

POLITICS AND THE PRESS IN KUWAIT  
A STUDY OF AGENDA-SETTING

BY

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### ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the concept of agenda-setting and its applications to research on the press in a Third World country, namely Kuwait. One characteristic of agenda-setting research is that so far it has been exclusively Western and in particular American. Another characteristic is that early research into agenda-setting was limited due to a focus on the process by which the media set the agenda for the public, and gave little attention to the process by which the media itself was created. This thesis, however, seeks to examine and explain the conditions under which certain issues and not others appear in the Kuwaiti press. The range of this study, therefore, was not limited to the correspondence between the media agenda and the public agenda, but it was also concerned to examine the way in which certain groups and institutions influence journalists and consequently the press.

The review of literature shows the extent to which most of the investigation into the relationship between the media and the public has been carried out in America and identifies the limited work on links between the media and other socio-political institutions in the U.K. Where this thesis breaks new ground, however, is in its application of the methodology and findings of agenda-setting research in a Third World country, namely Kuwait. The choice of Kuwait in particular was neither haphazard nor arbitrary. The presence in Kuwait of modern socio-political institutions of a certain degree of maturity of development and the diversity of its press, in more ways than one, made it most suitable for the present research.

In tackling its objectives, the research reported in this thesis employed two main methodologies. First, a questionnaire and interview were devised to explore and assess the importance of the issues involved, as well as the attitudes of each member of the sample from a conservative or



liberal perspective. Two groups of representative samples were extracted from among government officials and journalists. This is followed by a content analysis of a random sample of material from newspapers.

Results were subjected to a thorough statistical analysis of frequency distribution and cross-tabulation. This analysis provides, moreover, a detailed examination of correlations between the salience of a range of policy issues to journalists and officials on the one hand, and press reporting on the other. From this analysis the thesis derives conclusions about the political role and context of the press in Kuwait, and offers more general observations as to the applicability of agenda-setting research in Third World societies.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The work of Shaw and McCombs (1972) has introduced a concept into mass communication research known as the "agenda-setting function of the press." Although the effect of the media in changing people's behaviour (especially during electoral campaigns and voting) was found to be indirect and mediated by interpersonal influence, the ability of the media to disseminate ideas and to influence cognitions (Klapper, 1960) has been firmly established. Shaw and McCombs have provided data which indicated that the differential emphasis given by the media to certain issues corresponds with the differential concern of the audience with these issues. Hence it was concluded that by exposing and emphasizing certain issues (e.g. election debates), the media define for the audience the differential importance of these issues. Consequently, the media are said to set the agenda for the public.

"The expectation was that the debates, through their emphasis on some campaign issues to the exclusion of others, would affect the salience ratios of these selected issues relative to salience ratios of issues not addressed in the debates"

(Cadziala and Becker, 1983, p122)

The work of McCombs and Shaw has, thus, revitalised research on media effects and partially restored the belief that the media are not as important as previously believed. Numerous studies have consequently been undertaken to uncover the various dimensions and aspects of agenda-setting. For example, the discussion came to include such questions as: To what extent the media set the agenda for political elites? (Gormley, 1975); What are the differences between various media impacts in terms of agenda-setting? (Benton and Frazier, 1976); What is the difference between the

influence of national and local media agendas? (Palmgreen, 1977; Gandy, 1982); What are the differences between the television and newspaper agendas? (Fedler and Taylor, 1978); What is the time lag factor in agenda-setting (Stone and McCombs, 1981); and to what extent does the agenda of one medium influence those of other media? (Atwater, et al., 1987).

One characteristic of the early research into agenda-setting is that it has been exclusively American. The uniqueness of the American system, especially its Presidential debates, has seemingly imposed certain limitations on the global relevance of the agenda-setting hypothesis. Another characteristic is that early research was limited in scope in that the emphasis was on the degree of correspondence between the media agenda and the public agenda at a given point in time. In other words, there seems to have been general satisfaction with the notion that the media set the agenda for the public without enquiring into who sets the agenda for the media. Consequently, there were demands to go beyond agenda-setting and to examine the conditions under which certain issues and not others appear in the media. Gandy, for instance, states that:

"Because McCombs and his colleagues want to limit the agenda-setting construct to matters of issue salience, I suggest that one has to go beyond agenda-setting to determine who sets the media agenda, how and for what purpose it is set, and with what impact on the distribution of power and values in society".

(Gandy, 1982, p.7.)

The introduction of the "beyond agenda-setting" notion directed researchers' attention to viewing and analysing the media as organisations or institutions subject to internal constraints and external pressures and demands. The naivety with which the agenda-setting concept was introduced viewed the media as independent, self sustained systems which are essentially sui generis. This notion of totally independent media was then

enriched by introducing an orientation which not only showed the correspondence between the media agenda and the public agenda, but also showed the role which certain groups and institutions play in influencing the journalists as well as the organisations to which they belong (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975, 1977, 1986; Miliband, 1969).

As thinking evolved beyond agenda-setting, attention was accordingly directed to the political, social, economic and cultural context within which the media operate. In this regard, the pertinence of the British political communication research literature which for many years has been examining the relationship between the media and the other social institutions was ascertained (Murdock and Golding, 1977; Golding and Elliott, 1979; Golding and Middleton, 1982; Golding, Murdock and Schlesinger, 1986; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975, 1977 and 1986 and the Glasgow University Media Group, 1976 and 1980).

This thesis is a valuable contribution to the field in question in more than one sense. First of all, it studies agenda-setting in a traditional society and, so far as the candidate knows, it is the only study which tries to find parallels of the agenda-setting phenomenon in a third world country. The global relevance of this phenomenon is enhanced when it is studied in drastically different societies. This is especially so since most of the agenda-setting research has been conducted in Western societies, particularly in the United States.

Secondly, it entertains the general notion that, by virtue of their position in the social structure of a developing society, different groups contribute to the agenda-setting of the press in ways commensurate with their interests and related to the expectations of their constituencies. In this sense, the press agenda is not set in a vacuum. Likewise, it is not necessarily set exclusively by the journalists. That is to say, in addressing certain issues journalists may be expressing the views of other

groups, such as government officials or the rulers themselves, and, in a sense, they advocate their cause.

Thirdly, and more specifically, this thesis tries to uncover the role played by different groups who set the agenda for the Kuwaiti press. It examines the degree of similarity between attitudes taken by the press on prevalent issues and those of government officials who are generally conservative. It also examines the similarity between the attitudes of both officials and journalists in relation to prevalent issues in the press. Hence the thesis sets out to corroborate a theory, hitherto developed in limited settings, by applying it to an interested and radically different setting.

Such an approach is in line with the current state of agenda-setting research. It is not sufficient, however, to show the overall correlations between the press and the public agenda. Hence the exploration of some of the dimensions of the agenda of the press is not monolithic. The general point is that the press contains more than one agenda, and that these agendas are set by (i.e. correlate with the agendas of) different groups.

