\mathcal{H}$  is chosen as a dimensionless quantity). As a consequence,  
 693 this kind of dynamics in principle cannot lead to establishing a cooperation  
 694 between these two political parties, i.e., to the state  $\Psi = |11\rangle$ .

695 **Remark 1.** (Interpreting Hamiltonian) In QM  $\mathcal{H}$  has the dimension of  
 696 energy and here  $\gamma = \hbar$  is the reduced Planck constant  $\hbar = h/2\pi$ . It has the  
 697 dimension of action= energy×time. One may search to proceed in the same

698 way by inventing a notion of “political energy” (or “social energy”) which is  
 699 heuristically quite natural. However, in such an approach, the main challenge  
 700 is the development of a measurement methodology for such kind of “mental  
 701 energy.” This is a complicated problem that would require further analysis  
 702 of empirical data and we postpone a discussion on it to future publications.  
 703 In this paper we proceed operationally, by devising the overall structure of  
 704 the quantum dynamics applied to party’s decision making. At this stage we  
 705 are preliminarily considering some possible components that could consti-  
 706 tute the social analogue of the Hamiltonian operator. Due to the novelty  
 707 of the application of quantum-like models to political science and decision  
 708 processes, the Hamiltonian is treated in the developed model merely as the  
 709 generator of a state dynamics. It is palpable that a mental state (individual  
 710 or collective) can evolve over time. In the quantum-like model states (pure)  
 711 are represented in the complex linear space and the dynamics is also assumed  
 712 to be linear. In the case of an isolated cognitive (or social, or political) sys-  
 713 tem the state-evolution is described as unitary dynamics. Hamiltonian is the  
 714 generator of this unitary dynamics. Thus, in our setting the Hamiltonian  
 715 is in a sense a phenomenological entity. Nevertheless, the question of con-  
 716 struction of a concrete Hamiltonians has to be addressed. In physics there  
 717 are two basic procedures of constructing Hamiltonians. The most known  
 718 and widely used is the one based on the Schrödinger quantization procedure.  
 719 One borrows from the classical physics (presented in the Hamiltonian formal-  
 720 ism) the Hamiltonian function combined from kinetic and potential energies,  
 721  $\mathcal{H}(q, p) = \frac{p^2}{2m} + V(x)$ , and then quantizes it by utilizing instead of classical  
 722 coordinate and momentum variables,  $x, p$ , the corresponding quantum oper-  
 723 ators, obtained by the rules postulated by Schrödinger:  $x$  is mapped into the  
 724 operator of multiplication by  $x$  and  $p$  is mapped into operator proportional  
 725 to the derivative. We recall that the state space of the Schrödinger repre-  
 726 sentation is given by the space  $H = L_2(\mathbf{R}^3)$  of square integrable functions.  
 727 Unfortunately, this approach is problematic, if possible at all, to generalize  
 728 to the applications in cognition and decision-making in social and political  
 729 studies. We do not have a classical Hamiltonian theory of social phenomena.  
 730 Roughly speaking, there is nothing to quantize. However, there is another  
 731 way to obtain Hamiltonians, which is more promising for our applications. In  
 732 quantum field theory, Hamiltonians are often constructed in the Fock space,  
 733 with the aid of operators of creation and annihilation of quanta (excitations  
 734 of a quantum field). Processes of creation and annihilation are meaningful  
 735 not only for quanta of physical fields, but even for quanta of information  
 736 fields having, e.g., mental, or social, or political interpretation. As the start-  
 737 ing point, one can introduce operators of creation and annihilation  $a$  and  $a^*$ ,

738 an introduction can be found in e.g. Miller (2008).

739 We now come back to the unitary evolution of the state of political pref-  
740 erences. The important case of such conservation of the initial preference is  
741 the case of the absence of the direct interaction between the parties  $\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2$ .  
742 This situation is described by the Hamiltonian of the form:

$$\mathcal{H}_0 = \mathcal{H}_{01} \otimes I + I \otimes \mathcal{H}_{02}, \quad (12)$$

743 where  $\mathcal{H}_{0j} : H_j \rightarrow H_j, j = 1, 2$ , are Hamiltonians generating the preference  
744 dynamics of parties, which do not try to negotiate or send other signals  
745 to each other in favour or against a political cooperation. For example,  
746 the leaders of  $\mathcal{P}_1$  can have a meeting to discuss their own preferences to  
747 non/cooperate with  $\mathcal{P}_2$  (this sort of decision- making activity contributes to  
748  $\mathcal{H}_{01}$ ). Of course, we understand well that this would be an idealization of the  
749 real political situation. On a real political arena, the process of “signaling”  
750 between parties and electorates cannot be ignored in principle. However,  
751 even in physics the notion of an isolated system is an idealization of the real  
752 physical situation, since the vacuum is as well contributing into the system’s  
753 dynamics. Nevertheless, such a separation of internally and externally gener-  
754 ated dynamics is a useful approach that can be used both in physics and  
755 for social phenomena.

