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The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two

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journal contribution
posted on 01.06.2015, 14:53 by Xujin Chen, Benjamin Doerr, Carola Doerr, Xiaodong Hu, Weidong Ma, Rob van Stee
We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that the price of anarchy is at most two, when the network is a ring and the link latencies are linear. Our bound is tight. This is the first sharp bound for the maximum latency objective.

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Citation

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2014, 2, pp. 8-8

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING/Department of Computer Science

Version

AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)

issn

2167-8375

eissn

2167-8383

Copyright date

2014

Available date

01/06/2015

Publisher version

http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2632259.2548545

Notes

© ACM, 2014. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation archive Volume 2 Issue 2, June 2014 http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2548545

Language

en

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