The applied aspect of the study has been conducted in Kuwait because it offers a most suitable research setting. The most obvious reason is that its government and the Royal Family on whose behalf it rules have a traditionally conservative orientation which is juxtaposed over and against its active social groups. One of these groups is the nationalists whose liberal orientation and agitations for change have influenced modern Kuwait into becoming a country enjoying one of the highest per capita income and a most fair distribution of national wealth. Also, there is an influential merchant group which has existed from long before the discovery and exploitation of oil, and which has contributed in significant ways to building up the wealth of Kuwait in the form of an annual income from national and international investment the total of which in 1985 was

\$13,456 million, comparing favourably with oil revenue of \$9,480 million in 1986. The relationship between these groups is reflected in the press which, although privately owned, not only incorporates and advocates government positions, but also yields to government influence, even as this is a generally conservative disposition. It seems that a socio-political division of labour between the journalists and government officials has emerged throughout the years which is reflected in their differential influence on the press.

The empirical data for this study were collected between January and May, 1986. After a pilot study was undertaken to ascertain prevalent issues in the Kuwaiti press, a questionnaire and an interview protocol were produced and administered to two samples of journalists and government officials. At the same time, a sample of newspapers was also subjected to content analysis. The questionnaire consisted of 50 bi-polar statements representing fifty issues to which the respondent could react in either a liberal or a conservative manner. The overall hypothesis which underlay this study was consequently that government officials set the agenda for the press in a way that it might reflect the conservative views of the regime and give more emphasis for its news.

This thesis is divided into seven chapters, including this introductory one. Chapter II comprises the review of the literature in which the agenda-setting and related concepts have been developed. Based on the review, several points are emphasised. Though early research in agenda-setting was plentiful, it is shown that, on the whole, it was shallow and limited to the simple notion that the issues which were portrayed in the media (i.e. the media agenda) correlate in a rank order with the issues which occupied the thinking and attention of the public. Further, discussion shows that as the agenda-setting concept gained wider circulation, attention was directed to its methodological and theoretical dimensions.

At this juncture, attention is directed beyond the agenda-setting function of the media, namely who sets the media agenda. In this regard, the discussion shows that the British literature on the subject offers an analytical framework within which the socio-economic and political forces acting upon the media as corporations or social institutions offer many insights into how the media agenda is established. And, finally, Chapter II examines the pertinence of agenda-setting to Third World countries - a question which naturally leads to the following chapter which examines the socio-political organisations within which the media agenda in Kuwait is established.

Chapter III is devoted to acquainting the reader with the research setting. It traces the development of modern Kuwait and the establishment of its media. The transformation of the country from its tribal origins to the present time is spelled out. Particular attention is directed to the division of labour which was necessitated by the socio-historical events which led to the emergence of the country. A social structural analysis is presented to define the social dynamics governing the relationship among social groups, namely the Ruling Family, the merchants, the nationalists and the Bedouins, along with the journalists who were treated for research purposes as a social group in Chapter III. This last has been justified in terms of the common social characteristics of the journalists. The development of the Kuwaiti press is also traced, especially in relation to its position within the Kuwaiti socio-political spectrum. On the basis of this presentation it was posited that in a Third World country, such as Kuwait, in which a traditional authority blends with emerging modernist institutions, government officials set the media agenda, and journalists function as an extension of new social groups in traditional society. They are heavily influenced by the dominant ideology sponsored by the traditional elites and operationalised by government officials in public policy.

On the basis of such analysis, five hypotheses were devised and presented in Chapter V. The expectation was that a significant positive correlation would be found between the officials and the press agendas, as well as between the officials and the journalists' agendas. It was also expected that there would be a correlation between the journalists' and the press agendas. Similarly, influenced by sample testing of attitudes on the issues, it was expected that there would be a similarity in the conservative attitudes taken by the officials and the journalists, as well as between officials and the press. Chapter V also discusses the methodology and design of a questionnaire, developed on the basis of a pilot study to determine the prevalent press issues. The chapter also includes a discussion of the rotating systematic sample of three Kuwaiti newspapers covering a span of five months as well as of the content analysis of issues appearing in the questionnaire.

Chapter VI contains the research findings. Data from the content analysis, the questionnaire and the interviews were rank ordered, and a Spearman rank order correlating co-efficient was calculated for each set of data. The five hypotheses were found to be substantiated. Chapter VI also contains a presentation and descriptive analysis of the demographic socio-economic data characterising the participants.

Finally, in Chapter VII, the conclusions are presented. It has been found that the results of this study are consistent with the notion that the press, like other media, is subject to certain undercurrents which influence the way in which journalists address the issues at hand. Thus, on the basis of the findings in this study, it is not possible to state that on certain issues, journalists are not affected by influences from some groups in the society; such as, in our case, government officials. The press is shown to be inter-dependent with other institutions which it both affects and by which it is influenced.

## CHAPTER II

### THE AGENDA-SETTING OF THE MEDIA: THEORY AND RESEARCH

This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, theory and research of agenda-setting will be reviewed, including the conceptual definition of agenda function of the media and the research findings. Special care will be given to conceptualise and operationalise agenda-setting variables and dimensions. The relevant models, therefore, will be presented including the work of some researchers who tended to scrutinise the agenda-setting model. This part will eventually include some approaches particularly those overlapping with, or related to, the agenda-setting function of the media.

In the second part, the concept of agenda builders will be highlighted utilising the relevancy of the British research to agenda-setting. In this trend of research the emphases were given to the investigation of the socio-economic and political forces acting upon the media and playing the role of agenda-building. The dynamics governing the interactions between the media and other political institutions and other influential cultural sectors will be presented as a departure from the concept of public agenda dominated by the myopic assumption that the media set the agenda for the public without investigating the forces which set the agenda for the media. The discussion will be dominated by two main British schools of inquiry -the structuralists and the pluralists, along with the vocal media group in Glasgow University.

The third part will intimate the consideration within which the agenda-setting in Third World countries could be fruitfully examined. It will include some scholarly suggestions for appropriate directions of research and methods.



#### A. THE AGENDA-SETTING FUNCTION OF THE PRESS

From the most primitive to the most complex societies, communication is considered to be the carrier of the social process. It is an essential means of establishing, organising and modifying man's social life and passing on values and meanings from one generation to another. Thus, the social process relies profoundly on the accumulation, exchange, and transmission of knowledge. Knowledge, in turn depends, to a large extent, upon communication (Peterson, Jensen and Rivers, 1965, p.18).

In contemporary society, mass communication has become an integral part of the social process. It permeates social life. Although the media disseminate information, it is now known that their capacity to change behaviour is not as direct as was once believed. This means that they serve specific functions in contemporary society. For example, in his book The Effects of Mass Communication, Klapper introduced two conclusions regarding the effects of mass communication. They are as follows:

1. Mass communication ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects but rather functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influences.
2. These mediating factors are such that they typically render mass communication a contributory agent, but not the sole cause in a process of reinforcing the existing conditions.

(Klapper, 1960, p.8)

Although the effects of the media are not direct, the media do impart information and ideas. This point has been treated in recent research which examines the assumption that people do learn from mass communication. It is concluded that "mass communication does not only allow people to gain information about public affairs and what is happening in the world, but also to learn how much importance to attach to an issue or topic from the emphasis placed on it by the mass media" (McCombs, 1977, p.5). Put differently by Cohen, "the mass media may not be successful in telling us what to

think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to think about" (Cohen, 1963, p.13).