756 These free Hamiltonians can be defined with the aid of “number opera-  
757 tors:”

$$N_j|i\rangle = i|i\rangle, i = 0, 1. \quad (13)$$

758 In the matrix form we have

$$N_j = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (14)$$

759 Then  $\mathcal{H}_{0j} = \omega_j N_j$ , where the parameters  $\omega_j$  determine the frequencies of  
760 oscillations.

761 We can observe that a combination of such non-interactive dynamics with  
762 the impact of a social environment can transfer the non-cooperation state  
763  $\Psi_0 = |00\rangle$  into the cooperation-state  $\Psi = |11\rangle$ . Roughly speaking, even if  
764 parties do not interact directly, the social environment, in particular, their  
765 own electorate may turn parties’ preferences to cooperation, formalized in a  
766 joint coalition preference.

767 **Remark 2.** (Determination of the initial state) In QM to reconstruct a  
768 state, it suffices to know its coefficients in a proper basis. The absolute val-  
769 ues of coefficients are given by probabilities (more specifically, by their square  
770 roots). The problem of the phase determination is more complex. In general,

771 one has to use the powerful machinery of the quantum tomography. However,  
772 in the simplest case of a qubit-state, i.e., in the case of the two dimensional  
773 state space, the phase can be easily determined by using probabilities for  
774 measurements of two complementary observables. In decision-making such  
775 observables are given by two complementary questions, i.e., questions which  
776 exhibit non-commutative effects. Such effects have been well researched in  
777 cognitive psychology (the so called “order effects”). Busemeyer et al. (2006),  
778 Wang&Busemeyer (2013) and Khrennikova(2014b) actively explore these ef-  
779 fects and search to model such questions-observables in a quantum frame-  
780 work, with the aid of experimental data from different decision making con-  
781 texts. Khrennikova (2014a) performs a so called state reconstruction with  
782 the aid of obtained statistics, to examine the applicability of Born’s Rule  
783 for psychological data. It should be noted that a real experimental realiza-  
784 tion of studies on political non/cooperation and more specifically coalition  
785 formation (in the form of opinion polls) can be considered as a non-trivial  
786 problem.

## 787 4.2 Markovian quantum master equation in decision 788 making

789 One of the main distinguishing features of solutions of the Markovian quan-  
790 tum master equation is that here a non-stationary solution  $\rho(t)$  can stabilize  
791 to a stationary solution  $\rho_d$  representing the collective decision of all parties on  
792 (non)cooperation. Opposite to Schrödinger’s equation, the quantum master  
793 equation can transform pure states into mixed states. This is a dynamical  
794 equation in the space of density operators. Therefore the limiting strategy  
795 determining the decision on cooperation can be a mixed state even if the  
796 initial joint state of parties’ preferences was a pure state. Thus in general it  
797 determines only the probabilities of various pure strategies. For example, if  
798 there are two parties  $\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2$  then each state space is just qubit space. If, e.g.,

$$\rho_d = P|00\rangle\langle 00| + Q|11\rangle\langle 11|, P + Q = 1, P, Q \geq 0, \quad (15)$$

799 then the probability that both parties will prefer non-cooperation (coopera-  
800 tion) equals to  $P$  (to  $Q$ ). If, e.g.,

$$\rho_d = P|01\rangle\langle 01| + Q|10\rangle\langle 10|, P + Q = 1, P, Q \geq 0, \quad (16)$$

801 then the probability that  $\mathcal{P}_1$  ( $\mathcal{P}_2$ ) will prefer non-cooperation and  $\mathcal{P}_2$  ( $\mathcal{P}_1$ ) will  
802 prefer cooperation equals to  $P$  (to  $Q$ ). We remark that the decision-states,  
803 e.g., (15), (16) are in some sense classical states. Superposition indeterminacy

804 which can be present in the initial state, say

$$\rho_0 = |\Phi^+\rangle\langle\Phi^+| = \frac{1}{2}[|00\rangle\langle 00| + |00\rangle\langle 11| + |11\rangle\langle 00| + |11\rangle\langle 11|], \quad (17)$$

805 OR

$$\rho_0 = |\Psi^+\rangle\langle\Psi^+| = \frac{1}{2}[|01\rangle\langle 01| + |01\rangle\langle 10| + |10\rangle\langle 01| + |10\rangle\langle 10|] \quad (18)$$

