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A theory of esteem based peer pressure

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journal contribution
posted on 29.04.2019, 10:58 by Fabrizio Adriani, Silvia Sonderegger
How does the incentive to engage in social signaling depend on the composition of peers? We find that an increase in the mean peer quality may either strengthen signaling incentives (keeping up with the Joneses) or weaken them (small fish in a big pond). Both right and left truncations of the distribution of peer quality reduce signaling incentives, while more dispersed peer distributions strengthen them. Finally, more right skewed peer distributions strengthen signaling incentives when only a small fraction of the group engage in signaling, but weaken them when signaling is widespread.

History

Citation

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, 115, pp. 314-335

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/School of Business

Version

AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

Games and Economic Behavior

Publisher

Elsevier

issn

0899-8256

Acceptance date

22/03/2019

Copyright date

2019

Publisher version

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825619300454?via=ihub

Notes

The file associated with this record is under embargo until 18 months after publication, in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The full text may be available through the publisher links provided above.

Language

en