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Obligation: A Legal-Theoretical Perspective

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posted on 10.09.2015, 09:42 by Stefano Bertea
In this study, I intend to contribute to a better understanding of what kind of thing an obligation is and what its defining features are. Central to the conception I will put forward is the idea of obligation as having two essential aspects: one of these lies in the internal connection of obligation with moral practical reasons and is accordingly rational and moral; the other one instead lies in the conceptual link between obligation and requiredness, or mandatory force. In combination these two aspects, which interlock to form what I would call the duality of obligation, frame obligation as a rational and morally justifiable categorical requirement.

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Citation

Bertea, S, Obligation: A Legal-Theoretical Perspective, in 'Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following' ed. Araszkiewicz M; Banaś P; Gizbert-Studnicki T; Płeszka K, Springer, 2015

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF ARTS, HUMANITIES AND LAW/School of Law

Version

AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

Bertea

Publisher

Springer

issn

1572-4395

isbn

978-3-319-09375-8

Copyright date

2015

Publisher version

http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-09375-8_11

Notes

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Language

en

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