

**THE CONFLICT FOR POWER IN THE IRAQI POLITICAL
DISCOURSE ACROSS MAINSTREAM AND SOCIAL MEDIA:
(DE)LEGITIMIZATION, RAPPORT, SOCIOPOLITICAL
IDENTITIES AND IMPOLITENESS**

**A thesis submitted to School of English in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics**

May 2016

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The Conflict for Power in the Iraqi Political Discourse across Mainstream media and Social Media: (De)legitimization, rapport, sociopolitical identities and impoliteness

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Abstract

Political discourse is the battlefield for the conflict for power and legitimacy between different actors and ideologies. Analyzing how political discourse can be produced and perceived in different genres presents itself as an indispensable academic endeavor in order to understand the dynamics of such discursive conflicts in both their off and online contexts. This thesis investigates the Iraqi political discourses instantiated in three different genres across mainstream and social media. The thesis first develops an analytical approach that derives from Political Discourse Analysis and impoliteness studies to account for how political discourses can be produced, perceived and evaluated in situ. The analytical gap between the macro-analytical discourse approaches (e.g. CDS-informed Political Discourse Analysis), and micro-analytical approaches (e.g. discursive impoliteness studies) is bridged by examining the relational and interactional aspects of meso-level positioning as derived from Bamberg's (1997) tripartite adaptation of positioning theory.

The data analyzed in this thesis consists of three, thematically-comparable sets of interaction taken from contrasting genres (TV interviews, Facebook comment threads, online news readers' responses). The analysis of the data demonstrates that the conflicts between oppositional actors and ideologies can be discursively produced through the use of a limited number of "typical content-related argument schemes" or *topoi* (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:75), many of which seemed to be characteristic of Iraqi political Discourse, in order to (de)legitimize particular interpretations. In this sense, (de)legitimization is conceptualized as a micro argumentative practice rather than as a macro discursive goal as often argued by political discourse analysts. This conceptualization is innovative in bringing (de)legitimization closer to the study of impoliteness, and in so doing making it possible to pinpoint the attitudinal consequences and moral implications of the discursive conflicts in which oppositional ideologies compete for legitimacy. The analysis can also provide a broad contrastive

perspective as to how the conflict for power instantiated in the Iraqi political discourses could be produced and perceived across mainstream and social media.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the support and generosity I received while carrying out this research. Without it this study simply would not have been completed.

First and foremost, I would like to express my profound gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Ruth Page for her invaluable support, advice and guidance throughout the entire process. Her insights and continual encouragement made this thesis more of a stimulating challenge than the demanding burden I often felt it would be. I also would like to thank Dr. Philip Shaw, who kindly took on my supervision and provided me with valuable feedback at key moments in the study.

I would not have been able to carry out this research without the financial support from HCED-Iraq scholarship program. I highly appreciate their support and generosity.

I owe my loving thanks to my wife who overwhelmed me with her loving care, affection, and continue to support and encourage me in ways too numerous to count. I also would like to thank my father who has always been an inexhaustible source of support and inspiration.

Finally, my gratitude and respect also go to everybody at the School of English for they always wished me good luck. Being part of this school was a great experience.

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List of Abbreviations

CDS	Critical Discourse Studies
CMC	Computer Mediated Communication

Chapter One

Introduction

1. Introduction

Political discourse, i.e. the language used in or about politics (Fetzer, 2013: 1), in the media, is the key means for people to familiarize themselves with politics and engage in it (Lauerbach and Fetzer, 2007). Investigating political discourse in the media across different communicative genres can elucidate how the conflict for power, whose battlefield is discourse (Carta and Wodak, 2015:6), can be produced and perceived in these genres, and demonstrate how the medium affordances in these genres shape these conflicts for political power. Traditionally, scholars interested in analyzing political discourse, e.g. critical discourse analysts and political discourse analysts, have often concentrated on highly formalized political discourses produced in institutional genres. This thesis, however, will focus on less formal political discourses produced in non-institutional genres in both mainstream and the new forms of media in order to highlight interlocutors' ideological biases and unpack how they are (re)produced and perceived in interaction. The thesis provides fresh insights in Political Discourse Analysis by conceptualizing (de)legitimization in a way that brings Political Discourse Analysis closer to rapport and impoliteness studies, and in so doing it can pinpoint the attitudinal consequences and moral implications of the discursive conflict for power which involves oppositional sociopolitical viewpoints competing for legitimacy. The thesis also makes an important contribution to the study of impoliteness and that of rapport by providing an ethno-sectarian perspective, which represents a relatively new perspective in these emerging fields of scholarship.

In recent years, technological advancement has created various, new online platforms in which people can discuss public issues and concerns. The advent of different forms of 'social media'¹ was thought at first to give rise to a freer and more inclusive public sphere (Habermas, 1989), especially in countries that have always suffered from strict censorship over mainstream media (Etling *et al.*, 2009: 7). This view was mainly prompted by the view that social media "can generate political

¹ In line with Leppänen *et al.* (2015), social media is broadly thought of as digital platforms "that build on the ideological and technological premises and foundations of Web 2.0" and enable the "creation, exchange and circulation of user-generated content" to facilitate interactions between a wide range of interlocutors.

pressure because it is itself intrinsically democratic and can foster populist participation” (Seib, 2007: 5). This view was substantiated to a large extent by the tremendous political transformations that took place in the Arab world in 2010-2011, in which Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and weblogs represented the main tools harnessed by activists to gain momentum for their political struggle against authoritarian regimes (Storck, 2011). Social media, then, can provide more comprehensive and freer platforms for exchange of information and views, constituting an indispensable “online public sphere” (Douai and Nofal, 2012). This online public sphere allows the traditionally marginalized political actors to produce counter-discourses (Dahlberg, 2007: 837) that can counterbalance the disempowering nature of the elitist discourses pervading the traditional mass media (Hall, 2008: 116).

However, social media is sometimes criticized by cultural and critical theorists for being parasitically dependent on mainstream media (e.g. Habermas, 2006: 423, fn. 3) and so reproducing the existing power structures in society (Gerhards and Schafer 2010). Thurlow and Mroczek (2011: xxvi) highlights the ideological nature of social media “in terms of their political economies of access and control”. On the other hand, Blumler and Gurevitch (2010: 3-4) and Weiss (2013: 606) demonstrate how political and social fragmentations can be further exacerbated by the social media, as the interlocutors’ behaviors online often reinforce their pre-established ideological positions (Dahlberg, 2007). In line with this, several studies from different academic perspectives highlight the link between the political discourses circulated online and the polarization of political and social positions (e.g. Sunstein, 2008, Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2010, Conover *et al.*, 2011). In this respect, the thesis sets its problem space within the context of the oppositional positions between the techno-enthusiasts’ aspirations about the democratizing potentials of social media, and the techno-skeptics’ pessimism about the weak or even pathological public engagement in online discourses.

1.1 Cultural and political context of Iraq

Iraq is a Middle Eastern country located at the southwest of Asia in the region anciently known as Mesopotamia, but there are some suggestions that link the name ‘Iraq’ to ancient Aramaic or Sumerian languages.² Iraq is a multi ethnic country, in

² Wikipedia: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Iraq> (accessed 12/11/2015)

which Arabs, both Shiites and Sunnis, and Kurds represent the largest ethnic groups. Other ethnic groups include Turkmen, Shabakis, Assyrians, Armenians and Mandeans. This ethnic diversity is also crosscut by sectarian and religious divisions. Shia and Sunni Muslims form the predominant majority of the 33 millions Iraqis, while the religious minorities include Christians, Yezidis and Sabian Mandeans.

Article One in the constitution of Iraq, which was formed in 2005, stipulates that “the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic” (the constitution of the republic of Iraq, 2005). Due to the diverse nature of Iraqi society, the de facto political system in the country is consociational. Consociationalism, according to Ghanim, (2011: 136), refers to

a power-sharing system, between various confessional blocs. It is a model for conflict resolution in ethnically divided societies, which is grounded on quotas in government and bureaucracy, reciprocal veto rights, regional autonomy, and proportional representation.

Although there is no constitutional article about the ethno-sectarian allocation of the supreme governmental offices, the Iraqi consociational system customarily allocates the presidency to a Kurdish person, the premiership to a Shiite person, and the Speakership to a Sunni person. In this consociational system, almost every political party aims to represent a certain ethno-sectarian group because most political parties are, by tradition, ethno-sectarianly closed, that is, their members belong to a single ethnic or sectarian group. This consociational political system is fundamentally parliamentary in nature, as the parliament is the place where all the ethnic and sectarian groups are represented.

The political process involves two levels of power struggle among the main political actors. Firstly, there are intra-communal conflicts for power in which several political parties aim to claim representation of their ethno-sectarian group in order to be able to nominate the incumbents of the governmental offices allocated to their ethno-sectarian group. Secondly, political conflicts for power can also be inter-communal, in which political parties from different ethno-sectarian backgrounds compete for more power for their respective communities. Inter-communal (political) conflicts for power often take place when the political parties that represent the same

ethno-sectarian group develop a parliamentary coalition that represents their group to negotiate with other ethno-sectarian coalitions over governmental positions or to defend their ethno-sectarian group against possible infringement on their rights. Although inter-communal, i.e. ethno-sectarian, conflicts for power are a distinctive feature of the Iraqi political system, cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian conflicts for political power are possible, but they are often motivated by minor or short-term political interests.

The thesis considers the pursuit of domination and legitimacy played out in a particular period of recent Iraqi political history. In order to make sense of these power conflicts (and hence the data which are explored in later chapters), I begin here by introducing the key political entities who were competing for power during and after the 2012 Iraqi election.³ Ghanim (2011: 121-122) presents those political entities and summarizes the 2012 election results as follows:

The second legislative election was held on March 7, 2010..... The cross-sectarian coalition of Iraqiya, headed by the former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, won the highest number of seats, 91. This result gave Allawi a plurality but not outright majority. The second runner was the [bloc] of the then Prime Minister Maliki, the State of Law, which won 89 seats. The difference between these two [blocs] was only 54,000 in popular votes. The other Shiite [bloc] of Iraqi National Alliance came third with 70 seats. Within this Shiite coalition, the Sadrists faction, Ahrar, captured most of the votes, 39 seats, followed by the ISCI with 18 seats and the Fadhila Party with 8 seats. The total seats that went to the Kurdish parties were 57. Most of these seats went to the Kurdistan Alliance, 43, while the other parties won 14 seats: 8 for Gorran, 4 for Islamic Union of Kurdistan, and 2 for al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya. The Sunni [bloc], Tawafuq, won only 6 seats, while the list of the interior minister Bolani, Unity of Iraq, won 4 seats.

³ Since there was no legislation until August 2015 regulating the creation and performance of the political parties in Iraq, there were no political parties per se, but rather, very versatile and flexible political entities. These political entities can be political parties, political coalitions, political fronts, or even parliamentary blocs.

After the election, the predominantly Shiite Al-Maliki's State of Law bloc united with the other Shiite blocs, the Iraqi National Alliance and the Unity of Iraq bloc, to form the Shiite majority (163 seats). This emergent Shiite bloc nominated a Prime Minister Designate (Al-Maliki), who was later sworn in before the parliament. After failing to form the majority bloc in the parliament, the bloc of Iraqiya, an initially cross-sectarian coalition, became the major representative of Sunnis as most of its Shiite members resigned, which led to its unification with the Sunni bloc of Tawafuq. The different Kurdish blocs united after the election forming the third biggest bloc in the parliament. It is important to note that for the period in question, cross-sectarian fronts were occasionally formed to achieve certain short-term political goals within cross-sectarian confrontations in the national sphere. The most important cross-sectarian confrontation was the one whose aim was to vote out the Prime Minister in the parliament in 2013, which divided the country cross-sectarianly into pro-Al-Maliki and con-Al-Maliki factions.

1.2 Rationales for the thesis

The choice of the thesis topic was specifically motivated by three different rationales. Firstly, in the wake of the dramatic political uprisings in the Arab world and the ensuing political transformations in some countries, there is a need to explore the accompanying shift in political discourses within the Arab(ic) context. These political transformations might have never been possible without the use of social media. Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and weblogs represented the main tools harnessed by prodemocracy activists and Islamists alike to gain momentum for their political causes (cf. Storck, 2011). Although the political context in Iraq may differ from that in the other Arab countries, because the regime that ruled Iraq for decades had been overthrown by foreign forces, this did not deter Iraqi civil and political activists, and minority rights defenders from making use of social media to engage in political debates and to express their political views. Therefore, it seems necessary to scrutinize the different aspects of Iraqi political discourse and to examine how it might be differently produced and perceived in different communicative genres across mainstream and social media.

Secondly, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave rise to tremendous political transformations in the country. The political system has change from an

authoritarian regime to a consociationally democratic system, in which various ethnic and sectarian groups have to be represented. It is often argued by many political analysts and sociologists that the consociational democracy often inhibits nationalistic ethos and gives rise to a multiple array of ethno-sectarian identities in political discourse (Chanim, 2011; Younis, 2011). Notwithstanding, the fragmentation of the Iraqi national identity actually started before the consociational system was endorsed. It began during the last decade of Saddam Hussein's era when the state policies started to become more evidently ethno-sectarianly exclusionary. Amidst these ethnic, sectarian and social divisions, media platforms, and especially social media, have consequently become one of the most extensively (mis)used platforms for cross-sectarian interactions, and even more regrettably the key means for the post-US led invasion generations to familiarize self and communicate with the different other. Hence, investigating the production and evaluation of the conflict for power in Iraqi political Discourse, with a capital D, (Gee, 2005), presents itself as an indispensable academic endeavor for Iraqi researchers in order to understand the dynamics of these conflicts in both their off and online contexts.

Thirdly, the reason for employing rapport and impoliteness studies in the thesis is not only because it satisfies an analytical need, i.e. they can pinpoint the attitudinal and the moral implications of the political discourses instantiated in the social media (see further Chapter 3), but also because assessments of impoliteness and rudeness in online contexts have become a public and legal issue in Iraq. Ever since the Baghdad-Rusafa Appeal Court ruled that libels and slanders in social media are liable to prosecutions just as in mainstream media,⁴ norm disruptive or offensive practices in social media have come under the spotlight. Therefore, the present thesis also aims to make an academic contribution to this public and legal debate.

1.3 Thesis Questions

The thesis focuses on the conflicts for power that take place in mainstream and social media, the discursive patterns of these conflicts, and their interactional, moral and sociopolitical implications. Ultimately at a broader level, this thesis aims to shed some light on how the ethno-sectarian and social divisions in Iraq are reflected in mainstream and social media, and how these divisions are perpetuated by means of

⁴ Ruling 989/penalty/201429/12 <http://www.iraqja.iq/view.2713/> (accessed 23/01/2015)

the very same discourses instantiated in these types of media. In order to investigate this topic systematically and in an empirically grounded fashion, I articulate an overarching research question that guides the analytical focus of this thesis. This primary question is operationalized by three sets of subordinate methodological, empirical and theoretical questions (see Sunderland, 2010:15). The methodological question deals with the potential operationalization of the empirical objectives of this thesis by exploring possible methods to bridge the gap between the context of production and reception in the political discourses instantiated in both the mainstream and social media. The empirical questions posited in this thesis are to some extent comparatively oriented, focusing on the different characteristics of the political discourses produced in different thematic and generic contexts representing mainstream and social media. Finally, the theoretical question tests the theoretical assumptions of each of the analytical practices and approaches employed in the thesis, i.e. Critical Discourse Studies and rapport and impoliteness studies, against the as yet relatively under-investigated context of Iraqi mediatized political discourses in order to provide ethno-sectarian perspective. To that effect, new theoretical concepts will be introduced in this thesis in order to account for the various ways in which the argumentative and evaluative aspects of political discourse may be interrelated in ethno-sectarianly polarized contexts. These new theoretical concepts will be of relevance to current advances in Critical Discourse Studies and impoliteness studies.

Primary Question:

What are the interactional, sociopolitical, affective and moral implications of the conflict for power taking place in the Iraqi political discourses instantiated in three different genres representing mainstream and social media?

Methodological questions:

How can the production and evaluation of the conflict for power in mediatized Iraqi political discourses be accounted for systematically?

Empirical questions:

1. How do interlocutors communicate their political viewpoints, and what are the argumentation patterns that they tend to use across different generic and thematic contexts?
2. In what ways do medium affordances affect the dynamics of argumentation and interactivity across different generic contexts?
3. What types of identities are played out in the political discourses produced in these generic and thematic contexts, and how are they functionally employed by the interlocutors?
4. How can impoliteness assessments trigger and be triggered by (de)legitimization in the Iraqi political discourses circulated in different thematic contexts in the genres under scrutiny?

Theoretical questions:

To what extent can the analysis of the mediatized Iraqi political discourses in terms of production and perception attest the general assumptions of Critical Discourse Studies and impoliteness studies and theoretically contribute to these fields of scholarship based on empirical evidence from a relatively under-investigated context?

1.4 Structure of the thesis

The thesis comprises eight chapters. The present chapter, i.e. the Introduction, provides background information about the political and social contexts of the research project (section 1.1). It also sets out the rationale and motivation for conducting this research project (section 1.2). Furthermore in this chapter, the research questions have been discussed and categorized according to their theoretical, empirical and theoretical relevance (section 1.3).

Chapters two and three constitute the literature review that surveys the different approaches employed in the analysis. These two chapters aim to develop the theoretical framework that will inform the analysis in the later analytical chapters. Focusing on the analysis of the conflict for power in political Discourse, Chapter two outlines the theoretical background for analyzing mediatized political discourses (section 2.1 and 2.2) and unravels how power relations are played out therein (section

2.3). The chapter provides an overview on how the quest for domination and power is constructed and manifested by means of (de)legitimization and its functions (sections 2.4). Finally in this chapter, I introduce a typology of the (de)legitimizing argumentative structures that can be used in ethno-sectarianly based political Discourse (section 2.5).

Chapter three explores the relational and affective aspects of political discourse. The chapter conceptualizes (de)legitimization as a multi-tiered positioning process in which the argumentative and evaluative aspects of political discourse are intrinsically intertwined (sections 3.1 and 3.2). The chapter also reviews the state-of-the-art in rapport and (im)politeness studies as impoliteness assessments will be used to highlight the attitudinal consequences and moral implications of mediatized political discourses (sections 3.3 and 3.4). The chapter concludes by introducing the approach specially developed to account for the production and reception of the conflict for power that takes place in the political discourses circulated in mainstream and social media (section 3.5).

Chapter Four provides an account of methodology and data collection. It outlines the methodological decisions made in the research design for this project and explains their theoretical bases (section 4.1). The chapter also sets out the data collection process, and clarifies its selection criteria and categories (section 4.2). The data preparatory processes that include ethical issue, anonymization, translation, and presentation of the transcription, are detailed in sections 4.3 and 4.4.

Chapters Five, Six and Seven represent the analytical part of the thesis, in which the political discourse produced in three contrasting thematic contexts in three respective genres are analyzed. These genres includes TV interviews, representing dialogic mainstream media (Chapter Five), Facebook comment threads, representing social media (Chapter Six), and online news readers' responses, representing an online mass media platform (Chapter Seven). Each chapter explores how the conflict for legitimacy and power is produced and perceived in three thematic contexts in a specific genre. Each chapter consists of four sections. The first section in each chapter investigates how the conflict for power is produced by means of various (de)legitimization patterns. The second section in each chapter examines the participation framework afforded by each of the genres to demonstrate how the interlocutors position themselves in relation to each other, and to identify the different

roles available in each of these genres. The third section in each chapter unpacks the constructions of the functionally versatile sociopolitical identities constructed by the interlocutors and highlights their social implications in each of the different genres under scrutiny. The fourth section in each chapter deals with how rapport can be perceived and how the interlocutors evaluate each other's political and interactional practices in terms of impoliteness in order to highlight the moral implications of the political conflict for power in these three genres.

Finally, in the discussion and conclusions, Chapter Eight, I discuss and summarize the thesis findings and show how these findings address the project's research questions. I discuss the thesis' methodological and theoretical implications, and suggest potential directions for further research. I also set out the originality of this research work and underscore its contributions to the fields of Political Discourse Analysis, impoliteness studies, and intergroup communication.

Chapter Two

Discursive Conflicts for Power in Mediatized Political Discourse

2. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to lay out the theoretical framework used in analyzing the production of the conflict for power in mediatized political texts. In order to understand the dynamics of power relations in political discourse, it is important to explore the ontology of political discourse to clearly define the field of study. Therefore, the first two sections present the current state of research on political discourse in the public field. Section 2.1 interrogates the concept of political discourse and how it might be defined in accordance with the aims of the present thesis. Section 2.2 foregrounds how power may be exercised in political discourse in order to maintain the interlocutor's interactional goals and advance their political objectives. Section 2.3 explores the strategic functions of political discourse that serve the political actors' pursuit of legitimacy and power in ways that naturalize their ideological biases. Section 2.4 provides an overview on how the conflict for power is constructed and manifested by means of (de)legitimization, exploring the concept of (de)legitimization and its possible patterns. Finally, section 2.5 introduces the various topoi of (de)legitimization that are characteristic of Iraqi political Discourse.

2.1 Defining political discourse

Language is the main tool to perform political actions and advance political agenda, because, as stated by Chilton and Schaffner (2003: 3), "the doing of politics is predominantly constituted in language". Political actors use language to communicate their political thoughts and perform political actions to bring about political changes. Historically, the interface of language, rhetoric, and politics was a major topic of study for Aristotle, Machiavelli and many other great thinkers throughout history. More recently, the analysis of political discourse, i.e. the language used in or about politics (Fetzer, 2013: 1), has attracted considerable academic attention across a range of different disciplines; inter alia, Political Science, Critical Discourse Studies, Pragmatics, Communication studies, and Cultural studies. This interest in political discourse seems to have different motivations, the most important of which, especially from a critical discourse analytical perspective, is to delve into how political discourse can form and be formed by the underlying power relations and

hegemony in society (Foucault, 1981). Dunmire (2012) maintains that the interrelation between language and politics cannot be overlooked in academia, asserting that the “political turn in linguistics ran parallel to and was informed by a linguistic turn in political science” (ibid: 736).

However, political discourse cannot be properly defined without appealing to the notion of politics itself and how it might be related to that of discourse. Apparently, most, if not all, types of mediated communication can be considered political from poststructural and postmodern perspectives, because discursive practices are constructed by and constructive of social and political realities (Fetzer, 2007: 164). Dahlberg (2011: 41) points out that all types of discourse are essentially political, because “[d]iscourse theory is, at its core, a theory of politics: of the hegemonic formation of social relations - of discourses - that necessarily involve hierarchies of power and relations of inclusion and exclusion”. This conceptualization of discourse yields a rather blurry picture of what may constitute political discourse, because it conflates the distinction between the politics of language and the language of politics (Okulska and Cap, 2011: 6-7). To avoid any possible conceptual confusion, when doing Political Discourse Analysis it is necessary to analyze “politics as a discursive, [rather] than the discursive as political” (Hay, 2013:323), because analyzing political discourse is, to use van Dijk’s (2002:203) words, “theoretically and empirically relevant only when discourse structures can be related to properties of political structures and process”. Taking the narrow view of political discourse as the language of politics necessitates an examination of how ‘politics’ may be defined.

Traditionally, politics has been broadly defined in two different ways (Hay (2007: 61-2; Fetzer, 2013: 9). It is either defined in terms of deliberation among different political actors to make decisions and identify feasible choices for actions (Hague *et al.*, 1998:3–4; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012:17), or as a “quest for power” (Wodak, 2011: 5; Bourdieu, 2005:39). In this sense, politics can be envisaged as “a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it” or as a cooperation to “resolve clashes of interests” (Chilton, 2008:3). Apparently, these definitions of politics contradict each other, because one definition entails cooperation whereas the other implies conflict.

The contradiction between the two definitions of politics may be reconciled by appealing to Edelman’s (1976, cited in Lauerbach and Fetzer, 2007:5) distinction

between “an instrumental and an expressive dimension of politics”, or, in Sarcinelli’s (1987, cited in Lauerbach and Fetzer, 2007:5) term, “the production and the presentation of politics”. The production of politics, i.e. the instrumental dimension thereof, which refers to the decision making process in politics, presupposes the need for cooperation to resolve conflicts and make decisions. Alternatively, the representation of politics, i.e. the expressive dimension thereof, which refers to the representation of politics in the media, often triggers conflict and antagonism. This is because media represents a frontstage, where the representation and justification of actions is more important to the political actors than the political deals made in the backstage (Wodak, 2011:24). It is important to note here that disagreement and conflict can be used interchangeably in practice, because “conflict is a disagreement between two or more parties who perceive incompatible goals or means of achieving those goals” (Jones 2001: 91). Dynel (2015: 340) states that “both conflict and disagreement may also be studied in the context of broader communicative phenomena, such as arguments (Schiffrin 1985), disputes (Brenneis 1988), and quarrels (Antaki 1994)”.

Alluding to the domain of politics, van Dijk (1997) provides a well articulated characterization of what may constitute political discourse. He (ibid: 15) contends that political discourse can be contextually defined in respect of its “aim, goal or function”, and how these are related to the wider scope of politics. Implicitly acknowledging the fuzziness of political discourse, he (ibid: 16-18) points out that political discourse is the language of the different political domains, that include political systems, structure, process, actors and values. In this sense, van Dijk’s definition falls under the category of the language of politics rather than the politics of language. In terms of the actors involved in political discourse, van Dijk (1997: 13) states that all types of actors, whether the politicians or citizens, “as well as their organizations and institutions, may take part in the political process, and many of them are actively involved in political discourse”. Chilton (2004: 3) distinguishes between the practice of politics at the macro level, which involves political institutions, and micro levels, which involves individuals and social groups. Fetzer (2013: 13) refers to practice of politics at the micro level as doing politics from below, in which all political actors, politicians and grass roots, and social groups are involved in mediatized political practices in typically non-institutionalized settings (ibid.; 13).

The inclusion of the discourses produced by the general public about politics in political discourse is based in the democratic ideal that the power of politics is mandated to the professional practitioners of politics, i.e. politicians, by the public themselves. Therefore, it is hardly contentious to regard the discourse in which the general public is engaged in discussing political topics as a political discourse. Political discourse, then, is the function of politics and the arena where it is practised, debated and represented.

Political discourse in the media is notably different from other types of discourse. It is firstly characterized by the struggle for dominance and power, which consequently triggers antagonism and conflict. On the other hand, Finlayson and Martin (2008, 449) state that political speech represents “a snapshot of ideology in actions”. This can be extended to almost all types of mediatized political discourse, especially the ones in which political and ethno-sectarian biases are intrinsically intertwined as in the interactions under scrutiny in this thesis. As such employing fallacious arguments and manipulation of emotion can be another typical characteristic of political discourse (Keinpointer, 2008: 250). In this sense, political discourse is seldom informative and value-free; it is rather value-laden, tendentious and manipulative. Therefore, presenting a person’s self positively and authoritatively, and justifying their actions are typical discursive practices in political discourse. Finally, political discourse is a public discourse that is becoming more mediatized and digitalized (Fetzer, 2013: 3). It is communicated through different types of media that are multilayered in terms of “production, reception, transmission and discourse distribution in traditional and new media” (ibid, 1), which makes the analysis of its micro interactional dynamics and medium affordances very relevant to Political Discourse Analysis.

2.2 Analyzing mediatized political discourse

Mediatized political discourse represents the field in which ideology is put into action; to investigate this kind of discourse a critical perspective is required. A critical analysis of political texts does not only entail focusing on their production and rhetorical techniques used in them and their linguistic realizations, but also on interrogating their ideological underpinnings and highlighting their social and political implications. To that effect, several methodologies have been developed

within Critical Discourse Studies to explore the interrelation between politics, discourse and society (Baxter, 2010: 126). Out of these efforts, the new sub-discipline of Political Discourse Analysis has emerged.

Van Dijk (1997:11) conceives of Political Discourse Analysis as a critical enterprise that deals with political discourse stating that this enterprise could have the best of both Critical Discourse Analysis and the linguistic analysis of political discourse. Preferring the term ‘Analysis of Political Discourse’, Okulska and Cap (2010: 4) conceptualize this enterprise as involving the socially oriented analysis of “polity and/or policies, located at the intersection of political/public discourse and political/social institutions”. Van Dijk (1997, 12-14) asserts that it is important for Political Discourse Analysis to “answer genuine and relevant political questions and deal with issues that are discussed in political science”. In this sense, Political Discourse Analysis can have two objectives; first, it can account for the dynamics of the “discursive political practices”, and second, it can demystify the hidden aspects of the political context and uncover the ideological biases therein (ibid: 41).

Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) identify two major traditions in Political Discourse Analysis. The first tradition focuses on the representation of political reality including the representations of actions, actors, values and institutions (ibid, 2012:20), while the second tradition emphasizes the role of deliberation and argumentation in decision making in politics. The first tradition is represented by two influential approaches in the field; first Chilton’s (2004) cognitively anchored approach to Political Discourse Analysis, and secondly Wodak and Reisigl’s (2001) and Wodak’s (2011) Discourse-Historical Approach. In the approaches that fall in the first tradition according to the Faircloughs’ classification, politics is viewed as a struggle to impose particular ideologically motivated representations of reality. Fairclough & Fairclough (2012: 25-26) argue that such approaches fail to envisage politics as a domain of action, where political choices are made to bring about political transformation. The second tradition in Political Discourse Analysis is represented by Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) themselves, who conceptualize politics as deliberative acts that require practical reasoning and argumentation. They (ibid: 23) emphatically assert that no adequate critical Political Discourse Analysis is possible without argument reconstruction.

Four counter arguments can be presented in response to the Faircloughs' conceptualization of Political Discourse Analysis. Firstly, as convincingly argued by Hay (2013:325), reducing politics to deliberation and argumentation excludes a wide range of political discourses, because although "all situations of deliberation are political, not all political situations are deliberative". Secondly, in all the discourses in postmodern societies in general, and the increasingly mediatized and digitized political discourse in particular, it is representation, rather than argumentation, that plays a vital role in constructing our worldviews including the political (cf. the concept of hyperreality developed in Baudrillard, 1994). Thirdly, the argumentation process in the political discourses instantiated in the media, whether in the mainstream or the social, represents a means to gain power and legitimacy for the oppositional parties involved in these discourses, each which aims to promote particular representations of political reality. Fourthly, from a rhetorical perspective, Finlayson (2013: 318) argues, "political disputes take place not at the level of conclusions but at that of premises - conceptions of situations, of circumstances, of the social world". The significance of premises does not lie in their conceptual content only but also "in their capacity to induce chains of quasi-logical reasoning" (Finlayson, 2012: 762). This means that representation become far more fundamental than argumentation in Political Discourse Analysis, because representation forms the "constitutive presuppositions" that make political decisions and actions possible (Finlayson, 2013: 318).

Political Discourse Analysis can then be defined as any procedures, methods and techniques used to analyze the language of politics "that entails implementing/executing power for and gaining/manifesting superiority through furthering interactants' communicative goals" (Okulska and Cap, 2011: 399). This view is compatible with the shift in Political Discourse Analysis from "macro-politics, and politics as a product, to the more recent focus on the dynamics of politics and political process as it manifests in e.g., the microanalysis of politics" (Fetzer, 2013:2), which is entrenched in the Foucauldian tradition that the dynamics of power can be best felt and analyzed at the micro-level of analysis and practices (Thomas and Davies, 2005: 684; and Oberhuber, 2008: 277-8). This can be linguistically operationalized by tracing the interlocutors' negotiations of power in interaction at different levels of linguistics analysis, and identifying the argumentation patterns they

employ to naturalize their ideological biases in order to maintain their political interests.

2.3 Power in/of political discourse

Researchers interested in Political Discourse Analysis principally investigate the teleological and strategic functions of political discourse. This is because they tend to envisage political discourse as the domain in which political actors attempt to exercise power over others in order to attain their interactional goal at the micro level as part of their pursuance of their sociopolitical objective at the macro-level. To that end, the investigation of the strategic functions of political discourse necessitates unpacking the interrelation between power and discourse in general and political discourse in particular. The interrelation between discourse and power and how it shapes our conceptualization of the world around us has long been a subject of heated debate in different disciplines, including social theory (Foucault, 1981), Philosophy of Language (Searle, 1995), Critical Discourse Studies (Fairclough, 2003; Martín Rojo & van Dijk, 1997; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999; van Leeuwen, 2007) and Political Discourse Analysis (van Dijk, 1997; Chilton, 2004; Wodak, 2011; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012).

The conceptualization of power has developed dramatically over time. Power is traditionally defined in terms of control and influence exercised over others to urge them take a particular course of action (Dahl, 1957: 202-3). In response to the weakness of this one-dimensional and purely behavioristic conceptualization, Bachrach and Baratz (1970: 24) developed their two-dimensional view of power by extending the concept of power to include the ability to restrict the environment of action as well as exercising control over action. Fairclough & Fairclough (2012: 113) argue that the “two-dimensional view of power is an advance over the one-dimensional view in that it sees power (over) as not only a capacity in decision-making, but also a capacity to limit the scope of decision making”. However, power is not necessarily the observable control of action and its environment; it can be exercised covertly to safeguard the interests of the powerful. Therefore, evoking the Foucauldian concept of knowledge/power and the Gramscian concept of hegemony, Luke (1974) develops his three-dimensional view of power, in which he defines power in terms of interests, where actors can act contrary to their real interest

unknowingly (1974:34). Power can then be conceptualized as a covert operationalization of biases in discourse. These biases are often “socially structured and culturally patterned” (ibid: 26). Therefore, as aptly illustrated by Diamond (1996:13), “power is not just the ability to coerce someone or to get them to do something against their will, but rather, it is the ability to interpret events and reality, and have this interpretation accepted by others”.

Consequently, the linguistic manifestations of power and its pursuit, with the aim of imposing visions or beliefs (Bourdieu, 2005:39), can be traced in political discourse to uncover how the interlocutors secure their interests and naturalize their biases. The link between the interlocutors’ discursive behavior at the micro-level, i.e. the linguistic text, and attainment of their political goal at the macro-level, i.e. the political agenda, is mediated by several rhetorical and argumentative strategies. These rhetorical and argumentative strategies are used to empower the interlocutors’ positions and justify their political actions and agenda.

2.4 Functions of political discourse

Several scholars have proposed different theoretical perspectives and analytical toolkits to interrogate the ideological underpinnings of political discourse and scrutinize how power can be constructed, exercised, and legitimized in it. These theoretical perspectives and analytical toolkits have either been developed within the tradition of Political Discourse Analysis, e.g. Chilton & Schaffner (1997); Chilton (2004); Cap (2008), or within that of Critical Discourse Studies, e.g. Martín Rojo & van Dijk; (1997); Reisigl & Wodak (2001); Hart (2010).

Political discourse analysts tend to concentrate on the general strategic functions of political discourse. Chilton & Schaffner (1997) and Chilton (2004) argue that to carry out Political Discourse Analysis it is more feasible to start with a top-down categorization of the strategic functions that the language of politics may be employed for, rather than making claims about “the strategic potential of certain linguistic expressions in general” (Chilton, 2004: 45). This can be done, Chilton & Schaffner (1997: 212) argue, by linking “political situations and the processes of discourse types and levels of discourse organization”. In their earlier work, Chilton & Schaffner (ibid: 212–13) proposed four different strategic functions in political discourse namely: ‘coercion’, ‘(de)legitimization’, ‘dissimulation’ and ‘resistance,

opposition and protest'. Developing the original work of Chilton & Schaffner (1997), Chilton (2004: 45-7) identifies three strategic functions of political discourse; viz. coercion, (de)legitimization and (mis)representation, which is the outcome of merging the two functions of "dissimulation" and "resistance, opposition and protest".

Coercion is the strategic function of political discourse that is covertly associated with power. It is the intentional use of power in order to influence the way others act to maintain one's interests and goals (Chilton, 2004: 47; Hart, 2010: 63). Wartenberg (1990: 96) defines coercion as the use of power that necessarily involves a restriction of others' environment of action as well as making threats in case of non-compliance. Chilton asserts that coercion is not entirely discursive but rather dependent on the interlocutor's "resource and power" (Chilton, 2004: 45) or in Fairclough's (1989: 43) terms, "power behind discourse". Yet, coercion can be discursively exercised via directive and declarative speech acts that are entitled by powerful roles and identities (Hart, 2010:64). Additionally, coercive use of power "can also be exercised through controlling others' use of language - that is, through various kinds and degrees of censorship and access control" (Chilton, 2004: 45).

Coercive power with the intention to maintain interests cannot be effectively exercised without a justification of some sort. This justification is linked to the actors' legitimization of self to maintain "the right to be obeyed" (Chilton, *ibid*: 46). Legitimization may be achieved by "arguments about voters' wants, general ideological principles, charismatic leadership projection, boasting about performance and positive self-presentation" (*ibid*). Delegitimization is the "essential counterpart" of legitimization by means of which the opponent is "presented negatively, and [its] techniques include the use of ideas of difference and boundaries, and speech acts of blaming, accusing, insulting, etc" (*ibid*). Emphasizing its relation to concepts of role and social identity, Cap (2008: 22) envisages legitimization as "linguistic enactment of the speaker's right to be obeyed" by appealing to the sources of power associated with a particular social role and a political position. Linking (de)legitimization with self and other presentation, van Dijk (1997:32) argues that in the argumentative activities in political or racial discourses, interlocutors employ two major strategies: viz. "positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation". Legitimization is broadly defined as a justification strategy to naturalize power abuse and ideological biases. Martín Rojo & van Dijk (1997: 530) argue that all "justificatory discourses"

have legitimizing function, yet legitimization is at work only if power, authority or institutional settings are involved. Along the same line, Fairclough & Fairclough (2012:109) maintain that legitimization is a particular type of justification that is enacted in connection with the pursuit of power and characterized by “publicly shared and publically justifiable, and sometimes even highly formalized, codified, institutional system of beliefs, values and norms”.

Representation (as well as its counterpart, misrepresentation), on the other hand, refers to the political actors’ tendentious construction of reality. Chilton (2004:46) asserts that representation and misrepresentation are related to the “control of information, which is by definition a matter of discourse control”. He identifies two types of information control; quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative control of information refers to the amount of information (usually an inadequate amount), whereas “qualitative misrepresentation is simply lying, in its most extreme manifestation, but includes various kinds of omissions, verbal evasion and denial” (ibid). In this sense, (mis)representation, according to Chilton, can be achieved outside or inside the immediate discourse practices of the interlocutors. On the one hand, (mis)representation is a matter of power *behind* discourse (Fairclough, 1989), which involves the struggle for the access to public discourse and the control over it. On the other hand, however, (mis)representation is a matter of power *in* discourse (ibid), which is concerned about the quality of the interlocutors’ discursive practices in interaction.

In practice, coercion, (de)legitimization and (mis)representation are intrinsically interconnected. Both Chilton (2004: 47) and Hart (2010: 10) point out that representation creates a worldview that aims to secure the control of the action, i.e. coercion, but coercion cannot be successfully brought into action unless the represented worldview is justified by legitimization. The relation among the three main discursive strategies seems to be largely mediated by the interlocutor’s role or identity in the interaction. Coercion cannot be exercised unless the political actor enacts a certain role or identity, therefore a particular representation of the actor image who exercises coercion, i.e. his/her identity, needs to be legitimized. Furthermore, (de)legitimizing a representation of reality often aims to maximize the positive attributes of self and the negative attributes of others, and alternatively minimize the negative attributes of self and positive attributes of others.

Although the relation among the three strategies is not envisaged in hierarchical terms by Chilton (2004), Hart (2010:7) explicitly contends that coercion is the macro-level strategy to which both (de)legitimization and (mis)representation contribute. Since coercion is “not purely linguistic” (Chilton, 2004:45), it is (de)legitimization that seems to operationalize both coercion and (mis)representation. This is because (de)legitimization justifies/undermines the preferable representations of reality, whose aim is to maintain one’s access to power and to secure one’s capability to control others’ actions, i.e. Coercion. It is, then, (de)legitimization, rather than coercion, that should be conceived of as a macro discursive goal. Chovanec (2010:62) rightly argues that legitimization and delegitimization are the overarching goals of political discourse at “the macro-level, which are achieved through the use of several broad discursive strategies, realized by particular textual forms and structures as manifestations of the micro-level of discourse”.

2.5 (De)legitimization patterns in mediatized political discourse

The justificatory function of (de)legitimization often focuses on different aspects of the political context; it can either be actor-oriented, e.g. election campaigns, or action-oriented, e.g. declarations of war and announcements of strategic plans. In fact, both actor and action-oriented (de)legitimization are used simultaneously but they may differ in terms of their hierarchical importance, which is based on the genre expectations and the (de)legitimizers’ political goals. Implicitly alluding to the two possible orientations of (de)legitimization, Hart (2014: 7) argues that legitimization should be envisaged as a macro-function through which interlocutors “seek social approval of the Self”, self here is conceptualized either as the individual interlocutor or a social group or an institution the interlocutors are identified with, or “accreditation for social actions”.

The justificatory function of (de)legitimization has often been conceptualized as a macro discursive goal and explored in highly formalized textual formats of political discourse, mostly written texts and speeches, which are produced in monologic genres (e.g. Martín Rojo & van Dijk, 1997; Cap, 2010; Reyes, 2011; Sowin’ska & Dubrovskaya, 2012). However, in multi-party and dynamic political interactions, especially the ones produced in the social media, justifications of political actions or access to power and authority, and making claims about the public

images of self and others are typical micro interactional practices, whose aim is to voice political opinions or to express (dis)agreements in these debate-like interactions. In these multi-party and dynamic political interactions, it is, then, feasible to conceive of (de)legitimization as a micro argumentative practice that aims to promote/undermine certain interpretations of reality by justifying the public claims about self image, the capacity in which a course of action performed, or the course of action taken.

In the conflictive multi-party debate-like interactions, including the ones under scrutiny in this thesis, the interlocutors tend to recontextualize certain political actions and actors and present them in accordance with their political goals and ideological biases as part of their competition to legitimize their political convictions and delegitimize those of their opponents. Recontextualization, as it is used here, refers to the process of transforming meaning from its original context to acquire different meaning in a new one (Linell, 1998:144). Recontextualization makes the elements of the social practices recontextualized i.e. the roles and identities of the actors concerned, the performance styles of the actions involved, timings and settings (van Leeuwen, 2008: vii), “pass through the filter of the practices in which they are inserted” (ibid: 12). In practice, the transformed meaning may involve “actual wordings, explicitly expressed meanings, or something only implicit or implied in the original text or genre” (Linell, 1998: 148).

Investigating (de)legitimization in terms of the action and actors recontextualized is compatible with KhosraviNik’s (2010: 63) heuristic for analyzing what actors, actions and arguments are actually found in the text and how they are represented when investigating discourses on social and cultural categorization. This means that the working definition of legitimization in this thesis will be: the argumentative practice by means of which the interlocutors’ oppositional interpretations of political contexts are justified and through which their pursuit of power and domination in the mediatized political discourse is acted out. The justification function of the (de)legitimization process can be achieved by recontextualizing particular political actions to characterize them as legitimate and justified in accordance with the interlocutors’ political goals, and/or by recontextualizing particular political actors to characterize them as legitimate

claimants of power in accordance with the interlocutors' ideological preferences. Delegitimization is the counterpart of legitimization.

(De)legitimization is not associated with specific linguistic acts; it is rather a sociopolitical act that may take different realizations (Martín Rojo & van Dijk, 1997:527-8). The discursive realizations of legitimization involve different levels of linguistic description (Mackay, 2015:328). Therefore, it seems more viable to focus on the “typical content-related argument schemes” or *topoi* (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:75), and how they may be realized linguistically in different contexts rather than concentrating on the linguistic realizations of (de)legitimization and their descriptions in general. Drawing on several argumentation theoretical traditions, Reisigl (2014: 77) argues that in discourse analysis, *topoi* reveal more about the specific features of the discourses in which they are used (subject positions, ideological biases, justification strategies, and controversial claims, etc.) than their purely formal characters. *Topoi* are very important in political discourse because they facilitate the transition from the arguments to preferred conclusions (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 74–75). Although these *topoi* are not necessarily fallacious, they are frequently used fallaciously in political discourse. Wodak and Reisigl (ibid: 75) explicitly warn of this ambivalent nature indicating that it is not possible to make a clear-cut distinction “between more or less plausible argumentation and fallacies”, especially where tendentious predications are made as parts of these *topoi*. This is because these tendentious predications often restrict the pragmatic context making particular preferred presupposition more cognitively relevant to the recipients (Maillat & Oswald, 2011: 74-5), and, thus, more likely to evade their logico-rhetorical modules (Sperber, 2000).

Broadly speaking, there seem to be two general academic trends as to how to explore the discursive (de)legitimization patterns, i.e. *topoi*. The first trend focuses on the social categorization of the actors involved, i.e. the representation of self or in-group, on the one hand, vs. the representation of other or out-group, on the other (e.g. Martín Rojo & van Dijk, 1997; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Chovanec, 2010; Sowin´ska & Dubrovskaya, 2012). The second trend, however, is more action-oriented viewing (de)legitimization as an argumentative process that is based on the rationalization and justification of political actions (e.g. van Leeuwen, 2007; Reyes, 2011). It is important to note here that the distinction between these two trends is not stated explicitly, but is

rather implied by the (de)legitimization patterns and strategies described in the framework proposed by each researcher.

Concentrating on actor representation, Martín Rojo & van Dijk (1997: 534-41) identify multiple linguistic evidences at different levels of analysis, i.e. semantic, pragmatic and rhetorical, to demonstrate how the social categorization of actors, in terms of positive self presentation and negative other presentation, may have a justificatory function. Along the same line, Chovanec (2010), and Sowin'ska & Dubrovskaya (2012) interrogate the discursive inclusion and exclusion of actors in political discourses to highlight their (de)legitimizing nature. Both Chovanec (2010:62) and Sowin'ska & Dubrovskaya (2012: 450) assert that social categorization is cognitively associated with the positive qualities of in-group and the negative qualities of out-group. It is this cognitive association, which is quintessentially ideological, that creates the justificatory function of (de)legitimization (van Dijk, 1998:255).

Alternatively, viewing legitimization as an action-oriented process, van Leeuwen (2007:92) develops a well articulated typology for various legitimization patterns arguing that legitimization include four different categories: authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis. He conceives of authorization as a legitimizing process achieved by invoking the concept of power and authority, whether traditional, social, institutional or legal. Moral evaluation is defined as legitimizing assessment of actions "by reference to a value system" (ibid). Rationalization, on the other hand, refers to the justification of claims, actions and goals by highlighting their cognitive validity or expediency. Finally, mythopoesis can be defined as a legitimization process that is communicated through "narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions" (ibid).

Employing insights from both actor and action-oriented perspectives, Reyes (2011) develops a typology to account for (de)legitimization in US presidents' speeches. He (2011: 781) states that (de)legitimization can be discursively achieved through (1) appeal to emotions (particularly fear), (2) presenting a hypothetical future, (3) rationalization, (4) voices of expertise and (5) altruism. He (ibid: 785) argues that (de)legitimization by appealing to emotion aims to skew the interlocutors' opinion regarding the topic in question. This can be achieved by representing out-group members negatively. He (ibid: 786) maintains that (de)legitimization by hypothetical

future is justifying the interlocutor's (mis)use of his authority to take an action that protects his/her group from expected detrimental force or action. This can be discursively presented in various ways including proximization, which is defined by Cap (2010: 119) as a "strategy that relies upon the speaker's ability to present events on the discourse stage as directly affecting the addressee, usually in a negative or a threatening way". Reyes's second legitimization strategy, i.e. presenting a hypothetical future, is included in van Leeuwen's (2007: 104) theoretical rationalization that takes the form of prediction. Similar to Reyes's hypothetical future, prediction according to van Leeuwen (ibid), requires an actor with a particular social position to take protective measures. Moreover, Reyes's conceptualization of rationalization is similar to that of instrumental rationalization proposed by van Leeuwen (2007), because it only includes instrumentality, which needs to be conceptualized as a *modus operandi* (Reyes, 2011: 786). The fourth (de)legitimization strategy identified by Reyes, i.e. voices of expertise, is similar to van Leeuwen's (2007) authorization in terms of expertise. The last strategy identified by Reyes is altruism, which he defines in terms of the positive representation of self (2011: 787).

Taking the typologies developed by van Leeuwen (2007) and Reyes (2011) as points of departure, the major (de)legitimization topoi can be summarized in Table 2.1 below.

No.	Legitimization	Delegitimization	Orientation
1	Rationalization	Irrationalization	Action-oriented
2	Positive evaluation of action	Negative evaluation of action	
3	Authorization	Deauthorization	Actor-oriented
4	Positive representation of self	Negative representation of other	

Table 2.1 Patterns of (De)legitimization

In polarized political situations, (de)legitimization always comes in binary opposition, because legitimizing a political action or actor implicitly entails the delegitimizing the opposing ones, and vice versa. Interlocutors involved in political

interactions would be expected to legitimize their own or their in-group members' images as authorized, trustworthy, amiable, popular and the like, and/or their own or their in-group members' actions as legitimate, justified, legal, rational, expedient, beneficial and the like. Conversely, they would delegitimize their opponents' image as unauthorized, not trustworthy, and unpopular, or their actions as illegitimate, unjustified, illegal, outrageous and so on. Interlocutors often use action-oriented (de)legitimization to justify specific political actions; therefore action-oriented topoi tend to be short-ranged in nature focusing on the specific context in which the actions (de)legitimized take place. Alternatively, Interlocutors often use actor-oriented (de)legitimization to support the ideological biases about self and others, hence actor-oriented topoi tend to have a "panoramic" sociopolitical focus (cf. micro and macro legitimation in KhosraviNik, 2015). It is necessary to note that both action and actor-oriented (de)legitimization can be employed simultaneously in order to reinforce rhetorical effect.

2.6 (De)legitimization topoi in Iraqi political discourse

In this thesis, (de)legitimization will be examined in the relatively under-investigated Iraqi political discourse in multi-party political interactions produced in mainstream and social media in order to capture the dynamics of power and interlocutors' uptakes of each other's discursive behaviors at the micro-level of analysis and practices (see 4.2.1 below). Based on an in-depth survey of the data and the empirical evidence from my qualitative analysis (also see Al-Tahmazi, 2015), the major topoi summarized in table 2.1 above can be further explicated and correlated with further sub-argumentative structures and discursive means of realizations. The empirical evidence indicates that the (de)legitimization topoi found in any political Discourse can be motivated by the context of culture, to use Malinowski's (1966 [1923]) term, more than any other contextual factors as will be shown below. In this sense, expanding on the (de)legitimization topoi identified by other researchers, predominantly in western discourses, will situate the (de)legitimization topoi found in my data in their social and cultural contexts, i.e. Iraqi political Discourse, and highlight the cultural diversity of human discourses and the ways these discourses can be approached and analyzed from culturally sensitive, but globally minded, perspectives (Shi-Xu, 2015).

To start with, (ir)rationalization is an action-oriented (de)legitimization topos; it can be realized in two different ways: explanation and highlighting effectiveness. On the one hand, (ir)rationalization by means of explanation is related to the cognitive validity of the actions targeted by the process of (de)legitimization (van Leeuwen, 2007:92). In (ir)rationalization, the reasons that are ostensibly provided in support of an action intended to be (ir)rationalized are not necessarily the same reasons that support the action from the viewpoint of the (de)legitimizing (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012: 96). This explains how (ir)rationalization can function as a manipulative technique. Rationalization by means of explanation takes the form of providing supporting evidence to present the political action as valid and reasonable. Conversely, Irrationalization by means of explanation highlights the (perceived) inconsistencies in a particular political action to present it as cognitively invalid and incompatible with the interlocutors' needs. (Ir)rationalization by means of explanation is subsumed under van Leeuwen's theoretical (ir)rationalization, which he defines as presenting the action's (in)compatibility with truth (2007:103).

On the other hand, (ir)rationalization by means of effectiveness focuses on the outcome, usefulness and expediency of the political actions targeted by the process of (de)legitimization. It is, as such, epistemologically pragmatic in nature. This sub-type of (ir)rationalization is subsumed under van Leeuwen's (2007) instrumental (ir)rationalization, which defines the validity of the action in terms of efficiency, purposefulness and effectiveness (Reyes, 2011: 799). Rationalization by means of effectiveness is related to how expedient the political action targeted by rationalization is or how beneficial its consequences are for the general public in order to reinforce its validity. Alternatively, Irrationalization on by means of effectiveness is used to warn the intended addressee(s) of the inexpediency of the political action and its detrimental consequences, i.e. topoi of danger (Hart. 2010: 82). This can be discursively achieved by means of proximization to present the intended action as directly affecting the addressees in a negative way (Cap, 2010: 119).

Secondly, political actions can be (de)legitimized by means of legal or moral evaluation (van Leeuwen, 2007:97). This is done by appealing to the legal sets of values or the moral order. (De)legitimization that takes the form of evaluation may refer implicitly or explicitly to other actions to hold a comparison that aims to present the intended action as more/less legitimate than others. (De)legitimization by moral

evaluation presents the political action as (im)moral or good/bad. Moreover, (de)legitimization by legal evaluations presents the political action as (il)legal or (un)constitutional. In certain cases, the borderline between what is legal and moral may become very blurred in certain political situations. For instance a human rights-related issue seems to be both a moral and a legal issue.

The key difference between the two main action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi, i.e. (ir)rationalization and positive/negative action evaluation, can be better envisaged by using Chilton's (2004:117) distinction between epistemic and deontic (de)legitimization. (Ir)rationalization falls within epistemic (de)legitimization, which refers to the claim to have better understanding, recognition or knowledge of the real facts. Positive/negative action evaluation, however, falls within deontic (de)legitimization, which is concerned with the interlocutor's claims to be right in a moral sense. Figure 2.1 shown below lists the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi.




Figure 2.1 Action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi

The third (de)legitimization topos is (de)authorization. (De)authorization is predominantly actor-oriented; it can be operationalized by reference to authority and powerful positions. (De)authorization explicitly aims to strengthen/weaken the power of the political actors targeted by presenting them as (un)fit to hold the power

positions they claim for themselves. Both van Leeuwen (2007) and Reyes (2011) identify the topos of authorization through the voices of expertise as an important legitimization technique in political discourse. In political discourse, claims of popularity and reference to (electoral) representativeness can also be an empowering technique (see example 1 in 6.1 below). Characteristically in the ethno-sectarian discourses, claims of majority and minority can function as ethno-sectarian (de)authorization. Claims of majority are used to present in-group as a legitimate claimant of authority or powerful positions (see example 16 in 7.3 below). In contrast, claims of minority are used to present out-group as an illegitimate claimant of authority or powerful positions (see example 21 in 7.4 below). Ethno-sectarian (de)authorization can be considered a defining feature of the Iraqi political discourses that are produced in the mainstream and social media. Therefore, the power sources based on which political actors can be (de)authorized include: expertise, popularity, and representativeness and claims of majority/minority.

The last (de)legitimization topos is positive/negative actor representation. Political actors can be legitimized by presenting them positively, and delegitimized by presenting them negatively. Political actors can be presented as individuals or as groups; as one might expect self or in-group members are evaluated positively, whereas others and out-group members will be represented negatively (Reyes, 2011: 785). Van Dijk (1998:267) uses the term “ideological square” to refer to the cognitive tendency in political discourses to maximize positive attributes of self and minimize negative attributes of self, and to minimize positive attributes of other and maximize negative attributes of other. The ideological square highlights the interlocutors’ egocentric and exclusionary nature in political discourse. Positive representation of political actors can be done in different ways. Political actors can be presented as altruistic or attentive to public needs, and by means of inclusion (Reyes, 2011: 787). Political actors can also be legitimized by presenting them positively through comparisons with a negative role model, positive difference (Reisigl, 2014: 88), to highlight the contrast between the positive aspects of the legitimized actor and the negative aspects of the negative role model. Victimization is another way to achieve legitimization; it highlights in-group (perceived) grievances representing in-group as victimized by out-group and, as such, as entitled to more power (See example 4 in 5.1, example 5 in 6.1 and example 3 in 7.1 below). Conversely, negative

representation of political actors can be done in different ways. They can be presented as egocentric or selfish and careless about the public needs, or by means of exclusion. Political actors can also be presented negatively by making comparisons with a positive role model to highlight negative difference. Criminalization is another topos of delegitimization; it is used to represent out-groups as violating or impinging on in-groups' rights (see example 3 in 6.1 and example 4 in 7.1 below). The use of victimization and criminalization in political discourses that are primarily ethno-sectarian in nature seems to be mainly motivated by the sentiments of disenfranchisement and victimhood that permeate all Iraqi ethno-sectarian communities. Figure 2.2 shown below lists the actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi.




Figure 2.2 Actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi

As shown above, the (de)legitimization topoi can be classified into two broad categories, namely: collective and individualistic topoi based on the multitude of targets of the (de)legitimization process. The former (de)legitimize groups and communities in their entirety, whereas the latter (de)legitimize individuals, typically politicians. Collective (de)legitimization topoi include victimization, criminalization and claims of majority or minority. Individualistic (de)legitimization topoi involve the remaining actor-oriented topoi and all the action-oriented ones. Individualistic (de)legitimization topoi are always political in essence; they target specific political actors based on their political performance. In theory at least, they aim to persuade most of the Iraqi people about certain political claims regardless of their ethno-sectarian affiliations. Nevertheless, collective (de)legitimization is always ethno-sectarian in nature; they are frequently addressed to an intended audience, i.e. the in-group members, for out-group members do not tend to accept the arguments that are based on delegitimizing their ethno-sectarian community.

To capture how these topoi actually function, it is necessary to analyze how the (de)legitimized actors and actions are discursively represented in a linguistically grounded way. Within the critical discourse analytical tradition, van Leeuwen (2008 [1996]) developed a socio-semantic set of discourse-analytical concepts to describe how social actors and social actions might be represented in discourse. These analytical concepts are motivated by sociological rather than linguistic categories, although van Leeuwen (*ibid*: 33) indicates that there is a degree of overlap between the two. In a similar vein, Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 44) identify discursive representational strategies; these include different referential and nomination choices to refer to the (de)legitimized political actions and actors, and different predicative construction to assign quality to them or to characterize and evaluate them. Admittedly, there is not a straightforward relation between these representational choices, on the one hand, and their social meaning at the macro-level, on the other. The relation between the two is mediated by indexicality, which refers to the implicit correlation between linguistic choices and their conventionalized context of use (Ochs, 1996:411). Therefore, (de)legitimization will be analyzed in terms of the topoi identified above, the linguistic representations of the actors and actions involved (van Leeuwen, 2008 [1996]), and how they are predicated and characterized in the discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).

2.7 Summary

The aim of this chapter was to lay out the theoretical framework to be used in analyzing the production of the conflict for power in mediatized political discourse. Focusing on how political discourse could be conceptualized in accordance with the aims of the thesis, the chapter explore the interrelation between power and discourse, foregrounding the strategic functions of political discourse that serve the political actors' pursuit of legitimacy and power in ways that naturalize ideological biases. The chapter examined how the conflict for power can be constructed and manifested by means of (de)legitimization, exploring the concept of (de)legitimization and its possible patterns. Finally, it distinguished the various topoi of (de)legitimization some of them seem to be characteristic of Iraqi political Discourse. These (de)legitimization topoi could be categorized in two different respects: argumentative orientation and multitude of targets. In terms of the argumentative orientation, the (de)legitimization topoi were either actor-oriented or action-oriented. Actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi tend to support the long-rooted ideological biases about self and others and, therefore, have a panoramic focus on the sociopolitical conflicts in Iraq. Alternatively, action-oriented (de)legitimization tend to be short-ranged in nature focusing on the specific contexts in which the political actions (de)legitimized took place. In terms of multitude of targets, the (de)legitimization topoi were either individualistic or collective in nature, where individualistic topoi typically target individual politicians, while collective topoi (de)legitimize communities in their entirety.

Chapter Three

Evaluating the Discursive Conflict for Power: rapport management and impoliteness in mediatized political discourse

3. Introduction

This chapter explores the possibility of employing insights from rapport and impoliteness studies to examine how interlocutors affectively perceive and morally evaluate the use of different (de)legitimization topoi in the political discourse produced in the media. In doing so, the chapter ultimately aims to develop an approach that helps pinpoint the interactional, social and moral implications of the conflict for power in the Iraqi mediatized political discourse. Section 3.1 demonstrates how (de)legitimization can function as a multi-layered positioning process that is intimately interrelated to the relational aspects of communication and the indexing of sociopolitical identities in mediatized political discourse. Section 3.2 investigates the concept of rapport and how the affective and attitudinal aspects of communication can be accounted for by means of positioning analysis. Section 3.3 presents the state-of-the-art in (im)politeness studies and explores the interplay between (de)legitimization and (im)politeness in order to highlight how the interlocutors' discursive practices in political discourse affect and effect the moral and social orders. Finally, in section 4.4 I introduce my conceptualization to account for how the conflict for power in the mediatized political discourse can be affectively perceived and morally evaluated in terms of impoliteness.

3.1 (De)legitimization as a positioning process

Critical discourse analysts assert that the use of language is never politically neutral. (De)legitimizing, as the use of language to represent particular political actions or actors in a tendentious way, is an inevitably positioning process (Davies & Harré, 1990), through which the (de)legitimiser aligns him/herself with a particular interpretation of reality. In the multi-participant interactions investigated in this thesis, however, the use of (de)legitimization topoi also positions the interlocutors' in relation to each other based on the sociopolitical stances they attempt to communicate. The distinction between these two types of positioning is based on the

contrast between two spatiotemporal levels in the interaction; namely the there-and-then moment in which the (de)legitimized actions took place and from which they were recontextualized, and the now-and-here moment in which the interlocutors are interacting with each other.

Davies & Harré (1990: 48) define positioning as a “discursive process whereby selves are located in conversations as observably and subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced story lines” (Davies & Harré, 1990: 48). Bamberg (1997) develops Davies & Harré’s theory proposing a framework to account for positioning as a multi-tiered interactional process. Bamberg’s framework (1997) can account meticulously for the two levels of positioning in (de)legitimization, but more importantly it attends to a third level of positioning that focuses on the interlocutors’ indexing of their sociopolitical identities and elucidates how these identities can be linked to the broader macro-level social order (De Fina, 2013: 40). Bamberg (1997: 337-8) conceives of positioning as a discursive process that takes place at three different levels of analysis.

1. Positioning level 1 is concerned with the ways characters, their actions and evaluations are positioned in relation to each other in the reported event.
2. Positioning level 2 deals with the ways interlocutors position themselves to each other.
3. Positioning level 3 is related to the ways interlocutors “position themselves to themselves”. That is, how they want to be understood beyond the dominant discourses that frame the interaction.

Drawing on Bamberg’s positioning analysis, (de)legitimization can be analyzed at three levels, each of which has different analytical focus. At the first level of positioning, the analysis concentrates on how the (de)legitimized actions and actors are recontextualized from the there-and-then moment of the reported event and (re)characterized in the here-and-now moment of the interaction (see also De Fina and Georgakopoulou, 2012: 163, De Fina 2013:53), with a special emphasis on the lexicogrammatical representations of these actors and actions. At the second level of positioning, the analysis is concerned with the interlocutors’ alignments with each other when (de)legitimizing particular worldviews; this means that the analytical foci of this level are the different relational facets of interaction. Finally, at the third level

of positioning, the analysis deals with how the interlocutors act out their sociopolitical identities and how these identities are indexed. In fact, the last level of positioning analysis cannot be perceived as an utterly separate level of analysis; it rather represents a summation of the first two levels, with special focus on the interlocutors' practices that are indexical of their sociopolitical identities.

Analyzing (de)legitimization as a multi-layered positioning process brings closer the macro analytical techniques that focus on sociopolitical aspects of discourse and the micro analytical techniques that deal with interactional and attitudinal aspects of communication. This is because positioning analysis as Bamberg *et al.* (2011:182) argue, can account for the connection between “the in situ and in vivo interactive practices and wider cultural sense-making strategies”. Bridging such a methodological gap facilitates the cross fertilization between two disciplines, often perceived as unrelated, viz Political Discourse Analysis and rapport and impoliteness studies. This cross fertilization makes it analytically possible to trace the affective and moral implications of the different (de)legitimization topoi used in the multi-participant, debate-like, political interactions instantiated in the mainstream and social media.

3.2 Rapport management in mediatized political discourse

The relational aspects of communication have long been described as an essential part of any communication process. Brown and Yule (1983) argue that the use of language has a fundamental interactional function. More recently, there has been an unprecedented interest in investigating the relational aspects of communication across various sub-disciplines of linguistics including sociolinguistics, Pragmatics and (im)politeness studies (see Spencer-Oatey, 2011; and Haugh *et al.*, 2013). This interest is motivated by the fact that “human relationships are a primary locus of social organization” (Enfield, 2009: 60). Exploring the relational aspects of communication makes the connection between the interlocutors' discursive practices at the micro-level of the interaction and their social meaning at the macro-level clearer and more meaningful. This is because these discursive practices display how the interlocutors situate themselves within a network of subject positions (Davies & Harré, 1999: 35). More importantly, the emotive and evaluative dimensions of relations are of special significance in explaining how discourses are shaped by the social and moral orders.

In (im)politeness studies, different terms are used to refer to the relational aspects of interactions, including ‘relational work’ (Locher & Watts, 2005, 2008), ‘relating’ (Arundale, 2010), ‘relational practice’ (Holmes & Marra, 2004; and Holmes & Schnurr, 2005) and ‘rapport management’ (Spencer-Oatey, 2000, 2005). Broadly speaking, these different terms seem to overlap with each other but slightly differ in foregrounding different aspects of relationality (Spencer-Oatey, 2011: 3565-6). Highlighting interlocutors’ discursive efforts in negotiating their relations with others, Locher and Watts (2008:96) define relational work as “all aspects of the work invested by individuals in the construction, maintenance, reproduction and transformation of interpersonal relationships among those engaged in social practice”. Alternatively, Arundale’s ‘relating’ underscores the dynamic and conjoint construction of relations; he (2010: 138) conceives of relating as “the establishing and maintaining connection between two otherwise separate individuals, index(ing) phenomena that arise in linguistic and extralinguistic interaction between at least two individuals, the minimum unit of analysis being the dyad, rather than the individual person”. Anchored in the analysis of workplace contexts, ‘relational practice’ is envisaged as a means to lubricate the social wheels through supportive and/or deference oriented discursive practices in order to “advance the primary objectives of the workplace” (Holmes & Schnurr, 2005:125). Foregrounding the affective and evaluative dimensions of relations, Spencer-Oatey and Franklin (2009a: 102) define rapport as “people’s subjective perceptions of (dis)harmony, smoothness-turbulence and warmth-antagonism in interpersonal relations”.

The term ‘rapport’ seems to be more suitable for the purpose of this study, firstly because it helps link the interlocutors’ discursive practices with their perceptions of and attitudes towards the negotiation of power and the construction of social relations that take place in interaction. Secondly, rapport, as argued by Spencer-Oatey (2005:96), is based on three factors; interactional wants, behavioral expectations, and face sensitivities, which makes rapport management theory able to account for both relational work and identity work, i.e. the second and the third levels of positioning analysis respectively. Drawing insights from rapport management theory, it is, then, possible to develop an analytical framework to investigate how the discursive construction of power in political discourse can be attitudinally reacted to and morally or normatively evaluated in interaction. This analytical framework can

ultimately interrogate the social and moral underpinnings of the Iraqi mediatised political discourse.

Spencer-Oatey and Franklin (2009:112) indicate that interactional wants, encompass interlocutors' goals in the interaction, which can be transactional, relational or both. Behavioral expectations, on the other hand, are developed, Spencer-Oatey (2008: 15) argues, in relation to the interlocutors' "perceived sociality rights and obligations"; when these are not satisfied, rapport may be affected. Behavioral expectations can be motivated by social norms, conventions, principles and agreements that are associated with the situation in question (Spencer-Oatey and Franklin, 2009:111). Finally, face sensitivity refers to the aspects of self that have significant emotional value to interlocutors (Spencer-Oatey, 2005:104). Spencer-Oatey (2009: 141) views face as an inherently relational entity that is related to the positive attributes of self that an interlocutor claims for her- or himself and expects others to ratify, and the negative attributes of self s/he neither claims nor expects others to ascribe to him/her in particular context. The relationality of face presupposes that both self face and others' faces are involved and should be attended to in interaction (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 66). Face comprises personal, relational and collective attributes of self that are associated with self-esteem, reputation, prestige, dignity, honor, and competence (Spencer-Oatey, 2008: 14; Culpeper, 2011: 24).

Spencer-Oatey's (2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b) rapport management theory brings the concepts of face and identity closer than ever before. In fact, the relation between face and identity is originally alluded to in Goffman's (1967:5) definition of face, which he defines as "the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself [sic] by the lines others assume he [sic] has taken during a particular contact". In the same vein, Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) defines face as an "emotionally invested" public self image interlocutors claim for themselves in interaction; this public image "can be lost, maintained, or enhanced and must be constantly attended to in interaction". More recently, face and identity have been increasingly viewed as intimately associated concepts by several scholars (Locher, 2008; Ruhi, 2009, 2010; Culpeper, 2011; Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013; Joseph 2013). Locher (2008: 533) envisages relational work as an inclusive term that comprises rapport management, identity work and facework, arguing that relational work refers to the process of negotiating relations, whose product is face or identity. Culpeper (2011:25), on the

other hand, underscores the connectedness between face and identity asserting that face includes “all that the self identifies with”. He (ibid: 26) conceptualizes “the self as a schema consisting of layers of components varying in emotional importance with the most highly charged closest to the centre, and this is thus where potentially the most face-sensitive components lie”.

However, other scholars (including Arundale, 2009, 2010, Haugh 2009, 2012, O’Driscoll, 2012) argue against conceptualizing face in terms of self concept or identity. Rejecting Goffman’s original conceptualization of face, Arundale (2010) envisages face as an essentially social phenomenon while “identity is a phenomenon conceptualized in terms of an individual system” (ibid: 2091). Along the same lines, O’Driscoll (2011:21) conceives of face as a necessarily interactional phenomenon, while identity is not because it is, he adds, the more enduring image one holds about him/herself. Haugh (2012: 58) contends that conceptualizing face in terms of a “socially attributed aspect of self” conflates the concept of face with that of identity. This, consequently, results in, he (ibid) argues, “relationships themselves being neglected as an object of study in their own right in the analysis of interpersonal interactions”.

As convincingly argued by Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2013:5), characterizing face as being utterly different from identity contradicts the social constructivism which underlies most current approaches to identity. The main problem with the views that do not think of face and identity as intimately interrelated, Garces-Conejos Blitvich (ibid) argues, is that they still conceive of identity as predetermined construct, as originally theorized by essentialist approaches to identity, but identity is now commonly viewed by most identity scholars as a social phenomenon constructed interactionally (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006: 4). Furthermore, identity, as often argued by identity theorists, is not individualistic but rather socially negotiated and jointly constructed (Simon, 2004: 25), and as such is the responsibility of the interpreter as much as the responsibility of the constructor (Joseph, 2004:81), because it requires to be verified by others in situ (Burke & Stets, 2009: 68). Consequently, this makes the study of identity construction in discourse indispensable when investigating the attitudinal and moral aspect of relating, more specifically when dealing with face and (im)politeness.

However, identity itself is a contested concept; it is conceptualized differently by different scholars. Some theorists think of identity as a fundamentally social phenomenon (cf. Stryker's Identity Theory, 1987; Labov, 1972), whereas others contend that it is best conceived of as a cognitive entity (cf. Markus's social cognition perspective, 1977; Tajfel and Turner's Social Identity Theory, 1986; and Turner *et al.*'s Self-Categorization Theory, 1987). Alluding to this controversy, Simon (2004) argues that the social and the cognitive aspects of identity are two sides of the same coin. He asserts that the discussion over how to conceptualize identity is "in fact only possible, on the basis of a shared appreciation of identity as a crucial social-cognitive mediator that enables people to comprehend and act in their social worlds as self-conscious and motivated agents" (ibid: 42). Identity theorists have also contested the bases out of which identity can be constructed, relating identity to role, group or unique attributes of self. Bruke & Stets (2009:113) state that the concept of role is taken to be the fundamental basis of identity in sociologically informed identity theories, because it is envisaged as the main regulatory unit in any interaction. In cognitively informed identity theories, nevertheless, the group membership is perceived as the defining aspect of identity, because it revolves around the ways interlocutors perceive themselves as members in particular social groups (ibid: 118). From a cognitive point of view, a further distinction can be made between an interlocutor's perception of his/herself as social agent belonging to a particular social group and as unique member in it. This distinction is instantiated by the difference between collective identity and personal identity. Personal identity is then defined in terms of how unique an individual is and how distinct s/he is from others (Simon, 2004: 37; Bruke & Stets, 2009: 124).

It is not sufficient to emphasize the close relation between face and identity; it is even more important to elucidate the intricacies of this relation in a way that highlights the analytical difference and theoretical significance of each of these concepts when dealing with rapport in mediatized political discourse. Miller (2013:76) argues that "the processes by which face is managed and through which identities are constructed happen concurrently and are co-constitutive", which makes the separation between face work and identity work difficult (Joseph, 2013: 51). Face and identity seem to differ in two respects. First, identity can be a private phenomenon, as a person can reflect about self and who s/he really is. In contrast, face

is always a public phenomenon relevant only in interaction. Secondly, unlike identity, face is always characterized by emotional attachment; it comprises the aspects of self that have emotional significance to interlocutors. Goffman (1967:6) asserts that “a person tends to experience an immediate emotional response to the face which a contact with others allows him; he cathects his face; his [sic] "feelings" become attached to it”. Similarly, Spencer-Oatey (2007: 644) argues that from a cognitive point of view, face and identity are both related to the multiple attributes of self, but face is exclusively related to the attributes that are “affectively sensitive to the claimant”.

Drawing on insights from social and cognitive perspectives in identity theory, Spencer-Oatey (2008:14) argues that face can be associated with personal identity, relational identity and collective identity.⁵ By the same token, Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2013) explores how face and identity may be interrelated and how face can be related to the multiple identities interlocutors may have in interaction. She argues (2013: 17) that “each of the multiplicity of agent/identity that coverage in an individual will have specific authenticity/self-worth/self-efficacy attributes associated with them, i.e., faces”. Interestingly, Spencer-Oatey and Garces-Conejos Blitvich’s conceptualizations of face are compatible with the emic understanding of face within Iraqi culture, which emphasizes the positive image associated with the presentation of self. For instance, using the expressions *May Allah whiten your face* to praise someone or *May Allah blacken your face* to condemn him/her underscores the association between face on the one hand, and pride, honor and good reputation on the other (cf. Ruhi and Işık-Guler, 2007). Face can then be defined as the sentimentally sensitive aspects of self that are related to an interlocutor’s honor, reputation, dignity and self worth (Spencer-Oatey, 2008: 14; Culpeper, 2011: 24; Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013: 17). These aspects of self can be associated with an interlocutor’s personal, interactional or collective identities in interaction.

In this sense, face simultaneously functions as a regulative and constitutive force in interaction. Face regulates how the interlocutors desire to be positioned

⁵ I prefer to use the term *interactional* face rather than *relational* face because all types of face can have relational effect, and can, as such, affect how rapport is perceived. It seems more plausible to think of it as an interactional aspect associated with role relations in a given genre.

within networks of relations in a given interaction in a way that best serves interactional goals. Alluding to the regulative force of face in interaction, Goffman (1967:12) points out that the “maintenance of face is a condition of interaction, not its objective. To study face-saving is to study the traffic rules of social interaction”. In effect, interactional face, the sum of rights and obligations an interlocutor is entitled to by virtue of the role s/he enacts in a given genre, regulates his/her potential interactional moves. Moreover, face is also constitutive of rapport in interaction as it underlies interlocutors’ choices to manage a multiplicity of identities (De Fina *et al.*, 2006: 9) and therefore how interlocutors perceive their relation with each other in terms of “(dis)harmony, smoothness-turbulence and warmth-antagonism” (Spencer-Oatey, 2009a:102).

Since face is associated with an identity projected, which is the agent’s possession rather than the individual’s (Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013: 10, 17), rapport, therefore, is a flexible interactional construct that may change momentarily in the interaction. In practice, interlocutors constantly re-evaluate their relations with each other as the interaction unfolds according to the emerging interactional needs. Attending to this fact, Spencer-Oatey (2008: 32) identifies four different rapport orientations that underlie interlocutors’ perception of rapport, which are shown in Table 3.1 below.

No.	Rapport Orientation	Characteristics
1	Rapport-Enhancement Orientation	Interlocutors positioning themselves in relation to others in a way that enhances harmony in the interaction
2	Rapport-Maintenance Orientation	Interlocutors positioning themselves in relation to others in a way that maintains harmony in the interaction
3	Rapport-Neglect Orientation	Interlocutors positioning themselves in relation to others in a way that is indifferent to harmony in the interaction (the interlocutor’s attention is focused on tasks, or s/he is more concerned about their own self-image)
4	Rapport-Challenge Orientation	Interlocutors positioning themselves in relation to others in a way that impairs harmony in the interaction

Table 3.1 Rapport orientations adopted from Spencer-Oatey 2008

However, investigating rapport in multi-participant and mediatized genres, like the ones in which political discourse is produced, necessitates a sophisticated analytical toolkit to allow for investigating the possibility of multiple rapport orientations triggered by a single discursive practice. Discursive practices may be perceived differently by different interlocutors. In intergroup interactions, for instance, a particular discursive practice can be interpreted as rapport enhancing by in-group members and as rapport challenge by out-group members. Broadly speaking, a rapport enhancing practice tends to be perceived positively and therefore polite. Conversely, a rapport challenging practice tends to be perceived negatively and therefore impolite. It seems that Fetzer's (2007: 1343) distinction between the first-frame and second-frame participation is very useful when theorizing how rapport sensitive practices are evaluated in terms of (im)politeness in multi-participant and mediatized genres. The concept of first-frame participation refers to the interaction between the participants actively involved in the interaction, whereas the concept of second-frame participation refers to the passive role of the observing audience. Therefore, it is essential to take into consideration all the potential recipients at all participation footings in the given genre (Haugh, 2013) when investigating how rapport is perceived and how it may trigger evaluations of (im)politeness in mediatized political discourse.