806 disappears in the process of approaching the stationary state (here the Bell  
 807 states  $|\Phi^+\rangle, |\Psi^+\rangle$  were defined in (4), (5)). This is the most typical scenarios  
 808 of the evolution driven by quantum Markov master equation. However, for  
 809 some classes of equations the decision state  $\rho_d$  can be a pure state as well,  
 810 e.g.,  $\rho_d = |00\rangle\langle 00|$  (the definite non-cooperation preference of both parties) or  
 811  $\rho_d = |11\rangle\langle 11|$  (the definite cooperation preference of both parties). Moreover,  
 812 the limiting stationary states can have non-zero off-diagonal elements. In  
 813 such a case the quantum(-like) indeterminacy is not resolved completely, see  
 814 section 4.3 for examples.

815 In the general case of  $n$  parties the social environment contributing to  
 816 parties' preference dynamics can be split, into three sub-environments, in a  
 817 similar way as performed in Bagarello (2015b):  $\mathcal{R}_j, j = 1, \dots, n$ , represents  
 818 the preferences of the stable part of the electorate of the party  $\mathcal{P}_j$ ;  $\mathcal{R}$  rep-  
 819 represents the preferences of the “unstable electorate”, people who either have  
 820 no definite political preferences or even having some preferences can easily  
 821 change them. It is natural that  $\mathcal{R}_j$  acts only onto the preferences of  $\mathcal{P}_j$ , i.e.,  
 822 it is represented by a dynamical generator  $R_j$  in the state space  $H_j$ . The  
 823 preferences of the unstable electorate  $\mathcal{R}$  have to be taken into account by all  
 824 political parties; in general these preferences are represented by a dynamical  
 825 generator  $R$  acting in the state space  $H$ .

826 The important special case is that the operator of unstable electorate  $\mathcal{R}$   
 827 acts separately, but in the same way, to the preference state of each party.  
 828 Here we can invent an operator, say  $S$ , acting in the  $2^{(n-1)}$  dimensional  
 829 Hilbert space (all  $H_j$  are isomorphic to it). Then the impact of the social  
 830 environment to the preference state of  $\mathcal{P}_j$  is generated by the sum of operators  
 831  $R_j + S$ . One can say that, although the political parties do not try to negotiate  
 832 directly, they preferences are inter-related through the impact of the unstable  
 833 electorate.

834 We now write the Markovian approximation of the quantum master equa-  
 835 tion as expounded in Ohya and Volovich (2011):

$$\frac{d\rho}{dt}(t) = -\frac{i}{\gamma}[\mathcal{H}, \rho(t)] + L(\rho(t)), \quad (19)$$



836 where  $\mathcal{H}$  is a Hermitian operator acting in  $H$  and  $L$  is a linear operator act-  
837 ing in the space of linear operators  $B(H)$  in  $H$  (such maps are often called  
838 super-operators). Typically, the operator  $\mathcal{H}$  represents the state dynamics in  
839 the absence of environment. However, in general  $\mathcal{H}$  can also contain contri-  
840 bution of the impact of the environment. The super-operator  $L$  has to map  
841 density operators into density operators, i.e., it has to preserve Hermiticity,  
842 positive definiteness, and the trace. These conditions constraint essentially  
843 the class of possible generators  $L$ . By adding some additional condition the  
844 so called complete positive definiteness, we obtain the possibility to describe  
845 the class of generators precisely (see the book by Ohya and Volovich (2011)  
846 for technical details.) They have the form:

$$L\rho = \sum_k \alpha_k [C_k \rho C_k^* - (C_k^* C_k \rho + \rho C_k^* C_k)/2] = \sum_k \alpha_k [C_k \rho C_k^* - \frac{1}{2} \{C_k^* C_k, \rho\}], \quad (20)$$

847 where the symbol  $C^*$  is used to denote the adjoint operator of  $C$ . Hence, the  
848 operators  $R_j$  are of the form (20), where the operators  $C_k$  acts in the  $(n-1)$ -  
849 qubit space, and the operator  $R$  is also of this form with the operators  $C_k$   
850 acting in the  $n(n-1)$ -qubit space. Operators  $C_k$  encode the special features  
851 of a social environment.

### 852 4.3 Numerical simulation

853 In the case when only two parties are dominating a political arena, the pref-  
854 erence dynamics is represented in a four dimensional Hilbert space. The  
855 density matrix has 16 elements and besides the problem of numerical sim-  
856 ulation, the more technical problem of visualization arises. At this stage,  
857 we search to make the present pilot modeling of the political preference dy-  
858 namics with the aid of the quantum Markov equation not too complex. For  
859 illustrative purpose, we proceed as in Khrennikova et al. (2014), by reducing  
860 the dimension of the state space to two.

