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School Choice Design, Risk Aversion, and Cardinal Segregation

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journal contribution
posted on 21.09.2020, 09:28 by Caterina Calsamiglia, Francisco Martínez-Mora, Antonio Miralles
We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal segregation. Transportation costs facilitate the emergence of cardinal segregation as does competition from private schools. Furthermore, the latter renders the best public schools more elitist. The Deferred Acceptance mechanism is resilient to cardinal segregation.

History

Citation

The Economic Journal, ueaa095, https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa095

Author affiliation

School of Business

Version

AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

The Economic Journal

Pagination

ueaa095

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)

issn

0013-0133

eissn

1468-0297

Copyright date

2020

Available date

10/08/2020

Language

en

Publisher version

https://academic.oup.com/ej/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ej/ueaa095/5890338