The learning function of the media has also been treated by the UNESCO. According to the UNESCO, the eight main functions of mass communication media in any social system may be identified as follows:

1. **Information:** This function is defined as the gathering, processing and disseminating of news, or other kinds of messages, in order "to understand and react knowledgeably to personal, environmental, national and international conditions, as well as to be in a position to take appropriate decisions."
2. **Socialisation:** This is defined as the provision of knowledge which enables humans to operate as effective members in their society.
3. **Motivation:** This is defined as the promotion of the immediate and ultimate aims of each society, and the stimulation of personal choices and aspirations; the fostering of individual or community activities geared to the pursuit of agreed aims.
4. **Debate and discussion:** This function consists of the provision and exchange of facts and information in order to create agreement or to clarify different opinions towards different issues.
5. **Education:** This is the transmission of knowledge among people. The main goal of such a function is "to foster intellectual development, the formation of character and the acquisition of skills and capacities at all stages of life."
6. **Cultural promotion:** This refers to the exchange of all the cultural and artistic products in order to keep the present associated with the past. Also, it includes "the development of culture by widening the individual's horizons, awakening his imagination and stimulating his aesthetic needs and creativity."
7. **Entertainment:** This function refers to the diffusion of all means of collective recreation and enjoyment such as drama, dance, art, literature, music, comedy, sports, games and the like.
8. **Integration:** This is defined as the provision to all persons, groups and nations of access to the variety of messages which they need in order to know and understand each other and to appreciate others living conditions, viewpoints and aspirations.

(MacBride et al, 1980, p.14)

In addition to the above, a new function of the media has gained wide attention in recent years, namely the agenda-setting function of the press. The agenda-setting idea, however, was introduced some sixty years ago by Walter Lippman. In his Public Opinion (1922), he included a chapter

entitled "The World Outside and the Pictures in our Heads", in which he emphasised the fact that it is the mass media which dominate the creation of these shared images among members of the public. Such thinking has been echoed by Mills (1968). He stated that:

"Most of the 'pictures in our heads' we have gained from the media even to the point where we often do not really believe what we see before us until we read about it in the paper or hear about it on the radio. The media not only give us information; they guide our very experience. Our standards of reality tend to be set by these media rather than by our own fragmentary experience."  
(Mills, 1968, p.32)

In the same vein, White presented agenda-setting as evidence of the enormous influence the press has on the public mind with respect to political issues particularly in the United States. He argued that:

"The power of the press in America is a primordial one. It sets the agenda of public discussion; and this sweeping political power is unrestrained by any law. It determines what people talk and think about, an authority that in other nations is reserved for tyrants, priests, parties, and mandarins."  
(White, 1972, p.327)

This assertion indicates to what level the press functions to impress its priorities on the public. Put more succinctly, agenda-setting means that "what the press emphasizes is in turn emphasized privately and publicly by the audience of the press" (Shaw and McCombs, 1977, p.8). In other words, it is believed that mass media have the potential for structuring issues for the public. Thus, according to Shaw, who elaborated the agenda-setting idea, mass media are all pervasive but not particularly persuasive. He added that although this statement has been accepted as a truism, researchers of agenda-setting insist that the media are very persuasive in their unique way. However, Shaw distinguishes between the effect of mass media as described by the long-discredited hypodermic-needle theory and the agenda-setting theory. According to the hypodermic-needle theory, the media are directly effective in shaping and manipulating people's attitude - their likes and dislikes - regarding political, economic and

social matters (Shaw, 1979, pp.96-105). Accordingly, researchers were looking in vain for the way the media changed people's ideas and behaviours.

On the other hand, the findings of agenda-setting research focus upon the potential of the media for the structuring of issues or for defining what the important issues for the public are. The agenda-setting theory proposes a capability for mass media to select and emphasise certain issues and thereby lead those issues to be perceived as important by the audience - regardless of what the audience thinks could be done about those issues.

As Shaw put it:

".. because of newspaper, television, and other news media, people are aware or not aware, pay attention to or neglect, play up or downgrade specific features of the public scene. People tend to include or exclude from the cognitions what the media include or exclude from their content. People also tend to assign an importance to what they include that closely resembles the emphasis given to events, issues, and persons by the mass media.

(Shaw, 1979, pp.96-105)

Shaw and McCombs also indicate that "editors and broadcasters play an important part in shaping our social reality as they go about their day-to-day task of choosing and displaying news... Here may lie the most important effects of mass communication, its ability mentally to order and organise our world for us" (Shaw and McCombs, 1977, p.5).

Agenda-setting occurs because the press must be selective in choosing and reporting the news. Thus, what the public knows about various affairs or issues at any given time is largely a product of media 'gatekeeping'.

As reported by Littlejohn (1983), McCombs and Shaw described the agenda-setting process in six key variables. The first variable consists of the events and issues to be presented. Since there are countless numbers of events, some of them must be chosen and presented to the audience. The second variable is the influence of the media personnel; editors,

reporters and media personnel have their biases which affect media production. The third variable is the type of news media which plays a specific role in the agenda-setting function. Researchers have shown that newspapers are more powerful in setting the agenda for the people than, say, television. The fourth variable is the type of story which shapes the nature of the information communicated. The way the information is presented and the placement of the story (for example, front page) affect the salience of an item to the public. The fifth variable is the degree of emphasis related to how frequently an item is reported. Research findings indicated that the public generally ranks an issue as more important when it has been discussed frequently in the media. The sixth variable is the audience interest. Evidence suggests that the greater the interest in an issue the less the knowledge about it, the higher will be the need for orientation on the issue (Littlejohn, 1983, p.282).

Similarly, Tichenor et al. (1970) found that the media could distribute high degrees of knowledge regardless of the social class or level of education of the public. They found high correlation between public knowledge on some topics and their degree of media coverage.

Similarly, Shaw and McCombs argue that agenda-setting enables the audience to learn salience from the news media, incorporating it into their personal agenda. "The more the press covers a topic, the more an audience - especially audience members with more education - learn" (Shaw and McCombs, 1977, p.11). The audience learns what is made salient by the media. Such saliences, however, are outcomes of the press agenda incorporating them with existing traditions. Nevertheless, these saliences are the sum of the most important messages, launched by the press and received by the public. Shaw and McCombs present this concept of agenda setting with their assertion that the "increased salience of a topic or issue in

the mass media influences (causes) the saliences of that topic or issue among the public "(Ibid, p.12).

Therefore the agenda-setting theory of mass media, and the accumulative research of McCombs and others, suggest a causal relationship between the content of media agenda being presented to the public and the public rank ordering of the importance of these issues. However, the overall orientation of the agenda-setting in most previous studies has been so directed as to cover specific topics, including the relationship between the media agenda versus the public agenda, the time frame, the aggregate media and the individual media agenda, and recently the new trends of what might be hidden beyond agenda-setting.

#### EARLY RESEARCH FINDINGS OF AGENDA-SETTING

McCombs and Shaw made their first empirical test of the agenda-setting function of the press in 1972. This was similar to their findings showing that "among those undecided voters with leanings towards one of the three candidates, there was less agreement with the news agenda based on their preferred candidate's statements than with the news agenda based on all three candidates" (Shaw and McCombs, 1977, p.8).

Prior to this finding, an empirical study was conducted in the state of Iowa in the United States. Voters were to decide for or against a constitutional convention to reapportion legislative districts. Part of the findings showed that in thirty-eight counties with a local daily, the correlation between the press agenda and the public agenda was .92. In sixty-one counties without a daily newspaper, however, the correlation declined to .59 (Arnold, 1964, p.514).