3.3 Impoliteness as an affective reaction and a moral evaluation

Linguistic (im)politeness has been investigated in many different settings, including workplace contexts, intercultural encounters, interpersonal interactions and many others. The literature on these settings is rather abundant, encompassing dozens of journal articles, several special editions and edited volumes. Nevertheless, there is scant literature on the study of (im)politeness in political discourse; this noticeably includes Harris (2001) and Fracchiolla (2011). Other than relative lack of research conducted on (im)politeness in political discourse, there are several reasons that make the study of (im)politeness in mediatized political discourses a worthwhile endeavor. First of all, impoliteness analysis can account for how the conflict for power and legitimacy is received and evaluated in political interactions in order to cope with the shortcoming in Political Discourse Analysis that it often focuses on the production,

rather than the reception, of political texts. Furthermore, the study of (im)politeness unpacks the normative and moral underpinnings of the political discourses under investigation by examining how the interlocutors evaluate each other's political and discursive practices in terms of (im)politeness. In practice, when interlocutors evaluate particular discursive or political practices as polite, impolite, rude and so on, they implicitly indicate that "their evaluations are not idiosyncratic", but are rather based on normative and moral sets of values (Fukushima & Haugh, 2014: 165-166).

Traditionally, politeness is characterized as a set of rules followed to ensure good communication (Lakoff, 1973), a set of strategies for acting in a socially acceptable way (Brown and Levinson, 1987), or a regulative principle that maintains social equilibrium (Leech, 1983). More recently, and especially after Eelen's (2001:35) revolutionizing call to attend to the "evaluative moment" in real interactions when analyzing politeness and impoliteness, a notable shift has taken place. Scholars started to concentrate on how discursive practice may be evaluated in terms of (im)politeness; so (im)politeness was conceptualized as an evaluation (Watts, 2003: 8), a perlocutionary effect (Terkourafi, 2008:56) or valenced attitudinal response towards a specific behavior (Culpeper, 2011: 23). This shift triggered a major change in (im)politeness scholarship, especially in discursive approaches to (im)politeness, which is characterized by prioritizing the participants' understandings of what may constitute (im)polite behavior, i.e. politeness1, rather than the technical conceptualization of the term within a proposed theoretical framework, i.e. politeness2 (Eelen, 2001:30 ff.). In fact, the study of (im)politeness has evolved out of the study of indirectness in pragmatics to develop a wide range focus that includes rapport, identity, and affective and relational aspects of communication.

This thesis takes an epistemologically pragmatic approach to (im)politeness, in which (im)politeness is conceptualized as a means to an end not as an end in itself, concentrating on the interlocutors' own understandings of what may constitute an (im)polite discursive practice and the basis on which such a practice is morally and normatively evaluated (Kádár and Haugh, 2013:181-205; Fukushima & Haugh, 2014: 166). This conjures up the heated debate about the distinction between politeness1 and politeness2. Building on the original distinction drawn by Watts *et al.* (1992) between first-order politeness and second-order politeness, Eelen (2001: 35) defines politeness1 in terms of "action-centredness", which is fundamentally based on the

participants' understanding and evaluation in interaction. On the other hand, politeness₂ represents "the scientific conceptualization of the social phenomenon of politeness in the form of a theory of politeness₁" (ibid: 43). In her study of (im)politeness across time, Terkourafi (2011:161) finds that (im)politeness₁ and (im)politeness₂ had come from different conceptual origins and that each serves different social and epistemological purposes. However, Haugh (2012:122) refuses to equate the relation between (im)politeness₁, and (im)politeness₂ with that between emic and etic perspectives. He (ibid: 122-128) identifies several epistemological and ontological limitations in this equation arguing that it is rather too simplistic. Attending to all participation footings, he (ibid: 126) asserts that side participants, bystanders and the like "constitute another important first-order locus of analysis". Kádár & Haugh (2013: 84) refer to this category of interlocutors as "metaparticipants".

(Im)politeness₁ perspective can be made use of to explore the theoretical reach and empirical pertinence of employing interlocutors' evaluations of each other's discursive practices in terms of (im)politeness in analyzing the reception of the discursive conflict for power in political discourse. In the context of this thesis, the evaluations of (im)politeness are thought of as social and moral indicators to measure the extent to which the use of particular (de)legitimization topoi is deemed permissible, sanctioned, or tolerable. Since my data represent mediatized political interactions available to audiences, my own (emic) awareness of the rapport sensitive and (im)politeness relevant instances can inform the (im)politeness₁ perspective employed in the thesis. This is because I represent a metaparticipant, to use Kádár & Haugh's (ibid) term, in these political interactions. More importantly, my emic knowledge of some of the culture specific convention and the conventionalized uses associated with the genres under investigation can also be of great use to this (im)politeness₁ approach (see Long, 2016; Culpeper, 2016).

Evaluating a particular behavior as polite, impolite or otherwise is not done in a vacuum, but it is rather evaluated against a normative frame of reference (Kádár and Haugh, 2013:64), which sets the socially expected, allowable, prescribed and proscribed practices in a given context. In the same vein, Culpeper (2008: 30) introduces the idea of personal, cultural, situational and co-textual norms that frame interaction. Kádár and Haugh (2013: 94-95), on the other hand, argue that the

normative frame of reference encompasses three layers of norms: firstly the localized expectancies that involve spatiotemporal and interactional norms; secondly the conventionalized or semi-institutionalized norms that are related to community of practice or other group-based conventions; and thirdly the sociocultural norms related to societal conventions. These norms shape the moral order that underlies all evaluations of (im)politeness.

In this respect, the normative frame of reference and morality are strongly linked (Kádár and Marquez-Reitfer, 2015: 244). Culpeper (2011: 37) argues that the link between the normative frame of reference and morality is established by the obligations associated with the social norms, whose violations may be deemed immoral and as such impolite, because, as argued by Anderson (2000: 170), a social norm is “a standard of behavior shared by a social group” and perceived as “impersonally authoritative rules that everyone ought to obey” (ibid: 183). However, at a more individual level, morality can also be linked to a person’s behavioral dispositions that are reinforced by ideologies (Culpeper, 2011: 76). In everyday life, particular actions, behaviors or practices are often morally evaluated as right or wrong, good or bad, completely based on ideological biases not on social norms. Van Dijk (1998:8) argues that ideology influences our conception of morality by enabling us to establish a multitude of social beliefs about what is good or bad, right or wrong about particular action. Therefore the normative frame of reference can be thought of as a complex, culturally inculcated and socially reinforced, behavioral expectations with normative values guiding our practices.

In the different (im)politeness approaches, the normative frame of reference is grounded in different theoretical models developed in different disciplines, e.g. anthropology, i.e. culture, (Brown and Levinson, 1978), human cognition, i.e. frames (Terkourafi, 2008), sociology, i.e. Habitus, and community of practice, (Mills, 2003, 2011), or linguistics, i.e. genre, (Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013). Eelen (2001: 196) strongly criticizes the traditional theories of politeness (e.g. Lakoff, 1973; Brown and Levinson, 1978[1987]; Leech 1983) for anchoring their analysis in theoretically vague concepts like culture to account for variability and sharedness in politeness. He (ibid: 221) conceptualizes (im)politeness as an evaluation of a social practice that can be more plausibly grounded in Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Yet, Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2013: 21) rebuts the reliance of the discursive approaches to (im)politeness

on the concept of habitus emphasizing that it is too abstract to account for linguistic analysis. In an attempt to make her approach to (im)politeness more linguistically grounded, she (ibid: 24) links it to genre arguing that “[it] is at the socially shared level of genre practices, then, where we find the bundles of norms that guide our assessments of im/politeness”.

Anchoring the normative frame of reference in the concept of genre seems to be a fruitful theoretical move because, as argued by Cap and Akulska (2013: 4), “genres activate certain situational contexts and are realized in these contexts”; these social contexts give rise to a set of role relations that defines interlocutors’ rights and obligations and the behavioral expectations to which they give rise. Additionally, genre does not only subsume the interlocutors’ social rights and obligations in genre, but also their interactional wants, which represent important factors that affect rapport (Spencer-Oatey, 2005:96). This is because genre is broadly perceived to involve goal-oriented social practices (Gruber, 2013: 38). Therefore, genre, as “a way of acting and relating” (Fairclough, 2003: 29) predominantly defines the normative frame of reference in any interaction by virtue of the role relations and interactional wants permissible in that genre, against which discursive behaviors can be evaluated as polite, non-polite, impolite and otherwise.

It is also essential to take into account the variability, argumentativity and recursivity of the evaluations of impoliteness. The evaluations of (im)politeness can vary across individuals, or “even within the same individual over time” (Haugh, 2013: 56). This is mainly related to these individuals’ different conceptions about the normative frame of reference; norms and conventions are not necessarily shared but rather assumed to be shared (Bicchieri, 2006:2; Terkourafi, 2011:162). Bicchieri (2006:2) points out that interlocutors’ discursive practices “further confirm the existence of the norm in the eyes of its followers”. Drawing on insights from discursive psychology, Haugh (2013: 56) argues that variability in evaluating (im)politeness “is to be expected and should be theorized as such”. This variability makes the evaluation of (im)politeness debatable and open to negotiation in interaction. Evaluations of (im)politeness are also recursive; that is, they are not only communicated in social practices but rather represent social practices in and by themselves (Haugh, 2013: 54). This means that a particular evaluation of (im)politeness can itself trigger another evaluation, because “evaluating someone as

impolite can occasion a complaint or negative assessment” (ibid: 59). In this sense, variability, argumentativity and recursivity may be attributed to the different assumptions held by the interlocutors about the sharedness of a normative frame of reference in which the evaluations of (im)politeness are grounded.

In theory, an evaluation of (im)politeness can give rise to subsequent evaluations of (im)politeness in a recursive pattern. In this respect, Eelen’s (2001) distinction between expressive (im)politeness and classificatory (im)politeness seems very relevant here. Expressive (im)politeness refers to a negatively or positively valenced attitude encoded in a discursive practice, whereas classificatory (im)politeness is the normative judgment of this negatively or positively valenced attitude (Eelen, 2001: 35). Expressive impoliteness can be “first-positioned (i.e. initiating)” or “next-positioned (i.e. responsive)” (Haugh, 2015: 224). When first-positioned, expressive impoliteness involves an offensive practice, but when next-positioned it registers an offense via an affective stance (ibid: 280). On the other hand, classificatory impoliteness is always next-positioned, encompassing a moral stance made by invoking the moral order (ibid). Yet, in my data, indeed in all multi-party interactions, some discursive practices can involve both expressive and classificatory impoliteness. This takes place when an interlocutor communicates his/her evaluation of a particular discursive practice as impolite in an impolite manner (see example 22 in 7.4 below). In practice, the rapport sensitive instances that involve classificatory (im)politeness can be identified based on the interlocutors’ metapragmatic comments (Culpeper, 2011: 74) and other contextualization cues available (Gumperz, 1982: 131), which may include a word, a phrase, a paralinguistic feature or interactional practices. On the other hand, the rapport sensitive instances that involve expressive impoliteness can be analytically identified by making use of my own emic awareness of the norms conventionally associated with the settings under investigation to make specific genre-sanctioned and culture- specific interpretations of impoliteness (see Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013: 24; Long, 2016: 22).

Since I investigate mediatized political interactions, which typically include conflictive and antagonistic interactions, the analysis will be more attentive to impoliteness. Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2010:545) argues that impoliteness should not be envisaged “just as disruptive, but as constitutive of communal life”. Indeed, the evaluations of impoliteness can play a privileged role in unpacking the interactional,

social and moral underpinnings of the interactions in which they are made. In this thesis, Culpeper's (2011) definition of impoliteness will be adopted, because it takes into consideration three important aspects. Firstly, it highlights the connection between impoliteness and the social and the moral orders in which the interactions in question are anchored. Secondly, it is characteristically attentive to the role of emotions in evaluations of impoliteness. This seems to be very relevant in antagonistic interactions, especially because impoliteness is often perceived to be more intimately associated with true emotion (Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2010: 69). Thirdly, and maybe more importantly, Culpeper's (2011) definition links impoliteness with causing offense, which lies at the heart of the Arabic understanding of impoliteness. Culpeper (ibid: 23) defines impoliteness as:

a negative attitude towards specific behaviours occurring in specific contexts. It is sustained by expectations, desires and /or beliefs about social organisation, including, in particular, how one person's or a group's identities are mediated by others in interaction. Situated behaviours are viewed negatively - considered 'impolite' - when they conflict with how one expects them to be, how one wants them to be and/or how one thinks they ought to be. Such behaviours always have or are presumed to have emotional consequences for at least one participant, that is, they cause or are presumed to cause offence. Various factors can exacerbate how offensive an impolite behaviour is taken to be, including for example whether one understands a behaviour to be strongly intentional or not.

It is important to mention upfront that in the context of this thesis, impoliteness is perceived in its broadest sense to refer to the process of "inferring interpersonal meanings in context" (Culpeper *et al.*, 2014: 67). Thus, the conceptual distinction between impoliteness and rudeness made by some scholars (Terkourafi, 2008; Culpeper, 2005) is overlooked in the analysis. Firstly because this distinction is not lexically maintained in some languages (Terkourafi, 2008: 61), which makes it difficult to follow in the actual analysis, at least in certain languages. In fact, there is no Arabic equivalence to the English impoliteness itself; the expression *lack of*

politeness is often used to refer to impoliteness in Arabic; secondly, the distinction is actually based on the notion of the speaker's intention, which is admittedly impervious to analytical investigation, and as such runs the risk of indulging in purely cognitive analysis that is difficult to capture linguistically. Thirdly, as indicated by Culpeper in a later work (2008: 32), the distinction between impoliteness and rudeness is made "in the spirit of defining impoliteness²", and as such has little relevance to the impoliteness¹ perspective used in this thesis.

Evaluations of impoliteness can be instantiated by different triggers. Breaching of social entitlements and violating of behavioral expectations can give rise to negative evaluations and, as such, impoliteness may ensue (Spencer-Oatey, 2008; Culpeper, 2011). Impoliteness may arise in such cases because interlocutors are held accountable for their discursive practices that are evaluated negatively by others; this accountability is "underpinned, in part, by the presumed agency" of the interlocutors (Mitchell & Haugh, 2015: 207). However, particular discursive practices can still be assessed as impolite even though they do not violate the normative frame of reference. Spencer-Oatey (2005: 108) shows how particular practices can still be face-threatening without violating any expectations or breaching appropriateness. This is because, in theory, interlocutors' faces are expected to be maintained; unintended or implicit face attacks often give rise to negative emotions that are traditionally linked to impoliteness. Moreover, an evaluation of impoliteness can also arise when a self claimed identity is disauthenticated in an attempt to exclude an interlocutor from a social group because such a behavior orients rapport towards challenge and impairs harmonious communication (Garces-Conejos Blitvich *et al.*, 2013).

In conflictive interactions, disauthenticating interlocutors' projected identities or attacking the faces associated with these identities seems to be in line with the behavioral expectations associated with the context, which may make such practices more tolerable and a bit less impolite (Culpeper, 2011: 206). Yet, in my data the discursive practices that are perceived by the interlocutors as involving disauthentication of their projected identities or potential damage to their faces, especially their collective aspects of self, are evaluated negatively and envisaged as extremely offensive (see 6.4 and 7.4 below). This is firstly because in these public interactions these aspects of self become more emotionally sensitive and publicly

exposed (Culpeper, 2011: 219), and secondly the extent to which these interactions are polarized reinforces intolerance.

Therefore, drawing on Spencer-Oatey (2005: 108) and Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2013: 18), evaluations of impoliteness can be argued to emerge if:

- the normative frame of reference is violated,
- the self projected identity is not verified or disauthenticated, and
- the self-worth and self-efficacy attributes, i.e., face, associated with the self-projected identity are attacked

The difference between identity/face related impoliteness and that related to the violation of the normative frame of reference can be explicated clearly in multi-participant and multi-layered interactions like the ones investigated in this thesis. The discursive practices that raise social entitlement violation issues can be evaluated as impolite by all participants, ratified and non-ratified (Goffman, 1981). On the other hand, the discursive practices that raise identity/face related issues can only be evaluated as impolite or offensive by the addressees to whom these discursive practices are intended. This is because these practices attack the addressees' faces exclusively and, as a result, make them more vulnerable in interaction. The first type of impoliteness, the negative evaluations associated with violation of the normative frame of reference, can be captured at the second level of positioning analysis, as it deals with the interactional roles that define the interlocutors' rights and obligations. Nevertheless, the second type of impoliteness, i.e. the negative evaluations associated with identity/face attacks, can be captured at the third level of positioning analysis, because it concentrates on the discursive construction of identities, and by extension the faces associated with these identities (Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013).

Interestingly, as shown in (2.6) above, one of the delegitimization topoi is operationalized by invoking the moral order to evaluate negatively particular political actions. Evaluating political actions negatively based on moral grounds may amount to evaluations of impoliteness. This can be attributed to two reasons: firstly these evaluations are made in response to actions that triggered negative attitudes (Culpeper, 2011:23), secondly impoliteness cannot be dissociated from the process of evaluative characterizations of actors and actions (Georgakopoulou, 2013:68), which seems the essence of this type of delegitimization. However, these evaluations differ from typical evaluations of impoliteness in two respects. First, they are employed

argumentatively as part of the interlocutors' efforts to delegitimize the political actions performed by unfavorable political actors, whom the interlocutors typically perceived as out-group members. Second, the actions evaluated in terms of impoliteness do not take place within the same spatiotemporal level of the interaction in which the evaluations are made. The actions evaluated take place in the there-and-then moment of the reported events, but they are recontextualized in the here-and-now moment of the interaction. This means that actions are exogenous to the interaction in which they are evaluated negatively and, thus, considered impolite. Therefore, the term exogenous evaluations of impoliteness will be used to refer to delegitimization cases that are based on moral evaluations to differentiate them from typical evaluations of impoliteness which will be termed endogenous. Analytically, exogenous impoliteness assessments can be identified at positioning level 1, which focuses on the political actions that are recontextualized in the interaction and how they are morally evaluated and consequently delegitimized.

3.4 Interplay between (de)legitimization and impoliteness in mediatized political discourse

To sum up, this thesis traces how the conflict for power is produced, perceived and evaluated in debate-like multi-participant political interactions. To do so, the analysis needs to focus on both the discursive production of power and the (de)legitimization of particular interpretations of reality and their social meaning at the macro-level, and the interactional, attitudinal and moral implications of these practices at the micro-level. I argue that Bamberg's (1997) multi-tiered positioning analysis can account for these different analytical levels and how they may be interrelated in interaction. Bamberg's positioning analysis highlights how the use of (de)legitimization indexes sociopolitical stances, and simultaneously positions the interlocutors in relation to each other as well as to themselves.

This multi-tiered analysis can also account for how the various sets of impoliteness assessments may be triggered and functionally employed in political interactions taking into consideration the different spatiotemporal levels of the participation framework. In this sense, it explains how the evaluations of impoliteness in the interactions under scrutiny may have a delegitimizing function and, thus, may be employed argumentatively. This takes place when delegitimization is put into

action by morally evaluating the political action intended to be delegitimized. On the other hand, this multi-tiered analysis shows how (de)legitimization can trigger evaluations of impoliteness when interlocutors evaluate particular interactional practices that have delegitimizing functions as violating the genre-based interactional norms, failing to verify or rejecting the sociopolitical identities they claim, or else damaging the aspects of face associated with these identities. Unpacking the interrelation between (de)legitimization and impoliteness elucidates how the conflict for power in mediatized political interactions can be attitudinally confronted, and normatively and morally evaluated in interaction. This also highlights the intertextuality and multifunctionality of impoliteness in ethno-sectarian and political discourses. Figure 3.1 illustrates how each level of positioning analysis can capture a different type of evaluation of impoliteness.




Figure 3.1 Positioning analysis and evaluations of impoliteness in political interactions

Chapter Four

Methodology and Data

4. Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to explain the methodological basis of the analysis and to outline the data collection as well as the data preparatory processes, which include obtaining ethical approvals, anonymization, transcription, and translation. Section 4.1 outlines the methodological decisions made in the research design for this project and explains their theoretical bases. Section 4.2 sets out the data collection process, clarifying its selection criteria and its categories. The ethical issues and the anonymization process are detailed in section 4.3. The last section in the chapter, i.e. 4.4, is dedicated to the discussion of the translation method and presentation of the transcription conventions.

4.1 Methodology

This section sets out the methods and approaches applied in this thesis and their theoretical underpinnings. It also tackles the coding decisions made to quantify the textual data.

4.1.1 Mixed method analysis

In the field of linguistics, the relation between the quantitative and qualitative research paradigms is not always one of contrasting poles but rather of continuum (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Using a mixed methods design that integrates qualitative and quantitative analyses has been increasingly described as a beneficial strategy to answer a wide range of research questions (Angouri, 2010: 30; Page *et al.*; 2014: 53; Ivankova and Greer, 2015: 65). More specifically, Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009: 7) present mixed methods research as an alternative pragmatist paradigm that employs both textual and numerical analyses based on the researcher's needs. According to Tashakkori & Creswell (2007: 4), a mixed methods paradigm combines or integrates qualitative and quantitative elements in several ways, but the most relevant to this thesis include the use of

- *two types of research questions (with qualitative and quantitative approaches), and*

- *two types of data analysis (statistical and thematic).*

The analysis in this thesis has a predominantly qualitative element that deals with how conflict for power and legitimacy is produced, perceived and evaluated in mediatized political discourses. As indicated by Herring (2004: 369), “complex, interacting, ambiguous or scalar phenomena” can be more comprehensively analyzed and described by qualitative and interpretative approaches than quantitative approaches. Yet, using quantitative analysis is also important to analyze how various phenomena and discursive patterns are used differently in the different generic contexts. Sandelowski *et al.* (2009: 210) assert that quantifying patterns in qualitative analysis “allow[s] analysts to discern and to show regularities or peculiarities in qualitative data they might not otherwise see or be able simply to communicate, or to determine that a pattern or idiosyncrasy they thought was there is not”. To that effect, the outcomes of the qualitative analysis were codified and analyzed quantitatively in order to provide comparative insights about the linguistic description of texts produced in contrasting genres and thematic contexts. Therefore, using mixed methods was not only beneficial but rather imperative in the present thesis, because research design of the thesis was substantially based on both qualitative and quantitative research questions.

The use of mixed methods, in which the outcomes of qualitative analysis are codified and analyzed quantitatively, was also inspired by other similar studies in the different fields with which my thesis deals, i.e. Political Discourse Analysis, communication of emotions and attitudes, and Linguistic Impoliteness. Bull (2003:18-19) highlighted the importance of using coding systems to analyze textual data quantitatively in political communication. Boyd (2014) employed both quantitative and qualitative analysis to identify and analyze patterns of participatory positions in YouTube comments on US political speeches. Langlotz and Locher (2012) analyzed the ways in which emotional stances could be communicated in online disagreements by firstly identifying the linguistic and graphic patterns that indexed emotional display and then coding their corpus based on these linguistic and graphic patterns to analyze their corpus quantitatively. As for impoliteness studies, Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2010) quantified certain realizations of impoliteness to explore the interrelation between impoliteness and polarization in political discussions on

Youtube. In a similar fashion, Kleinke and Bös (2015) also used mixed methods to investigate how rudeness is functionally used in intergroup discussions in online fora. Exploring cross-cultural variation, Culpeper (2011, section 1.5) and Culpeper *et al.* (2014) employed mixed methods in their analysis of impoliteness in different cultural contexts in order to provide insights as to how impoliteness could be triggered and evaluated in different cultures.

Notwithstanding, coding the outcomes of qualitative analysis in order to analyze them quantitatively may sometimes be criticized for being unjustifiably subjective. However, subjectivity in mixed methods research can be mitigated by making adequate and transparent analytical decisions. In this thesis, three analytical decisions were made to minimize subjectivity and avoid biased interpretation of the data. First, the coding decisions were based on the interlocutors' perspectives, that is, the coding was in line with an emic perspective, in order to avoid as far as possible the potential imposition of the analyst's perspective. The interlocutors' perspective could be ascertained via the explicit metapragmatic comments (Culpeper, 2011: 74) and contextualization cues (Gumperz, 1982: 131) in the data, which might include a word, a phrase, paralinguistic feature or interactional behavior. As noted by Fielding (2009: 131), the quantification of textual patterns could be done based on categories or codes that emerge in the data. Second, the data were triangulated in terms of the political topics discussed and the genres from which they were extracted (see 4.2.2), to ensure that the results can be transferable to similar contexts (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009: 26). Data triangulation aims to converge and corroborate different datasets in order to ensure validity and increase the credibility of the analysis (Fielding, 2009:131; Angouri, 2010: 34). Third, the interpretation of the findings emphasized clear points of contrast as indicated through polarized quantitative results. Inevitably, this means that nuanced differences in particular instances were neglected in order to reduce likelihood of drawing unsubstantiated conclusions.

4.1.2 Interdisciplinarity

This thesis aims to answer a broad question related to how the conflict for power is produced, received and evaluated in the political discourses in some mainstream and social media in order to shed light on the ways ethno-sectarian divisions in Iraq form and are formed by the political discourses produced in mainstream and social media.

However, this question is too broad to be dealt with from a single academic perspective, and as such requires an interdisciplinary analytical approach that is specifically tailored to answer it. As Klein (1990:196) convincingly argues, interdisciplinarity “is a means of solving problems and answering questions that cannot be satisfactorily addressed using single methods or approaches”. The mixed methods in this thesis are thus developed from an eclectic interdisciplinary analytical approach, which also opens up the thesis’ relevance to a wider spectrum of audience and provides critical perspective to the research (see Page *et al.*, 2014: 49).

The present thesis draws on Political Discourse Analysis to analyze how the conflict for legitimacy and power is produced and discursively realized in Iraqi political Discourse. However, the majority of the political discourse analytical techniques focuses predominantly on the contexts of discourse production and pays very little attention to the reception of texts (cf. Fairclough, 2003: 12, Breeze, 2011:520). To attend to the reception of text, I employ the study of rapport and that of impoliteness to account for how the conflict for domination and power is perceived and evaluated, as these frameworks attend to the contexts of reception as they are made evident in the different interactional contexts. However, there is an analytical gap between macro discourse analytical approaches, e.g. the CDS-informed Political Discourse Analysis, and micro analytical approaches, e.g. discursive analyses of rapport management and (im)politeness. Methodologically, positioning analysis can bridge this micro-macro gap by appealing to the multi-tiered positioning theory, originally developed in narrative analysis (Bamberg, 1997), by investigating the relational and interactional aspects of communicative encounters at the meso-level.

4.2 Data

Data analyzed in any research raises numerous questions concerning the collection process, selection criteria, data categories and sample size. The purpose of this section is to address these questions.

4.2.1 Data Selection

The data collected in this thesis include nine contrasting political interactions discussing three different political topics in three different generic contexts representing mainstream and social media, in order to observe data triangulation.

Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007: 106) point out that the sampling scheme is one of the crucial factors “in situations where the purpose of the qualitative study is to generalize the findings”. Therefore, the data selection was based on a purposively predefined set of criteria in order to ensure that the data were representative of the types of media under scrutiny, namely mainstream and social media, and that the political discourses in these types of media were thematically comparable, i.e. the data collected from the different types of genres tackled the same political topics. Teddlie & Yu (2007: 80) maintain that purposive sampling can have two goals:

- *to find instances that are representative or typical of a particular type of case on a dimension of interest, and*
- *to achieve comparability across different types of cases on a dimension of interest.*

Therefore the general data selection criteria were:

1. The datasets that represented both mainstream media and social media had to be interactional, so that interlocutors’ uptakes of each other’s discursive behaviors could be observed in order to be able to analyze how the conflict for power in political discourse is perceived and evaluated (cf. Terkourafi, 2015: 95).
2. All the datasets had to include interactions that dealt with strictly political issues related to the political regime and process in Iraq rather than other general issues.
3. Data triangulation had to be taken into consideration; each of the datasets should include interactions that took place in three different thematic contexts, i.e. political topics.
4. All the datasets had to take place within the time span decided, i.e. from June 2013 to May 2014.

These general data selection criteria were not enough to facilitate the data selection and collection processes. First, it was relatively difficult to decide what best represented the political discourses instantiated in mainstream and social media in Iraq. Second, the lack of standardized procedures for collecting data from the internet including social media (Hewson, 2008), made it even more difficult to collect the data that fit the purpose of this thesis. Prior to the data selection process, I surveyed the

Iraqi TV channels, different social media and several online platforms, and also consulted some activists with good experience in offline and online activism within the Iraqi context in order to identify the most commonly used and watched political platforms. Based on the personal survey and consultation, it was decided to exclude some of the social media sites and platforms, such as Twitter and YouTube, because they were not commonly used by Iraqis to discuss political views. The survey and consultation processes also resulted in more detailed selection criteria that were specifically relevant to the genre chosen. The criteria based on which the selection of the TV interviews was made are listed below:

1. The selected interviews had to be taken from ostensibly cross-sectarian and non-partisan TV channels in order to ensure political inclusiveness in the policies of the TV channels selected.
2. The key political rivals or parties related to the discussed political topics in each of the selected interviews had to be all represented to guarantee the exchange of diverse viewpoints.
3. The selected TV interviews should not represent in any way a form of “confrontation” (see for instance Garces-Conejos Blitvich *et al.*, 2013).

Facebook was chosen as a social media context for interaction, as it represented the most commonly used social media site in Iraq (Iraq Insights and Trends, 2011: 4). The criteria based on which the Facebook comment threads were selected included:

1. The Facebook page had to be owned and administrated by key political commentators, journalists or civil activists. Facebook pages which were suspected to be administrated by others were ruled out.
2. The Facebook page owner had to have relatively high number of followers (50000 followers and/or friends on average).
3. The Facebook page owner had to interact actively with and respond to the commenters who engaged in the political discussions generated on their pages.
4. The posts made by the authors had to attract relatively high numbers of comments (minimally 100 comments) generating relatively long comment threads.

The online news readers' response threads were selected as a point of contrast with both the mainstream news and Facebook interactions, for in this case both forms of mass media and social media were intertwined. The online news reports were professionally generated journalistic content posted on an online mass media outlet, whereas the online news readers' response threads represent user-generated content posted on interactive platforms, typically categorized as a social media outlet (see Walther and Jang, 2012). The criteria based on which the online news website was selected included:

1. The selected online news website represents an online website of a leading and widely spread Arab news agency.
2. The comment section of the selected news website generated relatively long comment threads in comparison to other websites (70 comments on average in comparison to 10 comments on average for other popular online news websites).

4.2.2 Data Categories: generic categorization vs. thematic categorization

Although these multiple criteria made the data collection a highly difficult and complicated process, these parameters aimed to ensure that the datasets analyzed in the thesis were representative of the political discourses produced in some genres of mainstream and social media and ultimately comparable. The data analyzed in this thesis can be categorized in terms of the genres in which they were produced and in terms of their thematic contexts, i.e. the main topics discussed. From a generic perspective, the data collected first included a set consisting of three TV interviews representing mainstream media. These TV interviews were taken from three popular TV shows taken from two cross-sectarian and ostensibly non-partisan TV channels; Alrasheed www.alrasheedmedia.com, and Alsumaria www.alsumaria.tv. The second dataset consisted of three Facebook comment threads taken from three different Facebook pages. The first comment thread was taken from a Facebook page owned by the renowned journalist, author and activist Muhammad Al-Akhras. The second comment thread was taken from a Facebook page owned by the famous political talk show host, author and activist, Saadoun Muhsin Dhamad. The third comment thread

was taken from a Facebook page owned by well known political commentator Ibraheem Alsumydaie. The third dataset consisted of three online news readers' response threads taken from the pan-Arab online news website www.alarabiya.net.

From a thematic perspective, the data collected can also be categorized into three different sets based on the main topics discussed by the interlocutors. The thematic categorization crosscut the generic categorization. The political themes discussed in the first TV interview, first Facebook comment thread and first online news readers' response thread were related to the 2012 political deadlock in the country, which was related to the opposition's demand to vote out the former Prime Minister, Al-Maliki, or push him to tender his resignation. In contrast, the second TV interview, second Facebook comment thread and second online news readers' response thread predominantly focused on a highly sensitive and potentially conflictive topic, namely the sectarian-based power-sharing process in post US-led invasion Iraq along with the concomitant Sunni claims of marginalization and victimhood. Lastly, the political themes tackled in the third TV interview, third Facebook comment thread and third online news readers' response thread were mainly associated with the results of the 2014 parliamentary election and the follow up negotiations to form a coalition government. The political interactions, from which all the dataset were collected, took place in the period from June 2013 to May 2014. Table 4.1 provides more information on the three datasets collected in this thesis.

	TV interviews			FB comment thread			Online news readers’ response threads		
	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3
No. of turns	214	196	316	100	122	175	62	42	129
Words count	3912	4280	6175	2147	3653	2803	2614	2160	6520
Sub-total word counts	14367			8603			11294		
Total word count	34264								

Table 4.1 Dataset sizes and word counts

As indicated in the table above, there is variation in terms of the sizes of the datasets. This was expected because of the different modularity in each dataset. It was decided

to keep all the responses and comments (not to take a sample of comparable size) in order to ensure that the full discussions in each set are included. When doing quantitative analysis, I will normalize the results in relation to the total analytical tokens identified in each of the datasets. I will make sure to explain the normalization process I made in detail for each case within the analytical chapters.

4.3 Ethical Issues and Anonymization

The ethics of data collection from online outlets has been, and is still, a topic of heated debate within humanities and social sciences (e.g. Sharf, 1999; Eysenbach & Till, 2001; Bassett & O’Riordan, 2002; Flicker *et al.*; 2004; De Costa, 2015). The center of this debate is generally related to the extent to which the data collected are considered public, and consequently whether or not the interlocutors’ consent is needed (Page *et al.*, 2014:64, Bassett & O’Riordan, 2002; Eysenbach & Till, 2001). The TV interviews were considered public materials because they were broadcast by mass media and were made available online for public use, and as such required no consent to observe and transcribe. The online news readers’ response threads were also considered public discourses for several reasons, firstly because they represented discussions about public policies rather than friendships and private interests (Sellers, 2004: 15). Secondly, they were made publically available to anyone with an internet connection at a website that requires no subscription; alarabiya.net. Finally, the offline identities of commenters on alarabiya.net were not observable in this context and thus were at no risk of being revealed (cf. Markham, & the AoIR ethics working committee, 2012).

As a potentially semi-public, semi-private or even private context, Facebook is a rather more complex context from which to collect data. Here the question of who owns the interactions, their status as public or private, and the right to access the materials in the first place raise many questions. Facebook’s terms and conditions explicitly state that “[w]hen you publish content or information using the Public setting, it means that you are allowing everyone, including people off of Facebook, to access and use that information, and to associate it with you (i.e., your name and profile picture)”.⁶ More importantly, in contrast to many discourse-analytic studies of

⁶ Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, section Two: Sharing Your Content and Information

Facebook interaction that focused on data extracted from private wall pages (e.g. Page 2012, Maiz-Arevalo, 2015; Bolander and Locher, 2015; Theodoropoulou, 2015), here the Facebook pages were publically available. Therefore, the comments posted on public Facebook pages to debate public issues and made available to everybody, were considered public and, as such, ethically acceptable to use as part of the data for my analysis (cf. Markham, & the AoIR ethics working committee, 2012). However, the status updates made by the Facebook page owner needed informed consent from the owners, because they might have thought of their Facebook pages as an online private space (see Page *et al.*, 2014:64-65; Markham, & the AoIR). To conform to the University of Leicester ethics regulations, I applied for ethical approval to collect online data for my research. A consent form was developed in order to obtain the permission of the Facebook page owners from which the data were collected. The consent form was originally developed in English and then translated into Arabic, because the people whose consents I sought were Arabic speaking (see Appendix I). In accordance with Data Protection Act 1998, the Facebook page owners received accurate, explicit, and detailed information about the purpose of the data collection, and they were also able to contact the researcher in case of questions or concerns. They all signed the consent forms and sent me electronic versions of these consent forms (see Appendix II).

The data collection for the thesis had to be anonymized. Tilley & Woodthorpe (2011: 198) and Walford (2005: 85) define anonymization as the removal or obscuring of the interlocutors' names and any identifying details in order to ensure that interlocutors would not be identified. In qualitative research, anonymization is a desirable standard which primarily aims to minimize the risk of potential harm to interlocutors (Tilley & Woodthorpe, 2011: 199). Therefore, all information about the online commenters' names and locations were anonymized. Throughout the thesis, all interlocutors were referred to by their interactional roles, e.g. post-author, commenter 1, and commenter 2. Only when there was a need to refer to specific commenters, initials system was developed to designate them. This system employed every two successive alphabetical letters as initial for the designated commenter (see examples 7 and 5 in 6.2 below). Yet, the names of the interviewees in the TV interviews analyzed in this thesis were retained, because they were considered public figures discussing their political views publically on mass media.

4.4 Translation and transcription conventions

All the data were originally produced in Arabic, both high and low varieties. Arabic is a diglossic language that includes a high variety, modern standard Arabic, and a low variety, local Iraqi (colloquial) Arabic in the case of this thesis (Ferguson, 1959). However, some sociolinguistic studies seem to conceptualize standard and colloquial Arabic as “two extremes poles on a continuum” rather than completely distinct varieties with different functional and contextual usages (Albirini, 2016: 42). The data were mostly produced in the modern standard Arabic because of the settings and medium of the genre in question, but bidialectal code switching (ibid: 228) has occurred frequently. The data produced in local Iraqi (colloquial) Arabic were printed in red wherever analytically relevant. A semi-literal translation was used to present them in English in the thesis. The semi-literal translation aimed to exhibit, as accurately as possible, how the political topics, actions and actors were originally realized by the interlocutors. The English translation was on occasion slightly modified in case the original punctuation used by the interlocutors potentially gave rise to confusion as shown in the example below, which is a response posted by a reader of the online news website:

كله كذب حتى اهل الجنوب مو كلها تنتخب الهالكي ليش هو شنو اللي سواه بالجنوب اشو كلما مر الوقت يرجعون للوراء تخلف بالتعليم والفقر والمرض والكهرباء والماء والبطالة هاي مال 40 بالمئة كلها كذب بكذب

These are all lies. Not all the people of the south voted for the doomed one [a play with words to refer to Al-Maliki]. What has he accomplished in the south? It is getting worse as the time went by. [There are] deteriorating education ((system)), poverty, diseases, ((lack of)) electricity and ((running)) water and unemployment. The 40 percent is all lies.

The reader did not use any punctuation marks in his/her original response. Therefore, I had to use the proper punctuation marks to make the comment comprehensible to the English reader.

As for the data extracted from spoken interactions, viz, the TV interviews, I personally transcribed them using a simplified version of the ‘Jefferson system’ (cited in Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2002: vi-vii), which is shown below.

(0.5)	<i>Number in brackets indicates a time gap in tenths of a second.</i>
(.)	<i>A dot enclosed in brackets indicates a pause in the talk of less than two-tenths of a second.</i>
=	<i>‘Equals’ sign indicates ‘latching’ between utterances.</i>
[]	<i>Square brackets between adjacent lines of concurrent speech indicate the onset and end of a spate of overlapping talk.</i>
(())	<i>A description enclosed in a double bracket indicates a non-verbal activity.</i>
-	<i>A dash indicates the sharp cut-off of the prior sound or word.</i>
:	<i>Colons indicate that the speaker has stretched the preceding sound or letter.</i>
(inaudible)	<i>Indicates speech that is difficult to make out. Details may also be given with regards to the nature of this speech (eg. shouting).</i>
.	<i>A full stop indicates a stopping fall in tone. It does not necessarily indicate the end of a sentence.</i>
?	<i>A question mark indicates a rising inflection. It does not necessarily indicate a question.</i>
↑↓	<i>Pointed arrows indicate a marked falling or rising intonational shift. They are placed immediately before the onset of the shift.</i>
<u>Under</u>	<i>Underlined fragments indicate speaker emphasis.</i>
CAPITALS	<i>Words in capitals mark a section of speech noticeably louder than that surrounding it.</i>
◦ ◦	<i>Degree signs are used to indicate that the talk they encompass is spoken noticeably quieter than the surrounding talk.</i>

< > *'Less than' and 'More than' signs indicate that the talk they encompass was produced noticeable slower than the surrounding talk.*

[...] *Lines omitted for the purpose of brevity*

Chapter Five

Interplay of (De)legitimization, Rapport and Impoliteness in Political TV Interviews

5. Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to examine the conflict for power in three TV interviews representing political discourses in mainstream media in terms of production and reception. To that end, I investigate how the production, reception and evaluations of the conflicts for power instantiated in the three TV interviews across thematically different contexts. Focusing on the first levels of positioning analysis, section 5.1 examines how the interviewees pursued legitimacy and power when communicating their sociopolitical views through the use of different (de)legitimization topoi. Section 5.2 concentrates on the second level of positioning analysis to unpack how the participants in these interviews could establish alignments and position themselves vis-à-vis each other. This section also explores the medium affordances that shaped the participation framework and determined the role-relations in the genre of the TV interview. With a focus on the third level of positioning analysis, section 5.3 demonstrates how the interviewees discursively constructed their sociopolitical identities to elucidate the functions and social implications of these identities. Section 5.4 deals with the how rapport was perceived and how particular political and interactional practices were attitudinally confronted and morally evaluated in terms of impoliteness in order to pinpoint the social and moral implications of the conflict for power that took place in these interviews. Finally, section 5.5 sums up the main argument in this chapter and sets out the findings of the analysis.

5.1 Communicating sociopolitical stances through (de)legitimization

In multi-participant political interviews, like the one analyzed in this chapter, the interviewees tend to compete for the legitimization of particular interpretations of the political scene in the eyes of their audience in order to serve their political interests. To that end, the interviewees recontextualize and (re)characterize particular political action and actors to communicate their sociopolitical stances over the issues discussed in the interviews. To analyze the interviewees' communication of their sociopolitical stances, the three TV interviews comprising the dataset of this chapter were

transcribed and subjected to an in-depth qualitative analysis to identify the utterances that have (de)legitimizing functions. At the first level of positioning analysis, lexicogrammatical representations of the political actions and actors involved in these utterances were analyzed. Instances of actor-oriented (de)legitimization were analyzed by identifying who the (de)legitimized political actors were and how they were discursively represented in each of the interviews. In action-oriented (de)legitimization, however, there had to be an action involved; this action could involve a material, mental or verbal process (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004) for which the (de)legitimized actor was proven responsible and held accountable. Instances of action-oriented (de)legitimization were analyzed based on what political actions and actors were actually found in the text and how they were discursively represented. Examples 1 and 2 elucidate how instances of actor and action-oriented (de)legitimization could be analytically distinguished.

Example 1:

اما ائتلاف المواطن انتصر (0.2) لانه حقق نجاحات كبيرة قياسا الى ماكان عليه سابقا حيث حقق تقدم يكاد يكون مضاعفا قياسا الى نتائجه السابقة (.) > لا بل واكثر حتى من المضاعف .

As for Citizen Coalition (it) won (0.2) because (it) made successes in comparison to the past as it made a progress that might be a double in comparison to its previous results (.) <NO it is rather more than double.

(Interview 3: interviewee 1)

In example 1, the interviewee attempted to legitimize a particular interpretation of the political scene in the aftermath of the election in order to serve the interests of his political coalition. He employed the topos of authorization to empower his political coalition, i.e. Citizen Coalition, by referring to its increased popularity, which was proven by the result of the 2014 parliamentary election. Although he knew that his political coalition was the third or even the fourth in the number of parliamentary seats, he used authorization by virtue of popularity and representativeness to present his political coalition as making advances in comparison to the results in the previous election that took place in 2010, i.e. *it made a progress that might be a double in comparison to its pervious results (.)*. In this example, the political actor being

legitimized was discursively represented by virtue of collectivization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37-8), using a noun denoting a political group, i.e. Citizen Coalition.

Example 2:

انا ساقول لك بصراحة، بصراحة ايضا (.) هو انو مبادرة السيد رئيس الوزراء هو ان يقوم البرلمان بحل نفسه لاجراء انتخابات مبكرة ((يسعل)) = هذه ايضا ليس فكرة واقعية.

Frankly, I will tell you frankly (.) that Mr. Prime Minister's initiative IS THAT the parliament dissolves itself in order to hold an early election ((coughs)) = this is not a realistic idea either.

(Interview 1: interviewee 1)

Contrary to example 1 above, the interviewee in example 2 attempted to delegitimize the opponent's political interpretation of reality in order to advance the political agenda of his party. He irrationalized his opponent's action, i.e. *Mr. Prime Minister's initiative*, by appealing to effectiveness, arguing that this initiative was not practically viable, i.e. *this is not a realistic idea either*. In this example, the irrationalized political action was discursively represented by objectivation, which refers to, as argued by van Leeuwen (2008: 63-4), the substitution of the product, i.e. the initiative, for the action itself. The Prime Minister's responsibility for the action was communicated by possessivation using genitive phrase in Arabic that was functionally equivalent to possessive *s* in English.

In certain cases the interviewees combined actor-oriented with action-oriented topoi in order to reinforce the affect of the (de)legitimization as shown in the example below.

Example 3:

Interviewee:

أههه طبعاً قبل أن أجيبك (.) يودي أن أعلق على ما ذكره . الزميل ج :. يواد يقول أن هاهي رغبة المرجعية والناس وكذا . أنا أعتقد أن هذا كلام غير دقيق. لم تعلن أي مرجعية ، يعني ما عدا هنالك استثناء الى لظروف معينة(.) أيي ربما في يوما ما سأحدث عنها. لم تتحدث المرجعية عن شخص معين(.) أههه هذي أولاً . والشعب عندما ينتخب كتلة أكبر هذا يعني- ((يتم مقاطعته من قبل المقدم))

Uhhh actually before I answer (.) I would like to comment on what he has mentioned. Colleague ((used honorifically)) Jawa::d said that this is the desire of Marjaiya ((religious leaders)) and the people and so no. I think this is an inaccurate talk. No

Marjaiya ((religious leader)) has announced, I mean save one due to certain circumstances(.) and someday I may talk about them. No MARJAIYA has spoken about a person in specific(.) uhhh this is firstly. And when the people elect a bloc as majority this means-((gets interrupted by the interviewer))

(Interview 3: interviewee 2)

In example 3 above, interviewee 2 aimed to delegitimize his opponent's argument as to why his political party refused a third term for the former Prime Minister Al-Maliki. The reason for the refusal, as mentioned by interviewee 1 at some point during the interview, was that it was the desires of the Marjaiyas (Shiite religious leadership) and that of the people. Therefore, interviewee 2 in this example attempted to highlight the inconsistency in interviewee 1's argument in order to irrationalize it, i.e. *this talk is not accurate. No MARJAIYA has spoken about a person in specific*. The irrationalized action was discursively represented by abstraction, (van Leeuwen, 2008: 68). In order to strengthen his counterargument, interviewee 2 also used an actor-oriented legitimization topos, which was authorization via electoral representation, depicting his political party, which was impersonalized (van Leeuwen: 46) as the majority in the parliament, and as such a legitimate claimant of premiership.

Broadly speaking, in each of the three TV interviews analyzed in this chapter, the interviewers and the interviewees were concerned about recontextualizing a limited number of political actors and actions in order to (de)legitimize particular interpretations of reality in a way that better served their political agenda and ideological preferences. Indeed, it was the interviewers, or the program managers, who were responsible for determining the topic of discussion in each interview, as they have privileged access to public discourse (cf. van Dijk, 2008: 67ff). The first discussed topic was the 2012 political crisis related to the opposition's demand to vote out the former Prime Minister in Iraq, i.e. Nouri Al-Maliki, or push him to tender his resignation. As was to be expected, the main actors who were delegitimized included the former Prime Minister and the opposition parties, while the main political actions (de)legitimized included the former Prime Minister's policies, behaviors towards his opponents, i.e. the opposition parties, and the opposition parties' political agendas and their behaviors towards the former Prime Minister and his cabinet (see examples 2

and 6). Since the interviewees represented the two sides of the crisis, i.e. the ruling coalition and the opposition, they were more concerned about representing their political parties and their political agendas more positively and representing their opponents and their own political actions negatively.

In the second TV interview, the main political actors and actions that were targeted by the process of (de)legitimization were related to the sectarian-based power-sharing process in the post-Saddam Hussein⁷ Iraq. The political actors who were (de)legitimized included Saddam Hussein's ousted regime, stereotypically described as Sunni-favoring, and the new regime, stereotypically described as Shiite-favoring (see examples 7 and 8 below). Moreover, Sunnis and Shias were also (de)legitimized in this interview, because they were perceived as represented by the key actors in the political process. This was due to the consociational political system in the country. The interviewees, who were members of the main two communities, i.e. Sunnis and Shiites, frequently legitimized the communities they belonged to and delegitimized the other communities in pursuit of political support from their in-group members and domination over the out-group community. Alternatively, the political actions (de)legitimized were associated with the practices of the old and the new regimes and the practices of the ruling coalition and of the opposition parties. This interview dealt with the most sensitive aspect of Iraqi politics, which was related to the ethnic identities of the participants. This was evidently demonstrated by the frequent use of in-group victimization as a collective legitimization. The example below illustrates how the use of ethno-political terms and the victimization topos could be used for legitimization.

Example 4:

قن يلجئ السنة الى تشكيل اقاليم أأه التي تحفظ وحدة العراق، لحفظ ال أأه (.) يعني حكم الذات ان يحكموا انفسهم بانفسهم. لان حقيقة هناك اقضاء وتهميش وظلم موجود اليوم على مكون بعينه دون اخر.

Sunnis may resort to forming (federal) regions uhhh that maintain the unity of Iraq, to maintain uhhh the (.) I mean self-ruling, to rule themselves by themselves. Because in

⁷ Saddam Hussein was the longest serving president of Iraq who was deposed from power by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

fact there are exclusion, marginalization and injustice today imposed on a particular (ethnic) component rather than the other.

(Interview 2: interviewee 2)

In example 4, the interviewee legitimized the formation of a federal region wherein Sunnis could enjoy semi-autonomous rule. He rationalized this demand, which was actually part of his political party agenda to maintain uhhh the (.) I mean self-ruling, to rule themselves by themselves. The political action rationalized in this example was represented by means of objectivation using the process noun *forming* (see van Leeuwen, 2008: 63). Moreover, the interviewee simultaneously legitimized his own ethno-political group, which was first referred to by collectivization i.e. *Sunnis*, and then by backgrounding (van Leeuwen, 2008: 29). He resorted to the collective legitimization topos of victimization to present them as marginalized and victimized by others, i.e. *there are exclusion, marginalization and injustice today imposed on a particular (ethnic) component rather than the other*. Due to the nature of the general topic discussed, the collective topos of victimization was used frequently as a legitimization technique in the second TV interview.

The third TV interview tackled the results of the 2014 parliamentary election and the political negotiations that followed to form a ruling majority coalition. In this interview, the interviewees seemed to be more interested in strengthening their positions as legitimate representatives of the people and delegitimizing the previous political actions of their opponents (see examples 1 and 3 above). However, as the parliamentary elections failed to produce a decisive outcome for either party, the interviewees unanimously legitimize the recreation of the Iraqi National Alliance and its role in forming a unity government. Interestingly, the topoi of authorization and deauthorization were employed frequently in this interview (see also figure 3 below). This warrants the assumption that the interviewees in political interviews tend to be more concerned about the power potentials associated with the claims of being the legitimate representatives of the general public, and the comparative lack of their opponents' legitimacy around election time. Example 5 illustrates this tendency.

Example 5:

Interviewee:

رئيس الوزراء لم يأت بانقلاب حتى يقال هاي ديكتاتورية (.) اجه بأصوات الشعب.

The Prime Minister has not come (to power) by a coup d'état in order to say it is a dictatorship(.) he has come (to power) by the votes of the people.

(Interview 3: Interviewee 2)

In the above example, the interviewee was attempting to establish the well deserved right of the former Prime Minister's, who was the interviewee's party leader, to premiership. He invoked the concept of the power of the people that can be invested in a representative elected through a democratic election. Thus, the interviewee used the topoi of authorization to empower the leader of his political party by means of the votes his party garnered in the election in order to depict him as a legitimate incumbent of the premiership, i.e. *he has come (to power) by the votes of the people*. The political actor authorized in this example, i.e. Al-Maliki, was functionalized (van Leeuwen, 2008: 42) by reference to his position as a Prime Minister.

Interestingly, in all three TV interviews analyzed in this chapter the decisions made by the interviewees regarding employing actor-oriented or action-oriented (de)legitimization tended to be motivated to a great extent by the interviewer's interactional moves. It seems that the argumentation process in TV interview was necessarily organized around the gate-keeper's, i.e. interviewer's, interactional moves that aimed to unravel the interviewees' stances on certain political issues. The interviewer's discursive practices could involve different speech acts. The most frequent of these speech acts included 'directive' in the form of questions and 'expressive' in the form of provocative statements (Searle, 1975). This could be intuitively attributed to the power *over* discourse (Fairclough, 1989) that the interviewers possess in such a genre. This indicates that the argumentation process in the TV interviews tends to be hierarchically, rather than rhizomatically, structured (cf. 6.2 and 7.2). Consider the extract below which represented the first question raised by the interviewer that guided the direction of the interview and the way the interviewee's answer unfolded.

Example 6:

Interviewer:

اليوم كل المبادرات جاي تتجه نحو ازاحة المالكي او تغيير الحكومة . السؤال هنا (0.3) هذه الرغبة بالخلاص من اس المشكلة الي البعض يعتبره هو رئيس الوزراء؟ ام هي رغبة بازاحة سياسي عنده شعبية اثبتت الانتخابات الاخيرة انو مازال عنده شعبية واخذ المركز الاول؟ وتخشى ه ذه المكونات او هذه الكتل من بقاءه واحتفاضه بهذه الشعبية وبقائه بموقعه واحتفاظه بالسلطة لدورة ثانية؟

Nowadays all the initiatives are directed towards removing Al-Maliki or changing the government. The question then is (0.3) is it the desire to get rid of the SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM whom some consider is the Prime Minister? Or is it the desire to remove a politician with popularity who was proven popular still and was the first in the last election? And these components or blocs fear that he maintains and keeps this popularity and power for a second turn?

Interviewee:

هو انا لا اريد ان انكر ان لرئيس الوزراء شعبية (0.4) يعني هل له شعبية ام لا؟ هو لديه شعبية سواء ماكان اثبتته الانتخابات البرلمانية السابقة عندما حصل على اعلى الاصوات في بغداد او فيما يتعلق في انتخابات مجالس المحافظات التي جرت قبل ايام. انا لا اريد ان اقلل من قيمة ماحصلت عليه دولة القانون في انتخابات مجالس المحافظات (0.3) ولكن ايضا لا اريد ان اغمض عيني عن انها تراجعت الى حد ليس قليل. أهه في معظم المحافظات بل وحتى في المحافظات التي كانت تعتبر قلاعا بالنسبة لها او ملاذا لجمهورها (0.1) قد تآثرت الى حد كبير لصالح شركاء ومنافسي المالكي الاخرين (0.3) كتلة المواطن و -

I do not want to deny the Prime Minister's popularity (0.4) I mean is he popular or not? He is popular and this was proven in the last parliamentary election when he garnered the highest number of votes in Baghdad and in the provincial election held few days ago. I do not want to underestimate what the State of Law coalition has garnered in the provincial election (0.3) Yet I do not want to close my eye about (the fact that) it has declined noticeably. Uhh in most of the provinces even in the provinces which were considered its ((Al-Maliki's coalition)) strongholds (0.1) it retreated in favor of other competitors of Al-Maliki's (0.3) Citizen Coalition and -

(Interview 1: interviewer, interviewee 1)

Example 6 illustrates how the interviewer's power over discourse could influence the interviewee's choice of the (de)legitimization topos used in the response. The interviewer's utterance gave emphasis to the characterization of a political actor, viz.

Al-Maliki, rather than his political actions describing him once as the source of the problem and once as a politician with popularity without any reference to a specific action. This motivated the interviewee to focus on delegitimizing Al-Maliki's public image, rather than his actions and policies, using the actor-oriented delegitimization topoi of deauthorization. The interviewee attempted to deauthorize Al-Maliki by referring to the results of the provincial election that took place a few days before the interview took place, i.e. *Uhh in most of the provinces even in the provinces which were considered its ((Al-Maliki's coalition)) strongholds (0.1) it retreated in favor of other competitors of Al-Maliki's*. The results, as argued by the interviewee, represented a decline in Al-Maliki's popularity, and as such his authority and legitimacy. The interviewee deauthorized Al-Maliki in his capacities as a statesman and as a political leader as well. This was adroitly achieved by firstly referring to Al-Maliki's position as the Prime Minister by means of functionalization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 42), and secondly by referring to his political coalition by means of collectivization using a noun denoting a political group, i.e. *State of Law Coalition*. Depicting Al-Maliki losing in the election highlighted his insufficiency as Prime Minister and his failure as a political leader of his political Coalition.

Example 7 below showed how the action-oriented legitimization in the interviewee's answer was motivated by the interviewer's question.

Example 7:

Interviewer:

استاذ سامي(.) الا يتحدث الشيعة بان مثلاً انه منصب رئاسة الوزراء هو حكر على الشيعة حتى وان لم ينص على ذلك في الدستور؟

Mr. Sami (.) do not Shiites for instance say that the premiership is the monopoly of the Shiites even though it is not stated in the constitution?

Interviewee:

لا (0.5) لانه منصب رئاسة الوزراء تقرره الكتلة الاكبر حسب الدستور، سنيا كان او شيعيا (.) كرديا او عربيا . من خلال الدورات السابقة، الجمعية الوطنية ثم الدوريتين القادمتين، لان الشيعة اكثرية كانوا يشكلون الكتلة الاكبر في داخل [البرلمان].

No(0.5) because the premiership is decided by the biggest bloc according to the constitution, whether for a Sunni or Shiite (.) Kurdish or Arab. In the previous

(parliamentary) terms, the National Assembly and the following two terms, the Shias were the majority in [the parliament].

Interviewer:

[طيب]

[ok]

Interviewee:

ودستوريا من حقهم ان يرشحوا من يشائون.

Constitutionally they have the right to nominate whoever they want.

(Interview 2: interviewee 1, interviewer)

The speech act performed by the interviewer was an indirect assertion (Searle, 1975) that communicated a provocative statement about the Shiite monopoly of the premiership, i.e. *do not Shiites say, for instance, that the premiership is a monopoly of Shiites even though it is not stated in the constitution?* The interviewee interpreted this speech act as a potential delegitimization of the way Shiite political parties act, because it depicted them as making unconstitutional decisions. The political action in question was discursively represented by distillation, which highlights the quality and value of the action (van Leeuwen, 2008: 69-70); so it was represented as a monopoly. In doing so, the interviewee attempted to justify the way the Shiite political parties act, rationalizing their monopoly of the premiership. This was done by providing constitutional evidence that established the Shiite politicians' right to nominate the Prime Minister. He indicated that the Shiite political parties represented the majority in the parliament, and thus they have the constitutional *right to nominate whoever they want*. The interviewee represented the action differently in his response in order to neutralize the negative *valence* of *monopoly*. In the response, it was discursively represented as agentialized action (van Leeuwen, 2008: 66), that is, *the right to nominate*, to emphasize agency which, in turn, established the Shiite politicians' right to nominate the Prime Minister.

Furthermore, example 8 highlights the interviewer's powerful role that entitled him to reorient the argumentation process towards serving his interactional goal through resisting the interviewee's deviation from answering his question directly. The interviewer's question was about the ruling coalition's failure to build functioning state institutions in the aftermath of the US-led invasion, which was action-oriented question, but the interviewee attempted to eschew the question focusing instead on blaming the ousted regime.

Example 8:

Interviewer:

مالذي عطل هذه البناء؟

What delayed this building (of the state)?

Interviewee:

لكي تدرك المشكلات التي خلفها النظام السابق وما المشكلات التي نخرت الدولة العراقية (0.3) يوم 9 نيسان 2033 لم يتغير النظام فقط (.) ووو لم يطح بالدكتاتور فقط (.) انما انهارت دولة بكاملها اسست في عشرينيات القرن الماضي.

To understand the problems caused by the former regime and the problems that corrupt the Iraqi State (0.3) On April the 9th it is not only the regime that was changed (.) and the dictator was overthrown (.) but it is the entire state (which was) established in the twenties (of the last century) that has collapsed.

Interviewer:

أمممم

hummm

Interviewee:

دولة أهه كانت مفروضة (.) وأهه من غالبية الشعب العراقي لكنها، مفروضة على هذا الشعب. دولة مبنية على اساس عنصري، على اساس طائفي (.) عانى في ضلها غالبية الشعب العراقي (.) ووصلت الى ماوصلت اليه في اسوء حالاتها على يد صدام حسين.

A state uhh that was rejected (.) and uhhh by the majority of the Iraqi people, but it was imposed on this people. A state built on racist basis, sectarianist basis (.) Under which the majority of the Iraqi people had suffered (.) and it reached its worst conditions at the hand of Saddam Hussein.

Interviewer:

مالذي العطل هذه القضية؟

What delayed this issue?

(Interview 2: interviewee 1, interviewer)

At the beginning of the extract in example 8, the interviewer raised a question, namely *What delayed this building (of the state)?*. This question was action-oriented in nature because it concentrated on material process, which was the process of a state building. In a bid to eschew the question, the interviewee delegitimized the former regime using an actor-oriented technique. The interviewee described the former regime as being racist and sectarianist⁸ and illegitimately imposed on the people, i.e. *it was imposed on this people. A state built on racist basis, sectarianist basis*. When the interviewer realized that the interviewee was deviating, he urged the interviewee to commit to the line of the argument in his original question by raising the same question again at the end of the extract, i.e. *What delayed this issue?*.

To hold a cross thematic comparison between the three TV interviews analyzed in this chapter, the utterances identified as having (de)legitimizing functions were analyzed quantitatively. The quantitative analysis makes it possible to draw a general conclusion as to how the different (de)legitimization topoi were utilized strategically in the different thematic contexts. The numbers of (de)legitimization instances identified were 83, 76 and 102 in the first, second and third interviews respectively. These 261 instances were coded for the eight (de)legitimization topoi listed in table 2.1. As mentioned in examples 3, 4 and 6, some of the utterances with (de)legitimizing functions involved more than a single topoi. These utterances were accommodated in the analysis by quantifying each single occurrence of the different

⁸ A distinction is made here between the terms 'sectarianist' and 'sectarian'. The term sectarianist is used to refer to the political practices that have sectarian-based exclusionary effect; the use of the adjective 'sectarian' does not necessarily involve such an exclusionary implication.

topoi in the utterance; this means that the utterances that included two (de)legitimization topoi were coded twice. The results were then normalized in relation to the total number of (de)legitimization topoi occurrences in each interview. Coding decisions regarding ambiguous cases of (de)legitimization were made by using the interactional responses that followed as evidence of the emic interpretation of the participants. The quantitative analysis shows that the (de)legitimization patterns varied in accordance with the main topic discussed in each of the TV interviews. This suggests that the thematic context had the greatest impact on how the (de)legitimization patterns emerged.

Figure 5.1 (below) shows the percentages of the different (de)legitimization topoi used in the first interview.




Figure 5.1 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in the first interview

The most striking observation in Figure 5.1 was that the negative representation of others was the most commonly used topos (N=17) followed by the positive representation of self (N=15) with a narrow margin difference between the two. Authorization (N=3) and deauthorization (N=7) were the least used of all topoi. In terms of the action-oriented (de)legitimization, the figure indicates that the frequencies of the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi were obviously less polarized, which means that all the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi were used almost evenly. The topoi of negative evaluation of actions (N=11) and positive evaluation of actions (N=11) were the most commonly used action-oriented topoi.

Figure 5.2 below shows the percentages of the different (de)legitimization topoi used in the second interview.




Figure 5.2 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in the second interview

As for the second TV interview, figure 5.2 above exhibits that the legitimization topos of the positive representation of self was by far the most commonly used (N= 20).

This is due to the interviewees' frequent use of victimization to present in-group members positively (see example 4 above), which seems to be related to the sectarianly sensitive nature of the topic discussed. The common use of victimization could be attributed to the fact it was the most tolerable collective topoi. Due to institutional settings of the TV interviews the use of explicitly inflammatory discourse, typically associated with the collective topoi of criminalization and sectarianist exclusion (cf. figures 6.2 and 7.3 below), were neither tolerated nor beneficial to the interviewees in this public context. Therefore, use of victimization instead of criminalization may be also deemed a manifestation of political correctness in the political discourses produced in the mainstream media. The second most commonly used topos was the negative evaluation of actions (N= 15). The results highlight how polarized the use of the different (de)legitimization topoi was. The least used topoi were authorization (N= 3).

Figure 5.3 below demonstrates the percentages of the different (de)legitimization topoi used in the third interview.




Figure 5.3 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in the third interview

Unlike the results in the other interviews, the frequent use of authorization (N= 21) and deauthorization (N= 14) seems very salient in the third TV interview as shown by Figure 5.3. In light of the topic of the interview and with reference to examples 3 and 5, this seems to be motivated by interviewees' interests in the power potentials associated with the claims of being the legitimate representatives of the general public, and the lack of their opponents' legitimacy around election time. The second commonly used actor-oriented topoi was the positive representation of self (N=16). In regards to the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi, the positive evaluation of actions represented the most commonly used topoi (N=14) followed by the topoi of irrationality (N= 13).

Interestingly, the interviewees in the three TV interviews persistently served their predefined goals in ways that were commensurate with their political institutions' agendas. They tended to legitimize the political views institutionally endorsed by their political parties and to delegitimize the ones institutionally endorsed by the opponent parties. This was evident in the interviewees' frequent indexing their institutional affiliations (also see example 17 below) when using (de)legitimization. Even in ethno-sectarianly polarized interactions, e.g. the second TV interview, in which they might be expected to advance the goals of the ethno-sectarian community they belonged to, the interviewees tended to employ ethno-sectarian topoi to covertly legitimize their political institutions' agendas in securing bigger shares in the government, which was in fact based on ethno-sectarian quotas (see examples 4, 14 and 21). This highlights how manipulative the interviewees' practices could be and ultimately suggests that these practices were motivated by instrumental (or goal-oriented) rationality (Mueller, 1989).

When presenting the quantitative results in term of the dichotomy of actor-oriented vs. action-oriented (de)legitimization in each interview, as shown in figure 5.4 (below), it becomes clear that that actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi were slightly more commonly used than action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in all the interviews.




Figure 5.4 Percentages of actor-oriented and action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in the three TV interviews

Figure 5.4 can be a bit misleading because in many cases in the TV interviews analyzed here both action and actor-oriented topoi were used in a single utterance to reinforce the effect of the (de)legitimization process. The utterances in which both action and actor-oriented topoi were used represented 15% of the total utterances with (de)legitimizing functions in the first interview, 28% of the total in the second interview and 14% of the total in the third interview. Indeed, this makes the utterances with (de)legitimizing functions that concentrated on (de)legitimizing actions more common than the ones that concentrated on (de)legitimizing actors exclusively. Focusing on (de)legitimizing political actions rather than political actors in the TV interviews could be attributed to the political actors' persistence to justify the political practices of their political parties and to promote their agenda.

5.2 Interactional practices and alignments in political TV interviews

Analyzing participants' interactional practices at the second level of positioning analysis has two advantages: it firstly unpacks how the interviewees flesh out their generalized interactional identities, i.e. genre-sectioned roles along with their entitlements, and turn them into particularized interactional identities (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007) based on the politically defined alignments made by the participants. In the genre of TV interview, the genre-specific roles in the interview, e.g. interviewer vis-à-vis interviewee, are known by virtue of the generic structure of the interaction and made recurrently salient during the interview according to the participants'

emerging needs. These genre-sanctioned roles can evolve into political roles of supporters or antagonists in regards to the topic in question. These political roles form the participants' enriched particularized interactional identities. Secondly, the second level of positioning analysis can also elucidate how the politically defined alignments concurrently effect and affect the participants' perception of rapport in the interview. Example 9 below shows how the participants could attend to their genre-sanctioned roles as the need emerged.

Example 9:

Interviewer:

استاذ جواد، خلىني اقاطعك حتى نستثمر الوقت

(Formal term of address) Jawad, let me interrupt you to save time.

Interviewee:

نعم

Yes

Interviewer:

جاوبني على سؤالي (0.5) نتائجكم (.) شلون تتوقعوها؟ ووين متجهين يعني؟ شنو هي خططكم؟ ولاي اهداف رايدين توصلون؟

Answer my question (0.5) your results (.) how do you expect them? I mean, where are you heading? What are your plans? What the goals you seek to achieve?

(Interview 3: Interviewer, Interviewee 3)

In example 9 above, the interviewer's interactional move highlighted his genre-specific role positioning the other participant in the role of the interviewee. The interviewer comfortably interrupted the interviewee to steer the interview in the direction that best served his interactional wants, which revolve around eliciting as much information as possible from the interviewees. This interruption did not violate the behavioral expectations in this genre, because the deontic power associated with the interviewer's genre-sanctioned role entitled him to interrupt the interviewee without repercussions.

In the three interviews analyzed here, after a few interactional moves the participants' genre-sanctioned roles evolved into politically defined alignments that positioned them vis-à-vis each other by virtue of the stances they took towards the topic in question. The politically defined alignments could be established by virtue of (de)legitimizing particular political actors and actions. Due to the antagonistic debate-like nature of the interviews analyzed in this chapter, the interviewees' politically defined alignments were often in direct contrast to each other. Example 10 demonstrates how two interviewees in the third interview communicated their opposing political stances over forming a majority government in the aftermath of the parliamentary election in 2014, which consequently positioned them in contrast to each other.

Example 10:

Interviewee 2:

أقول اني ميهمني هاي الكلمات (0.4) الجوهر انه لانرجع الى التجربة السابقة. جوهر(.) حتى جوهر الاغلبية السياسية هي يعني ان لانرجع الى الوراء. بمعنى اخر، لو كانت حكومة الوحدة الوطنية او الشراكة قد نجحت، ماكننا رفعنا شعار الاغلبية السياسية.

I say I do not care about these words (0.4) the essence is that we do not go back to the previous experience. The essence (.) even the essence of political majority is that we do not fall back.

In other words, if the national unity or the partnership government had succeeded we would not have raised the slogan of political majority.

Interviewee 1:

حينها تحدثنا وقلنا ان نصف زائد واحد لايمكن ان يحكم العراق، لان العراق فيه مكونات وفيه تلاوين ينبغي ان تكون حاضرة وان تكون معبرة عن نفسها

When we talked (about this), and said that a half +1 cannot rule Iraq, because Iraqi is composed of different colors (ethnicities) that should be represented.

(Interview 3: Interviewee 1, Interviewee 2)

In example 10, interviewee 2 asserted his support for a majority government, which would challenge the consociational system in the county. He irrationalized the formation of a national unity government highlighting its ineffectiveness, and rationalized the formation of a majority government highlighting its ability to

overcome the difficulties encountered by the former government, which was a national unity government.⁹ On the other hand, interviewee 1, in his later response to interviewee 2, communicated a completely opposite stance. He irrationalized the majority government representing it as inapplicable in an ethnically diverse country like Iraq, where each ethnic group would want to be represented in the government. Communicating such oppositional stances positioned the interviewees as rivals and opponents over the topic in question, which in certain cases could orient rapport towards challenge between them.

Unlike the interviewees, the interviewers' political stances could oscillate between two opposite poles. By virtue of the social entitlements associated with their roles, the interviewers might change their alignments over the issue under discussion as the interviews would unfold based on their interactional need without violating any behavioral expectations. An interviewer could take an opposite alignment against the interviewee to whom the question was directed in what seems to be an attempt to provoke the interviewee to provide a desired answer or more information. The interviewers as the animators and authors, but rarely the principals (Gofman, 1981), were often perceived by the interviewees as less committed to the opinions expressed in their utterances, and as such less accountable and morally responsible for them. Example 11 explains how the interviewer in the third TV interview changed his alignments as the interview unfolded when discussing the results of the parliamentary elections. The interviewer first aligned with the interviewee from the State of Law coalition when directing a question to the interviewee representing the oppositional side, which was Citizen Coalition, and then he shifted his stance to align with the interviewee from Citizen Coalition when directing a question to the interviewee from the State of Law Coalition.

Example 11:

Interviewer:

First question

شريح مكنلي شلون انتلاف المواطن هو المنتصر او هو المتقدم في اغلب المحافظات، كما اعلن عن ذلك السيد الحكيم؟ النتائج الي دنسمعها تشير الى تقدم دولة القانون.

⁹ In the context of Iraqi politics, the term National Unity Government indicates that all the political parties in the parliament are represented in the government with no parliamentary opposition what soever.

Sheikh ((religious term of address used honorifically here)) can you tell me how Citizen Coalition is winning in most the provinces, as declared by (term of address) Hakeem ((who was the head of the coalition))?..... The results we have been hearing indicate that the State of Law ((coalition)) is in advance.

Second question

بس قبل ذلك، رغم ان ائتلاف دولة القانون هو المتقدم (.). بس يبدو ان ائتلاف المواطن واثق من قدرته، من حظوظه بخصوص تشكيل الحكومة القادمة.

But before all that, although the State of Law (coalition) is at the top (.) but it seems that Citizen Coalition is confident of his competence as well as his odds regarding the formation of the coming government.

(Interview 3: Interviewer)

In the first stance, when addressing the representative of the Citizen Coalition, the interviewer deauthorized the coalition which the addressed interviewee was representing and authorized its traditional rival State of Law coalition by invoking the result of the election. By so doing, the interviewer in the first question positioned himself in an opposite alignment with the addressed interviewee. Yet, when addressing the representative of the State of Law Coalition in the second question, the interviewer aligned himself with the traditional rival of the State of Law, i.e. Citizen Coalition, presenting it as more able to form the new government using authorization in terms of expertise and competence. Communicating such oppositional stances did not orient rapport towards challenge between the interviewer and either of the interviewees, because his interactional practices fell within the behavioral expectations associated with his genre-sanctioned role.

In particular cases, the politically defined alignments that evolved as the interaction unfolded could orient rapport between the interviewees toward challenge and in extreme case towards confrontation. Example 12 below is an extract taken from the second interview in which the interviewees established oppositional alignments when voicing their opinions over the issue discussed; these alignments interactionally positioned them in direct contrast to each other. Interviewee 1 attempted to refute a previous argument provided by interviewee 2 about the policies of the former regime, ousted by the US-led coalition in 2003. To that effect,

Interviewee 1 irrationalized the argument, highlighting its inconsistencies. Interviewee 2 challenged this counterargument establishing an antithetical alignment that consequently resulted in impairing the harmony of the interview.

Example 12:

Interviewee 1:

ال أهيه الامر الاخر (0.5) التوصيف بان النظام السابق ماكان يميز على اساس أهيه شيعي وانما على اساس حزبي (0.5) انظر الى مجلس قيادة الثورة (.) كم فيه من الشيعة؟ ولا واحد- ((يتم مقاطعته من قبل الضيف الثاني))

Uhhh, the other issue is (0.5) the description that the former regime was not discriminating based on uhhh was (not discriminatory against) Shiite but on partisan bases (0.5) Look at the Revolutionary Command Council (.) How many Shiite members were there? None- ((get interrupted by the other interviewee))

Interviewee 2:

<كيف؟!>

<How?!>

Interviewee 1:

انظر(.) عدلي.

Look (.) list [them] for me.

Interviewee 2:

عدلياهم، اي.

List (them) for me, yes.

Interviewee 1:

لا انت عدد

No, you list (them)

Interviewee 2:

Saadoon Hamadi

سعدون حمادي

Interviewee 1:

ماكان بمجلس قيادة الثورة.

He was not in the Revolutionary Command Council.

Interviewee 2:

محمد حمزة الزبيدي

Muhammad Hamza Az-Zubaidi

Interviewee 1:

ما ماكان ب [(...)]

He was not [in (...)]

Interviewee 2:

[كلهم] هؤلاء كانوا شيعة.

[All of them] were Shiite.

Interviewee 1:

و يوم سقط النظام(.) يوم سقط النظام يوم 9 نيسان(.) شوفلي كم شيعي بمجلس قيادة الثورة، ولا واحد(.) انظر الى الجيش، شوفلي أهله قيادات الفيالق ولا واحد شيعي (0.5) شوفلي قادة الفرق، ولا واحد شيعي. صحيح الشيعة موجودين في حزب البعث، صحيح يسمح لهم دخول المؤسسات العسكرية، لكن هناك مستويات من القيادة مستويات من الوظائف لا يصلها شيعي حتى لو كان بعثيا.

On the day the regime was overthrown (.) on the day the regime was overthrown on April the 9th (.) tell me how many Shiite in the Revolutionary Command Council, no one (.) Look at the army, look at uhhh the divisions' commanders, none was Shiite (0.5) look at uhhh the brigade commanders, none was Shiite. (It is) correct (that) there was Shiite (members) in Ba'ath Party, (it is) correct (that) they were allowed to join the military establishments, but there were levels of command, levels of positions that no Shiite could occupy even if he was Ba'athist.

Interviewer:

نعم، اعطي مثلا على هذا.

Yes, give me an example for that.

(Interview 2: Interviewee 1, Interviewee 2, Interviewer)

At the beginning of the extract in the example, the interviewee 1 refuted the argument presented by the interviewee 2 in earlier turns; this refutation was considered a challenge because it was endorsed by the interviewee's role as representative of his political party (Weizman, 2008: 36). This challenge was represented by the first interviewee's attempt to irrationalize the argument by invoking its inconsistency, i.e. *the description that the former regime was not discriminating based on uhhh was (not discriminatory against) Shiite but on partisan bases (0.5) Look at the Revolutionary Command Council, how many Shiite members are there? None*. This delegitimization process triggered a series of challenges made by the two interviewees to fault each other's argument. These series of challenges triggered intense emotive response, which made this interaction rapport sensitive. The intense emotive responses were indexed by certain contextualization cues (Gumperz, 1982), such as intonation, directive speech acts including a question, i.e. how, and an order, i.e. No, you list (them), successive overlapping and interruptions. At the end of the extract, however, the interviewer employed his gate-keeping rights to moderate the standoff between the two interviewees. He took over by raising a question to interviewee 1 to end the standoff.

Conversely, the interviewees might also position each other in more rapport enhancing ways referring to them as colleagues or brothers.¹⁰ Such interactional moves aimed to disaffiliate the rival interviewees from the practices of their political parties in order to mitigate the potential face attacks associated with delegitimizing these political practices. Such rapport enhancing interactional moves were used to maintain the harmony of the interview. Example 13 taken from the first interview illustrates a rapport enhancing move made by one of the interviewees from United Coalition to take a supportive position with the other interviewee, who was from the State of Law Coalition to mitigate the delegitimizing of the State of Law political rhetoric.

¹⁰ The use of 'brother' as a rapport enhancing term of address is very common in the Arab and Muslim worlds.

Example 13:

دولة القانون في هذا الانتخابات مجالس المحافظات، واطن ان اخي عزت يتفق معي، انو دولة القانون استخدمت خطابا ذو طابع حربي.

