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Accountability with Large Electorates

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journal contribution
posted on 24.04.2020, 10:32 by R. Emre Aytimur, Christian Bruns
We show that ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability. In our model, an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive fuzzy private signals about her performance. A sampling effect enables the incumbent to form a precise estimate of the median voter's signal, and the resulting level of accountability is as if the incumbent faced a perfectly informed social planner. Public information or ideological preferences can impair the beneficial impact of the sampling effect on accountability; overconfidence of voters can restore the full benefit of the sampling effect.

History

Citation

The Economic Journal, Volume 129, Issue 620, May 2019, Pages 1529–1560

Author affiliation

School of Business

Version

AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

The Economic Journal

Volume

129

Issue

620

Pagination

1529–1560

Publisher

Oxford University Press

issn

0013-0133

eissn

1468-0297

Acceptance date

28/02/2018

Copyright date

2018

Available date

02/08/2018

Publisher version

https://academic.oup.com/ej/article-abstract/129/620/1529/5447331?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Language

en

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