Agenda-setting was also examined with reference to specific groups. For example, Gormley (1975) conducted a study in North Carolina to examine the extent to which the media set the agenda for political elites. His

findings showed a correlation of .75 between a newspaper's agenda and a senator's agenda. The author argued that the strong positive relationship could mean that the newspaper set the senator's agenda, or vice versa, or that both set the agenda for each other. He added that, in any case, this finding is at least consistent with the hypothesis that mass media "set the agenda" for political elites if an agenda is defined as the ranking of only a small number of broad issues.

For example, he found a .75 correlation when his measurements were revolving around five issues. But when he increased the number of issues to twenty-five, the correlation decreased to .20. Such inconsistent correlation necessitates specifying the scope of selecting the issues by which the agenda is tested, especially when it is known that the fewer the issues, the higher the correlations (Gormley, 1975, pp.304-308).

The ability of the press to set people's agenda at all levels has also been questioned by McCombs (1976). He bluntly states that "no-one contends that agenda-setting is an influence process operating at all times, and in all places and equally for all people." McCombs (1976, pp.1-7) identifies a number of "contingent conditions" which have been yielded by research and found to affect agenda-setting. These include: the individual's need for orientation; frequency of interpersonal discussion; level of media exposure; and voting decision state (decided versus undecided).

Prior to the above conclusions, McCombs found a correlation between the New York Times agenda and that of the local newspapers ranging from .66 to .70; and a correlation between Time magazine and television networks of .66. Lower correlations appeared with other magazines at .51 to .54 (McCombs and Shaw, 1972, pp.176-187). Such correlations show the differences between the agendas of local and national media. They all show the way each medium differently perceives the importance of different issues. This is consistent with an earlier work of McCombs who found in 1972 that,

compared with television, newspapers cultivate more agenda in the public mind, and that papers have the major role of setting the agenda for the public leaders.

In order to determine the kinds of issues most involved in agenda-setting of different media, Benton and Frazier (1976) designed a study to determine whether the agenda-setting function of the mass media, fairly well established empirically in terms of general issues in one medium, also hold at two sub-issue levels of information in the same or other media. The authors' conclusions indicate that newspapers were found to be setting the agenda for all audiences at the sub-issue information levels, and that TV dealt mainly with general issues and did not appear to have much impact on the public agenda at sub-issue levels even for television-oriented respondents (Benton and Frazier, 1976, pp.261-274).

A similar study entitled "Agenda Control in the 1976 Debates : A content Analysis", was designed by Bechtolt, Hilyard and Bybee to elaborate Benton and Frazier's conclusions. These authors recorded each of the television Ford/Carter debates. A list of topics discussed in the debates was constructed and divided into general categories and sub-categories. Two independent coders recorded topics discussed for each 30-second segment (as the unit of analysis), and then the data were organised in terms of "topic initiation" and "time spent on topic."

Their findings show that the candidates initiated progressively more general topic areas as the debates proceeded, but that reporters were a major element in initiation of sub-topics in all debates (Bechtolt, Hilyard and Bybee, 1977, pp.674-681).

A similar idea was also studied by Palmgreen and Clark (1977), who argued that local newspapers would exert more influence on local issues, while the national TV networks would be ahead when compared with newspapers in terms of shaping the national agenda among audiences.



The authors argue that the presence of issues information in media channels cannot induce agenda-setting effects unless audience members are exposed to the information. Accordingly, the authors conducted a study in Toledo, Ohio, to test the hypotheses that newspapers would manifest a stronger agenda-setting effect than would TV with respect to local issues, and that TV would manifest stronger agenda-setting on national issues. As predicted, Palmgreen and Clark found that, at the national level, network television exercises a stronger agenda-setting influence than newspapers. The relative agenda-setting influences of television versus newspapers are consistent with other data from this study concerning the relative strengths of the various media as sources of issues information (Palmgreen and Clark, 1977, pp.435-452).

These findings, however, came under attack because they failed to determine the factors involved as intervening variables. These variables include: type of events - local versus national - the ability of individuals personally to observe local political problems, and the level of media coverage of political issues. Palmgreen himself suggested that more mediating variables should be studied, such as the previously edited news releases handed to the media. For example, in a recent analysis, Gandy noted that wide coverage with less effort became the main strategy of bureaucrats. The aim of information subsidies has shifted from mass audience to specialised targets. Therefore, selected channels with high influence on high level officials and policy makers are more sought after than small local influence media. Most news sources very often concentrate on wire service and elite papers like The New York Times than on an unknown small town newspaper (Gandy, 1982).

The comparison of the role of different media in agenda-setting prompted Adam and Albin (1980) to suggest that "there are many topics that get newspaper coverage while being scarcely covered by television," and

that "there are virtually no topics that receive television news attention that are not issues in elite newspapers" (Adam and Albin, 1980, p.729). This means that studies to conceptualise each individual medium agenda versus the whole aggregate media agenda have not received the attention they deserve. In this regard DeGeorge (1981) suggested that it is possible to attempt to isolate particular media that have the most influence on the public agenda. He also stated that "all media influences can be grouped and their content measured in the aggregate" (DeGeorge, 1981, p.221).

Because of the fact that there are conflicting research findings on the effects of media news on personal agendas during non-election years, Williams and Larsen conducted a study to examine the total agenda-setting of the media during an off-election year. The findings show that the aggregate personal agenda ranked the economy most important, government problems second, and energy-related problems third. On the other hand, the media ranked the economy first, but other political issues second and third. Also, the findings show no significant correlation between media and aggregate personal agendas for national issues. However, all correlations for local issues were significant (William and Larsen, 1977, pp.744-740).

These contradictions prompted Chaffee and Wilson, in their study entitled "Media Rich, Media Poor : Two studies of Diversity in Agenda Holding," to argue that the general goal of reporters and editors in the news industry is to identify issues and explain the various positions that people hold on them. The findings suggested that if the news media are "effective" in terms of role and functions, they should cause two sequences to happen. First, the media audience should come to be concerned with those issues stressed in the news. Agenda-setting research indicated that under certain conditions at least this is the case. Secondly, there should be diversity of perceptions of public issues. This should manifest itself

in the number and variety of issues that people think are important, as well as in the variety of conclusions they have reached on those issues. This was also the case, especially when the author's findings indicated that diversity of agenda is higher in communities that have more newspapers (Chaffee and Wilson, 1977, pp.466-476).

Other types of agenda were suggested by Shaw in his study "The Agenda-Setting Hypothesis Reconsidered : Interpersonal Factors." He examined the agenda-setting and the media modelling hypotheses by differentiating intrapersonal and interpersonal agendas - in other words, what people think about as opposed to what people talk about. He then conducted a panel survey on agenda-setting in North Carolina during a political campaign which provided data revealing that the importance of the event may be a necessary condition for the media-modelling effect to appear during a political campaign. It also showed that close approximation of panel members' agendas and newspapers' agendas did not occur until just prior to the election. The findings of this study also revealed that the more frequent and more active one's participation in inter-personal networks, the closer is the agreement between one's personal agenda and that of the media (Shaw, 1977, pp.230-240).

There was also more differentiation of agenda-setting functions according to the media's impact on thinking and behaviour. For example, in his study "Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media," McCombs (1977) summarizes research on agenda-setting and discusses its implications for public relations. His research shows that the mass media have more influence on both awareness and knowledge than on attitudes and behaviour. He adds that agenda-setting directs attention to an early stage in the individual thinking where the issues just emerge. Therefore, knowledge of the agenda-setting process and its role in the formation of public opinion can provide

public relations practitioners with the lead time and behoves them to deal with issues at the time they are first emerging on the public agenda.