The State of Law in the last provincial election, and I believe my brother Izat agrees with me, used war-styled rhetoric.

(Interview 1: interviewee 1)

In example 13, the interviewee was negatively representing the rival coalition, i.e. State of Law, accusing it of using a provocative rhetoric, i.e. *war-styled rhetoric*, against its opponents. However, he positioned the other interviewee who was a member in the State of Law Coalition as a brother, i.e. *my brother Izat*. In this example, the interviewer's interactional move seems to have two advantages. He firstly wanted to mitigate his attack on the other interviewee's political coalition by implying that he did not target the other interviewee in person, and in so doing he saved the personal aspects associated with his face. Secondly, disaffiliating the other interviewee from the political practices of his own political coalition rendered him a witness to this practice, which in turn made this delegitimization attempt more credible.

The interviewees in each of the interviews analyzed did not only position themselves in relation to the other interviewees, whom was purportedly viewed as an opponent, and the interviewer, but also in relation to the audience, who were metaparticipants (Kádár & Haugh, 2013: 84) at the second-frame (Fetzer, 2007: 1343). Interviewees could attend to the audience by referring to their interests within the argumentation process. Example 14 demonstrates how an interviewee legitimized his political party by depicting himself and his party as very attentive to their people's needs.

Example 14:

اذا شعرنا بان هناك شي ضد مصالحنا، ضد وجودنا، ضد محافظاتنا، ضد جمهورنا ومطالبنا(.) يعني سيكون لنا موقف.

If we feel there is anything against our interests, our existence, our provinces, our people and our demands (.) we will take a stand.

(Interview 1: Interviewee 1)

In this example, the interviewee attempted to characterize his political party positively by presenting it as the defender of the interests of the ethnic constituency his party

aimed to politically represent in order to enhance the legitimacy of this political party. This type of interactional practice highlights how the interviewees could attend to the second-frame of participation. Involving the audience in the interaction often aimed to win the audience's sympathy and consequently guarantee greater rhetorical effect.

Alternatively, interviewees sometimes attempted to justify particular political actions by depicting them as being demanded by the people themselves, as shown in example 15.

Example 15:

لا هذا رفضنا طبعاً يتأتى من مسألة ومن مسألة منهجية ومن مسألة علمية ومن مسألة وأرادة عامة وأرادة مرجعيات الدين(.) في ضرورة التداول السلمي للسلطة وعدم التأسيس لثقافة الاحتكار أو ثقافة اللال الاحتكارية أو أن صح التعبير الديكتاتورية. هذا أههه يعني(.) الصفة لا تتماشى مع مذاق التحالف الوطني ولا على مذاق جمهور التحالف الوطني.....

No our objection is actually derived from a methodological and scientific issue and an issue related to a public demand and Marjai'ayas' ((the religious leaders)) demand (.) (which) emphasizes on a peaceful handover of power and not to establish a culture of monopoly or uh or a culture of monopoly, or dictatorship so to speak. This means uh (.) it does not fit the National Alliance taste and that of the constituency of the national alliance....

(Interview 3: Interviewee 3)

Attempting to substantiate his objection to nominating the former Prime Minister for a third term, the interviewee rationalized his political stance by providing different reasons for this objection, of which the religious leaders' and the people's desire was the most important, i.e. *issue related to a public demand and Marjai'ayas' ((the religious leaders)) demand*.

In the TV interviews analyzed, there was no audience present; thus the audience included the metaparticipants at the second-frame who could be addressed indirectly as in examples 14 and 15. At the first-frame participation, the situation was more complicated, because it involved different “interactional orders” (Langlotz and Locher, 2012). The interactional order refers to the participation framework in interaction; it indicates to whom an interactional move could be addressed, and as such clarifies the dynamics of the argumentation process in the interaction. Employing the insights of Langlotz and Locher (2012), figure 5.5 (below) sets out the interactional orders and the dynamics of argumentation in the genre of multi-

participant TV interview. The interviewer could address the interviewees (A) or refer to a world reported in his utterances (B), which motivates how the argumentation process unfolds (see examples 8 and 9). The interviewees could address each other (C) (this often takes place if a rapport sensitive issue emerges (examples 24, 25, and 26), and they could refer to the world reported in the interviewer's utterances (D) or the world in general (E). The utterances that might have a (de)legitimizing function could only be generated when they referred to at least to one of the worlds indicated in the figure (see the line in bold), because (de)legitimization presupposes a worldview that needs to be supported or refuted.




Figure 5.5 Participation frameworks in TV interview

5.3 Unpacking the construction of sociopolitical identities

A participant's sociopolitical identity may include different social attributes related to his/her personal and collective aspects of self. This is mainly due to the fact that identity is not unitary but rather a versatile and multifaceted entity comprising different beliefs about ones' own attributes and characteristics (Campbell *et al.*, 2000: 67). Mole (2007:15) argues that sociopolitical identities derive "from the establishment of rules and the fixing of meanings which condition and constrain political action by legitimizing certain agents and policies and delegitimizing certain others". In the context of this chapter, participants' indexing of their enregistered, i.e. stereotyped, and emergent sociopolitical identities (Agha, 2009; De Fina, 2015) were examined by focusing on the third level of positioning analysis, as it could clarify the link between the participants' use of (de)legitimization topoi with their construction of sociopolitical vis-à-vis the contesting dominant discourses that framed the interview in its "temporal and spatial locality" (Moissinac, 2007: 236).

Example 16 below elucidates how an interviewee constructed a sociopolitical identity that did not only index his political affiliation but also his personal attributes that emphatically established his ostensible uniqueness as a man of principle, not one that sought power.

Example 16:

Interviewer:

يعني تريد تقنع دكتور ظافر (.) وتريد تقنع المشاهدين انو السيد المالكي صار له يمكن سنة يحجي بحكومة
الاغلبية، وناوي على الدورة الجاية، أهه موضوع عسير جدا [يصير بناء اذا هو مو بال]...

Do you want to convince Dr. Dhafir (.) and the audience that Mr. Al-Maliki, ((who)) spent almost a year talking about the majority government, is willing in the next term to! uh... it is hard [to accomplish anything if he is not in the]....

Interviewee 1:

[هو هو (.)] هو يقبل باغلبية من دون ان يكون هو رئيس [وزرائها؟]

[He, he (.)] does he accept a majority ((government)) without him being its Prime [Minister?]

Interviewer:

]

هو (.) هو (.) هو هذا سؤال.

[This (.) this] (.) This is my question.

Interviewee 2:

انا الان مانوب عنه في هذه القصة. هو رجل عندو شخصيتو (.) عندو طموحو (.) عندو اعتقاده هو. اني ميهمني
انو هو شلون يفكر. هل يفكر انو الاغلبية بدونه اغلبية او لا، ميهمني. اني افكر انو لازم يصير أهه (0.4) بعد كفى
هذا الضحك على الذقون (0.3) شراكة ووحدة ومدرى شنه. يجب ان نذهب الى حكومة اغلبية واقلية. وخل نكون
احنا الاقلية. مو كئلك هارد لك حتى لو خسرنا. مو مهم؟

Now I am not talking on his behalf on this issue. He is man of a character (.) of an
ambition(.) of a belief. I do not care how he thinks. Does he think that a majority
without him is a majority or not? I do not care. I think that there must be uhhh (0.4)
Enough with this comedy(0.3) partnership ((government)) and unity ((government))
and whatever. We must opt for a majority and minority. Let it be (that) we are the
minority. Didn't I tell you hard luck for us even if we lost? It is not important.

Interviewee 2:

أهه خلي...

Uhh let...

Interviewer

بس كثرة الدعوات تبسو من كلام واثق؟

But numerous calls (for a majority government) seem to be out of confidence?

Interviewee 2:

من حقه لو مو من حقه؟ اذا هو هو يكدر اذا اني....

That's his right, isn't it? If he, he can, if

Interviewee 1:

من حقه يسوي بروبوگاندا (.) [ليش لا؟]

It is his right to make propaganda (.) [why not?]

Interviewee 2:

[<لا لا لا]. هسه هو مو رقم من ارقام الساحة؟

[>No no]. Isn't he one of the key figures in the ((political)) arena?

Interviewee 1:

نعم لاشك (.). لابل هو الرقم هو الان الان الاول في بغداد.

Yes no doubt (.). He is even the main figure in Baghdad now.

Interviewee 2:

من حقه هو يطرح مشروع ويتبناه. من حقه. يتوفق ما يتوفق مو هو اي مهم عندي. المهم عندي مشروع صح.

It is his right to propose a project and adopt it. It is his right. ((Whether)) he succeeds or not does not significantly matter to me. What matters to me is that his project is correct.

(Interview 1: Interviewer, Interviewee 1, Interviewee 2)

At the opening of the example the interviewer and interviewee 1 attempted to delegitimize the calls for majority government often made by the leader of State of Law Coalition, i.e. Al-Maliki, by irrationalizing the majority government, highlighting its detrimental consequences as it would concentrate power in the hands of Al-Maliki, whose coalition had the majority seats in the parliament. In response to this delegitimization attempt, the addressed interviewee (interviewee 2), who represented the State of Law Coalition in the interview, provided a counterargument that aimed to legitimize the majority government. The legitimization of the majority government was achieved by highlighting its beneficial outcomes depicting it as the possible reform to the dysfunctional ethno-sectarianly based power sharing government, i.e. *Enough with this comedy (0.3) partnership ((government)) and unity ((government))* and *whatever*.

As part of his counterargument to the original delegitimization bids made by the interviewer and interviewee 1 at the beginning of the extract in example 16 above, interviewee 2 made sure to convey an implication that he was a man of a vision who aimed to improve the political system, not a merely blind follower of his political party leader, e.g. *We must opt for a majority and minority. Let it be (that) we are the minority. ((Whether)) he succeeds or not does not significantly matter to me*. Legitimizing the majority government did not only construct interviewee 2's political

alignments in regards to the issue in questions here, but it also constructed his personal identity as a political reformist and a non-conformist State of Law member. His sociopolitical identity as reformist was discursively indexed by a positive stance he took towards the political action of calling for majority government. Furthermore, his personal identity as a non-conformist State of Law member was indexed by taking an ostensibly indifferent stance to his political party's eagerness for power, e.g. *I do not care*.

In the interviews analyzed here, the interviewees' sociopolitical identities did not only include personal attributes but also collective ones. Collective attributes indicated the interviewees' membership in certain political institutions or ethno-sectarian communities. The institutional identities were strongly associated with the political institutions active in the Iraqi political arena. From a sociological viewpoint, an institution is a "complex of positions and roles" that has the social function of modeling human behaviors according to sets of rules, norms and values (Turner, 1997: 6). Renkema (2004: 253) points out that an institution can be viewed as an intermediary level between the individual and society. Due to the nature of the interviews, the interviewees frequently indexed their institutional identities to reaffirm their roles as representatives of their political parties and coalition in the interviews. Yet, this was slightly less evident in the second TV interview because the interviewee were more concerned about their image as representative of their ethno-sectarian communities due to the ethno-sectarianly nature of the topic discussed. Example 17 below demonstrates how the interviewees could index their institutional political identities.

Example 17:

هذا تنظيره كدولة قانون.

This is what we think as State of Law ((members))

(Interview 1: Interviewee 2)

وليس العراق التي سحبت الترشيح..... اذا العراقية قدمت مرشحين اخرين.

It was not Iraqia ((coalition)) that withdrew the nomination..... that means Iraqia ((coalition)) has ((in fact)) nominated others.

(Interview 2: Interviewee 2)

ائتلاف المواطن انتصر (0.2) لانه حقق نجاحات كبيرة قياسا الى ماكان عليه سابقا ولازلنا فعلا متقدمين في اغلب المحافظات.

Citizen Coalition (it) won (0.2) because (it) achieved successes in comparison to the past..... we are still in fact at the top in most of the provinces.

(Interview 3: interviewee 1)

Example 17 shows how the institutional political identities can be indexed by the interviewees in the three interviews. In the first interview the interviewee explicitly indexed his representation of the State of Law Coalition using the expression *This is what we think as State of Law ((members))*. In the second interview, the interviewee indexed his membership in his political institutions, i.e. Iraqia coalition, by virtue of a political stance, which was an attempt to defend the political policies of that political institution. The interviewee in the third interview, explicitly referred to his political institution, i.e. Citizen Coalition, and then indexed his membership in it by using the collective pronoun 'we'.

In a fragile, consociational democracy like Iraq, it was typical for the interviewees' to interweave their political affiliations with their ethno-sectarian attributes that defined their memberships in certain ethnic or sectarian groups to foreground particular sub-national identities. In the interviews that discussed less ethno-sectarianly sensitive topics, i.e. the first and third interviews, the interviewees tended to construct their ethno-sectarian based political identities in a way that enhances nationalistic ethos or inter-communal rapprochement in order to present themselves as nationalistic, non-sectarianist or tolerant with other communities. Consider examples 18 and 19 taken from interview 1, in which the constructed sociopolitical identities comprised both political and ethnic concepts of self. In example 18, the interviewee' sociopolitical identity was constructed by means of legitimizing a political action, whereas in example 19, the interviewee constructed his sociopolitical identity though legitimizing a political actor.

Example 18:

Interviewee 2:

تحالفنا مع الاخوان الكورد يجب ان يحصل، ولكن ابدأ ليس على حساب المكون الاخر (0.3) مستحيل.

Our alliance with the Kurdish brothers should be maintained, but never at the expense of ((losing)) the other ((ethnic)) component (0.3) impossible.

(Interview 1: Interviewee 2)

The interviewee in example 18 legitimized the political action of making an alliance with the Kurds by indicating that this political alliance was not at the expense of other communities' fundamental interests, i.e. the Sunnis. By so doing, the interviewee indexed his political affiliation with the State of Law Coalition, which was backgrounded in the extract (van Leeuwen, 2008), and simultaneously indexed his membership in a sectarian group, i.e. Shia, through differentiation (van Leeuwen, ibid: 40), where his ethno-sectarian community was explicitly distinguished from the other communities, i.e. *the Kurdish brothers, the other ((ethnic)) component*, i.e. the Sunnis, to index difference between in-group and out-groups. In the example above, the interviewee constructed his ethno-sectarian based sociopolitical identity in a way that resisted the political stereotype associated with his enregistered identity (Agha, 2009; De Fina, 2015) and enhanced inter-communal rapprochement in order to disperse any possible Sunni suspicion about the Shiite-Kurdish political alliance. This inter-communal rapprochement was meant to be interpreted as a rapport enhancing move, especially by the metaparticipants at the second-frame, i.e. the audience.

In the same vein, the interviewee in example 19 below attempted to ease any tension engendered by the rival interviewee's accusation for his political coalition to ignite animosity with the Kurds in order to win the votes of the sectarianist Sunni in election, e.g. *his problems with the Kurds were the same issues Usama Al-Nujaifi made use of to win the election.*

Example 19:

Interviewee 1:

ولا احد في الموصل ولا في كركوك ولا في ديالى يَتمنى عداء بين اخوانه في هذه المحافظات والاخوة الكورد.
No one in Mosul or Kirkuk or Diyala wishes for animosity between his brothers in these provinces and the Kurdish brothers.

(Interview 1: Interviewee 1)

In response to this accusation, the interviewee in example 19 legitimized his sectarian community, i.e. Sunnis, using positive in-group representation topos by showing positive intentions towards the Kurds. Communicating this political stance indexed

the interviewee's sectarian identity as a Sunni, and concurrently indexed his sociopolitical identity. The sectarian affiliation of his political party was discursively indexed in terms of spatialization, "in which social actors are represented by means of reference to a place with which they are, in the given context, closely associated" (van Leeuwen, 2008: 46). The spatialization in this example was established by referring to the Sunnis via the cities in which they form the majority, i.e. *Mosul or Kirkuk or Diyala*. Similar to example 18, the interviewee in example 19 attempted to use this collective legitimization to depict himself, his political party and ethnic community as tolerant actors who were looking for peaceful coexistence with the Kurds, which could be perceived as a rapport enhancing attempt targeting part of the audience, i.e. the Kurds in this case.

As in interview 1, indexing sectarian affiliation in the third interview often aimed to disperse any possible inter-communal tension triggered by political actions as demonstrated in example 20 below.

Example 20:

Interviewee 1:

اولا الاصرار على التحالف الوطني(.) وكما ذكرت يعني وكما ذكر الاستاذ الساعدي، يشكل ضرورة(.) ضرورة وطنية ولقد لعب هذا التحالف دورا رئيسا وحقيقيا في لملة وحدة البلد والحفاظ على وحدته واستقلاله. هذا لا يعني انه لا توجد ملاحظات على الاداءات التي تمتع بها هذا التحالف(.) هذا واحد. الاصرار على التحالف لا يعني اطلاقا ابقاء الاصطفافات الطائفية او العنصرية. نحن واقعا نستغرب من استمرار هذا الامر لدى بعض القنوات الاعلامية. ولا ادري لماذا اصرارها، حينما تقول ان هناك تحالف يوجد فيه اكثر عناصره شيعة(.) ان هذا تحالفا طائفيا. واذا كان هناك تشكل اخر يقابله اكثره سنة يكون طائفيا. واذا كان هناك تشكيل اقله اكراد او تركمان فسيكون عنصريا. اعتقد هذا فرد تلاعب بالاصطلاحات غير دقيق. الوطن يجمع كل هذه التلاوين، ولا يوجد اي تناقض في ان تكون هناك كتل معبره عن مجموع كتل بشرية تنتسب الى مذهب(.) او تنتسب الى طائفة(.) او تنتسب الى عنصر.

First of all the insistence on the National Alliance (.) as Mr. Al-Sa'idi and I mentioned, represents a necessity (.) a national necessity. And this alliance has played a fundamental and actual role in preserving the unity of the country and maintaining its independence. This does not mean that there are some remarks on the performance of this alliance (.) this is firstly. The insistence on the alliance does not mean at all keeping the sectarian and racial alignments. We are in fact surprised by the continuation of this issue on some media channels. I do not know why this

insistence when sometimes they say there is a new alliance which most of its members are Shiites (.) this is a sectarian alliance. And if there is another formation that confronts it, most of it((s members are) Sunnis, it is sectarian ((alliance)). And if there is a formation most of it((s members are) Kurds or Turkomen it would be racial ((alliance)).I think is a kind of inaccurate manipulation of terms [playing with words]. The homeland gathers all these colors, and there is no contradiction when there are blocs that represent human groups that belong to a sect (.) or denomination (.) or a race.

(Interview 3: Interviewee 1)

In the above example, the interviewee sought to legitimize his political party's insistence on recreating the broad Shiite political alliance in the parliament, i.e. the National Alliance, and simultaneously to refute the political and media debate about how the recreation of such an alliance would sustain the sectarian and ethnic alignments in the new government, which indeed hampered reforms and negatively affected the performance of the previous government. The legitimization process in this example was achieved by rationalizing the recreation of the National Alliance through highlighting its beneficial outcomes on the political arena in the country, e.g., *this alliance has played a fundamental and actual role in preserving the unity of the country and maintaining its independence*. By rationalizing the Shiite alliance, the interviewee positioned himself as a Shiite consociationalist ready to share power with other ethno-sectarian communities. Such a sociopolitical identity was indexed by virtue of the stance he took towards the recreation of the alliance. The interviewee concurrently asserted that this alliance was not sectarianist and did not target any other ethnic or sectarian group. Communicating such a stance was meant to disperse the threat that the recreation of the Shiite alliance might pose to the other communities which were often described as minorities. Taking this stance aimed to function as rapport enhancing and inter-communal rapprochement towards these minority groups.

Unlike the tendencies in the first and the third interviews, the interviewees in the second interview were prone to identify themselves with particular ethno-sectarian communities in order to highlight difference and provoke tensions between the communities to which they belong. The interviewees in the third interview aimed to attain their political goals as representatives of ethno-sectarian communities looking

for more administrative positions in the power sharing government. This was mainly due to the nature of the topic discussed, which was characteristically sensitive from an ethno-sectarian point of view. Examples 21 and 22 below show how the interviewees underscored their different sociopolitical identities as part of their pursuit of ethno-sectarian power.

Example 21:

Interviewee 1:

لا يمكن ان(.) لايمكن ان تتوقع ان السنة(.) ان عدد النواب السنة يكونون في داخل البرلمان هم الاكثرية . لان البرلمان هو انعكاس عن واقع الشارع كما هو، مو كما نشتهي وكما يخطط البعض . لذلك معضلة التهميش مالها معنى مالها قيمة . التهميش وين؟! [اكو واحد]...

It is not possible that (.) not possible that you expect that Sunnis (.) that the number of Sunni representatives in the parliament is a majority. Because the parliament is a reflection of the reality on the ground as it is, not as we desire or as some plans. Therefore the dilemma of marginalization has no value. Where is the marginalization?! [Is there anyone] ...

Interviewer:

]

حتى وان كان [السنة اغلبية؟! السيد النجيفي قال السنة اغلبية(.) قالها بوضوح.

[Even though] the Sunnis are a majority?! Mr. Al-Nujaifi said Sunnis are a majority (.) he said it clearly.

Interviewee 1:

وين الاغلبية؟ وين(.) ما باننت؟! مو سويننا انتخابات؟ ثلاث دورات برلمانية؟!]

Where is the majority?! Where (.) why not obvious?! Haven't we held an election? >Three parliamentary terms?!

(Interview 2: Interviewer, Interviewee 2)

In example 21 above, the interviewee was responding to an argument made by his opponent, i.e. the other interviewee, which indicated that the Sunni political parties' share of government positions was not fair as it was not commensurate with the size of the community they politically represented. He deauthorized the Sunnis, presenting them as a minority, in order to refute his opponent's argument, e.g. *Where is the*

majority? Where (.) why not obvious?! Haven't we held an election? >Three parliamentary terms?!. In doing so, the interviewee positioned the opponent in a role of minority representative, which seemed to be interpreted as a rapport challenging act by the opponent (see example 21 below). This positioning process was discursively represented by means of collectivization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37-8) using a noun denoting a sectarian community to refer to the political actor, i.e. Sunnis. By taking such a stance, the interviewee oriented rapport towards challenge and also implicitly constructed his sociopolitical identity as a politician representing the majority, i.e. Shiites. Indexing such a sociopolitical identity reinforced his enregistered identity as a Shiite hardliner State of Law member.

In example 22, the interviewee challenged the other interviewee's bid to position him and the sect he politically represented as a minority.

Example 22:

اليوم اكو قوة تحاول ان تظهر هذا المكون على انه اقلية. وهذه القوة تعمل في كل الظروف، في الانتخابات و بعد الانتخابات. وتكلم الاخ ابو ياسر عن انه اليوم ال ا ههه ال البرلمان موجود وان البرلمان هو الذي يقوم بصنع الحكومة(.) وهم مشاركون في ا ههه (.) لا اخي(.) نحن اليوم لسنا مشاركين (.) والدليل على ذلك الملف الامني. الدوائر الامنية تكاد تكون خالية، ونسبة المشاركة تكاد تقل عن 8% من المكون السني عن المكون الشيعي. وهذا امر واضح بيه الاقصاء والتهميش.

Today there is a force that tries to present this ((sectarian)) component as a minority. And this force functions in all circumstances, in the election and after the election. Brother Abu Yasir has talked about the uhhh there is a parliament and it forms the government(.) and they are participating in the uhhh(.)No brother (.) we aren't participating and the evidence is the security issue. The security departments are almost empty ((of Sunni participation)), and the participation rate is almost less than 8% for the Sunni component. This is an issue in which marginalization and exclusiveness are obvious.

(Interview 2: Interviewee 2)

The interviewee, in the example above, positioned himself as representative of Sunnis through collectivization using a collective pronoun, i.e. *we*. He also positioned the sect he represented, i.e. Sunnis, as marginalized by an unnamed force, which by implication referred to the government predominantly controlled by the Shiite political parties. Such a positioning process had two rhetorical advantages; it firstly legitimized the interviewee's political party, which was assumed to represent Sunnis,

by characterizing it positively as a victimized political actor. Secondly, it delegitimized the government (discriminatory) policies, and by so doing the interviewee constructed his identity as a Sunni politician defending his community's rights.

An in-depth look at how the participants employed (de)legitimization to position themselves in relation to each other and to themselves revealed that there were two discursive patterns the participants employed to identify themselves as members in certain sociopolitical groups. These patterns resonate with the identification practices observed by Bucholtz (1999) in a community of female 'nerds' at a US high school. Bucholtz (ibid: 211-12) maintains that identities are constructed and projected by two identification practices, these are:

NEGATIVE IDENTITY PRACTICES are those that individuals employ to distance themselves from a rejected identity, while POSITIVE IDENTITY PRACTICES are those in which individuals engage in order actively to construct a chosen identity. In other words, negative identity practices define what their users are NOT, and hence emphasize identity as an intergroup phenomenon; positive identity practices define what their users ARE, and thus emphasize the intragroup aspects of social identity.

Calculating the frequencies of legitimization versus delegitimization in each interview highlights the different discursive patterns the participants used to index their sociopolitical identities as shown in figure 5.6 (below).




Figure 5.6 Percentages of legitimization and delegitimization in the TV interviews

Paying special attention to identity construction, figure 5.6 exhibits how differently the interviewees' sociopolitical identities were constructed in the different thematic contexts. Unlike the participants in the third interview, the participants in the first two interviews tended to construct their sociopolitical identities via negative identification; that is, defining self by negatively recontextualizing particular political actions and negatively characterizing particular political actors, i.e. through delegitimization which dissociated them from these disproved political actions and disfavorable political actors. Nevertheless, in the third interview, which dealt with 2014 election results, the participants tended to construct their sociopolitical identities via positive identification; that is, defining self through promoting self image and justifying self actions. Due to the lack of a decisive winner in the election, the interviewees tended to use the legitimization topoi of authorization and positive representation of self more frequently (see figure 5.2) to emphasize the electoral representativeness of their respective parties and their positive traits.

Negative identification practices seem to be motivated by two different reasons. On the one hand, negative identification can be triggered by a general cognitive tendency identified by several researchers including Messick & Mackie (1989, 55–9) who argue that people tend to perceive out-groups to be more homogenous than in-groups. On the other hand, and from a rhetorical viewpoint, employing negative identification in the first two interviews was less committal and more equivocal. The use of negative identification practices was a good diversionary technique, because it made it easy for the interviewees to avoid discussing their own political performance, agenda and plans, which might require them to commit to a certain course of action, and offered them the chance to indulge in the effortless attacks of opponents.

5.4 Rapport and impoliteness in political TV interviews: attitudinal and moral implications

As argued in 3.4 above, analyzing the impoliteness assessments and how they could be triggered in the TV interviews under scrutiny is advantageous in two respects. First, it can pinpoint the attitudinal and affective consequences, and moral implications of the interviewees' practices. Secondly, it accounts for how the evaluations of impoliteness can be functionally employed in these interviews, that is,

how the evaluations of impoliteness in these TV interviews might have delegitimizing functions and, thus, be employed argumentatively. Ultimately, these two analytical advantages unpack the interactional, social and normative underpinnings of the TV interviews in which these evaluations of impoliteness were made and account for how the interviewees' discursive conflict for power and legitimacy was perceived and evaluated in situ. In the context of this thesis, the outcomes of multilayered positioning analysis could elucidate how rapport was perceived by the interlocutors and how the evaluations of impoliteness were made in interaction.

There are three important aspects that seem very relevant to the analysis of the impoliteness assessments in mediatized political interactions like the TV interviews analyzed in this chapter; these aspects include the source, type and directionality of impoliteness. Firstly, the source of impoliteness refers to the spatiotemporal context in which the action perceived as impolite took place, whether endogenous or exogenous to the interview in which the impoliteness evaluations were made. Secondly, types of impoliteness are related to the connection between impoliteness and the interviewee's sociopolitical identity and the aspects of face associated with it (cf. Bull *et al.*, 1996). In this sense, instances of personal, institutional or communal impoliteness, identified in the dataset analyzed in this chapter, could show how the moral and the social implications of the conflict for power are linked to macro social categories such as ideologies, political institutions, or ethno-sectarian communities. Thirdly, the directionality of impoliteness refers to the multitude of targets at which the practices perceived as offensive and impolite can be directed. Impoliteness can be directed at single or multiple participants at different levels of participations (Kaul de Marlangeon, 2008); personal impoliteness, for instance, is often unidirectional in nature as it only targets the participant whose practices or character is described in terms of impoliteness. Alternatively, institutional and collective assessments of impoliteness are multi-directional, targeting numerous participants at different levels of participation.

The relation between (de)legitimization and the evaluations of impoliteness seems to be intricately versatile and complex in mediatized political interactions. This is mainly due to the fact that (de)legitimization can be both morally based and attitudinally implicative. Nevertheless, this complexity and versatility can be accounted for by the various levels of positioning analysis, for each of these

positioning levels has a different analytical focus that can deal with a different aspect of impoliteness. In the TV interviews analyzed here, impoliteness could arise because certain practices performed within the interaction were perceived as emotionally offensive. Yet, the interviewees might also appeal to the moral order to evaluate some political actions that were performed outside the interaction. The aim of these morally based assessments was to delegitimize others's or out-groups' political actions (see figure 3.1). Evaluating political actions negatively based on moral grounds might amount to evaluations of impoliteness, because these evaluations were made in response to actions that triggered negative attitudes. However, these evaluations differed from typical evaluations of impoliteness in two respects. First, they were employed argumentatively as part of the interviewees' efforts to delegitimize the political actions performed by their rivals. Second, the actions evaluated in terms of impoliteness did not take place within the same spatiotemporal level of the interaction in which the evaluations were made. The actions evaluated occurred in the there-and-then moment of the reported events, but they were recontextualized in the here-and-now moment of the interview, highlighting the intertextual link between the two moments. This means that actions were exogenous to the interaction in which they were evaluated negatively and, thus, considered impolite. Instances of exogenous impoliteness were analytically captured by the first levels of positioning analysis, whereas instances of endogenous impoliteness were analytically captured at the second and third levels of positioning levels. Consider the examples 23 and 24 (below), which highlight the difference between these two evaluations of impoliteness.

Example 23:

Interviewee 1

مو من مصلحة رئيس وزراء يريد ان يمشي بحكومة سليمة ويستمر (. حتى اذا كان طامح بالتمديد والاستمرار، وهو يعادي شركائه . يستمر في هذا الموقع، المفروض يرضي هؤلاء الشركاء (. بالعكس (. المنطق حتى من باب المصلحة وليس وليس من باب السوية أهيه خل نكول هو رجل يطمح لان ولكن اذا هؤلاء الشركاء بايد شركاء وبايد اعداء . هذا الموضوع هو الي ماخلة الاجواء تستمر بصورة صحيحة . يعني هم معه في الحكومة في بغداد ويتآمرون في اربيل لسحب الثقة عنه مثلاً . يعني هذا كيف يقبل؟ ! لا يقبل.

It is not in the Prime Minister's interest, ((one)) who wants to run a functional government (. even if he desires to continue ((for a new term)), to antagonize his

partners. On the contrary (.) logic, even out of interest not that of integrity...uhhh. Let's say the man is desires to continue in this position, ((he is)) supposed to satisfy those partners(.) but if those partners on one hand ((behave as)) partners and ((behave as)) enemies on the other. This thing did not make the ((political)) atmosphere continue as healthy. I mean, they are with him in the cabinet in Baghdad and conspire against him in Erbil to take the motion of no confidence for instance. How is this acceptable?! (This is) not acceptable.

(Interview 1: interviewee 1)

In example 23, the interviewee delegitimized how the United Coalition behaved politically, i.e. *they are with him in the cabinet in Baghdad and conspire against him in Erbil to take the motion of no confidence for instance*, using the topos of negative evaluation of an out-group action. In this example, the delegitimized political practice of United Coalition was discursively represented as a conspiracy. At the end of the example, the interviewee invoked the moral order to evaluate this kind of political practice in terms of moral acceptability wondering how such a political practice can be considered acceptable, i.e. *How is this acceptable?!*. In this example, the interviewee evaluated the political practice of the United Coalition in terms of impoliteness, implying it violated the moral expectations. This evaluation conveyed an emotionally charged negative attitude, i.e. *(This is) not acceptable*, towards what was considered an offensive action. This impoliteness assessment was communicated by Iraqi colloquial variety of Arabic rather than the modern standard Arabic used at the beginning of the extract to express intense emotive response. Indeed, conspiring is often considered as an outright immoral action in Arab culture. In fact, one of definitions of the verb 'to conspire' is to break a pledge¹¹, which is considered a very serious immoral practice in Arab culture, as it reveres keeping pledges and promises. The evaluated practice did not take place in the interview, but it was rather performed prior to the interaction; the interviewee recontextualized the action in the interview as part of his delegitimization of the rival political coalition. As this type of evaluation was embedded within the delegitimization of the political practices of United Coalition, it could be captured at the first level of positioning analysis, in which the political actors and action are positioned relative to each other in the reported event.

¹¹ Alma'ani online dictionary

Therefore, this example can be argued to involve an instance of exogenous impoliteness.

In certain cases, exogenous impoliteness assessments could give rise to endogenous impoliteness. This was because exogenous evaluations of impoliteness were not communicated in a vacuum but rather embedded in social practices, which were themselves liable to impoliteness assessments (Haugh, 2013; Kádár and Haugh, 2013). For instance, in example 24 below an exogenous impoliteness assessment made by interviewee 1 was embedded in an action-oriented delegitimization; this exogenous impoliteness assessment triggered an endogenous impoliteness assessment as interviewee 2 perceived this interactional practice as an unguarded attack on the leader of his political coalition.

Example 24:

Interviewee 2:

المالكي مع الاكراد (.) شنو مشاكله؟ ! هي نفس المسائل التي كان يثيرها الاخ اسامة النجيفي ويقيم الدنيا ولا يقعدا بسببها . مشاكله مع الكرد هي نفس المشاكل الي اسامة النجيفي بيها ربح الانتخابات . لما المالكي يصعد الموقف ويوكف وقفة رجل من حديد بوجه رفاقه الاكراد واخوانه وحلفائه، انت يا اسامة النجيفي تروح من وراء تصوير كردي. هذا مع ::يب (0.3) هسه تريد نفتح كل الملفات؟

His problems with the Kurds were the same problems Usama Al-Nujaifi made use of to win the election. When Al-Maliki stood up as a man of steel against his old colleagues and allies, oh you ((vocative article)) Usama betrayed him and turned a Kurd ((Kurd's supporter)). This is shame:::ful. Do you want us to uncover everything?

Interviewer:

والله ياريت .

Please do.

Interviewee 2:

صعب (.) بصراحة صعب .

((This is)) difficult(.) frankly difficult.

Interviewee 1:

لا خليه ...

No, let him

Interviewee 2:

صعب .

((It is))

difficult.

Interviewee 1:

انت مابقيت شي . انت سويت التوصيف ... أهه سيقتنع الناس بكلامك بدون هاي التفاصيل . يصير ... يعني يعني
وكانك اتهمت الاخرين بدون ادلة .

You spared nothing. You make the description ((sounds like))... Uhhh people will be convinced by your argument without the ((required)) details. Can you... I mean, I mean you sound like accusing the others without evidence.

(Interview 1: interviewee 1, interviewer, interviewee 2)

At the beginning of the extract in example 24, interviewee 2 delegitimized the leader of United Coalition for changing his political stance over the Kurds' demand from the federal government. Hinting at his (perceived) opportunistic nature, interviewee 2 implicitly depicted him as a double-faced man with no principle. In doing so, interviewee 2 communicated an exogenous impoliteness assessment embedded in a delegitimization act by which the opportunistic practice of the targeted political character was evaluated based on moral grounds, i.e. *This is shame:::ful*. This exogenous impoliteness was evaluated as a case of violation of the normative frame of reference for not being in line with the appropriate behavior of a decent politician.

In his response, interviewee 1 evaluated this exogenous impoliteness as an impolite interactional practice itself, because it was perceived as violating both the norm of proper argument that would require real evidence, and the behavioral expectations that would entail avoiding outright face attack. The interviewee used the clause *you spared nothing*, which is often used in informal Iraqi Arabic to suggest that a social norm was flagrantly violated, to register a moral stance (Haugh, 2015). Interviewee 1 perceived this attack as a threat that damaged the face associated with his institutional identity as member in United Coalition, whose leader was explicitly

attacked in the example. This type of endogenous impoliteness assessment was captured at the second level of positioning analysis, which concentrated on the violations of behavioral expectation associated with the interactional roles in this genre, and the third level of positioning analysis, which focused on how identities were constructed vis-à-vis the competing discourses that framed the interview.

Turning to the type of impoliteness in the TV interviews, three types of impoliteness were identified: personal impoliteness, institutional impoliteness and communal impoliteness. If an interviewee, or an action he performed in his capacity as distinctive or unique person, was evaluated in terms of impoliteness, this could be considered an instance of personal impoliteness. The exogenous impoliteness assessment referred to in example 24 above could be classified as a typical case of personal impoliteness, in which a specific political actor in his capacity as a distinctive agent was morally evaluated. An important aspect of any personal impoliteness assessment is its unidirectionality as the behavior perceived as impolite was directed at a single participant. The personal impoliteness in the example above involved the evaluation of Al-Nujaifi's practice as a metaparticipant.

Institutional impoliteness by definition relates to the institutional identity of the interviewees. Therefore, institutional impoliteness may arise when an agent acting out an institutional role violates a social norm or threatens another agent's face. Kaul de Marlangeon (2008: 738) defines institutional impoliteness as "a bounded phenomenon of public nature, performed by individuals that act on behalf of the group sharing the same system of values". Example 25 below introduces an example of institutional impoliteness embedded in an attempt to delegitimize the State of Law Coalition. This institutional impoliteness was perceived by the interviewee representing the State of Law as an offense triggered by the opponent interviewee to target his entire political coalition rather than his personal face only. This instance of offense making was interpreted as a typical case of institutional impoliteness, because both the delegitimizing and the delegitized are the representatives of their political coalitions.

Example 25

Interviewee 3:

لا هذا رفضنا طبعاً يتأتى من مسألة ومسألة منهجية ومسألة علمية ومسألة أرادة عامة وأرادة أرادة مرجعيات الدين(. في ضرورة التداول السلمي للسلطة وعدم التأسيس لثقافة الاحتكار أو ثقافة الل ال الاحتكارية أو أن

صح التعبير الديكتاتورية. هذا أهمه يعني (.). الصفة لا تتماشى مع مذاق التحالف الوطني ولا على مذاق جمهور التحالف الوطني على حتى أممم(.). أدبيات المنهج السياسي في التداول السلمي للسلطة في النظم الديمقراطية.

No our objection is actually derived from a methodological and scientific issue and an issue related to a public demand and Marjai'aya's ((the religious leaders)) demand (.)(which) emphasizes on a peaceful handover of power and not to establish a culture of monopoly or uh or a culture of monopoly, or dictatorship so to speak. This means uh (.) it does not fit the National Alliance taste and that of the constituency of the national alliance not even uh (.) the political method of peaceful transition of power in democratic regimes.

Interviewer:

.....أستاذ كمال، حظوظكم بتشكيل الحكومة القادمة يبدو أنها ضعيفة(0.4) أولاً ثقة (.). ثقة باقي الأطراف بكم ضعيفة، ووأهه رفض بعض الكتل لولاية ثالثة للسيد المالكي(.). وما عدكم مرشح آخر.

.....Mr. Kamal, your chances to form the next government look weak (0.4) First of all the trust (.). trust of other parties in you are weak. And uh some blocs reject a third term for Mr. Al-Maliki ((in office))(.). and you have no other nominee.

Interviewee 2:

أهمه طبعاً قبل أن أجيبك (.). يودي أن أعلق على ما ذكره . الزميل ج :يود يقول أن ها هي رغبة المرجعية والناس وكذا . أنا أعتقد أن هذا كلام غير دقيق. لم تعلن أي مرجعية ، يعني ما عدا هنالك استثناء الى لظروف معينة(.). أيي ربما في يوما ما سأحدث عنها. لم تتحدث المرجعية عن شخص معين(.). أهمه هذي أولاً . والشعب عندما ينتخب كتلة أكبر هذا يعني- ((يتم مقاطعته من قبل المقدم))

Uhhh actually before I answer (.). I would like to comment on what he has mentioned. Colleague [used honorifically] Jawa::d said that this is the desire of Marjaiya ((religious leaders)) and the people and so no. I think this is an inaccurate talk. No Marjaiya ((religious leader)) has announced, I mean save one due to certain circumstances(.). and someday I may talk about them. No MARJAIYA has spoken about a person in specific(.). uh this is firstly. And when the people elect a bloc as majority this means-((gets interrupted by the interviewer))

(Interview 3: interviewee 2, interviewee 3)

At the beginning of the extract in the example above, interviewee 3 attempted to legitimize his political coalition's rejection of support for the former Prime Minister

for a new term in office by providing two justifications. The first justification was the need for political change to prevent power monopoly, and the second was the desire of the religious leaders, whose opinions are very important in a country where politics and religion are strongly connected. Interviewee 2 interpreted the second justification provided by interviewee 3 as a serious threat to his coalition as this might undermine the popularity of his political coalition. This is due to the fact in certain cases the Iraqi religious leaders' opinions can have a notable impact on the political process in the country. In the extract, interviewee 2 was reluctant to answer the interviewer's question before he replied to the challenge that was directed to him in his capacity as member in a political institution, i.e. the ruling coalition, which might damage the self-worth and self-efficacy attributes, i.e. face, associated with his institutional political identity in the eyes of the audience. Therefore, he rushed to refute his opponent's argument by denying its validity, i.e. *I think this is an inaccurate talk*, and then continued to authorize his political party by appealing to its previous result in the election, i.e. *when the people elect a bloc as majority this means*. The answer of interviewee 2 in the example 25 above involved an institutional impoliteness that was indexed by certain contextualization cues, such as intonation, his insistence to refute interviewee 3's argument before answering the question raised by the interviewer, and the emotionally aggressive counterclaim (Langlotz and Locher, 2012: 1594), i.e. *No MARJAIYA has spoken about a person in specific*.

Alternatively, evaluations of communal impoliteness are inherently related to the ethno-sectarian identities of the interviewees. Such evaluations were made when the self-worth and self-efficacy attributes associated with the interlocutors' ethno-sectarian identities were attacked. The second interview, which dealt with the more sensitive aspect of politics related to the ethnic identities of the interviewees, was the typical context for communal impoliteness to emerge. Consider example 26 below.

Example 26:

Interviewee 1:

لا يمكن ان(.) لا يمكن ان تتوقع ان السنة(.) ان عدد النواب السنة يكونون في داخل البرلمان هم الاكثرية . لان البرلمان هو انعكاس عن واقع الشارع كما هو، مو كما نشتهي وكما يخطط البعض . لذلك معضلة التهميش مالها معنى مالها قيمة. التهميش وين؟! [اكو واحد]...

It is not possible that (.) not possible that you expect that Sunnis (.) that the number of Sunni representatives in the parliament is a majority. Because the parliament is a

reflection of the reality on the ground as it is, not as we desire or as some plans. Therefore the dilemma of marginalization has no value. Where is the marginalization?! [Is there anyone] ...

Interviewer:

*[حتى وان كان] السنة اغلبيّة؟! السيد النجيفي قال السنة اغلبيّة(.) قالها بوضوح.
[Even though] the Sunnis are a majority?! Mr. Al-Nujaiḫi said Sunnis are a majority
(.) he said it clearly.*

Interviewee 1:

*وين الا غلبيّة؟! وين(.) ما بانّت؟! مو سوينّا انتخابات؟! ثلاث [حورات برلمانية?!]
Where is the majority?! Where (.) why not obvious?! Haven't we held an election?
>Three parliamentary terms?!*

Interviewee 2:

*[ممكن] اجاب؟ ((مقاطعا الضيف الاول ومخاطبا المقدم))
[Can I] respond? ((interrupting interviewee 1 and addressing the interviewer))*

Interviewer:

*طبعاً(.) لك حرية الاجابة.
Of course (.) you have the right to respond.
[Interviewee 1 keeps the floor]*

(Interview 3: interviewee 1, interviewer, interviewee 2)

Interviewee 1 in the example above deauthorized the Sunni community, presenting it as a minority. This deauthorization attempt was perceived as face sensitive by the opponent, interviewee 2, interpreting it as an offensive attack against his entire sect not only an attack against him as a person or his political coalition, and as such impolite. This communal impoliteness was captured by the third level of positioning analysis where interviewees' indexing of their ethno-sectarian identity was scrutinized. The communal impoliteness was indexed by interviewee 2 by certain

contextualization cues that included overlapping and interruptions, i.e. [*Can I respond?* ((interrupting interviewee 1 and addressing the interviewer)), and metapragmatic comments (Culpeper, 2011: 74), i.e. his challenging counterclaim in his response (see example 22 reused below).

Example 22:

Interviewee 2:

اليوم اكون قوة تحاول ان تظهر هذا المكون على انه اقلية. وهذه القوة تعمل في كل الظروف، في الانتخابات و بعد الانتخابات. وتكلم الاخ ابو ياسر عن انه اليوم ال ا ههه ال البرلمان موجود وان البرلمان هو الذي يقوم بصنع الحكومة(.) وهم مشاركون في ا ههه (.) لا اخي(.) نحن اليوم لسنا مشاركين(.) والدليل على ذلك الملف الامني. الدوائر الامنية تكاد تكون خالية، ونسبة المشاركة تكاد تقل عن 8% من المكون السني عن المكون الشيعي. وهذا امر واضح بيه الاقصاء والتهميش.

Today there is a force that tries to present this ((sectarian)) component as a minority. And this force functions in all circumstances, in the election and after the election. Brother Abu Yasir has talked about the uhhh there is a parliament and it forms the government(.) and they are participating in the uhhh(.) No brother (.) we aren't participating and the evidence is the security issue. The security departments are almost empty ((of Sunni participation)), and the participation rate is almost less than 8% for the Sunni component. This is an issue in which marginalization and exclusiveness are obvious.

(Interview 3: interviewee 2)

The interviewee, in the above example, positioned the Sunnis as marginalized by the government, which was predominantly controlled by the Shiite political parties. By so doing, he legitimized his sect by representing it positively as victimized, and simultaneously delegitimized the government's exclusionary policies. This challenging interactional move and the pointed complaint (Culpeper, 2011: 256), i.e. *No brother (.) we aren't participating and the evidence is the security issue*, communicated that interviewee 2 has taken offense when interviewee 1 deauthorized Sunnis as a minority in the previous example. Therefore, the actor-oriented legitimization of Sunnis and the action-oriented delegitimization of government exclusive policies involve an embedded evaluation of communal impoliteness. In terms of directionality, this inter-communal impoliteness evaluation indicates that

interviewee 2 interpreted the collective authorization attempt in the previous example as an offensive, and as a result face threatening, act to him and to the entire ethno-sectarian community he sought to represent in this interview. By so doing, interviewee 2 directed the expressive communal impoliteness embedded in interviewee 1's deauthorization towards multiple participants at different levels of participation, i.e. the Sunni community at the second-frame.

Impoliteness instances identified in the dataset exhibit thematically related differences across the three TV interviews analyzed in this chapter as shown in figure 5.7 (below).




Figure 5.6 Percentages of impoliteness in the TV interviews

In the figure, impoliteness was codified in terms of expressive impoliteness and classificatory impoliteness (Eelen, 2001). As argued in 3.3 above, the identification of the classificatory impoliteness instances in the dataset was based on the interviewees' metapragmatic comments (Culpeper, 2011: 74) and contextualization cues (Gumperz, 1982: 131). The identification of the expressive impoliteness instances, on the other hand, was based on my own emic knowledge of the norms conventionally associated with the settings under investigations to make specific genre-sanctioned interpretations of impoliteness (see Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013: 24). The numbers of impoliteness assessments identified in the utterances that have a (de)legitimizing function were as follows; 5 instances of expressive impoliteness and 3 instances of classificatory impoliteness in the first TV interview, 9 instances of expressive impoliteness and 5 instances of classificatory impoliteness in the second TV interview, and 3 instances of expressive impoliteness and 1 instance of classificatory impoliteness in the third TV interview. Since some instances of (de)legitimization involve both action-oriented and actor-oriented topoi, the quantitative analysis of the

impoliteness in each interview is normalized by the number of utterances identified as having a (de)legitimizing function, which might include more than a single topos. Figure 5.7 demonstrates that impoliteness was more salient in the interview that was more sectarianly sensitive because of the sensitivity of the topic. However, it was less salient in the third interview in which the interviewees concentrated on justifying their actions and improving their image rather than attacking others (cf. figure 5.3 and 5.6).

5.5 Summary

The aim of this chapter was to examine how the conflict for power could be discursively produced, perceived and evaluated across thematically different contexts in the genre of multi-participant political TV interviews. Focusing on how the conflict for power was discursively realized, the interviewees tended to recontextualize particular political actions and actors and (re)characterize them in order to (de)legitimize particular interpretations of reality. At the first level of positioning analysis, the analysis shows that the interviewees employed a wide range of topoi to (de)legitimize particular political interpretations of political reality. Although, the balance between the action and actor-oriented topoi was maintained, the use of the different (de)legitimization topoi seemed to vary in thematically motivated patterns. In the first interview the positive representation of self image and the negative representation of others were the most commonly used topoi. The collective legitimization topoi of victimization was characteristically employed in the second TV interview due to the ethno-sectarianly sensitive nature of the topic. Interestingly, in the third interview, which discussed the results of the 2014 parliamentary election and the possibility of forming a ruling coalition, the topoi of authorization and deauthorization were the most commonly used topoi.

At the second level of positioning analysis, I interrogated the interlocutors' genre-sanctioned roles in the TV interview and examined how they evolved into political alignments as part of their attempt to establish their alignments towards the topic in question and/or towards each other. The analysis indicates that these political alignments affected and effected how rapport was perceived in the interviews. At the third level of positioning analysis where the sociopolitical identities were scrutinized, different types of sociopolitical identities were indexed. These identities combined political orientations with personal traits or institutional or ethno-sectarian affiliations.

It seems that the interviewees tended to construct their identities via negative identification patterns due to cognitive and rhetorical reasons. It is the interrelation between the here-and-now, i.e. in the locality of interviews analyzed in this chapter, and the there-and-then, i.e. the (de)legitimizing process, that determined how the interlocutors defended their political interests and constructed their sociopolitical identities.

Focusing on how conflict for power was perceived and evaluated in terms of impoliteness, the last section investigated the interrelation between (de)legitimization and impoliteness in order to highlight the social and moral underpinnings of the political discourse produced in TV interviews. The multi-tiered positioning analysis was used to identify various instances of exogenous and endogenous impoliteness each of which triggered at different spatiotemporal levels of the context. Exogenous evaluations of impoliteness were embedded in the (de)legitimization acts, and hence were captured at the first level of positioning analysis. The findings suggest that exogenous impoliteness assessments functioned as moral gauges for negatively perceived political practices. Endogenous evaluations of impoliteness, on the other hand, were the focus of the second and third levels of positioning analysis as they were triggered by (perceived) violation of the normative frame of reference and identity and face related offenses. Thus, endogenous impoliteness assessments could normatively gauge for the interviewees' interactional practices in situ. As for the types of impoliteness, the impoliteness assessments identified mostly include institutional impoliteness in the first two interviews, but communal impoliteness in the second interview, which seems to be motivated by the thematic context. The analysis of impoliteness indicates that impoliteness was more salient in the interview that was more sectarianly sensitive because of the sensitivity of the topic. However, it was less salient in the third interview in which the interviewees concentrated on justifying their actions and improving their image rather than attacking others.

Chapter Six
Interplay of (De)legitimization, Rapport and Impoliteness in Facebook
Discussions¹²

6. Introduction

This chapter aims to scrutinize the discursive conflict for power in three Facebook comment threads, to explore the participation framework and dynamics of argumentation in these online interactions and finally to examine the social and moral implications of this conflict for power. Section 6.1 investigates how the conflict for power, by means of (de)legitimization, could be produced and reacted to on Facebook at the first level of positioning analysis. Section 6.2 explores the interactional orders afforded by the medium in the Facebook comment threads to demonstrate how the interlocutors positioned themselves in relation to each other in the wake of the collapsed context in this genre (Marwick and Boyd, 2011). Section 6.3 unpacks the social ramifications of the conflict for power in this genre by highlighting how the sociopolitical identities were constructed and how they consequently led to the creation of online sociopolitical communities. Investigating how rapport was perceived in situ elucidates how certain political and interactional practices could be evaluated in terms of impoliteness (section 6.4), which ultimately pinpoints the moral implications of the political confrontations taking place on Facebook.

Research on (de)legitimization, as a discursive power source, has often overlooked computer mediatized communication. However, the use of different social media platforms in political debates makes the investigation of the conflict for power in the political discourses produced in social media a worthwhile and valuable research project, especially because the continuity and similarity between the virtual and the real can be “fruitfully used to diagnose cultural change and societal conditions” (Bou-Franch & Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2014: 22). This is especially relevant in the context of this chapter, as Facebook users are urged by particular affordances of the medium to make the connection between their off and on-line self more visible (Cirucci, 2015). From a political perspective, social media represent communication platforms technologically equipped to function as an indispensable

¹² A part of this chapter was published in the *Journal of Multicultural Discourses*, under the title: ‘The Pursuit of Power in Iraqi Political Discourse: unpacking the construction of sociopolitical communities on Facebook’, Vol. 10 (2): 247-265.

“online public sphere” (Douai and Nofal, 2012) in the globalized world where marginalized people can voice their political opinions and produce counter-discourses that offset hegemonic discourses (Dahlberg, 2007: 837). In this respect, the popularity of social media as means of activism and political engagement has increased considerably since the political events of 2011-2012 in the Arab world (Arab Media Outlook Report, 2012: 224).

In Iraq, Facebook is the most commonly used social media site. Facebook characteristically generates and circulates huge political discourses in which a wide spectrum of interlocutors can participate making use of different affordances, one of which is the public commenting tool on public pages. The most relevant medium factors (Herring, 2007) of Facebook are its collapsed context (Marwick and Boyd, 2011), which gives it its participatory nature, which theoretically allows everybody with internet connection to engage in these interactions. Asynchronicity is another important medium factor because it offers users plenty of time to send precise and planned messages (Tanskanen, 2007: 98). The comment liking tool is also important as it may indicate the commenters’ endorsement of some political opinions, which can ultimately index their memberships in some online communities forged within the comment threads (see examples 17, 18 and 19)

6.1 (Dis)agreeing through (de)legitimization

Unlike the political discourses produced in mainstream media, the use of (de)legitimization in the political discourses instantiated on Facebook comment threads does not quintessentially aim to promote specific political agendas. The commenters’ principal goal when engaging in a political discussion on Facebook comment threads is to communicate their (dis)agreement with the arguments made by the post-author (i.e. page owner) or the other commenters and have their voices heard, especially because their ability to access mainstream media is rather restricted. This was evident by the commenters’ frequent use of debate related expressions, such as ‘agree’, ‘disagree’, ‘don’t think’, ‘this opinion’, ‘this argument’.

Broadly speaking, in these debate-like interactions the commenters recontextualize particular political actions and actors and then (re)characterize them in order to (de)legitimize particular interpretations of the political scene. The commenters in the comment threads analyzed in this chapter legitimized the political

actors they liked, along with their political actions and (de)legitimized the political actors they disliked, along with their actions. In doing so, they voiced their political opinions in a manner that was in line with their ideological preferences. As discussed in the previous chapters, the lexico-grammatical realizations of (de)legitimization can be analyzed at the first level of positioning analysis to demystify their ideological packages. Similar to the analysis in Chapter Five, both action and actor-oriented (de)legitimization could be found. Unlike the interlocutors in the interactions analyzed in Chapter Five, however, the commenters in the Facebook interactions employed these types of (de)legitimization to communicate their utter or partial (dis)agreement with others rather than promoting specific political agendas. Consider examples 1 and 2 below.

Example 1:

المواطن مع الأحرار مع متفرقه و يصيرون النصف + ١ و يشرحون رئيس وزراء وبأي باي نوري ان شاء الله

Citizen ((coalition)) and the Free ((bloc)) along with the small blocs become a half+1 and ((they)) nominate a Prime Minister Designate and bye bye Noori..... Allah's willing.

(Comment thread 3)

In order to express his disagreement with the political prediction made by another commenter, the commenter in the example above authorized two political actors whilst deauthorizing another one in order to legitimize his own prediction about how the political scene would evolve in the aftermath of the 2014 parliamentary election in the country. He first authorized the traditional Shiite rival of the ruling party, i.e. *Citizen ((coalition)) and the Free ((bloc))*, by invoking their popularity and representativeness as indicated by the election results and their ability to form the new government. The commenter discursively represented these political actors by means of association, which refers to “groups formed by social actors and/or groups of social actors (either generically or specifically referred to) which are never labeled in the text (although the actors or groups who make up the association may of course themselves be named and/or categorized)” (van Leeuwen, 2008:38). The then-ruling party, the State of Law, was individualized and nominated (see van Leeuwen, 2008: 52) by using the first name of its leader, i.e. Noori. Although it was the first winner in

the parliamentary election, the commenter deauthorized the State of Law by highlighting its inability to form a majority coalition that could form the government, i.e. *bye bye Noori..... Allah's willing*.

Example 2:

أنت رجل حدوس يا أبا XXX. نعم لقد قام أعداء المالكي برفع شعبيته الى أعلى درجاته بعد قام خصومه بواسطة خطابهم الطائفي المتشنج بأظهاره الخطر الأكبر على طائفة معينة وهذا ما ولد تعلق كبير من أبناء الطائفة الأخرى بالمالكي كمدافع عنهم وعن طائفتهم..مودتي.

Oh father of XXX ((traditional term of address)) you are man of insight. Al-Maliki's enemies had raised his popularity to the utmost after they managed by means of their convulsive sectarian discourse to depict him as the greater danger to a particular sect. And this made the people from the other sect more attached to Al-Maliki as he (represented) their defender and the defender of their sect.. My regards.

(Comment thread 1)

In example 2, the commenter was communicating his agreement with the political interpretation made by the post-author in his original post. He thus delegitimized the opposition parties' practices using negative evaluations of an action. The commenter discursively represented the opposition in terms of possessivation (van Leeuwen, 2008:34) in relation to the former Prime Minister who was nominated (ibid: 40), i.e. *Al-Maliki's enemies*. The delegitimized actions were first agentialized (ibid: 66) to highlight the opposition's responsibility for them, i.e. *Al-Maliki's enemies had raised; they managed to*, and then by an objectivated action (ibid: 63-4), which was negatively presented through predication, i.e. *by means of their convulsive sectarian discourse*.

In certain cases both actor-oriented and action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi can be used in order to make the disagreement more grounded and justifiable, as shown in example 3 below.

Example 3:

هل تتحاور مع من يتمنى لو يذبحك؟

Do you hold dialogue with the one who wishes to slay you?

(Comment thread 2)

In example 3 the commenter attempted to rebut the post-author's call on the government to embark on national dialogue. To that end, the commenter criminalized

the Sunni opposition, with whom the post-author urged the government to hold dialogue, discursively representing them by genericization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 35), i.e. *the one who wishes to slaughter you*. Criminalizing the Sunni opposition as such represented them as fit for prosecution rather than political dialogue. By so doing, the commenter attempted to irrationalize the political action (i.e. holding a dialogue with the opposition), by highlighting its inconsistency, because the Sunni opposition was perceived by the commenter as unfit to hold dialogue with. This political action was discursively represented in terms of objectivation by the commenter, substituting the product, i.e. dialogue, for the action, i.e. to hold dialogue or to negotiate.

As was to be expected, in the first comment thread, which discussed the 2012 political standoff between multiple opposition parties and the ruling party as well as the concomitant propagandas, the main actors (de)legitimized included the former Prime Minister and the opposition parties (see example 4 below), while the main political actions (de)legitimized included the former Prime Minister's policies, behaviors towards his opponents, i.e. the opposition, and the opposition parties' political agenda and their behaviors towards the former Prime Minister and his cabinet as shown in example 2 above. Example 4 introduces the post-author's argument in the first comment thread and a response posted by one of the commenters, in which he used delegitimization to communicate his agreement with the post-author's argument.

Example 4:

Post-author:

قلتها أكثر من مرة ؛ أعداء المالكي أفادوه أكثر من أصدقائه ، تحالفوا ضده بحيث حولوه إلى بطل لشرائح عديدة
وها هي النتائج تثبت هذه النظرية . وتوقعاتي الشخصية - رغم أنني لست مختصا بالتحليل السياسي ، أن السنة
المقبلة ستشهد تغيرا تكتيكيا في معسكر خصومه . سيضطرون للتعامل معه لأنه أصبح الرقم الصعب في
المعادلة السياسية. لا بل أتوقع أنه حتى القوى الإقليمية ستعيد تقييمها للمشهد بعد نتائج الانتخابات .
لو كنت مكان الخصوم لصالحت المالكي وفعلت عكس ما كنت أفعله كي لا تزداد شعبيته أكثر فيفوز بولاية ثالثة.
أما لو جرى العكس واستمرت المعركة التسقيطية ، فثقوا أن أعداد المصوتين له ستزيد بحيث تخرج الجميع
وأنني موجود وأنتو موجودين.

I have said it more than one time; Al-Maliki's enemies benefited him more than his friends ((did)), they allied against him so they turned him into a hero in the eyes of many groups and the ((election)) results are proving this theory. Even though I am not specialized in political analysis, I personally expect that next year would witness a

tactical change in his opponent's campaign. They would have to deal with him because he became the most important figure in the political equation. I even expect that the regional powers would reassess the (political) scene after election results.

If I were in the opponents' places ((shoes)) I would make peace with Al-Maliki and do the exact opposite of what I (they) did in order not to increase his popularity and not to let him win a third term. If things go the other way around and the battle of defaming continues, be assured that his votes would increase and would embarrass them all.

Here I am and there you are. ((Time will prove my expectation right)).

Commenter:

انتخاب المالكي كان اصلا انتخابا طائفيا بحتا فهو و كان و و سيكون رئيس وزراء لطائفة واحدة.

Al-Maliki's (victory in the) election was originally sectarianly motivated. He has been, and always will be, a prime minister for one sect only.

(Comment thread 1)

In example 4, the post-author irrationalized the opposition parties' practices against Al-Maliki, (the former Prime Minister), specifically their defaming campaign, highlighting its detrimental consequences on the opposition parties themselves, e.g. *they allied against him so they turned him into a hero in the eyes of many groups and the ((election)) results are proving this theory*. The irrationalized actions were represented by means of agentialization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 66), i.e. *they allied; they turned*, and objectivation, (ibid: 63-4), i.e. *the battle of defaming*. The responsibility of the opposition parties for these actions was linguistically established by presenting them as the doers of these actions, i.e. agents.

In the same example, the commenter used the negative representation of an out-group actor to delegitimize the former Prime Minister, i.e. Al-Maliki, in order to voice his opinion regarding the issue discussed by the post-author, and which generated the entire interaction, i.e. the comment thread. The commenter characterized Al-Maliki as a Prime Minister for his own sect only not for all Iraqis, i.e. *he has been, and always will be, a prime minister for one sect only*, to cast doubt on his legitimacy. In doing so, the commenter indirectly communicated his disagreement with the author. The characterized, i.e. the former Prime Minister, was

discursively represented by means of nomination (van Leeuwen, 2008: 41) referred to by his last name.

In the second comment thread analyzed in this chapter, the main political actions that were targeted by (de)legitimization were related to the government's refusal to hold dialogue with the Sunni opposition, which was perceived as sectarianly tendentious. The post-author in his original post blamed the government for refusing to hold dialogue with Sunni opposition highlighting the similarity of this refusal to hold dialogue with the Sunni opposition with the refusal of Saddam's regime, which is often described as autocratic, to hold dialogue, due to sectarian biases, with the former opposition parties, who are now in power. Therefore, the political actors who were (de)legitimized in the comment thread were the government (and the former opposition), which was stereotypically described as Shiite-dominated, and the Sunni opposition (sometimes assimilated with Saddam's ousted regime), which was stereotypically described as Sunni-dominated. Moreover, Shiites and Sunnis were also (de)legitimized in this comment thread, because they were perceived as actors in the political process in Iraq. Alternatively, the political actions that were delegitimized were associated with the practices of the government and of the Sunni opposition. This comment thread tackled the more sensitive aspect of politics, related to the ethno-sectarian affiliations of the commenters; this was demonstrated by the frequent use of collective (de)legitimization topoi such as out-group criminalization (see example 3 above), and in-group victimization as (see example 5 below), which both were based on differentiation and exclusion.

Example 5:

Post-author:

قيل لصدام سابقاً حاور قادة المعارضة من الشيعة، فقال كيف احاور خونة يحملون السلاح مع الجيش الإيراني ويقتلون أبناء بلدهم.. اليوم يجلس مكان صدام من يرفضون الحوار مع الآخر تحت نفس الذريعة، وهذا يعني بأن دوامة العنف ستبقى تلتهمنا داخل هذا البلد الفخ.

It had been told to Saddam previously to hold a dialogue with the Leaders of the Shiite opposition; he said how would I hold a dialogue with traitors who had held up arms with the Iranian Army to kill their own people.. Today sit in Saddam's place those who refuse dialogue under the same pretext, this means that the cycle of violence will continue to devour us in this entrapment(-like) country.

Commenter:

مقارنة غير عادلة بين ناس كانت تريد لقمة عيش وحرية كلمة وديكتاتور لا يتكرر مثل صدام جمعهم في مقابر جماعية.. وبين ناس لهم ما يمثلهم في الحكومة والبرلمان ولديهم الكثير ولكن مجموعة من القتلة أذهبت بصيرتهم.. هذا ليس حبا بالمالكي ولكن غباء معارضييه جعله فلتة زمانه.

An unjust analogy between (a group of) people were asking for living and a freedom of speech and an unrepeatable dictator like Saddam (who) gathered them in mass graves.. And (another group of) people who have representatives in the government and the parliament and so many other things but a group of killers made them lose their sight..

This is not an admiration for Al-Maliki but it is the stupidity of his opposition that made him the exceptional man of his time.

(Comment thread 2)

In the above example, the post-author established his political stance using the action-oriented topos of irrationalization to delegitimize the government's refusal to hold talks with the Sunni opposition highlighting this refusal's devastating consequences, i.e. *this means that the cycle of violence will continue to devour us in this entrapment(-like) country*. In the example above, the political action delegitimized was discursively represented as an agentialized action, i.e. *those who refuse dialogue*. Agentialized actions, to use van Leeuwen's (2008: 66) words, are the actions "represented as brought about by human agency" in order to associate the actions with their performers, and consequently highlighting their responsibility for these actions. Therefore, right from the outset of the interaction symbolized by the main post, the post-author communicated a sociopolitical stance that was antithetical to the government and its policies.

In order to communicate his disagreement with the post-author, the commenter in example 5 (above) attempted to rebut the analogy between the former Shiite opposition (i.e. politically represented by the current ruling party) and by extension the Shiite people, discursively represented in terms of genericization (van Leeuwen, 2008:36) and differentiation (ibid, 40), i.e. *(a group of) people, (another group of) people*, and the Sunni opposition. The rebuttal of this analogy was operationalized by the legitimization topos of positive representation of in-group actors by virtue of

victimization. The commenter characterized the Shiites as victimized people who had been killed and buried in mass graves by a dictator merely for asking for decent living and freedom of speech, i.e. *(a group of) people were asked for living and a freedom of speech and an unrepeatabe dictator like Saddam (who) gathered them in mass graves.*

The third comment thread discussed the results of the 2014 parliamentary election. The commenters highlighted the strengths of political parties they supported and justified their political actions, and pinpointed the weaknesses of their rivals and condemned their political actions. Interestingly, the topos of authorization was employed frequently in this comment thread (see also figure 6.3 below). Most of the authorization attempts made by the commenters were achieved by appealing to the political parties' capability to form a ruling coalition, because the parliamentary elections failed to produce a decisive winner who could form a ruling majority in the parliament. Consider example 6 below.

Example 6:

اعتقد المالكي سيحصل ٩٥ مقعد. مع الفضيله وتيار الاصلاح والصادقون والقوائم الصغيرة سيشكلون الحكومة.
I think Al-Maliki will garner 95 seats. With Al-Fadhila, Tayarul-Islah, Al-Sadiqoon and the small blocs they will form the government.

(Comment thread 3)

In the above example, the commenter attempted to authorize the political actor he supported, i.e. Al-maliki, in two ways. He first appealed to the popularity of this political actor expecting that he would garner 95 of the parliamentary seats. Such a number was considered remarkably high within the politically dispersed Iraqi context, in which no party was expected to acquire more than 80 seats. Secondly, the commenter authorized this political actor in terms of expertise, highlighting his ability to convince the small parliamentary bloc to join his ruling coalition. The political party targeted by process of authorization was discursively represented by individualization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37) referring to it by virtue of its leader, i.e. Al-Maliki.

A quantitative comparison of the (de)legitimization in the three comment threads can be illuminating. The numbers of (de)legitimization instances identified were 67, 114 and 105 in the first, second and third comment threads respectively.

These 286 instances were coded for the eight (de)legitimization topoi listed in table 2.1. As shown in example 3 above, some comments that had (de)legitimizing functions included multiple (de)legitimizing topoi; in such cases the occurrence of multiple topoi was accommodated in the analysis by quantifying each single occurrence of the different topoi. The results were then normalized by the total numbers of (de)legitimization instances identified in each in each comment thread. Coding decisions regarding ambiguous cases of (de)legitimization were made by using the interactional responses as evidence that a comment was interpreted by the participants as serving either a legitimizing or delegitimizing function.

Figure 6.1 (below) shows the percentages of the different (de)legitimization topoi used in the first comment thread.




Figure 6.1 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in first comment thread

Figure 6.1 the negative representation of others was the most commonly used (N= 26) followed by authorization (N= 11) and deauthorization (N= 10) respectively. In terms of the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi, the topoi of negative evaluation of actions (N= 8) was the more commonly used followed by the delegitimization topoi

of irrationalization (N= 5). The legitimization topoi of rationalization (N= 1) and positive evaluation of actions (N= 1) were the topoi least used in this comment thread.

Figure 6.2 below shows the percentages of the (de)legitimization topoi in the second comment thread.




Figure 6.2 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in second comment thread

As for the second comment thread, as shown in Figure 6.2 above, the delegitimization topoi of negative representation of others was by far the most commonly used (N= 66) followed by the legitimization topoi of positive representation of self (N= 20). This was due to the commenters' persistent use of communal criminalization, in order to present others or out-group members negatively, and communal victimization, in order to present in-group members positively, which seems to be related to the sensitive nature of the topic discussed, i.e. the government policies that were perceived as sectarianly biased by some Sunni opposition. Deauthorization (N= 1) was the least used of all topoi. In terms of the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi,

it was the negative evaluation of actions that was the more commonly used (N= 11) whereas the other action-oriented topoi were approximately used evenly.

Figure 6.3 below shows the percentages of the (de)legitimization topoi in the third comment thread.




Figure 6.3 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in third comment thread

As shown in figure 6.3 above, the topos of authorization was the more commonly used (N= 32) followed by the topos of negative representation of others (N= 30) in the third comment thread. Most importantly, authorization and deauthorization were used very commonly (N= 49), representing 47% of all topoi. In the light of the topic of the comment thread, which was concerned with the results of the 2014 election, and with reference to the individual examples (e.g. example 1), the high percentages of authorization and deauthorization seem to be due to the commenters' interest in making claims about the ability of the political actors they support/oppose to represent the general public and to form a ruling coalition. This suggests that the topic

discussed in this comment thread and the temporal context of the interaction (i.e. its proximity to the events debated in the comment thread) affect the commenters' choices of (de)legitimization topoi. In terms of action-oriented (de)legitimization, irrationalization (N= 7) and the negative evaluation of action (N= 8) were the most commonly used topoi.

Generally speaking, the use of the different (de)legitimization topoi in the three Facebook comment threads was demonstrably more polarized than in the thematically corresponding TV interviews analyzed in Chapter Five. However, the results in the three comment threads exhibit thematically prompted patterns of use that were more or less similar to those found in Chapter Five. In the first Facebook comment thread and its thematically corresponding first TV interview, the actor-oriented topos of negative representation of others was the most commonly used topoi. The collective topos, especially criminalization and victimization, were the most frequent in both the second Facebook comment thread and the second TV interview. In the third Facebook comment thread and its thematically corresponding third TV interview the use of authorization and deauthorization were prominently salient.

The quantitative analysis shows that actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi were much more commonly used than action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in the three comment threads. Despite the thematically motivated individual differences between the three comment threads, the percentages of the (de)legitimization orientations within each thread stayed relatively the same, i.e. roughly 1 to 4. This suggests that the political debates in the context of Facebook were more personalized and less agenda-oriented than in the corresponding TV interviews, because in such online debates the commenters tend to focus on the political actors and their images rather than their actions and agendas regardless of the topic being debated. This ultimately indicates that the comments were more interested in supporting their ideological biases about the political actors in the political arena.




Figure 6.4 Percentages of actor-oriented and action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in comment threads

6.2 Establishing alignments and forming political fronts

As shown in Chapter Five, the advantage of the second level of positioning analysis in mediatized political interactions is twofold: showing how the genre-sanctioned roles can evolve into political roles of supporters or antagonists with regard to the topic in question; and secondly, unpacking how these interactional roles concurrently effect and affect participants' perception of rapport in the interaction. Yet, in multi-participant and asynchronous interactions such as the Facebook comment threads analyzed in this chapter, the second level of the positioning analysis has a further advantage. It can elucidate the “interactional orders” afforded by the medium in this genre (Langlotz and Locher, 2012). Due to the collapsed context in the Facebook comment threads (Marwick and Boyd, 2011), it is possible for any metaparticipant to address the post-author, another commenter or maybe both, which makes the participation framework in this genre more complicated than in the interactional genres in the mainstream media, e.g. TV interviews.

Tracing how the genre-sanctioned roles could be fleshed out in the interaction, examples 7 and 8 demonstrate how a commenter established a politically defined alignment that allowed him to join one of the political fronts constructed in the interaction.

Example 7:

AB:

هذه حقيقة نحن الغير سياسيين ندركها فكيف من يسمون نفسه بالسياسيين؟؟؟؟!!

This ((what you have said in the main post)) is a fact that we the non-politicians are aware of how about (those) who call themselves politicians?????!!

(Comment thread 1)

The commenter (AB) in example 7 voiced his agreement with the original argument made by the post-author about the opposition parties' practices towards the Prime Minister. This agreement was indicated by the commenter's claim that *[t]his is a fact that we the non-politicians are aware of*. Such a comment automatically established his genre-sanctioned role as commenter in a comment thread on Facebook, which bestowed on him certain rights and obligations associate with this role. Yet, his agreement with the post-author's argument did not unequivocally signal his political alignments towards the political fronts constructed in the interaction, e.g. pro-Prime Minister, con-Prime Minister, pro-opposition, con-opposition, because he ambiguously voiced agreement with the main post without (de)legitimizing any of the parties involved.

However, in a later comment made by the same commenter, his genre-sanctioned role evolved into a particularized interactional role (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007) i.e. a politically defined alignment, which established his membership in one of the political fronts formed in the interaction, as shown in example 8 below.

Example 8:

CD:

المالكي سياسي ناجح ... بالرغم من انني لم ارغب به استطاع تمويل دعايته الانتخابيه من خصومه من خلال المظاهرات بل وحتى اصبحت مختارا لزمانه .

Al-Maliki is a successful politician... Even though I do not like him he managed to fund ((make effective)) his electoral campaign from his opponents via the demonstrations he even became the chosen one of this time.

AB:

انت تقصد دكتاتور ناجح ومتعطرس.

You mean a successful and arrogant dictator.

(Comment thread 1)

Paying attention to the second level of positioning analysis could elucidate how commenter AB aligned himself in relation to other commenters by identifying the

interactional order in his comment in example 8 above, i.e. for whom his comment was intended. The interactional order in the example above was commenter-to-commenter, in which AB's comment was intended as a response to a specific recipient, i.e. commenter CD. The responsiveness was signaled by means of "format tying" (Bolander, 2012:1616), which was made by recycling a lexical item and syntactic structure, i.e. *a successful politician*, in the first comment and *a successful dictator* in the other. By so doing, commenter AB established his antithetical alignment to the other commenter and constructed his membership in the political front of the opponents of the former Prime Minister, and, as such, a likely support for the opposition parties.

Due to the nature of the Facebook comment threads, the post authors' politically defined alignments were established upfront in their original posts. This indirectly positioned them in relation to their audience (potential commenters and lurkers). Unlike the interactional moves made by the interviewers in the TV interviews analyzed in Chapter Five, the post-authors established relatively fixed alignments to the topics of discussion avoiding oscillation between different political stances across the interaction, because they were perceived by the commenters as the "principal" (Goffman, 1981) responsible for and committed to what their posts said and, thus, "active in some particular social identity and role" (ibid: 145). In the data analyzed in this chapter, the post-authors continued defending their political alignments as needed in the comment threads. Consider the example 9, in which the post-author in the second comment thread was responding to a commenter to defend his politically defined alignment which he established in the original post that generated the comment thread as shown in example 4 above.

Example 7:

Commenter:

فلتسل الدماء لكن لا استسلام للإرهابيين. ألم يكن هؤلاء في الحرس الجمهوري الصدامي يذبجون أبناء الانتفاضة؟

*Let the blood be shed but ((with)) no submission to the terrorists. Weren't those in Saddam's republican guards slaughtering the sons of the uprising?*¹³

¹³ Uprising here refers to the 1991 uprising against Saddam Hussein's regime

Post-author

لا احد يطالب الحكومة بان تتحاور مع داعش او القاعدة، لكن مع السياسيين الذي تعتبرهم خونة وبعثيين وعملاء، وهو ما قاله صدام عن قادة المعارضة.

No one is asking the government to hold a dialogue with Daesh ((ISIS)) or Al-Qaeda, but with the politicians you considered traitors, Baathists and proxies, which was what Saddam said about the leaders of the opposition.

(Comment thread 2)

At the beginning of example 7, the commenter positioned himself in direct contrast to the Sunni opposition supporters and less directly to the post-author, rejecting his opinion of the talks between the government and the Sunni opposition. In his response, the post-author clarified his stance in relation to the topic in question defending his original politically defined alignment. By so doing, the antithetical positioning between him and the commenter was explicitly maintained.

Due to the collapsed context in the Facebook comment thread, rapport could be enhanced or threatened by any metaparticipant, as s/he can join the interaction. The politically defined alignments that evolved as the interaction unfolded had considerable impact on the way rapport was perceived and managed by the participants at the different interactional orders available in the participation framework of this genre. Example 10 below shows how rapport was oriented and perceived in an interaction between a commenter and the post-author in the second comment thread, wherein the commenter positioned himself relative to the post-author.

