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Public affairs practice and lobbying inequality: Reform and regulation of the influence game

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journal contribution
posted on 17.01.2018, 16:02 by Scott Davidson
Although vigorous lobbying by groups within society is essential for the functioning of democracy, it is widely perceived that resource-rich groups, particularly corporations, enjoy unfair advantages and influence. This perception damages public trust in the efficacy of civic participation and the legitimacy of policymaking. This problem intermittently leads reformers and scholars to assess and develop policies that might assist in addressing lobbying power imbalances. This paper takes up Moloney's call for exploring ways of intervening in the communicative economy to directly address the problem of lobbying inequality. It considers the extent of lobbying inequalities and theoretical frameworks for understanding how resources enable an influence advantage, before assessing the types of regulatory approaches that have been used by democratic institutions. Voluntary measures that could be taken by the corporate sector and professional associations are considered, alongside the current interest in using digital platforms to identify inequalities and incorporate public preferences as a variable in allocating lobbying resources.

Funding

The author gratefully acknowledges the study leave support received from the University of Leicester.

History

Citation

Journal of Public Affairs, 2017, 17:e1665.

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/Department of Media, Communication and Sociology

Version

AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

Journal of Public Affairs

Publisher

Wiley

issn

1472-3891

eissn

1479-1854

Acceptance date

16/07/2017

Copyright date

2017

Available date

22/08/2019

Publisher version

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pa.1665/abstract

Notes

The file associated with this record is under embargo until 24 months after publication, in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The full text may be available through the publisher links provided above.

Language

en