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Signaling about norms: Socialization under strategic uncertainty

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journal contribution
posted on 14.11.2016, 11:48 by Fabrizio Adriani, Silvia Sonderegger
We consider a signaling model where adults possess information about the dominant social norm. Children want to conform to whatever norm is dominant but, lacking accurate information, take the observed behavior of their parent as representative. We show that this causes a signaling distortion in adult behavior, even in the absence of conflicts of interest. Parents adopt attitudes that encourage their children to behave in a socially safe way, i.e. the way that would be optimal under maximum uncertainty about the prevailing social norm. We discuss applications to sexual attitudes, collective reputation, and trust.

History

Citation

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2018, 120(3), pp. 685-716

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/Department of Economics

Version

AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Publisher

Wiley

issn

0347-0520

eissn

1467-9442

Copyright date

2017

Available date

28/02/2019

Publisher version

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12240/full

Notes

JEL codes: C72, D83, D80, Z13.;The file associated with this record is under embargo until 24 months after publication, in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The full text may be available through the publisher links provided above.

Language

en