journal contribution posted on 31.03.2017, 15:37 by Shaun Hargreaves Heap, Abhijit Ramanlingam, David Rojo Arjona
Social information “nudges” concerning how others perform typically boost individual performances in experiments with one group reference point. However, in many natural settings, sometimes due to policy, there are several such group reference points. We address the complications that such multiple group social information might introduce through an experiment. The boost to average performance is significant and comparable to the one group case. Between-group inequality does not change. Individual inequality falls, however, because the boost is largest among the pre-“nudge” very poor performers. Finally, the boost to average performance is highest when individuals freely choose their group affiliations.
Hargreaves Heap’s work was
supported by the Economic and Social Science Research Council through the Network for
Integrated Behavioural Science (Grant reference ES/K002201/1). Funding from the School of
Economics, University of East Anglia and the Department of Political Economy, King’s
College London is gratefully acknowledged.
CitationSouthern Economic Journal, 2017
Author affiliation/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/Department of Economics
VersionAM (Accepted Manuscript)
Published inSouthern Economic Journal
PublisherWiley, Southern Economic Association
NotesJEL classifications: C91, D03, D60;The file associated with this record is under embargo until 24 months after publication, in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The full text may be available through the publisher links provided above.