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Computational complexity of traffic hijacking under BGP and S-BGP

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conference contribution
posted on 12.02.2015, 15:21 by M. Chiesa, G. Di Battista, M. Patrignani, Thomas Erlebach
Harmful Internet hijacking incidents put in evidence how fragile the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is, which is used to exchange routing information between Autonomous Systems (ASes). As proved by recent research contributions, even S-BGP, the secure variant of BGP that is being deployed, is not fully able to blunt traffic attraction attacks. Given a traffic flow between two ASes, we study how difficult it is for a malicious AS to devise a strategy for hijacking or intercepting that flow. We show that this problem marks a sharp difference between BGP and S-BGP. Namely, while it is solvable, under reasonable assumptions, in polynomial time for the type of attacks that are usually performed in BGP, it is NP-hard for S-BGP. Our study has several by-products. E.g., we solve a problem left open in the literature, stating when performing a hijacking in S-BGP is equivalent to performing an interception.

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Citation

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2012, 7392 LNCS (PART 2), pp. 476-487

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING/Department of Computer Science

Source

39th International Colloquium, ICALP 2012, Warwick, UK, July 9-13, 2012

Version

AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Publisher

Springer Berlin Heidelberg

issn

0302-9743

eissn

1611-3349

isbn

978-3-642-31584-8;978-3-642-31585-5

Copyright date

2012

Available date

12/02/2015

Publisher version

http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_43

Language

en

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