Bartram P&S.pdf (262.17 kB)
Download file

Labor Migration Policy and the Governance of the Construction Industry in Israel and Japan.

Download (262.17 kB)
journal contribution
posted on 26.03.2009, 11:36 by David Bartram
Significant “guestworker” immigration occurs when the state lacks the capacity to inhibit rent-seeking by private interests that benefit from imported labor. Policies allowing imported labor result in government subsidies for employers‟ profits. These subsidies are usefully conceived as rents. A developmentalist state (e.g. Japan) will constrain the creation of such rents, especially because imported labor carries long-term costs not borne by employers and inhibits productivity growth and positive structural change. A clientelist state (e.g. Israel) falls prey to this type of rent-seeking because of a weaker institutional capacity for creating conditions that make alternative solutions feasible and profitable for employers.

History

Citation

Politics & Society, 2004, 32 (2), pp. 131-170.

Published in

Politics & Society

Publisher

Sage Publications.

issn

0032-3292

Available date

26/03/2009

Publisher version

http://pas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/32/2/131

Notes

This is the author’s final draft of the paper published as Politics & Society, 2004, 32 (2), pp. 131-170. The final published version is available at http://pas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/32/2/131, Doi: 10.1177/0032329204263068.

Language

en

Usage metrics

Categories

Exports