complete_info_working_recent_1.pdf (398.11 kB)
Download file

Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the “law of one price”

Download (398.11 kB)
journal contribution
posted on 09.10.2019, 14:37 by K Chatterjee, K Das
This paper analyses a model of price formation in a market with a finite number of non-identical agents engaging in decentralised bilateral interactions. We focus mainly on equal numbers of buyers and sellers, though we discuss other cases. All characteristics of agents are assumed to be common knowledge. Buyers simultaneously make targeted offers, which sellers can accept or reject. Acceptance leads to a pair exiting and rejection leads to the next period. Offers can be public, private or “ex ante public”. As the discount factor goes to 1, the price in all transactions converges to the same value.

History

Citation

International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44 (4), pp. 949-991

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/School of Business

Version

AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

International Journal of Game Theory

Publisher

Springer Nature

issn

0020-7276

eissn

1432-1270

Acceptance date

28/12/2014

Copyright date

2015

Available date

09/10/2019

Language

en

Usage metrics

Categories

Exports