McCombs goes on to say that the public agenda is of three types: issues which are personally most important; issues perceived as important in the community; and issues discussed most often. Each one of these three types involves different public relations goals. Moreover, according to McCombs, research on media agendas reveals that newspapers rank first in organising the public agenda. Television spotlights the top items on the agenda and briefly re-orders or re-arranges them. Also, the findings of some researches indicate that there is a three-to-five month time lag between the appearance of an item on the press agenda and its appearance on the public agenda (McCombs, 1977, pp.89-95).

Studies of both print and broadcast media have shown that economic and structural constraints play a major role in shaping the news decisions of journalists. To see whether this might be a factor in the low visibility of state government, Gormley collected 3,334 TV scripts of state and local television news stories from 25 commercial stations in 10 cities. These were coded for stories on state government and use of film. Each stations' evening newscast rating was also obtained. The findings show that in 7 out of 10 cities, the station with the most state government coverage had the highest rated newscast. Also, the study revealed that weak statehouse reporting cannot be blamed entirely on public antipathy to it. Filmed coverage of statehouse affairs was low because it is expensive. The study added that several economic alternatives to filmed coverage existed that would allow increased media coverage of state government (Gormley, 1977, pp.354-359).

Some research on agenda-setting suggests that some radio and television users may be more likely to seek additional details from newspapers than others, and that they may be more likely to seek additional details

about some types of stories than about others. Fedler and Taylor conducted a study in 1978 to examine previous research findings in this area. One hundred and seventy four students were given copies of the Orlando, Florida, Sentinel Star and asked to read the entire paper as they normally do. Each subject was asked to circle every item he or she had looked at and then asked to mark every story which had been heard on the radio or television. Then, basic demographic and media use data were collected via a short questionnaire. The results of this study indicated that young adults spend a considerable portion of their media time with television and radio, but they continue to utilise newspapers both as a primary source of information and as a follow-up for stories heard elsewhere (Fedlar and Taylor, 1978, pp.301-305).

Williams and Smelak tried to examine the effects inherent in structural dimensions of network television news campaign agenda as perceived by their audiences. Five hundred and three persons were randomly chosen in a small city in Indiana. A telephone interview was conducted with each person. Then, personal agendas were constructed by rank ordering issues according to the number of respondents perceiving them as the most important. Following that, a content analysis of all weekday and evening network newscast (the three major networks) during three weeks was used to form network agendas. The structural dimensions were then categorised as either ordering or visual treatment effects. The findings revealed that the correlation between the media and personal agenda was greater for many of the structural dimensions when compared to the overall agenda-setting effect of each TV network. Results also showed that inherent structural biases in the TV coverage of the 1976 campaign produced non-purposive effects in perceptions of the issues (Williams and Smelak, 1978, pp.531-540).

Other studies emphasised the time lag between the appearance of media agenda and the formation of public agenda. Sohn examined the general hypothesis that the local daily newspapers are effective over time in causing topics emphasised in the newspapers to be emphasised in the community discussion arena. The findings suggest that there is no support for the idea that local newspapers are effective in setting the reading agenda, and only limited support was found for the assertion that the local newspaper is effective in setting the local talking agenda for respondents. However, there was evidence that talked about topics from one time period influence what is read about in a later period, even as much as nine months later (Sohn, 1978, pp.325-333).

Similarly, Stone and McCombs, in their study in 1981, tried to find out how long it takes before an issue receives public recognition. The authors argued that knowing the time required for mass media to bring a topic to the public's attention is important from both a substantive and methodological standpoint. The authors have done two previous studies, the Charlotte Voter study on the 1972 presidential election and the Syracuse Sophomore study in October 1973. The findings indicate that it takes from two to six months for a topic to be first registered by the public. Thus, the authors suggest that agenda-setting researchers should undertake a few months of fieldwork prior to their survey for the best match between the media agenda and the public agenda (Stone and McCombs, 1981, pp.51-55).

In another study using the public opinion poll data taken at numerous points in time, Winter and Eyal tried to examine the impact of a single issue on the public agenda by using a combined extensive content analysis. The public agenda was determined from 27 Gallup polls conducted between 1954 and 1976 which asked about the most important issue facing the American people at the time of the poll. Also, the media agenda consisted of the number of front page stories on civil rights in the New York Times,

in each of the six months prior to each poll. Results showed strong agenda-setting effects for civil rights issues, the optimal effect span was the four-to-six-week period immediately prior to the fieldwork (Winter and Eyal, 1981, pp.376-383).

#### SCRUTINIZING THE AGENDA-SETTING MODEL

Accumulated research on agenda-setting raised many questions about the specific mechanisms through which the media influences public opinion, and the types of issues which appeal to the public. As such questions were raised, the agenda-setting function itself was subjected to considerable scrutiny, and doubts were cast on the sweeping findings of previous research. For example, Gadziala and Backer (1983) reported that although most studies dealing with the 1976 election debates in the U.S. expected those debates to affect the salience ratings of the issues, for the most part the data resulting from these studies did not support this expectation. Accordingly, a study conducted by these authors, in upstate New York during the 1976 election, provided data allowing for a more sensitive test of the agenda-setting hypothesis than those already published. The study consisted of telephone interviews before and after each of the three presidential debates, as well as after single, vice-presidential debates, a total of five waves of interviews. To determine which issues should be examined, the authors used content analysed data from the 1976 debates from two local newspapers and from Newsweek magazine's campaign coverage. The most striking finding was that not much seems to have happened during the debates in terms of changes in evaluation of the importance of the issues. There was, even after an issue-by-issue analysis, no convincing evidence of an agenda-setting effect for the debates (Gadziala & Becker 1983, pp.122-26)

In another part of the world, Kent Asp attempted to study the role of mass media in Sweden compared with the role of the media in the United

States concerning the agenda-setting process and some other mediating variables. He argued that in recent American voter studies, the mass media had been seen to play an important part in that they set the agenda for election (McCombs, 1977; Patterson, 1980; Weaver et al., 1981). Evidence indicated that the priorities of the news media became the priorities of the voters. But the priorities of the voters may be based on sources other than the news media. Asp reported the results of a study on the role of the mass media in the agenda-setting process by examining one of the factors that may be important to both the priorities of the news media and those of the voters - the political parties. The correspondence between the agendas of the parties, the news media, and the voters was calculated with the aid of a new measure, the matching index. The results indicated that the news media are more powerful as agenda setters for the voters than are the parties. It appears that the large differences that exist at the party level are evened out on their way down to the level of the voters through the mediation of mass media (Asp, 1983, pp.333-355).

Likewise, Williams, Shapiro and Cutbirth argue that more mediating variables should be taken into consideration, such as the content variable and how the news media organise their messages. One organising scheme is to order stories based on their relative importance to the audience. Such an order provides a frame of reference for the audience. The authors added that the framing is very important because audience members need to know the relationship between the stories and the candidates. The authors indicate that the audience must decide if issues are relevant or irrelevant to the campaign. The general conclusion of this study of the 1980 presidential campaign is that framing is a crucial content variable in the agenda-setting process. The authors argue that the assumption of past agenda-setting research that respondents can either consciously or subconsciously make these links is clearly not valid, and may explain some of the



inconsistencies in previous research (Williams, Shapiro and Cutbirth, 1983, pp.226-232).