Example 10:

XXX لا تكن محامي الإرهابيين

(First Name) do not be the terrorists' advocate.

(Comment thread 2)

In the example above, the commenter indirectly communicated his disagreement with the post-author's call upon the government to hold talks with the Sunni opposition. The commenter signaled responsiveness by naming the addressee (the post-author) (Bolander, 2012:1615). Using the negative representation of out-group actors, the

commenter attempted to criminalize the Sunni opposition characterizing them as terrorists in order to delegitimize the Sunni opposition, with whom the post-author requested a dialogue. By communicating such an emotionally loaded disagreement, the commenter aligned himself and the post-author in two opposing fronts in the interaction, which oriented the rapport towards challenge between them.

In some cases, establishing political alignments in intensively antithetical manners rendered communication impossible between some commenters. Example 11 below is an extract taken from the first comment thread in which two commenters, voicing their opinions over the issue in question, established strongly expressed antithetical alignments. In doing so, the commenters oriented rapport towards challenge, rendering the interaction between them quite conflictive. Realizing that communication was no longer possible, one of the commenters positioned the post-author as a gatekeeper, inviting the post-author to wield the deontic power associated with his role to retain the harmony of the interaction.

Example 11:

42. Commenter:

XXX تريدني ارد XXX بنفس اسلوبه لو تتصرف انته؟

Father of XXX do you want me to respond to XXXX in the same manner or you will take care of it?

43. Post-author:

لا آني راح أتصرف بدون زعل أخوان ، صفحتي ليست مكانا للشتم وسأحذف الآن كل التعليقات المسيئة .

No I will take care of it. Do not blame me brothers; my page is not a place for insults and I will delete all the offensive comments.

48. Commenter:

اسف صديقي ابو الطيب ... ولكن الصفحة التي يقل فيها ضيوفك الادب علي لا تلزمني.

Sorry my friend Father of XXX... but I do not want the page ((place)) where your guests becomes less polite with me is of no use to me.

51. Post-author:

أحمد الحضيبي ، جذلت التعليقات المسيئة.

XXXX, I deleted the insulting comments.

54. Commenter:

شكرا ابو الطيب .

Thanks father of XXX.

(Comment thread 1)

In the example above, the commenter appealed to one of the post-author's genre-sanctioned roles; that is the role of a gatekeeper. Within the affordances of Facebook, the gatekeeper role was bestowed on the post-author because he was the page owner. The commenter in comment 42 positioned the post-author as a gatekeeper by performing a directive speech act, i.e. an indirect request. In doing so, the commenter invoked the post-author's mediating role in the interaction, which was expected to soothe the tension and to put an end to the perceivably norm disruptive behavior of another commenter. The commenter in the example above, then, explicitly indicated in comment 48 that he would not continue the discussion if the insulting comments from the other commenter continued. In comment 43, the post-author responded to the commenter of comment 42; he acted in his capacity as a gatekeeper, warning all commenters that he would delete all the insulting comments. Later in the thread, in comment no. 51, the post-author informed the offended commenter, using naming as a responsive signal, that he had indeed deleted the offensive comments, which implicitly invited the commenter to continue his political argument if he still so desired.

As mentioned above, the second levels of positioning analysis can identify the interactional orders of the interactions. In the comment threads analyzed in this chapter, the comments could be directed to a single interlocutor as shown in example 12 below, in which the comment was addressed to the post-author.

Example 12:

مشتبه سيدنا

(You are) misguided our Saed ((traditional term of address used honorifically)).

(Comment thread 3)

The interactional order in the example, which represents an introductory part of a comment, was commenter-to-post-author, in which the commenter was only interested in communicating his disagreement with the post-author's argument. The commenter signaled responsiveness to the post-author by means of a special type of naming (Bolander, 2012:1615) expressed by the traditional term of address *our Saed*, which was used honorifically in the example.

Alternatively, some comments could involve more than one interactional order. Consider example 13 below in which the comment was directed to both the post-author and other commenters.

Example 13:

عن اي فوز يتحدث الاخوه؟ ممكن تنورني ابو XXX تره افتر عندي الديلكو؟!

What a victory are the brothers talking about? Can you enlighten me Father of XXX ((traditional term of address)) because my head is spinning?!

(Comment thread 1)

In example 13, the commenter responded to both the post-author and some of the commenters. The commenter used the traditional term of address *Father of XXX* to index responsiveness to the post-author, whereas the responsiveness to the other commenters was indexed by the use of noun phrase *the brothers*, which was used honorifically. The commenter established an antithetical alignment to commenters who agreed with the post-author's argument about the former Prime Minister's victory. However, he attempted to mitigate the threat to the post-author's face possibly made by this disagreement. Therefore, he directed the disagreement to the commenters, and involved the post-author as a verified witness in the discussion.

Interestingly, some comments, predominantly those which were extreme or controversial, tended to attract the attention of several commenters, motivating them to respond to the commenters rather than the post-author, creating multiple embedded debates within each comment thread. These embedded debates decentralized the interaction, making it less unidirectionally responding to the main post that expressed the post-author's political opinion, which was supposed to be the main topic of the debate. Using Deleuze and Guattari's (1988) metaphor of the rhizome when discussing the structure of knowledge, it can then be argued that the interactional orders on Facebook comment threads analyzed in this chapter were manipulated to

make the argumentation process rhizomatically proliferated rather than hierarchically structured. Consider example 14 below.

Example 14:

87. Commenter AB:

اعتقد المالكي سيحصل ٩٥ مقعد. مع الفضيله وتيار الاصلاح والصادقون والقوائم الصغيرة سيشكلون الحكومة.

I think Al-Maliki will garner 95 seats. With the Virtue, Reform Current, the Truthful and the small blocs they will form the government.

138. Commenter CD:

المواطن والاحرار انتهى المالكي.

Citizen ((Coalition)) and the Free ((bloc)) and Al-Maliki is finished.

155. Commenter EF:

المواطن مع الأحرار مع متفرقه و يصيرون النصف + ١ و يشرحون رئيس وزراء وبأي باي نوري ان شاء الله

Citizen ((coalition)) and the Free ((bloc)) along with the small blocs become a half+1 and ((they)) nominate a Prime Minister Designate and bye bye Noori..... Allah's willing.

156. Commenter GH:

المواطن والاحرار ما يوصلون ٧٠ مقعد. شتحي انت بابا؟!!

Citizen ((Coalition)) and the Free ((bloc)) will not get 70 seats. What do you say son (used patronizingly)?!

158. Commenter EF:

يصيرون ٧٩ معهم متفرقه كول ٣٠ اذا ما حصلت مفاجاه من متحدون.

They will be 79 ((seats)) and with them will be the small blocs, say, 30 ((seats)), if no surprise takes place with the United ((Coalition)).

(Comment thread 3)

In the examples above, each commenter attempted to legitimize his political view by virtue of authorizing the political actors they liked and deauthorizing the ones they did not like, appealing to those political actors' popularity and representativeness as indicated by the election results and their ability to form the new government. The commenters signaled responsiveness to each other by means of "format tying" (Bolander, 2012:1616), recycling some lexical items and syntactic structures, e.g. *Citizen ((coalition))* and *The Free ((bloc))*, in comments 138, 155 and 156; and the pronoun *they* in comment 158. The commenters in the above example challenged the hierarchy of interaction which was supposed to revolve around the page-owner-commenters relationship, which was afforded by the Facebook context. Being less interested in voicing their (dis)agreements with the page-owner's main post, the commenters indulged in debating the post-election scenarios and the formation of the ruling coalition, creating a decentralized discussion embedded within the interaction of the third comment thread. This interactional pattern gave rise to a micro debate that was rhizomatically, rather than hierarchically, connected to the argumentation process in the comment thread in question. Each of these decentralized debates discussed different aspects of the political topics originally raised by the post authors. The commenters engaged in these decentralized debates according to their interactional interests.

Analyzing the different interactional orders in the Facebook comment threads highlights the distinctive nature of the Facebook participation framework and its difference from the participation framework set out by Langlotz and Locher (2012) for the commenting tools in online platforms. When analyzing data from the commentary section of *Mail Online*, Langlotz and Locher (ibid: 1598) identified four interactional orders available to the interlocutors. These are commenter-to-world in the article, commenter-to-author, commenter-to-world in general, and finally commenter-to-commenter. Although the participation framework abstracted by Langlotz and Locher (ibid) is very useful, it cannot be applied wholesale to explain interactional orders in Facebook comment threads analyzed in this chapter. This can be attributed to the fact that the participation framework in the Facebook comment thread includes an additional state of affairs beyond the two worlds abstracted by Langlotz and Locher (ibid: 1598) i.e. the world in the article/post and the world in general. The participation framework in the Facebook comment thread also includes

the hypothetical online world as perceived by some of the commenters (see examples 17, 18, and 19). Figure 6.5 (below) explains the interactional orders available to the interlocutors using Facebook's public commenting tool. The commenters can either address the post-author (A) or another commenter (B). Additionally, the commenter can refer to the world reported in the main post (C), the actual world (D) or the virtual world constructed online (E). It is important to note that the commenters can engage in more than one interactional order simultaneously, e.g. addressing the post-author and referring to the world reported in his post. The comments that have (de)legitimizing functions can only be generated when referring to at least one of the worlds indicated in the figure (see the line in bold), because (de)legitimization presupposes a worldview that needs to be supported or refuted.




Figure 6.5 Participation Framework in Facebook comment threads

6.3 Indexing sociopolitical identities and constructing online communities

The significance of the third level of positioning analysis lies in its potential to explore the social implications of the conflict of power, instantiated by the use of (de)legitimization, through highlighting the discursive construction of sociopolitical identities. It shows how commenters' politically defined alignments are transformed into sociopolitical identities that comprise personal and collective attributes, and as such, link to macro level social categories. Consider the example 15 below.

Example 15:

انتخاب المالكي كان اصلا انتخابا طائفيا بحتا. فهو و كان و و سيكون رئيس وزراء لطائفة واحدة.

Al-Maliki's (victory in the) election was originally sectarianly motivated. He has been, and always will be, a prime minister for one sect only.

(Comment thread 1)

Example 15 above shows how the commenter indexed more transportable attributes of his identity when taking into account the ideological underpinnings that framed the discussion. The commenter established a politically defined alignment as an opponent of Al-Maliki through negatively representing him as a discriminatory Prime Minister to cast doubt on his legitimacy. Communicating this political stance against a political actor in such a way, the commenter did not only index his politically defined alignment, but also his sociopolitical identity as a non-sectarianist and nationalist through his evaluative stance towards the political actor and topic under discussion (cf. Bucholtz and Hall, 2010: 21).

Similar to the TV interviews analyzed in Chapter Five, in the three comment threads analyzed in this chapter the political affiliations of the commenters were sometimes interwoven with the collective attributes that defined their membership of certain ethnic or sectarian groups in order to foreground their sub-national identities. Example 16 below illustrates how a commenter constructed his sociopolitical identity in a way that indexed his membership in a sectarian community.

Example 16:

هذه ليست معادلة عادلة ، لا المالكي بكل فساد و قتلته يشبه صدام ، ولا " الشيعة " واعتذر لانني اسمي الاشياء بمسمياتها مارسوا نفس العنف الذي مارسه السنة ..

This is not a just comparison, neither does Al-Maliki with all his corruption look like Saddam, nor did “the Shiites”, and I apologize for calling things by their names, exercise the same violence exercised by Sunnis.

(Comment thread 2)

In order to convey his disagreement with the post-author's argument, the commenter attempted to delegitimize his call to hold dialogue with the Sunni opposition. He also delegitimized the Sunnis as exercising excessive violence in comparison to the violence exercised by Shiites, hinting at the claim that the Shiites' exercise of violence could be proportionately tolerated. In doing so, the commenter took an antithetical alignment to the post-author, but more importantly he indexed his sectarian identity as a Shiite, opposite to Sunnis, by virtue of differentiation (van Leeuwen, *ibid*: 40).

When the commenters discussed a characteristically sensitive topic from an ethno-sectarian point of view as in example 16 above, they tended to index their ethno-sectarian identities almost always in order to highlight difference and divergence from other commenters and communities. Across the three comment threads analyzed in this chapter, constructing ethno-sectarian identities was often perceived as an attempt to reinforce inter-communal tension or an impingement on the other communities' political rights (cf. Spencer-Oatey's (2008) rights and obligations). Despite the negative effect, commenters still indexed their ethno-sectarian identities either as an attempt to substantiate fallacious and tendentious arguments, or as a form of emotional discharge in response to the perceived grievances against their ethno-sectarian community (as shown example 16 above).

An in-depth look at how commenters employed (de)legitimization to position themselves in relation to each other and to themselves indicate that commenters tended to identify commenters as members in certain communities through two different patterns. Calculating the frequencies of legitimization versus delegitimization in each comment thread clarifies the commenters' identification practices that indexed their sociopolitical identities as shown in figure 6.6 (below).




Figure 6.6 Percentages of legitimization and delegitimization in the Facebook comment threads

The figure shows that commenters in the three comment threads tended to use delegitimization more frequently than legitimization. Nevertheless, in the third comment thread, which was about the 2014 election, the result was less polarized, because the commenters used the legitimization topos of authorization more frequently to emphasize electoral representativeness. These results suggest that the commenters tended to construct their sociopolitical identities via negative identification, which was notably based on differentiation and exclusion (see example 16 above). The prominence of the negative identification practices in the Facebook comment threads, in comparison to the TV interviews, indicates how ambivalent the commenters felt about their sociopolitical identities, at least in the online context, and also suggests that the Iraqi public, at least as represented by the commenters, did not trust the key political actors and the political institutions they belong to.

Upon constructing their sociopolitical identities, commenters emphasized difference from and deepened divisions with the commenters perceived as out-group members. As such, commenters, consciously or unconsciously, sometimes pigeonholed each other into discursively formed communities. These communities were oppositional to each other due to the binary nature of the (de)legitimization process that indexed the commenters' sociopolitical identities. Constructing online communities is motivated by deindividuation, which is very common in highly polarized contexts (Garces-Conejos Blitvich: 542). Deindividuation refers to the tendency of conforming to the behavioral standards associated with a social group when confronting individuals perceived as out-group member(s) (Reicher *et al.*, 1995:191).

line 39 assigned the accuser an emergent identity (Agha, 2009: 236) positioning him in the role of an outsider who did not belong to the community of the author's fans and friends, and by so doing the commenter implied that he was a member in this imagined online community. He nicely evoked that online community by using the title of the one of the author's books, i.e. *The Dispossessed*, excluding the accuser from this community stating that *obviously, Al-Shimari is not Magrood ((dispossessed))*. The existence of this imagined community and other commenters' membership in it were also indexed similarly in several later comments.

Commenters could also form partially imagined communities, which were motivated by actual but fuzzy or indefinite political groupings in the offline world. Consider example 18 below.

Example 18:

استاذ ابراهيم اترك هذا الموضوع، المالكي 69!! --استاذ ابراهيم المالكي 100 فما فوق لاتصير جزء من منظومة اعداء المالكي. واريد منك ان تقول الحق بان خصوم المالكي خسروا الانتخابات، وهي هاي الحقيقة. خليك مستقل احسالك

Mr. XXX let go with this subject, 69!!--Mr. XXX Al-Maliki ((garnered)) at least 100 ((seats)) do not be part of the league of Al-Maliki's enemies. I want you to say the truth that Al-Maliki's rivals had lost the election, which is the truth. It is better for you to keep being independent.

(Comment thread 3)

In example 20, the commenter voiced his disagreement with the post-author's speculations about the parliamentary seats won by the former Prime Minister's coalition. Rejecting the number of seats expected by the post-author (69), he authorized the Prime Minister's coalition by appealing to the expected number of the seats they would win. He also deauthorized all the other blocs describing them as the *league of Al-Maliki's enemies*, asking the post-author not to join this league. By so doing, the commenter formed an imagined league that included all the rivals of the Prime Minister, who were quite many in number but ineffectively disunited. Conversely, the commenter indirectly constructed his sociopolitical identity as pro-Al-Maliki, and as such, as a member in the league of Al-Maliki's supporters (see Upaghyay, 2010: 121). Interestingly, the league of Al-Maliki's enemies was not

totally imagined, because it was inspired by the implicit agreement among most political parties, who chose not to support Al-Maliki (the former Prime Minister) for another term in office.

Alternatively, commenters could discursively construct an online version of actual ethno-sectarian communities that also existed in offline. Typically, when interactional tension was exacerbated due to controversial or extreme comments that gave rise to rhizomatically embedded debates, more commenters subscribed to these online recreated communities and discursively behaved in line with the ideological biases of these communities. Example 19 (below) shows how commenters could discursively construct an online version of ethno-sectarian communities.

Example 19:

73. Commenter AB:

نحكم وتفخخون. والله المستعان يا ابن الخايبه.

We rule and you blow up. May Allah help the sons of the ill-fated ((victims)).

74. Commenter CD:

وانت مكيف حاكم...؟ وبنفس الوقت مقتنع انه المكون الاخر يفخخ...؟ خلي يروحلك عزيز وخلي نشوف شلون راح تكوم تسب الحكومة.

Are you delighted that you rule?... and are you convinced that the other sect is blowing up?... when you lose a beloved one you will see who you blame the government.

76. Commenter AB:

لا ما اسببه ومقتنع التفخيخ والتفجير منكم. شنو قابل اغبياء؟

No I won't blame it and I am convinced that all the blowing up and explosions are from you. Do you think we are stupid?

(Comment thread 3)

In comment 73 in the example above, commenter AB authorized his own sect, with the statement, *we rule*, and simultaneously criminalized the opposing sect, *you blow up*. He implicitly indexed his sociopolitical identity as a Shiite by using the collectivized first person plural to refer to the majority sectarian community that rules the country, in which he was a member. By contrast, he indexed the identity of the

opposing minority, i.e. Sunnis, whom he accused of the violent attacks against simple people referred to by the idiomatic expression *the sons of the ill-fated*. Understanding the implied sectarianly biased accusation in 73, commenter CD responded to commenter AB in 74 in a bid to defend his social group by rejecting the accusation, i.e. *are you convinced that the other sect is blowing up?*, and blaming the government for these actions. In comment 76, commenter AB delegitimized the Sunnis again by reiterating the accusation of being responsible for the explosions and the violence in the country.

This extract demonstrates how two actual communities, i.e. Shiites and Sunnis, were discursively recreated as the homogenously and monolithically Sunni-hating Shiite community, and homogenously and monolithically Shiite-hating Sunni community. These mediated, ethno-sectarian communities characteristically attracted the attention of several commenters, and as such triggered inter-communal discursive conflict motivated by the ideological biases of offline communities. Therefore, this took the political discussion from mutual accusations by two commenters to a different level of inter-communal conflict in which few other commenters participated.

Other than the explicit responsiveness signal, the commenters' subscription to the different constructed communities was also identified by two other analytical techniques; firstly, by analyzing the liking patterns: when engaged in a debate embedded within the comment thread, commenters tended to use the liking tool afforded by Facebook to show their endorsement of the comments that supported their ethno-sectarian biases or to subscribe to one of the online communities. This was evident by the numbers of likes received by the comments that invoked the creation of these online communities. Secondly, by identifying the different normative frames of reference based on which the commenters managed and perceived rapport when interacting with each other, it was noticed that the commenters who directly or indirectly indexed their membership in one of the communities would orient rapport towards maintenance or even enhancement when interacting with commenters perceived to be from the same constructed community, whereas they would orient rapport towards challenge when interacting with commenters perceived to be from the rival community (as will be shown later in example 20 below).

6.4 Rapport perception and variability of impoliteness assessments on Facebook

As the comment threads analyzed in this chapter represented multi-participant interactions, it was expected that the commenters' conceptions of the normative frame of reference underlying their perception of rapport and evaluations of impoliteness would vary. Exploring how the commenters differently conceived of the normative frame of reference in these comment threads necessitated analyzing the commenters' evaluations of particular political and interactional practices in terms of impoliteness. This could also serve the ultimate aim of this chapter; that is, to pinpoint the moral implications of the conflict for power in the political discourses instantiated in these Facebook comment threads. Methodologically, in multi-participant interactions it is sufficient for an utterance to be considered as impolite, in its broadest sense, if it is at least evaluated by a single participant (Kleinke and Bös, 2015: 51).

In this respect, the discursive construction of online communities in the political interactions on Facebook and the evaluation of impoliteness in these interactions seem to be dialectically related. On the one hand, each discursively constructed online community presupposed the existence of a normative frame of reference against which the members of that community evaluated their own and other's behaviors in terms of impoliteness. Yet on the other hand, this normative frame of reference defined this online community and unified how its members conceived of it as a distinct community differentiated from other communities. Example 20, taken from the most sectarianly sensitive comment thread, shows how differently commenters evaluated the main post that originated the comment thread in respect of impoliteness, and by so doing identified themselves with different online communities.

Example 20:

Post-author:

قبل لصادم سابقاً حاور قادة المعارضة من الشيعة، فقال كيف احاور خونة يحملون السلاح مع الجيش الإيراني ويقتلون أبناء بلدهم.. اليوم يجلس مكان صدام من يرفضون الحوار مع الآخر تحت نفس الذريعة، وهذا يعني بأن دوامة العنف ستبقى تلتهمنا داخل هذا البلد الفخ.

It had been told to Saddam previously to hold a dialogue with the Leaders of the Shiite opposition; he said how would I hold a dialogue with traitors who had hold up

arms with the Iranian Army to kill their own people.. Today sit in Saddam's place those who refuse dialogue under the same pretext, this means that the cycle of violence will continue to devour us in this entrapment country.

34. Commenter AB:

وهل قاتل المعتصمون جيشهم تحت راية دولة اجنبية كما فعل حزب الدعوة؟ كن منصفاً.

Had the sit-in-ers ((the people who do the sit-in)) fought their army under the banner of a foreign state as did Da'awa party? be fair.

46. Commenter CD:

مقارنة غير منصفة ولا موضوعية... المعارضة السابقة لم تفجر في الشوارع ولم تغرق الشوارع في الدماء وكانت لها مطالب واضحة تتعلق بالديمقراطية والمشاركة السياسية... المعارضة الحالية إرهاب أعمى يشغل لأجندات دولية متعددة الأطراف ولا يمتلك أي رادع أخلاقي وقد رفضوا كل محاولات الحوار ولا يقللون إلا أن يعود كليب حياً. ولن يعود!!

((It is)) an unfair and non-objective comparison... the previous opposition had not blown up the streets nor had drowned the streets with blood, and it had obvious demands related to democracy and political participation... The current opposition is a blind terror serving multiple international agendas with no moral deterrent, and they refused all the attempts for dialogue and they do not accept but to have the tike ((a play with word to refer to Saddam Hussein)) back alive. And he will not!!

(Comment thread 2)

Commenter AB disagreed with the post-author for equating the ousted regime's refusal to hold dialogue with the former opposition, which was stereotypically described as Shiite-dominated, and the current government's refusal to hold dialogue with the Sunni opposition, which was sometimes assimilated with the former ousted regime. In his attempt to refute the analogy between the two cases, Commenter AB used the topos of positive in-group representation to legitimize the Sunni opposition depicting them as peaceful *sit-in-ers* ((the people who do the sit-in)), and the exclusive topos of negative out-group representation to delegitimize the previous opposition, which is now the ruling party, for serving foreign agendas. Demanding the post-author be fair, commenter AB implicitly expressed his disappointment with his argument indicating how offensive and face-threatening such an analogy could be to

him, other Sunni commenters and Sunni lurkers. This indicated that commenter AB appealed to the normative frame of reference that was congruent with the dominantly Sunni ideological and ethnic biases in order to make such a morally based evaluation of the post-author's argument.

Like Commenter AB, Commenter CD also expressed his disappointment with the post-author's analogy by describing it as unfair and non-objective, yet for a different reason. His negative evaluation of the post-author's argument was based on his refusal to equate the previous opposition, which was tacitly depicted as pacifist and democratic, with the immorally driven and terror loving Sunni opposition, as described by the commenter. In doing so, the post-author's argument was evaluated as inconsiderate, face threatening, and as such impolite towards commenter CD, other Shiite commenters and Shiite lurkers. The normative frame of reference based on which commenter CD made this evaluation was congruent with the dominantly Shiite ideological and ethnic biases. Example 20 above thus indicates how the commenters' evaluations of the post-author's interactional behaviour and political views varied according to the normative frames of reference they drew on to make evaluations of impoliteness, which indicates the possible rift in the Iraqi political context. As indicated in 6.3, appealing to a frame of reference associated with a particular ethnic community when making a moral evaluation eventually indexed the commenters' subscription to one of the imagined communities constructed in online interaction.

As discussed in Chapter Five, the sources of impoliteness (i.e. exogenous vs. endogenous), types of impoliteness (i.e. personal, institutional and communal) and directionality of impoliteness represent the three important aspects of impoliteness analysis necessary to unpack how the commenters perceived, reacted to and morally evaluated the (de)legitimization of certain interpretations of political reality as part of their conflict for power in the political interaction under scrutiny. In the three comment threads, several instances of exogenous impoliteness were identified by virtue of which the commenters communicated emotionally charged negative attitudes towards particular political practices. These impoliteness assessments were used argumentatively as part of the ongoing discussion in the comment thread to delegitimize the political actions performed by unfavorable political actors, whom the commenters often perceived as out-group members. See example 21 below.

Example 21:

خطاب المالكي يتوافق بالتمام مع خطاب عمار الحكيم البارحة .. الاثنان صوت واحد ، تكلمنا عن اعادة اللحمة
 للائتلاف الشيعي الطائفي. *تافلة بجلگهم ايران...صدگ ما ينطوها لو الدم تعدى الركبة .. اما عن التغيير فقد
 اتشرح جميعهم بالانتخابات، بس ماكو ذرة حياء على طرة گصصهم ،،جان استقال ولو واحد منهم..*

Al-Maliki's speech is completely compatible with Ammar Al-Hakeem's yesterday speech. . They both have one voice; they spoke of restoring the sectarian Shiite coalition. They have been spitted in their mouths ((they have come under the leverage of)) by Iran ... They are truly not going to give it ((the power)) up even if blood reaches up to the knees. As for the change, they have all been washed out in the election, yet there is no grain of shame on their foreheads ((they do not even feel ashamed)); they could have resigned ((used conditionally)).

(Comment thread 3)

In the example above, the commenter attempted to delegitimize two political actors, i.e. Al-Maliki and Ammar Al-Hakeem, and their attempt to retain power. Although in their own election campaign each of these political actors implied that they would not restore the sectarian based ruling coalition, they had to break their campaign promises in order to stay in power as they both failed to ensure a ruling majority. The commenter used the negative evaluation of out-group action to delegitimize those political actors' refusal to lose power at any cost. Most importantly, the commenter explicitly alluded to the moral order to highlight the immorality of such an action in an emotionally vehement fashion, evaluating it as *shameworthy*, i.e. *yet there is no grain of shame on their foreheads ((they do not even feel ashamed))*, by making use of the intertextual connection between the political practice evaluated and the interaction itself. This exogenous evaluation of impoliteness was communicated by local Iraqi Arabic rather than modern standard Arabic used at the beginning of the extract to express intense emotive response. Since this type of moral evaluation, i.e. exogenous impoliteness, was embedded in the delegitimization of the political practice, it was thus analytically captured by positioning analysis level 1, where the political actions and actors were contextualized and characterized at the then-and-there moment of the reported event.

In certain cases, exogenous impoliteness assessments gave rise to endogenous impoliteness assessments. These endogenous impoliteness assessments arose because certain practices performed within the interaction were perceived, by at least one

commenter, as rapport sensitive because they were emotionally offensive, morally unacceptable or violating a normative frame of reference. Consider example 22.

Example 22:

Post-author:

يمعدين خل نتناقش بهدوء وبدون تجريح ولا تخوين.

Guys let's discuss quietly and without slandering and defaming others.

(Comment thread 1)

In the above example, implicitly evaluating some of the previous comments as impolite for violating the norms of responsible and fruitful debate, the post-author urged the commenters to avoid personal, emotionally negative attitudes. Furthermore, in a later comment, one of the commenters requested the intervention of the post-author to act in his capacity as a gatekeeper to put an end to an offensive comment that targeted him (see example 11 above).

However, many of the endogenous impoliteness instances identified in the comment threads analyzed in this chapter did not involve explicit moral evaluations of others' practices inside the interaction, but rather encompassed offensive retaliation that can be considered typical cases of expressive impoliteness (Eelen, 2001: 35), as shown in example 23.

Example 23:

بالمباشر .. انت في طرحك هذا جعلت نفسك بين امرين / اما جاهلا و غيبيا .. او خبيثا و لثيما .

To be direct.. By your argument you make yourself/ either ignorant or stupid.. Or malicious and vile.

(Comment thread 2)

Example 23 shows how a commenter conveyed his strongly worded and offensive disagreement with the post-author's argument, which was about the importance of dialogue between the government and the Sunni opposition. The commenter was not concerned about providing a counterargument or, at least, refuting it, but he was rather more interested in attacking the post-author and threatening his face. This comment was not directly evaluative in nature, i.e. classificatory impoliteness (Eelen, 2001:35); it rather involved a tacit evaluation communicated indirectly by virtue of an offensive remark, which made it a typical case of expressive impoliteness. In the example above, the expressive impoliteness was communicated by means of a

conventional formula of impoliteness that involved personalized negative assertions (Culpeper, 2011: 135). This endogenous impoliteness could be analytically captured by positioning analysis level 2, where the commenter positioned himself in relation to the post-author, taking a strongly antithetical alignment that violated the behavioral expectation in that genre.

With regard to the types of impoliteness, no institutional impoliteness was identified. This might be attributed firstly to the non-institutionalized and informal nature of such Facebook comment threads, and secondly the commenters' reluctance to associate themselves with political institutions (see negative identification in 6.3 above). Yet, perhaps more surprisingly, few instances of personal impoliteness were identified in the dataset analyzed in this chapter. Personal impoliteness arises when an agent, or an action s/he performs in his capacity as a distinctive or unique person, is evaluated in terms of impoliteness, as shown in the example below.

Example 24:

الاخ XXX اعتقد انك تجامل XXX صاحب المدى بكلامك ضد المالكي لان مؤسسة المدى هي من تكفلت بنفقات طبع كتابك الموسوم (المكاريذ) اليس كذلك ياسيدي؟؟

Brother XXX, I think that you are flattering XXX, the owner of XXX ((publishing house)) by your talk against Al-Amaliki because XXX Foundation published your book (Al-Magareed) ((The Dispossessed)), isn't that right sir???

(Comment thread 1)

In the example 24, the commenter attacked the post-author accusing him of being partial in order to refute his argument about the political crisis, i.e. *I think that you are flattering XXX, the owner of XXX ((publishing house)) by your talk against Al-Amaliki*. The commenter indexed responsiveness by means of naming (Bolander, 2012:1615), using the term of address *brother XXX*. This comment was an instance of personal impoliteness, because it involved an offensive attack against the post-author's self-worth, i.e. face, that was associated with his personal identity rather than his collective identity. This kind of impoliteness was implicational context-driven (Culpeper, 2011: 180). Like all instances of personal impoliteness, the evaluation of impoliteness in the example above was unidirectional, because it was directed at a single interlocutor, i.e. the post-author.

Communal impoliteness was the most common type of impoliteness identified in Facebook comment threads analyzed in this chapter. Communal impoliteness

assessments were inherently related to the ethno-sectarian identities of the commenters; they emerged when the self-worth and self-efficacy attributes associated with these identities were threatened. Damaging the self-worth and attributes of these ethno-sectarian identities were often interpreted as a flagrant attack against the entire ethno-sectarian community and its values. This could be attributed to the ethnically politicized Iraqi culture and the genre motivated deindividuation. The second comment thread, which dealt with the more sensitive aspect of politics related to the ethno-sectarian identities of the data analyzed in this chapter, was the typical context for communal impoliteness to emerge. Consider example 25 below.

Example 25

كانت أمة عربية أيام صدام ثم صارت أمة إسلامية وهابية، هم ساقطون.

It was an Arab nation ((referring to Baath party motto)) in Saddam's days and then became an Islamist Wahabbist nation ((referring to Islamic fundamentalism)), they are fallen ((rogues)).

(Comment thread 2)

In the above example, the commenter indirectly voiced his disagreement with the post-author over the dialogue between the government and the Sunni opposition by using the actor-oriented delegitimization topos of negative out-group representation. The delegitimized political actor was discursively represented in two different ways: firstly by means collectivization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37-8) using the collective noun *nation*; and secondly by means of backgrounding (ibid: 29) using the pronoun *they*. The commenter delegitimized the Sunni opposition by implying their opportunism for shifting ideologies from Baathist nationalism to Islamic fundamentalism, and then by describing them as fallen ((rogues)). This comment involved an expressive impoliteness communicated by a conventional impoliteness formula, which Culpeper (2011: 135) termed “personalized negative references”, i.e. *they are fallen ((rogues))*. In terms of directionality, the expressive communal impoliteness embedded in this delegitimization attempt was directed towards multiple participants at different levels of participation, i.e. Sunni commenters and lurkers.

Generally, an overview of impoliteness analysis across the three comment threads demonstrates that impoliteness was more likely to emerge in commenter-to-commenter interactional order, especially when multiple commenters became

engaged in an embedded interaction rhizomatically related to the comment thread (see example 26 below). This was because some controversial comments often attracted the attention of other commenters motivating them to aggressively respond to the commenters who produced those controversial comments, and subsequently generating more expressive and classificatory impoliteness. This could give rise to “flaming”, which refers to often gratuitous use of abusive or offensive language to target other participants in computer mediated communication (Lange, 2014: 54). Consider example 26.

Example 26:

80. Commenter AB:

الرئاسة المفروض تكون لاحد هؤلاء :
علي دواي
البولاني
عادل عبد المهدي
اياد علاوي
والافضل علاوي
بس للاسف الطائفين خلو وصول الشرفاء والوطنيين للمنصب مجرد امانى
وللاسف الديموقراطية فيها عيب قاتل هو اننا مجبرين لآخذ اصوات الجهلاء والسيئين والطائفين بنضر الحسابان
ليوصلو امثال حنان الفتلاوي و محمود الحسن و مشعان الجبوري للبرلمان.

The Premiership should be for one those:

Ali Daway

Al-Bulani

Adil Abdulmahdi

Ayad Alawi

And the best is Alawi

But unfortunately the sectarianists made it a mere wish for the decent and patriotic ones to assume this post.

And unfortunately democracy has the fatal flaw that we are forced to consider the votes of the ignorant, the bad and the sectarianists to get Hanan Al-Fatlawi, Mahmoud Al-Hasan and Misha'an Al-Jubouri and their ilk to the parliament.

81. Commenter CD:

ترى انت مبين كلش تفقهم! دير بالك لحسدك على فهمك. مبين تفقهم من البولاني.

You apparently seem to understand very well ((very smart))! Be careful I envy you for your understanding. You apparently understand very well ((very smart)) because of ((your)) Al-Bulani ((choice)).

82. Commenter EF:

Shut up

83. Commenter GH:

I think Ayad Alawi is the best one of them if he takes the people with him to London and rule them ((there)).

اني اشوف اياد علاوي احسن واحد بيهم لو ياخذ الشعب وياه لندن يحكمهم.

(Comment thread 3)

The example above shows how commenter AB's attempt to legitimize certain political actors and delegitimize others perceived as controversial by the other commenters, which motivated them to respond to him rather than the post-author. All the following comments in example 28 above, whose responsiveness was indexed by "format tying" (Bolander, 2012:1616), involved some type of offensive reply. These offensive replies seemingly threatened commenter AB's self-worth and self-efficacy either through a conventionally blatant silencer (Culpeper, 2011: 136), i.e. *shut up*, or sarcasm, which represents convention-driven implicational impoliteness (Ibid: 165), i.e. *You apparently seem to understand very well ((very smart))!* These responses can be considered as typical cases of expressive impoliteness for damaging explicitly and seriously the commenter's face. In the three abusive comments in the example above, Iraqi Arabic rather than modern standard Arabic was used to express intense emotivity.

An overview of the impoliteness instances identified in the three comment threads demonstrates that there was a correlation between local Iraqi (colloquial) Arabic and the linguistic realization of impoliteness; in many impoliteness assessments the commenters registered impoliteness, especially classificatory and next-positioned impoliteness, by using local colloquial Arabic (also see examples 21. 22 and 26). Additionally, across the three comment threads analyzed here, the actor-oriented delegitimization attempts seemed to be more socially reprehensible than the action-oriented ones, and as such more likely to be evaluated as impolite, because

they involved explicit aggression against specific political actors rather than criticism of their political practices.

As in the previous chapter, the impoliteness instances identified in the dataset exhibit thematically motivated variation across the three comment threads analyzed in this chapter as shown in figure 6.7 (below) which represents a quantitative analysis of the impoliteness. The impoliteness instances identified were codified in terms of expressive impoliteness and classificatory impoliteness, and then normalized by the number of comments identified as having a (de)legitimizing function.




Figure 6.7 Percentages of impoliteness in the Facebook comment threads

Similar to the impoliteness analysis in the previous chapter, figure 6.7 demonstrates that impoliteness was more salient in the comment threads that were more sectarianly sensitive, i.e. the second Facebook comment thread, wherein 36 instances of expressive impoliteness and 18 instances of classificatory impoliteness were identified. Yet, the numbers of impoliteness instances identified in the comments that had (de)legitimizing functions were proportionately the same in the first and the second comment threads; 13 instances of expressive impoliteness and 6 instances of classificatory impoliteness were identified in the first comment thread and 19 instances of expressive impoliteness and 8 instances of classificatory impoliteness were identified in the second comment thread. Different from the results of the quantitative analysis of impoliteness in the TV interviews, the first comment thread did not score a higher level of impoliteness in comparison to the third one. This difference could be attributed to the evident moderation attempts made by the post-author of the first comment thread in his capacity as a gatekeeper. Also, unlike the TV interviews analyzed in the previous chapter, proportionately fewer instances of

classificatory impoliteness were identified in the three comment threads. In this research work, the major analytical importance of classificatory impoliteness consists in its ability to unpack more clearly the normative foundations that underlie the evaluation of impoliteness. This suggests that within these Facebook threads, the commenters were more interested in the retaliatory tit for tat rather than sanctioning offences or violations of the behavioral expectations by invoking the normative foundations of their impoliteness evaluations.

6.5 Summary

Like Chapter Five, the aim of this chapter was threefold: firstly, to examine the commenters' use of different topoi to (de)legitimize particular interpretations of political reality as part of their conflict for power in these Facebook comment threads, secondly to examine the participation framework and the dynamics of argumentation, and thirdly to analyze the social and the moral ramifications of this conflict for power in different thematic contexts. The analysis shows that commenters used (de)legitimization to voice their (dis)agreement with the political views presented in interaction. At the first level of positioning analysis, the findings suggest that there was a thematically prompted variation, proportionately similar to that identified in chapter Five, in terms of the (de)legitimization topoi used in the three Facebook comment threads. In the first Facebook comment thread and the thematically corresponding first TV interview, the actor-oriented topos of negative representation of the other was the most commonly used. The collective topoi, especially criminalization and victimization, were the most frequent in both the second Facebook comment thread and the second TV interview. In the third Facebook comment thread and its thematically corresponding third TV interview the use of authorization and deauthorization were prominently salient. The analysis shows that the political debates in the context of Facebook were more personalized and less agenda-oriented than in their corresponding TV interviews

The second level of positioning analysis elucidated how the commenters' genre-sanctioned roles in the comment threads evolve into political alignments as part of their attempt to establish their alignments towards the topic in question and ultimately towards each other. This level of analysis also interrogated how these political alignments affected and effected rapport between the commenters in these

interactions. Due to the affordances of Facebook, it was found that the set of the interactional orders available in the comment threads complicated the dynamics of argumentation process making it rhizomatically versatile rather than hierarchically structured, which allowed the commenters to tackle different aspects of the political topics originally raised by the post authors. This necessitated a modification to Langlotz and Locher's (2012) model of participation framework for online interaction in order to better account for the dynamics of argumentation process in the Facebook comment threads.

Most commenters' sociopolitical identities were interwoven with their ethno-sectarian affiliation; this was analyzed at the third level of positioning analysis. It seemed that the participants in social media, like those in mainstream media, constructed their sociopolitical identities via negative identification patterns motivated by cognitive, cultural and political reasons. Most importantly, the findings also indicate that constructing sociopolitical identities had social implications, the most important of which was constructing different imagined communities. The commenters in Facebook comment threads tended to invoke online communities, which ranged from completely imagined communities to recreated versions of offline communities.

Furthermore, the commenters' attempts to (de)legitimize certain versions of political reality had moral implications. The commenters' conceptions of what might constitute impolite behavior seemed to vary, because their conception of the normative frame of reference varied based on the commenters' membership in the community invoked online. The multi-tiered positioning analysis was used to identify various instances of exogenous and endogenous impoliteness each of which triggered at a different spatiotemporal level of the interaction. In respect of the source of impoliteness, both exogenous and endogenous impoliteness assessments were identified. Impoliteness assessments were found to be either personal or communal in nature. The analysis of impoliteness indicated that impoliteness was more salient in the comment thread that discussed the most sectarianly sensitive topic. The impoliteness analysis also suggested that the commenters were more interested in the retaliatory tit for tat rather than the explicit moral evaluations of others' behavior.

Chapter Seven

Interplay of (De)legitimization, Rapport and Impoliteness in Online Readers' Response threads¹⁴

7. Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to examine conflict for power in three threads of readers' responses on a news website, whose affordances could produce a distinctive type of mediatized political discourse. To that end, I investigate how this conflict was discursively produced, perceived and evaluated across thematically different contexts. Section 7.1 investigates how the conflict for power, by means of (de)legitimization, could be produced and reacted to in threads of readers' responses in online news platform employing the first level of positioning analysis. Section 7.2 examines the participation framework afforded by the medium to demonstrate how the responding readers positioned themselves in relation to each other, and to identify the different roles available in the threads of online readers' responses. Section 7.3 unpacks the constructions of the functionally versatile sociopolitical identities and highlights their social implications in this type of genre. It also investigates how the respondents' interweaving of their political affiliations with their ethno-sectarian attributes could lead to the construction of online versions of their offline communities. Section 7.4 deals with how rapport could be perceived and how the respondents evaluated each other's political and interactional practices in respect of impoliteness in order to highlight the normative underpinnings and moral implications of the political conflict for power in the genre of online news readers' responses.

The data analyzed in this chapter represented a functionally distinct type of media discourse, in which both forms of mass media and social media were intertwined. The online news reports that attracted the readers' responses were professionally generated journalistic contents posted on an online mass media outlet, whereas the threads of the readers' responses represented user-generated contents posted on an interactive platform, typically categorized as a social media platform (see Walther and Jang, 2012). Technologically speaking, the online news website

¹⁴ A version of this chapter was accepted for publication in Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. The paper will appear under the title of 'Fuelling ethno-sectarian conflicts: (De)legitimization and impoliteness in readers' responses in an Arab online media'.

from which the data were extracted, alarabiya.net, represents a participatory and interactive web 2.0 website (Herring, 2013), because it has a comment section that allows the respondents to express their opinions over the reported news freely,¹⁵ see figure 7.1 below.




Figure 7.1 Structure of alarabiya.net comment section in Arabic and English.

¹⁵ The website has no netiquette for commenting, and no indication of editing could be found.

For the purpose of this chapter, the most relevant medium characteristics (Herring, 2007) in the online news comment section were its maximum 600 symbol textual content, asynchronicity, potential anonymity or pseudonymity, response title designation and (dis)liking options. This was because the content limit could affect message intensity, asynchronicity could increase message precision (Tanskanen, 2007: 98, Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2010:542), anonymity or pseudonymity could increase confrontation (Kleinke and Bös, 2015:48; see also example 3 below), response title designation could index the interactional order (see example 11 below) and finally (dis)liking patterns could indicate polarization (see example 18 below).

To ensure comparability with the datasets in Chapters Five and Six, the three response threads selected in this chapter were similar in terms of the topics they tackled to the data analyzed in the previous chapters. These topics included firstly a political topic, which dealt with the political crisis in the country in 2012, secondly an ethno-political topic, which mainly dealt with the power sharing process in the country in light of the Sunnis' claims of political marginalization, and thirdly the preliminary results of the 2014 parliamentary election and the main expected winners.

7.1 Voicing sociopolitical views through (de)legitimization

In the online readers' response threads, the different (de)legitimization topoi were intrinsically employed to express the readers' political viewpoints in response to news items posted online. The respondents' use of (de)legitimization in this context was typically achieved by recontextualizing particular political actors, actions and events reported in the news section and characterizing them in ways congruent with their ideological preferences. In this sense, investigating the use of the different (de)legitimization topoi could give a glimpse of the reproduction of ideology and perpetuation of sociopolitical conflicts in this online context. As discussed in the previous chapters, the lexico-grammatical realizations of the (de)legitimization process in discourse can be analytically captured at the first level of positioning analysis. Nevertheless, the actual analysis of the lexico-grammatical representation of actors and action (de)legitimized and the argumentative patterns in the three threads of responses analyzed in this chapter revealed distinctive patterns of (de)legitimization, which seem to be affected by the medium and social factors

(Herring, 2007) of the genre under investigation as will be shown below in this section.

The first online news report to which the readers were responding was titled *Al-Esawi for Alarabiya: No solution for Iraq's Crisis save Al-Maliki's resignation*. It dealt with the political crisis in the country in 2012. Later on, this crisis was exacerbated in the aftermath of a violent incident in the small town of Hawija where many protestors and a few policemen were killed and injured in a confrontation between them. Having been incapable of voting the former Prime Minister out in the parliament, Al-Esawi and the opposition parties requested that the former Prime Minister step down, especially after government's violent reaction to the protesters in Hawija in northern Iraq. The report tackled the opposition parties' political reaction, and set out the government's and opposition's narratives of what happened in that incident. The journalistic content of this report motivated the readers to express their opinions over the political situation and the political actors and actions reported using the comment section in the website.

Hence, in the response thread generated by this online news report, it might conceivably be expected that the main actors (de)legitimized by the respondents would include the former Prime Minister and the opposition parties, whereas the main political actions (de)legitimized by the respondents would include the former Prime Minister's policies, his behaviors towards the opposition parties, and the opposition parties' political agenda and their behaviors towards the former Prime Minister. See examples 1 and 2.

Example 1:

ادخلو على النت وانتم تعرفون الحقيقة هذا الدوم بكجي البعثي....

Enter ((2nd person plural)) the net ((search the internet)) and you will know the truth about this Baathist drummer ((Baath regime supporter))....

(Response thread 1)

The example above represents actor-oriented delegitimization by a reader to rebut the opposition's argument stated by Al-Esawi and reported in the news section. The opposition argued for the former Prime Minister to tender his resignation in order to put an end to the political crisis and stabilize the political situation in the country. Using the topos of negative representation of out-group actor, the respondent

characterized Al-Esawi as a supporter of the societally and legally denounced Baath Regime, which was perceived responsible for the crimes committed under its reign. Linguistically, in this response Al-Esawi was represented by means of appraisal (van Leeuwen, 2008: 45) referring to him by means of a connotatively negative noun phrase, i.e. *Baathist drummer* ((*Baath regime supporter*)).

Like the data analyzed in the previous chapters, the respondents could also combine action and actor-oriented strategies in order to (de)legitimize their argument about the political actors, action and events reported in the news section. See example 2, in which a respondent used both authorization and irrationalization to substantiate his political view.

Example 2:

ان اغلبية اهل العراق مع حكومة المالكي المنتخبة وذات الاغلبية البرلمانية ... والعراقيون يستطيعون اختيار الحكومة عبر صناديق الانتخابات الديمقراطية وحدة وليس بالتلويح بالعنف والقوة والارهاب وان من ينادي بها سوف يحترق بنارها ولايجني شيئا كما حدث من قبل ... وان الطريقة البعثية السابقة لن ولن تجني نفعا بل سوف تكون وبالا على اهلها.

The majority of the people of Iraq are with Al-Maliki's elected and parliamentary majority-owning government... Iraqis can choose the government only by the democratic election boxes ((ballot)) not by waging violence, power and terror, whom he calls for them ((violence, power and terror)) will be burned by their fire and will gain nothing as happened before ((referring to the previous years of sectarian violence))... The previous Baathist way will not be of use but will be a scourge on its people.

(Response thread 1)

In an attempt to voice his opinion of the reported political actors, the reader in the example above first authorized the former Prime Minister by characterizing his government as fairly elected and representative of the majority of the Iraqi people, i.e. *The majority of the people of Iraq are with Al-Maliki's elected and parliamentary majority-owning government*. The authorized political actor was discursively represented by means of possessivized objectivation (see van Leeuwen, 2008: 46), referring to him metonymically by means of the political entity (the government) he was closely associated with, i.e. *Al-Maliki's elected and parliamentary majority-owning government*. The respondent then used the action-oriented topos of

irrationalization in order to delegitimize the call for revenge for the killed protesters by hinting at the detrimental consequences of such a call, i.e. *whom he calls for them ((violence, power and terror)) will be burned by their fire and will gain nothing as happened before ((referring to the previous years of sectarian violence))... The previous Baathist way will not be of use but will be a scourge on its people*. The irrationalized action was discursively represented by means of objectivation where the action of calling for revenge was replaced by its products (see van Leeuwen, 2008: 63-4), i.e. *waging violence, power and terror*; and *the previous Baathist way*, to refer to the call for revenge for the killed protesters.

Distinctively, however, many of the responses identified as having (de)legitimization functions in the first thread of readers' responses included political actors and actions that were not reported in the first online news report. Motivated by expressive rationality (Svensson, 2011), the respondents frequently voiced their ideologically biased political views about the broad political situation in the country in general without limiting themselves to the political actors, actions and issues discussed in the online news report. The most salient actors who were not reported but still (de)legitimized in the response thread included the key ethno-sectarian communities in the country, i.e. Sunnis and Shiites. The most salient political actions which were not reported but still (de)legitimized in the response thread included the actions perceived as infringements by one of these ethno-sectarian communities of the others' political rights. Therefore, the (de)legitimization attempts that were based on the ethno-sectarian grounds in general, and in-group victimization and out-group criminalization in particular, were common in this response thread regardless of the content of the online news report (see examples 3 and 4). This seems to be related to the anonymity and pseudonymity available on the online news response thread, which allowed the discussion to develop into an inter-group conflict without any serious consequences incurred by the conflict instigators (cf. Haines *et al.*, 2012). This makes the first response thread stand out when compared to the first TV interview analyzed in Chapter Five, and the first Facebook comment thread analyzed in Chapter Six, although they all discussed more or less similar political topics.

Consider the example below which shows how in-group victimization transformed a political topic into an explicitly ethno-sectarian discussion.

Example 3:

المشكلة ليست في المالكي بل في الدستور الذي يصنع من كل رئيس وزراء مالكي جديد ... دستور يعطي الشيعة كل شيء ... ويسلب كل حقوق السنة .. كفى كذبا وخداعا.

The problem is not with Al-Maliki.... But it is in the constitution which makes a new Al-Maliki out of each Prime Minister... (It is) a constitution (that) gives the Shiites everything... and takes away all the rights of Sunnis.. Enough with all the lies and the deceptions.

(Response thread 1)

In example 3, the respondent was concerned about the solution proposed by the opposition parties to end the political crisis in the country at the time. Implying that the opposition's call for the former Prime Minister to step down was an ineffective solution, the respondent argued that the problem was due to the constitution rather than the individual who assumed the Premiership. This argument was based on the premise that the power sharing formula in the country was unfair and ethno-sectarianly imbalanced. In a bid to substantiate this premise, the respondent used the topos of victimization depicting the Sunnis as disenfranchised, i.e. *takes away all the rights of Sunnis*, by the Shiites who were implicitly represented as power extorting. Both of the political actors targeted by the (de)legitimization process were discursively represented by means of collectivization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37-8) using the collective nouns *Sunnis* and *Shiites*.

The criminalization that was motivated by the ethno-sectarian biases and ideologies was also very common in the first response thread. Example 4 introduces an out-group criminalization legitimizing a sociopolitical view. Example 4:

منصب رئيس الوزراء حكر للشيعة وهم من يقرر من يستحقه. اما زمن البلطجة و الصعلكة وفرض الامور بالقوة انتهى مع زوال حكمكم واختباء زعيمكم القائد الضرورة في حفرة..

The position of the Prime Minister is a monopoly for Shiites and (it is) they who decide who deserves it. The time of thuggery, bullying and getting things done by force has come to an end when your rule demised and your leader hid in the hole ((referring to Saddam Hussein))..

(Response thread 1)

In example 4, the respondent used negative representation of out-group members to express his opinion about the Sunnis and Saddam Hussein. He criminalized and so delegitimized the Sunnis, characterizing them as thugs and bullies who ruled the country by force during Saddam Hussein's era. Linguistically, the actors targeted by this criminalization attempt were represented by differentiation (see van Leeuwen, 2008:40). In the example above, the Sunnis, who were associated with Saddam Hussein's bullying and intimidating rule, i.e. *your rule, your leader*, were differentiated from and compared to the Shiites, who were explicitly nominated in the response to create the difference between the respondent's "self" and the "other". By so doing, the respondent represented the political conflict between the government and the opposition (which was reported in the news section) as a more ethno-sectarianly centered conflict between Sunni and Shiite groups (in the comment section).

The second online news report, which was titled *Alawi for Alarabiya: Al-Maliki's policy will drag the country to a catastrophe*, mainly dealt with the power sharing process in the country, especially in light of the Sunnis' claims of being politically marginalized. Alawi urged the former Prime Minister to respond to the demands of the Sunni tribes in Anbar province, warning that violence and terror would flourish if the sectarianly exclusionary policies continued. The report also highlighted the need to reform the political system, and to make it more inclusive. In the second readers' response thread, the main political actors (de)legitimized were the former Prime Minister and the opposition parties in general, and the Sunni opposition in particular, whereas the main political actions (de)legitimized included the former Prime Minister's policies towards Sunnis, which were perceived as exclusionary, and the opposition parties' political agenda. Unsurprisingly then, the respondents' arguments were predominantly based on differentiation and exclusion of the delegitimized actors, and in-group victimization of the legitimized actors (see example 5) and the delegitimization of policies perceived as sectarianly exclusionary (see example 6). However, what made the second response thread distinctive in comparison to the second TV interview analyzed in Chapter 5 and the second Facebook comment thread analyzed in Chapter Six, was the use of historically-inspired ethnic and racial stereotypes and ethno-sectarian biases to highlight

sociopolitical divergence and the ideological employment of history to delegitimize political practices (see examples 5 and 6).

Example 5:

لقد انكشف ارتباط المالكي وائتلاف دولة القانون بأجندات المخابرات الارهابية الصفوية الايرانية، وضاق الحبل على رقابهم...فقررروا ان يقاتلوا اهل السنة في المحافظات المنفضة واخواننا الشيعة العراقيين الوطنيين الشرفاء..
Al-Maliki and the State of Law Coalition's connections with agenda of the terroristic Safavid Iranian intelligence have been revealed, and the (gallows) rope has become tightened on their necks... Therefore they decided to fight the people of Sunna ((Sunnis)) in the revolting provinces and our Iraqi Shiite decent nationalist brothers..

(Response thread 2)

In an attempt to delegitimize the former Prime Minister and his ruling coalition, the respondent in example 5 negatively represented them by means of differentiation and exclusion, which was based on the assumption that Al-Maliki's Shiite dominated coalition were backed by Sunni-hating Iran. This delegitimization was based on the racial and ethno-sectarian stereotype that the Shiite political parties were inspired by an Iranian-backed agenda to control the Sunni areas in the Iraq, dating back to the reign of the sixteenth century Safavid dynasty. Characterizing the former Prime Minister and his ruling coalition as Iranian Safavid¹⁶ proxies was a bid to differentiate them from *Iraqi Shiite decent nationalists* and eventually exclude them as non-Iraqis based on an ethno-sectarian stereotype that had a racial hint to it. The respondent also attempted to legitimize *the people of Sunna ((Sunnis)) in the revolting provinces* positively representing them as victimized by the former Prime Minister who decided to target them for ethno-sectarian reasons. In the response above, the political actors targeted by the delegitimization were discursively represented by nomination, i.e. *Al-Maliki*, and collectivization, i.e. *the State of Law coalition* (see van Leeuwen, 2008: 52), while the political actors targeted by legitimization were discursively represented by means of possessivation (ibid:34), i.e. *the people of Sunna*, and then by spatialization, which van Leeuwen (ibid:46) defined as "a form of objectivation in

¹⁶ A descriptor used to refer to the Safavid dynasty that ruled Iran in the sixteenth century, whose kingdom was represented as the Shiite rival of the Sunni-inspired Ottoman Empire. Nowadays, it is sometimes used to refer to the Shiite Arabs in an exclusionary and derogatory manner to link them with Iran.

which social actors are represented by means of reference to a place”, i.e. *in the revolting provinces*, which were four Sunni provinces at the time.

Example 6 demonstrates how some policies, perceived as sectarianly exclusionary could be delegitimized by action-oriented topoi that made use of ideologically loaded interpretations of history.

Example 6:

كيف سيتعايش السني والشيعة في العراق بعد قول رئيس الوزراء نوري المالكي إن المواجهة الحالية هي «استمرار للمواجهة بين أنصار الحسين وأنصار يزيد». هل هذا راس وزراء ام طبال؟ حاقدا عمى مسخم 1345 سنه ومازلت تصدق ان السنه من قتل ال البيت الاطهار.

How would Sunnis and Shiites coexist in Iraq after the Noori Al-Maliki the Prime Minister stated that the current conflict is “a continuation of the conflict between the Supporter of Al-Hussein and the Supporter of Yazeed”. Is this a Prime Minister or drummer? A spiteful blind black-faced (it has been) 1345 years and you still think Sunnis killed the virtuous Ahlu Al-Bait ((Family of Prophet Muhammad)).

(Response thread 2)

In the example above, the respondent delegitimized the former Prime Minister for allegedly using a sectarianly loaded historical battle that culturally represented a battle between good, i.e. *the Supporter of Al-Hussein*, and evil, i.e. *by the Supporter of Yazeed*, to describe the political confrontation between the government and opposition. The respondent irrationalized the former Prime Minister’s action by highlighting its detrimental consequences on peaceful coexistence in the country, i.e. *How would Sunnis and Shiites coexist in Iraq*. The action targeted by the delegitimization was agentialized (van Leeuwen, 2008: 66) to highlight the former Prime Minister’s responsibility, i.e. *Prime Minister stated that*. To reinforce the impact of the delegitimization process, the respondent then negatively represented the statement maker, i.e. the former Prime Minister, characterizing him as a *spiteful blind black-faced*.

The third online news report was titled *Preliminary Results: Al-Maliki garners 40% ((of the votes)) in the Southern Provinces*. It reported the preliminary results of the 2014 parliamentary election and the key (expected) winners. The report also demonstrated the main competing electoral coalitions, which included partisans and

independent candidates, and gave a brief account of the Iraqi electoral law and the ballot counting process. Prompted by the content of the report, the main political actors (de)legitimized in the third response thread were the competing politicians and their electoral coalitions. Unlike the third TV interview analyzed in Chapter Five and the third Facebook comment thread analyzed in chapter Six, which tackled the same topic, (de)authorization was not the most commonly used (de)legitimization topoi (see figure 7.4 below). In this response thread, (de)authorization was mostly combined with negative out-group representation, which was by far the most commonly used actor-oriented topos (see example 7). As for the action-oriented (de)legitimization instances identified in the third response thread, they mainly targeted the election process (see example 8), and the federalization process, which represented one of the most debated issue in the politicians' election campaigns (see example 9).

Example 7:

كله كذب حتى اهل الجنوب مو كلها تنتخب الهالكي ليش هو شنو اللي سواه بالجنوب اشو كلما مر الوقت يرجعون للوراء تخلف بالتعليم والفقر والمرض والكهرباء والماء والبطالة هاي مال 40 بالمئة كلها كذب بكذب .

These are all lies. Not all the people of the south voted for the doomed one ((a play with words to refer to Al-Maliki)). What has he accomplished in the south? It is getting worst as the time went by. (There are) deteriorating education ((system)), poverty, diseases, (lack of) electricity and (running) water and unemployment. The 40 percent is all lies.

(Response thread 3)

In the example above, the respondent attempted to deauthorize Al-Maliki, who was being reported as a prospective winner in the online news report, by falsifying what was reported about the election, e.g. *These are all lies*. She then negatively represented Al-Maliki, characterizing him as too bad to vote for, especially because the services in the southern part of the country, which represented his stronghold, had deteriorated drastically during his term, i.e. *what has he accomplished in the south it is getting worst as the time went by*. This negative representation of Al-Maliki was then combined with the deauthorizing argument that he could not be the winner, which was repeated at the end of the comment, i.e. *the 40 percent is all lies*. The actor targeted by the delegitimization was discursively represented by pejorative nomination, i.e. *doomed one*. This pejorative nomination represents a play with words

to refer to Al-Maliki making use of the rhyming in the two words: the Al-Maliki and Al-Haliki, which means the doomed one.

Example 8:

عن اي تغيير تتحدثون؟ العراق لن يصلح حاله ماطول هو محتل من قبل ايران ومافيات ايران!! هذه الانتخابات ضحك على الذقون لا اكثر ولا اقل.

What (political) change are you talking about? Iraq will not be saved as long as it is occupied by ((under the hegemony of)) Iran and the mafia of Iran!! This election is a farce no more or less.

(Response thread 3)

In the example above, the respondent, whose pseudonym suggested that she was a woman, delegitimized the election process itself. The respondent hinted that it was rigged by the Shiite political parties, which were stereotypically accused of being backed by Iran. She evaluated the action, i.e. the election process, negatively describing it as *a farce no more or less*. The delegitimized action was discursively represented by means of objectivation (van Leeuwen, 2008: 63-4) substituting the actions, i.e. the ballot casting, vote counting and the election process in general, by the products, i.e. *the change, the election*.

Example 9:

اذا كان من الصعب على العراقيين ان يتفقوا على قائمة علمانية ينتخبوها بدل التصويت الطائفي فالافضل لهم ان يتم تشكيل فدراليات في الجنوب واحدة والمناطق الغربية واحدة وبغداد يكون وضعها مستقل لانها العاصمة. هذا الحل السلمي افضل من الحرب الاهلية والتقسيم ويحافظ على العراق كبلد واحد ويترك الامر للاجيال القادمة لتصحيح اخطاء اجدادهم الذين هم الجيل الحالي.

If it was too difficult for Iraqis to agree on a secular ((non-sectarianist)) (electoral) list ((coalition)) to vote for instead of the sectarian-based voting it is then better for them to form federal regions one in the south and another in the west, and Baghdad should have it independent status because it is a capital. This peaceful solution is better than the civil war and fragmentation and it will keep Iraq as one country and leave it to the next generation to straighten the mistakes of their grandparents who are the current generation.

(Response thread 3)

In a bid to legitimize his view about the best political solution for the country, the respondent rationalized federalization, highlighting its effectiveness and beneficial results to the country, i.e. *This peaceful solution is better than the civil war and fragmentation and it will keep Iraq as one country*. Linguistically, the action targeted by the legitimization process was first represented as deagentialized action that is not “brought about human agency” (van Leeuwen, 2008: 66), i.e. *to form federal regions*. Subsequently, and in order to emphasize its benefits, the respondent represented the action by distillation, which refers to the process of abstracting or highlighting some of the aspects of the action for the sake of legitimization by establishing a reference to action (ibid: 69-70), i.e. *This peaceful solution*.

Quantitative analysis made it possible to compare the three response threads in terms of the (de)legitimization patterns used across three thematic contexts. The numbers of (de)legitimization instances identified were 77 in the first response thread, 51 in the second response thread and 95 in the third response thread. As in 5.1 and 6.1 above, these 222 instances were coded for the eight different strategies of (de)legitimization. As mentioned in examples 2, 4 and 6, some of the responses that had (de)legitimizing functions included multiple (de)legitimizing topoi. In these cases, the occurrence of multiple topoi was accommodated in the analysis by quantifying each single occurrence of the different topoi; this means that the responses that included more than two (de)legitimization topoi were coded twice. The results were then normalized in relation to the total instances of (de)legitimization identified in each response thread. Coding decisions regarding ambiguous cases of (de)legitimization were made by using the interactional responses as evidence that the topos was interpreted by the participants as serving either a legitimizing or delegitimizing function.

Figure 7.2 (below) shows the percentages of the different (de)legitimization strategies used in the first response thread.




Figure 7.2 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in first response thread

Figure 7.2 clearly shows that the negative representation of out-group members was the most commonly used topos (N=46) followed by positive representation of in-group members (N=7), and authorization (N=7). This seemed to be related to the fact that the discussion was, to a large extent, based on ethno-sectarian grounds in general, and out-group criminalization in particular (see examples 3 and 4 above). In terms of the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi, the topos of negative evaluation of actions (N=7) was the more commonly used, followed by the topos of irrationalization (N=4), which also seemed to be related to the ethno-sectarian nature of the discussion.

Figure 7.3 below shows the percentages of the (de)legitimization topoi in the second response thread.




Figure 7.3 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in second response thread

Like the first response thread, negative representation of out-group members (N= 33) was also the most commonly used topos in the second response thread although with a marginally higher percentage, as shown in figure 7.3 above. The second most commonly used topos was the positive representation of in-group members (N=6). In a similar fashion to the TV interview and Facebook comment thread that discussed similar ethno-sectarianly sensitive topics, the results in the second response thread, as shown in figure 7.3, were due to the respondents' frequent use of out-group criminalization to present out-group members negatively, and in-group victimization to present in-group members positively, which seems to be related to the sensitive nature of the topic discussed, i.e. the power sharing process in the country, and the Sunnis' claims of political marginalization. In terms of the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi, the negative evaluation of actions, which often targeted

ethno-sectarian practices of out-group members (see example 6 above), was found to be the more commonly used (N=4).

Figure 7.4 shows the percentages of the (de)legitimization topoi in the third response thread.




Figure 7.4 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in third response thread

Unlike the TV interview and Facebook comment thread that discussed similar topics, i.e. the results of the 2014 parliamentary election, figure 7.3 shows that both authorization and deauthorization represented only 22% of all the topoi used, which made them the second most commonly used topoi (N=10 each) rather than the first. It was found that the negative representation of out-group members was the most commonly used topoi (N=49). This was mainly due to the respondents' tendency to

combine (de)authorization with the negative representation of out-group members (see example 7 above), and sometimes with positive representation of in-group actors, which represented the third commonly used topos (N=9). Irrationalization and negative evaluation of actions were the most commonly used action-oriented topoi (N=6 for both), which suggests that the respondents were interested in delegitimizing the practices related to the election process.

The quantitative analysis shows that the delegitimization topos of the negative representation of out-group members was by far the most commonly used topos across the three online response threads analyzed in this chapter. This suggests that the medium, rather than the topic, had the greatest impact on how the (de)legitimization patterns emerged in the discourses produced in this genre, which made the response threads characteristically different from the data analyzed in the previous chapters (cf. technological determinism in Arendholz, 2013: 18-19). More importantly, however, the quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that in the unmoderated genre of the response threads the respondents' expressions of opinions were not necessarily based on politically substantiated ground, but rather motivated by ethno-sectarian and racial biases. This explains the comparatively increased use of actor-oriented (de)legitimization in general, and collective (de)legitimization in particular regardless of the topics discussed.

The quantitative analysis also indicates that actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi were much more commonly used than action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in the three response threads, with a margin slightly different from that identified in the Facebook data. Despite the thematically different contexts in the three response threads, the percentages of action-oriented (de)legitimization to the percentages of actor-oriented (de)legitimization within each thread were almost the same, i.e. roughly 1 to 5. Similar to Facebook comment threads analyzed in Chapter Six and different from the TV interviews analyzed in Chapter Five, the political interactions in the context of online news were characteristically personalized and infrequently agenda-oriented, because the respondents tended to (de)legitimize the political actors and their images rather than their actions and agendas, regardless of the topic reported in the news section.




Figure 7.5 Percentages of actor-oriented and action-oriented (de)legitimization topics in response threads

7.2 Establishing alignments and forming political fronts

In the readers' response threads, the second level of positioning analysis could reveal how the respondents constructed their politically defined alignments to establish their roles as supporters or antagonists with regard to the political actors reported in the news section, and how these roles concurrently affected and effected rapport in the interactions under investigation. Additionally, and as explained in Chapter Six, positioning analysis at this level could also capture the interactional order(s) in responses and, as such, unpack the dynamics of argumentation and the participation framework in the multi-participant and asynchronous interactions that were analyzed. The collapsed context in the response threads made it theoretically possible for the respondents to establish their politically defined alignments, and, as such, position themselves in relation to other participants either by directly addressing those participants, i.e. the authors of the news reports, other respondents, and lurking readers (metaparticipants), or indirectly by merely expressing opinions concerning the topics in question. In practice, and in contrast to the commenters in the Facebook comment threads, the respondents in the online response threads never addressed the author of the news reports. This might be attributable (in part, at least) to the fact that the news reports posted on the website were written by a team of news editors rather than individual authors.

In the response threads, the respondents could position themselves in relation to each other either indirectly by expressing their opinions of one of the political

actors mentioned in the news report, or directly by signaling responsiveness to intended participants in the response title. Example 10 demonstrates how two respondents established their politically defined alignments and indirectly positioned themselves in relation to each other only by expressing their opinions of one of the political actors mentioned in the news report.

Example 10:

Respondent 1:

أياد علاوي هو أمل العراق الوحيد في الخلاص.

Eyad Alawi is the only hope of salvation for Iraq.

Respondent 2:

علاوي عميل امريكي و ضد الجيش العراقي

Alawi is an American agent ((proxy)) and is ((conspiring)) against the Iraqi Army.

(Response thread 2)

In example 10 above, respondent 1 expressed his opinion about the main political figure mentioned in the online news report, i.e. Eyad Alawi. Attempting to legitimize Alawi, respondent 1 positively characterized him as *the only hope of salvation*. Taking this stance towards this political figure established respondent 1's politically defined alignment and also indicated his membership of the group of Alawi's supporters. In a bid to respond to respondent 1, respondent 2 delegitimized Alawi by implicitly excluding him from the body of patriotic Iraqis, which makes the interactional order principally respondent-to-respondent. The responsiveness was signaled by means of "format tying" (Bolander, 2012:1616), using the name of the targeted political figure, i.e. *Alawi*. By responding in this way, respondent 2 indirectly established an antithetical alignment to respondent 1 and also indexed his membership in the political group of Alawi's opponents.

Alternatively, example 11 shows how a respondent explicitly positioned himself in relation to another in an antithetical manner by using the response title in order to signal responsiveness right from the outset.

Example 11:

Respondent 1:

لماذا ينتخبون الشيعة المالكي؟؟؟ ماذا قدم لهم؟؟؟ لا امان التفجيرات يوميا ,الاقتصاد مشلول والبترول يسرق يوميا ويذهب الى ايران .الفقر .بنية تحتية سيئة جدا ..ماذا بقى لكي تنتخبوه؟؟

Why are Shiites voting for Al-Maliki??? What has he delivered for them??? No security, daily explosions, paralyzed economy, the oil is being stolen everyday going to Iran, poverty, and very bad infrastructure. What has been left to vote for him?

Respondent 2:

Response title: *a response to one who claims to be a girl* عنوان التعليق : ردا الى من يدعى أنه فتاة

لماذا تفتح عينيك الطائفية على الشيعة فقط؟؟ وتغضضها عن السنة مثلا؟؟ لقد حكم العراق اهل السنة مدة 80 عاما وفي النهاية تركوه بلدا مدمرا محتلا متخلفا يعاني من الحروب والحصار و الارهاب والدمار والديكتاتورية والطائفية ووالخ؟؟؟ وانظري أيضاً الى البلدان العربية الاخرى وحالها اليوم فوضى وارهاب وتفجيرات و قتل ودمار وتخلف وحروب اهليه ومشاكل لاتعد ولا تحصى ووالخ. وجميعها بلدان سنية يحكمها السنة؟ ولا يوجد بها شيعة؟؟ خليك فتاة طيبة وابتعدي عن الطائفية؟ هذا ان كنتي فتاة فعلا؟ ولكن لا اعتقد بل من الطائفيين الذين يكتبون بعدة أسماء؟؟؟

Why are you opening your sectarianist eyes on the Shiites only ((you are biased against the Shiite))?? And you close them on the Sunnis?? Iraq has been ruled by the Sunnis for 80 years and they have eventually left it a destructed occupied and underdeveloped country suffering from wars, embargo, terror, destruction dictatorship, and sectarianism etc. ??? Look at the other Arab countries which are ((filled with)) chaos, terror, explosions, killing, destruction, underdevelopment, civil wars and countless problems, etc. They are all Sunni countries and ruled by Sunnis? No Shiite in it?? Be a nice girl and move away from sectarianism? If you were really a girl? But I do not think so but (you are one) of the sectarianists who write with multiple names???

(Response thread 3)

In the example above, responsiveness was explicitly signaled in the comment title as respondent 2 directly referred to the pseudonym chosen by respondent 1, i.e. *a response to one who claims being a girl*. Respondent 1 delegitimized Al-Maliki and

blamed the Shiites for voting for him, and by so doing she established her political alignment over Al-Maliki's electoral victory in the southern provinces and the people who voted for him. Interpreting her response as offensive to all Shiite people, respondent 2 attempted to respond by delegitimizing the Sunni characterizing them as unfit for ruling. Respondent 2, thus, oriented rapport towards challenge when interacting with respondent 1, especially in his last few sentences, i.e. *Be a nice girl and move away from sectarianism? If you were really a girl? But I do not think so but (you are one) of the sectarianists who write with multiple names???*. Interactionally, the example shows how the lack of any moderation or gate-keeping roles jeopardized the harmony of communication and made it more confrontational. In this respect, the response threads were different from the moderated contexts of the TV interviews and the Facebook comment threads analyzed in the previous chapters.

Similar to the Facebook comment threads analyzed in chapter Six, every response thread was organized as a series of decentralized debates rhizomatically connected to each other. Employing Bolander's (2012) responsiveness analysis indicates that approximately 70% of the responses in each response thread analyzed in this chapter were addressed to other respondents. The rhizomatically structured argumentations in the online response threads were influenced by the respondents' tendency to reply to the respondents who made extreme or controversial responses. Such a tendency was clearer in the online response threads in comparison to the data analyzed in the previous chapter due to the nature of the medium (see examples 3 and 11 above). This tendency, however, was not the only reason behind the rhizomatic structure of the interactions on the response threads. The affordances of the response threads made the argumentation process inherently rhizomatic in nature. Unlike the Facebook comment threads, the lack of hierarchically powerful roles, e.g. report author or gatekeeper, around which hierarchical interactions could be organized, made the response threads inherently divided into numerous, embedded debates which, although decentralized, were rhizomatically linked to the topics under discussion. Consider example 12.

Example 12:

84. Respondent 1:

شكرو انو البعض لسا مش فاهم معنى الديمقراطية . فهو يقبل بنتائجها اذا كانت تتناسب مع رغباته اما إذ اختلفت فهو يكيل للديمقراطية والفانزين بها الاتهامات والتشكيكات والسباب ووووو !!!!! الطبيعي انو يقبل العقلاء بنتائج الديمقراطية مهما كانت نتائجها وده الفرق باسادة بين العقلاء والاغباء ..

85. Respondent 2:

Democracy calls for the best, you stupid hahahahaha

وشو هو مقياس الأفضل بنظرك، يا فطحل زمانك!!!!!!

87. Respondent 2:

You stupid, the best (is the one) who builds and serves (and provides) his people with the best services. This does not apply to Al-Maliki the criminal (who) stole the money of Iraq and of the Iraqis... Understand you idiot hahahahahahahahaha.

من يحدد المجرم من عدمه هو خيارات الشعب العراقي الذي أكد دحيته حسب ما يراه بعينه بعيدا عن الأخبار الإعلامية المسيسة ... العراقيين هم ادرى فهل انت ستحترم خيار اتوام كالعادة... شوية عقل.

The Iraqis are the most ware (of the facts), are you going to respect their choices or as usual will.... (Get) some brain.

89. Respondent 3:

يا سيد يلي فاهم كثير ، لا وجود للديمقراطية أصلا فالديمقراطية هي كلمة استخدمت للضحك على الناس وتعني علمياً العشوائية و يجب التحكم بها و نسمى العشوائية الموجهة . و الانتخابات في الدول العربية تكون 99.8% و علميا هذه أرقام كاذبة غير منطقية لذلك يبدأ السب و التشكيك لأن المتحكم بها هم الأجهزة الأمنية و تتوجه الديمقراطية نحو ما تريد هذه الاجهزة .

Dear Mr. very perceptive, there is no democracy at all, democracy is a word used to fool people and (it) scientifically means randomness that needs to be under control or oriented randomness. The (results of the) elections in the Arab countries are (always) 99.8% and scientifically these figures are unreal and irrational because the ones who control them are the security apparatuses and democracy is oriented according to what they want.

90. Respondent 4:

الديمقراطية هي إعطاء الشعب القدرة لاختيار قيادته السياسية ... هو صحيح في تلاعب بالديمقراطية لكن ده لا يستدعي ان ننتقد الديمقراطية بل يجب انتقاد الأسلوب المتبع اذا كان يشوبه الغش والخداع ... في العراق، وحسب معلوماتي، يوجد مراقبين دوليين بالإضافة لمراقبين من مختلف المرشحين في كل مركز انتخاب لذا يصعب التلاعب بالنتائج.

Democracy is to give the people the ability to choose their political leadership... it is correct there is manipulation in democracy, but this does not necessitate criticizing democracy but criticizing the followed style which infested with cheating and deception.... In Iraq, according to my information, there are international monitors as well as monitors (representing) the different candidates in each polling center and therefore it is difficult to rig the results.

(Response thread 3)

In the examples above, each respondent attempted to legitimize his political view and delegitimize the others'. The respondents signaled responsiveness to each other by means of "format tying" (Bolander, 2012:1616) which was made by using specific lexical items and syntactic structures. The reference to democracy was the ubiquitous connection that permeated this embedded interaction; every respondent referred to it in their responses, and they also used the noun phrase *the best* to refer to the outcome

of the election, which represents a prerequisite for democracy and as such was linked to the discussion. This interactional pattern, in which the respondents were engaging in a decentralized debate rhizomatically linked to the response thread, was very common across the three response threads analyzed in this chapter.