861 In other words, we consider the two dimensional sub-model of the gen-  
862 eral four dimensional model presented earlier, corresponding to the political  
863 context, in which two parties can either both agree to cooperate or non-  
864 cooperate in respect to a coalition formation. We reduce the modeling task  
865 to the subspace with the basis  $e_1 = |00\rangle, e_2 = |11\rangle$ . It is assumed that at the  
866 beginning (i.e., before interaction with the “electorate environment”) the two  
867 parties were in superposition of the basic states:

$$|\psi\rangle = c_1|00\rangle + c_2|11\rangle, \quad |c_1|^2 + |c_2|^2 = 1. \quad (21)$$

868 We also assume that in the absence of interaction with the “electorate bath”

869 the state of preferences fluctuates driven by the Schrödinger's dynamics with  
 870 the Hamiltonian

$$\mathcal{H} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \lambda \\ \lambda & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad (22)$$

871 where  $\lambda > 0$  is the parameter describing the intensity of flipping from  $|00\rangle$  to  
 872  $|11\rangle$  and vice versa. The simplest perturbation of such Schrödinger equation  
 873 is given by the Lindblad term of the form:  $C\rho C^* - (C^*C\rho + \rho C^*C)/2 =$   
 874  $C\rho C^* - \frac{1}{2}\{C^*C, \rho\}$ . We select the operator  $C$  by using its matrix in the  
 875 basis  $e_1, e_2$ :  $C = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \lambda \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$ , hence,  $C^* = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ \lambda & 0 \end{pmatrix}$ , where the parameter  
 876  $\lambda$  which is responsible for the interaction between preferences of the two  
 877 political parties and the electorate is selected the same as in the Hamiltonian  
 878 (22), just for simplicity of illustration.

879 We comment briefly on the choice of the operator  $C$ . This operator com-  
 880 bines the preferences of the two parties. Hence, it represents the unstable  
 881 part of the electorate, which demands are contributing to the decisions of  
 882 both parties. In this model, for simplicity, we did not take into account the  
 883 “separate electorates” of these parties.

884 Thus, we proceed with the quantum master equation:

$$\frac{d\rho}{dt}(t) = -i[\mathcal{H}, \rho(t)] + C\rho(t)C^* - \frac{1}{2}\{C^*C, \rho(t)\}. \quad (23)$$

885 We present dynamics corresponding to symmetric superposition,

$$c_1 = c_2 = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}, \quad (24)$$

886 see Fig. 1, and to a strongly asymmetric superposition

$$c_1 = \sqrt{0.9}, c_2 = \sqrt{0.1}, \quad (25)$$

887 see Fig. 2.

888 In this dynamics of parties' preferences for establishing or not-establishing  
 889 a particular political coalition (formally, entering a coalition agreement), the  
 890 interaction with the “unstable electorate environment” plays a pivotal role.  
 891 Strong oscillations of the state dynamics that persist in the absence of an in-  
 892 teraction with the “electorate bath”, are speedily damped under the influence  
 893 of “electorate bath” and the matrix elements  $\rho_{11} \equiv \rho_{00,00}$ ,  $\rho_{22} \equiv \rho_{11,11}$ ,  $\rho_{12} \equiv$   
 894  $\rho_{00,11}$ , and  $\bar{\rho}_{12} = \rho_{21} \equiv \rho_{11,00}$  stabilize to some definite values. This entails  
 895 that the preferences of the parties, which were in a fluctuating superposition  
 896 of choices stabilize under the impact of the “electorate bath.”




Figure 1: Stabilization of the matrix elements of the density operator; the initial state is symmetric superposition of state  $|00\rangle$  and  $|11\rangle$ .




Figure 2: Stabilization of the matrix elements of the density operator; the initial state is strongly asymmetric superposition of states  $|00\rangle$  and  $|11\rangle$ .

897 In the  $\rho_{\text{lim}}$  the elements  $\rho_{00,00} \approx 0.6, \rho_{11,11} \approx 0.4$  determine the corre-  
898 sponding probabilities for the particular choices of the parties, e.g.  $p(00) \approx$   
899  $0.6, p(11) = 0.4$ . on the Fig.4.3. For illustrative purposes, we selected an in-  
900 teraction of political parties with the electorate bath, such that both initial  
901 states, (24) and (25), generate the same limiting distribution of preferences  
902 (in fact, this state can be generated from any initial state). Under the pres-  
903 sure of the social environment, the parties started with a superposition (24)  
904 increase the 00-preference and the parties that started with a superposition  
905 (25) decrease this preference. The resulting distribution of choices is the  
906 same for both political contexts (with the initial state (24) and with the  
907 initial state (25)).