In a similar study, Chang examined the press coverage of Reagan's China policy before and after taking office in terms of press agenda and treatment. Content analysis of three prestigious newspapers: The Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, and The Washington Post was used for two time periods - May 1980 to 20th January 1981; and 21st January 1981 to 31st October 1981. The findings of this study show that when Reagan became president, U.S.-China relations were given more attention in the papers studied. However, while Reagan was a candidate, coverage of his China policy focused on American-Taiwanese relations.

Also, the results of this study reveal that coverage of Reagan's China policy was more negative during the campaign, with both news and opinion articles showing this tendency. On the other hand, in his first nine months as president, Reagan's China policy attracted more positive treatment. The author argues that Reagan gradually changed his tone in dealing with the China and Taiwan problems and the newspapers followed suit (Chang, 1984, pp.429-432). In this case it appears that the media agenda followed rather than led Reagan's political position on this issue.

Another line of research emphasised barriers to agenda-setting. For example, in their study "Possible Barriers to Agenda-Setting in Medical News," Culbertson and Stemple (1984) conducted a telephone survey of 415 Ohio residents to test their beliefs about health care. The results of that survey were compared to the results of a content analysis of 2,137 news articles, editorials and signed columns about medicine from alternating issues of every Ohio daily with a weekday circulation of at least 100,000 in March 1982.

The findings suggest, as was hypothesised that agenda-setting effects were weak or non-existent. The results overall indicated that a given

topic's amenability to human-interest coverage suggests a "featurisation potential" which helps encourage high play on that topic - even in what may be basically hard news (Culbertson and Stemple, 1984, pp.53-60). The sensitivity of the issues is an important factor in agenda-setting. For example, Graine, Pollack and Kusmierek (1984) compared the campaign agendas of three Chicago daily newspapers: The Sunday Times, The Defender and The Tribune during the 1983 Chicago general election. The study attempted to test the way the three papers presented the racial issue and the correspondence of their coverage to the public agenda.

The findings show that although all the papers published stories in which candidates insisted that race should not be considered an issue, race nevertheless became an issue because of the fact that all three papers devoted so much space to it. Because of the sensitivity of the racial issue, all the papers studied maintained more coverage of it than the other seven campaign issues combined, even though the coverage was judged to be unbiased (Graine, Pollack and Kusmierek, 1984, pp.352-363).

This suggests that the choice of issues by the media is not unrelated to the expected reaction of the public to these issues. This point is studied by Weaver in his review of recent studies in the area of agenda-setting. He suggests that the key assumption underlying agenda-setting is that there is a two-way link between what we know and are concerned about with regard to an issue, and what opinions we hold about it. He found out in his review of key studies that media emphasis on an issue is likely to result in increased concern by people over that issue, although the precise ranking of a set of issues by the media is not necessarily reflected in group ranking of unobtrusive (not directly experienced) issues (Weaver, 1984, pp.680-691).

Weaver's work suggests that the agenda-setting hypothesis has become so popular among researchers in different areas, and especially by those

researching the media effect and political communication, that it has evoked critical attention by many. Among this criticism the most important is which agenda influences which? In other words, which agenda comes first, the public's agenda or the media's agenda? In search of the answer, different scholars came to present conflicting findings. For example McCombs and Shaw tried, in 1977, to examine the content of the media and the public's views at two or more points in time. But the results of their study were ambiguous at best. The data for newspapers supported the agenda-setting hypothesis that the media set the agenda for the public. On the other hand, the data for TV news presented more support for the opposite notion, that the public's agenda influenced the media's agenda. They argued that the two media are playing different roles in the agenda-setting process, but their data do not really show the television influence on the public agenda (Shaw and McCombs, 1977).

This assumption was supported by the findings of Garber who argued that "people do not necessarily adopt the precise attitudes and opinions that may be suggested by the media" (Garber, 1980, p.9). Instead, she says that mass media information provides the ingredients that people use to "adjust their existing attitudes to keep pace with a changing world".

Such a continuous adjustment has also been suggested by Watt and Van den Berg who found that the media have mainly a short term effect on the audience. They concluded that the media maintain short-term direct effects in viewer behaviour, and that even prominent coverage has a short-term agenda-setting effect. Furthermore, the authors indicated that effects occur only during the early stages of coverage, and that there is no evidence that later coverage is related to audience behaviour (Watt and Berg, 1981, pp.43-49).

In an elaboration of the notion that adjustment to prevailing concerns underlies agenda-setting, Behr and Iyengar (1985) mentioned that the public

agenda is influenced by what the media presents as news about issues which concern people. They presented the following three forms of adjustments:

1. Public concern for issues differs in response according to the national condition from which the issue is derived. For example, as energy shortages worsen, more drivers spend time in gas lines; as food prices rise, more shoppers notice the decline in their purchasing power.
2. Worsening national conditions spawn coverage on the basis of which people form judgements about national problems. As inflation increases, and television runs more news stories on inflation, more people conclude that inflation is an important problem.
3. People may respond to information about local conditions in their neighbourhoods or communities, information acquired through interpersonal communication, direct experience, or local media. Local information may be generalised to form judgements about national conditions (Behr and Iyengar, 1985, pp.38-57).

A current study to examine the extent to which governments influence the agenda of newspapers was introduced by Turk (1986). She sought to examine the influence of public information officers who work on behalf of the local government agencies in the State of New Orleans in the United States on the daily and Sunday newspapers. Her data presented further support to previous literature, which indicates that the source of information upon which journalists heavily rely, helps to shape the issues of the agenda and the salience of those issues, and that the media accordingly shape the salience of those issues in the public minds.

Turk's findings presented empirical evidence that public relation practitioners and the information they provide to the journalists influence the agenda of newspapers. It was also found that the content of news stories appearing in newspapers was loaded with information obtained by journalists from public relation sources. For example, among the 444 subsidised news items initiated by public relation agencies, 48 percent were found to be "Written News Release," 21 percent "Telephone Calls," and 6 percent "Agencies Documents." The journalist initiated productions were

only 16 percent "Telephone Calls" and 6 percent "Agency Document." More importantly, those news stories which were subsidised by the public information officers were found not only to include items of raw information, but they also contained the judgements of those public relations officers and the policies of their agencies as to how the priorities and salience of their news should be defined. For example, 84 percent of subsidised information indicated a positive pro-agencies policy. Similarly, 70 percent of subsidised news initiated by the reporters was supportive of the agencies' policies, but only 30 percent was negative or even mixed (Turk, 1986, pp.13-14).

Furthermore, Turk believes that even the rest of the news which was not a reflection of the public relations agenda, is still the production of other sources. "Some of those sources may have sought to influence the media agenda in much the same purposeful subsidy providing ways as the agency public information officers" (Ibid, pp.27-28).

#### CONCEPTUALISATION AND OPERATIONALISATION OF THE AGENDA-SETTING

Part of the research of agenda-setting was directed to the conceptualisation and the operationalisation of the agenda-setting variables and dimensions, particularly such aspects as time frame, media agenda, public agenda, and inter-media agenda. For example, the time frame has been defined as "the total period under consideration from the beginning to the completion of the data gathering process" reported by Gormley (1975, pp.304-308).

To clarify the term time-frame, a cumulative research of agenda-setting was designed. The main focus was to find answers to questions such as: "How long would it take an issue to be consumed and recognised by the audience?" and "What time span should the researcher use in media content analysis?"