Unlike Facebook, the lack of hierarchically powerful roles highlights the distinctive nature of its participation framework. Figure 7.6 (below) explains the interactional orders available to the participants in the online news responses. The respondents could only address another respondent (A) creating response threads. However, they could refer to three different worlds; the world reported in the news section (B), the actual world (C) or the virtual world constructed online (D). Analogous to the participation framework within Facebook, the responses that have (de)legitimizing functions could only be generated when referring to at least one of the worlds indicated in the figure (see the line in bold), because (de)legitimization presupposes a worldview meant to be supported or refuted.




Figure 7.6 Participation framework in online response threads

7.3 Constructing virtual sociopolitical identities and online communities

In the online news response threads analyzed in this chapter, the respondents' discursive practices were the main resources through which their sociopolitical identities could be analyzed by employing the third level of positioning analysis. Due to the medium affordances in the response threads, the respondents' sociopolitical identities were not only indexed in the contents of these responses, but also by the pseudonyms they chose for themselves. Unlike the Facebook usernames (which under the terms and conditions of the site reflected the participant's names also used by them in offline interactions), the respondents in the response threads could choose their usernames specifically for the political interaction in which they were involved. Examples 13 and 14 show how different aspects of the respondents' identities could be indexed by the information conveyed in the different parts of the response.

Example 13:

راح يجيبون السنه رئيس منتخب وهمينه راح يلبد بالحفرة مره ثانيه ، دروحوا أهل الحفر.

The Sunnis will bring an elected president and he too will hide in the hole one more time, get lost people of holes.

(Response thread 1)

In Example 13, the respondent's sociopolitical identity was indexed by content of the response itself, in particular by the negative stance he took towards the Sunnis and Saddam Hussein, who were tacitly represented as inseparably interrelated through using the expression *people of holes*. This innuendo was based on the shared knowledge that Saddam Hussein was found hiding in an underground bunker after having been overthrown by US troops in 2003. Due to the binary oppositional nature of delegitimization and the ethno-sectarianly polarized political context, the respondent's delegitimization of the Sunni community and the former Iraqi president signaled his transportable attributes as a Shiite (Zimmerman, 1989:90), and his political affiliation as an opponent of Saddam Hussein' regime.

However, in example 14, some of the attributes comprising the respondents' sociopolitical identities were indexed upfront by the pseudonyms they chose for themselves as examples of "visible indicators" (Zimmerman, 1989:91) which unequivocally referred to particular transportable attributes of their identities.

Example 14:

Pseudonym 1:

Umar Ibn Al-Khattab

عمر بن الخطاب

Pseudonym 2:

Sunni Iraqi ((with feminine grammatical gender value))

عراقية سنية

Pseudonym 3:

Classy non-sectarianist Iraqi ((spelling error in the original was corrected))

عراقي راقئ وليس بطائفي

(Response thread 3)

The first pseudonym indexed the ethno-sectarian identity of the respondent through the association with a sectarianly loaded name of a historical figure, i.e. the second Caliph of Rashidun Caliphate *Umar Ibn Al-Khattab*, who is highly revered by Sunnis but disrespected by some Shiites. This username historicized the Sunni-Shiite political conflict in Iraq and signaled enmity to Shiite respondents. The second username directly revealed the collective identity of the respondent, who chose to identify herself as a Sunni Iraqi woman. The third username, however, indexed the respondent's cultural orientation that is more related to personality, rather than the collective attributes of his sociopolitical identity, because he explicitly identified himself as a non-sectarianist Iraqi.

In the previous chapters, the analysis showed that political affiliations could be interwoven with the communal attributes that defined the respondents' memberships in ethno-sectarian communities only if the political topic discussed was ethno-sectarianly sensitive. By contrast, in the three response threads analyzed in this chapter the respondents almost always constructed their sociopolitical identities by interweaving political affiliations with ethno-sectarian attributes regardless of the topic discussed. This was predominantly due to the nature of (de)legitimizations which often ethnicized the political topics discussed. Example 15 unpacks how a

respondent constructed his sociopolitical identity in a way that indexed both his political ideology and membership in an ethno-sectarian community.

Example 15:

Respondent 1:

في الواقع المدن الشيعيه هي التي يجب ان تتظاهر وتطلب من المدن السننيه التوقف عن دعم الارهابيين في مناطقهم..فادينا ملايين الضحايا... والتوقف عن اخذ الدعم المالي من قطر وسنة العالم. التوقف عن غسل عقول الارهابيين والارهابيات وبعثهم للتجمعات الشيعيه.

In fact (it is) the Shiite cities that should demonstrate and demand the Sunni cities to cease supporting terrorists in their areas...because we have millions of victims... and to stop taking (financial) support from Qatar and the world's Sunnis ((referring to non-Iraqi Sunnis)) and to stop brainwashing the men and women terrorists in order to send them to Shiites' gatherings.

(Response thread 1)

In the example above, the respondent represented the Shiite community positively by means of victimization and represented the Sunni community negatively by means of criminalization. Interestingly, however, the respondent did not only criminalize Iraqi Sunnis but also all the Sunnis in the world, i.e. *the world's Sunnis ((referring to non-Iraqi Sunnis))*. Taking these stances towards this ethno-sectarian community, the respondent indexed his sociopolitical identity as a victimized Shiite, explicitly differentiated from the terror-supporting Sunnis across the world. By so doing, the respondent combined his political ideology as non-radical and terror-hating person with his ethno-sectarian affiliation in a single sociopolitical identity.

Most importantly, in the data analyzed in this chapter, and in contrast to the data analyzed in the previous chapters, the respondents' sociopolitical identities which comprised ethno-sectarian attributes along with their political affiliations frequently functioned as supranational, rather than sub-national, identities. This seems to be motivated by the demographics of the respondents in the response threads. Since the data analyzed in this chapter was taken from the comment section of a pan-Arab, non-exclusively Iraqi, website, several non-Iraqi respondents, as indicated by their pseudonyms, participated in interaction, which put the discussions about the Iraqi politics in these response threads in a broader geopolitical context that spanned the entire Middle East region. Example 16 shows how the collective attributes of being

Sunni or Shiite could be used to construct supranational, rather than sub-national, sociopolitical identities.

Example 16:

لا بد من اقامة الدولة السنية الكبرى في جميع انحاء سوريا ولبنان والعراق والاردن وفلسطين والاحواز من اجل ان تسود الامة السنية على ارضها وفاء لشهداء الابرار الذين خرجوا من مساجدهم وبذلوا دماءهم الطاهرة الزكية فداء لامتهم السنية ومن اجل اقتلاع آلة القتل العلوية النصيرية الخبيثة المجرمة عملية الشعبوية الصفوية الباطنية الحاكمة ومن اجل استئصال التحالف الاقلوي.

It is imperative to form the greater Sunni State in all parts of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine and Ahvaz in order for the Sunni Nation to prevail on its lands and to reward its righteous martyrs who have come out of their mosques and shed their pure and immaculate blood to serve their Sunni Nation in order to eradicate the malicious and crime-committing Alawite and Nusairi killing machine that are proxy of the malevolent Safavidism and to eradicate the minority alliance.

(Response thread 2)

In example 16 above, the respondent referred to the so-called Sunni nation as if it was a real geopolitical entity, legitimizing the demand to form the greater Sunni State that spans across most of Mesopotamia and the Levant regions. The respondent also delegitimized the Shiite community, referring to it as the minority alliance in order to represent the Sunni Nation as a majority in the Muslim world. He represented the minority alliance or the Shiite community in the Muslim world as including the Alawite minority in Syria and the Shiite communities in Iraqi and Iran, referring to them as Safavids. Representing the Sunni community all over the Middle East as a nation that should have its own state indicated that the respondent was envisaging his Sunni identity as a sociopolitical identity in a supranational entity, i.e. Sunni nation/state, rather than an indication of membership in a sub-national group, the Sunni community in Iraq. This exemplifies how ethno-sectarian attributes could be precariously unstable and thus liable to politicization in the late modern Arab culture in general and Iraqi culture in particular.

In a similar fashion, the respondent in example 17 recontextualized the sociopolitical struggle between two ethno-sectarian communities at the sub-national level into a broader supranational conflict. Distinctively, however, the respondent used this ethno-sectarian identity to excommunicate others with opposing ethno-sectarian identities from their national group.

Example 17:

ساعة خلاص العراقيون الشرفاء من المالكي وعصابته الصفوية ومليشياته الدموية أصبحت قريبة جدا بفضل الله سبحانه وتعالى ثم اهالي العراق الغيارى والنشامى الابطال.. كل من يؤيد المالكي العميل فهو ايراني صفوي ونحن نعرف حقد الايرانيين لقتل الشعب العراقي.. وكل من يقف ضد افكاره الصفوية فهو عراقي وطني شريف يريد الخير والامان لهذا البلد.

The decent Iraqis' time of salvation from Al-Maliki and his Safavid gang and bloody militias has come very near by the willing of Allah his Almighty and (that of) the ferment and heroic Iraqis.. Whoever supports Al-Maliki, the (collaborating) agent ((used negatively as a proxy for a foreign country)), is an Iranian Safavid and we (all) know the Iranians' malicious eager to kill the Iraqi people.. And whoever stands up to his Safavid ideas ((referring to Al-Maliki's)) is a decent patriotic Iraqi desiring peace and safety for this country..

(Response thread 2)

The respondent in the example above attempted to delegitimize Al-Maliki's supporters, who were often Shiite Iraqis, by virtue of differentiation and then exclusion from the national space, representing them as Iranian Safavid, i.e. *Whoever supports Al-Maliki, the (collaborating) agent ((used negatively as a proxy for a foreign country)), is an Iranian Safavid.* By linking Shiism to the Iranian Safavid dynasty, the respondent wielded the ethno-sectarian affiliation of some Iraqis, i.e. Shiite Iraqis, as an exclusionary tool in order to deprive them of their national identity as Iraqi citizens, representing them as non-genuine Iraqis, or even Iranian.

It was, therefore, found that the collective attributes that defined the respondents' memberships in the ethno-sectarian communities were discursively represented differently: these representations included Sunnis vs. Shiites (see examples 15 and 16 above), Arabs (or Iraqis) vs. Persians (Iranians or Safavids) (see example 17 above), and Muslims vs. non-Muslims (see example 18). This indicates that the transportable attributes of the sociopolitical identities in the Iraqi political context were not fixed but rather fluid in nature depending on the context in which they were used. It is important to emphasize that the different representations of these collective attributes were motivated by ethnic stereotypes and sectarian biases in order to highlight difference and deepen divergence from respondents perceived as out-group members.

Similar to the Facebook comment threads, an in-depth look at how the respondents employed (de)legitimization to position themselves in relation to each other revealed that there were two patterns of identifying respondents as members in certain communities. Calculating the frequency of legitimization topoi versus delegitimization topoi used in each response thread, highlighted the different identification practices employed by the respondents to index their sociopolitical identities as shown in figure 7.7.




Figure 7.7 Percentages of legitimization and delegitimization topoi in the response threads

Figure 7.7 shows that respondents in the three response threads tended to use delegitimization more commonly than legitimization. Nevertheless, in the third response thread, which was about the 2014 election, the result was slightly less polarized, because the respondents used the topoi of authorization and positive representation of in-group members more frequently to emphasize the electoral representativeness and positive attributes of the political actors perceived as in-group members. These results suggest that the respondents tended to construct their sociopolitical identities via negative identification, which was based on differentiation and exclusion (see examples 17, 18, 19 above). As in the Facebook comment threads analyzed in Chapter Six above, this indicates how ambivalent the respondents felt about their sociopolitical identities, at least in the online context, and also supports the locus communis about the Iraqi public's lack of trust in the main political actors and the political institutions they belong to. These results along with similar ones found in the previous chapter (see 6.3) substantiate the argument made by many political analysts (e.g. Radwan, 2012) and civil activists (e.g. Dawood, 2014) about the crisis of democracy and the lack of public confidence in the political system in Iraq.

Due to the anonymity and pseudonymity afforded by medium of the online readers' response interactions, deindividuation and the polarization, the interactions almost always developed into an inter-communal conflict, which consciously or unconsciously motivated the respondents to classify each other into in-group or out-group members. Unlike the online communities constructed in the Facebook comment threads analyzed in the previous chapter, the online communities constructed in the online response threads were solely online versions of the actual ethno-sectarian communities, operationalized by the same norms and ideologies underlying the original communities in the offline world. Example 18 shows how the respondents could discursively construct an online version of actual ethno-sectarian communities.

Example 18:

4. Respondent 1:

منصب رئيس الوزراء حكر للشيعية وهم من يقرر من يستحقه. اما زمن الباطجة و الصعلكة وفرض الامور بالقوة انتهى مع زوال حكمكم واختباء زعيمكم القائد الضرورة في حفرة ..

5. Respondent 2:

The Muslim ((referring to Saddam Hussein)) is the crown on your head ((degrading idiomatic expression)) and (you) are not worthy of the soil he walked on, alas now you slaves has grown tongues, but we will chop your necks off, (you are) a clique of barbarians feeling happy because of a rule of 10 years.

احفاد صدام قائد الحفرة الشهيرة يريدون العودة للحكم وانا اقول لكم حلم ابليس في الجنة ههههههههه.

9. Respondent 4:

I am not a grandson of Saddam you scoundrel. Sa'ddam was your uncle ((leader)) hahahaha or you have forgotten (now)..... We will overthrow Al-Maliki and you will be watching. Laugh and feel happy (now) because in a while you will be whining over the ruins of the doomed one ((a play with words to refer to Al-Maliki)) and his Magi-Shiite government. Iraqi will return to us you Arabanized ((pretending to be an Arab)) Shrooqi ((degrading expression referring to Shiites from southern Iraq)).

10. Respondent 5:

الناقص انت ومن على شاكلتك البعثية جماعة سعدي الحلي. انت مو من جماعة سعدي

It is you and your ilk that are scoundrels, (you are) Baathists from Saadi Alhili's group ((expression used to refer to homosexuals)). Aren't you from Saadi's group.....

11. Respondent 6:

اتصور انتو جماعة سعدي الحلي وعلا راسكم الحكيم و السستاني...

I think (it is) you that are from Saadi Alhili's group along with Al-Hakeem and Al-Sistani ((names of religious Shiite clerics))...

12. Respondent 7:

يامن تقول شروكي مستعرب هل تعرف معنى كلمه شروكي اجزم بانك ح... ولا تعرفها ،،،، هذه الكلمه كانت تطلق على الملك سرجون الاكدي ومناها الحكم الاصيل او الطيب بين قوسين، يعني الاشروكيه هم اصل العراق يا جاهل.

You, who say Arabized Shrouqi, do you know that does Shrouqi means? I am sure you are a D.....((shorthand for 'donkey')) and you do not know,,,,, this name had been used for the King Sargon of Akkad ((ancient king of Mesopotamia)) and it means the veracious or good king, which means that Shrouqis ((referring to the Shiites people in southern Iraq)) are the origin(al people) of Iraq, you ignorant.

14. Respondent 6:

قائد الحفرة احسن من قائد السبح.....

The leader of the hole is better than the leader of the beads ((referring to Al-Maliki))....

17. Respondent 8:

المشكلة الحاكم الشيعي لو أي حاكم شيعي يجيكم راح تتحبوا عليه تريدون الحكم بيدكم وانتم اقلية 7% من شعب العراق ارنتم. المفروض الانسان يعرف حجمه وقدره اصلا المالكي رحمه لكم لانه يخاف الله لان لو يجي غيره عليكم ما يخاف الله فسوف تترحموا على ايام المالكي.

(your) problem is (with) the Shiite ruler, any Shiite ruler you have you would talk (badly) about him. You want to rule yourselves (even though) you are a minority of

the Iraqi people (representing) 7%. One must know one's value and size.... Al-Maliki is a mercy of Allah to you because he fears Allah, if you have another ruler with no fears of Allah you will long to the days of Al-Maliki.

18. Respondent 9:

يمعود اخاف 5%.... شوف شلون دماغ سز... زين شلون ترضون 7% تحكمكم لمدة 30 سنة؟! من موت يكرفكم.

Oh I am afraid 5%.....what a schmuck... well how had you accepted that the 7% ruled you for 30 years ((referring to the Saddam Hussein's rule))?! May death take you all.

(Response thread 1)

The respondents in example 18 were engaging in a confrontation embedded within the first response thread. They signaled responsiveness to each other by means of “format tying” but more importantly by the “order and participant roles”, which Bolander (2012:1617) conceptualizes as a “strongly content related” type of responsiveness. This type of responsiveness requires in-depth examination of content of the successive comments to determine whether the respondents were engaging in this rhizomatically embedded debate or merely expressing their political opinion without reactively responding to others. All the responses were confrontational, demonstrating typical flaming behaviors and consequently polarizing the interaction even further. This was indicated by the relatively high numbers of the (dis)likes they garnered. Although each response in this thread had 7.8 likes and dislikes on average, response 4 had 8 likes and 17 dislikes, comment 7 had 12 likes and 15 dislikes, and comment 17 had 10 likes and 16 dislikes. This highly polarized context motivated more respondents to categorize others into in-group and out-group members based on their politicized ethno-sectarian affiliations, giving rise to vicious and ultra extreme online versions of their offline communities: a homogenously Shiite-hating Sunni community and a homogenously Sunnis-hating Shiite community. This made the political discussions in this unmoderated genre irrationally polemical rather than reasonably topic-focused or deliberative (see Figure 7.8)

The respondents referred to these communities differently using a wide range of ideologically loaded names in order to historicize or racialize the political conflict between these two communities. These names firstly included ideologically loaded

collective expressions to refer to these communities; the expressions *grandsons of Saddam* was used to refer to Sunni community in responses 7 and 9, and the expressions *Magi-Shiite, or Arabized Shrouqis* were used to refer to Shiite community in responses 9 and 12 in the example above. Secondly, some of these stereotypes were based on the associations between specific political or religious figures and the communities they belong to. Therefore, *Saddam Hussein* (see comments 4, 5, 7, 9 and 14 in the example above) made implicit reference to the Sunni community by means of association, and Al-Maliki, Al-Sistani and Al-Hakeem (see comments 4, 5, 7, 9 and 17 in the example above) made implicit reference to the Shiite community by means of association.

Comparatively, the online communities constructed in the three online response threads analyzed were bigger than the ones constructed in the Facebook comment threads analyzed in the previous chapter, as a higher number of participants interactionally subscribed to these online communities. Perhaps due to the highly ethno-sectarianly polarized nature of the interactions, more online news readers seemed emotionally motivated to highlight their ethno-sectarian affiliations in the interaction in order to defend their ethno-sectarian community against the offenses caused by the respondents perceived as out-group members. In the data analyzed in this chapter, these highly xenophobic online versions of the offline communities were recreated through the respondents' appeal to the ultra extreme ideological biases associated with their enregistered identities (Agha, 2009; De Fina, 2015). Politically speaking, the xenophobic and ultra extreme online versions of the offline communities might further deepen inter-communal rifts and weaken national unity in the country, because, for most of the post-US led invasion generations, social media represent the only way to familiarize self and communicate with the different other and out-group members.

The respondents' subscriptions to the constructed communities in each response thread were identified mainly by analyzing the content of the response or the pseudonyms chosen by the respondents. Additionally, tracing the respondents' rapport management between each other was a useful means to identify the respondents' memberships in the communities constructed online. It appeared that the respondents who indexed their memberships in one of the online communities would act in a rapport enhancing manner when interacting with respondents perceived to be from the

same online community, whereas they would act aggressively or even offensively when interacting with respondents perceived to be from the rival community. This aggressiveness towards the respondents perceived as out-group members has an important interactional function in creating a sense of in-group bonding among respondents who shared the same ideological biases (also see Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2010: 543; Perelmutter, 2014: 87; Bou Franch & Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2014: 21). This type of aggressiveness, which often gave rise to impoliteness, emerged because each discursively constructed community presupposed the existence of a different frame of reference against which the members of that community evaluated their own and other's behaviors normatively. Alluding to the unifying force of the moral and normative orders, Chilton (2004: 199) argues that "sharing of a common view regarding these concepts [i.e. justice and injustice, good and evil] is an intrinsic part of constituting a social or political group". Yet at the same time, establishing a shared frame of reference also positions those who do not share that group as a separate, distinctive community of others. Example 19 shows how respondents' different evaluations of a particular response made by one of the readers of the news section and their different rapport-sensitive reaction to the respondent who posted it could indicate their memberships in different online communities.

Example 19:

22. Respondent 1:

أيها المالكي الشجاع يا قائد الصولة الظافرة على الارهابية والغوغاء والمطلوبيين
الخيرين والوطنين والاحرار من ابناء شعب العراق معك و جنودا رهن إشارتك

Oh you Al-Maliki the courageous, the leader of the victorious charge on the terrorists, the mobs and the wanted.... We say to you we are along with all the good, patriotic and free people of Iraq are with you as soldiers at your service.

24. Respondent 2:

آخر تصريح لعلاوي بانه لن يرشح للانتخابات القادمة خوفا من ذكاء الازرفي و حنكته السياسية و تح ليله للواقع
العراقي و العالمي ...

The last statement for Alawi was that he would not run in the next election because he was afraid of the punctured one's ((a play with words to refer to the respondent Al-Azraqi offensively)) intelligence, political experience and realistic analysis for the Iraqi and the global situations...

26. Respondent 3:

تحية الى الازرقى العراقي وهو يقاوم بكلمته جموع الحاقدين على شعب العراق الابي.

Greeting to the Iraqi Al-Azraqi as he is resisting by his words the crowds of the malicious (who are) against the dignified Iraqi people.

27. Respondent 1:

شكرا اخي الكريم أحمد على التحية وعلى كلماتك الأطراء الطيبة ووطنيتك الصادقة تجاه وطنك العراق و
اعتزازك في ابناء العراق الشرفاء الذين يدافعون عن الوطن وكل من موقعه سواء بالسلاح او بالقلم ويفضحون
هؤلاء الارهابية الاشرار الذين يستهدفون العراق العظيم وشعبه الكريم !!

Thanks my dear brother Ahmed for the salutation and the words of compliment and for your true patriotism towards you country Iraq and for cherishing the honest sons of Iraq who are defend the homeland each from their position whether by arms or by the pen to expose those evil terrorists who target the great Iraq and its decent people!!

28. Respondent 4:

بوركت ايها الازرقى العراقي . انت من موقعك تساند العراق وجيشه والاشراف من ابناء العشائر التي تحارب
قوى الظلام ومن يدعمها من الجهلة والطائفين.

Bless you the Iraqi Al-Azraqi. You are from your position supporting Iraq, its army and the tribesmen who are fighting the forces of darkness and whoever supporting them, the ignorant and sectarianists.

(Response thread 2)

In example 19, respondent 1 used legitimization topoi to express his support to the former Prime Minister. In a bid to communicate his political view, respondent 2 ridiculed respondent 1's legitimization of the former Prime Minister, orienting rapport towards challenging respondent 1 and the group he belonged to. The normative frame of reference based on which respondent 2 made his negative evaluation of respondent 1's legitimization of Al-Maliki was congruent with the dominantly Sunni ideological biases. Therefore, by making this normatively motivated attitudinal reaction, respondent 2 indexed his subscription to the online version of the Sunni community constructed in interaction. Conversely, both respondents 3 and 4 agreed with respondent 1's political stance over Al-Maliki, who was stereotypically described as a

Shiite leader, orienting rapport towards enhancement with respondent 1 by means of the compliments they paid to him, as well as their encouragement to him to continue what he was doing. The normative frame of reference based on which respondents 3 and 4 made their positive evaluations of respondent 1's legitimization of Al-Maliki was congruent with the dominantly Shiite ideological biases. Therefore, by making these normatively motivated attitudinal reactions, the respondents indexed their subscription to the online version of the Shiite community constructed in interaction.

7.4 Rapport perceptions and variability of impoliteness assessments in online readers' response threads

As shown in the previous chapters, in order to pinpoint the affective repercussions and moral implications of the discursive conflict for power, it was important to analyze different aspects of impoliteness. The multi-tiered positioning analysis could capture meticulously how various sets of impoliteness assessment were triggered and functionally employed in the response threads taking into consideration the different spatiotemporal levels of the interaction. In the conflictive online interactions analyzed in this chapter, impoliteness could function as a social categorization tool in order to classify the respondents as in and out-group members. This could be achieved by two types of impoliteness: on the one hand exogenous impoliteness assessments, which clarified the respondents' moral stance in regards to certain political practices and the actors responsible for them; on the other hand endogenous impoliteness, which often involved affective expressions of attitudes used to reinforce certain identities and oppose others (Culpeper, 2011: 252; cf. Svensson, 2011), and by so doing enhance rapport between the like minded respondents and simultaneously underscore divergence with and difference from others (Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2010: 543; Perelmutter, 2014: 87; Bou Franch & Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2014: 21).

In the three response threads, several instances of exogenous impoliteness were identified by means of which the respondents communicated moral stances and emotionally fraught negative attitudes towards particular political practices as part of the respondents' delegitimization of out-group members. Consider example 20.

Example 20:

للاسف الشديد بعض اهل الانبار خضعوا الى اوامر ارباب القاعدة و داعش بعدم المشاركة بالانتخاب ولم يشاركوا خوفا من العقاب . **يا حيف على الزلم** .. الذين فقدوا الهوية العراقية و همشوا انفسهم بانفسهم من اجل ارضاء اوامر حفنة ارهابية اجانب ؟

*Regretfully, some of the people of Anbar have yielded to the orders of Al-Qaeda and DAESH ((ISIL))'s terrorism by not participating in the election, they have not participated for being fearful of punishment... **what a pity for the men** who lost their Iraqi identity and marginalized themselves by themselves for obeying a clique of foreign terrorists' orders.*

(Response thread 3)

In the example above, the respondent used the negative evaluation of an out-group action to delegitimize the people of Anbar who boycotted the 2014 parliamentary election and represented this boycott as an act of obeying the terrorists' orders. In doing so, the respondent explicitly appealed to the moral order to highlight the negative nature of this political stance in a vehement fashion. The respondent evaluated this political stance negatively, describing it as a regretful and pitiful practice, i.e. *regretfully,.... **what a pity for the men** who lost their Iraqi identity.* Invoking the moral order to evaluate this stance negatively amounts to impoliteness assessment of a public practice (see Culpeper, 2011: 65; Culpeper *et al.*, 2014 for the relation between impoliteness and the emotions of regret and pity). Part of the impoliteness metapragmatic comment (Culpeper: 2011: 74) was expressed in Iraqi colloquial, rather than, modern standard Arabic to express intense emotive response. Evaluating the boycott of the election in this way was a typical case of exogenous impoliteness, because the action evaluated took place outside the context of the interaction. As this type of moral evaluation was embedded in the delegitimization of the political action, it was thus analytically captured at the first level of positioning analysis.

At the second level of positioning analysis, it was possible to capture some instances of endogenous impoliteness, especially the ones that included violations of the social rights and obligations the respondents expected to be associated with their roles. Example 21 shows how a respondent denounced another respondent's deauthorization of the former Prime Minister for being motivated merely by ethno-sectarian biases, which was perceived as unfair.

Example 21:

and, thus, as impolite itself (see example 25 below). This means that respondent 2's contribution included both classificatory impoliteness, as it involved an explicit moral judgment of Sunni respondents' practices, and expressive impoliteness, as it encompassed an affective reaction that was deemed offensive by the Sunni respondents later on in the thread. The classificatory impoliteness in the second response in the example was analytically captured at the second level of positioning analysis, because the appeal to the violation of fairness was associated with the respondents' interactional roles that defined their rights and obligations.

Like the Facebook comment threads, most of the endogenous impoliteness instances identified in the online news response threads analyzed in this chapter did not involve explicit moral evaluations of the respondents' practices inside the interaction, i.e. classificatory impoliteness, but rather involved offensive affective reactions encoded within the responses, which were considered typical cases of expressive impoliteness, as shown in example 22.

Example 22:

والله كلکم وحاقدون وابو اسراء صاعد قصین ما علیکم.

I swear to Allah you are all and spiteful. And the father of Isra'a ((honorific referring to Al-Maliki)) is at the top ((winning)) whether you want it or not.

(Response thread 3)

Example 22 shows how a respondent expressed a negative attitude towards other respondents who delegitimized the former Prime minister, establishing a strongly antithetical alignment to them. The respondent was not concerned about providing a counterargument or, at least, refuting the opposing responses, but he was rather more interested in attacking the respondents who delegitimized the political actor he supported, i.e. Al-Maliki. In the first sentence in the example above, the respondent avoided communicating what seemed to be a taboo word directly on record leaving it to the readers to fill in the blank, i.e. *I swear to Allah you are all and spiteful*. Additionally, the expression *whether you want it or not* in this context was considered highly offensive, because in the Arabic culture it implies that other's opinions are not respected. This impoliteness assessment was communicated by means of a conventional formula of impoliteness that involved personalized negative reference (Culpeper, 2011: 135). The response was also emotionally intensive as it was

expressed in Iraqi Arabic rather than modern standard Arabic. As such, the response above was interpreted by respondents who opposed Al-Maliki as impolite for being offensively inappropriate and face-damaging. The response in the example above was not directly evaluative in nature, i.e. classificatory impoliteness; it rather involved an offensive reaction, which made it a typical case of expressive impoliteness.

At the third level of positioning analysis wherein the respondents' constructions of their sociopolitical identities were under scrutiny, it was theoretically possible to identify three types of impoliteness related to the types of identities and the aspects of face associated with each of them; viz. institutional, communal and personal impoliteness. However, in three response threads, no institutional impoliteness was identified. Like the Facebook comment threads, this may be attributed to firstly, the non-institutionalized and informal nature of the response threads, and secondly the respondents' reluctance to associate themselves with political institutions (see negative identification in 7.7 above). As was to be expected, many cases of communal impoliteness assessments were identified in the response threads analyzed in this chapter. Unlike the interactions analyzed in the previous chapters, all the three response threads analyzed in this chapter were thriving contexts for communal impoliteness to arise regardless of the topics discussed. This was because the respondents constantly ethnicized and racialized the discussions in these response threads.

Interestingly, the communal impoliteness identified in the data analyzed in this chapter could be classified into two categories: face-related impoliteness and identity-related impoliteness (see 3.3 above). The communal impoliteness assessments were mostly due to attacking the aspects of face associated with the respondents' ethno-sectarian identities, i.e. face-related impoliteness. Damaging the self-worth, self-efficacy, dignity or honor, i.e. aspects of face, associated with these ethno-sectarian identities was interpreted as a flagrant attack against the entire ethno-sectarian community and its values. Therefore, and unlike Culpeper's finding about the main triggers of impoliteness and interactional aggression in interpersonal settings (2011:47), this made the collective face, rather than the personal or Quality face, "overwhelmingly the most important type of face relating to impoliteness" (2011:47), in an ethnically politicized culture and in the genres that encouraged deindividuation, such as the online news readers' responses. Consider example 23.

Example 23:

اهل الوسط والغرب قرروا اعلان الاقليم اسوة باخوتهم الاكراد لاننا لم نعد نندمج مع اهل الجنوب ولطميائهم .
وكل هوساتكم لاذلالنا ستنتهي باقليم يكسر رجليكم ولن تدخلوه .

The people of the Centre and the West decided to announce their region (in a way similar to the Kurdish brothers ((referring to the Kurdish semi-autonomous region)) because we can no longer take the people of the South and their Latimiyas ((a distinctive Shiite religious rite)). And all your attempts to humiliate us will lead to (the establishment of) a region wherein your legs will be broken and you won't be allowed to enter.

(Response thread 3)

In example 23, the respondent negatively represented the Shiites and criminalized them, characterizing them as people who cannot be lived with, and who attempted to humiliate the Sunni people. The Shiites and the Sunnis were discursively represented by means of spatialization, which van Leeuwen (ibid: 46) defined as “a form of objectivation in which social actors are represented by means of reference to a place”. In the example *the people of the South* referred to the Shiites, and *the people of the Centre and the West* referred to the Sunnis. In doing so, the respondent delegitimized the Shiite community and communicated a strongly negative attitude against them in a way that was interpreted as aggressively face damaging and offensively impolite by the Shiite respondents. This impoliteness assessment was triggered by a conventionalized threat (Culpeper, 2011: 136), i.e. *wherein your legs will be broken and you won't be allowed to enter*. In terms of the number of targets, the expressive inter-communal impoliteness embedded in this attempt at criminalization was directed towards multiple participants at different levels of participation, i.e. Shiite respondents and readers (metaparticipants), due to the context collapse, which were publically available and viewable by a potentially huge and unknowable audience. This type of impoliteness assessment was analytically captured at the third level of positioning analysis, because it involved an attack on the aspects of face that were associated with the participants' ethno-sectarian identities.

In contrast to the examples analyzed in the previous chapters, some impoliteness assessments identified in the data analyzed in this chapter were not due to face attacks targeting particular respondents, but rather motivated by disauthenticating their sociopolitical identities, i.e. identity-related impoliteness.

Example 24 demonstrates how disauthenticating some respondents' ethnic and national identities resulted in impoliteness.

Example 24:

Respondent 1:

العراقيين الآن بحاجة الى قائد غير طائفي ونظيف يعرف كيف يدير البلاد بحكمة العراقيين عانوا الكثير وتعبوا نحتاج الى رجل يفعل ويطور العراق الى حال افضل كبقية دول العالم لا الى خراب العراق ، كفى مهازل وقتل وهدر دماء وأهم شيء يبقى العراق للعراقيين فقط ((ولا مكان)) للفرس المجوس فيه.....

*Iraqis are now in need for a non-sectarianist and clean(handed) leader who knows how to run the country wisely..... Iraqis have suffered a lot and have grown tired..... We need a man who acts and develops Iraq to (become) better like the rest of the world.... NO for the destruction of Iraq, enough, with the nonsense, killings and bloodshed..... The most important thing is (that) Iraq remains for Iraqis only and **no place** for the Persian Magi in it.*

Respondent 2:

لست انت يا امعة من يحدد من يحكم العراق.

It is not (for) you, you flunky, to decide who rules Iraq.

(Response thread 2)

In the example above, Respondent 1 made use of the relation between the Shiites in Iraq and Iran, which is stereotypically characterized as one of subordination, to represent the Shiite Iraqis as *Persian Magi*. Respondent 1 attempted to use this relation as an exclusionary tool in order to deprive the Shiite Iraqis of their national identity as Iraqi citizens and ethnic identity as Arabs. In doing so, he presented his, tacitly indexed, Sunni identity as a normative standard for Iraqi identity, i.e. *The most important thing is (that) Iraq remains for Iraqis*. This kind of impoliteness was implicationally driven by the confrontational atmosphere of the interaction (see Culpeper, 2011: 180). As indicated by his reply, respondent 2 interpreted respondent 1's remark as seriously offensive and impolite, which motivated him to respond in an offensively retaliatory manner, i.e. *[i]t is not (for) you, you flunky, to decide who rules Iraq*. Respondent 2's interpretation of respondent 1's remark as offensive and impolite was not only because his face was attacked and damaged, but because his national and ethnic identities, as an Iraqi and as an Arab, were disauthenticating.

Few instances of personal impoliteness were also found in the online news readers' responses. However, personal impoliteness was always combined with communal impoliteness, which made these impoliteness assessments more offensive, because it was directed to the respondents in their capacities as specific individuals and in their capacities as members in particular ethno-sectarian communities, as shown in example 25.

Example 25:

Respondent 1:

المشكلة الحاكم الشيعي لو أي حاكم شيعي يجبكم راح تتحجوا عليه تريدون الحكم ببيكم وانتم اقلية 7% من شعب العراق انتم . المفروض الانسان يعرف حجمه وقدره اصلا المالكي رحمه لكم لانه يخاف الله لان لو يجي غيره عليكم ما يخاف الله فسوف تترحموا على ايام المالكي.

(Your) problem is (with) the Shiite ruler, any Shiite ruler you have you would talk (badly) about. You want to rule for yourselves (even though) you are a minority of the Iraqi people (representing) 7%. One must know one's value and size.... Al-Maliki is a mercy of Allah to you because he fears Allah, if you have another ruler with no fears of Allah you will long to the days of Al-Maliki.

Respondent 2:

يمعود اخاف 5% شوف شلون دماغ سز ... زين شلون ترضون 7% تحكمكم لمدة 30 سنة؟! من موت يكرفكم.

Oh I am afraid 5%.....what a schmuck... well how had you accepted that the 7% ruled you for 30 years ((referring to the Saddam Hussein's rule))?! May death take you all.

(Response thread 1)

In example 25 above, respondent 1 attempted to deauthorize the Sunnis, characterizing the Sunni community as a minority, which represents only 7% of the population. In his response to respondent 1, respondent 2 insulted both respondent 1 and the ethno-sectarian community he belonged to, i.e. Shiite people. This response engendered multi-directional expressive impoliteness, in which respondent 2 attacked respondent 1's face that was associated with his personal identity as a unique individual, i.e. *what a schmuck*, and the face associated with his collective identity as a member in the Shiite community, i.e. *May death take you all*. In this sense, the second response in the example involved a personal impoliteness, communicated by conventional formulae of "third-person negative reference" (Culpeper, 2011: 135),

and communal impoliteness communicated implicationally by virtue of the ethno-sectarianly confrontational context (ibid: 180). To index intense anger, respondent 2 used the low variety of Arabic to communicate his response (see Culpeper, 2011: 65; for the relation between face-related impoliteness and anger).

It was theoretically expected, and analytically demonstrated in the previous chapters (see 6.4 and 7.4), that delegitimization, rather than legitimization, would give rise to impoliteness, because delegitimization entails attacking others' face or disauthenticating their identities, (also see examples 22, 23, 24 and 25 above). This was predominantly attributed to the fact that damaging out-group members' face was a means to enhance one's own and in-group members' face in ethno-sectarianly polarized interactions like the ones analyzed in this chapter. Surprisingly, however, in the data analyzed in this chapter, impoliteness was sometimes motivated by legitimization. The current approaches in impoliteness studies may fail to account for how legitimization can trigger impoliteness, but by extending Spencer-Oatey's (2008: 16) and Culpeper's (2011:39) insights, it can be argued that impoliteness that arose from legitimization were motivated by the perceived violation of association and equity rights reflecting the respondents' concerns over fairness and consideration of in-group's rights. In highly ethno-sectarianly polarized contexts, (undue) in-group legitimization attempts were often perceived by out-group respondents as provocative impingements on their ethno-sectarian communities' sociopolitical rights. Consider example 26 in which an authorization attempt gave rise to impoliteness.

Example 26:

Respondent 1:

يطالب باستقالة المالكي الذي فازت كتلته باغلب محافظات الجنوب اضافة الى بغداد!! يعني هذا استقالة اكثر من عشر ملايين نسمة صوتوا له...

He ((referring to the politician mentioned in the online news report)) is demanding Al-Maliki's resignation whose bloc won in most of the Southern provinces as well as Baghdad!!.. This means a resignation of more than ten million capita (who) voted for him...

Respondent 2:

هو منو انتخب الهالكي ابو السبح؟؟؟كلها صناديق جتي من ايران الصفوية..

Who voted for doomed one ((a play with words to refer to Al-Maliki)), the beads seller ((degrading expression referring to his alleged humble origin))??? They were all (ballot) boxes coming from the Safavid Iran..

(Response thread 1)

In the example above, respondent 1 attempted to authorize the former Prime Minister by appealing to the votes he gleaned in the previous provincial election in order to express his rejection of a demand made by an opposition leader in the reported world (see figure 7.6 above). Although the first response in the example only expressed respondent 1's political opinion over the topic in question through legitimizing one of the political actors mentioned in the news section, without being directed to other respondents, it was perceived as an irritatingly provocative and inflammatory remark, and most likely impolite, and consequently triggered an intensively offensive reply in the second response (see Culpeper, 2011: 64 for the link between impoliteness related to behavioral expectations and moral emotions such as anger and irritation). Respondent 2's response suggests that he interpreted respondent 1's attempt to authorize Al-Maliki as a provocative impingement on the sociopolitical rights of his Sunni community. Therefore, he reacted by deauthorizing Al-Maliki and accused him of being assisted by Iran, for ethno-sectarian reasons, to rig the election results in order to retain power. The use of an ethno-sectarian stereotype that had a racial hint to it, i.e. *Safavid*, signaled the ethno-sectarian ground of respondent 2's remark, which was meant to counterbalance the violation of his expectations regarding the political entitlements of his ethno-sectarian community. Although Culpeper (2011: 206) indicates that "counter-aggression may be taken as a matter of fair defence", the respondent's remark was still interpreted as ethno-sectarianly offensive and impolite by Shiite respondents and readers (metaparticipants), because it involved an ethno-sectarianly offensive stereotype, i.e. *Safavid*.

Contrary to the impoliteness analysis in chapters Five and Six, the instances of expressive and classificatory impoliteness analyzed in this chapter did not exhibit relevant thematically related differences across the online readers' response threads analyzed in this chapter as shown in figure 7.8 (below). This can be attributed to three different reasons: firstly the respondents always ethnicized the political topics

discussed, and as such made these more sensitive (see 7.1 above). In a culture where ethno-sectarian identities are often politicized and inter-communal tension is high, damaging the self-worth associated with these communal identities is often interpreted as an attack against the entire community and its values. In the dataset analyzed in this chapter, the use of collective delegitimization topoi, which was fairly common, was often perceived as a blatant act of aggression by out-group respondents, which consequently triggered various impoliteness assessments. The second factor that seems to make impoliteness equally salient across the three response threads was the lack of a moderating role in this type of genre that could ease expected tensions between the respondents. Finally, the potential anonymity or pseudonymity made the respondents less socially accountable before the eyes of others (cf. Mitchel and Haugh, 2015), which gave rise to gratuitous aggressive practices and, in many cases, flaming (Lange, 2014: 54). Apparently, the lack of moderation and anonymity are specifically related to the affordances of the medium.




Figure 7.8 Percentages of impoliteness in the response threads

The numbers of impoliteness assessments identified in the responses that have (de)legitimizing functions were as follows: 29 instances of expressive impoliteness and 5 instances of classificatory impoliteness in the first response thread, 19 instances of expressive impoliteness and 3 instances of classificatory impoliteness in the second response thread, and 38 instances of expressive impoliteness and 11 instances of classificatory impoliteness in the third response thread. The impoliteness assessments in each response thread were normalized by the number of responses identified as having (de)legitimizing functions. Figure 7.8 also shows that classificatory

impoliteness instances identified in the three online news response threads were much fewer than the instances of expressive impoliteness. This suggests that the respondents had a tendency to register their negative attitudes towards others' interactional practices in a retaliatory fashion rather than sanctioning moral and normative judgments about others' violations of appropriateness or their aggressive behaviors, i.e. classificatory impoliteness. Additionally, collating the results in figure 7.8 with those in 7.5 and the in-depth look at the individual impoliteness assessments identified shows that actor-oriented delegitimization seemed to be more socially reprehensible than the action-oriented types of delegitimization, and as such, was more likely to be evaluated as impolite.

7.5 Summary

The aim of this chapter was to examine how the conflict for power could be discursively produced, perceived and evaluated across thematically different contexts in three online readers' response threads. Focusing on how conflict for power was argumentatively structured and linguistically realized, the first level of positioning analysis demonstrated that the respondents employed various topoi of (de)legitimization in order to express their political views. Collective topoi in general and out-group criminalization and ethno-sectarian differentiation and exclusions in particular were by far the most commonly used topoi in the three response threads regardless of the topics discussed, which, when compared to the results in the previous chapters, suggests that it was the medium, rather than the topic, that had the greatest impact on how the (de)legitimization patterns emerged in the interactions analyzed in this genre. Distinctively, the respondents employed history-inspired racial stereotypes and ethno-sectarian biases in their (de)legitimization to highlight sociopolitical divergence. More importantly, the quantitative and qualitative analyses suggested that in the unmoderated genre of the online response threads, the respondents' expressions of opinions were not necessarily based on politically substantiated ground, but rather motivated by ethno-sectarian biases.

At the second level of positioning analysis, and due to the affordances of the response thread, it was possible for the respondents to index responsiveness explicitly using the response title or implicitly by expressing their opinion about the topics in question, and in doing so establish alignments to the intended recipients.

Interactionally, the online respondents' interactions lacked the presence of a moderator or gate-keeper, which made the response threads highly confrontational, and as such different from the data analyzed in the previous chapters. It was also found that the set of the interactional orders available in the online respondents' interactions divided the argumentation into multiple, embedded debates that were rhizomatically attached to each other with no substantive hierarchical connection.

The third level of positioning analysis showed that the respondents' sociopolitical identities were almost always the result of interweaving political stances with ethno-sectarian identities. Distinctively, however, these ethno-sectarian identities frequently functioned as supranational, rather than sub-national, identities. Like the data analyzed in the previous chapters, although with higher margins, the respondents constructed their sociopolitical identities via negative identification, which supported the argument made by many political analysts and civil activists about the crisis of democracy and the lack of public confidence in the political system in Iraq. Most importantly, the findings also indicated that most respondents in the online response threads tended to organize themselves in online communities that represented highly xenophobic and ultra extreme online versions of their offline communities. This explains why the unmoderated online response threads functioned as a platform that facilitated the expression and exchange of extreme ideological views giving rise to polemical discourses that lacked rational political deliberation.

Focusing on how the discursive conflict for power was perceived and evaluated, the last section investigated the normative and moral aspects of the respondents' use of (de)legitimization to express their political views. The multi-tiered positioning analysis was used to identify various instances of exogenous and endogenous impoliteness assessments, each of which triggered in different spatiotemporal levels of the interactions. The impoliteness assessments identified were always communal in nature. Although occasionally combined with personal impoliteness, these instances of communal impoliteness were often utilized as a social categorization strategy. Surprisingly, in the data analyzed in this chapter, impoliteness assessments were sometimes triggered by legitimization. This was because (undue) in-group legitimizations in highly ethno-sectarianly polarized contexts were often perceived by out-group commentators as provocative impingements on their ethno-sectarian communities' sociopolitical rights. Quantitative analysis of impoliteness

indicated that the respondents in the online response threads were a mainly interested in the retaliatory tit for tat rather than the explicit moral evaluations of others' behaviors. Unlike the data analyzed in the previous chapters, the quantitative analysis of impoliteness assessments did not demonstrate thematic variation across the three response threads analyzed in this chapter, because, due to the medium, they were all ethno-sectarianly sensitive.

Chapter Eight

Discussion and Conclusions

8. Introduction

The main objective of this study was to advance the understanding on the discursive conflict for power within Iraqi political Discourse. Ultimately, at a broader level, this was meant to shed light on how the ethno-sectarian and social divisions in Iraq are reflected in mainstream and new media, and how these divisions are perpetuated by means of the very same discourses instantiated in these two types of media. To that effect, the thesis attempted to answer the following primary research question:

what are the interactional, sociopolitical, affective and moral implications of the conflict for power taking place in the Iraqi political discourses instantiated in three different genres representing mainstream and social media?

This primary question was operationalized by three sets of subordinate methodological, empirical and theoretical questions.

The methodological question dealt with the potential operationalization of the empirical objectives of this thesis by exploring the possible methods to bridge the gap between the context of production and reception in the political discourses circulated in both the mainstream and the social media. Methodologically, the present thesis drew on Political Discourse Analysis to analyze how the conflict for legitimacy and power was argumentatively structured and linguistically realized in the data. To attend to the reception of text, I employed the study of rapport and that of impoliteness to account for how the conflict for domination and power was perceived and evaluated, as these frameworks attend to the contexts of reception as they were made evident in the different interactional contexts in the data. The analytical gap between macro discourse analytical approaches, e.g. the CDS-informed Political Discourse Analysis, and micro analytical approaches, e.g. discursive analyses of rapport management and (im)politeness was innovatively bridged by employing Bamberg's (1997) multi-tiered positioning analysis. This facilitated the cross fertilization between two often perceived as unrelated approaches, viz political discourse analysis and rapport and impoliteness studies. This cross fertilization made it analytically possible to trace the attitudinal and affective repercussions, and the moral implications of the different

(de)legitimization topoi used in the multi-participant, debate-like, political interactions instantiated in mainstream and social media.

From a theoretical perspective, the thesis provided fresh insights into Political Discourse Analysis in two ways. Firstly, it identified new sets of “content-related argumentation schemes” (Reisigl, 2014:77), i.e. topoi, used by the interlocutors to legitimize their political viewpoints and to delegitimize those of their opponents. These sets of topoi included in-group victimization vs. out-group criminalization, and in-group authorization (claims of majority) vs. out-group deauthorization (claims of minority). These sets of topoi are entrenched within the sentiments of victimhood and disenfranchisement that permeate all Iraqi ethno-sectarian communities, and underlie many of the political actors’ attempts to pursue increased political power. These topoi seem to be characteristic of Iraqi political Discourse, and seem to define its distinctive sociopolitical nature. This also suggests that (de)legitimization topoi are conditioned by the context of culture, in Malinowski’s (1966 [1923]) term, more than any other contextual factors. In this sense, identifying these culture specific (de)legitimization topoi expanded on the topoi identified by other researchers, predominantly in western discourses, and highlighted the cultural diversity of human discourses and the ways these discourses could be approached and analyzed from culturally sensitive, but globally minded, perspectives (Shi-xu, 2015). Secondly, (de)legitimization in this thesis was conceptualized as a micro argumentative practice that could be attitudinally and affectively confronted and morally assessed in interaction, rather than as a macro discursive goal of highly formalized political texts and speeches as often conceptualized in Political Discourse Analysis. The conceptualization was innovative in bringing (de)legitimization closer to the study of rapport and impoliteness analysis, and, in so doing, it could pinpoint the affective and attitudinal consequences and moral implications of the conflicts for power in Iraqi political discourses across mainstream and social media in which oppositional sociopolitical viewpoints were competing for legitimacy.

The thesis also made an important contribution to the study of impoliteness and that of rapport by providing an ethno-sectarian perspective, which represents a relatively fresh perspective in these emerging fields of scholarship. The thesis made an important distinction between exogenous and endogenous evaluations of impoliteness taking place at different spatiotemporal levels of the interaction. This

distinction elucidated how the evaluations of impoliteness could trigger and be triggered by (de)legitimization, thus highlighting the multifunctionality and intertextuality of impoliteness assessments in ethno-sectarian and political discourses. The other contribution to the study of impoliteness that the thesis made was to propose a necessary expansion of Spencer-Oatey's (2008: 16) association and equity rights in order to account for the evaluations of impoliteness that could be triggered by legitimizations. In typical interactional contexts, it might not be expected that legitimization could give rise to an impoliteness assessment, because legitimization does not involve explicit norm disruptive behavior or face attack. However, in ethno-sectarianly polarized contexts it was found that legitimization could indeed trigger impoliteness assessment. Although the current approaches in impoliteness studies may not adequately account for how legitimization triggers impoliteness assessment, extending Spencer-Oatey's (2008: 16) and Culpeper's (2011:39) insights on association and equity rights, which reflect the interlocutors' concerns over fairness and consideration of in-group's rights, can explain this atypical case of impoliteness. Based on the evidence from the data in this thesis, I argued that (undue) in-group legitimization was often perceived by out-group interlocutors as a provocative impingement on their ethno-sectarian communities' sociopolitical rights.

8.1 General Trends in Iraqi Political Discourse

Despite the thematically and generically prompted variations in the data, several common discursive patterns could be found in the various forms of political discourses analyzed in this thesis. From an empirical perspective, the thesis attempted to answer four empirical questions. Each of these empirical questions was related to a different level of the analysis, viz. the three levels of positioning analysis and the overarching analysis of rapport and impoliteness. The four levels of analysis accounted for different aspects of the conflict for power in three different genres representing mainstream and social media, and measured its cross-thematic and cross-generic variations, as clarified below:

1. analyzing the (de)legitimization patterns in each genre across three different thematic contexts,
2. identifying the roles and participation frameworks afforded by the media in these genres,

3. unpacking the sociopolitical identities, their functions and social implications, and finally
4. examining the functions, sources, types and directionality of impoliteness assessments across different thematic and generic contexts.

At the first level of positioning analysis, the findings showed that interlocutors employ a limited number of (de)legitimization topoi to (dis)agree with others or express sociopolitical views. These (de)legitimization topoi could be categorized in two different respects: argumentative orientation and multitude of targets. In terms of the argumentative orientation, the (de)legitimization topoi were either actor-oriented or action-oriented. The analysis indicated that actor-oriented (de)legitimization supported the long-rooted ideological biases about self and others and, therefore, tended to have a panoramic focus on the sociopolitical conflicts in Iraq. Alternatively, action-oriented (de)legitimization tended to be short-ranged in nature focusing on the specific contexts in which the political actions (de)legitimized took place. In terms of multitude of targets, the (de)legitimization topoi were either individualistic or collective in nature. The former (de)legitimize individuals, typically politicians, whereas the latter (de)legitimize groups and communities in their entirety. Individualistic (de)legitimization topoi were political in essence; they targeted specific political actors based on their political performance. They aimed to persuade most of the Iraqi people about certain political claims regardless of their ethno-sectarian affiliations. In contrast, collective (de)legitimization was always ethno-sectarian in nature; they were frequently addressed to an intended audience, i.e. the in-group members, for out-group members would not tend to accept the arguments that were based on delegitimizing their ethno-sectarian communities.

The quantitative analysis of the (de)legitimization patterns demonstrated that actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi were more commonly used than action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in all the interactions analyzed in this thesis; this was characteristically salient in the political discourses produced in online contexts. These results suggested that the argumentation structures in all the political debates analyzed in the thesis were personalized and infrequently agenda-oriented, as the interlocutors tended to (de)legitimize the political actors and their images rather than their actions and agendas regardless of the topic being debated and the medium affordances.

The quantitative analysis showed that the argumentation structures, and, as such, the interlocutors' self identification practices, in the Iraqi political Discourse tended to be based on delegitimization rather than legitimization regardless of the topics debated or their generic contexts. This seemed to be prompted by two different reasons. On the one hand, and from a rhetorical perspective, employing delegitimization in argumentation was less committal and more equivocal. Delegitimization made it easy for the interlocutor to avoid discussing their own political ideological convictions and political thoughts, which might require them to commit to certain premises or courses of actions, and offered them the chance to indulge in apparently effortless attacks of opponents' political convictions. On the other hand, and from a political perspective, the interlocutors seemed not to trust the key political actors and the political institutions to which they belonged. This substantiated the argument made by many political analysts (e.g. Radwan, 2012) and civil activists (e.g. Dawood, 2014), about the crisis of democracy and the lack of public confidence in the political system in Iraq.

In terms of the sociopolitical identities constructed in the interactions taking place in the different genres across mainstream and social media, the ethno-sectarian identities were always at play due to cultural and political reasons. However, these ethno-sectarian identities seemed to be unstable, versatile and multifunctional. They could be played out as sub-national or supranational identities based on the contexts or even the interlocutors' interactional needs. In terms of the functions, the ethno-sectarian identities were employed as a means to reinforce inter-communal solidarity and to counterbalance the negative stereotypes associated with these enregistered ethno-sectarian identities, or to voice dissent and express ethno-sectarian antagonism.

The analysis demonstrated how the evaluative and argumentative aspects of language are inseparably interrelated in the Iraqi political discourses produced in both mainstream and social media. This was evident in the relationship between instances of (de)legitimization that could trigger and be triggered by evaluations of impoliteness. In some cases, the evaluations of impoliteness were argumentatively employed to delegitimize political actions. This took place when the interlocutors invoked the moral order to evaluate certain political actions as immoral, unfair or unacceptable. The term exogenous impoliteness was used to refer to these evaluations of impoliteness because the political actions evaluated as negative, unfair or immoral

took place outside the interactions in which they were evaluated. Exogenous impoliteness could be captured at the first level of positioning analysis, because its analytical focus was the actions that took place in the there-and-then moment of the reported events, but they were recontextualized in the here-and-now moments of these interactions. Alternatively, (de)legitimization was found to trigger various impoliteness assessments, some of which were prompted by violations of behavioral expectations, while others were due to attacking various aspects of self. These types of impoliteness were called endogenous impoliteness because the practices evaluated as impolite occurred inside the interactions in which they were evaluated. Endogenous impoliteness could be captured by the second and third levels of positioning analysis, which focused on the interlocutors' interactional roles and their sociopolitical identities respectively. Broadly speaking, and unlike Culpeper's finding about the main triggers of impoliteness and interactional aggression in interpersonal settings (2011:47), the aspects of face associated with collective identity (rather than those associated with the personal or interactional identities), were found to be the most important aspects of face relating to impoliteness in contexts that are politicized along ethno-sectarian lines.

8.2 Cross Thematic Comparison of Iraqi Political Discourse

The data analyzed in each of the analytical chapters included different political interactions in which three different political themes were discussed. The three themes included: the 2012 political deadlock in the country, the sectarian-based power-sharing process in post US-led invasion Iraq, and finally the results of the 2014 parliamentary election, and thus provided a cross thematic perspective on the conflict for power in Iraqi political Discourse. The results exhibited thematically prompted variations in the political TV interviews and the Facebook comment threads. In cross-sectarian political interactions, i.e. the first theme, the actor-oriented topos of negative representation of other was the most commonly used. The collective topoi, especially criminalization and victimization, were the most frequent when the topics discussed were ethno-sectarianly sensitive, i.e. the second theme, which made interactions about this topic more clearly polarized and inter-communally confrontational. The use of authorization and deauthorization were prominently salient when discussing the topic of the 2014 election.

The cross thematic variations in the (de)legitimization patterns affected how offensively aggressive the political discussions were. As might be expected, the interactions that focused on ethno-sectarian topics tended to be more emotionally sensitive and so interactionally aggressive than any other political topics, because these ethno-sectarian interactions could eventually generate highly exclusionary remarks. However, the interactions that focused on the election-related topics tended to be less emotionally sensitive and aggressive than the interactions that discussed other topics, because the interlocutors in these interactions used relatively fewer delegitimization topics.

8.3 Cross Generic Comparison of Iraqi Political Discourse

The analysis could also provide a broad contrastive perspective as to how the conflict for power instantiated in the Iraqi political discourses could be produced and perceived across different genres across mainstream and social media. The findings in the three analytical Chapters (Chapters Five, Six and Seven) suggested that there were differences in the (de)legitimization patterns, argumentation structures, dynamics of interaction, identity construction, rapport perception and impoliteness assessments between the television interviews, Facebook interactions and online readers' response threads. These differences prompted by the genre gave rise to different interactional, sociopolitical and moral implications in the interactions under investigation.

The results demonstrated that the interlocutors' discursive practices in the TV interviews focused on (de)legitimizing specific political actions and actors in manners that were relatively less aggressive. As TV interviews represented a more institutionalized type of media than the other genres analyzed in the thesis, there were established cultural and institutional conventions that prevented explicitly aggressive and offensive behaviors. In this respect, the interviewers, who had powerful interactional roles, often ensured that these cultural and institutional conventions were respected. Therefore, the interviewees were found to employ action-oriented (de)legitimization more frequently than in social media. This made the interactions in this genre more focused on debating specific political issues or actions, which were predominantly raised by the interviewers themselves, rather than on indulging in the long-standing and diachronic aspect of the political conflicts in the country, which could give rise to exclusionary and offensively aggressive remarks. The other

important finding that supported this argument was that the interviewees were found to use (de)legitimizing topoi that did not involve explicit exclusionary remarks; no instances of criminalization and sectarian exclusion from the national space were found even in the ethno-sectarianly polarized debate, i.e. the second TV interview. Characteristically, explicit indexing of self ethno-political affiliations was perceived as morally acceptable, because it functioned as a means to reinforce inter-communal solidarity or to counterbalance the negative stereotypes associated with these enregistered sectarian identities. However, the interviewees frequently employed in-group victimization as an indirect strategy to make implicit negative remarks about the other ethno-sectarian communities, or in extreme cases, employed negative characterization of particular political actors who were perceived as representing the rival communities to delegitimize these communities.

In the TV interviews analyzed in this thesis, the medium affordances and the interactional roles available greatly influenced the dynamic of the argumentation process and affective and moral aspects of the interactions. Firstly, the interviewers tended to reorient the interaction towards the reestablished goals of the interviews every time they felt these goals were not being served. Therefore, they interrupted the interviewees or rephrased the questions they believed were not being fully answered by the interviewees. Secondly, the interviewers made use of the power associated with their interactional roles to moderate the interviews in order to contain any confrontation between the interviewees. Even in extreme cases, when interviewees took offence at each other's practices, they tended to invoke the normative frame of reference in order to sanction a moral stance (Haugh, 2015: 280), rather than descending to a tit-for-tat exchange of offenses as was found in the online response threads, and to a lesser extent in the Facebook comment threads. This was demonstrated by the percentages of classificatory impoliteness compared to expressive impoliteness in the TV interviews.

Broadly speaking, in the TV interviews analyzed in this thesis, the interlocutors persistently served their predefined goals in line with their affiliation to their respective political institutions. They tended to legitimize the political views institutionally endorsed by their political parties and to delegitimize the ones institutionally endorsed by the opposing parties. This was evident in the interlocutors' frequent attempts to index their institutional identities when performing

(de)legitimization. Even in ethno-sectarianly polarized interactions, e.g. the second TV interview, in which they might be expected to advance the goals of the ethno-sectarian community they belonged to, the interlocutors tended to employ ethno-sectarian ideologies to advance the goals of their political institutions not vice versa. This suggested that these behaviors were motivated by instrumental (or goal-oriented) rationality (Mueller, 1989), which made these TV interviews not only exclusive but also quite manipulative, and as such more detrimental to the public sphere (cf. Habermas, 1989).

In the analysis of online discourses, the affordances of genres in which the political discourses were produced led to varying outcomes. In the interactions that took place in the online news readers' responses, the respondents' discursive practices seemed to be motivated by expressive rationality (Svensson, 2008). This was because the respondents tended to use actor-oriented (de)legitimization very frequently to support their ideological biases about self and others, expressing their sociopolitical views in an aggressive and offensive fashion. In the readers' response threads, the (de)legitimization patterns exhibited an abundance of explicit negative ethno-sectarian stereotypes communicated by means of collective topoi, such as criminalization and sectarian exclusion. Furthermore, recontextualizing historical events and the use of history-inspired stereotypes to express sectarianly exclusionary political views were very salient in this genre.

The medium affordances and the lack of a moderator role in the online news comment threads greatly influenced the interlocutor's self-positioning, the dynamic of the argumentation and the affective and attitudinal aspects of the interactions. In terms of sociopolitical identities and the ways they were played out in this genre, the respondents' ethno-sectarianly politicized identities were indexed specifically to voice political dissent and express ethno-sectarian antagonism. In this genre, although the argumentation was rhizomatically structured, the respondents tended to foreground their ethno-sectarian identities to organize themselves in online communities that represented highly xenophobic and ultra extreme versions of their offline communities. Anonymity and pseudonymity afforded by the medium made the respondents feel they were less socially or morally accountable for their discursive practices in the interaction, which resulted in a notably high number of instances of retaliatory (i.e. expressive) impoliteness in this genre. In this highly polarized context,

impoliteness was sometimes motivated by legitimization. This was because (undue) in-group legitimizations in highly ethno-sectarianly polarized contexts were often perceived by out-group commentators as provocative impingements on their ethno-sectarian communities' sociopolitical rights. Polarization, use of exclusionary topoi and construction of ethno-sectarian identities to highlight dissent indicated how this unmoderated genre could function as a platform that facilitates the reproduction of extreme ideologies giving rise to polemical discourses that perpetuated the offline ethno-sectarian conflicts.

In the Facebook comment threads, although the interactions reflected some ethno-sectarian biases, especially when debating an ethno-sectarianly sensitive topic, the (de)legitimization patterns were, to a large extent, based on the commenters' political preferences and interactional needs. This was reflected by the relatively infrequent exclusionary remarks made by the commenters. The analysis shows that commenters used (de)legitimization to voice their (dis)agreement with the political views presented in interaction. In this respect, the (de)legitimization patterns exhibited thematic variation, which indicated that the commenters were more focused on the topic in question.

The medium affordances and the interactional roles available on the Facebook page influenced the dynamic of the argumentation process and evaluative aspects of the interactions. The post authors made use of the power associated with their interactional roles to moderate the interactions that were generated by their posts on their Facebook pages in order to prevent the interactions from developing into aggressive confrontations. They could explicitly invoke a normative frame of reference to remind the commenters about their rules for acceptable political debates in their Facebook pages, or suppress ethno-sectarianly exclusionary and offensively aggressive behaviors. In this genre, the medium affordances divided the argumentation into a series of decentralized debates that were rhizomatically connected to each other. Each of these decentralized debates discussed different aspects of the political topics originally raised by the post authors. The commenters tended to engage in these decentralized debates according to their interactional interests. This allowed the commenters to organize themselves in online imagined communities in these decentralized debates. These online constructed communities ranged from completely imagined communities, which were divided over specific

political issues, to recreated versions of offline communities with all their ethno-sectarian biases.

These minimally regulated Facebook interactions gave rise to an online public sphere that was more inclusive than the one offered in mainstream media and less pathologically polemical than the one offered in the online news readers' responses, which suggested that the commenters' practices in the genre of Facebook comment threads were, to a moderate extent, motivated by communicative rationality (Habermas, 1989). However, a caveat must be stated here. Just because the Facebook affordances can facilitate rational dialogue among a wide range of interlocutors, this does not entail that all political debates on Facebook pages will be rationally deliberative, producing well argued counter-discourses that can inform the general public and simultaneously offset hegemonic discourses (Dahlberg, 2007: 837). This is because rational discussions are the outcome of effective moderation and minimal gate-keeping (Mahlouly, 2014: 79), which may not be available all the time.

In terms of the viability of political deliberation that can sustain truly democratic political participation, the results, then, question both the techno-enthusiasts' argument about the democratization in the online public sphere and highlight its contingency, and the net-sceptics' pessimism about online public engagement (Virkar, 2014:41). The general conclusion in this regard is that it seems necessary to consider the affordances of the medium as well as the recognized roles and functions in the genre under scrutiny, when examining how political discourses are produced and perceived, because meaning, especially in computer mediated communications, is locally situated and generically conditioned.

8.4 Limitations and challenges

Like all academic research, there are some limitations to this thesis. The nature of the research and its design made it difficult to analyze sizeable datasets that allowed the use of corpus linguistic or social network analytic techniques to produce large scale quantitative results. The thesis had a predominantly micro analytical perspective that drew on qualitative analysis. This was because the thesis aimed to identify the (de)legitimizing topoi and explains their potential functions as means to examine the argumentative structures and linguistic realizations (i.e. production) of the conflicts for power in the Iraqi political Discourse. The thesis also concentrated on pinpointing

the interactional consequences, attitudinal and affective reactions and normative/moral evaluations of using (de)legitimization topoi as a means for unpacking how the discursive conflict for power was perceived and evaluated. On the other hand, the quantitative analysis used in this thesis only aimed to provide a glimpse to cross-generic and cross-thematic perspectives by focusing on the various argumentative and interactional patterns that emerged in different generic and thematic contexts. Since the data encompassed a small number of topics within a limited time frame, it is then necessary to highlight that the findings of the cross-generic analysis might be transferable to similar contexts but not necessarily generalizable (Teddlie & Yu, 2007: 78, 98 fn2).

There were two major challenges in this thesis; on the one hand, it was not possible to make use of inter-rater reliability checks due to the nature of any PhD thesis like this. In this respect, several methodological decisions were made to minimize the inevitable subjectivity involved in the qualitative, micro-analytic types of analysis (see 4.1.1). On the other hand, and due to speed at which the forms of online discourse change, my online datasets inevitably represented a snapshot of particular kinds of interaction that seemed very analytically important and relevant in the current Iraqi social and political contexts. Nonetheless, these datasets have a longitudinal importance as much as they reflect cultural and sociopolitical patterns in Iraqi society that seem to have become increasingly established, especially in the post-US led invasion era.

8.5 Potential for further research

There is much potential for further research that can emerge from this thesis. As the thesis provides a cross-section view of the conflict for power in the Iraqi political discourses produced in the mainstream and social media, one possibility might be conducting a diachronic study that traces the changes in the Iraqi political Discourse over a long period of time. There is also a potential to conduct a comparative study that analyzes the political conflict for power in two different cultures in terms of production or reception or both to identify cross-cultural variations in terms of the argumentative structures, cultural and political underpinnings that shape the discourse in these cultures. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary approach developed in the present thesis sets the stage for further research into rapport management in political

discourse, which can allow for a better understanding of self-positioning in a variety of media discourses that have extensive affective possibilities.

Appendix 1 (Consent Templates)

A. English Version

Dear Respondents,

I am writing a thesis on how power and rapport are employed and represented in modern Iraqi political discourse, and I would like to gather some more examples of the posts and comments on current political issues in Iraq posted on your Facebook accounts.

Any data will be anonymized, so that your name and references to places that might be used to identify you will be removed.

The anonymized examples will only be used in this thesis, and the data will be kept only for the length of this project and then destroyed. If you decide that you no longer want to be part of the project, then please let me know.

If you would like a copy of the final paper, please let me know and I'd be happy to send one on to you.

If you are happy to participate in the project, please sign the attached consent form and send it back to me at the School of English, University of Leicester.

Below is the contact detail of my supervisor at the school of English, Dr Ruth Page . Should you need more information on this consent form, please contact her or me.

Dr Ruth Page

Room 1509, Attenborough Tower
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University of Leicester
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Thanks very much in advance for your help,

Thulfiqar Al-Tahmazi
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Consent form

I agree that Mr. Thulfiqar Hussein Al-Tahmazi can select and analyse posts and comments that have been posted on my Facebook account. I understand that any information I submit will be anonymized and will be stored separately from this document as part of the research project carried out by him.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my contribution from the project at any stage, I can do so.

I am over 18 years of age.

Name:

Date:

B. Arabic Version

سيدي الكريم/ سيدتي الكريمة

اني باحث في مجال اللسانيات وتحليل الخطاب، أعكف حاليا على كتابة اطروحتي للدكتوراه في جامعة لستر في المملكة المتحدة والتي تتناول "التنازع على السلطة في الخطاب السياسي العراقي في الاعلام التقليدي والجديد: استراتيجيات الحجاج والشرعة، تشكل الهويات السوسيوسياسية، وتلقي الاخر"، ولدي الرغبة بجمع امثلة عن بعض المنشورات والتعليقات التي تخص الشأن السياسي العراقي والتي نُشرت في حسابكم على الفيس بوك لاستعمالها كبيانات لاجراء التحليل.

اود التأكيد ان البيانات التي ستؤخذ من حسابكم على الفيس بوك سيتم استعمالها من دون الاشارة الى الاسم وسيتم مسح هذه البيانات بعد الانتهاء من هذه الدراسة. في حال قررتم الانسحاب من البحث في اي مرحلة منه، إذ بإمكانكم ابلاغي بذلك وسيُلبى طلبكم.

في حال رغبتكم بالحصول على النسخة النهائية من الدراسة، يرجى ابلاغي بذلك وسأرسلها لكم بامتنان.

في حال موافقتكم على المشاركة في هذه الدراسة يرجى التوقيع على طلب الموافقة المرفق.

للحصول على معلومات تفصيلية عن الدراسة يمكنكم الاتصال بمشرفتي العلمية السيدة د. روث بيج من قسم اللغة الانكليزية.

د. روث بيج

مكتب رقم 1509 بناية ألتبرا

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شكرا جزيلاً لمساعدتكم ومساهمتم في هذه الدراسة

ذوالفقار حسين الطهم ازي

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استمارة الموافقة

أوافق على أن يقوم السيد ذوالفقار حسين الطهمازي باختيار نماذج من المنشورات والتعليقات التي عملتها في حسابي على الفيس بوك. علما اني بُلغْتُ أن هذه النماذج سيتم التعامل بها سرّياً ومن دون ذكر الاسم وبانها ستُستعمل جزءاً من بيانات الدراسة التي يقوم بها.

بُلغْتُ أيضاً أن لي الحق بسحب النماذج التي أُخذت من حسابي على الفيس بوك من الدراسة في أية مرحلة منها عند رغبتني بذلك.

علما بان عمري هو اكثر من 18 سنة.

الاسم:

التاريخ:

التوقيع:

Appendix 2 (Consent Forms)

استمارة الموافقة

اوافق على ان يقوم السيد ذوالفقار حسين الطهمازي باختيار نماذج من المنشورات والتعليقات التي عملتها في حسابي على الفيس بوك. علما اني بُلغْتُ أن هذه النماذج سيتم التعامل بها سرّياً ومن دون ذكر الاسم وبانها سَتُستعمل جزءاً من بيانات الدراسة التي يقوم بها.

بُلغْتُ ايضاً أن لي الحق بسحب النماذج التي أخذتُ من حسابي على الفيس بوك من الدراسة في اية مرحلة منها عند رغبتي بذلك.

علما بان عمري هو اكثر من 18 سنة.

الاسم: سدرن محسن محمد

التاريخ: ١٦ - ٣ - ٢٠١٤


التوقيع: سدرن محسن محمد

استمارة الموافقة

وافق على ان يقوم السيد ذوالفقار حسين الطهمازي باختيار نماذج من المنشورات والتعليقات التي عملتها في حسابي على الفيس بوك. علما اني بُلغْتُ أن هذه النماذج سيتم التعامل بها سرّياً ومن دون ذكر الاسم وبانها ستُستعمل جزءاً من بيانات الدراسة التي يقوم بها.

بُلغْتُ ايضا أن لي الحق بسحب النماذج التي أخذت من حسابي على الفيس بوك من الدراسة في اية مرحلة منها عند رغبتي بذلك.

علما بان عمري هو اكثر من 18 سنة.

الاسم: ابراهيم الصبيحي
التاريخ: ٢٠١٤ ١٥ ١٤
التوقيع: 

استمارة الموافقة

وافق على أن يقوم السيد ذوالفقار حسين الطهمازي باختيار نماذج من المنشورات والتعليقات التي عملتها في حسابي على الفيس بوك. علماً اني بُلغْتُ أن هذه النماذج سيتم التعامل بها سرّياً ومن دون ذكر الاسم وبأنها ستُستعمل جزءاً من بيانات الدراسة التي يقوم بها.

بُلغْتُ أيضاً أن لي الحق بسحب النماذج التي أخذتُ من حسابي على الفيس بوك من الدراسة في أية مرحلة منها عند رغبتي بذلك.

علماً بأن عمري هو أكثر من 18 سنة.