908 The results presented in this section were obtained with the aid of a nu-  
909 merical simulation by using the standard package of “Matematica” software.

## 910 5 Concluding remarks

911 This paper extends the methods of quantum cognitive psychology and decision-  
912 making to the field of political science. The presented model takes into  
913 account the preferences and aspirations of the political parties, their mem-  
914 bers and their electorate. The author hopes that this contribution will fur-  
915 ther strengthen the area of research related to interdisciplinary applications  
916 of models borrowed quantum formalism and information theory to decision  
917 making processes on the political arena.

918 On the real political arena the state of preferences of a group of political  
919 parties is a cocktail of power seeking, policy seeking as well as additional eco-  
920 nomic and financial factors, non-separably coupled to their decision-making  
921 outcomes. In this note, following the methodological approach elaborated in  
922 Zorn and Smith (2011), quantum information entanglement is used, to rep-  
923 resent the non-separability of all aforementioned factors and their intrinsic  
924 multi-parties coupling.

925 In line with the models used by Asano et al. (2011) and Asano et al.  
926 (2012), we adopted the open quantum system theory, to model the process  
927 of establishing the so called political behavioral equilibrium, the final deci-  
928 sion state of (non)cooperation. In this equilibrium state, the parties either  
929 firmly decide to establish a political coalition, or continue to pursue a political  
930 opposition. In the setting of this exposition, the electorate bath, surrounding  
931 the party, plays a pivotal role. An important cluster, constituting the elec-  
932 torate bath, is the so called unstable part of the electorate. These undecided  
933 voters can be categorised by an absence of a definite political ideology and  
934 hence, make their decisions “irrationally” from the viewpoint of the neoclas-

935 sical economics theories. Nevertheless, the support of this group of voters  
936 can play an imperative role with far-reaching ramifications for the goals and  
937 actions of political parties.

938 One of the main findings of the introduced theory of open quantum sys-  
939 tems, is that the obtained equilibrium state exists for a wide class of quantum  
940 Markov dynamics. At the same time, when applying the presented model,  
941 one should bear in mind that as always is the case in quantum theory, this  
942 equilibrium is of a stochastic nature. As such, the quantum approach is  
943 not functioning as a deterministic model, for predicting a particular deci-  
944 sion outcome. Another important characteristic of the model is related to  
945 the possibility to describe a class of quantum Markov dynamics, where the  
946 final decision state does not depend on the state of initial preferences, see  
947 section 4.3 for some concrete examples. At the first sight, this feature of  
948 the proposed dynamical model might be considered as unrealistic. One may  
949 doubt that such a class of dynamical systems, capturing a dramatic departure  
950 from the initial decision-making states of the parties to their final actions,  
951 would correspond to the real world process of political coalition formation.  
952 Surprisingly, on the real political arena in many countries, one can find nu-  
953 merous examples of (non)cooperation decisions that match well with class of  
954 decision-making dynamics. We highlighted briefly some cases of grand coalitions,  
955 discussed in mass-media (BBC News 2010; BBC News, 2013; Spiegel  
956 Online International, 2013; Financial Times, 2012). Coalitions between ide-  
957 ologically distant parties also periodically occurred in European politics. A  
958 notable example is the sudden coalition between the opposition parties Fine  
959 Gael and Labour in Ireland covered in The Guardian (2011), as well as more  
960 recently, the coalition between Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives in  
961 the UK (BBC, 2010) and finally, a very recent case of a Right Wing party  
962 joining Syriza in Greece discussed in the Wall Street Journal (2015). This list  
963 could be extended with other examples, including the cases of ideologically  
964 connected parties that did not manage to establish a coalition agreement.

965 In this work we were primarily interested in a class of quantum dynamical  
966 systems, producing a unique steady state, independent of the initial condi-  
967 tions. In general, a quantum dynamical system can have a manifold of steady  
968 states, corresponding to different initial conditions.

969 Future studies on the dynamics of coalitions and alliances between politi-  
970 cal parties will be based on a more extensive analysis of coalition (non)formation  
971 cases, in order to establish the concrete parameters for the devised dynam-  
972 ical operators. The cases of “Grand Coalitions” and other exotic coalitions  
973 would benefit from further studies, to refine the proposed model. At last,  
974 the choice to form a coalition is not the end of the story. The “collapse”  
975 of the coalitions, including the success or failure of post-coalition members

976 would benefit from a more in-depth exploration, to capture this process by  
977 a suitable dynamical model.

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