It was recognised that media effects are not compelling or immediate. Lang (1981) observed that the mass media construct issues and political figures during elections in gradual periods of time. Also, McCombs and Shaw decided on their time frame of three and a half weeks during their earliest study of the media and two and a half weeks for the public agenda. They allowed an overlap of two and a half weeks of simultaneous media and public agenda data gathering to minimise inconvenient time-lag.

Time-frame conceptual studies vary sharply and follow different time selection periods. The range of the time frame is enormous. For example, whereas in his study of the Lake Monroe issue in Bloomington, Indiana, Cohen used a time-frame of three years, Palmgreen and Clark chose to limit their study of Toledo, Ohio, local and national issues to a period of two weeks.

Such wide variations prompted Eyal et al., (1981) to elaborate on agenda-setting temporal features. They identified five characteristics of agenda time-frames. The first is the time-frame which refers to the period from the beginning to the end of data gathering. The second time lag refers to the lapse of time between independent variable, the media agenda, and the public agenda as the dependent variable. It should be noted, however, that some studies have no time lag at all, while others tend to allow an average time lag of five to nine months. Thirdly, some studies draw the attention to the concept of duration in agenda-setting. Duration is defined as the interval during which the media measure is collected in terms of media agenda and to the overall time span during which the public agenda has been collected. Scholars chose various durations beginning with a period of a week of media content analysis, as Mullins did in 1977, and ending with data gathering in four and a half months, as in the Gormley study in 1975. McCombs and Shaw suggest a general formula for duration in

agenda-setting. They believe that the agenda-setting influence of newspapers will be more representative if it is observed in a three to five months time period. The fourth aspect is the duration of public agenda measurement. It refers to the span during the process of data gathering. Finally, Eyal et al include what they called the optimal effect span, which is the "... peak association between media emphasis and public emphasis of an issue" (Eyal et al., 1981, p.212). The time-frame concept of agenda-setting is illustrated by Eyal in Figure 2.1.




Fig. 2.1 The Concept of Time-Frame in Agenda-Setting  
as Illustrated by Eyal et al

Source : Mass Communication Review Year Book, 1981, p.213

#### AUDIENCE AGENDA MODELS

As mentioned earlier, the main hypothesis in agenda-setting assumes that a high correlation exists between topics or issues published by the media and the perceived importance of such issues among media audiences. Researchers of mass communication agreed upon some techniques to conceptualise and operationalise this hypothesis. The content analysis procedure is the method which is widely adapted amongst researchers to measure the media agendas. To measure audience agenda researchers often provide a list of topics or issues which the respondent is asked to rank order. To measure the existing relationship between media agendas and audience agendas

researchers, however, found three practical models to ascertain the agenda-setting empirically. They are the awareness model, the priorities model and the salience model.

The assumption underlying the awareness model is that public awareness of certain issues and topics comes through the media, and that consequently the level of awareness will be determined according to the level of attention and coverage given by the aggregate media to these issues. If the media avoid covering any particular issue or event, the audience will not be aware of that issue or event. The degree of media coverage would therefore be correlated with audience awareness. In the priorities model, the media are considered as a power that has the capability to organise and rank order the public agenda. The amount of space and time given to an issue in the media determines its priority as evidenced by the importance assigned to it in the media content. In the salience model, audience consume media agenda in a cognitively balanced process. Under the influence of the media they assign higher or lower importance to the issues in a way that fits into their cognitive structure. The choice of the most appropriate of these models is a value that has not yet been approved by scientists. They have not yet agreed on which of these models best fits agenda-setting operationalisation. DeGeorge noted that there is no evidence to indicate which of these four models best exemplifies the agenda-setting. He concluded, however, that:

"the priorities model will work best - best describe reality - when there is a high media emphasis and public exposure to a set of topics or issues and high influence of some intervening variable, such as interest or need for orientation. The awareness model will best describe the situation when there is both low media exposure and low influence from the intervening variable. Following this reasoning, the salience model is logical for use in an environment where there is a combination of high/low or low/high influence between media emphasis and the contingent variable".

(DeGeorge, 1981, p.222)



Another model is presented by Scheff (1967) which provided a framework for the conceptualisation and study of co-orientations or consensus that could easily be adapted to the study of mass communications. A person can give his own reactions and opinions to a given communication, and he can also give his opinion on the views which he thinks others will have formed with reference to that communication. In other words, we will gather direct impressions as well as impressions of other people's reaction to a given item of news or information.

Scheff noted, however, that co-orientation or agreement between two individuals on an issue constitutes the zero level of co-orientation. He states :

" . . . we call agreement the zero level of co-orientation of other's feelings (we recognise that they recognise it) as the first-level co-orientation, and perceptions of other's perceptions (we recognised that they recognised that we recognised it) as the second level or co-orientation"

(Scheff, 1967, pp.32-46)

In an elaboration of Scheff's co-orientation model, Chaffee and McLeod introduced a model of interpersonal co-orientation for the study of mass communication which has certain pertinence to agenda-setting models. It was based on five general postulates. The first is that communication is a process of exchanging information between people. This requires the adoption of interpersonal units of analysis and re-conceptualising variables in terms of interpersonal constructs. The second is that the exchange of information directs attention to the studying of the change of personal information over time. The third is that communication, as a process of exchange, increases the need for measuring the sequence of messages and acts independently from personal cognition. The fourth is that the free exchange of information is based on a person's capability of simultaneous orientation to objects or issues. The fifth is that the basic data of co-orientation research should consist of the relationship between the

persons interacting and their interpersonal cognitions regarding objects or issues presented, discussed or exchanged (Chaffee and McLeod, 1970).

In an attempt to develop a way of measuring co-orientation, Chaffee and McLeod (1973) introduced the Measurement Model. Their emphasis was directed to measuring the variables that link the perceptual units of analysis together. Thus, in their model presented in Figure 2.2, "the boxes represent the basic cognitive and perceptual orientation measures, rather than the person". Furthermore, "the variables are thus the relationship between the orientational measures, not the measurers themselves" (Chaffee and McLeod, 1973, p.384).

McQuail and Windahl (1981) considered the agenda-setting hypothesis as one that survived amongst all hypotheses about the effect of mass communication. The reason given was that agenda-setting deals with learning and not with attitude change or directly with opinion change. Such characteristics more or less coincide with mass communication empirical findings which supported the assumption that the effect of mass communication occurs mainly on the information level. The agenda-setting theory succeeded in connecting these findings with the possible effect on the opinion level by the proposition that the media have a teaching function, which is simply that the people learn the issues from the media content, and consequently put them in order of importance according to the extent of their media coverage.

As shown in Figure 2.3, some issues receive more attention in the media and consequently public familiarity with these issues gradually grows over a period of time. Other issues receive less attention and decline accordingly. Therefore, it is possible to test this hypothesis easily by comparing the findings of the media content analysis with any change of public opinion using a survey designed to disclose any such change.




Fig. 2.2 The Co-Oriented Measurement Model

Note: The boxes indicate the measures that are taken on each person. Arrows connecting the boxes are labelled to indicate the measures that are compared to construct each co-orientation next.

Source : James M. McLeod and Steven H. Chaffee  
 "Interpersonal Approaches to Communication Research"  
 American Behavioural Scientist 16, 4 (March/April 1973), p.384

The authors, however, pointed out certain ambiguities in the agenda setting hypothesis. The first is the uncertainty of whether the effect of the media agenda on the individual agenda may be direct or may be modified by personal influence. This factor is highly important as any intervening variable must be accounted for in any research design, especially in content analysis as a source providing indications of agenda-setting effects.