الاسم: محمد غازي الأخرس

التاريخ: ٢٠١٤ / ١ / ١١

التوقيع: 

Appendix 3 (Transcripts of the Data)

A. First TV Interview

Link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ngTZRf6V1xY>

No.	Interlocutors	Turns
1	Interviewer	المقدم: بعد هذا التقرير نرحب ببيك دكتور طايفر، السيد عزت الشهبندر يمكن جابينه يمكن خلال دقيقتين ينظم النه. بس خليني اسال السؤال الرئيسي الي بمحور حلقتنه اليوم، يمكن تتفق وبياي وتتفق وبه الكثيرين الي يشوفون انو هاي الاربع سنوات عنوانه الكبير هي خصومة بين رئيس الوزراء المالكي و اه يعني وخصومه الي معترضين على ادارته. اليوم كل المبادرات جاي تتجه نحو ازالة المالكي او تغيير الحكومة. السؤال هنا، هذه الرغبة بالخلاص من اس المشكلة الي البعض يعتبره هو رئيس الوزراء، ام هي رغبة بازاحة اهه سياسي عنده شعبية اثبتت الانتخابات الاخيرة انو مازال عنده شعبية واخذ المركز الاول؟ وتخشي هذه المكونات او هذه الكتل من بقائه واحتفاضه بهذه الشعبية وبقائه بموقعه واحتفاضه بالسلطة لدورة ثانية؟
2	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم. هو انا لا اريد ان انكر ان لرئيس الوزراء شعبية. يعني هل له شعبية ام لا. هو لديه شعبية سواء ماكان اثبتته الانتخابات البرلمانية السابقة عندما حصل على اعلى الاصوات في بغداد او فيما يتعلق في انتخابات مجالس المحافظات التي جرت قبل ايام. انا لا اريد ان اقل من قيمة ما حصلت عليه دولة القانون في انتخابات مجالس المحافظات. ولكن ايضا لا اريد ان اغض عيني عن انها تراجعت الى حد ليس قليل. اهههه في معظم المحافظات. بل وحتى في المحافظات التي كانت تعتبر قلاعا بالنسبة لها او ملاذا لجمهورها قد تآثرت الى حد كبير لصالح شركاء ومناقسي المالكي الاخرين، كتلة المواطن و
3	Interviewee	بالنتيجة تتفق مع الرأي الي يكول انو المالكي عنده شعبية.
4	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	لا لاشك لا شك
5	Interviewee	طيب، الرغبة بازاحة يعني كل المبادرات، الدكتور اياد علاوي استقالة المالكي، السيد النجيفي تستقيل الحكومة وتصير غير حكومة. كلها تتجه باتجاه انو المالكي لازم يطلع من الحكم.... هذا الاتجاه بسبب المشاكل لانو المالكي سبب المشاكل لو لانو تخافون من هاي الشعبية الموجودة.
6	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	لا لانو. الحقيقة ليس لدينا قلق من شعبية المالكي، لانه في في يعني معظم الساحات نحن لسنا متزاحمين مع دولة القانون. اههه المحافظات التي فيها التي فيها العراقية، والان متحدون في انتخابات مجالس المحافظات، ظهر بانها تكاد تكون الاولى على معظم المحافظات الي او كل المحافظات التي التي اشتركت فيها. وبالتالي ليس هناك مزاحمة بيننا. وحتى في بغداد قائمة متحدون هي القائمة الثانية بعد دولة القانون بغض النظر طبعا في الحجوم، هناك فرق بالحجوم بالااصوات بيننا وبين دولة القانون. السؤال كالاتي: كيف ينظر المالكي
7	Interviewee	يسعل
8	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	سلامات
9	Interviewee	الله يسلمك
10	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	كيف ينظر المالكي لزملائه السياسيين الاخرين؟ هل ينظر لهم شركاء ام اعداء وخصوم؟ انه استمعت لخطابه اليوم وووو في خطاب اليوم....(يدخل الضيف الثاني الى الاستوديو) اهلا استاذ عزت.
11	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	غير مسموع
12	Interviewer	لا بادين والله

	1(Al-Ani)	
13	Interviewer	لابدينه والله، بالجو هسه احنه
14	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	يعني حتى
15	Interviewer	هلو استاذ عزت، تفضل استريح
16	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	حتى من نكول دولة القانون يسوون اضاعه للوقت
17	Interviewer	يسوفون، متعلمين على التسوييف
18	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	: ها حتى الجمهور يعذرنه
19	All	الكل يضحك
20	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	حياك الله
21	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	: الله يحييك، الله ابو الخير
22	Interviewer	الله ابو الخير، اهلا وسهلا استاذ عزت
23	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	واليوم في خطاب السيد رئيس الوزراء، كيف ينظر السيد رئيس الوزراء الى زملائه الاخرين؟ التوصيف الي استخدمه انهم اعداء وانهم خصوم، وبالتالي....
24	Interviewer	باعتمادك جان يقصد منو بالاعداء؟
25	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	هو كان يتحدث بشكل رئيسي عن السيد رئيس مجلس النواب. هو كان يلمح، هو لم يقل ذلك، كان يلمح، ها لم يقل بالاسم. وعموما اذا كانت، اذا كان التوصيف بهذا الشكل، بانهم اعداء وليسوا شركاء، فالازاحة في السؤال الي تفضلت عنه حضرتك هو يكون مقبول. الازاحة تكون مقبولة، لانها ازاحة عدو. اما نحن فنظر اننا شركاء، قد نكون منافسين لاشك، بالتوصيف الادق اننا متنافسون ولكن لسنا لسننا خصوما او اعداء. الافكار التي طرحت في مايتعلق في حكومة مؤقتة مابعد حل البرلمان، يعني استقالة الحكومة ثم حكومة مؤقتة ثم حل البرلمان، هي تأتي ايضا في مبادرة كانت للسيد رئيس الوزراء لطالما طرحها خلال الفترة الماضية في مايتعلق بالانتخابات المبكرة.
26	Interviewer	حجينا بيها يمكن البارحة، وكان موضوعنا هذا وكانت التراتبية تختلف.
27	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	طيب، هو هو السؤال، هو هو هذا التوصيف، اذا كنا اعداء ستكون الازاحة مقبولة.... اذا كنا شركاء فينبغي ان تكون المصلحة العامة هي التي تحكم ومقترحاتنا افكارنا الي نتقدم بيها.
28	Interviewer	طيب، استاذ عزت السؤال الي طرحته على الدكتور ظافر قبل وصولك، هو انوو الدعوات يعني من ثلث سنوات كلها تصب باتجاه انو المالكي يجب ان يترك منصبه. يعني خاصة من اهههه اليوم تجسدت والبارحة، الدكتور اياد علاوي يكول احنة امام حرب اهلية اذا ما المالكي والحكومة تستقيل، مبادرة السيد النجيفي هي حل الحكومة وتشكيل حكومة مصغرة وبعدين حل البرلمان. السؤال هو هاي الرغبة في ان المالكي يترك منصبه خوف من منافس ام الرغبة في التخلص من اه ههه اس المشكلة؟
29	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	شكرا لك وسعيد اني بصديقنا واخونا ظافر العيساوي.
30	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	شو العيساوي
31	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	ظافر العاني العزيز. اني خبطت اثنين ظافر العيساوي زين
32	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	انه ان ايضا سعيد لان كنت للتو مع اخي الدكتور رافع العيساوي

33	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	عظيم، يعني، تحياتي. اههه يعني المالكي مزعج. بصراحة اكلك. مزعج لايقبل ال اهههه
34	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	التقسيم
35	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	التقسيم العراق. لايقبل انهو يصير تجاوز على الدستور. ولايقبل من الشركاء ان يكونوا شركاء بالاسم بس همه اعداء ومتامرين في الواقع. يعني دائما همه شركاء اههه بس ببش شركاء، شركاء بالمكاسب وشركاء بالامتيازات. بس بالواجبات يتامرون عليه. فهذا الموقف الموقف موقف المالكي. اكو تراكم تراكم صار حول هؤلاء الشركاء في نظره الى موقع اهههه، كدر ينطي توصيفه الدقيق اخوية ظافر، موقع الاعداء. مو من مصلحة رئيس وزراء يريد ان يمشنى بحكومة سليمة ويستمر حتى اذا كان طامح بالتمديد والاستمرار وهو يعادي شركائه. بالعكس المنطق حتى من باب المصلحة، وليس وليس من باب السوية. خل نكول هو رجل يطمح لان يستمر في هذا الموقع، المفروض يرضي هؤلاء الشركاء ولكن اذا هؤلاء الشركاء بايد شركاء وبايد اعداء. هذا الموضوع هو الي ماخله الاجواء ماتستمر بصورة صحيحة. يعني هم معه في الحكومة في بغداد ويتامرون في اربيل لسحب الثقة عنه مثلا. يعني هذا كيف يقبل؟ لايقبل.
36	Interviewer	هذا السبب الوحيد الي يخلي السيد المالكي يتكلم عن حكومة اغلبية؟
37	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	شوف هي حكومة مجلس الحكم، حكومة الشراكة و حكومة الوحدة الوطنية كلها، هسه اذا قبلناها على مضض فهي حكومات مرحلية. اضافة الى انها اثبتت، اذا منكول فشلها، ماثبتت نجاحها. هسه اذا اثبتت نجاحها فخلص وكتها اكسباير. النظام السياسي بطبيعته اذا يتطور، فالمرحلة الاخيرة للتطور هو هذا ان تصير حكومات اغلبية. مو مو معيب. وعدنا اصرار ان لاتكون اغلبية طائفية، اغلبية سياسية. يعني المكاسب عظيمة في هذا الموضوع، يعني مثلا، انه في التحالف الشيعي اتحالف مع اطراف في العراقية، التحالف السني. واكو اخوان اخرى اخرين بالتحالف....
38	Interviewer	شتسميها هاي؟ هم رجعت طائفية.!
39	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا لا لا. يعني انه اشكل انه الشيعي الي منضوي تحت اطار شيعي، اتحالف مع اطراف من القائمة العراقية الي هي تحت عنوان ضمن اطار سني. اشكل الاغلبية، واطمح لان اتحالف مع اطراف كردية. حتى تاخذ هذه الاغلبية صبيغه افضل. بهذا احنه عشرين عصفور ضربنه بحجر واحد: اولا يصير تداول للسلطة جميل، هناك معارضة وهناك حكم ناس تحكم. اثنين، اخلصنا من هاي المحاصصة الطائفية، انتهت الى الابد. يعني انه واخي ظافر معارضة او حكام.
40	Interviewer	اذا دكتور ظافر يبدو من الحديث انو الصراع بين ارادتين. ارادة تريد تشكل حكومة اغلبية واضحة رواها. الانتخابات باقيلها سنة ممكن اتحالف مع جزء من السنة وجزء من الاكراد واشكل حكومة اغلبية. بس الخطاب الجاي تطرحوا هسه، الرؤية مالتكم الثانية هي مجرد انو المالكي يطلع. مشروعه القادم شنو؟ هسه ماسمعه غير بس المالكي يطلع وانتخابات مبكرة.
41	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	يعني اني اههه بس شوية اعلق على اخي الاستاذ عزت؟
42	Interviewer	اي بس لاتنسى السؤال.
43	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	لا ابد. لو حكومة اغلبية سياسية تعتمد على ان تكون عابرة للثنيات والطائفية، تمام استاذ عزت؟
44	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	اكيد
45	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	جيد، هذا الي كان في اربيل ها هي رغبة بتشكيل حكومة اغلبية سياسية الي انتة سميتها مؤامرة.
46	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	روعة، روعة، طيب. تدري ليش سميتها مؤامرة، بس هذا السؤال
47	Interviewer	لا جان يقصد الاثنين مؤامرة
48	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	اثنتين وثلاثة وعشرة وكلهن
49	Interviewer	كلهن مؤامرات

50	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لأنها تقوم على ازاحة الطرف الاخر، يعني يشترط
51	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	ليش مو التيار الصدري موجود والديمقراطي الكردستاني موجود
52	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا لا من هو الطرف الاخر؟ الطرف الاخر المالكي. هو انتو ماا انتو زاعجكم المالكي
53	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	لا لا بس اسمحلي
54	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	انه هذا المشروع الي تركب باربيل، اللي تعتبره انت نظام اغلبية سياسية يشترط في نجاحه ان يزاح هذا العقبة. ليش؟
55	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	جيد، اذا انت شتعتبر بالمقابل؟ انت تعتبر انو بدون المالكي لايمكن ان يقوم العراق، او لا يمكن ان تكون هناك عملية سياسية.
56	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا مو هيچ
57	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	انه ازاحة المالكي هي نفسها مؤامرة على الرغم من ان الاخوان ذهبوا في طريق دستوري يتعلق باجراءات سحب الثقة واجراءات دستورية وطبيعية وكانت هناك مفاوضات فيها من الاخوة اخوتي الشيعة ومن الكرد ومن المحافظات من العراق.
58	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	طيب، مانجوا
59	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	جيد لكنها ليست مؤامرة
60	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	خو ماذيناهم بالحبس من مانجوا ااه مانجوا
61	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	جيد جيد لكن التوصيف ليس دقيقاً. بدليل انك تريد ان تسلكون في المرة القادمة وانا اشجع ذلك. وانا اصطف معاك تماماً على ان لا تكون الحكومات القادمة او التحالفات هي تحالفات فئوية ذات طابع فئوي. يعني مو تحالف شيعي كردي يستبعد منه التركمان و العرب السنة. جيد. ثانياً: عندما كان الآخرون، يعتبرون الآخرين متامرين على السيد رئيس الوزراء، لماذا هذه القدرة على انو مصالحة وارضاء التحالف الكردستاني وابقاء العراقية في ها العداء مع المالكي؟ لماذا؟ هذا سؤال. بين مطالب مشروعة، انت سميتها مشروعة اكثر من مرة، وبين مطالب انت كان لديك اعتراض عليها؟
62	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	ولازلت، ولازلت، نيج مشروعة وهاي عندي عليها اعتراضات.
63	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	جيد، طيب لكن الي صار شنو؟ جيد لكن الي صار شنو، انو الي اكو اعتراضات عليها من جنابك هاهنا تم تلبيتها.
64	Interviewer	مشت
65	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	مشت
66	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	كلي، انطيني واحد؟
67	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	اي، هسه خلص مشت
68	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	هاا غير مسموع
69	Interviewer	بعد شوية هذا موضوعه الثاني هذا اليوم

70	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	اما المطالب الي تسميها مشروعة ماتزال على الرف مركونة. انه اعتقد انو لدينا عقدة. بشفافية، اعتقد ان لدينا عقدة وجزء غير قليل من العقدة اعترف به انهو هي عقدة ذات طابع شخصي عقدة ذات طابع شخصي. ولربما ان هناك قدرربما، اكو وقت لو تريد تروح فاصل؟
71	Interviewer	لالالا تفضل.
72	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	ان هناك تضليل في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف
73	Interviewer	ماكاعدين سوة، ماكاعدين سوة بنية صافية
74	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	ايضا اتقاطع الحوار. وشعورنا انه مع عدالة مطالبنا واعتراف الطرف المقابل بها، الا انه مستعد ان يقدم اي تنازل لاي طرف اخر لكنه غير مستعد للتجاوب معانه.
75	Interviewer	زين زين، استاذ عزت شلون يكدر السيد المالكي يشكل حكومة الاغلبية هذه؟ واليوم يحجي بحكومة الاغلبية وفشل البرلمان. وهو بالتاكيد بنيتة على الانتخابات القادمة على البرلمان القادم يجب ان تكون هناك حكومة اغلبية. شلون راح يكدر يشكل، وواضح جدا هو، يعني ما اعرف مالكر اتحدث عنه واكول انو يريد يرأس هذه الحكومة، بس واضح جدا يبدو انو ائتلاف دولة القانون مامستعد ان يقدم بديل اخر. اهو شلون راح يكدر في ظل كل هذه الاعتراضات من مكونات مهمة وككل مهة ان ينجح بتشكيل كل هذه الاغلبية؟
76	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	وليفشل، الاصل انو هذا هذه القاعدة تمشي. اذا هم كدروا يحققون الاغلبية ناخذلهم تحية. اذا هو عجز نكوله هارد لك موو؟
77	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	اي
78	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	نكوله هارد لك، شنو هالمصيبة. خو مويقي الى الابد رئيس وزراء، يروح للمعارضة
79	Interviewer	بس يكولك، بس يكولك احتمال ميعجز، لان جاي يقدم تنازلات يكلك انت معترض عليها في سبيل ان يحقق، يمهده لهذه الاغلبية.
80	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا لا، طبعا اذا فرضيته صحيحة اني اقف وياه ضد المالكي.
81	Interviewer	لعد شنو الي صار؟
82	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	الذي حصل شئ واحد. ولم يحصل سواء، الاتفاق على ان الحوار هو القاعدة الصحيحة لحل المشاكل، خلص. تشكلت لجنة رابعة اثنين باثنين، ونوضعت سبع ثمن نقاط الي هي المازق، سبب الازمة، راح اههههه يحجون بيها. الى الان ماوصلو الى حل نقطة واحدة. هذا هو. لكن الرائع بالخطوة، هو يتذكر اخي ظافر، شكك كان الاخوة الكرد عنيدين بان لا حوار ومكان الاتفاقات والمؤامرات على اذاحة المالكي هو اربيل، الان هي اربيل تجي واسميتها بروح وطنية ورياضية هي رائعة، هي اربيل تجي الى بغداد، تعالوا نتفاهم جاهزين. هذي خطوة لازم يقدرها المالكي، اذا ميقدرها موصحيح، نقطة ضد مو اله. الاخوان العرب السنة، انه اسال اخي ظافر، شعنده مشاكل المالكي وية الاكراد؟ يعني هاي الازمة صعدت الى هذه ال، شعنده؟
83	Interviewer	وية وية؟؟
84	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	: المالكي مع الاكراد. شنو مشاكله؟ هي نفس المسائل التي كان يثيرها الاخ اسامة النجيفي وقيم الدنيا ولا يقدها بسببها. مشاكله مع الكرد هي نفس المشاكل الي اسامة النجيفي بيها ربح الانتخابات. لما المالكي يصعد الموقف ويوكف وقفة رجل من حديد بوجه رفاقه الاكراد واخوانه وحلفائه، انت يا اسامة النجيفي تروح من وراه تصير كردي. هذا معيب. هسه تريد نفتح كل الملفات؟
85	Interviewer	والله ياريت.
86	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	صعب بصراحة صعب
87	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	لا خل--
88	Interviewer 2 (Al-	صعب

	Shahbandar)	
89	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	انت مابقيت شي. انت سويت التوصيف ، سيقنتع الناس بكلامك بدون هاي التفاصيل . بصير يعني يعني وكانك اتهمت الاخرين بدون ادلة
90	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا شلون
91	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	يعني مثلاً، مثلاً، دعني اقول لك، انا ايضا انا ايضا
92	Interviewer	يعني ماقاله، يعني ماقاله انو السيد النجيفي حصل على هاي الشعبية والاصوات بسبب موقفه المعادي للكوورد
93	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	اي والله ماوصل الا بصوت..... غير مسموع
94	Interviewer	غير مسموع
95	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	بسبب خطابة المدافع عن محافظته والمناطق التي كانت لديها.....
96	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	: تسلم رانع، رانع.....
97	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	التي لديها مشاكل مع الاخوة الكورد، هل المصلحة.. جيد جيد
98	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا عندة لا عندة تاريخ نضالي مع صدام ولا عند تاريخ اههه احد انعمله ولا
99	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	هل المطلوب ان يبقى العداء مستمرا؟
100	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا
101	Interviewer	لا طبعاً. مثل ما المالكي هسه يجوز جبرته ظروفه الحالية والازمة الحالية انو الاكراد بجوه .
102	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	ممتاز ممتاز ممتاز. الفرق انو اسامة ليس بيده سلطات تنفيذية بحيث يكدر يمنح الكورد سوى السلام. سوى السلام هاي الاشياء ذات الطابع المعنوي. ولا احد في الموصل ولا في كركوك ولا في ديالى يتمنى عداء بين اخوانه في هذه المحافظات والاخوة الكورد. هسه خلي بعد ايام ستظهر تفاصيل الاتفاق الذي جرى بين الحكومة والاخوة الكورد. يقدم تنازلات ووو لا اعرف هل نتحمل جزء من المسؤولية في اننا وضعنا المالكي مثلاً في وضع ضعيف او شئ من هذا القبيل او انه
103	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	: ليش ، ليش
104	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	بحيث استطاع انو المالكي
105	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لن يقدم
106	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	تتعلق بتواجد البيشمركة في كركوك وتتعلق بدفع المستحقات ال حتى السابقة ووو اشياء اخرى. انا انا لا اريد اي موقف عدائي من حكومة بغداد تجاه الاخوة الكرد، لاشك. لكن انا لا اقبل ان يكون هناك اتفاق على حساب طرف اخر. فما بالك اذا كان هذا الطرف هو المحافظات التي انا انتمي لها. طبعاً لا لا اقبل. اذا شعرنا بان هناك شي ضد مصالحنا وضد وجودنا وضد محافظتنا وضد جمهورنا ومطالبنا، يعني سيكون لنا موقف. احنه..... القضية، حتى الاخ عزت الان عندما يتحدث عن الاخ اسامة بهذا التوصيف وبهذا الشكل، ستؤكد لك مدى شخصنة الموضوع. يعني ان هنالك ان هنالك، ان الطابع الشخصي للمشكلة ليس قليلاً. ثانياً:
107	Interviewer	طيب
108	Interviewer	: ساقول فد جملة، ساقول جملة مهمة وكبيرة

	1 (Al-Ani)	
109	Interviewer	زين كبيرة بس مو طويلة.
110	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	لا كبيرة، كبيرة. ينظف حنجرته. انا شخصيا، شخصيا اعتقد بانو خيار سحب الثقة ليس خيارا، يعني ليس هو ليس هو الحل. ليس هو الحل. وانما هنالك حلول اخرى ينبغي ان يتم سلوكها قبل ان يتم الوصول الى قضية القطيعة. ليس حلا، ليس فقط هذا الموضوع، ولكن لانه ليس متاحا لكي اكون واقعيًا واننا.
111	Interviewer	طيب
112	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	شكو
113	Interviewer	راح يكصون عليه، عدهم اعلان.
114	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	طيب
115	Interviewer	اهلا بكم مرة اخرى. دكتور ظافر قبل ما بكطعنا الفاصل، فعلا كنت تتحدث بجملة كبيرة. عنما اسمع قيادي في متحدون ليس مع الذهاب مع خيار سحب الثقة، كيف؟
116	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	اي، انا اقلك اخي احمد. انا في النهاية انسان يعني اكايمي وكوني ادرس الموضوع من زاوية المدرسة الواقعية. موقفت لانني انا، ليس لانني غير راغب بسحب الثقة عن المالكي. ولكن هو السؤال: هل هو ممكن؟ ها، احنة جربنا موضوع سحب الثقة عندما كان هناك تحالف وثيق وكبير مابين العراقية والتحالف الكردي والاحوة في التيار الصدري. وعلينا ان نعترف بانه كانت للمالكي قدرة على ان يستميل البعض من داخله. وما تزال لديه هذه القدرة. واي شخص في رئاسة حكومة تكون لديه اوراق كبيرة، خصوصا في ظل بلد لديه هذه الامكانيات الواسعة والصلاحيات الممتدة في ظل عدم وجود نظام داخلي لمجلس الوزراء. اقول انه هذا هذا ليس خيارا متاحا في الوقت الحالي بالنسبة لنا. ولا اعتقد بان هناك رغبة بالمضي باتجاهه.
117	Interviewer	ما اعرف شلون لعد؟ ما اعرف؟
118	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	هذه الفكرة التي طرحها السيد رئيس مجلس النواب هو ان تقدم الحكومة استقالتها وليس ان يجري سحب الثقة عنها.
119	Interviewer	اي يجوز لان ما كدرتوا تسحبون الثقة
120	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	لا لا وهي وهي جائت ردا
121	Interviewer	بالنتيجة الهدف واحد هو انه المالكي
122	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	وهي جائت ردا، وهي جائت ردا. انا ساقول لك بصراحة بصراحة ايضا، هو انو مبادرة السيد رئيس الوزراء هو ان يقوم البرلمان بحل نفسه لاجراء انتخابات مبكرة، يسعل، هذه ايضا ليس فكرة واقعية. البرلمان لن يحل نفسه ها. لن يحل نفسه لان احنة منكدر نحل البرلمان ونروح لجمهورونه ونكلله يابة احنة سلمناكم بيد رئيس الوزراء. والان احنة
123	Interviewer	والمالكي مراح يستقيل مو؟
124	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	والان، يعني في ظل وجود البرلمان، المالكي مقبل يجي استضافة اربع مرات، تخيل الوضع اذا....
125	Interviewer	طيب البرلمان مراح يحل نفسه، والمالكي مراح يستقيل وحكومته تبقى. والكل متجه نحو انتخابات برلمانية قادمة، اهيه هواي مراهنين على نتيجتها دولة القانون؟
126	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	نعم، اهه نص دقيقة اذكر اخي العزيز ظافر، لما الكورد، اخوانه الكورد واعزائنا، بدوا يضغطون على المالكي حتى تاريخيا وعاطفيا، اين التحالف الشيعي الكردي
127	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	هه هه
128	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	ها، شنو جان جواب سامي العسكري وياسين مجيد؟
129	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	انتهى هذا التحالف.
130	Interviewer	كذبة
131	Interviewer 2 (Al-	كذبة، تخيل؟! حتى تكول المالكي ماعنده رغبة باتجاه اخوانه العرب السنة. لا اني طلعت وفلسفت وكنت لا والله هذا التحالف مقدس وتاريخي ورائع، ولكن ذاك في مرحلة اسقاط الدكتاتورية والان

	Shahbandar)	نحن في مرحلة اسقاط الدولة. وتحالفنا مع الاخوان الكورد يجب ان يحصل ولكن ابدا ليس على حساب المكون الاخر مستحيل. هذا تنظيره كدولة قانون، هذا وين احنه كنا رايعين؟ مو الهم؟ بس اني اريد اذكر، الاخ الدكتور صالح المطلك، صارت الاعتصامات، حمى الاعتصامات بدئت في الرمادي. انقسمت العراقية قسمين، واحد وكف على التل يتقرج، عمر بن العاص، يشوف ويه معاوية ادسم والصلاة خلف علي اسلم، ماريد اكوله منو. وناس راحوا كعدوا على المنصات. اما المنكر لذاته هذا البطل صالح المطلك، راح كعد ويه المالكي. لا المالكي راضي عنه، لا هو منسجم معاه ولاحصل منه شي ويجلدوه في ساحات الاعتصام. ليش؟
132	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	هه؟
133	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لان يدري هنا يكدر يخدم اخوانه اصحاب المطالب مو هناك. هو يعلم
134	Interviewer	وهذا النموذج الي ممكن تشكلون وياه حكومة اغلبية؟
135	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	ليش لا؟ ليش هو منين، مو من الرمادي؟
136	Interviewer	اهه
137	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	منين هو، من الحمزة، من الديوانية؟ هو من الرمادي، هو وجمال الكربولي وكثير من الاخوان الموجودين همه من الرمادي والفوجة.
138	Interviewer	زين؟
139	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	فاريد ان اكول هذني لاتنسوهن، لانو الاخ ظافر مايكرد يصير مو موضوعي. رائع بس مرات موضوعيته ينطيهما اشارة كلش صغيره. هو كال لعلنا نحن حشرناه، او احنه جزء من السبب في حشره ان يتوجه، لا صحيح صحيح
140	Interviewer	: والرجل يريد يخلص من هذا هذا الموضوع
141	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	غير مسموع
142	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	ولكن، للكن صدقتي لم يذهب، حشرتموه ولكنه لم يذهب الى اربيل اربيل جاءت عنده. زين، ننقل، شنو كان سؤال حضرتك؟
143	Interviewer	لا السؤال هنا راح يتحول.
144	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	اوكي
145	Interviewer	عفوا، هنا من واحد يقره الساحة، باجر انتخابات، وراح استوحي السؤال من كلام السيد عزت الشهبندر، انه وكانوا حكومة الاغلبية الي بصورها السيد المالكي الان هي حكومة دولة القانون والمجلس الاعلى والاطراف الكردية، ليدفع بمتحدون والتيار الصدري ويجوز يروح وباهم التغيير اذا مقتنع. يعني هاي حكومة الشكل العام الحكومة المتوقعة.
146	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	الحقيقة هذا، انت تذكر جنابك، انو السيد رئيس الوزراء
147	Interviewer	طبعا بالاضافة الى ال الفنة الي اشار لها استاذ عزت.
148	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا طبعا اذا هيج الاتجاه هاي اغلبية طائفية ابد نو كف ضدها. اني او كف ضدها ابد.
149	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	لا هو راد يكو لك بالاضافة الى
150	Interviewer	بالاضافة الى دكتور صالح وو
151	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا ماكو اضافة، لا مو ملحق بجمع المذكر السالم ابدا لا
152	Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)	: لا مو بالاضافة، عفوا شركاء
153	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	شركاء حقيقيين، طبيعي. ونطمح

154	Interviewer	وعدم عدم
155	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	ونطمح بالاخوة الكورد. الساحة الكردية هي جزء من العراق
156	Interviewer	لا، بالتحديد خل ناكد هاي الصورة. احنه كلنا دولة القانون المجلس الاعلى والاطراف الي اشترلتها حضرتك الي هي دكتور صالح وحركة الحل وغيرها، هاي الي تشكل الحكومة؟
157	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	مو اله الحل، ليش الحل؟ يجوز متحدون. مندرى.
158	Interviewer	متحدون؟! ماسوينا شي ذاك الطاس وذاك الحمام
159	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	ليش؟..... لا، مندرى. عفوا لما تحين القصة وينطرح المشروع السياسي، يجوز رؤية متحدون تنسجم مع دولة القانون وليست رؤية جبهة الحوار.
160	Interviewer	الله الله يبشرك بالخير
161	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	ماكو تعيين من الان. صدقني، شوف اكولك والله اكو اثنين موجودات بالطرح، اولا ماكو تشخيص منو هو شريكي بحكومة الاغلبية، ابد. ماكو هيج تشخيص. اثنين: اكو فرق كلش كبير بين اغلبية سياسية واغلبية طائفية. مدركين احنة هذا الموضوع. ولذلك اكول ولنخسر نحن، انت سالتني سؤال كلش حلو، منو كال يكدر المالكي يسوي حكومة اغلبية؟ وانشاء الله مايكدر. المهم السستم هذا يمشي. انو اغلبية واخليها. خلصونا من هالمصيبة هاي.
162	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	لا هو مو انشاء الله مايكدر. هو مراح يكدر/ لان مراح يحصل على عدد مقاعد كافية.
163	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	اني ميهمني، والله ميهمني
164	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	اني اعرف. اني متأكد
165	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	اني يهمني النتيجة
166	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	اني اعرف. بس اني غير مسموع. اذا كان السيد رئيس ال، اذا كانت دولة القانون قد خسرت في انتخابات مجالس المحافظات هذه فرق 56 او 59 مقعد في مجالس المحافظات.....
167	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا بعد بعد
168	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	طيب 50 او 52
169	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا لا
170	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	لنفترض انها خسرت هذا العدد. تخيل انو على مجلس النواب كم ستخسر دولة القانون. ولماذا خسرت دولة القانون؟ دعني اجيب عن هذا السؤال.
171	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	انت ليش تفقر، ليش تسوي ففران، ليش
172	Interviewer	بعدها النتائج ماظالعه
173	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	ليش تنبي الحقيقة على فرضية
174	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	دعني اجيب عن ها السؤال. لا النتائج ظهرت
175	Interviewer	لا كلي لماذا لاتستطيع دولة القانون ان تشكل حكومة اغلبية
176	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	انا افولك انا افولك. الا اذا، وهذا المشروع مشروط، انو دولة القانون في هذا الانتخابات مجالس المحافظات، واظن ان اخي عزت يتفق معي، انو دولة القانون استخدمت خطابا ذو طابع حربي. ها وانا اذكره بالخطابات غير الموفقة لدولة القانون سواء كان في ديالي او في ميسان او في

		كربلاء او في النجف. قد يكون فيها رغبة في اثاره الجمهور، ولكن انا اقول لك بانها خطابات كانت معبئة بالعدائية. وهذا انا هنا اريد ان اقدم امتثاني للجمهور الذي انساق مع الخطاب السلمي والمتمدن يعني للقوائم السياسية الاخرى التي فازت بالانتخابات بنتائج لم تكن قد حصلت عل ربعا في انتخابات مجالس المحافظات السابقة.
177	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	المجلس الاعلى
178	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	جيد، ولذلك اذا بقي هذا الخطاب ستكون النتيجة مؤلمة. ولن يكون باستطاعة اخوانه في دولة القانون لا ان يحصلوا على الاغلبية ولا ان يقنعوا الاخرين بان يكونوا شركائهم اذا استمر هذا الخطاب واذا استمرت هذه الخصومة وهذا العداء.
179	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	احنه ليش متناقش بالقاعدة ، قاعدة يعني نكول احنة مع حكومة اغلبية ولا لا.
180	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	انا مع حكومة اغلبية.
181	Interviewer	يجوز متفقين على الاغلبية
182	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	احسنت
183	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	انا مع حكومة اغلبية ليست فنوية
184	Interviewer	استاذ عزت، اسمحلي دكتور
185	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا ليست طائفية
186	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	اي
187	Interviewer	يعني تريد تقنع دكتور ظافر وتريد تقنع المشاهدين انو السيد المالكي صار له يمكن سنة يحجي بحكومة الاغلبية وناوي على الدورة الجاية، موضوع عسير جدا انو يصير بناء
188	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	هو هو. هو يقبل باغلبية من دون ان يكون هو رئيس وزرائها؟
189	Interviewer	هو هو هو هذا سؤالي.
190	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	انه الان ماالنوب عنه في هذه القصة. هو رجل عندو شخصيتو عندو طموحو عندو اعتقاده هو. اني ميهمني انو هو شلون يفكر. هل يفكر انو الاغلبية بدونه اغلبية او لا، ميهمني. اني افكر انو لازم يصير، بعد كفي هذا الضحك على الذقون، شراكة ووحدة ومدري شنو. يجب ان نذهب الى حكومة اغلبية واقلية. وحل نكون احنة الاقلية. مو كذلك هارد لك حتى لو خسرنا. مو مهم.
191	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	اههه خلي
192	Interviewer	بس كثرة الدعوات تيدو من كلام واثق؟
193	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	من حقه لو مو من حقه؟ اذا هو هو اذا
194	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	من حقه يسوي بروبوكاندا ليش لا
195	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	لا لا. هسه هو مو رقم من ارقام الساحة؟
196	Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)	نعم لاشك، لابل هو الرقم هو والان الان الاول في بغداد
197	Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)	من حقه هو يطرح مشروع ويتبناه، من حقه. يتوفق ما يتوفق مو هواي مهم عندي. المهم عندي مشروع صح.
198	Interviewer	هيج رجل ازيحة لو اتفاهم وباه احسن؟
199	Interviewer	لا ازيحه.

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhNK8_dqhc

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14	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	الذي عطّلها هو العمق التاريخي لهذا المشكله. و ال و الي يعني هنالك ارث ثقيل ومزعج وجد العراقيون او وجد من بنى الجديدة وحاول --- يرضخ تحته. الشيء الاخر ان التغيير في العراق جاء بخلاف ارادة دول اقليمية في المنطقة قاطبة، يعني باستثناء دولة او دولتين رحبتا بالتغيير، كل دول المنطقة كانت غير راضية عن التغيير لحسابات مختلفة. لعل في مقدمتها ان هذا التغيير بدل النسيج السياسي في المنطقة العربية. النسيج السياسي للدول المبني على ايام سايس بيكو على طريقة معينة. هذا التغيير احدث هزة ليس في العراق وانما في المنطقة. ولذلك تمت مواجهة هذا التغيير.
15	Interviewer	طيب قبل الانتقال دكتور سامي
16	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	ولذلك بدء بدء القرار العراقي يتأثر بايحاءات وضغوط وتدخلات الدول الاقليمية.
17	Interviewer	طيب هذا مفهوم استاذ سامي ولكن قبل الانتقال للدكتور احمد، هل كل ماجرى للعراق بعد 2003 مما لايتوافق مع وجهة نظرك في بناء الدولة بشكل صحيح هو مرتبط فقط بالخارج؟ لم تكن هناك اخطاء في الداخل؟ لم تكن هناك اخطاء في بناء الدولة؟
18	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	الجزء الاكبر في الداخل. البعد الخارجي موجود ولكن البعد الخارجي ليس هو الوحيد، الاساس هو التغيير الداخلي. يعني انت اشرت في مقدمتك وهي صحيحة، لأول مرة يجد الشيعة انفسهم هم اكثرية في البلد وعليهم ان يقودوا ادارة هذه البلد. لأول مرة يجد السنة انهم مجرد شركاء في هذا البلد، وليسوا سادة لهذه البلد. منذ تأسيس الدولة العراقية السنة، وقبل تأسيس الدولة العراقي، كانوا حكام العراق.
19	Interviewer	يعني (غير واضح)
20	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	يعني لأول مرة الكردي يشعر بانه مواطن من الدرجة الاولى ولديه حق استخدام لغته.
21	Interviewer	طيب.
22	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	هاي التغييرات الي حصلت الجوهرية ماكنت مرضية ل لغالبية الي
23	Interviewer	يعني هل كان منصفاً للسنة ان يضعوا تحت طائلة هذا الشعور او ان يوصل الاول بهم ان يشعروا مثلاً بانهم مهمشون؟
24	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	لا هو ليس ليس منصفاً ان ايههه يستبعد احد. ليس منصفاً ان تستبعد لاكثرية ولا اقلية. لكن حين تعتاد على شي، تعتاد ان تكون انت الحاكم واني المحكوم، حين تتغير المعادلة وتكون شركاء في الحكم، قد لا يرضيك هذا الامر. والباتلي تحاول مقاومته، ولاحظنه المقاومة. لاحظنا في بداية تأسيس النظام الجديد هناك مقاطعة لمؤسسات الدولة، مقاطعة للانتخابات بحجج كثيرة، و رفع و حمل السلاح بحجة مقاومة الاحتلال، لكن الحقيقة هو مقاومة هذا التغيير. هذا التغيير لم يكن، على الاقل الغالبية من الوسط السني، راضية بيه، رغم انها، جزء من عدهه، عانت من النظام السابق لكن الغالبية
25	Interviewer	طيب.
26	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	تشعر بان هذا التغيير ماجاء بضمن حسابتها التي كانت تريدها.
27	Interviewer	طيب استاذ سامي. اذا دكتور احمد، يعني مذكره الاستاذ سامي نقاط كثيرة، بالتأكيد الان انت تحدث للرد عليها. يعني ايه هو يعني مجمل مايقول ان التغيير الذي حصل كان مرفوضاً من قبل السنة. لذلك كل مايجري من مشاكل هو فقط للتعبير عن هذا الرفض، حتى وان اتخذ صور واشكال مختلفة.

38	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	هنالك لجنة شكلت اهههه لبيان مدى الخلل في التوازن وقد وضعت هذا الخلل واشترته وكان واضحا جدا.
39	Interviewer	طبيب، جيد دكتور احمد. اذا استاذ سامي، يعني ما الذي جائت به عملية التغيير او مرحلة التغيير؟ كل ماجانت به اقضاء الى السنة تهميش لهم ابعادهم عن مناصب سيادية؟ ليس هناك وجود على الخارطة السياسية؟ وان وجد فهو من اجل الصراع فقط والعودة ربما الى نقاط قديمة. بماذا ترد؟
40	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	يعني قبل ان اجيب على سؤالك، يعني فقط للمعلومات، اكو قضيتين ذكرت، في حكومة عبد الكريم قاسم، وهي اول حكومة جمهورية او انقلاب جمهوري اطاح بالملكية، كان عبد الكريم قاسم رئيس وزراء، وكان هنالك مجلس سيادة، يعني مجلس مايقابل مجلس الرئاسة. هذا مجلس السياسية، اهه مجلس السيادة، كان واحد شيعي وواحد سني وواحد كردي. والاتي بهم بهذا العنوان، هذا ممثلا للشعبة وهذا ممثل للسنة وهذا ممثل للكردي. الى ان انهيار نظام عبد الكريم قاسم بعد اربع سنوات، هذا المجلس بسمونه مجلس السيادة. ال اهه الامر الاخر، التوصيف بان النظا السابق ماكان يميز على اساس شيعي وانما على اساس حزبي. انظر الى مجلس قيادة الثورة كم فيه من الشيعة. ولاواحد،
41	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	كيف؟!
42	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	انظر، عددي
43	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	عددياها، اي
44	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	لا انت عدد
45	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	سعدون حمادي
46	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	ماكان بمجلس قيادة الثورة
47	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	محمد حمزة الزبيدي
48	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	ما ماكان ب
49	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	كلهم هؤلاء كانوا شيعة
50	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	يوم يوم سقط النظام، يوم سقط النظام يوم 9 نيسان شوفي كم شيعي بمجلس قيادة الثورة، ولا واحد. انظر الى الجيش، شوفي اهه قيادات الفياق ولا واحد شيعي، شوفي قادة الفرق، ولاواحد شيعي. صحيح الشيعة موجودين في حزب البعث، صحيح يسمح لهم دخول المؤسسات العسكرية لكن هناك مستويات من القيادة مستويات من الوظائف لا يصلها شيعي حتى لو كان بعثيا، حتى لو عضو في قيادة.
51	Interviewer	نعم، اعطي مثلا على هذا
52	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	اذا النظام كان طائفي
53	Interviewer	استاذ سامي اعطني مثلا على ان الشيعة مثلا في زمن صدام لا يمكن لهم الوصول الى موقع معين.
54	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	المثال الجيش، اي ضابط اي ضابط شيعي، ويسمعوني قادة الجيش ويسمعوني الجيش السابق، اي ضابط جيش يصل الى مستوى معين من الرتبة العسكرية لا يمكن ان يكون شيعي فريق. ولا فريق في تاريخ حزب البعث شيعي.
55	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	بارق، بارق الحاج حنطة منين؟
56	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	ماكو راسا يحال على التقاعد
57	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	بارق الحاج حنطة منين؟

58	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	ماكو ولا واحد من قادة الفيلق شيعي، ماكو واحد من قادة الفرق شيعي. واذا واحد، افترض كال اكو واحد، من مجموع كم؟ هل يتناسب حجمه او وجوده بحجم الشيعة الي همه اكثرية. لو يعني الشيعة البعثيين الشيعة ماكان فيهم قيا-- ايه كفاءات تفوق او تساوي زملائهم البعثيين من السنة؟ انما نظرة النظام كانت نظرة طائفية.
59	Interviewer	طيب، هذا في نظام صدام
60	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	هذا في نظام صدام
61	Interviewer	رد عليه استاذ سامي اليوم ان (غير مفهوم)
62	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	اليوم اجينه ، الان انتخابات، الانتخابات ايه الحاكم فيها الناس، الناس تذهب الى صناديق الاقتراع، تختار مجلس نواب، مجلس نواب يأتي مفصل مو بمعايير طائفية ولا بمعايير عرقية، يأتي بمعايير مناطقية، معايير محافظات. كل محافظة لديها نواب ويأتون. شي طبيعي لان الشيعة اكثرية يأتون اغلب النواب شيعة. وشي طبيعي لان السنة اقلية يأتون عدد النواب بما يناسبهم، وهذا الامر ينطبق على الكرد.
63	Interviewer	طيب هذا الاغلبية والاقلية استاذ سامي
64	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	لايمكن ان تتوقع
65	Interviewer	يعني اثير فيها خلاف
66	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	لا خليني اكمل
67	Interviewer	السيد النجيفي وهو رئيس البرلمان قال السنة اكثرية
68	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	لا يمكن ان، لايمكن ان تتوقع ان السنة، ان عدد النواب السنة يكونون في داخل البرلمان هم الاكثرية. لان البرلمان هو انعكاس عن واقع الشارع كما هو، مو كما نشتهي وكما يخطط البعض. لذلك معضلة التهميش مالها معنى مالها قيمة. التهميش وين، اكو واحد
69	Interviewer	حتى وان كان السنة اغلبية؟! السيد النجيفي قال السنة اغلبية، قالها بوضوح.
70	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	: وين الاغلبية وين مابانت؟! مو سوينه انتخابات، ثلاث دورات برلمانية!
71	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	مممكن اجابو؟ (مخاطبا المقدم)
72	Interviewer	طبعاً لك حرية الاجابة
73	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	جمعية وطنية، يكلون السنة كانوا مقاطعين، مو مشكلة. اجينة لمجلس النواب الاول واجينة لمجلس النواب الثاني، اجينة لمجالس المحافظات، مابين انه السنة اغلبية. بل حتى بغداد التي حتى بعضهم يتحدث ان بغداد اغليتها سنة، انظر الى مجالس المحافظات في كل الانتخابات التي جرت. هذا واقع، هذا واقع، واقع العراق انه اغليته شيعة والاقلية فيه عرب سنة و ووو اكراد. لايمكن تغييرها، ان قضية ال، انها بشرية يعني مالها علاقة بقرار اتنا ورغباتنا. هذا لايغني تهميش، حين ياتي عدد النواب الشيعة اكثر من عدد النواب السنة في البرلمان لايغني ان هناك تهميش لهم، لان القرار في نهاية المطاف
74	Interviewer	طيب الا يتحدث....
75	Interviewee 1	لان القرار في نهاية المطاف لهم

	(Al-Askari)	
76	Interviewer	استاذ سامي، الا يتحدث الشيعة بان مثلاً انه منصف رئاسة الوزراء هو حكر على الشيعة حتى وان لم ينص على ذلك في الدستور؟
77	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	لا، انه مجلس، انه منصب رئاسة الوزراء تقرره الكتلة الاكبر، حسب الدستور. سنيا كان او شيعيا او كرديا او عربيا.
78	Interviewer	ااهه هه
79	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	من خلال الدورات السابقة، الجمعية الوطنية ثم الدوريتين القادمتين، لان الشيعة اكثرية كانوا يشكلون الكتلة الاكبر في داخل البرلمان.
80	Interviewer	ااهه ااهه، طيب
81	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	ودستوريا من حقهم ان يرشحوا من من يرره من يشائون.
82	Interviewer	طيب استاذ سامي، اذا دعني مع الدكتور احمد. دكتور احمد النقاط مثارة بهذا الشكل، ااهه من المنطقي انه وفقاً لقاعدة الاغلبية والاقلية، ان يفرز مستوى معين من العدد يتناسب مع الاقلية والاغلبية. لماذا اصر السنة الا الان، او يصرون على ان قضية الاغلبية اخذت منهم؟ هم الاغلبية الان والشيعة اقلية، وهذا مادفع برئيس اكبر سلطة تشريعية، وهو السيد النجيفي، وهو القول بذلك بشكل علني وواضح. ثانياً، لماذا ايضا يفسر كل، كل خطوة تفسر الان في الدولة على انها تتم بنسق طائفي او بخطاب طائفي؟
83	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	طبعاً الاغلبية والاقلية الان في البلد لاتقاس بالغ ااهه بالاقلية والاغلبية في البرلمان العراقي. لانكم تعلمون بان نسبة المشاركة في الانتخابات تختلف من منطقة الى منطقة اخرى ومن محافظة الى محافظة اخرى. نجد ان بعض المحافظات تكون نسبة المشاركة فيها عالية جداً في الانتخابات، بينما مناطق اخرى تكون نسبة المشاركة قليلة. وهناك سبب لان تكون نسبة المشاركة قليلة، واضرب لك مثل مثل ماضرب ابو ياسر مسالة بغداد. المناطق التي تكون فيها الاغلبية السنية، تكون فيها نسبة المشاركة قليلة بسبب ان هذه المناطق في يوم الانتخابات تقطع الطرق، توضع سيطرات، يمنع الحركة، منع تجوال، بل هنالك تفجيرات بقتال صوتية، توضع حاسبات على الطرق، كل واحد يريد يجي يريد ينتخب يحطون اسمة بالحاسبة، هذا مطلوب خاف يعتقل. فهناك، كأنما يراد لهؤلاء الناس ان يمنعوا من الذهاب الى الانتخابات، وهذا ماموجود اليوم في بغداد، وخاصة في مناطق حزام بغداد. تجد اهنالك قورة تريد ان تمنع هؤلاء الناس من الذهاب للانتخابات، لكي تكون نتائج الانتخابات، تقول ان، مايقول به الاخوة ان نسبة الشيعة اكثر من نسبة السنة. ولكن هذا الامر غير صحيح، لان نسبة المشاركة في الانتخابات في المناطق السنية اقل بكثير من نسبة المشاركة في المناطق الشيعية. وفي امر
84	Interviewer	ولكن في المقاييس العددية.....؟
85	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	وفي امر مفروض
86	Interviewer	دكتور احمد، يعني سياسياً، سياسياً
87	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	حكومياً
88	Interviewer	دكتور احمد، سياسياً، يعني
89	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	نعم
90	Interviewer	حينما يتحدث سياسي معين اقلية وعن اغلبية، هو يقصد مكونات.
91	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	نعم
92	Interviewer	هو يقصد طائفة، يعني من يقول هذه الطائفة اقلية هو يقصد من حيث العدد. اذا بعيداً عن قضية المشاركة في الانتخابات.

93	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	<p>بعدين انت شلون تكدر تقيس هذه اقلية او اغلبية، غير بعدد النواب سواء كان في مجلس المحافظة او في البرلمان. لكن اذا انت منعت هذه المناطق من ان تذهب الى الانتخابات، وحطيت العراقيل في طريقها وحددت اه اه عملية المشاركة في الانتخابات، مراح يكون تمثيلها في مجلس المحافظة قليل. لذلك انت اليوم تتحدث وتقول بانها اقلية، هي ليس اقلية وانما مشاركتها قليلة بسبب الظروف الصعبة في مناطقها التي منعتها من ان تشارك في الانتخابات، هذا السبب. اليوم اكو قوة تحاول ان تظهر هذا المكون على انه اقلية. وهذه القوة تعمل في كل الظروف، في الانتخابات و بعد الانتخابات. وتكلم الاخ ابو ياسر عن انه اليوم ال ال ال البرلمان موجود وان البرلمان هو الذي يقوم بصنع الحكومة، وهم مشاركون في ال ال. لا اخي نحن اليوم لسنا مشاركين والدليل على ذلك الملف الامني، الدوائر الامنية تكاد تكون خالية، ونسبة المشاركة تكاد تقل عن 8% من المكون السني عن الممكن الشيعي. وهذا امر واضح بيه الاقصاء والتهميش. لماذا تكون نسبة، ليس الدستور واضحا بان الاجهزة الامنية والمؤسسة العسكرية تتكون من مكونات، المادة 9 من الدستور، ان تتكون من مكونات الشعب العراقي بما يماثل توازنها. لكن اليوم من تجي على المؤسسة العسكرية وتجي تسوي احصائية لما موجود فيها من قادة فرق وقادة الوية وافواج وكل القادة العسكريين، تجد نسبة محددة بمجلس الوزراء، ان 8% تمثل السنة. هل هذا هو نسبتهم حقيقة، اليوم هو هذا في هذا البلد؟! </p>
94	Interviewer	طيب، على مستوى القرار
95	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	هذا ليس فيه اقضاء وتهميش؟!
96	Interviewer	<p>دكتور احمد، دكتور احمد. طيب، على مستوى القرار، يعني كيف نقفز، يعني ف اطار الحديث، على انه رئيس السلطة التشريعية، وعذرا لهذه التوصيفات، لكن هي بواقع الحال سياسية، رئيس السلطة التشريعية سني وزير الدفاع بالوكالة، الان العمليات التي تجري في الانبار، وزير الدفاع بالوكالة هو سني، قادة العملية حتى قائد العملية الذي استشهد في الانبار كان سنيا، وسميت العملية باسمه. هذه النقاط كيف نقفز عليها؟ </p>
97	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	<p>يعني اليوم اذا كانت وزارة الدفاع كلها شيعية وكان وزير الدفاع سني ولم ياتي به السنة الى الى هذه المنصب. انت تعلم جيدا والاخوة يعلمون انه ليس السنة من رشحوا الاخ سعدون الدليمي الى هذا المنصب، وانما السيد المالكي هو الذي وضعه وكالة في هذا المنصب. اذا هو لا يمثل المكون السني، ليس خيار المكون السني. وحتى القادة الموجودين، كم عددهم، على عدد الاصابع؟ يعني عندما، ف فنجي نسوي احصائية عن القادة السنة في الجيش، كم عددهم؟ هؤلاء يعدون على عدد الاصابع. هل هو هذا نسبة تمثيل مكونهم اليوم في المؤسسة العسكرية؟ اقول لك لا. هنالك ابعاد لهذا المكون من ان يكونوا قادة. وحتى، اضربك مثل في ذلك، اليوم المفروض على السيد المالكي بارسل قادة الفرق والقادة العسكريين للتصويت الى البرلمان. الى هذا اليوم السيد المالكي لم يرسل هذه الاسماء للتصويت في البرلمان بسبب انه ليس هناك توازن في هذه، لان الدستور يقول يجب ان يكون متوازنين حسب النسب السكانية للمكونات او المحافظات. لكن ليس هناك توازن فميكدر يذره. لان البرلمان وف لن يصوت عليهم وو النسب فيها غير متوازنة، ولحد هذا اليوم كل قادة المؤسسات العسكرية يعملون بالوكالة و لم يصوت عليهم البرلمان بسبب عدم وجود التوازن في تعيينهم. </p>
98	Interviewer	<p>طيب دكتور احمد، ولكم ايضا حرية الرد دكت—استاذ سامي. يعني دكتور احمد، بشكل واضح، حتى وزير الدفاع بالوكالة السيد سعدون الدليمي، لم يختاره السنة، </p>

106	Interviewer	قيل واحد منهم.
107	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	لا لابداء، هذا الرجل خالد العبيدي، قدم ثم هو الذي، طبعاً اني مسؤول عن كلامي، انا مسؤول عن كلامي، اتابع الامر، هذا الرجل هو الذي سحب ترشيحه لان قال انا لاستطيع ان اعمل بهكذا ظروف. الرجل هو الذي سحب ترشيحه، وانا بالاعلام اتكلم وانا مسؤول عن كلامي. وهو موجود الان الاخ خالد العبيدي من اهله نينوى. هو الذي سحب ترشيحه وليست العراقية التي سحب الترشيح. زين، اذا العراقية
108	Interviewer	<<<العراقية، يعني هو الذي سحب ترشيح؟
109	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	هو الذي سحب ترشيحه، ولكنهم لم يقبلوا جميعاً
110	Interviewer	يعني السيد خالد العبيدي انسحب بدون من ان يطلب منه؟
111	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	طبعاً، انسحب من نفسه وانا مسؤول عن هذا الكلام، لكن العراقية قدمت نواباً، نواب ما هو اليوم نائب في البرلمان العراقي. هذا عرض على هيئة المسائلة والعدالة وعرض على كل المؤسسات ال ال الي تسوي فلتره الى ان يدخل الى البرلمان، لكنه لم يقبلهم السيد المالكي. اههه عرض له وزراء سابقين، عرض له شخصيات معروفة بالكفاءة والمهنية، لم يقبلوا جميعاً. السبب، لانهم قدموا من جهة منتخبة من ال ال المكون السني. بعدين اعرج على موضوع، قال سعدون الدليمي ايضا يمثل المكون السني، اليوم من يمثل المكون السني هي المجموعة المنتخبة من قبل المكون السني. عندما نتكلم عن الانبار، لانتكلم عن شعب الانبار، وانما نتكلم عن انتخبه شعب الانبار ليمثله. والذين انتخبوا من شعب الانبار، هم اعضاء مجلس النواب
112	Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)	هو منتخب، مو هو منتخب، هو موجود
113	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	اعضاء مجلس النواب هم من يقررون من يمثلهم، لايجي فلان يمثلهم. اليوم اكو اعضاء
114	Interviewer	طيب دكتور، اليس السيد سعدون الدليمي ايضا منتخب؟
115	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	نعم منتخب، طبعاً لكنه واحد من 15، واحد من 15. هل هو وحده يقرر ويقرر ليس منه وانما من الطرف الاخر؟! هذا ميجوز. لكن اليوم اكو 14 نائب اخرين من الانبار لم يقرروا هذا القرار، اذا كيف ياخذ به؟! اذا القرار يكون من الناس المنتخبين. وعما ارجع الى سؤالك، وقلت انه احنه بعد عشر سنين ونتكلم عن محاصصة وعن طائفية، ياخي المحاصصة منو سواها؟ ليش اليوم من تحي على مؤسسة تجد ان 90 الى 95% من هذه المؤسسة من المكون المعيين؟! وتجي 5 الى 10% من المكون الثاني. مو هو هذا البناء الخاطي للدولة العراقية بعد اه هه بعد الاحتلال؟! هو هذا البناء الي اتكلم عنه. لو كان البناء صحيحاً منذ وكان على اساس المهنية والحيادية والولاء للعراق، لما وصلنا الى اههه الى ماوصلنا اليه اليوم. لكن البناء كان على اساس الولاء للطائفة والولاء للحزب والولاء للجهة الضيقة، هذا الاساس الي بنيت عليه الدولة العراقية. لذلك اليوم احنه بعد عشر سنين وصلنا الى وصلنا اليه اليوم. كل شي سيء، الوضع الامني منهيار وضع الخدمات سيء لان الدولة بنيت بناءاً خاطئاً منذ الاحتلال والى هذا اليوم. وهذا الي اقله، لو كنا قد بنينا بناءاً صحيحاً، دولة مؤسسات، اجيب اليوم الاخ على اساس انه كفوء انه يستطيع ان يكون في هذا المكان اههه ويؤدي دوره، مانتظر لخلفيته، هذا سني شيعي مادوره اني، لكن على ان يأتي شخص كفوء يقدر ان يؤدي الامانة في هذا المكان، لا اعتراض عليه.
116	Interviewer	طيب،
117	Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)	ولكن الخدمات صفو، الوضع الامني منهيار، اذا الاشخاص الذين جيء بهم لا على اساس المهنية وانما على اساس الولاء لهذا المكون او لهذه لهذا الحزب.
118	Interviewer	طيب دكتور احمد، اذا وصلنا الى نقطة الفاصل استاذ سامي ايضا. بعد الفاصل سنكون في فقرة اخرى تتعلق بتصريحات او كلام قيل هنا او هناك. اذا مشاهدنا الكرام فاصل قصير نعود بعده لمتابعة الجزء من خفايا معلنه. ارجو ان تبقوا معنا.

C. Third TV Interview

Link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TLjJ-a-496I>

No.	Interlocutors	Turns
1	Interviewer	مساء الخير، انتهت الانتخابات فهل انطلقت التفاهات بغية الوصول لتحالفات تعمل على تشكيل الحكومة القادمة. فاي ائتلاف قادر على تأمين النصف زائد واحد؟ دولة القانون؟ كيف والولاية الثالثة للمالكي مرفوضة من بعض الكتل؟ ام ان ائتلاف المواطن والاحرار هما من سيتمكنان من تأمين الاغلبية؟ هل سيبقى التحالف الوطني مستمر؟ اين الكورد الى ماذا يسعون ومع من يريدون التحالف؟ اين اطراف العراقية السابقة؟ هل سيجتمعون مرة اخرى ومع من سيتحالفون؟ هل القادم سينتهي بحكومة اغلبية ام بحكومة شراكة ايضا؟ الحوار بعد قليل.
2	Interviewer	تحية طيبة مرة اخرى مشاهدينا وتحية طيبة لضيوفي الكرام، الشيخ حميد رشيد معلى المتحدث باسم المجلس الاعلى، ايضا السيد كمال الساعدي عن ائتلاف دولة القانون، اهلا وسهلا بكم وسعيد جدا بحضوركم.
3	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	اهلا وسهلا
4	Interviewer	شيخ البداية وياك. بعدما اعلن السيد الحكيم فوز ائتلاف المواطن، او خل نكول مثل ماهو كال تقدم ائتلاف المواطن. باي اتجاه حثركون و اي اهداف رايدون توصلوها؟
5	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، شكرا لكم ولمشاهديكم الكرام ولضيفك الكريم. اههه لاشك اهه نحن منذ ان شرعنا في الجاعية الانتخابية وحتى ما قبل ذلك اعلنا بشكل واضح ان هذه الانتخابات نعول عليها كثيرا في تصحيح المسارات وفي ايجاد حلول للارزمة القائمة. وكنا قد شخصنا ان ازمة البلاد اههه ربما يمكن اجمالها واختصارها بازمة ثقة في مابين الفرقاء من جهة، وازمة في عدم وجود رؤية واحدة يشترك عليها الجميع.
6	Interviewer	هه هه
7	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	فضلا لى بقية الازمات والتدخلات الخارجية. لكن هذان الازمتان، ازمة الثقة و عدم وجود الرؤية المشتركة دعنا نشخص اتجاهين اساسيين. الاتجاه الاول هو البحث عن الفريق القوي المنسجم المكون لمختلف الشرائح، او على الاقل على المكونات الاساسية للبلد من جهة، وان يكون هناك برنامج عملي يشكل رؤية مشتركة قابلة للتطبيق يمكن ان يطبقها هذا الفريق القوي المنسجم
8	Interviewer	يعني بين قوسين تبحثون عن شراكة قوية، شراكة الاقوياء؟
9	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	شراكة الاقوياء مع برنامج يشكل رؤية تكون قاعدة فكرية لهذا الفريق المنسجم
10	Interviewer	عذكم عذكم طموح بقيادة هذه الشراكة لو مو شرط الهم والهدف ايجاد هذه الشراكة؟
11	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	ايجاد هذه الشراكة، واذا كنا نحن محورها فنحن اهلهها
12	Interviewer	هه هه
13	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	وايضا احنه في رؤيتنا انو البلد يقاد بطريقة شراكة متكافئة تحترم خصوصيات الاخرين وتتحمّل المسؤولية بشكل كامل.
14	Interviewer	شيخ مكتلي شلون ائتلاف المواطن هو المنتصر او هو المتقدم في اغلب المحافظات، كما اعلن عن ذلك السيد الحكيم.
15	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	بالتاكيد المواطن انتصر، اذا كنا نتحدث عن المواطن العراقي عموما حين مشاركته
16	Interviewer	اقصد اقصد ائتلاف المواطن.

17	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	اما ائتلاف المواطن انتصر لانه حقق نجاحات كبيرة قياسا الى ماكان عليه سابقا. حيث حقق تقدم يكاد يكون مضاعفا قياسا الى نتائجه السابقة لا بل واكثر حتى من المضاعف
18	Interviewer	السيد الحكيم، السيد الحكيم معقد مقارنة بين الحاضر والسابق، كالمقدمون في اغلب المحافظات؟
19	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	ولازلنا فعلا متقدمين في اغلب المحافظات
20	Interviewer	النتائج الي دنسمعها تشير الى تقدم دولة القانون.
21	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	دولة القانون كقائمة كبرى فعلا هي القائمة الاكبر في كل المحافظات، في اغلبها، ولم تكن نقصد انه نحن اكبر منها عددا. نحن قلنا انه نحن متقدمون في تلك التشكيلات التي حصلت ومتقدمون دون ان ندخل في مباحث اهيئه للتوضيح. مانقصده بهذا التقدم؟ هذا التقدم ممكن ان نشرحه لكل من ان يسالنا.
22	Interviewer	هه هه، استاذ كمال، النتائج حتى الان لم تعلن بشكل رسمي من قبل المفوضية، حظوظكم جيدة تشوفها؟
23	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	بسم الله الرحم الرحيم. تحية لك وللضيف الكريم وللمشاهدين الكرام. المعطيات الاولى اهيئه تقول ان اهيئه دولة القانون هي القائمة المتقدمة، وهي الان تعتبر من اكبر القوائم. وهذا ممالا شك فيه. ولكن تبقى قضية الارقام حتى هذه اللحظة ليس هنالك شي رسمي. النكهات تبنى بناءا على المعطيات الاولى والفرز الاول.
24	Interviewer	هه هه
25	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	التي تشير الى، اهيئه بعض المحافظات تقريبا حسمت، مو بشكل رسمي، بس المعطيات الي بيها تقريبا حسمت من ناحية الاعداد لكل الكتل، يعني تقديريا يبقه يقفر مقعد له اي الكتلة او تلك، هذا موجود. بس كمعدل للقوائم، اغلب المحافظات تقريبا حسم او يعني وصلنا به لدرجة اليقين. بغداد حتى هذه اللحظة غير واضحة لانها مدينة كبيرة والعدد كبير.
26	Interviewer	زين، خليني اقاطعك.
27	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	نعم.
28	Interviewer	رغم ان دولة القانون هو الاول، حسب المعطيات الحالية والمتوقع استمرار هاي المعطيات. وبالفعل سنظهر النتائج ودولة القانون هو الاول، بس نتائجكم مو قوية، او خلي اقول مو هي المتوقعه. قبل الانتخابات جان عكم طموح 100 اكثر من 100 شوية اقل من 100 شوية. الحديث اليوم، دولة القانون لكن اقل من 100 مقعد بكثير.
29	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	يعني اذا اقل من 100 مقعد هذا مو معناه تراجعنا.
30	Interviewer	لا، ركزلي على كلمة "بكثير".
31	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	بكثير شكك يعني، مو الكثير (يضحك)
32	Interviewer	مااعرف، مااعرف (يضحك)
33	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	شلون تريد تورطني انه بالحجاية، غير تكلي بشكك. كلمة بكثير يكولون من 70 وفوك، موو
34	Interviewer	مو يجوز هيجي،
35	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	..ولقد نصركم"
36	Interviewer	مو يجوز هيجي، مو يجوز هيجي
37	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لاااهه (يضحك)
38	Interviewer	لو هذا الشئ مستبعد؟

39	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا اياهه (يضحك)
40	Interviewer	مستبعد؟
41	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	اعتقد اياهه، اني مادري، انا لاستطيع ان اقدم تقدير دقيق. اني اعتقد ان دولة القانون بين ال 90 وال 100، 85 الى 100 او 90 الى ال 100. هذا توقع، ممكن ان اكون مخطئ بيه. المعطيات الاولى من خلال اتصالنا تقترب من هذا الرقم. و بالتالي اعتقد باننا اذا لم نتقدم فاننا لم نراجع، حتى في ظل هذا الضغط الهائل الذي وجهه لنا في الاربعة سنوات الماضية من هجوم اعلامي كاسح وشديد وعنيف. اتهمنا بذهابنا المالية، اتهمنا بكوننا بكفالتنا واتهامنا بوطنييتنا، واتهامنا اتهامنا بكثير من الاتهامات الباطلة.
42	Interviewer	زين
43	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	قنوات اشتغلت، سياسيين اشتغلوا. انا اعتقد لو غير قائمة ممكن ان تتشهم وممكن ان تتراجع الى 60 مقعد. لكن
44	Interviewer	الائتلاف، الائتلاف الاول حسب المعطيات الحاضرة، وين ماشي؟ وين رايح؟
45	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	ماذا تقصد بالائتلاف الاول؟
46	Interviewer	ائتلاف دولة القانون، هو الاول حسب المعطيات بعد انتهاء الانتخابات.
47	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	اي؟
48	Interviewer	وين ماشين وين رايحين؟
49	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	ياهه دعني اقول لك. التحالف الوطني بالنسبة لنا الركيزة الاساسية. التحالف الوطني بالنسبة لنا هو الركيزة الاساسية ولا يمكن ان نفرط به. اذا فرطنا بالتحالف الوطني، فرطنا بكثير من المراكز القوية التي نتكئ عليها لبناء العراق. لذلك، انا باعتقادي، سنبدأ بالتحالف الوطني ثم بعد ذلك نفتح على الكتل الاخرى. وهذا ليس يعني مو بالضرورة زمني، يعني نفتح على التحالف وبعدين على الكتل. ممكن ان يكون الانفتاح على الجميع. لكن لا يمكن لنا ان نتجاهل التحالف الوطني.
50	Interviewer	ماكو اي خط احمر على اي جهة؟ على اي شخص؟
51	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا لا، ماكو اي خط احمر. عدنه قضية واحدة احنه نعمل من اجلها، هل سننجح او لانهج؟ هذه متروكة لمجموعة من العوامل، القضية الاساسية التي نعمل لها، ماكول حكومة اقلية سياسية، حتى لا يقال انووه الاوضاع غير واضحة، اقول نعمل ان لانرجع الى الورا. ان لانكرر...
52	Interviewer	حجي وناقش، حجي وناقش التحالف الوطني وموضوع الاغلبية السياسية.
53	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	نعم
54	Interviewer	بس قبل ذلك، رغم ان ائتلاف دولة القانون هو المتقدم، بس يبدو ان ائتلاف المواطن وائتلاف من قدرته، من حظوظه بخصوص تشكيل الحكومة القادمة؟
55	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	يعني انتخابيا، المواطن تقدم، لاشك. انا تشكيل الحكومة فهذي مجموعة عوامل وشروط، اعتقد ان المبكر الحديث عنها. من يشكل الحكومة؟ لكن شئ واحد انا متأكد من عدنه انووه الحكومة لن تخرج رئاسة الحكومة، رئاسة الوزراء
56	Interviewer	لن تخرج؟
57	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	، لن تخرج من التحالف الوطني.
58	Interviewer	هه هه
59	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	نعم
60	Interviewer	ولن تخرج من دولة القانون؟
61	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا اريد ان اقول ذلك. اياهه
62	Interviewer	قادرين، قادرين على تأمين النصف زائد واحد؟

63	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	باعقادي قادرين. لكن هذا مو وحده كافي. الذي نريده، نريد ان ننطلق الى حكومة جديدة. لاسميتها اغلبية سياسية، احنه طبعا طموحنا اغلبية سياسية. وهذا شعار رفعناه، هذا مو تراجعنا. لكن اني ميهمني الشعار.
64	Interviewer	شلون ميهمك الشعار؟
65	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	القضية الاساسية
66	Interviewer	بعض ناخبيكم انتخبوكم على اساس هذا الشعار؟
67	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا لان اقصد مو تراجعنا
68	Interviewer	هه هه
69	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	اكون اني ميهمني هاي الكلمات، الجوهر انه لانرجع الى التجربة السابقة. جوهر، حتى جوهر الاغلبية السياسية هي يعني ان لانرجع الى الوراء. بمعنى اخر، لو كانت حكومة الوحدة الوطنية، او الشراكة قد نجحت، ماكننا رفعنا شعار الاغلبية السياسية.
70	Interviewer	هه هه
71	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	يعني اذا تسالني تكولي حكومة الشراكة لو كانت ناجحة، تتادون لاغلبية حكومة سياسية؟ اكلك لا منادي. لكنه لم تتجج.
72	Interviewer	حاوكم يم موضوع الاغلبية السياسية. شيخن ائتلاف دولة القانون هو المتقدم. وحسب السيد المالكي، قادر على تأمين النصف زائد واحد. اذا وجهت الدعوة لائتلاف المواطن للاتحاق بدولة القانون او للتحالف مع دولة القانون من اجل تشكيل الحكومة القادمة برئاسة السيد المالكي، حتوافقون؟
73	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	نحن ابتداء لاتجود لدينا خطوط حمرة على اي ممارسة من شأنها الدفع باتجاه الاسراع بتشكيل الحكومة. لذلك نحن الان حددنا اهدافنا، على الاقل لما بعد الانتخابات. الشعار الاول او المطلوب الاول هو ضرورة الاسراع بالانتهاء من العد والفرز وعلان النتائج باسرع مايمكن.
74	Interviewer	زين
75	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	والمبدئ رقم 2 هو ضرورة الاسراع بعقد التفاهات والتحالفات التي من شأنها ان ايجاد وتشكيل الحكومة باسرع وقت ممكن. هذان المطالبان اساسيات بالنسبة لينا. كما تفضل الاستاذ الساعدي، نتفق ايضا على ان المقدمة الاولى هي التحالف الوطني.
76	Interviewer	هه هه
77	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	التحالف الوطني بالامكان ايجاد تفهات اساسية داخل قواه، لكننا فعلا ليس بوجدنا تكرار التجربة السابقة. عندما نذهب الى التحالف الوطني، اعتقادا منا انلهذا التحالف دور اساسي ومهم ويعتبر ركيزة للبلاد. وهو صمام امان فعلا للعملية السياسية. لكننا بحاجة الى اعادة اهه
78	Interviewer	هيكلية
79	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	صياغة
80	Interviewer	هيكلية
81	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	او هيكلية، وتطوير النظام الداخلي له
82	Interviewer	طيب قبل، قبل من خوض بتفاصيل هذا الموضوع. اسف جدا على المقاطعة. بصراحة، ائتلاف المواطن صموحه رئاسة الوزراء؟ يسعى لرئاسة الوزراء؟

106	Interviewer	طيب، خليني اروح لجواد الجبوري، المتحدث الرسمي لائتلاف الاحرار، استاذ جواد اهلا وسهلا بيبك.
107	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	اهلا وسهلا ومرحبا.
108	Interviewer	حياك الله. استاذ جواد، اولا حظوظكم شلون شايفيها. وثانيا وين متجهين، وين رايعين.
109	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم. تحية لك ولضيفك العزيزين، فضيلة الشيخ حميد المعلى والسيد النائب الاستاذ كمال الساعدي ولمشاهديك الكرام. ابتداء اسمح لي ان اتقدم بالتهنئة الى الشعب العراقي الذي كشف عن شعور عالي بالمسؤولية في خوض الانتخابات، المسؤولية الشرعية الدينية وما التزمه من، تطبيقه من طاعة لتوجيهات المرجعيات الدينية، والمسؤولية السياسية، بما التزمه من انقياد للزعامة السياسية وزعماء الكتل وغيرها. وكذلك المسؤولية الاجتماعية بان عبر عن رأيه باعتباره هو فعلا مصدر للسلطة. وها قد لبي هذا النداء ونقل ال
110	Interviewer	طيب
111	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	نقل السلطة من يده الى يد الطبقة السياسية
112	Interviewer	هه هه
113	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	وباعتبارها النخب السياسية التي ايضا يقع على عاتقها الان تحقيق مطالب هذا الشعب. رأينا
114	Interviewer	واضح استاذ جواد
115	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	رأينا الانتخابات بهذا الشكل. جرت بشكل او باخر فهي جيدة، تتم عن ان هناك رغبة على ضرورة التداول السلمي للسلطة.
116	Interviewer	هه هه
117	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	واحترام النظام السياسي.
118	Interviewer	استاذ جواد، خليني اقاطعك حتى نستثمر الوقت
119	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	نعم
120	Interviewer	جاوبني على سوالي، نتائجكم شلون تتوقعوها ووين متجهين يعني؟ شنو هي خططكم؟ ولاي
121	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	اني
122	Interviewer	ولاي اهداف رايعين توصلون؟
123	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	اني سواك سمعته، كان تبادر لذهني كان شلون شفت الانتخابات
124	Interviewer	لا لا
125	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	لهذا جاوبت
126	Interviewer	اتحدث، اتحدث عن نتائجكم المتوقعة واتحدث عن اهدافكم بالمرحلة المستقبلية.
127	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	عذرا، في ما يتعلق بانجاز اتنا وماحققته كتلتنا من نتائج تعبر عن الارتياح. ونتائج مقنعة جدا ضمن الخطة الي هه
128	Interviewer	طيب
129	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	الي حدناها. هناك نمو وهناك تقدم. لدينا مكنة انتخابية وتحصي عدد المقاعد. لكن لانود بان نطرح رقم يخلق، يضغط على الساحة الاعلامية (غير مفهوم)
130	Interviewer	بغض النظر، بغض النظر عن الرقم، الاحرار اقرب لعقد تحالف مع ائتلاف المواطنين و مع ائتلافات خارج اطار التحالف الوطني؟ لو تشكيل الحكومة مرتبط بالتحالف الوطني، وانتو ملتزمين وراغبين باستمرار التحالف الوطني.

131	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	<p>طبعاً الاعتماد على التجربة السابقة دائماً مسألة صحيحة في كل الحكومات وفي كل النظم السياسية. لدينا تجربة التحالف الوطني بما لها وما عليها فإذا ينبغي العودة لها وإن ننظر في إمكانية تطوير المنجز. نعم نشكل ملاحظات على أن التحالف الوطني كان عليه أن يقدم أفضل مما قدم في أن يكون تحالفاً وطنياً بحد ذاته بحد اسمه. رغم الاخفاقات التي حصلت، مع شديد الأسف، إلا أنا لازلنا موجودين ضمن التحالف الوطني. بالإمكان أن نعتد على تفاهماتنا، وتوجد لدينا كتل ككتلة المواطن تشترك معنا في استراتيجية النظرة في إدارة الدولة وتشترك معنا في إشكالاتنا على كتلة شقيقة في داخل التحالف الوطني التي تكلفت بإدارة الدولة وإدارة الحكومة. لأن لا يوجد قيد على كتلة من الكتل إنما توجد ملاحظات على ربما شخصيات في داخل كتل في التحالف الوطني أو غير التحالف الوطني</p>
132	Interviewer	هه هه
133	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	هذا الذي يعني ب
134	Interviewer	واضح استاذ جواد
135	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	تتحفظ كتلة الاحرار عليه
136	Interviewer	<p>واضح، ارجعك، اسف جدا. ارجعك بوقت لاحق اذا تسمح. حلوة هاي الاجواء، يعني ماكو خط احمر، اكو استخدام لمفردة الاشقاء، كنا فاقدوها قبل الانتخابات. استاذ كمال، دولة القانون مع استمرار التحالف الوطني، باي الية رايديه يستمر؟ بنفس الالية السابقة؟ وايضا ليش رايديه يستمر؟ حتى متخرج رئاسة الوزراء من التحالف الوطني؟ لو حتى رئاسة الوزراء تروح للكتلة الاكبر داخل التحالف الوطني، والمقصودة اكيده دولة القانون؟</p>
137	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا انا باعتقادي ان القضية اكبر من ذلك. اكيده مثل ما اشار سماحة الشيخ ان قضية رئاسة الوزراء مهمة، لكنها ليست القضية الوحيدة. انا شخصياً لدي قناعة لا اجامل بها.
138	Interviewer	هه هه
139	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	<p>انا اعتقد ان تحويل التحالف الوطني الى مؤسسة سياسية كبرى لا تخضع لاعتبارات انتخابية ولا ولا تتبدل فيها المواقف، يرسم استراتيجية وطنية للعراق، لدي اهم من اي موقع اخر. هذه قناعة لا اجامل بها، على الرغم انني اعلن باننا راغبون برئاسة الوزراء غير مفهوم.</p>
140	Interviewer	هذا حديثكم مع وحدة العراق؟ الحديث عن التحالف الوطني والاصرار على ايجاد التحالف الوطني واستمرار التحالف الوطني، يعزز وحدة العراق؟
141	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	نعم.
142	Interviewer	مو التحالف الوطني حيكون مقابله تحالف سني
143	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا
144	Interviewer	ومقابلته تحالف كردستاني
145	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا لا
146	Interviewer	مو معناه هذا الشئ اكو طائفية؟
147	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	<p>لا لا، دعنا نفرق بين المذهبية، نحن في بلد فيه مذاهب. كل من ينكر ذلك ويريد يبين سياسة على اساس تجاهل هذه الاشياء، لا يفهم شي بالتشكيلة الاجتماعية في العراق. ان لا اري تناقضا بين ان يكون الانسان شيعياً ووطنياً او سنياً ووطنياً. اني ماشوف اكو تناقض حتى نكول انه بقاء كل واحد على انتمائه المذهبي يمثل اصطفاً طائفي. هذا خطأ، خطأ. هذا تفسير خطأ. الانتماء المذهبي شئ وان يكون الانسان وطنياً عندما ياتي ويعمل بالدولة، شئ اخر.</p>
148	Interviewer	زين
149	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	<p>ما الذي يمنع الشيعي ان يجي، ياتي يشتغل بوزارة ويخدم، يخدم وطنه باخلاص وشرف، شنو اليمعنه؟ يعني مذهبه يمنعه، والسني كذلك مذهبه يمنعه؟ يكوله انت سني ميصير تصوير وطني؟! من يقول بذلك؟! التحالف الوطني مؤسرة سياسية، اذا وضعنا لها نظام داخلي، شروط، اهداف، الية، للعمل</p>

150	Interviewer	هه هه
151	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	الية للحوار، الية لاختيار المسؤولين، الخ
152	Interviewer	هذا هذا الشيء جان موجود.
153	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لاماكان موجود
154	Interviewer	جان موجود بالدورة الماضية.
155	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا لا ماماكان موجود
156	Interviewer	جان عدكم برنامج
157	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا لا ماماكان
158	Interviewer	وجان عدكم اليات عمل
159	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	نعم
160	Interviewer	وانتم متهمون بعدم الالتزام بقرارات التحالف الوطني. اضعفتم التحالف الوطني.
161	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	انا ما هسه هاي الاتهامات صحيحة لو لا. شكك هي دقيقة، لكن مع ذلك فليكن، راح اعتبر هذا الكلام صحيح.
162	Interviewer	زين؟
163	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	جدلا، انا اقول احنه نتقدم مو نرجع الى الخلف. اذا كانت هنالك اخطاء فعلينا ان نصحيحها. انا اعتقد ان التحالف الوطني الان ضرورة ان يعاد النظر فيه. وحتى لايشكي احد، وحتى لا يخرج عن قرارته احد، حتى لايجتهد احد في قبال الاخرين.
164	Interviewer	هه هه
165	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	وحتى يتحول الى مؤسسة سياسية، اقول واكرر لايتاثر بالنسب الانتخابية ولايتاثر بالخلافات ولا ولا. يتحول الى مؤسسة سياسية.
166	Interviewer	واضح
167	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	هو صمام الامان للعراق. انا اري ان التحالف الوطني صمام امان للعراق.
168	Interviewer	واضح. شيخ ليش مصرين على استمرار التحالف الوطني؟ مو استمرار التحالف الوطني، مو معناه استمرار السيد المالكي برئاسة الحكومة؟ على اعتبار ان دلة القانون هو الاكبر داخل التحالف الوطني ومن الطبيعي يعني ياخذون رئاسة الوزراء. ومرشحهم هو السيد المالكي، هو الوحيد ماعدهم مرشح اخر.
169	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	اولا الاصرار على التحالف الوطني وكما ذكرت يعني وكما ذكر الاستاذ الساعدي، يشكل ضرورة، ضرورة وطنية ولقد لعب هذا التحالف دورا رئيسا وحقيقيا في لملة وحدة البلد والحفاظ على وحدته واستقلاله. هذا لايعني انه لا توجد ملاحظات على الاداءات التي تمتع بها هذا التحالف. هذا واحد. الاصرار على التحالف لا يعني اطلاقا ابقاء الاصطفافات الطائفية او العنصرية. نحن واقعا نستغرب من استمرار هذا الامر لدى بعض القنوات الاعلامية. ولا ادري لماذا اصرارها، حينما تقول ان هنالك تحالف يوجد في اكثر عناصره شيعة ان هذا تحالفا طائفيا. واذا كان هناك تشكل اكثر سنة يكون طائفيا. واذا كان هناك تشكل اغلبية اكراد او تركمان فسيكون عنصريا. اعتقد هذا فرد تلاعب بالاصطلاحات غير دقيق. الوطن يجمع كل هذه التلاوين ولا يوجد اي تناقض في ان تكون هناك كتل م عبره عن مجموع كتل بشرية تنتسب الى مذهب او تنتسب الى طائفة او تنتسب الى رؤية فكرية او تنتسب الى عنصر.
170	Interviewer	رايين اعادة هيكلة التحالف الوطني
171	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	التحالف الوطني

172	Interviewer	معناها ان التحالف الوطني مجان يسير بصورة صريحة؟
173	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	نعم توجد اخفاقات فيه، كما توجد فيه ايجابيات.
174	Interviewer	وعندكم ثقة انه ممكن تعيدون هيكله التحالف الوطني؟
175	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	نعم، نعتقد هكذا. واذا لا نستطيع وبالتاكيد نحن لسنا بصدد تكرار الاخطاء وتجربة خاطئة.
176	Interviewer	شنو المقصود باعادة الهيكلة؟
177	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	اعادة الهيكلة: ايجاد صيغ قانونية يلتزم بها يعتبر فيها التحالف الوطني هو القائد الحقيقي للبلد والمطيخ الاساسي لتوجيه الحكومة فيما، في حال تشكيلها. بحيث يكون رئيس الوزراء، كان من كان س او ص، يعتبر نفسه خادما في التحالف، ولا يعتبر نفسه انه قد تسنم هذا المنصب ليكون قائدا وراندا ويكون الامور كلها بيده. هذا الي نعتقد. نعتقد ان التحالف الوطني ينتج رئيس الوزراء وينتج هذه الحكومة او يكون المساهم الاكبر في انتاج تلك الحكومة.
178	Interviewer	هه هه
179	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	تكون اغلب قرارات التحالف هي السائدة وليست قرارات الفرد. هذا
180	Interviewer	واضح
181	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	هذا الي نعتقد، وتحويله الى مؤسسة تتراكم الخبرة فيه لكي يؤسس لبناءات تصنع الدولة ولا تعزز السلطة.
182	Interviewer	واضح شيخ
183	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	قد السلطة تعزز في مرحلة
184	Interviewer	نعم
185	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	لكن البناءات الاساسية هي بناءات الدولة.
186	Interviewer	خل اروح لفاضل قصير وبعد الفاصل نرجع ونكمل حوارنه. مشاهدنا فاصل قصير ابقوا معنا.
187	Interviewer	تحية طيبة مرة اخرى مشاهدنا والجزء الثاني من برنامجنا اليوم. استاذ جواد الك مرة اخرى، اسف جدا على الاطالة. موقفكم واضح، موقف الاحرار واضح، رافضين الولاية الثالثة للسيد المالكي. بالتالي متشوف موافقتكم على استمرار التحالف الوطني، معنى ذلك ولاية ثالثة للسيد المالكي؟ هم الكتلة الاكبر داخل التحالف الوطني وربما من حقهم الحصول على رئاسة الوزراء؟
188	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	لا ليس، ليس بالضرورة تماما هذا الموضوع. انما يعني اعادة توازن القوى داخل التحالف الوطني هو امر صحي وضرورة ايضا من ضرورات تقويم الاداء السياسي للدولة باعتبار ان التحالف الوطني هو رائد العملية السياسية او ربما هو التحالف الاكبر، فمن الحق الطبيعي ان تعيد النظر في احداث عام اه توازن قوى التحالف الوطني بما اخرجه من مخرجات اثار كثير من الاشكاليات وجرت للتحالف الوطني مشاكل لثان هو في غنى عنها لاختلاف وجهات النظر في ادارة التحالف الوطني. فالיום حين ما نؤشر ظاهرة خلل لانستهدف احد من من من كتل التحالف الوطني وانما حرصا على التحالف لاننا جزء منه،
189	Interviewer	زين
190	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	وحرصا على الدولة لاننا جزء منها.

