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Persistent Cooperation and Gender Differences in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games: Some Things Never Change

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journal contribution
posted on 01.05.2018, 14:55 by Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, Eva M. Krockow
In the finite-horizon repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, a compelling backward induction argument shows that rational players will defect in every round, following the uniquely optimal Nash equilibrium path. It is frequently asserted that cooperation gradually declines when a Prisoner’s Dilemma is repeated multiple times by the same players, but the evidence for this is unconvincing, and a classic experiment by Rapoport and Chammah in the 1960s reported that cooperation eventually recovers if the game is repeated hundreds of times. They also reported that men paired with men cooperate almost twice as frequently as women paired with women. Our conceptual replication with Prisoner’s Dilemmas repeated over 300 rounds with no breaks, using more advanced, computerized methodology, revealed no decline in cooperation, apart from endgame effects in the last few rounds, and replicated the substantial gender difference, confirming, in the UK, a puzzling finding first reported in the US in the 1960s.

History

Citation

Acta Psychologica, 2018, 187, pp. 1-8

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF LIFE SCIENCES/Biological Sciences/Neuroscience, Psychology and Behaviour

Version

AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

Acta Psychologica

Publisher

Elsevier

issn

0001-6918

eissn

1873-6297

Copyright date

2018

Available date

01/05/2018

Publisher version

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001691817305917

Notes

The file associated with this record is under embargo until 24 months after publication, in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The full text may be available through the publisher links provided above.

Editors

Notebaert, W

Language

en