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Further Results on Capacitated Network Design Games

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conference contribution
posted on 22.07.2015, 16:29 by Thomas Erlebach, Matthew Radoja
In a capacitated network design game, each of n players selects a path from her source to her sink. The cost of each edge is shared equally among the players using the edge. Every edge has a finite capacity that limits the number of players using the edge. We study the price of stability for such games with respect to the max-cost objective, i.e., the maximum cost paid by any player. We show that the price of stability is O(n) for symmetric games, and this bound is tight. Furthermore, we show that the price of stability for asymmetric games can be Ω(n log n), matching the previously known upper bound. We also prove that the convergence time of best response dynamics cannot be bounded by any function of n.

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Citation

Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2015), Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9347, pp. 57–68, 2015

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING/Department of Computer Science

Source

SAGT 2015, Saarbrücken

Version

AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2015)

Publisher

Springer

issn

0302-9743

isbn

978-3-662-48432-6;978-3-662-48433-3

Acceptance date

01/07/2015

Copyright date

1007

Available date

29/09/2016

Publisher version

http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_5

Editors

Hoefer, M.

Temporal coverage: start date

28/09/2015

Temporal coverage: end date

30/09/2015

Language

en

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