191	Interviewer	عديم ثقة بإمكانية، بإمكانية إعادة هيكلة التحالف الوطني ويكون افضل من المرحلة السابقة؟ وليش هاي الثقة؟ وانتو طيلة الفترة الماضية متهمين رئيس الوزراء بأنه لا يلتزم بقرارات التحالف الوطني. مو ممكن ينعاد نفس السيناريو؟
192	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	هو التوصيف احياناً نتمنى ان لا يرتقي الى حد الاتهام. حينما توثق حالة وتدافع عنها باعتبارها حالة صحية وتعبر عن كتلة نظر كتلة مهمه من كتل التحالف ويشتر... وخصوصاً اذا خرجت من اطار التحالف الى اطار قوى سياسية اخرى تشترك معك بنفس وجهة النظر، لا يعد اتهام انما توصيف لحالة. ومسألة النقد والنقد الذاتي والتقييم وتنظيم الاداء يجب ان يحظى بمرونة ومقبولية طالما يصب في المصلحة العام. ولكن يبقى الانقسام في وجهات النظر، يعني مسأ... او ظاهرة الاستحواذ او ظاهرة تجافي تجافي وجهات النظر للكتل الشقيقة في داخل التحالف الوطني، هذا بالتأكيد يدعي، يكون يكون هناك مدعاة لاعادة تنظيم، او ان صح التعبير انت تسميها هيكلة، بحد ذاتها هي اعادة تنظيم ووقفه تأمل لغرض الوثوب الى الامام بقوة لان الان هذا اصبح مطلب شعبي. و لاحظت كلمة
193	Interviewer	زين
194	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	التغيير التغيير التغيير، اشتركت بها كل القوى السياسية، ناهيك عن اشتراك الشعب الذي كان ينادي بالتغيير. تغيير المنهج تغيير السلوك. مسألة التغيير يعني ظاهرة صحية لغرض الاقتراب من المطلب الشعبي وخاصة وقد انتهى الشعب من مسؤوليته ونقلها بحوزة من ينوب عنه. فاليوم مسؤولية القوى السياسية، تحديداً داخل التحالف الوطني، ان تذهب الى القوى الاخرى الصديقة، ناهيك عن ذهابها الى الراي العام وذهابها الى ارادة الشارع بشكل يتمشى مع الرغبة العامة في ارادة التغيير (غير مفهوم).
195	Interviewer	بس بالمقابل التحالف الوطني لازم يذهب الى الكتل الاخرى بمرشح لرئاسة الوزراء على اعتبار هو التحالف الاكبر، مو هيجي؟
196	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	تماماً، هذا هذا
197	Interviewer	شلون من تتفقون على مرشح رئاسة الوزراء استاذ جواد؟
198	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	عفوا
199	Interviewer	شلون ممكن؟ شنبى الالية الي حتمكم على مرشح، مرشح التحالف الوطني لرئاسة الوزراء؟
200	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	اهه يعني يعني اسمحلي اقول انو هذا الموضوع هو سابق لوانه، بانتظار الحجم الانتخابي. هذا معياري مهم من معايير الاتفاق على هذا المطلب.
201	Interviewer	زين
202	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	وعلينا ايضاً ان لاننسى المطلب، المطلب المهم الذي نادى به المرجعيات الدينية وكذلك ان لانغفل الدور الاقليمي والدور الدولي ايضاً لهذا المعيار. على اعتبار ان شخصية رئيس الوزراء يجب ان تحظى بوجهات نظر الاطراف المذكورة يعني اهه سابقاً.
203	Interviewer	هه هه
204	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	هو بحد ذاته هذا موضوع غير صعب يعني ليس، يعني لا يصعب على عقلاء التحالف الوطني وحكاماء التحالف الوطني في ايجاد
205	Interviewer	زين
206	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	الشخصية، بينما
207	Interviewer	خليني اسألك سؤال اخير استاذ جواد
208	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	عفوا
209	Interviewer	خليني اسألك سؤال اخير < أأأأ رفضكم للسيد ال ال المالكي ولالية ثالثة للسيد المالكي هذا الرفض نهائي لو ممكن تغييرون موقفكم؟
210	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	أأأأ لا هذا رفضنا طبعاً يتأتى من مسألة ومسألة منهجية ومسألة علمية ومسألة ارادة عامة وارادة ارادة مرجعيات الدين في ضرورة التداول السلمي للسلطة وعدم التأسيس لثقافة الاحتكار أو وثقافة الل ال الاحتكارية أو أن صح التعبير الديكتاتورية. هذا ممم يعني الصفة لا يتمشى مع مذاق التحالف الوطني ولا على مذاق جمهور التحالف الوطني ولا على ولا على حتى أأأأ أدبيات المنهج السياسي في التداول السلمي للسلطة في النظم الديمقراطية. وأأأأ ليس أستعداً لشخص السيد المالكي وإنما هذا هو حتى كان مشروع قانون في عدم أأأأ السماح لولاية ثالثة أو حتى لولاية واحدة تجعل ال اهه

211	Interviewer	واضح، واضح، واضح أستاذ جواد
212	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	تجعل يعني المكلف بهذا المنصب هو مثلاً أشار فضيلة الشيخ أنه منصب أعلوي للخدمة لا هو منصب يعني منصب سيادي ولا هو منصب. يعني أأ أحتكاري.
213	Interviewer	واضح أستاذ جواد أأ جواد
214	Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)	لشخص دون آخر
215	Interviewer	واضح أستاذ جواد أشكرك جزيلاً لأنضمامك وينا. السيد جواد الجبوري المتحدث أأ بأسم أئتلاف الأحرار أنه شكر أأ أأ الك. أنه أنه أستاذ كمال حظوظكم أأ بتشكيل الحكومة القادمة يبدو أنها ضعيفة. أولاً ثقة باقي الأطراف بكم ضعيفة وأأ رفض بعض الكتل لولاية ثلاثة للسيد المالكي وماعدكم مرشح آخر.
216	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	أه طبعاً قبل أن أجيبك وودي أن أعلق على ما ذكره الزميل جواد يقول أن هاي بي رغبة المرجعية والناس وكذا أنا أعتقد أن هذا كلام غير دقيق. لم تعلن أي مرجعية يعني ماعدا هنالك استثناء إلى لظروف معينة أي ربما في يوم ما سأحدث عنه. لم تتحدث المرجعية عن شخص معين أنه أه هذي أولاً. والشعب عندما ينتخب كتلة أكبر
217	Interviewer	أمم
218	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	هذا معناها
219	Interviewer	السيد بشير النجفي أيق الله العظمى بشير النجفي جزء من المرجعية؟
220	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	نعم هذا الس ليس بودي أن أتحدث أجبننا عن هذه القضية في أأ في مجموعة من البيانات لا أريد أن أفتح هذا الموضوع. أأ الشعب عندما يقول بالديمقراطية الشعب عندما يقول بالصوت هذا معناه أن لديه رغبة معينة عليك أن تستجيب لهذه الرغبة. هذا فقط لا أريد أن أعلق. أه أه على هذا ليس أكثر ليس لعلاقة بالديمقراطية لل
221	Interviewer	أنتهى، انتهى دور الشارع بعد أنتهاء الانتخابات
222	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لأنه لأنه رئيس الوزراء لم يأت بأقلام حتى يقال هاي ديكتاتورية أجة بأصوات الشعب.
223	Interviewer	زين أنتهى أنتهى دور الشارع بعد أنتهاء الانتخابات اليوم الكرة بملعب الأئتلافات. الأئتلافات أو بعض الأئتلافات أولاً ما عده ثقة بدولة القانون.
224	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	أمم
225	Interviewer	وثانياً ما تريد ولاية ثلاثة للسيد المالكي، رافضة
226	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	هي القضية (غير مفهوم)
227	Interviewer	يعني ان كان الاحرار، او متحدون او علاوي او حتى لربما الكرد.
228	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	اني اولا لا اعتقد بان هناك كتل ستبقى على مواقفها الرافضة. القضية لاتتعلق بالثقة بقدر ما تتعلق بالمواقف. يعني بعض القيادات الكردية شنو مشكلتها مع السيد المالكي؟ الثقة؟ مشكلتها انطينا نفط حتى احنه نمشي وبالك عدل، انطونا النفط. اي.
229	Interviewer	حتتطوهم النفط حتى تحصلون على رئاسة الوزراء؟
230	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا لا خليني اكمل، اني كاعد افسر الموقف. هذا بعدين. لو كنا منطين النفط ماكان صارت هاي المشكلة. القضية لاتتعلق بالثقة، تتعلق بموقف وطني. ها الموقف ميصير، هذي ثروة العراق مالها علاقة بالثقة الها علاقة بالمصالح. وهذا الي خلانه ربما الشعب يثق بي. اننا موافقنا لانبنينا على اساس مصالح وانما على هنالك ثوابت وطنية. لذلك فكرة الرض، انا اعتقد ان بعض الكتل ستغير. والمهم لدينا الان، انا اكرر، المهم لدينا الان ان لاينكرر الماضي باي شكل. انا اعتقد بالاليات التالية، اولا: التحالف الوطني عليه ان يتحول الى مؤسسة وان يضع لنا نظام داخلي. وانا اؤيد ببعضه مقالته الشيخ انه بصير هو المؤسسة القيادية التي تقود البلد. وان لا يكون من ينتمي لهذه المؤسسة يلعب نفس الدور السابق. هذا لم يعد مقبول ابدًا باي شكل من الاشكال...
231	Interviewer	المقصود الاحرار هنائه؟

232	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	اي واحد يجي بصير بالحكومة وبالتحالف الوطني وبطلعلي معارض، هذا لم يعد مقبول ابدا . يكون انا بالتحالف الوطني واني بهاي الحكومة، نعم. ان تمشي مع الحكومة وتنقدها من الداخل، داخل مؤسسة التحالف الوطني او داخل مجلس الوزراء. اما تجلس جنب رئيس الوزراء وتطلع تتحول الى اي معارض، هذا لم يعد مقبول ابدا. هي النقطة الاولى
233	Interviewer	زين خليني. خليني اسالك هذا السؤال،
234	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	طيب
235	Interviewer	مممكن ايه تغييرون المالكي؟ تجيبون مرشح اخر استجابة لرغبات الكتل داخل التحالف الوطني وباقى الائتلافات؟
236	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	اني اني عندي رغبة الشعب قبل رغبة الكتل. يعني الههه رغبة الكتل نجيب واحد ننطي النفط؟! يعني هي المشكلة النفط. هذا الي نجيبه اذا وافق على النفط احنه منوافق عليه. اذا ميوافق راح يصير نفس وقف المالكي. احبيلكيها بصراحة.
237	Interviewer	امم
238	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	راح هم يواجه نفس هذا، اذا اتخذ نفس موقف المالكي وكال نفط العراق يعود للحكومة الاتحادية، وهذه مشكلة مراح تنحل بسهولة. راح ايضا يوقفون وياه بنفس موقف المالكي، ونكون بدل.. استبدلنا اكراما لطرف معين وخسرنا الكثير. وما ما حققتا شي، او ايه ننطي النفط مثلا وهاي يمكن اني تمشي. فاكو بعض المواقف مالها علاقة بالثقة وبالأشخاص، الها علاقة "تنفذ رغباتي او لاتنفذ رغباتي".
239	Interviewer	شيخ، التحالف الوطني مؤسسة لابنائها، هي تقود البلد، كل ال ااههه الائتلافات عدها رأي، راي مهم رأي مسموع؟ لو مؤسسة لاجل دولة القانون ولجل السيد المالكي؟ ان كان هذا حديث السيد كمال الساعدي هو الي حيطبق، بالتالي اكو موقف مضاد من السيد المالكي عند الكرد، ربما عند السنة. انتو شنو موقفكم؟ ممكن تطلبون من دولة القانون تغيير السيد المالكي؟ عدكم مرشح بديل كمواطن؟
240	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	لا، احنه حينما نتحدث في ان يكون التحالف مؤسسة، حين ذاك سوف لن ياتي احد يفرط بالمصالح الكبرى والعليا للبلد. ان ياتي يعطي النفط، وخر لايعطي النفط. اذا التحالف الوطني قال نعطي نفطا فينبغي ان نعطي نفطا. وحينما يقول لانعطي نفطا، فبالاكيد هذا التحالف حكيم، وهو ينطلق من مصالح البلد العليا وبالتالي حينما يوافق، يوافق على اشياء دستورية. وحينما يرفض، يرفض ايضا على اشياء دستورية. سوف لن يكون هناك مجال لتوافقات داخل الطاولة. الكل يكون حول الطاولة. وسوف لن يكون هناك تلاعب بمواد الدستور، فيكون الدستور نابضيا، نقبلة حينما نريد هذه القضية ونرفضه حينما لايتوافق مع رغباتنا. حينما نقول ان التحالف الوطني مؤسسة، حينما تقر هذه المؤسسة قرار، يلتزم به الجميع ومن ضمنهم رئاسة الوزراء، كائن من كان رئاسة الوزراء.
241	Interviewer	زين، ممكن توافقون على ولاية ثالثة للسيد المالكي داخل التحالف الوطني، داخل تفاهمات بالتحالف الوطني؟
242	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	نحن اعلنا بكل واضح في تصويت داخل مجلس النواب، ثم الغي، قلنا لسنا مع ان تكون هناك ولاية ثالثة لرئاسة الوزراء. ليس للشخص الموجود، مع كامل المحبة والتقدير والاحترام للسيد المالكي.
243	Interviewer	زين
244	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	قلنا وجهة نظرنا، ان من الناحية الدستورية والقانونية فعلا، الدستور والقانون لايتحدث عن رئاسة تتكرر او لا تتكرر. تحدث عن كتلة كبرى ومن حق الكتلة الكبرى ان
245	Interviewer	هي الي ترشح
246	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	ان ترشح شخصا حتى ولو لمئة مرة.
247	Interviewer	زين
248	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	هذا من جهة، من جهة اخرى كان هناك نوع من انواع التباين ان عدم تكرار الولاية لاي رجل، يعني بغض النظر عن ان هذا الرجل هو الان يحتله السيد المالكي، ان عدم تكرار ها المنصب لرجل لاكثر من مرتين، حتى سمعت ان السيد المالكي هو بنفسه ايضا يتحدث وقال: قال: ان شخصا يولي لولايتين يكون قد منح فرصة كافية لتنفيذ برنامجه.
249	Interviewer	اهه هه

250	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	وهو لا يستحق ان يكرر مرة ثالثة
251	Interviewer	ياما ينجح ياما يفشل خلال ال ثمن سنوات
252	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	احسنت. واعتقد ان هذا مبدئ حقيقي وصحيح
253	Interviewer	زين، بالمقابل
254	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	ينبغي الالتزام
255	Interviewer	عدكم مرشح، عدكم مرشح؟ ائتلاف المواطن هل حدد مرشح لرئاسة الوزراء ممكن تطرحوه على ائتلافكم داخل التحالف الوطني؟
256	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	موجودين بالتأكيد. لو، قلت لك، نحن الان لم يكن هذه النقطة هي مورد البحث بالنسبة الينا. لكن لايعدم، اولا لايعدم التحالف الوطني من ان ينتج رجل اخر يكون شقيقا للسيد المالكي ويحتل محله، ولايعدم لكتلة ال...
257	Interviewer	شقيق لو منافس؟
258	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	شقيق ومنافس. التنافس شرعي هنانه.
259	Interviewer	زين
260	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	التنافس هنا مقبول. ائتلاف المواطن، تيار شهيد المحراب، اول يوم دخل الى العراق هو لديه مرشحين لتسليم هذا المركز وقيادته. لم يكن عاجزا عن انتاج مثل هذا الرجل او دفعه الى الواجهة. كان مرشحنا قائم وموجود ولدينا، الحمد لله، الرجال الاخيار القادرين على ان يقودوا البلد (غير مفهوم) به امام
261	Interviewer	خلو خلو لخونا نروح لمحمد عثمان الخالدي عن ائتلاف متحدون. استاذ محمد اولا اسف على الاطالة وثانيا اهلا بيبك.
262	Interviewee 4 (Al-Khalidi)	اهلا وسهلا بيبك استاذ علي وبالضيوف.
263	Interviewer	شكرا جزيلا. استاذ محمد ليش مصرين على رفض الولاية الثالثة للسيد المالكي؟
264	Interviewee 4 (Al-Khalidi)	يعني تعرف ايه كان هناك اتفاقات وهناك اراء متطابقة، من اجزاء من التحالف الوطني واجزاء من العراقية واجزاء من الكوردستاني بهذا الخصوص. يعني مو تكول متحدون فقط كان
265	Interviewer	زين
266	Interviewee 4 (Al-Khalidi)	ضمن ال ال اه، يعني الوحيدة في هذا الامر. والدليل عندما كان هناك تصويت على منع الولاية الثالثة 170 نائب صوتوا بهذا الاتجاه و كانوا يمثلون مختلف الكتل السياسية. وهي كانت لقطع الطريق امام شخص لولايتين اكثر من ولايتين.
267	Interviewer	هه هه
268	Interviewee 4 (Al-Khalidi)	هذا الامر يعني كان، وبسبب عدم وجود نص دستوري بهذا الامر، استمرار او عدم استمرار. كان هناك فقط لرئيس الجمهورية. فكان الراي الغالب هو انه الشخص اذا تولى منصب مرتين رئاسة الوزراء يجب ان
269	Interviewer	زين
270	Interviewee 4 (Al-Khalidi)	لاتولاه ثالثا ونحن مع هذا الراي ومستمرين
271	Interviewer	خليني خليني اداخل وياك استاذ محمد. السيد النجيفي ايضا اعلنها يوم الاقتراع، كال نحن مع عدم التجديد لولاية ثالثة للسيد المالكي. السيد المالكي يكول ان المتحدثون عن عدم التحالف معنا مفلسون وتلقينا اتصالات من كيانات بعض المتحدثين بيدون استعدادهم للتحالف معنا. شلون تعلق هنانه؟

272	Interviewee 4 (Al-Khalidi)	يعني نحن ككتلة، انا الي اعرف كتلة متحدون او اكثر كتل العراقية السابقة الي كانت هي قائمة كبيرة تفتت الي كتل اصغر، والبعض الاكبر من هذه القائمة ضد ايه الولاية الثالثة والبعض الاخر يقبلون يعني. وكما موجود في التحالف الوطني وكما موجود في التحالف الكردستاني، قسم يقبلون وقسم ميقبلون، ولكن الان من الذي الان يحكم، الذي يحكم هو عدد المقاعد وعدد التحالفات التي هي من شأنها تشكيل الحكومة وعلى راسها رئيس الوزراء. يعني هنانا انتهى كل ادوار المواطن. هناك ثلاثة جهات تتحكم في تشكيلة الحكومة المقبلة، هي امريكا، المحور الثلاثي التركي الايراني السعودي، وايضا المحور الاخير هو المواطن الي صوت. الان بدعنا بالمواطن، هل انه احد الكتل يستطيع ان يجمع 165 نائب ليشكل الحكومة، هو الافضل. انا مع اغلبية سياسية، انا مو مع اعادة تشكيل التحالفات السابقة.
273	Interviewer	زين
274	Interviewee 4 (Al-Khalidi)	احنه اذا بدينا نجمع التحالف الوطني، بدينا نجمع العراقية، بدينا نجمع الكوردستاني ماسوينا شي. احنه نريد الان تصير هنالك تحالفات
275	Interviewer	زين ارتو متجهين استاذ محمد نحو
276	Interviewee 4 (Al-Khalidi)	لتشكيل حكومة اغلبية سياسية ومعارضة
277	Interviewer	متجهين، متجهين نحو اعادة تجميع قوى العراقية مرة اخرى بتحالف جديد؟
278	Interviewee 4 (Al-Khalidi)	انا مو مع تجميع كل القوى السياسية مع ايه يعني مادري مع احتراماتي للاراء الاخرى، انا افضل ان تكون هناك حكومة اغلبية من الكل من الكل يعني حكومة
279	Interviewer	و هاي حكومة شراكة مو حكومة اغلبية سياسية
280	Interviewee 4 (Al-Khalidi)	تشكل من جزء من التحالف الوطني وجزء من العراقية وجزء من الكوردستاني، وبالعكس معارضة. نعم
281	Interviewer	طيب، استاذ محمد عثمان الخالدي عن ائتلاف متحدون شكرا جزيلاً لانضمامك وبانة. استاذ كمال، شعاركم كان التغيير قبل الانتخابات، وين المشكلة اذا غيرتوا السيد المالكي؟ يعني فقط السيد المالكي هو القائد الوحيد داخل ائتلاف دولة القانون؟
282	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا، لم يقل احد ذلك
283	Interviewer	اكو قيادات اخرى واكو ناس وطنيين داخل دولة القانون.
284	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	بالتأكيد.
285	Interviewer	زين.
286	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	احنه حتى هذه اللحظة لم يطرح السيد المالكي بشكل رسمي. ولم تجتمع دولة القانون، ولن تجتمع باعقادي حتى تظهر نتائج الانتخابات. لذلك ما ما ب حديث رسمي، الحديث مو رسمي. احنه نعتقد ان المشكلة مو بالاشخاص بالعراق. يعني الان اذا اجه واحد غير السيد المالكي، راح تنحل المشاكل؟ انا لا اعتقد ذلك. هي ربما الخلاف مع اخواننا الاخري، هم يعتقدون ان المالكي سبب هذه المشاكل.
287	Interviewer	وحديثهم انو بقاء المالكي ممكن يؤدي
288	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	نعم
289	Interviewer	الى مزيد من الازمة الطائفية
290	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	نعم
291	Interviewer	ويؤدي الى حرب اهلية.
292	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا هذا كلام غير دقيق. اني اعتقد هاي لعبة الكتل الاخرى تريد تزيح المالكي لانه الشخص القوي. انه اعتقد انه اذا اجه واحد اخر واذا بقه التحالف الوطني على وضعه هذا، واذا اجه شخص اخر سيؤكل. هو هذا المخطط.
293	Interviewer	زين
294	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	هذي رؤيتي اني.

295	Interviewer	بقاء المالكي او مجي شخص اخر من ائتلاف دولة القانون او من باقي قوى التحالف الوطني. بايد قوى التحالف الوطني لو بايد قوى خارجية؟ بصراحة ايران، دور ايران واردة ايران؟
296	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	اعطاء ايران هذا الدور وكأنما ايران تملك العصى السحرية هو فد امر غريب بصراحة. لا احد ينكر ان هناك علاقات مع ايران. مثل ما كتل اخرى عدها علاقات مع دول اخرى، لا احد ينكر. لا احد ينكر دور التأثير الاقليمي في العراق ولا حتى الدور الامريكي. لكن هل للامريكان ان يصنعون رئيس وزراء؟ الان مو هاي الانتخابات هي الي افرزت. جانت امريكا او ايران او حتى الدول العربية قادرة على ان تغير مسار الانتخابات؟ مكدرت، مكدرت. المواطن..
297	Interviewer	ممکن ممکن دورهم يحضر بعد الانتخابات، مثل ما حضر بال 2010 حسب شركاء الكم داخل التحالف الوطني الي كالوا لولا التوافق الايراني الامريكي لما بقى المالكي في رئاسة الوزراء لدورة ثانية.
298	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	منو هذا الي يكول؟
299	Interviewer	هذا كلام مو اول مرة تسمعه؟ اكيد..
300	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	اني لا سامعه، بس منو الي يفلول؟
301	Interviewer	شركاء الكم في التحالف الوطني.
302	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	وين، شوكت كالوها؟
303	Interviewer	مكالوها؟
304	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	لا، اريد تنطيني تصريح واح علنا كال، خو هاي المجالس قبل وقال. القسم الثالث هذا معروف بالجيش يسموه القسم الثالث، هذا معروف.
305	Interviewer	زين؟
306	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	القليل والقال و هذي، مثل ماتحدثت تنبؤات قبل الانتخابات وطلعت كلها غلط. مو صحيح؟
307	Interviewer	زين؟
308	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	ايران لها مصالح استراتيجية في العراق، المملكة العربية السعودية لها مصالح استراتيجية بالعراق، امريكا لديها مصالح استراتيجية بالعراق وتركيا وهكذا بقية الدول. وهي تسمى لان تكون لها بصمة، هذا لا احد ينكره. لكن مو هي الي تصنع رئيس وزراء. الان تخيل لو ان رئيس الوزراء عنده 20 نائب، فاز ب 20 نائب، منو ينطي رئاسة وزراء؟ ابو ايران وامريكا والسعودي مينطوا رئاسة وزراء.
309	Interviewer	واضح. شيخ هل الارادة الايرانية هي التي ستدفع قوى التحالف الوطني لاستمرار هذا التحالف؟ هل الارادة الايرانية ال ا هه هي التي ستحدد من سيكون في رئاسة الوزراء؟
310	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	هذا نفس السؤال واعتقد هم نفس الاجابة.
311	Interviewer	نفس الاجابة؟
312	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	لا، احنه نعتقد ان الشأن العراقي هو شأن مدول منذ ا هه يعني زمن بعيد.
313	Interviewer	هه هه
314	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	العامل الاقليمي والعامل الدولي ايضا لها تأثيرات اساسية على طبيعة وشكل النظام في داخل العراق. لكن العامل الداخلي وخاصة بعد التغير الاخير الذي حصل في 2003 اتصور اعطى دور كبير واساسي في ترسيم شكل النظام وهيكلته. الانتخابات، كما ذكر الاستاذ، حينما تنتج كتلة كبرى وحينما تنتج كتل لها اصوات حين ذاك لا يمكن للارادات الخارجية ان تتدخل وترسم الاشياء وكأنها اقدار تفرض على الاخرين.
315	Interviewer	زين خلينا بارادتنا، الناخب انتخب والكرة الان بملعب القوى السياسية. ائتلاف المواطن ليش شايف حكومة الاغلبية مو هي الحل، ويديتوا تتحدثون وتطرحون مفاهيم جديدة؟
316	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	لعله احنه الوحيدين الي منذ البدء يعني اكندا على ان موضوعه الاغلبية بالطريقة التي سمعناها، يعني رفضناها. موضوعه الاغلبية يعني كما يتبادر الى الذهن تعني ان الامر نصف زائد واحد. لكن اجب لاحقا تعريفات ان ليس المقصود ان يكون مقتصر على مكون واحد. مع ان هذا تفسير جيد نحن نقبل مثل هذا التفسير لكن الاصطلاح ابتداء لا يتحمل مثل هذه التفسيرات. لذلك نقول بشكل واضح وصريح، لسنا مع نصف زائد واحد حسب الاصطلاح القانوني لهذا لنظام الديمقراطية
317	Interviewer	مع مع شراكة الاقوياء؟

318	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	اسمجلي. كما لسنا مع شراكة فضفاضة قوية ان الجميع يشترك بها، كما اشار الاخوة ان يكون هو من داخل الحكومة من جهة ونصفه في المعارضة.
319	Interviewer	وهذا الي حصل وادى الى اخفاقات.
320	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	يمكن ان يخرج الى خارج الحكومة ويكشف برامجها ولايمارس دورا ايجابيا.
321	Interviewer	زين، بهالتناقض بالمواقف شلون ممكن ان تتفقون داخل التحالف الوطني صيغة موحدة؟
322	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	اتصور ان الامور قد ترشدت اكثر. حينما تحدثنا وقلنا ان نصف زائد واحد لايمكن ان يحكم العراق، لان العراق فيه مكونات وفيه تلاوين ينبغي ان تكون حاضرة وان تكون معبرة عن نفسها. استمعنا لاحقا لتفسيرات لهذه الاغلبية ليست نصف زائد واحد اولا، ثانيا انها ليست اغلبية مقتصرة على مكون واحد دون شراكة المكونات الاخرى. قلنا اذا هذا مانقوله،
323	Interviewer	زين،
324	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	شراكة اقوياء من داخل مكونات الشعب العراقي الاساسية يتفقون على هذا البرنامج فيشكلون باختصار فريق قوي منسجم مع رؤية واضحة وبرنامج عملي. هذا الي نريده وهذا الي نعتقد مشكلة العراق وليس مشكلة العراق،
325	Interviewer	واضح
326	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	لاشخص قوي
327	Interviewer	واضح.
328	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	ولاشخص باسمه وعينه، وانما الفريق القوي وليس الشخص القوي. والبرنامج الواضح وليس الاجتهادات العشوائية.
329	Interviewer	استاذ كمال نص دقيقة. مصرين على حكومة الاغلبية السياسية بس البعض رافضها وشايفها مو هي الحل على القل بالوقت الحاضر؟
330	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	انا، بالتفسير الي تقدمه احنه نقتررب مع بعضنا كثيرا لان احنه اساسا.
331	Interviewer	لا لا ماتحدثت فقط عن التحالف الوطني، يعني عندك القوى الكردستانية رافضة حكومة الاغلبية.
332	Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa'adi)	هذا شأنها بس احنه منسمح بتكرار الماضي. احنه منسمح ان العراق يروح الى هاوية لان هنالك طرف رافض. احنه نريد حكومة قوية، نريد حكومة قوية الي يشترك بيها بعنوانه الوطني مو جاي يمثل كتله. لايمثل الشيعة، بعد مقبول وزير يكول انه امثل الشيعة او امثل الكورد، وزير يجي يمثل العراق حكومة منسجمة، مقبول بعد وزير يطلع ينتقد. نائب وزرائه بالحكومة ويطلع يتصرف كمعارض هذا بعد مسموح.
333	Interviewer	اني اني خلص عندي الوقت، اسف جدا. السيد كمال الساعدي عن ائتلاف دولة القانون شكرا جزيل. الشكر ايضا للشريخ حميد رشيد معلى المتحدث الرسمي باسم ائتلاف المجلس الاعلى، شكرا الكم
334	Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)	شكرا.
335	Interviewer	وصلنا مشاهدنا الى نهاية الحلقة، لايسعني الا ان اشكركم على حسن المتابعة والاصغاء. الى اللقاء.

D. First Facebook Comment-thread

Link: <https://www.facebook.com/malakhrs?fref=nf#!/malakhrs/posts/500168530032974?pnref=story>

No.	Interlocutors	Comments
1	Post-author	قلتُها أكثر من مرة ؛ أعداء المالكي أفادوه أكثر من أصدقائه ، تحالفوا ضده بحيث حولوه إلى بطل لشرائح عديدة وها هي النتائج تثبت هذه النظرية . وتوقعاتي الشخصية - رغم أنني لست مختصاً بالتحليل السياسي ، أن السنة المقبلة ستشهد تغيراً تكتيكياً في معسكر خصومه . سيضطرون للتعامل معه لأنه أصبح الرقم الأصعب في المعادلة السياسية. لا بل أتوقع أنه حتى القوى الإقليمية ستعبد تقييمها للمشهد بعد نتائج الانتخابات . لو كنت مكان الخصوم لصالحت المالكي وفعلت عكس ما كنت أفعله كي لا تزداد شعبيته أكثر فيفوز بولاية ثالثة ، أما لو جرى العكس واستمرت المعركة الشيعية ، فتقوا أن أعداد المصوتين له ستزيد بحيث تخرج الجميع وأناي موجود وأنتو موجودين
2	Commentator	صدقته والله
3	Commentator	صحيح وهو لعبها صح وبحرفية واكبر حملة انتخابية اله كانت مظاهرات الانبار
4	Commentator	هذه حقيقة نحن الغير سياسيين نذكرها فكيف من يسمون أنفسهم بالسياسيين؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟
5	Commentator	لو كان لديهم شيء يقدموه افضل مما عند المالكي او كانوا صادقين لوثقت بهم قواعدهم او انصارهم
6	Commentator	تحليلك سليم فعلا. هذه ماسنشاهده في المرحلة المقبلة
7	Commentator	وهو يدل ان كان خصوم المالكي بهذا الحمق ... انه اعقل منهم جميعا
8	Commentator	اتمنى حقيقة ان يعاد انتخاب المالكي ثالثا و رابعا ليرى الجميع حجم الفشل الذي سيقودنا اليه
9	Commentator	صحيح كلامك استاذ محمد الخارطة السياسي في العراق مختلفه الشعب العراقي يطبق المثل الشين التعرّفه احسن من الزين المتعرّفه نوري شين بس نعرّفه
10	Commentator	الكارثة اللي راح تصير بانتخابات الانبار ونيوى راح تشتد الصراعات والتسقيط بين الكتل المتنفذة بالمحافظتين مما سيضطر بعضهم للاستقواء بالمالكي على ابناء عمومته
11	Commentator	سيدي الفاضل الامور لا تحتاج مجهود كبير ومحل سياسي خبير للتوصل ما توصلت اليه , ما فعلتم هو تأملكم لما يحدث ودراسة الفعل ورد فعله . اذا بالغ خصمك في مساوئك فسيخسر مصداقيته وتزداد مويدين وهذا ما يحدث مع المالكي هم صنعوه بحمقهم وتعصبهم

63	Commentator	<p>معادلة قاسية يا ابو الطيب التي تدونها الان.. المالكي محظوظ بمعارضة مترهلة انسجمت في ان لا تنسجم في الصمود امام سلطته، غياب المعارضة يضعفها امام هيمنة السلطة وقاندها، وينبغي ان لا يمنع ذلك من الصمود بذروة كبيرة امام الزعيم واستحواذه على كل شيء، فلا مبررات لمعارضتي صدام المستبد الذين نسفوا وحدتهم بمؤتمر لندن اذ لم يتفقوا حينها على تغيير النظام لدينا بمساعدة اجنبية، ولا حجة ايضا للكتل النيابية التي يهيمن على تفكيرها اليوم الانتماء للعقيدة والمكون عند اي خطوة يمكنها انتاج تحالف مضاد لسلطة المالكي، هذه الخارطة لا شك انها تنتج جمهور تابع للمنتهز الاقوى وهي فطرة الشعوب لدى عالمنا الذي يشكل الجزء الشرقي من الخريطة العربية، تسويق المعارضين لدى تونس وليبيا ومصر على سبيل المثال لم يستطع ان يحدد مزاج الشارع بكيانه فحدث التغيير في تلك البلدان بعفوية طفقت ان لا تعيش دون كرامة، الناتج في بلدنا يوسف له لانه يضعنا امام نخبة لم تستطع لحد اللحظة من استغلال فشل "القائد" كي تخضع المواطن لنفسه، وليس للجماعة التابعة والمتأثرة</p>
64	Commentator	كلنا مكاريد
65	Commentator	كل عذا الكلام الصائب وتقول انك لست محللا سياسيا
66	Commentator	مشكلة "أعداء" المالكي ليست فقط الشخصية، وإنما سيرتهم أتخمت بأخطاء قاتلة
67	Commentator	كلنا مكاريد ربنا يا مرتضى
68	Commentator	استاذ سرمد , اصبت عين الحقيقة والواقع الذي يرفضه اعداء المالكي
69	Commentator	فعلا هذا ما يحدث الان ، وما سيحدث مستقبلا ، اذ لا يبدو على خصومه أنهم سيفهمون اللعبة
70	Commentator	كلامك مضبوط وكلنا حجبنا هالحجي
71	Commentator	مشكلة اعداء المالكي هو عدم وجود خبرة سياسية كافية لديهم لاسقاط المالكي
72	Commentator	تحالفوا ضده وحملوه وحده المسؤولين وهم شركاؤه في كل شيء في النجاح وفي الفشل
73	Commentator	<p>من لا يقدّم براهين كافية على حسن نواياه لا يصلح أن يكون معارضةً مُعتمَدةً .. أو بديلاً مناسباً .. لذا فالوضع الآن مُرشح لأن يستمر على حاله .. مع تغييرات نسبية ربما .. تحياتي أخي محمد</p>
74	Commentator	<p>وهناك جهة دعمت أكثر بعض الإعلاميين والمتقنين الذين يجبرون أي مصيبة في العراق ضد المالكي فحسبهم الناس أن لهم مشكلة شخصية مع المالكي بس إلا، كانوا يتغاضون مع المخطئين والمفسدين الآخرين، بل كانوا "يتورعون" عن الحديث عن الإرهابيين استعداداً للناس على المالكي</p>
75	Commentator	http://alhayat.com/Details/505780 هذا تقرير ممتاز عن النتائج
76	Commentator	<p>اعتقد ان هناك عدة عوامل ادت الى بقاء تحالف المالكي محافظا على ما بيده الاول استخدام الورقة الطائفية لجذب الناخب ثانيا استخدام ورقة التعيينات وخاصة العسكرية وهذا ما حصل فعلا في محافظة كربلاء من قبل صهره اذ قام بتعين ما يقارب 6000 شخص في سلك الشرطة وحيث اخذ عليهم العهود والمواثيق وهددهم بطردهم من هذه الوظيفة في حال لم يتم انتخابه هم وعوائلهم وتم تعيين هؤلاء منذ اكثر من 6 اشهر ثالثا استخدام المال العام في شراء الناخب رابعا خصومه الذين افادوه كثيرا وهناك عدت امور اخرا الا انه ومع ذلك لم يحفظ على ما بيده كم سبق حيث فقد الكثير من المقاعد حسب اطلاعي</p>

77	Commentator	اتمنى اسمع رد النائب صباح الساعدي على نجاح دولة القانون في الانتخابات الحالية
78	Commentator	شباب الي في بغداد احد عنده تصور عن توزيع المقاعد ولو تقريبي ؟
79	Commentator	أنت رجل حدوس يا أبا الطيب ..نعم لقد قام أعداء المالكي برفع شعبيته الى أعلى درجاته بعد قام خصومه بواسطة خطابهم الطائفي المنتشج بأظهاره الخطر الأكبر على طائفة معينة و هذا ما ولد تعلق كبير من أبناء الطائفة الأخرى بالمالكي كمدافع عنهم وعن طائفتهم ..مودتي
80	Commentator	ربما سيخسر المالكي نسبة مهمة من مقاعد مجالس المحافظات التي يسيطر عليها حالياً لكن ليس بالقدر الذي يعكس فشله الذريع في الارتقاء بواقعها الخدمي ولا الإحباط الشعبي من جراء تصرفات أتباعه وهو ما يعد نصراً كبيراً بحد ذاته وكل ذلك بفضل غياب معارضيهِ وافتقارهم للرؤية والمشروع البديل,,,
81	Commentator	لم يفوز ... ولو تقيس بمعدل الناس التي أنتخبت المفروض 13 مليون ناخب ولم ينتخبوا إلا 3 ملايين وحسب رقابة تموز
82	Commentator	تعوزنا الثقافة الانتخابية يا اصدقاء . . وشعبنا يفك بطريقة جمعية !!
83	Commentator	مختار العصر (صكار السنة) طالما هذه ثقافة القاعدة الجماهيرية الاكبر حتى اذا لم يرشح (لولاية اخرى الذي ياتي بعده (هل الكعك من هل عجينة) قد يكون الذي تتمناه لبلدك عندما تنتخب ابنتك زوجه التي صبغت اصبعها في هذه الانتخابات هذه ليس تشائماً انه الواقع ايها الطيب
84	Commentator	استاذ محمد هيجل الطريقة الي يحسب بيه الاصوات هي طريقة سانت ليغو وتتخلص بما يلي اولا يتم حساب عدد الاصوات الصحيحة المدلى بها لكل قائمه ثانيا يتم ترتيب القوائم للكيانات السياسية حسب الاصوات ثالثا يتم تقسيم الاصوات الصحيحة التي حصلت عليها القوائم على الاعداد الفرديه (1-3-5-7....) حتى نحصل على نتائج قسمه تعادل عدد المقاعد المخصصه للدائره بعد ترتيب النتائج من الاعلى الى الادنى توزيع المرشحين ولا يعاد ترتيب المرشحين داخل القائمه المفتوحه استنادا الى عدد الاصوات التي حصل عليها كل مرشح اذا تساوى مرشحان او اكثر في القائمه الواحد بعدد الاصوات فيتم تخصيص المقاعد بينهم وفقا لتسلسلهم في قائمه الكيان هذا الملخص لعمليه سانت ليغو وهي تخدم الاحزاب الصغيره
85	Commentator	بشر في صح وستين صح
86	Commentator	انتقاد اخطاء الحاكم من حقوق المواطن بل من واجباته ولا عبرة لازدياد شعبيته او نقصانها..مع ان شعبية المالكي ازدادت لعدة اسباب اهمها ولع العراقيين بالحاكم القوي وانبهارهم بالاعلام الموجه..ولا ننسى قيامه باللعب على الوتر الطائفي الذي نجح فيه الى ابعاد الحدود واسباب اخرى قد لا يتسع المجال لها الان..تحياتي

87	Commentator	لست مع هذا المنطق أبو الطيب الحبيب.. ببساطة لأنه ينطبق على صدام مثلاً، والأسد، ومبارك والقذافي ووووووو... انصار المالكي هم الذين انطلت عليهم لعبة شيطنة الآخر.. كل خصوم المالكي، بالنسبة له ولجمهوره، هم مجرد شياطين وقتلة وارهابيين، هكذا تم تصوير الأمر لجمهوره، وجمهوره صوت له بناء على ذلك.
89	Commentator	ههه ابو الطيب والله دوخهم المالكي يعادوه عداوتهم تحسب لصالحه بصالحه تمشي الامور لصالحه ويكولون الناس الحمد لله الامور زينه وبالاخير بيغه احسن من غيره
90	Commentator	مع الاحترام للآراء الضد من كلام محمد غازي إلا إن الامر هو وللأسف هكذا، اذكر مقالا رائعا لأحمد عبد الحسين وهو الناقد الاخطر، قال فيه ان المالكي محظوظ بخصومه، استاذ عبد الخالق الجميل نقد المالكي افتقد للموضوعية في اغلبه الموضوعية التي تستوجب رؤية المشاهد من كل زواياه، حتى تصور البعض من المهوسين بنظرية المؤامرة انه نقد مدفوع الثمن.. احترامي للجميع
91	Commentator	لقد اصبت عين الحقيقة. لقد بنى خصوم المالكي برج شعبيته بتاريخهم السيء القاسي حينما ملكو سلطة ولو جزئية واخطائهم المتكرره .\سلمت
92	Commentator	اتفق جدا أخي محمد.... هذا هو رأيي منذ زمن بعيد وما زال
93	Commentator	انا متفق معك تماما لعب الصديرون في اللحظة الاخيره رقصة موت عل تعديل قانون المساءله والعداله لكنها لم تقدمهم لقد ساعد اعداء المالكي خصمهم كثيرا وللأسف أقول بكل مرارة المالكي افضل من جميع خصومه الكبار اعني الاحزاب الطائفية الأخرى شيعة وسنة
94	Commentator	المالجي لعبه صح
95	Commentator	صح
96	Commentator	صدقت ابا الطيبخسر كل من كان له ندا
97	Commentator	المالكي افضل قطعة في الباله
98	Commentator	من صفات الحاكم الحقيقي ان يحاول ارضاء كل شعبه.
99	Commentator	محلل مضبوط

E. Second Facebook Comment-thread

Link: https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=788332457858876&id=100000463883800&stream_ref=10#!/damad.s/posts/709674535722888?stream_ref=10

No.	Interlocutors	Comments
1	Post-author	قيل لصدام سابقاً حاور قادة المعارضة من الشيعة، فقال كيف احاور خونة يحملون السلاح مع الجيش الإيراني ويقتلون أبناء بلدهم.. اليوم يجلس مكان صدام من يرفضون الحوار مع الآخر تحت نفس الذريعة، وهذا يعني بأن دوامة العنف ستبقى تلتهمنا داخل هذا البلد الفخ.
2	Commentator	يذكر أحدهم أنهم بعثوا لمبعوث لصدام وتم طرده من صدام وقالوا له تعال ننسى الماضي
3	Commentator	لا يوجد حل الا حرق هذا البلد الفخ
4	Commentator	استر يلي بتستر
5	Commentator	صح لسانك
6	Commentator	بلد فخ
7	Commentator	المشكلة ليست طائفية كما وصفت بل هي سلطوية اقتصادية
8	Commentator	عندما نكره الدكتاتور ونعشق الدكتاتورية ستستمر المهزلة مهما تغيرت وجوه المهرجين على خشبتها.....
9	Commentator	لا حوار مع من يرفض وجودي كأ انسان بناء على هويتي بالولادة
10	Commentator	لغة الحوار معدومه ومازالوا بنفس الحس يعيشون ومازالوا يعتبرون انفسهم في دور المعارضة مازالوا متقمصين شخصية المعارض رغم زوال صدام ... فكم نحتاج الى مثل نيلسون مانديلا وكم نحتاج الى مثل غاندي ... لا يتكررون
11	Commentator	شتان بين المعارضتين أولاً، وقد حاورت جهات عدة المعتصمين ومنهم محافظ الأنبار ولم يجد نفعاً، هم لا يريدون حلاً، والدليل حتى هذه الساعة لا أحد يعرف قيادتهم من هي ولا مطالبهم ما هي
12	Commentator	سعدون العزيز .. الله لا يكلها ... نريد فسحة امان للي يجون وانا على الاقل
13	Commentator	هذه ليست معادلة عادلة ، لا المالكي بكل فسادة وقتله يشبه صدام ، ولا " الشيعة " واعتذر لانني اسمي الاشياء بمسمياتها مارسوا نفس العنف الذي مارسه السنة ..
14	Commentator	صدك بلد "فخ"
15	Commentator	لا ادري متى يرتاح هذا الشعب ويشوف حاله..كل عمرنا حروب ومعارك وانتصارات على ابناء جلدتنا واهلنا مع كل الاسرف..تسلم عزيزي كانك في قلبي..تحياتي.
16	Commentator	ما اشبه اليوم بالبارحة.

17	Commentator	مقارنة غير عادلة بين ناس كانت تريد لقمة عيش وحرية كلمة وديكتاتور لايتكرر مثل صدام جمعهم في مقابر جماعية ..وبين ناس لهم مايملتهم في الحكومة والبرلمان ولديهم الكثير ولكن مجموعة من القتلة أذهبت بصيرتهم ..هذا ليس حبا بالمالكي ولكن غباء معارضيه جعله فلتة زمانه
18	Commentator	لم يحاور صدام الشيعة لأنه يعلم انهم سيقولون نحن الأكثرية ونريد ان نحكم ...ولم يحاور من يجلس مكان صدام السنة لأن السنة اليوم يقولون نحن الأولى منكم بللحكم فنحن نحكمكم منذ قام العراق كحاضرة عربيةوستبقى جدلية الحاكم والمحكوم في العراق الى ان يرث الله الأرض...
19	Commentator	انت كاتب ومحاور مرموق لكن عليك ان تكون منصفاً في مقارناتك يا صديقي فتاريخ الامس هو غير تاريخ اليوم وانت ادري ان الفرق كبير بين الديمقراطية والدكتاتورية ..لكنكم العالم كله مع صدام ضد المعارضة و...من هي المعارضة في تلك الفترة؟! وهل بطشت المعارضة بأبناء جلدتهم من أبناء شعبهم
20	Commentator	هل نواجه في العراق مشاكل مستعصية؟ وما الجبوح التي تمتعنا بها لفترة قصيرة جدا لم تكن من صنع ساستنا
21	Commentator	على مايبدوا أن (الحق) أمر تقديري يختلف من فرد ل آخر!
22	Commentator	الجلوس مع من يعرف الحوار وليس مع الذباحين ,, شاكر وهيب الارهابي اللي فطس تحاور من مجموعة السواق على الطريق !!ماذا فعل نحرهم لانهم اخطأوا في اوقات الصلوات واعدادها ,, اي كلام هذا
23	Commentator	من يمتلك في هذا البلد ولو شيئا من القوة .امسى يحسب نفسه انه صار قبان كفه الحق,وكل الآخرين هم اصحاب كفه الباطل .
24	Commentator	اختلف وياك اخ محسن لان الجماعة كل مايروح احد للتفاوض يصعد سقف المطالب واول من يصرح ارتفاع سقف المطالب قناة الجزيرة بعدها المتظاهرون والاحداث كلها قريبة والتاريخ مو بعيد حتى نقول تم تحريره ولا تنسى الاعمال الارهابية التي تدار من المخيمات ... مع خالص تقديري لك واني دائما اتابع منشوراتك
25	Commentator	خوفي ان يكون كل هذا فلم هندي الغاية منه جر كل من لينزوي وراء طائفته وفي النهاية ولد الخايبه ماكلينها
26	Commentator	صدام يحاور ويقتل كما حاور البرزاني وقتله والمعارضه كانت ترفض الحوار معه لعلمهم بغدر هدام اما اليوم الحكومه تدعوا للحوار لكن الطرف الاخر يناور رجل بالدوله ورجل مع الارهاب واليتوب ملئ بصور الخونه
27	Commentator	لا اعرف الغاية من اصراركم ان الحكومة لم تحاور المعتصمين ؟لم يبقى الا العاهل السعودي يدخل طرف مفاوض
28	Commentator	في وقت صدام لم تكن الشرعية للديمقراطية، بل كانت الشرعية للثورة، وبالنسبة لصدام وزبانيته، كنت انا - باعتباري كنت من افراد حزب الدعوة في منتصف الثمانينات - عميلاً لإيران التي تريد أن تُسقط الثورة العربية الكبرى
29	Commentator	لم يتغير شيء . بالتغيير سقطت السلطة . وبقي النظام . نحن امام نفس ظاهرة الاستبداد . وبنفس أدواته . فقط تغيرت بعض مفرداته . هناك كان يستخدم مفردة رفيق هنا مولاي . هذا هو التغيير الجوهرى . هناك كان يطول شواربه على شكل ^ ألأن يطمع جبهته بفحمة سوده , كي يقولوا عنه مومن . وهكذا مهزله , الانتهازية متحصرة دائماً لتتلون مع كل نظام . لاندرى بعد سقوط هذا النظام ماذا سنرى من تقلبات جديدة .
30	Commentator	انا مع فكرة الطرح التي اردت بها الاستدلال الى منطق التعقل والمحاوره بدل السلاح . ولكن في فترة صدام حكم مركزي دكتاتوري مغيب والان المحافظات تحكم نفسها بابنائها ضمن الحكومات المحليه ولهم ممثلهم في البرلمان والمركز ولكن الشأن العراقي ليس بيد اهله يمتلك زمامه عدة اطراف خارجيه منها قاسم سليماني والاستخبارات السعودية والمال القطري والخطط التركية ولن تقوم للجهلة قائمه مالم يتمسكو بوطنيتهم وينسون من يقاتلون بالانابه عنهم
31	Commentator	ستبقى رياح الطائفه تعصف بهذا البلد المنكوب لفرته لا احسبها قصيره ,ان كانت رياح طبعيه تخرج من خزين الطائفه الموجود في وجدان هذا الشعب او تلك الرياح الاصطناعيه والتي تولدها مراوح الطائفه والتي تغذيها طاقات الاطماع واللهات خلف

		عرش الحكم.
32	Commentator	كيف يحاورون من يرفض الحوار ؟؟؟ ثم كل الطلبات التي تم تحقيقها وتقول حوار !!!!!!! غريب رأيك استاذ سعدون
33	Commentator	وهل قاتل المعتصمون جبشهم تحت راية دولة اجنبية كما فعل حزب الدعوة كن منصفاً
34	Commentator	من للابرياء ممن حوصروا بين تهديدات داعش وبين تجاهل الحكومة واصرارها على السلاح
35	Commentator	لا يمكن المقارنة بين المعارضتين.. بل لا يصح اصلاً إطلاق صفة المعارضه مع ناس موجودين في البرلمان ولديهم وزراء في الحكومة ويديرون محافظتهم بأيديهم وفوق كل هذا يكونون حواضن لداعش.
	Commentator	انور السادات قبل استقالة اعضاء الحكومة المصرية المختلفين معه (الأخوانجية) اودعهم السجن .. عمل تصفية ابو اسراء مأكدر يسوي الي سواء انور السادات .. للخصومه اكثر منهم (متحدون) لأنه المشهد العراقي انقسامات داخل انقسامات !!
36	Commentator	صدقت ورب الكعبة الذي لا اعيدده
37	Commentator	است.. ماذا؟
38	Commentator	اعتذر عن الرد على كل التعليقات، لكنني اتابعها جميعها واتشرف بها مهما كانت مختلفة معي او متهمه لي.. شكرا لكم، وادعوكم إلى التأمل ملياً في ما نسقط فيه جميعاً
39	Commentator	هناك فرق بين التجربتين .. تحياتي صديقي لان المقاربة بينهما غير موضوعية .
40	Commentator	عموماً كعلمانيين نحن يجب ان نتخذ موقف حضاري بخصوص ما يحصل . المروجيين للحملة و المعارضين لها هم يعانون ازمة تقديس الموروث الفكري . ف علينا ان نوعي اهلنا الناس المقربين المتحمسين ل تداعيات هذه الازمة ان صح التعبير . و نقول لهم العلمانية هي الحل .
41	Commentator	الكثير منا لا يعرف ما يدور داخل قرى المناطق الغربية، لا نعرف ماذا يفعل الجنود والضباط هناك، كيف يتعاملون مع النساء، مع الأطفال، نجلس هنا ونفرح بتدخل الجيش دون ان نكلف انفسنا عناء التروي، ونحن نعلم كيف تعامل الجيش مع متظاهري 25 شباط وامام عدسات الكاميرات
42	Commentator	الكلام صحيح ودقيق ولا اعنفد هو رأي علماني بقدر ما هو رأي عام يشترك به ارجو عدم حصر الاسلاميين بشخص او حزب
43	Commentator	نفس الجيش الذي حبس هادي المهدي ومجموعة من الناشطين في صندوق الهمر، لأنهم خرجوا معترضين على سوء الخدمات، ولم يفرق بينهم وبين الارهابيين، كيف نتوقع بأنه سيفرق بين المواطنين العزل وبين ارهابيي داعش والقاعدة.. ادعوا جميع من يفضل تدخل العسكر على الحوار أن يفكر بالأطفال والشبية والعجائز والنساء
44	Commentator	مقارنة غير منصفة ولا موضوعية... المعارضة السابقة لم تفجر في الشوارع ولم تغرق الشوارع في الدماء وكانت لها مطالب واضحة تتعلق بالديمقراطية والمشاركة السياسية... المعارضة الحالية ارباب اعمى يشتغل لأجندات دولية متعددة الأطراف ولا يمتلك أي رادع أخلاقي وقد رفضوا كل محاولات الحوار ولا يقبلون إلا أن يعود كليب حيًا. ولن يعود!!
45	Commentator	لا اتفق مع تحليلك واستنتاجك سعدون لأنك تساوي بين معارضي صدام والقاعدة ليس هكذا الامور تساق

46	Commentator	سنقبل هذه المقاربة استاذ سعدون الغالي فيما لو تساوى الواقعين واقع دكتاتورية صدام وواقع صندوق الاقتراع .. لا معارضة مسلحة مع وجود ديمقراطية الا المعارضة السياسية السلمية ... لنخلي بلدنا اولاً من القاعدة وغيرها من المسميات الاخرى عندها وعندما يكون الاعتراض من دون فوهة بنقوية سنضعه فوق رؤوسنا ... نحن امام حالة تهديد الامن القومي للعراق استاذ سعدون وتقبل تحياتي
47	Commentator	للأبرياء حكومة محلية وحكومة اتحادية والحكومتين جاءت باصوات الأبرياء اللذين فوضوا بمنع كل سلاح خارج اطار الشرعية ان يهدد وجودهم تحت اي ذريعة
48	Commentator	سعدون مخطيء 100%
49	Commentator	كن منصفاً أخي ابا غيث ،،،،
50	Commentator	هل تتحاور مع من يتمنى لو يذبحك؟
51	Commentator	إنها ليست مخيمات اعتصام وليس لها مطالب مشروعة وإنما تمثل اجندات خارجية وارهابين والغرض منها جر العراق الى صراع طائفي أما ما تقوله أخي سعدون من هل نقبل الاعتداء على الشيوخ والاطفال والنساء طبعاً لا نقبل ولكن هل تقبل يومياً عشرات الانفجارات في العراق
52	Commentator	يسمح لأي أحد انا لست مع المالكي ولكن ليس هناك وجه للمقارنة لان صدام لم ومطالبهم لا الها راس بالمشاركة في الحكم والاداره وهؤلاء تارسين المنطقة الخضراء والحكومة جزعت من ولارجلين ويقتلون الشعب والأبرياء ويتبنون ذلك بشكل رسمي المفاوضات فكلارك ومقارنتك في غير محلها اعتقد ذلك
53	Commentator	الانباريون في الحرس فلتسل الدماء لكن لا استسلام للإرهابيين، ألم يكن هؤلاء الجمهوري الصدامي يذبحون أبناء الانتفاضة؟
54	Commentator	لا احد يطالب الحكومة بان تتحاور مع داعش او القاعدة، لكن مع السياسيين الذي تعتبرهم خونة وبعثيين وعملاء، وهو ما قاله صدام عن قادة المعارضة
55	Commentator	ومن الذي اجبر الجيش على التدخل بعد سنة من الأنتظار وطلب المفاوضات وعمل ما يعمل كما تقول استاذ سعدون!! هل يجب ترك القاعدة تغني من على منابر ساحات الاعتصام سنة اخرى لتسيل دماء عراقية اخرى كي لا يحس البعض بظلم الجيش له !!!
56	Commentator	الاخ بهجت مو يتمنى يذبحك هو يذبحنا يوميا
57	Commentator	لا اعتقد بان المقارنة منصفه...توجد اخطاء لآباس من ذكرها وابداء الراي في طريقة تصرف الحكومة دون المقارنة مع المقبور وزمانه العفن..مع محبتي واحترامي للاستاذ سعدون ضمد.
58	Commentator	الاخ سعدون بواد والشعب العراقي بواد اخر,, للأسف لم ينتفض الاخ سعدون حين تعالت الاصوات القبيحة من على منصات الفتنة تطالب بذبج (الصفويين و المجوس) اي (الشيعة) و قطع رؤوسهم و تسميتهم (بالخنازير) و(الحية الرقطاء) ,,, حقا" عالم غريب عجيب يعلو فيه صوت الباطل وتصفق له الايادي الخبيثة
59	Commentator	كل ما نتمناه القاعدة هو ان تتجح يدفعنا للخلط بينها وبين سنة العراق، وها نحن نخلط وننفعل ونبحث عن الثار
60	Commentator	أستاذ سعدون: ارجو منك متابعة قناة السيد النجيفي رئيس البرلمان وبعدها انا متأكد ستغير رأيك.
61	Commentator	هم عملاء آل سعود و هم لم يؤمنوا يوما بالعراق
62	Commentator	عزيزي سعدون... السلطة والحكام... منبثقة من مكونات هذا الشعب.... وقد انعم الله على شعبنا بأن جعل نسبة كبيره منه تتمتع بنعمة الطائفية..... فلا تستغرب فعلة السلاطين والحكام.. من امثال صدام..... و.....نوري ...

63	Commentator	ابو غيث ولماذا الحوار مع الاخر وهو اساسا شريك في العملية السياسية .. شريك في الحكومة والبرلمان والقضاء .. فهل تصح بعد ذلك المقارنة بين ما رفضه صدام وبين سياسيين منتخبين شعبيا ؟؟ تحياتي لك
64	Commentator	من يخلط بين سنة العراق والقاعدة فهو جاهل. وبنفس الوقت على كل سنة العراق اتخاذ موقف واضح وحدي من القاعدة. البعض فعل فعلا...
65	Commentator	لا حوار...وان جلسوا لطاوله حوار لن يتحاوروا لأن كلا الطرفين غير جادين في بناء دولة قائمة على التسامح وقوة القانون وصارت الطبقة السياسية طبقة فاسدة تنتج جيشا من الجراد يأكل لحمنا وقوتنا يوميا
66	Commentator	المالكي رئيس حكومة والقائد العام للقوات المسلحة ومن واجبه حماية الشعب من القتل والمجرمين وجميعنا قرأنا وكتبنا عنه عندما تحت انفجارات وارهاب وقتل والمالكي لا يحرك ساكنا نحتاج الى قائد عسكري مثل السيسي يم لا السجون بكل من يعتدي على الشعب والجيش والشرطة
67	Commentator	هناك اناس لا تتعلم الامن تجاربها وقد ابتلانا الله بهم وسنظل ندفع الثمن
68	Commentator	كافي مزادات سعدون ،،، القوات الامنية لا تستهدف السنة بل السنة صاحو الغوث من احمد العلواني وامثله والعشائر في الانبار اغلبها مع القضاء على الارهاب وليس مع التجيبي وامثاله الذين يستغلون السنة فقط دون الاهتمام بمستقبلهم ..
69	Commentator	كانت أمة عربية أيام صدام ثم صارت امة إسلامية وهابية هم ساقطون
70	Commentator	نحتاج إلى حكومة أقوى من استفزازات داعش، حكومة تعمل وفق استراتيجية بعيدة المدى، لا وفق استراتيجية مرتبطة بالانتخابات
71	Commentator	لا اوافقك المعطيات تختلف تماما وقرائتك غير دقيقة
72	Commentator	لا اريد ان اعتقد بدل سعدون لكن هي مقارنة فقط اكيد مع الفارق بين صدام وداعش من جهة والاحزاب الحاكمة النتيجة المراد الوصول لها بغض النظر الاحزاب والاشخاص من كان يعيب على صدام افعاله عليه ان لا ياتي بمثلها وهنا يشار لنقطة مهمة وهي الحوار ننفذ للحوار لاننا اقوياء لو كانت الحكومة ضعيفة لقبلت الحوار لكن عندما تقوت واصبح لها جيش قوي ترفض الحوار هذه نقطة مهمة علينا التوقف عندها
73	Commentator	استاذ سعدون لانخلط ولاهم يحزنون المطلوب من السنه ان يفرزوا انفسهم عن القاعدة ويتبرعوا مما فعله صدام ولن يفعلوا هسه اذا كانوا خافين من القاعده والبعثيين فذنبهم على جنبهم واذا كانوا هم قاعده وبعثيين فيستاهلون الاكثر
74	Commentator	أي تهاون الآن و سيكون مصير العراق أسوأ من سوريا
75	Commentator	اخ سعدون اي استفزازات هذه ! تقصد المفخاخات اليومية و الاحزمة الناسفة وقطع الرؤوس !! هل يوجد اكبر من هذه الاستفزازات؟؟
76	Commentator	اخ سعدون ؟؟؟ ماهكذا يتم عرض الامور فالموضوع وان كان به خلطا للوراق ولعبا بالنار الراكدة ولكن الرد كان ضروري
77	Commentator	الى كل الاصدقاء الذين يقولون بان الحكومة تعبت من الحوار، ادعوهم الى مراجعة الاحداث وسيجدون بان الحوار لم يحدث، ذهب الشهرستاني وقابل جهات لم تفرزها ساحات الاعتصام وكذلك فعل وزير الدفاع، وهذا خطأ جسيم، اذا اردت ان تتحاور فتحاور مع اصحاب الشأن حتى لو كنت تحتقرهم
78	Commentator	متى كان الأنباريون عراقيين؟ هم غالبيتهم بعثيون ساندوا عربان الأردن و فلسطين
79	Commentator	سعدون لا تكن محامي الإرهابيين
80	Commentator	ضياح الحكمة والعقل لدى الطرفين دمر العراق وسيمسح من الخريطة مع الاسف
81	Commentator	اذن هل توجد جهة معترف بها من قبل ساحات الاعتصام لكي تفاوض؟

82	Commentator	هم لا يعرفون حوار لأنهم فقط يريدون الحكم لا أكثر
83	Commentator	عندما لم تكن هناك شرعية للديمقراطية في زمن صدام وكانت الشرعية للثورة جاءت أمريكا وصارت الثورة لأنها ربما أدركت بيقين أنها ستكون ثورة إسلامية بحكم انهيار وتشرد كل القوى الوطنية
84	Commentator	قل أن على الحكومة أن لا تزج بالخطاب الديني في الصراع لكن كيف تحاور من يفخخ و يكبر ؟
85	Commentator	التوقيت لتدخل الجيش مصمم على قياس المرشحين من الجهتين الطائفتين ، لامصلحة لنا في اغفال من يريد استقرازا لنعود كرة ثلاثة ننتخب الطائفة وممثليها المتخمين .
86	Commentator	اخ سعدون لا تدع معارضتك للملكي وحزبه في سياساته ان تكون محاميا "لدا عش و التنظيمات الارهابية التي تتفخر بقتلها للعراقيين كل يوم من دون ان تعي ذلك
87	Commentator	اخوان انتظرو صلاة الجمعة من الصحن الحسيني وستجدون خطاب ممثلي المرجعية لا يبتعد التذكير بالحوار لانها الوسيلة الوحيدة للعبور بالبلد لا يقصد داعش انما الجهات السياسية من المكونات كافة لدينا ثلاث مكونات اذا ما ارادت النجاة بالبلد عليها التحاور في المشاكل والابتعاد عن تجبيش الشعوب والطوائف فقط ضرب الارهابيين
89	Commentator	للأسف سعدون حسبت أنك كنت ستكون أكثر صرامة و تدعم الجيش العراقي
90	Commentator	في بداية عمليات الثار للقائد الشهيد او عمليات وادي حوران، كادت داعش ان تنتهي، لكن ما حصل مع ساحات الاعتصام فتح امامها منفذا مهما، وهاهي تتغلغل مع الاسف
91	Commentator	أخي الجهات النافذة السنية تشعل النار للحصول على تنازلات
92	Commentator	كان على الحكومة أن لا تفتح أكثر من جبهة، كان عليها ان تحاصر ساحات الاعتصام لتمنع لجوء داعش اليها، ثم تستنفذ السبل مع المعتصمين، وتنتهي من الداعشين وبعد ذلك لكل مقام مقال، أما أن تفتح النار على كل الجهات فهي بذلك تشبه الطفل الذي يحمل السلاح ولا يعرف كيف يسيطر على نيرانه
93	Commentator	وشنو الفرق واحد يحمل سلاح مع الجيش الايراني ويقتلني والاخر مع الارهاب ويقتلني ---
94	Commentator	من يعمل من فخري كريم ,, نتوقع منه اكثر من هذا الهراء
95	Commentator	ولكل منتفعين ونهازي الفرص وطبالين يقيمون نفس الحفل الذي كان يرقص فيه صدام الهدام المدمر الاول للعراق في القرن العشرين
96	Commentator	مجرد عقد مقارنة بين صدام والماكي هي عملية استخفاف بعقول العراقيين ,,
97	Commentator	اليوم اكثر الناس سعادة هم الطائفيين من سياسيي الشيعة والسنة، لم يعد عليهم ان يبرروا فشلهم او جرائمهم، كل ما عليهم ان يفعلوه هو الصراخ وتوزيع الاتهامات والتخوين
98	Commentator	الاخ والصديق سعدون...المقارنة عبر صحيحة وخاطئة تماما...كيف يمكن مقارنة الوضع الحالي رغم كل سيئاته وعيوبه بنظام الدكتاتور المجرم صدام حسين الذي اباد العراقيين بالكيمياوي والمقابر الجماعية ؟ هل يعقل هذا؟ اما عن الآخر فاعتقد ان الجميع ممثل بالبرلمان العراقي والحكومة وباقي مفاصل الدولة وبالامكان عبر الاليات الديمقراطية والدستورية ان تصل اي كتلة او اي طرف اخر الى السلطة لتحقيق برامجها واهدافها. اما اذا كان الاخر هو الجماعات المسلحة المتشددة والداعشية فلا يمكن مقارنتها بالمعارضة الشيعية ايام حكم النظام السابق . وهذه الجماعات لاتؤمن اساسا بالعملية السياسية ولا بالتفاوض ولا تعرف غير القتل وسفك الدماء ،وبالتالي فلا يمكن التفاوض معها...اعتذر للاطالة.
99	Commentator	الاخ سعدون هذا المقطع هدية لك و اللي يكول ماكو داعي للعمليات في الانبار http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QQbQD3rF0PQ

100	Commentator	العار والشنار على كل عراقي يحاول ان يقف اليوم على الحياض والعراق يواجه أعتى المجرمين والسفاحين .. ألم تحرك ضمائرنا اشلاء الضحايا التي ملأت شوارع العراق من أقصاه الى أقصاه؟؟ تركتم المجرمين ومسكتكم بتلابيب الضحية؟؟
101	Commentator	ليس بصحيح من رفضو الحوار سابقا هم نفس الخونة الذين يرفضون الحوار بذريعة ان الحكومة ايرانيه والعراقيين بدئو يعرفون من هو المصلح ومن هو المجرم ومن هو مسيس من قبل حكومات خليجية كافره اسرائيليه
102	Commentator	مرة اخرى يتم خلط الأوراق، انا لست ضد اعتقال العلواني، انا ضد طريقة الاعتقال، الآن اصبح العلواني بطلا والجميع يطالب باطلاق سراحه، واخوه الذي يقول عنه القضاء بانه اراحي اصبح شهيدا لدى الكثير من الناس، لماذا لم تستقد الحكومة مما حدث في الحويجة؟
103	Commentator	اذن نعترف الان بلين العلواني مجرم و اراحي و يستحق الاعتقال , هذه خطوة مباركة اخ سعدون
104	Commentator	استغرب هذا الكلام من مثقف مطلع... عزيزي استاذ سعدون .. اتعيش في العراق ام جزر الواق واق... قليلا من الموضوعية يا اخي.
105	Commentator	نفس الاسطوانة تكرر من قبل المهيمنين على كل شيء بمختلف العصور يعني بالشعبي يكولون عل هل الرنه طحينج ناعم
106	Commentator	لا اعتقد الامر يختلف عليه اثنان مطالب المعتصمين هي عودة الامور الى نصابه اي اعادة الحكم السابق بكل طائيفته واجرامه والامر من الواضح لايحتاج الى توضيح لست مع احد لكن لا بد من وقفه وقرار لغلق ملف دمر الكثير من طاقات البلد المعطلة اصلا طرحك في بداية الامر استاذ سعدون كان بهذا الاتجاه ماحدا بما بدا خالص تحياتي
107	Commentator	استاذ سعدون لاشك انك اعلامي تعمل بفضائية الحرة وطالما تحاورت مع عشرات الشخصيات السياسية والدينية العشائرية القريبة من الساحات والتي لها امتدادات في عمق المشهد الانباري الم يسرك او سرب لك احدهم من راس الاعتصام؟ الجهة المخولة بالتفاوض؟ سمع وطاعة المتظاهرين وانقيادهم لمن لحزب لمرجعيه لمحقل*
108	Commentator	السياسة فن الممكن والمراوغة والدهاء ولكن مع الاسف من يملك القرار سواء من الحاكم والمعارض لهم باع طويل في الغياب والنهب وممارسه في القتل والترويع
109	Commentator	هذه الاراء هي السبب الحقيقي الذي دعا بالحكومة -وانا اقول بجانبها الشيعي والسني- لاختيار هذا التوقيت. فالشيعة سينتخبون المالكي لأنه هو من يحمي الهوية المذهبية لهم، والسنة سينتخبون متحدون لأنهم هم من وقف بجانبهم في ايام المحنة، والضحية هو هذا الشعب المظلوم وإلا فمئذ سنتان ولدي احد اقاربي في الجيش العراقي يقول بان القاعدة بدأت ببناء مقراتها فأين كنتم يا ايها الحكومة الموقرة. مع جل اعتزازي للجيش البطل.
110	Commentator	السلام عليكم ...ان الحاكمين الجدد هم امتداد للنظام السابق ولكن الحالي مؤطر باطار اسلامي وهي وسيلة لخدا ع الجماهير البسيطة سوزان لنداوي عضوا ارتباط المخابرات الامريكية ومن على قناة روسيا اليوم اعلنت ان صدام قدم لامريكا كل التسهيلات على ان يصبح العراق كولاية من ولايات الامريكية على ان لا تطر به ولاكن الادارة الامريكية رفضت ذلك ...انتهى الكلام الى عضو ارتباط المخابرات الامريكية . السؤال لماذا والسبب يعود ان البطل القومي يجب ان ينتهي والبطل الطائفي هو الذي يجب ان ياتي بعد ان اعدا دا جيدا والان اعيد اغلب البعثيين وهم يحكمون تحت قيادة المالكي ودوره تقسيم العراق بعد ان قسم الشيعة والا امريكا تاتي به بدون مقابل واشعال المنطقة صراع مذهبي
111	Commentator	يا اخ سعدون تعترض على طريقة الاعتقال ولا تعترض على الشناتم الذي وجهها العلواني والوعود الذي اطلقها بقطع رؤوس الشيعة ولا تعترض على الاستقرازاات المستمرة للشيعة ولا تعترض على التحريض على قتل الجنود والشرطة . كل هذا وتعترض

112	Commentator	<p>اخوان يمكن انا (مصخن)!!!! اعتقد انا كنت اسير!!!!!! بس يمكن فقدت الذاكرة.. الذاكرة البعيدة والذاكرة القصيرة!! قابيل من!!!!!! هابيل من!!!!!!</p> <p>اروح انام والله احسن وقبل لا انام اقرأ سورة الفاتحة على ارواح ابن عمي الي راح فدوه للوطن سنة ١٩٩١ بدون جثة الى الان،واقرا الفاتحة على روح ابن خالي راح فدوه للوطن بمفخخة ولم يشاهد طفله الذي اتى بعد موته بأشهر،واقرا الفاتحة على روح جاري الشاب الصغير الذي ذهب تفجيراً!!!!</p> <p>بس ترى خطيه احمد العلواني لان جماعة المالكي لم يتحاوروا معه اثناء قتله للجنود وعت عيني على خيام المعتصمين الاطهار الابرار لأن جماعة المالكي دمروا اشجار الزيتون المزروعة قربها واخافوا حمام السلام البيضاء التي ترفرف فوق خيامهم!!!</p>
113	Commentator	<p>دومة العنف سوف تبقى لازال العقلية الطائفية معشعشة في عقولنا بدل من ان نوجه سهامن للفاسدين</p>
114	Commentator	<p>بالمباشر .. انت في طرحك هذا جعلت نفسك بين أمرين / اما جاهلا وغيبا .. أو خبيثا ولئيما ./ وقد قيل لكل جواد كيوه .</p>
115	Commentator	<p>لا تردد تفاهات سرمد الطائي الطرف الاخر من هشيم وهاني النجيفي وجميلة برفضون كل حاجه وباملائات عربات الخليج ويتمويل لذا ماذا تفعل مع الحيوان</p>
116	Commentator	<p>الاستاذ سعدون ضمد .. وهل يمكننا ان نتخلى عن تاريخنا المقدس الذي ننتمي اليه وباصرار نحن امة ننتمي للتاريخ...والحاكم اي كان يستعيد نفس الخطوات ويتخذ نفس الطريق ويختار نفس الاسماء . وتطلق عليه كل الالقاب . ونستمر نحن ندفع الثمن ارضاء لما يؤمنون به جميعا .. مع الود</p>
117	Commentator	<p>هي ساحات الاعتصام كلها داعش وعصابات البعث هاي هي الحقيقة واضحة ولكل يعرفه وحضرتك ايضاً ستاد سعدون تعرف ذلك ولكن ما ادري ليش في كتاباتك ونا من المتابعين لك لاحظ دائماً تحجب وظوح الحقيقة وما هو السبب ؟؟؟!!!! كل أنسان واعى ومتقف يعرف حقيقة زيف الاعتصامات وما وراءه هي عبارته عن مجاميع ارهابية لي للتغطية على ما يجري ويعمل في صحري الأنبار</p>
118	Commentator	<p>الرصافي كلمتني حينما قال اغسل يديك والمعاني اليوم اثبت نبؤه الرصافي رحمه الله</p>
119	Commentator	<p>أخ سعدون أي الموضوعية بالمقارنة بين زمنين ؟ هل كان يوجد في النظام السابق مجال للحوار والانتقاد وهل أعترف أبتداءً بوجود معارضة ؟ ثم هل تعتبر من يأوي داعش ويمدهم ويدعمهم معارضة .</p>
120	Commentator	<p>داعش صناعة امريكية والقاعدة صناعة امريكية وما يحصل هو لعبة لتاجيج الوضع الطائفيولا يتم حلها ما دام الامر الامريكان يفودون العملية السياسية</p>
121	Commentator	<p>الاخ سعدون .. كلامك اليوم غير دقيق فالسنة الشرفاء من أهالي الأنبار وغيرها حاوروا الحكومة واستجابوا واعانوا الحكومة وهم الان يقفون معها صفا واحدا .. ومن لم يقبل بالحوار فهم المتطرفون الارهابيون اعوان القاعدة وعملاء قطر والسعودية وهؤلاء لا يريدون غير تخريب البلد واسقاط العملية السياسية ... ولو قلت الحوار مع هؤلاء فلا حوار مع القاعدة وانت اعرف الناس بذلك فليس هم اهل حوار ولا نياتهم ولا افعالهم ولا اقوالهم تؤيد ذلك بل ماجرى في ساحات الاعتصام ومقاومة العلواني تؤيد ذلك ... واما قولك الحوار مع اشخاص تفرزهم ساحات الاعتصام فلم نر غير صيحات واناشد القاعدة والمتطرفون امثال اللافي وخميس ابو ريشه وغيرهم من القتلة الذين مثلوا بجثث العراقيين هؤلاء هم قادة خيم الاعتصام .. وبدلا من هذا الكلام الذي لا طائل وراءه فلنكتب شيئا لدعم القوات الأمنية وسعيها في القضاء على الارهاب لينعم العراق وشعب العراق بالامن والخير والسلام ... دمت موقفا</p>

122	Commentator	<p>الكرسي نفسه وقصور صدام بقيت...وقد تركها أو غاد البعث ليسكنها أو غاد اليوم...التاريخ نفسه فمن يسفه الناس سابقا تحت مسميات الخيانة والعماله...اليوم يجلس مكانه من يردد نغس الأسطوانه مع فارق بسيط فسابقا كانت كذبة القوميه واليوم كذبة الطائفه والذي لا يرى الشمس لا يسعه أن يرى أوضح الحقائق...لا تهاجمو من قال بل هاجمو ما قال إن شئتم...بوركت أخي سعدون ضمد</p>
123	Commentator	<p>لا أظن هناك مقارنة لأن اليوم الحوار موجود لكنه بلا نتيجة بسبب الغباء والفساد ونوعية النخب السياسية....في زمن صدام...لا حوار مع الشيعة البتة..لا وجه للمقارنة.. محبتي لك</p>

F. Third Facebook Comment-thread

Link: <https://www.facebook.com/alsumydaie68/posts/809043769123810>

No.	Interlocutors	Comments
1	Post-author	من المصدر الارقام من مصدر مطلع داخل المفوضية : القانون ٦٩ المواطن *٤٦ الاحرار ٣٢ متحدون ٣٣ الوطنية ١٤ علاوي) العربية ١١ (المطلق) البارتي ٢٨ الاتحاد ١٢ التغيير ١٠ الاتحاد الاسلامي ٥ البديل ٥ * الجماعة الاسلامية ٣ مترقة ٥١
2	Commentator	استاذ ابراهيم انت اعلامي معروف ابتعد عن الارقام اذا كنت غير متأكد عليك مراجعة حساباتك وكتابتك انا متابعت لك صرت اسم رائحة التناقض في قلمك وليس شخصك الترنج مع الوعود اشبه بالسراب مع لعبة اسمه السياسة ساطمناك ستعود حليلة لعادتها القديمة صدقني وانت تعرف ما اقصد كل واحد من الكتل عنده مرشح للناطق الرسمي ماشالله محد يوصلهم بالكلام فاسعى كي تحافظ على اسمك تحياتي ذكر ان تنفع الذكرى
3	Commentator	انا انشر تسريبات يتم تداولها في الأوساط السياسية ولم أزع منها لي هي
4	Commentator	انت رجل تعودنا على صدقك والرجاء الابتعاد عن التخمينات ومن المصادر المطلعة والغير مطلعه
5	Commentator	المقاعد ناقصة 100 ارجع احسب واجمع
6	Commentator	يعني التيار المدني تقصد بالمتفرقة ؟ جدي اكرو حلقات مفقودة بالحكاية مالتك ...
7	Commentator	دكتور .. المصدر يركز على الكبار
8	Commentator	ومن هم الكبار تجار الدم !!!! الكبار بسرقة البلد ام الكبار سنأااا عمرأا ام الكباااار بكبر كرووووشهم من اموال الشعب !!! ما فهمت يعني كبار بالاستحواذ ع السلطة غصبا عن انوفنا وصغااااارا بعقولهم لانهم للاسف كل هالسنوات ما عرفوا يصنعون لانفسهم غير حقد وكراهيه ودمار للبلد
9	Commentator	كبار على حساب دم وممتلكات الشعب العراقي ولكن الله فوقهم واكبر من الجميع رغم انوفهم ومعتقداتهم العفنه
10	Commentator	يعني التحالف المدني شكذ؟
11	Commentator	بروح ابوك تتمنى المالك ياخذ الولاية الثالثة مو ؟

12	Commentator	طبعا لا
13	Commentator	انشاءالله ثالثة
14	Commentator	الولاية الثالثة حلم للمالكي لن يتم تحقيقه انشاءالله وعشم ابليس بالجنة
15	Commentator	انا أشكك جدا بهذه الأرقام المدني الديمقراطي لكان له حسب ارقامك ١١ مقعد ...تبخرت...تحياتي
16	Commentator	ليست أرقام
17	Commentator	المالكي يصعد بعد.... أكثر من نشر امس
18	Commentator	مبروك لكل من يفوز بثقة الشعب والبرلمان
19	Commentator	قصدي امس كان ٥٥ المواطن والمالكي ٦٥ اعتقد رح تكبر الفجوة بالعدد يس نريد نعرف توقعك للتحالفات وهل الجيش مشمول بهالارقامممنون
20	Commentator	بالمناسبه امس على الحره لاول منذ سنين اسمعك تقول امنيات وليس تحليل
21	Commentator	تحليل دقيق جداً
22	Commentator	الايام سنثبت انا منذ سنين متابعة لاول مره اختلف مع تحليلك ننتظر قادم الايام . تحياتي
23	Commentator	هاي اخبار بيثها احمد الجلي لاتخليهن يعبرن عليك حبيب غلبي .
24	Commentator	وردت الي بنفس الوقت الذي وردت اليه وتأخرت في النشر
25	Commentator	احتمال لهذا السبب انا تصورتها منه تحياتي
26	Commentator	تره ماصايره بتاريخ العالم. ياناس ياعالم دولة القانون الهه جمهوره القوي وشعبيتهه وحسب التوقعات راح تتجاوز ال ٩٠ مقعد ويجي واحد مايندل حلگه من خشمه يحجي ويكول حرامات يوصلون للبرلمان. انت منو حتى تصادر حقوق الناس واصواتهم مثل ما انت انتخبت النجفي وجاب ٣٠ غيرك انتخب المالكي. هسه منو طلع الدكتاتور
27	Commentator	المالكي اشترى الصوت بقطعة ارض أو تعيين، لو عندنا صدك دولة قانون كان المالكي الان في السجن
28	Commentator	نشكر المالكي التقت الجمهورية ووزع اراضي وعين اشرف من قائدكم النجفي
29	Commentator	انت غلطان. الواعي والمثقف راح انتخب بدون امتيازات ماديه. ناس تنتخب الزين خو مو زباله ؟
30	Commentator	الله أعلم الأخ الجبوري لم يشاهد مقطع الفيديو الذي عرض فيه القاضي (محمد حسن) يوزع سندات الأراضي على الفقراء ويطلب منهم أن يقسموا بأنهم سيصوتوا لدولة (القانون) المالكي . والله مهزلة
31	Commentator	الظاهر لازم نطالب بتغير الشعب قبل متغير الوجوه السياسية
32	Commentator	استاذ ابراهيم حسب رؤيتي للنظام السياسي في العراق ان هذه الانتخابات لاتسمن ولاتغني من جوع بسبب الاحزاب الدينية الطائفية ...العراق لايبني ولايستقر الا من خلال الدولة المدنية العابره للطائفية وبصراحه العراق يحتاج الى عبد الفتاح السيسي العراقي طبعا لكي يقضي على كل رموز الفساد المتجذره والشعب يتحمل القاسم الاكبر مما وصلت اليه الاوضاع الحاليه والاتى اسوأ والله أعلم
33	Commentator	استحقينه الهجره وشلون طركاكاه وكعت ع روسنه
34	Commentator	عل الاقل صدام فاد السنه وبكل مكان وخلاهم على روسنا مع الاسف والمالكي هم صار صدام عالشيعة متكولولي اسوا للشيعة صدام من باع العراق فاد كل السنه بس الممالكي باعنا برخص التراب واقل كافي عاد قال الامام علي (ع) ياشعب العراق يأهل النفاق واشفاق والله لقد ملتئم قلبي قبحاً

35	Commentator	للاسف
36	Commentator	غفية لعد المدني الديمقراطي وينه من هالفلم!!
37	Commentator	التحالف المدني حصل 11 مقعد حسب شبكة عين المراقبة للانتخابات
38	Commentator	اويلي على العراق ابتلاه الله بشعب لا يستحي وان لم نستحي فأفعل ما شأت
39	Commentator	عمي باتغير هذا شعب لم يريد العيش باستغرار ولا يريد الحرية ولا الكرامة المرجعية و علماء الدين والمتقفين ينادون بتغير ويحصل دولة القانون 69 مقعد وهذا لامي موجه لختنا الشيعة لأن من المستحل سني صوت لدولة القانون
40	Commentator	ارجوكم اتركوا الطائفية لان المكون الاخر ترك لكم الجمل بما حمل وزهد بالسياسة والعملية السياسية . فجمهور القوائم الاخرى لم تذهب للانتخابات والدليل هذه النسبة القليلة والتي اعتمد عليها المرشح باعضاء حزبه وعائلته واقربائه فارجو ان تتركوا الطائفية وتنافسوا فيما بينكم على السلطة لان صورة الانتخابات بعين المكون الاخر سقطت ولم يعد يسمح لنفسه ان يكون جرجويه لتزين العملية السياسية فقط . والدليل عدم الاقبال في الاعظميه وكانت المراكز فارغه ومن صوت هم القلة صوتوا للقانون والاحرار والمواطن وحتى باقي المناطق الاخرى ارجوكم انتهت قصة الطائفي لان العملية اصبحت من لون وطعم واحد واخيرا وخيرا فعلوا . لا نريد الحكم ولا نريد اي شئ نريد سلامة شبابنا واطفالنا ونساءنا فقط . فاحكموا وسنرى كيف تحكمون نتمنى لكم كل الموفقيه لخدمة شعبكم .
41	Commentator	والله كلام صحيح لكن صارلنه ٨ سنوات كله فشل الحل؟؟؟شنو؟؟؟؟
42	Commentator	انعل أبوكم لأبو نوري المالكي ولأبو كل من انتخب نوري المالكي والله ولا يصير براسكم خير ابد ياخيصة
43	Commentator	سلاماً سلاما
44	Commentator	خطاب المالكي يتوافق بالتمام مع خطاب عمار الحكيم البارحة .. الاثنان صوت واحد ، تكلمنا عن اعادة اللحمة للائتلاف الشيعي الطائفي . " تافلة بخلگهم ايران والمرجعية . وصدگ ما ينطوها لو الدم تعدى الرغبة .. اما عن التغيير فقد اشرش جميعهم بالانتخابات ، بس ماكو ذرة حياء على طرة گصصهم ،، جان استقال ولو واحد منهم .. عيني ابراهيم احترم مهنتك وابقى على صوت الحق فذكاءك الاعلامي محسود فز من الجهلة وهوا السياسة اقصى كل الاصوات الشريفة
45	Commentator	المؤشرات تقول ان دولة القانون ستحصل ع 100 مقعد .
46	Commentator	حيل وابو زايد بالعراقيين هيجي شعب متخلف ما شايف مثله يروحون ينتخبون نفس الوجوه القبيحة... تستاهلون الي يصير بيكم
47	Commentator	انه عمل مخابراتي بامتياز العزف على تناقض الاعداء وهز ثقتهم بنفسهم و ببعضهم ثم الوثوب على الفرصة
48	Commentator	طيب اين المدني الديمقراطي
49	Commentator	استاذ ابراهيم اترك هذا الموضوع المالكي 69 --استاذ ابراهيم المالكي 100 فما فوق لاتصير جزء من منظومة اعداء المالكي واريد منك ان تقول الحق بان خصوم المالكي خسروا الانتخابات وهي هاي الحقيقة خليك مستقل احسلك
50	Commentator	عجبتني (منظومة أعداء المالكي) .. أنصحك أعبده وعوف رب العالمين اصرفك
51	Commentator	القانون 68-72 فقط...وهو ليس خاسرا والمواطن 43-46 ..لا يوجد اي تغيير الا في بغداد فقط بنسب طبيعية
52	Commentator	اخ فراس خلي عندك روح رياضية وتقبل الخسارة برحابة صدر -
53	Commentator	المجموع 319 وبين الباقي والقانون فقط في البصرة وبغداد 42 مقعد
54	Commentator	خويه شو متحدون والمواطن ديقلون شويه اخاف منا لسبوع ايطبعون مشاركين
55	Commentator	اربع عجاف اخرى ومزبد من الظلم... عساها ببختكم
56	Commentator	على هايه النتائج جيب ليل واخذ عتابة وراح اتجر
57	Commentator	استاذ ابراهيم لازم تريد قطعة ارض على كورنيش الاعظميه

58	Commentator	مجموع الارقام 319
59	Commentator	استاذ ابراهيم شتقصد متفرقة ... لان رقمها كبير .
60	Commentator	قبل شوية قريت القانون ١٠٣ والمواطن الة سبعين والاحرار مآخذة ستين ومتحدون سبعين وعلاوي خمسين والباقيين مية وخمسين . لو فرضنة كلهم يصدكون يعني الف نعمة على الجاذب هههههه
61	Commentator	ماكو واحد احسن من واحد الكل سواسيه والاغلبه للي ياخذ اكثر ولحد يصير دكتاتور ويصادر خيار الناخب العراقي
62	Commentator	المطلب كم مقعد في الانبار
63	Commentator	القانون 111 / مواطن 30 / احرار 27 /علاوي 4 /مطلبك 18/متحدون 27 / بارتي اتحاد تغيير 55
64	Commentator	حبيبي استاذ ابراهيم انتة تخوط بصف الاستكان لحد يوم امس الظهر دولة القانون عبرت ٩١ مقعد من غير الخاص والخارج ونص من العد والفرز لبغداد
65	Commentator	صدك. حجي ابراهيم بعدك ماسك. على جمره. لو هديتها؟
66	Commentator	استاذ ابراهيم اقرء هذا الخبر وبالتالي ارقامك تكون بعيدة جداً الاخرين؟الخبر::كربلاء - النتائج الأولية بحسب ماكينة دولة القانون الانتخابية دولة القانون (189094) صوتا ، اي (٨) مقاعد الاحرار (53937) صوتا، اي (٢) مقاعد المواطن (41039) صوتا، اي (١) مقعد المجموع الكلي (11) عدد المقاعد النيابية لمحافظة كربلاء. ملاحظة: النسب اعلاه تحتل الخطأ(10%)
67	Commentator	والله دافكر بالهجرة بجديه اريد احدث اركني النقاش
68	Commentator	وين تهاجر؟؟
69	Commentator	اتمنى ان يعطو فيزا للعراقيين حتى يهجون من هبلد
70	Commentator	تحالف المدني ...شرق...اعلستهم
71	Commentator	اذا اخذها المالكي هالمره فأقرأوا عالديمقراطية والانتخابات السلام ، وكل انسان مثقف ايشوفلة صرفه و يشرذ من العراق ، المرجعية تكلمهم تغيير ويروحون عله نفس الفاسدين والفاشليين
72	Commentator	نحكم وتفخخوون. والله المستعان ياابن الخايبه
73	Commentator	وانت مكيف حاكم ... وبنفس الوقت مقتنع انه المكون الاخر يفخخ .. خلي يروحلك عزيز وخلي نشوف شلون راح تكوم تسب الحكومة
74	Commentator	ترة الخلل بالشعب مو بالحاكم الطاغى المستبد أو الحكومة الفاسدة الفاشلة ...
75	Commentator	لا ما اسبهه ومقتنع التفخيخ والتفجير منكم شنو قابل اغبياء لو جايبكم من الصومال . ؟
76	Commentator	التغيير بهاي الانتخابات عن 2010 والي نادت بي كل الناس والمراجع هوه (مشعان الجبوري) خوش تغيير
77	Commentator	اظاهر هيچ استاد نبيل مترهملهم جارة بس للأسف ومع احترامى للزنيين شعب لو كى ويخضع للاستفزاز
78	Commentator	منو انطاك النتائج حصريا بس لك انت بأعلام المفوضية لو أنته كالقايض على جمر فيطمنوك حتى لا تحترك ايديك!
79	Commentator	خبر اليوم بالفلوس بأجر بلاش

80	Commentator	وفق هذه المعطيات سيبقى الأكراد بيضه القبان في اي تحالف !!! حرامات مشعان ما راح يحزر العراق من الأكراد !!!
81	Commentator	الرئاسة المفروض تكون لاحد هؤلاء علي دواي البولاني عادل عبد المهدي اياذ علاوي والافضل علاوي بس للأسف الطائفيين خلو وصول الشرفاء والوطنيين للمنصب مجرد امانى وللاسف الديموقراطية فيها عيب قاتل هو اننا مجبرين لاخذ اصوات الجهلاء والسيئين والطائفيين بنضر الحسبان ليوصلو امثال حنان الفت لاوي و محمود الحسن و مشعان الجبوري للبرلمان
82	Commentator	ترى انت مبين كلش تفتهم ديربالك لحسدك على فهمك مبين تفتهم من البولاني
83	Commentator	انجب
84	Commentator	اني اشوف اياذ علاوي احسن واحد بيهم لو ياخذ الشعب وياه لندن يحكمهم
85	Commentator	الف مبروك متجهون الى حكومة محاصصة ومتشكل بسنة والمستفيد الاول والاخير البارتي وظلمة ودليلها الله
86	Commentator	لو اكو شعب حي جان هسه الشوارع امتلات بالمظاهرات بلبي حق وباي قانون وباي شرع يكون العد والفرز لمدة شهر لم تحصل ولن تحصل حتى في جزر الواق واق ههههههه
87	Commentator	ليس الفرز من يؤخر اعلان النتائج وانما الطعون التي سوف تكون بالمئات اذ لم تكن بالالف
89	Commentator	اعتقد المالكي سيحصل ٩٥ مقعد مع الفضيله وتيار الاصلاح والصادقون والقوائم الصغيرة سيشكلون الحكومة وشكراً
90	Commentator	يجي يوم يتحاكم المالكي منو جان يتوقع صدام يتعلك علمشقه Musab Jabbar
91	Commentator	من يشكر المالكي خلي يجاوبني... هذه الاراضي من املاك عائلة المالكي والفلوس الي وزعها من جيوب الي خلفوه.... ليش ماوزع السيد الحكيم والسيد مقتدى اراضي مثل المالكي..... رحمتك ياربي كم لدينا في العراق اغبياء وحمقى ولوكية وعبيد
92	Commentator	اي تغير اننا نضحك على انفسنا لو على العالم الذي يسقط عروش عندما تنتفض شعوبها . اما نحن تغيرنا عباره عن ارقام تصعد وارقام تنزل والشخص ثابتة لا تتغير واصبحت قائمة الشعب صفر في حسابات الانتخابات هههههههه .
93	Commentator	استاذ ابراهيم دولة القانون عدا بغداد و التصويت الخاص ٦٧ و هدامؤكد
94	Commentator	مع احترامي لكم انتم ناس الله اكون ابعنكم لان الانتخابات كلها مهزله ايم هزله والله نفس الطاس والجدر تحياتي لكم
95	Commentator	اعتقد ان هذه الحكومة سوف تبقى لتصرف الاعمال لاكثر من سنتين لصعوبة الائتلافات
96	Commentator	والله استاذ ابراهيم حسب المعطيات الي تفضلت بها او تفضل بها المصدر الخاص بك لا تبشر بخير لان المتفرقة كما سميتها تشكل رقم كبير وستخضع لضغوط السيد المالكي ولن يتحقق التغيير المنشود
97	Commentator	مع احترامي بس هاي النسب مو مضبوطة
98	Commentator	يعني يا ابو زيد كأنك ما غزيت
99	Commentator	احترم شبياتك انت ابليس تافل بحلكك وراضع وي حليبك اذا المرجعية Saad Naser التي سحبت نفسها من كل تأييد لأي قائمة كانت ومواقفها النبيلة السابقة بحقن دماء العراقيين انت تصفها هكذا فأقول انت مو بس تافل بحلكك الشيطان لا بايل بحلكك اردوغان وعربان الخليج
100	Commentator	اخي العزيز صحيح جداً أن الأرقام متغيره كل ست ساعات من عمل المفوضيه ولكن هذه الاحصائيه خاطئه

101	Commentator	Almarzoog Saif Mohammed Rajih
102	Commentator	من مصدر غير (موثوق) الارقام بعد الفرز كالاتي /
103	Commentator	والله حرنه منين ناخذ الارقام مندرى هسه اكو انتخابات بالعالم متطلع النتائج الا وره شهر
104	Commentator	يعني ليش هل الاستعجال ان شاء الله تعلن المفوضيه النتائج و من ثم سوف تقوم اتلافات و هي تحدد المالكي بلولايه الثالثه ام لا
105	Commentator	استاذ ابراهيم انتة شخصية محترمة أتمنى عليك ان تبتعد عن هذه الإحصائيات لأنها بعيدة. عن الحقيقة وسوف ترى ونرى وأنا أرى انك اصدك من الامور وكي لا تتحاز لطرف وتبقى وسطي مع اعتزازي
106	Commentator	البديل مو للمواطن؟؟ مال جواد البزوني
107	Commentator	استاذ ابراهيم عاشت ايدك الناس لو تطلعها عسل هم متقنع
108	Commentator	استاذ انطينا النتيجة النهائية
109	Commentator	المجموع ٣١٤
110	Commentator	بس عاجل السومرية ان العد والفرز بلش قبل 3 ساعات يعني هاي النتائج صدك (فتاح فال) بيباب الشرجي
111	Commentator	لا يوجد الاصلاح ولا الفضيلة ولا الصادقون ولاكرامة ... هذا فتاح الفال عندك ذاكرته ضعيفه
112	Commentator	كلهم ضمن المتفرقة (٥١)
113	Commentator	هههههه.... عملتوا بالنصيحة وقللتوا من الكرد لان كان الكذب مفضوح. بس الحلو ان المتفرقة زادت حتى تصير مبهمه
114	Commentator	شكرا استاذ ابراهيم... ارجو كذلك ذكر موضوعين مع هذه الارقام كي نطمأن...الاول هو نسبة ثقتك بهذا المصدر يعني 70 % او 80 %...والثاني ماهي النسبة التي تتوقعها لتلك الارقام من الزيادة والنقيصة...يعني قصدي زائد ناقص شكك؟؟؟؟ شكرا استاذ ابراهيم
115	Commentator	المجموع مو كامل ايضا وهاي الارقام مو صحيحة.
116	Commentator	يعني المالكي أخذ الولاية الثالثة استاذ ابراهيم؟
117	Commentator	اضرر رب جماعتك بقوا خو ماشلت الصورة من الحايط بقيها تفيدك
118	Commentator	هاي عاشر نتائج تظهر انه
119	Commentator	حلو
120	Commentator	أتوقع المالكي يتحالف مع الأكراد للبقاء ... مقابل كركوك ... لكن هذه المرة يعطيهم ضمانات حقيقية
121	Commentator	هههههههه انتو هم امصدين انتخابات نزيها كلها تزوير الحكومة الي تحاصر مكون معين واتشن عليه معركة وتمنعه من التصويت هذه حكومه اصل لا ساقطه وانتخاباتها باطله
122	Commentator	استاذ ابراهيم ممكن دكلي هاي الارقام شنو اشو يومية تأتينا برقم جديد
123	Commentator	تترجه خير استاذ من شعب باع ضميره ابطانيه@انا أكد الارقام الي علنتها شبه اكيد وقرربا جدا من العدد الصحيح شكرا لك استاذ
124	Commentator	Ameer Nihad
125	Commentator	بلازحمة اكو احصائية عن تيار الاصلاح...الجعفري
126	Commentator	الحيثان الكبيرة ستأكل الأسماك ،الصغير هو الغلبة لمن يملك صوتا اعلى
127	Commentator	استاذ ابراهيم ما رايبك بالمفاوضات التي تجري في الاردن والاخرى التي سوف تجري مع الاكراد وتصدير نفط الشمال ليست اصوات كافيه للاغلبيه؟؟؟
128	Commentator	علي العراقي

176	Commentator	المطلّك كم مقعد في الانبار
177	Commentator	الفضيله مهمشين عندك ليش

19	Respondent	تحلم	العیسای تطلب فیدو واحد هناك عشرات الفیدوهات التي تثبت تورطك بقتل وهدر الدم العراقي لت تحتمي طويلا بخيم الارهاب ستطولك يد العدالة
20	Respondent	لا داعي للكذب	انت اما كذاب او مجنون ومخمور اوربما شيعي واطن الوصف الاخير ينطبق عليك وهو اتعسها...ارنا فديو واحد يدين العيساي عندها اشهد انك صادق ولكن للاسف انت كاذب مثل رئيس وزرائك
21	Respondent	لا عيساي ولا مالكي ولا ايران	لم نري لحد الان قائد او بطلا سياسيا ان يلمنا ويحبنا منذ غزو العراق واصبحت عراق فريسة للاعداء وندعوا ونرجوا من الله ان يرسل قائدا يحب شعبه
22	Respondent	ومن انت لتقرر عكس قرار الشارع	ومن انت أيها الشريف. انت تتكلم بنفس الطاءفيه
23	Respondent	هذا العيساي كان دوم بكجي عند البعثية	ادخلو على النت وانتم تعرفون الحقيقة هذا الدوم بكجي البعثي
24	Respondent	بلاد الرافدين	عجيب من يطلق لقب دكتاتور على المالكي انتم مشاركون بالحكومة والبرلمان لماذا لا تسقطون الحكومة والرجل دعا لانتخابات مبكرة لكن أمركم ليس بيدكم أربعة أشهر والكل يعرف ساحات الاعتصام بيد القاعدة وجيش العراق قادر على سحق هذا الاعتصامات اي اعتداء على جندي عراقي هوة إهانة للعراق
25	Respondent	..@yahoo.com	ولو حرامات الاجابة علا كلام سخيف لكن لا مفر؟؟ هي وينها الدولة؟؟ واين هو جيشها؟؟ هذولة كلهم سجناء سابقين ..جابههم الهالكي . و سواهم جيش ..بصفحة ابو ابو و ابو اليدافعله ..
26	Respondent	الكلام من ذهب	إن صاحب الحق لا بد أن ينتصر يوماً في صراحة مع الباطل، وإن طال به الزمان، وحطت عليه الدنيا، فستكون الغلبة لأهل الحق إن شاء الله.
27	Respondent	الا يتعض المالكي	قراره بيد طهران و القول لكم يا احرار العراق قانون وضعوه هم وبريمر فصلوه على كيفهم ويقولون ديمقراطية المالكي وزير الدفاع والداخلية و و و و و و و و ماذا عمل للشعب خلال حكمه دولة النفط لا يوجد فيها امن ولا كهرباء وكل همهم الان ارسال الاموال الى جيش بشار والعراق يموت لان الاوامر تأتيه من طهران الشعب العراقي الذي اذل كل الغزاة لن يعجزه المالكي الضعيف ولكن لو كان يعقل ويحب وطنه لا أعلن الاستقالة ورضي بالمطالب وحافظ على بلده وليس مثل بشار الذي دمر شعبه وبلده وقريبا ان شاء الله سحله ومرنقة المالكي اضعف بكثير من مجرمي بشار الاحراؤ قادموون
28	Respondent	احلموا ياعرب	اذا واحد مسنود من ١٧ مليون شلون يكون ضعيف يا هتر ممكن بشار يسقط لكن المالكي باحلامكم والله

39	Respondent	وهل يذكر العيساوي تاريخ الجيش عام 1991	هل يذكر العيساوي تاريخ الجيش العراقي عندما احتل الكويت وقمع الانتفاضة الشعبانية في العراق عام 1991
40	Respondent	قمع الانتفاضة الشعبانية	شلون لثفا عايشين وياكم كل هالمده والله مدري , اجل قمع ساحه اعتصام سلميه في الحويجه قلم عليها ساحه اراهبيين وبعثيين لكن قمع غوغانيين حرقوا الدوائر وقتلوا الابرياء وارادوا ان يقلبوا النظام بالتعاون مع ايران , شتردون بعد احسن من ما جرالكم , شنو كان المفروض ياخذون انواط الشجاعه مو هيح
41	Respondent	تكرر الشيء وتأتي بمثله	عجيب امرك تلومهم لان قالوا عن ساحة الاعتصام اراهبيين وبنفس الوقت تسمي ثورتهم الشعبية غوغاء
42	Respondent	غوغاء	قصداك الغوغاء؟ ..
43	Respondent	شاهد على العصر	وازيدك باتنا رجعتنا من الكويت مشيا على الأقدام وتحت القصف الأميركي وتحملنا الإهانات والجوع ومرارة الهزيمة والذل عنما كانت الطائرات الأميركية تلقي علينا الطعام من السماء كالأغنام وبعدها يقول البطل الهمام صدام اننا انتصروا اي انتصار هذا !! ورب الكعبة من يومها اشتعلت نار في صدري لم انطفأ الا يوم اعدام صدام الذي سحق الجيش العراقي والله جيش بطولات حروب فلسطين اصبح جيش يستخدم لاهواء رئيس متهور وجاهل .
44	Respondent	العيساوي	ومن يكون هذا العيساوي حتى يريد مصادرت ارادة الشعب العراقي هل هو القائد الضرورة الايعلم ان المالكي في الانتخابات الاخيرة فاز فوز ساحق ماذا يعني هذا
45	Respondent	عيساوي	وانت منو .
46	Respondent	-17 خبر مؤلم - انفجار بالثوره - ختية	بغداد - هز انفجار قوي مدينة الصدر في بغداد، موقعا بحسب ما ذكره مصدر في الشرطة، عددا من القتلى والجرحى. ولم يتسن على الفور معرفة حجم الخسائر او الاضرار. وقال المصدر في حديث له اليوم، إن التفجير الذي وقع قرب مطعم شعبي أوقع ضحايا في مدينة الصدر في بغداد. وتعد مدينة الصدر ابرز معقل للتيار الصدري الذي يتزعمه مقتدى الصدر والذي أدان بشدة ما حدث في بلدة الحويجة.
47	Respondent	هاى هيه بس	اهلنا واخوتنا الاكراد السنه استطاعوا تكوين جيش خاص بهم قادر على دحر اى محاوله صفويه همجيه قادر على ردعها وقتل من تسول له نفسه المساس بهم وهذا هو الحل الوحيد الذى يفهمه اتباع ولايه السفه فى العراق... فعلينا نحن العرب السنه تشكيل جيش قوى قادر عل ردع احفاد العلقمى الجدد...واقول للعيساوى وامثاله انتم من اوصلتنا لهذه الحاله من الذلاتدرى لماذا انتم والجبورى والدليمى والكربولى بعتم انفسكم لاتباع ايران بئس بخس وقتلتم المجاهدين الحقيقيين واصبحتم مكشوفين امام الشيعه ليقتلونكم هل فهمت يا عيساوى . الموصل ورجالها ارجل منكم اتدرى لماذا لانه لا يوجد فيها عيساوى وجبورى وكربولى ... انتم من اذلنا ... واقول لاحفاد العلقمى (الذين يتكلمون عن الحفر) اين ابوصالح الا تقولون انه فى السرداب؟؟؟؟

48	Respondent	España	نطالب المالكي بالإستقالة عندما نسمع باستقالة حكام الدول الإسلامية. قلتم أن طارق عزيز قال أن من ضرب الكرد ليس صدام حسين و قلتم أنه صدق في كلامه و قال أن المالكي معتدل فقلتم كذب في كلامه. أفتؤمنون ببعض الكتاب و تكفرون ببعض.
49	Respondent	العراق	الله كريم الله مع الحق أن شاء الله
50	Respondent	كلهم مثل بعض	الحقيقة انا لا نملك قيادات سياسية وطنية سواء سنية او شيعية الكل ينحاز لطائفته وهذه هي المصيبة .. الحكم العلماني هو الحل لكن اين هو ومتى يظهر هذا الحزب العلماني الوطني الذي يعترف بدين ولا مذهب
51	Respondent	España	العيساوي يثرثر.
52	Respondent	you toooooo	وأنت كذلك
53	Respondent	España	لا تتكر أنك أنت كذلك و اتفقنا. شكك دمك خفيف
54	Respondent	بغداد الكراة داخل	اذا كانت الحكومة تكذب على بعضه لبعض وتكذب على الشعب فكيف نستطيع ان نأمن بحكمهم للشعب الحكومة تقول ببيان لها ان القوة التي اقتحمت ساحا المعتصمين في الحويجة كانت تحمل الدروع الواقية وتحمل خراطيم الماء ؟ ولاكن ما نراه من الشهداء والسمننا من الجرحا ان اغلبهم مصابين في اعلا الجسم باطلاق ناري متعمد هل خراطيم الماء تطلق ماء ام رصاص يكفي كذب يا حكومة المالكي يا فاشلين
55	Respondent	لماذا هذه الخطابات الطائفية الهدامة؟؟؟	ان اغلبية اهل العراق مع حكومة المالكي المنتخبة وذات الاغلبية البرلمانية ... والعراقيون يستطيعون اختيار الحكومة عبر صناديق الانتخابات الديمقراطية وحدة وليس بالتلويح بالعنف والقوة والارهاب وان من ينادي بها سوف يحترق بنار هاولايجني شيئا كما حدث من قبل ... وان الطريقة البعثية السابقة لن ولن تجني نفعا بل سوف تكون وبالاً على اهلها .
56	Respondent	إذا استقال المالكي	راح بجيبون السنة رئيس منتخب وهمينه راح بلبد بالحفرة مره ثانيه ، دروحوا أهل الحفر
57	Respondent	المالكي الرئيس بالصدفه	لقد فتح المالكي على نفسه " أبواب جهنم " إنه إختراع نتيجة صفقه إيرانيه -أميركيه فجاء بالصدفه فظن نفسه القائد الملهم ... وجعلك لسانه أثناء الكلام أكبر دليل بانه ينتحل صفة مسؤول
58	Respondent	الحل هو اقتران الاستقالة بالاعتزال	اعتقد ان الحل الحقيقي يكمن في استقالة المالكي واقتران ذلك باعتزال العيساوي ومن معه العمل السياسي لان هؤلاء جميعا مصنفون تحت مصطلحات : الحقد ، الغباء ، المصالح الضيقة ، البرامج الإصلاحية الوهمية ، عدم التخصص في العمل الموكل اليه ، الرياء والتبعية العمياء ، مناصرة الطائفة لا الوطن من غير حتى ان تستفيد تلك الطائفة . ولهذا العراقي اليوم إنسان لا يرقى لمستوى المواطنة بسبب سياسة الكيل بمكيالين

59	Respondent	ما ننطيه	العیساوي خن یولن لماذا لا تقول بان مصلحکم تعارضت مع الحكومة ودعني اقول لك شيئا وان هذا لم يحصل ابدا وفي الاحلام ان ذهب المالكي فسياتي بعده مئات اشد من المالكي نفسه لاننا نعتبر المالكي متساهل معكم ونحن نريد القوة والقوة اكثر معكم فتح لاندغ مرتين كفانا لغة صدام وما ننطيهها .
60	Respondent	يا سيد عيساوي	المشكلة ليست في المالكي بل في الدستور الذي يصنع من كل رئيس وزراء مالكي جديد ... دستور يعطي الشيعة كل شيء ... ويسلب كل حقوق السنة .. كفى كذبا وخداعا .. يا عباد المال البارحة كنت تشارك في الحكومة .. وغدا ترضى عندما يرضى سيدك المالكي...
61	Respondent	ماذا يريد السنة بالضبط؟	طبعاً نقصد مناطق المدن الغربية فلهذا الان كثيرين مثلي لا يفهمون مطالبهم ماعدا الغاء قانون الارهاب في سويسرا (اسف اقصد العراق) في الواقع المدن الشيعية هي التي يجب ان تتظاهر وتطلب من المدن السنة التوقف عن دعم الارهابيين في مناطقهم.. فلدينا ملايين الضحايا... والتوقف عن اخذ الدعم المالي من قطر وسنة العالم. التوقف عن غسل عقول الارهابيين والارهابيات وبعثهم للتجمعات الشيعية. لم ارى خنوع كشيعة العراق... فالعشائر في الجنوب مستعدة ان تتقاتل على بقره ولا تقاتل ابنا هذه المدن الوحشية والذين اغلبهم ان لم يكن اراهابي فمتعاطف وان لم يكن بعثي فتقتسدي وان لم يكن هذا وذاك فطائفي وهجمي. اقول هذا مع فائق اعتذاري لكثير من ابناء هذه المدن ممن يتبرء من هؤلاء
62	Respondent		المفروض من يطالب باستقالة المالكي ان يكون غير اراهابي وانك اراهابي يا عيساوي واعترفوا عليك حمايتك وعليك اولا ان تحضر المحكمه وبعدها طالب بالاستقاله اثنين خوش هدية الى العيساوي فوز قائمة المالكي مرة ثانية حصركم مرة ثانية ولاعودة الى الارهابيين القتله

H. Second Online Readers' Responses Threads

Link: <http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/2014/01/06/-علاوي-الطائفة/>

[.html.السياسية-تخلق-أرضاً-خصبة-للإرهاب](http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/2014/01/06/-علاوي-الطائفة/)

No.	Interlocutors	Title	Comments
1	Respondent	اريد اباد علاوي رئيس وزراء	كافي ظلم المالكي و سرقة الشعب والفساد و الطائفية. نحن العراقيين بصوا واحد نكولها نحن واحد و نريد نعيش بكرامه و سلام.
2	Respondent	مو جربناهم كلهم	لو مانقدر بعد الهزيمة المنكرة، والمهانة الفاضحة، والتشريد الطويل، والذل تحت أقدام المتسلطين.
3	Respondent	أنا والحرامي في بغداد	كيف سيتعايش السني والشيعي في العراق بعد قول رئيس الوزراء نوري المالكي إن المواجهة الحالية هي «استمرار للمواجهة بين أنصار الحسين وأنصار يزيد» هل هذا راس وزراء ام طبال؟حاقد اعمى مسخم 1345 سنه ومازلت تصدق ان السنه من قتل ال البيت الاطهار . سيدك السستاني هو حفيد من سلاله الشمر واذا احد لا يصدق اذهبوا واسالوه ولكن كيف تسالون وهو لا يفصح العربييه.
4	Respondent	الامة-الدولة	بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم.نحن الثورة. لا بد من اقامة الدولة السنية الكبرى في جميع انحاء سوريا ولبنان والعراق والاردن وفلسطين والاحواز من اجل ان تسود الامة السنية على ارضها وفاء لشهداءها الابرار الذين خرجوا من مساجدهم وبذلوا دماءهم الطاهرة الزكية فداء لامتهم السنية ومن اجل اقتلاع الة القتل العلوية النصيرية الخبيثة المجرمة عميلة الشعوبية الصفوية الباطنية الحاقدة ومن اجل استئصال التحالف الاقلاوي الذي بات يشكل عبئا على اوطاننا لعمالته اجيرا كحصان طروادة لدى جهات شعوبية صفوية باطنية دخيلة غريبة على اوطاننا وملينة بالحقد على امتنا السنية.
5	Respondent	لى عراقي مظلوم	الى عراقي مظلوم اتفق وياك 100% انشاءالله يخلص العراق من الحرامية و القتل.
6	Respondent	المرحلة الثانية من المقاومة العراقية!	مايحصل في العراق اليوم يعبر بشكل جلي عن بداية المرحلة الثانية من المقاومة العراقية لتحرير العراق من المحتل الإيراني بعد أن تم تحريره وبنصصـــــر تام من الاحتلال الأمريكي!.
7	Respondent	الاشورين هم الأصل	كافي سني شيعي مسيحي كردي يزبدي كلهم عراقي مو كافي يا مجرمين دمرو العراق اللة يدمركوم
8	Respondent	أليس هذا نفس العلاوي؟؟؟	الذي أمر في عهده بالهجوم عل الفلوجة وشاركت فيه القوات الغازية الامريكية و مرتزقة البيشمرکه الذين رقصوا الدبكة فرحا بتدمير الفلوجة,,,, ومع هذا ظلت الفلوجة عصية على الامريكان.

9	Respondent	يا علاوي من دمر الفلوجة في المرة الأولى؟	علاوي.. بطل مذبحة الفلوجة اراد علاوي ان يثبت قدراته للاميركان فكان عنيفا في التعامل مع الفلوجة هام 2004 التي ارتقت القوات الاميركية. اعلن حالة الطوارئ واغلق حدود العراق وشارك بالقوات العراقية في الحملة الاميركية على المدينة انتقاما لمقتل وسحل اربعة من مرتزقة شركة بلاك ووتر الامنية وقد كانت الحملة انتقاما من المدينة لمقاومتها القوات الاميركية وكان الحادث ، اضافة الى ردة الفعل، مبررا للقيام بعمل عنيف للغاية ضد المدينة وجعلها عبرة لباقي العراقيين،
10	Respondent	علاوي الشيعي ؟ ؟ علاوي البعني	علاوي يسعى على إظهار الحكومة الحالية بمظهر العجز والمطالبة بإسقاطها من أجل مآربه الخاصة للانتخابات القادمة ؟؟ ولكن عليه ان يعرف ان الشيعة من المستحيل يعطوه اصواتهم لانه بعني ؟؟؟؟ ويعرف ان السنة مستحيل يعطوه اصواتهم لانه شيعي ؟؟؟؟ علاوي مايزال يناور سياسياً وإعلامياً عبر وسائل كثيرة في الداخل والخارج ؟ واليوم يتصيد بالماء العكر وتصور ان الهجوم على الارهابيين ووقفه بصورة غير مباشرة مع الخونة سخدمه للذعاب الانتخابية القادمة ؟؟ ولكن ليعلم علاوي وغيره ممن تسول لهم انفسهم باستغلال الاوضاع والاحداث في العراق لمآربهم و مصالحهم السياسية ولعبوا على الحبلين ؟؟ فهؤلاء لا مكان لهم بيننا ؟؟ @@
11	Respondent	علاوي شخصية وطنية	علاوي شخصية وطنية وهو الذي وقف بوجه التدخل الابرائي في العراق ولذلك ايران منعت بكل قوتها و بدعم عملاتها في العراق . منعت وصوله للحكم... اما ضرب الفلوجة اثناء حكمه فان العاقل فقط يدرك بان اثناء فترة حكمه كانت السيادة والقرار امريكي 100% و العراق لم يملك جيش ومن ضرب الفلوجة الجيش الامريكي والجيش الامريكي لا يحتاج الى اي تأييد او ضوء اخضر عندما يرغب بالقيام ب مهمة عسكرية
12	Respondent	سقطت الاقنعة ؟؟ وأنكشفت الوجوه	لقد سقطت الاقنعة عن البعض من سياسيين او رجال دين او مواطنين ؟ في معركة الشرف والكرامة الى يخوضها العراقيين الابطال ضد الارهاب القاعدي الداعشي البعني و الذي اصبح مصدر قلق للعالم اجمع _ تلك المعركة الشريفة التي تريد للعراق الأمن والسلام والامان من التفجيرات والقتل وتدمير العراق والفتنة بين شعب العراق ؟ لقد أنكشفت الوجوه الحقيقة و سقطت الاقنعة التي تستر بها البعض ؟ لقد وضحت الوجوه , الصالح و الطالح , وبانت للعيان و من هو العراقي الوطني الحقيقي ؟ الذي يغار على الوطن و هب مدافعا عن العراق ؟ ومن هو الخائن و المنافق وعدو العراق الذي أصطف مع اراهابي القاعدة وداعش و يدعم من يضرب الوطن ويقتل ابناء العراق @@
13	Respondent	المالكي وائتلاف القانون عملاء ايران	نحمل المالكي وحكومته كل ما يجري اليوم من إزهاق للأرواح سببه الرئيسي ماطلة الحكومة وتسويقها واقتعالها لللازمات وإشعالها نار الحرب والفتنة، فعلى الحكومة أن تكف يدها عن أهلنا في الانبار وبقية محافظاتنا المنتفضة.. المالكي يريد ولاية ثالثة يريد أن يبقى على الكرسي فقط ولا يهتم ولو ضحى بالآلاف من جنوده والمواطنين المصطفين معه طائفا سيكتشف هؤلاء المخدوعين فيه انه عبر بهم البحر وارجعهم عطاشا من أجل تحقيق مصالحه الشخصية الضيقة هو فقط يثير هم طائفا عندما تقترب الانتخابات وبعد انتهاء الانتخابات يضعهم جانبا ويتفرغ لمصالحه ولمصالح المقربيين منه..
14	Respondent	الازرقى	الازرقى منو يدفعه راتب بحيث 24 ساعة كاعد وراء الكمبيوتر , لانفع و لادفع للعراق سوى الثثرة

15	Respondent	المالكي وميليشياته المجرمة	ساعة خلاص العراقيون الشرفاء من المالكي وعصابته الصفوية وميليشياته الدموية أصبحت قريبة جدا بفضل الله سبحانه وتعالى ثم اهالي العراق الغيارى والنشامى الابطال..كل من يؤيد المالكي العميل فهو ايراني صفوي ونحن نعرف حقد الايرانيين لقتل الشعب العراقي..وكل من يقف ضد افكاره الصفوية فهو عراقي وطني شريف يريد الخير والامان لهذا البلد..ان"ضعاف النفوس من ذوي الاجندات الرخيصة يحاولون تصوير مايجري في الانبار بأنه صراع بين الجيش والارهاب لكن الحقيقة ان الجيش العراقي تم زجه في معركة ضد الشعب وضد المدنيين وهو امر لايمكن القبول به او السكوت عليه ويجب ايجاد الحلول السريعة لحقن دماء الابرياء ورفع المعاناة عنهم
16	Respondent	المالكي وانتلاف دولة القانون خراب العراق	عمي عشائر الانبار واهلها يبقون اخوانا واهلنا بس اللي اوصل حال الشعب العراقي الى هذا الحال هو المالكي وقواته المأمورة من ايران...شنو ذنب اهل الجنوب يرحون للقتال مع اخوتهم من الانبار..الكثير من الشهداء قتلوا من اهل الجنوب من الجيش العراقي الذي اصبح الان جيش المالكي الصفوي..المالكي اعدنا كثيرا الى الوراء بزرع الفتنة الطائفية.
17	Respondent	الى بنت الجنوب والله لو عدنا	والله لو عدنا بنات مثل هذه الاخت الطيبة بنت الجنوب كان عم الخير من الشمال الى الجنوب بدل طايح الحظ المالكي الى اراد يكحله عماها . لو يرسل كرين دايزر يحله ؟ لم اعلم سوى اليوم ان علي بابا ايراني وتم اللصق بقصص الف ليلة و لغايه في نفس صاحبها .واتهام العراق ان علاوي عراقي
18	Respondent	هروب عوائل انتلاف دولة القانون	لقد انكشف ارتباط المالكي وانتلاف دولة القانون بأجندات المخابرات الارهابية الصفوية الايرانية، وضاق الحبل على رقابهم...فقرروا ان يقاتلوا اهل السنة في المحافظات المنفضة واخواننا الشيعة العراقيين الوطنيين الشرفاء..لقد هربوا عوائلهم من المنطقة الخضراء الى ايران وسبحاولون الهروب من العراق ولكن سنجلبهم ونحاكمهم على كل قطرة دم سالت في ارض العراق الطاهرة...
19	Respondent	المالكي وجلوزته خسرو امام الانبار	للاسف انتلاف دولة القانون عميل ايران بقيادة المالكي لم يقدموا في فترة الثمانية اعوام الماضية غير خراب العراق وسرقة خيراته وموارده..للاسف خسر الشعب العراقي الكثير تحت زمرة هذه العصابة الارهابية العميلة للمخابرات الايرانية...لكن سيأتي يومهم وسيحاسبهم الشعب وسنراهم من على التلفاز...ان"ضعاف النفوس من ذوي الاجندات الرخيصة يحاولون تصوير مايجري في الانبار بأنه صراع بين الجيش والارهاب لكن الحقيقة ان الجيش العراقي تم زجه في معركة ضد الشعب وضد المدنيين وهو امر لايمكن القبول به او السكوت عليه ويجب ايجاد الحلول السريعة لحقن دماء الابرياء ورفع المعاناة عنهم.
20	Respondent	رد على الازرقى	يا ازرقى الحكومة عاجزة و ما كوداعي علاوي يفضحها , الجريمة منتشرة و الفساد الاداري منتشر و الفرهود الحكومي و الحزبي على قدم و ساف الفقر و المجاعة منتشرة الخدمات زفت ...الخ فاذا انت من جماعة ابواق الحكومة و مستفاد منها , فهذا لايعني بان الحكومو مو عاجزة
21	Respondent		يا علاوي جربناك اثناء فترة رئاستك ولم تثبت كفاءة بل قتلت العراقيين بالفلوجة !

22	Respondent	المالكي قائد الصولة الظافرة على الارهاب	أيها المالكي الشجاع يا قائد الصولة الظافرة على الارهابية والغوغاء والمطلوبين للقضاء " والله لا نقول لك كما قال بنوا إسرائيل لموسى ((فاذهب انت وربك فقاتلا انا هاهنا قاعدون)) ولكننا نقول لك نحن وكل الخيرين والوطنين والاحرار من ابناء شعب العراق معك و جنودا رهن إشارتك فما انت إلا سيف حق جردته الملمات والنوب , شامه الشعب الجريح بوجه اعداء الداخل والخارج ! وصولتكم أيها الشوس القواعس إلا صولة الدماء على سيوف جلاديهما الذين أهرقوها ظلماً وعدواناً فلا تأخذكم في أعداء الشعب لومة لائم أو عدل عادل ؟ فقد بانت الامور على حقيقتها وسقطت أوراق التوت التي كان البعض يتستر بها عليهم عليهم يا ابو أسراء@@@
23	Respondent	جريمة أستبعادك من حكم العراق دمر العراق	والله يادكتور لو أنك رئيس وزراء في العراق خلال الأربع سنوات الأخيرة لكان العراق واحة للأمن والسلام ووفرت على الشعب المنكوب مليارات من الدولارات حولها مالكي الى بشار وأرسل آلاف العراقيين ليموتوا في سوريا ولا أحد يذنبهم ولو أنك لكان الاقتصاد بأحسن حالاته والعراقيين ببجوحة ولكن بقي من قتل بمفخخات المالكي على قيد الحياة ووفرت آلاف الشهداء والمعاقين والخسائر المادية من المفخخات الارهابية التي لم تتوقف رغم الجهاز الأمني الكبير , ألوم التحالف الذي ترك المالكي يلعب مصير العراق بدون رقيب ولا حسيب وأصبح العراق تحت حاكم فعلي وهو السليمانى الذي يقود الجميع مثل مايريد , ولكن أحرار العراق أحفاد البابليين
24	Respondent	اخر تصريح لعلاوي	اخر تصريح لعلاوي بانه لن يرشح للانتخابات القادمة خوفا من ذكاء الازرقى وحكته السياسية وتحليله للواقع العراقي و العالمي , لان اكو بس اثنين بهذه المهارة شارون وهو على اخر نسمة وعلى ابواب القبر و الازرقى الوحيد الان المترعب على عرش التحليلات السياسية
25	Respondent	المدعو الزرقى	اخي عادل هذا الازرقى من جماعة السويد اللي جوي من ايران واصله حتى تبعه لوبيه خير كان رجع للعراق واتحفنا بأرائه السديده حول السلم والمن والرخاء الذي يعيشه العراق بفضل الهالكى، بس عرب وين طنبره وين
26	Respondent	تحية	تحية الى الازرقى العراقي وهو يقاوم بكلمته جموع الحاقدين على شعب العراق الابي
27	Respondent	شكراً للاح أحمد تحياتي وتسلم ياطيب	شكرا اخي الكريم أحمد على التحية وعلى كلماتك الأطراء الطيبة للآزرقى و وطنيتك الصادقة تجاه وطنك العراق و اعتزازك في ابناء العراق الشرفاء الذين يدافعون عن الوطن وكل من موقعه سواء بالسلاح او بالقلم ويفضون هؤلاء الارهابية الاشرار الذين يستهدفون العراق العظيم وشعبه الكريم !! أكرر شكري واعتزازي يحضرتك و بكل شريف عراقي @@@
28	Respondent	الازرقى يدافع عن العراقيين	بوركت ايها الازرقى العراقي انت من موقعك تساند العراق وجيشه والاشراف من ابناء العشائر التي تحارب قوى الظلام ومن يدعمها من الجهلة والطائفين كلنا عدنا مأخذ على حزب الدعوة والحكومة والبرلمان والعملية السياسية العرجاء لكن عندما يتعلق الامر بالصراع بين عبدة الشيطان الذين يسيئون للايات السود ولذكر الله كلنا نقف مساندين لجيشنا الباسل وابناء الانبار لكي يستعيدوا مدنهم من قوى الارهاب اليوم الحرب في الانبار نيابة عن العراق اجمع ونيابة عن الانسانية ضد الارهاب العابر للحدود
29	Respondent	يا علاوي	و الله انت هم كارثة , انتخبناك و فزت و عفتها بايد المالكي و عصابات ايران و فلنت. السياسيين العراقيين ...

30	Respondent	مبروك عليك	هو من هدم الفلوجة على النساء والأطفال في 2004 لو كنت صغير
31	Respondent	لا والله مو صغير	لا والله مو صغير بس ظنينا انصلح حاله و خايف ع العراق بس طلوعوا كلهم وسخين
32	Respondent	ليش ما نشرتوا تعليقي ؟	الحرية حلوة بالكلام
33	Respondent	العراق ضاع بين حانا و مانا	العراق ضاع بين حانا و مانا بين المالكي و حاشيته الايرانية وقواته الفلسدة و بين داعش و اجرامهم
34	Respondent	ترهبون به عدو الله وعدوكم.	العنف يولد العنف المالكي يقصف الاحياء المدنية بالرمادي والفلوجة بغية قتل اكبر عدد ممكن من الناس يظن هكذا انه منتصر طبعاً اهل الانبار يستطيعون تقطيع رؤوس جنود المالكي اللي اسروهم ليث الرعب في قلوب العدو لكنهم لم يفعلوا ويمكنهم ويمكنهم ولو كنت مكانهم لربما فعلت على ثوار العشائر استهداف قاعدة الحباينة الجوية منها تنطلق الطائرات لقصف اهالي الرمادي والفلوجة
35	Respondent	علاوي الى اللقاء	علاوي انتهى سياسيا بالعراق .. فلا تتعبوا انفسكم معه فلا جدوى من كلام شخص لم يحضر ولا جلسة برلمان واحده ويقوم خارج العراق ويصرح من هنا ومن هناك ..
36	Respondent	كلاكما	كلاكما نفس طينة الإرهاب وعلى نفس الدبابة الامريكية أتيتم
37	Respondent	منذ أن رحل..؟	لم يزل العراق يعيش كارثة كبرى منذ أن رحل صدام، ولم تزل اميركا وايران يعيشون به ويعيثون فيه فسادا عظيما منذ ذلك الحين. وقد أن الأوان لأن يتحرك الشعب العراقي بجميع أطرافه وطوائفه ويحرر بلده من هذا العدوان العريض ويستعيد كرامته وعزته، وكفاية ذل.
38	Respondent	بشار الاسد رمز النخوة العربية	بشار الاسد رمز النخوة العربية ورمز الكرامة و رمز الشهامة ورمز الرجولة و رمز المقاومة ورمز الممانعة و رمز الصمود و رمز التصدي و رمز التحدي
39	Respondent	لا مكان للفرس المجوس	العراقيين الآن بحاجة الى قائد غير طائفسي ونظيف يعرف كيف يدير البلاد بحكمة العراقيين عانوا الكثير وتعبوا نحتاج الى رجل يفعل ويطور العراق الى حال افضل كبقية دول العالم لا الى خراب العراق كـفى مهازل وقتل وهدر دماء وأهم شيء يبقى للعراقيين فقط ((ولا مكان)) للفرس المجوس في
40	Respondent	امعة	لست انت يا امعة من يحدد من يحكم العراق
41	Respondent	أياد علاوي هو أمل العراق الوحيد للخلاص	أياد علاوي هو أمل العراق الوحيد في الخلاص
42	Respondent	علاوي عميل امريكي	و ضد الجيش العراقي

I. Third Online Readers' Responses Threads

Link: <http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/iraq-elections/2014/05/01/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A8-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%8A%D8%B1.htm>

No.	Interlocutors	Title	Comments
1	Respondent	هناك انتقادات ونقص في الانتخاب	التصويت 60 بالمائة والمتبقي 40 ومنع اهالي الانبار وباقي المحافظات لم تدخل الى التصويت الانتخابي. اذا فاز العميل الايراني نوري المالكي او احد الطائفين ممن يخضعون لاوامر ايران . فلن يعيش العراق بامان وسيستمر الارهاب والقتل والطائفية.
2	Respondent	اعذروني على ما اقلوه،	الانتخابات حق وواجب فمن صوت بقرر مصير الدولة ايجابيا ومن لم يصوت ايضا يقرر مصير الدولة سلبيا وعليهم ان يتقبلوا النتائج على مضض ، هذه هي الديمقراطية حكم الشعب من الشعب الي الشعب ومع الشعب، ولا جدوى بالبكاء بعد هدر الحليب، واتمنى كل الخير للشعب العراقي وانشاءالله يقضى على الازهابيين اعداء الشعب العراقي، والسلام والتقدم والازدهار والايمان وكل الخير ما تمناه للشعب العراقي، مع بركات الرب، أمين أمين.
3	Respondent	عدوكم واحد	العراق مقبل على التقسيم فالحكيم وجميع الأحزاب الأيرانية التي تحكم العراق يهمها عزل العراق عن العرب والنفوذ به وبعد القضاء وأباداة السنة سيتم أباداة الشيعة العرب وتهجير هم من مناطقهم الغنية بالترول , نقول أن السنة العرب بذلوا الدماء وجاهدوا وقتلتوا بشرف لنيل حريتهم رغم التآمر الدولي عليهم ولكن الشيعة لازالوا مغيبين عن المشهد وعن حاضرهم ومستقبلهم لابد أن يلتحموا مع الأنبار لتحرير العراق قبل أن يأتيكم الدور والتدمير والمعتقات لأن إيران لا يهمهما المذهب بل هي دولة عنصرية تريد بناء أمجادها على جماجم العرب , وهي تنتقم من جميع العرب العراقيين ...
4	Respondent	حرب نفوذ	العراق اصبح تحت النفوذ الايرانى واذا لم يستيقظ العرب من نومهم العميق فان سوريا ودول اخرى ستسقط بايدي طهران المدعومة من اسرائيل والاتقيات الدينية والكثائن
5	Respondent	سلاما عراق الفرقدين^عراق علي والحسين	شكرًا وعرفانا وتقديرا لكل عراقي أدى واجبه الوطني و شارك بالمسييرة ومارئون الديمقراطية وتحدى الارهابية والحاقدین وافشل مخططاتهم الاجرامية ,,," مبرووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووو وووک العرس الديمقراطي العراقي الكبير وكـــــــــــــــللـــــــــــــللـــــــــلووووووووووش,,, وباسمع الصوت صلى على النبي أول محمد وابن عمه علي,,, اللهم صلي على محمد وآل محمد,, (@@)
6	Respondent	غباء النصيري الازرقى لن ينتهي غبا	هههههههههههههههه الفرقدین ایہا الایرانی الدمارکی المهرج اضحتکئی هذه الکلمه الفرقدین . لایطیق لك عرق شوی شوې افهم ايھاموطنک الاصلي هی طهران وليس العراق کفاک غبا

13	Respondent	الشيعة لا يصلحون للحكم	الشيعة يحكمون بنفس طائفي. ولن يستقر حال العراق الا بابعاد المالكي عن حكم العراق ,,المالكي في كلماته يرد نحن شيعة ونحارب احفاد يزيد ويقصد اهل السنة. ويقول تحويل القبلة من مكة لكر بلاء وغيره من الكلمات الطائفية ..معقول رئيس وزراء عراقي يحكم بلد زي العراق وفي بلد يعيش فيه مختلف المذاهب والاعراق يتكلم بنفس طائفي ابن السنة والزيدية والصابئة والمسيح. كل الدول يوجد فيها مذاهب وديانات مختلفة ويعيشون بسلام وحقوقهم واحدة. عمركم سمعوا حاكم يتكلم بنفس طائفي بصراحة انا ماعمري سمعت الا المالكي انت رئيس سياسي مالك ومال الديانات والمذاهب كل الي عليك توفر الرفاهية والامان لشعبك وكلن يعبد الله على طريقة
14	Respondent	تابع تعليقي	لماذا ينتخبون العراقيين الشيعة المالكي؟؟؟؟ماذا قدم لهم؟؟؟لا امان التفجيرات يوميا ,الاقتصاد مشلول والبتترول يسرق يوميا ويذهب الى ايران. الفقر. بنية تحتية سيئة جدا. الشعب العراقي نصفه يعيش لاجئ خارج وطنه. نشر الطائفية وفرق بين الشعب الواحد. حتى الجواز العراقي اصبح الاسوء في العالم. ماذا بقي لكي تنتخبوه؟؟
15	Respondent	ردا الى من يدعى أنه فتاة؟وطائفية عجباً	لماذا تفتح عينوك الطائفية على الشيعة فقط؟؟ و تغمضينها عن السنة مثلا؟؟ لقد حكم العراق اهل السنة مدة 80 عاما وفي النهاية تركوه بلدا مدمرا محتلا متخلفا يعاني من الحروب والحصار و الارهاب والدمار والديكتاتورية والطائفية ووالخ؟؟؟؟ وانظري أيضا الى البلدان العربية الاخرى وحالها اليوم فوضى و اراهاب وتفجيرات و قتل ودمار وتخلف وحروب اهلها ومشاكل لاتعد ولا تحصى ووالخ كما نشاهد و جميعها بلدان سنية يحكمها السنة ؟ ولا يوجد بها شيعة؟؟ خليك فتاة طيبة و ابتعدي عن الطائفية ؟ هذا ان كنتي فتاة فعلا ؟ ولكن لا اعتقد بل من الطائفيين الذين يكتبون بعدة أسماء؟؟
16	Respondent	عراقي راقئ وليس بطائفي	عراقي انا كلامي مافية طائفية ..بس انا اتكلم عن واقع العراق اليوم. تنكر ان المالكي طائفي؟؟وعلى العموم ان ماني ضد الشيعة بس على الاقل انتخبوا شيعي علماني ماعنده طائفية ويعامل الشعب سواسية مايفرق بينهم ..بس وضعكم الحالي فيه ظلم كبير لبقية الطوائف..كنت اتمنى تتقبلون تعليقي برحابة صدر. كلمة الحق ماينزل منها. وعلى العموم انا فتاة طيبة فعلا وكنت تعليقي من باب الغيرة على العراق وهو اول تعليق لي عن العراق واخر تعليق ..يااااي
17	Respondent	العرب	لا اتفق معك على الاطلاق. المشكلة ليست بالشيعة او بالسنة. المشكلة بالعرب. انتم العرب لاتصلحون للحكم. اولا انتم لاتحبون بعضكم البعض. مضت 11 سنة فوضى عارمة تقتلون الاطفال والشيوخ والابرياء وتفجرون السيارات المفخخة في الطرقات العامة والاماكن المزدحمة. المشكلة ليست بالشيعة وانما بالاعراب. نحن الاكراد تعبنا منكم ومن الاقتتال فيما بينكم. الم يكن صدام سني؟؟؟؟ الم يقتل الشيعة الم يقتل الاكراد.
18	Respondent	يابة اصلح حالك اولاً!	عن ماذا؟ نتحدث انت؟ ادعي باننا باحسن حال؟ نحن اللورد مبتلين مثل الاخوة العرب اذا نتحدث عن الحكومة الكارتونية في اربيل فانت تضحك على نفسك اولاً قبل غيرك! الحزبية و التبعية العشائرية الخائفة للحرية ليس احسن من المذهبية الموجودة ببغداد ! فلا ترمي الناس بالحجر اذا كان بيتك من الزجاج...
19	Respondent	انا صالح حالي ولست طائفيا	يا به انت مسمي الحكومه بالاقيلم حكومه؟ الشي الاخر انا لم احكم على امة كامله لاجل انسان جاهل ماذا قدم رئيسك جلال طالباني للعراق والكورد وللشعب السوري؟ انا لم ارمي الناس بالحجر انا اوضحك ماكو احد احسن من احد كلنا بالهواء سوا والعدو الحقيقي هي ايران وامريكا واسرائيل.الي زرع الطائفية والفتنه تتوقع من بكل تاكيد هي ايران والهلال الشيعي الذي يريد مد نفوذه من طهران الى المغرب العربي. انا لذي اصدقاء من كل الجنسيات. ومن كردستان ايضا وقد درست تاريخ كردستان ولا يوجد فرق بين تاريخكم وتاريخ العرب. ارجو مرك ان لا يذهب فهمك الى بعيد.

63	Respondent	إيران اليورانيوم, ونحن العرب.....	العرب أصحاب نفس قصير جداً، يملون بسرعة ولا يستمرون ويثابرون حتى إنجاز مشاريعهم. لهذا اعتمدوا على الأجنبي في كل شيء، بما في ذلك حماية بلدانهم من الأخطار الخارجية، دون أن يعلموا أن ذلك الأجنبي المتمثل بالولايات المتحدة لن يبقى قوياً على مر الزمان، بل سيضعف يوماً ما، وسينزولهم يرتعدون خوفاً، كما هو الحال الآن، بعد أن بدأت واشنطن تتلمص من حماية حلفائها العرب، وتعد الصفقات مع خصومهم الإيرانيين.
64	Respondent	أرقد بسلام	رحمة الله عليك ياأبواللثين مامثلك اليوم أحد
65	Respondent	دولة و الخطة القادم	في حال تسلم رئيس دولة (الهالكي) لسلطة رابعة يعتزم بالتغيير و يقصد به هذه المرة تغيير الشعب و ليس ادارة مجلس و زراءه لأن هو و اشركاله و من لف لفهم باقون ان رضينا أم أبينا الخطة القادمة (سرقة ، تهجير ، قتل) هذا الملخص لبرنامجهم القادم أما التفاصيل كالآتي ١- سرقة . هو الحفاظ على ثروات العراق في بنوك خارجية و القصد منه زيادة ثروته تحسباً لمستقبل اسرته فيما اذا انتهت ولايته الرابعة ! ٢- تهجير . حتى ينفرد هو وحاشيته و من لف لفهم هو واسياده في طهران على ان لا يعترضه احد من باقي الكيانات والحزاب الاخرى ٣- قتل . ان كانوا من ابناء الشيعة او السنة او المسيحيين او باقي الديانات غير الموالين
66	Respondent	استقرار العراق	نحن العراقيون من نقرر مصير العراق وستحل جميع مشاكلنا الداخلية بالحوار الوطني الجاد فقط انتم ايها المتطفلون تنحوا جانبا وتوقفوا عن ارسال السيارات المفخخة ودعم الميليشيات والتعنيف للفكر التكفيري الهمجى المتخلف الذي لا يؤمن بالآخر وما شأنكم انتم بالسياسة انتم لم يسمح لكم في بلدانكم باختيار الشيوخ او رؤساء بلدنكم حيث يتم اختيارهم بالوراثة ولايسمح لكم بالتعبير عن الراي حتى فكيف تبدوان بشيء لا تمتلكونه لأن فاقد الشيء لايعطيه اما بالنسبة للعراق فنحن من نختار من يحكمنا ومن لا يروق لنا سنعاقيه من خلال صناديق الاقتراع وسيبقى العراق شامخا بأهل الشرافاء شيعة وسنة عربا و اكراد ومسيحين وايزيديين واشوريين .
67	Respondent	العراق و المجرم الحاقد نوري المالكي .	اذا فاز المجرم نوري المالكي بالانتخابات العراق في حرب اهلية الحل هو اغتيال المجرم نوري المالكي .
68	Respondent	شخص وأحد	مواطن شرقاوي = الأزرقى
69	Respondent	بغداد/العراق	هذه الانتخابات تدرج تحت سياسة تغيير الوجوه مع الابقاء على سياسة النظام..
70	Respondent	اذا فاز المالكي يثبت ان الشعب العراقي	اذا فاز المجرم نوري المالكي هذا يثبت ان الشعب العراقي غبي .
71	Respondent	على الأقل نحن ننتخب بأنفسنا يا وائل ههه	على الأقل نحن ننتخب بأنفسنا يا وائل...
72	Respondent	ياخي العراقي الحر انتخب الافضل لك	ياخي العراقي الحر انتخب الافضل لك ماذا جنيتم من المجرم نوري المالكي سوا الخراب و الدمار و الجوع و سرقة اموال العراق والعراقيين بمشاريع مشبوهة مثل مشروع النخيل بالبصرة نوري المالكي لايعرف شي بالسياسة و الاقتصاد حتى الشركات لايعرف اسمائها هل هذا يشرف العراق عراق التاريخ و الحضارة و الكبرياء هذا غباء و انتحار .
73	Respondent	WAEI SAUDI FREE	بيدو لي ان هذا الشخص مريض مضحك بتعليقاته عالج نفسك ايها المريض المصخره بأقرب وقت ممكن ماعندك سالفه .

96	Respondent	ولكن لا تنسى ولا تتناسى . أرجوك!!	أهل البيت ستة أفراد ، خمسة منهم عرب وواحد فارسي . محمد صل الله تعالى عليه وآله وسلم وعلي وفاطمة الزهراء والحسن والحسين عليهم أفضل الصلاة والسلام عرب وسلمان المحمدي الفارسي رضي الله تعالى عليه . الامام زين العابدين (ع) وهو الامام الرابع من ذرية الرسول محمد صل الله تعالى عليه وآله وسلم . وهو الامام علي بن الحسين (السجاد) عليه السلام أبوه عربي هو الامام الحسين سيد شباب أهل الجنة عليه أفضل الصلاة والسلام ، ...
97	Respondent	التشيع عربي عراقي	التشيع عراقي نشأ وترعرع ويبقى عراقيا وكل اصحاب الامام امير المؤمنين عليه السلام من العراقيين الاقحاح ورثة الحضارات ولان اكثرهم كان يتكلم باللغة النبطية الموروثة عن الاجداد لذا كان يطلق عليهم العجم والتسمية الاصح لهم النبط لكن تسرع البعض ووهمه او نفسه المريضة جعلت من كلمة عجمي مرادفة للفارسي وبهذا الاعتبار فالعراقيين ليس بينهم فارسي وانما هناك اذنيال لفارس ... وسلمان المحمدي هو عراقي ايضا واطلق عليه فارسي لان بلاده كانت تحت الوصالية الفارسية ... اما بشأن والده الامام زين العابدين عليه السلام فلا توجد ادلة تاريخية معتمدة في انها ابنة يزجرد وهذا الفكرة اصطنعها الفرس كي يجعلوا لهم نفوذا على التشيع
98	Respondent	عـ الثورة العراقية الكبرى ساجل	2سقوط خمس قذائف هاون عيار 120 ملم على قاعدة الاسدي في الرماد واعمد الدخان ترتفع من وسطها @.@ علما انها قاعدة شبه @.@@ خالية حيث ان معظم الميليشيات وقوات الجيش الصفوي قد هربت باتجاه مبهم @.@ تكبير
99	Respondent	عـ الثورة العراقية الكبرى ساجل	رجال جيش الطريقة النقشبندية يعطون هم ويستولون على اثنتين في قضاء الحويجة 44 كم جنوب كركوك @.@.@ واسر ضابطين صفوين مع كمية من الاسلحة @.@.@.@ تكبير @.@.
100	Respondent	عـ الثورة العراقية الكبرى ساجل	الجيش الاسلامي وجيش المجاهدين يطلقون قذائف هاون باتجاه مطار صدام الدولي مما ادى الى تدمير مدرج وتضرر طائرتين يستخدمهما الجيش الصفوي لمحاربة ونقل العتاد الى بئار الاثد
101	Respondent	الانتخاب	انتخبنا المالكي بس نعرف ماراح يطور الجنوب بس يمص النفط ويهرب امواله للخارج مع باقي الاحزاب الاسلاميه وغير الاسلاميه مصاصو الدماء
102	Respondent	الى جنوبي	ياخي ليش هلشكل تحجي اكثر المناطق استفاده وازدهار حاليا هي الجنوب وروح دور وشوف منو الديهرب النفط
103	Respondent	عـ الثورة العراقية الكبرى —	المجالس الثورية في بغداد والمحافظات تدعو الجيش الى الوقوف معها ضد ميليشيات ايران المجرمة وتعطيه مهلة لكي يلقون السلاح مقابل الامان لهم مع تسليمهم دشاديش نوع دفة البرواري
104	Respondent	عصابات	دائما الذين يحكمون العراق عصابات قتل وأجرام لشعوبهم ولشعوب المنطقة الله يكون بعون الشعب العراقي
105	Respondent	اي والله ...الله يساعد الشعب العراقي
106	Respondent	الى الازرقى	يا ولد انت ماملت من البهله والاهانه الي نازله على كرامتك بكل تعليق تعلقه .ولك والله انك متعود على هل الالهات وحتي ممكن من اهل بيتك . خلي عندك شوية بس من العقل واحترام الذات وخف علينا بتعليقاتك الكوميديه ياشويبي
107	Respondent	ليش	ليش ما تسلمون دفة الحكم لأهل العراق الاصليين اللي هم المسيحيين ويس كم سنة والمسيحيون هم عراقيون....ونوع العراقيون بأن العراق راح يتعمر ويصبح احسن من الامارات ... على الاقل بانهم لا يسرقون خيرات البلد وامناء ومخلصين ويوزعون الخير على الشعب
108	Respondent	عاشت ايدك يا أزرقى	كلامك سليم وينطبق المثل هنا تماما

120	Respondent	مفتهمت	عقدتيه للشغله... ايران وي بشار مو القاعده... احن ميهنه منو وي منو انريد ناس تبني العراق و خلص. البلد اولاً..
121	Respondent	اسمع يا عراقي	اذا فاز الهالكي فهذا معناه ان الشعب اختاره وكلهم او اقليتهم من الشيعة . وهم يعيشون في اسوء بلد في العالم حسب التقارير الدولية وليس السنية . فأقول مبروك عليكم المالكي وتستاهلون اكثر . ياناس صرتوا مضحكة امام شعوب العالم الحرة وانا اعتقد هذا كله من عند الله سبحانه وتعالى (وكما تكونوا يولى عليكم) الرحمة الى شهيد الحج الاكبر .
122	Respondent	العراق	والله كلكم...وحاقدون وابو اسراء صاعد قصبين ماعليكم ههههههه
123	Respondent	الى ضياء العراقي	في أي عرف كان عربي أم أعجمي لا تكون الزوجة من أهل بيت الرجل لكي تُخرج زوجات الرسول من أهل بيت الرسول ؟؟؟ ارجو ان لا يكون السبب هو تكليف نساء الرسول (ص) في مكة المكرمة للسيدة عائشة أم المؤمنين للذهاب مع ابن عمه الرسول وزوج اختها ، الزبير بن العوام في جيش باتجاه البصرة لتعقب بعض من قتلة عثمان بعد ان سيطر الشيعة (قتلة عثمان) على المدينة المنورة ، مما منع نساء الرسول من العودة اليها حيث ذهبوا للحج في تلك السنة .
124	Respondent	اذا الشعب اختار فهذه ارادته	طبعاً النتائج تقول انت ائتلاف دولة القانون اكتسح كل منافسيه بالرغم من حملة التسيقيط التي مورست ضد المالكي وائتلافه من قبل الاحزاب الشيعية والسنية على حد سواء لكن الشعب اختاره وهذه حقيقة علينا التسليم بها الشعب العراقي بطبيعته يكره التطرف ولو لا خوف اهل الانبار ومناطق السنة من داعش لنتخبوا الهالكي كما انتخبوه الشيعة الذين خلصهم من سيطره المليشيات
125	Respondent	بغداد	اشو هوايه اتمظرتون ايران والعجم محتلينه بعد ما ننطيهه شوفو غير سالفه يا انزال
126	Respondent	العراق	رغم ماواجهه دولة القانون من تحديات فإنه وبأذن الله تعالى سيتصدر القوائم الانتخابية بكل جداره وسينتصر الحق
127	Respondent	ادانة	الاخوة المحترمون ارجوكم ساعدوني رأيت الصورة للاطباء يغمسون اصابعهم في المرققة ومنع الكوادر الطبية من الانتخابات كذلك الفلوجة الصامدة واهل الاعظمية الابطال والقرى في ديالى والانبار ومحافظات اخرى واغتيال مرشحين وقوات سوات تحاصر مكاتب المفوضية واخذ صناديق الاقتراع ومفوضية الانتخابات غير حيادية لانها تحت ضغط التهديد والابتزاز والضرب وحالة الحرب والا حرب كفاكم تضحكون على عقولنا هذه المفوضية لم ولن تكون حيادية ابدا

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