Fig. 2.3 The Agenda-Setting Model. Matters given most attention in the media will be perceived as the most important

Source : McQuail and Windahl, 1981, p.63

The second problem is the method used to differentiate between different agendas. For example, it is anticipated that there are different group agendas for institutions, political parties and government officials. We can add that in a traditional system there are ruling family agendas which play their role alongside government agendas.

The third theoretical ambiguity about agenda-setting is the degree of purposiveness that could be imputed to the media. In some cases the agenda-setting seems to be a systematic process designed intentionally to lead the media in certain directions. In other cases its impact is analysed from a functional perspective. The agenda-setting theory of press effects

is indebted, as Shaw argued (1979), to the uses and gratification research introduced by Blumler and Katz (1974) which perceived audiences as active and selective when dealing with media messages. Mass media compete with other sources to satisfy the needs of the audience, and it must therefore initiate the linkages needed to satisfy those needs because the choice lies with the audience.

McQuail casts doubts, however, on whether agenda-setting is initiated by the media or by public need (uses and gratification) or, as was raised by scholars whose enquiries went beyond agenda-setting, by the institutional elite who control access to important news (McQuail & Windahl, 1981)

#### INTER-MEDIA AGENDA

In a very recent, study Atwater et al (1987) examined what they called the inter-media agenda-setting in the context of the State legislature. The media components consisted of news coverage by wire services, newspapers, radio and television in a mid-west capital city of the United States. The reports of news stories concerning state government were analysed and the results used to find the trends in story initiation across the media over a 12-day time span. The objective was to study four factors:

1. Which of the three media featured the most news stories concerning state government which were not covered by the other two.
2. What emphasis the three media put on news reports disseminated by at least two of them.
3. Over the period of time, how do the newspapers affect the broadcasters and wire services personnel in coverage of major news items?
4. Over the period of time, how do all three media affect each other's story agendas?

The findings were consistent with previous research literature, namely that bureaucratic news dominated the media. The analysis in Atwater's study

showed that government and political topics occupied the highest rank in the three media, the newspapers, the wire services and the radio and television services. Business and economic news ranked second.

Furthermore, findings indicated that correlation between the wire services and the newspapers was .87, the newspapers and broadcasting correlation was .90, and the highest correlation of all was between the wire services and broadcasting at .97 (Atwater et al, 1987, p.57). Atwater also found that when the cross-correlations were considered, of the three media the wire services agenda was found to change the most, followed by the newspapers and then broadcasting. The baseline correlation, however, showed that the newspapers' agenda seemed to have a greater influence on the broadcaster's agenda than the reverse for most of the time. Such influence was higher in the case of newspapers and wire services. The wire services story agenda tended to follow that of the newspapers over the whole study period. Overall findings showed similar news judgement across the three media outputs. Newspapers, for example, were disseminating unique stories among other media. The considerable inter-media agenda-setting role of the newspapers and other news organisations was found not to be dependent on other media stories with one reservation, which was that the influence among those media occurs within the interpersonal contacts amongst journalists prior to or after news publications (Ibid, p.60).

#### CONCEPTUAL FORMATION OF AGENDA-SETTING

Although the impact of the media in influencing the cognitions of the audience was widely known, the empirical evidence to support this idea was presented in the work of McCombs and Shaw (1972). They provided the first empirical verification of what they called the agenda-setting function of the mass media. They selected a number of undecided voters and asked them to identify the key issues of a political campaign as they perceived them,

regardless of the degree of importance assigned to these issues by the candidates. They also conducted a content analysis of selected media and found that they contained 15 issues of major or minor importance. A rank order analysis of the data showed a high correlation between what the media treated as important and the degree of importance assigned to these issues by the public. The significant rank order correlation between what the media presented as important "was taken as evidence of the mass media's power to influence the salience of the issues, thereby setting the public agenda" (Ibid, p.6).

Therefore agenda setting, as a concept, refers to the ability of the media to influence the cognitive structure of the audience. As a phenomenon, on the other hand, it refers to the correspondence between the differential importance assigned to events or things in the media and the way they are thought of cognitively by the public. Analytically, agenda setting as a concept and as a phenomenon falls within the domain of cognitive theory. It had been formulated and reformulated for years before the name was coined by McCombs and Shaw under such concepts as selective perception, attitude change and cognitive organization. Gandy (1982, pp.5-6), for example, notes that "some ten years before its explicit formulation by McCombs and Shaw, Kurt and Gladys Lang had begun to specify an agenda setting function for the mass media". The Langs advanced the notion that "the mass media structured a reality which was so pervasive and so obtrusive that it was difficult, if not impossible, to escape its influence".

Conceptually, then, the idea that the media sets the audience agenda by structuring their cognitive world along the lines presented in the media was prevalent in literature long before the introduction of the "agenda setting" term. The introduction of that term, however, demarcated the phenomenon of correspondence between the differential presentation of

certain issues in the media, and the salience of these issues in the public's cognitions. From a theoretical perspective, therefore, agenda setting is but a hypothesis which, after its initial identification by McCombs and Shaw, has been examined under different conditions. It is not a theory, and cannot be. Rather it falls as an hypothesis within the bounds of cognitive theory stated before.

#### RELATED APPROACHES TO THE AGENDA-SETTING

Three main approaches in media studies overlap with the study of the agenda-setting theory of the press; the knowledge gap, the spiral of silence and the gatekeeper approach. In the knowledge gap, Tichenor et al (1970) advanced the argument that as the mass media are infused into a social system, members with higher education acquire knowledge faster than do those with relatively lower education. Consequently, the knowledge gap between two social groups increases rather than decreases. The authors suggest that this hypothesis is based on the assumption that the highly educated people are expected to have :

1. Better communication skills, such as higher reading and comprehension abilities.
2. More stored information.
3. Increased relevant social contacts.
4. More ability to retain information.

The higher educated members are more likely to gain knowledge faster than the lower educated members (Tichenor, 1970).

Researchers have tested this hypothesis under various conditions and have reported conflicting results. Analysing 58 previous studies, Gaziano (1983) reported that nearly three quarters of those studies treated levels of education as an independent variable and levels of knowledge as a



dependent variable. She suggested that careful examination of third variables is essential to explain the continuing decrease in knowledge gaps.

Among those third or intervening variables are :

1. Types of topic studied.
  2. Levels of media publicity.
  3. Social structure of the community.
  4. Existence of social conflicts related to the topics.
  5. Individual's level of interest and motivation to learn.
- (Gaziano, 1983)

Similarly, McQuail introduced two levels of hypotheses of knowledge gap. Firstly, the general hypothesis which deals with the general distribution of knowledge between social classes. In a situation where inequalities in education and income exist within a given society, mass media alone cannot modify these inequalities. The second hypothesis dealt with specific issues and topics in which some audiences might be better informed than others. At this level the media could play the role of opening and closing gaps between the higher and less informed audience. Donahue et al (1975) suggest that the media act to close the gaps, especially on the issues of great concern and during conflicts that increase the tendency for the masses to know and learn. The printed media, however, as favoured sources of information for favoured classes, are found to widen the gaps more than television.

The second approach to agenda-setting is that of the spiral of silence of Elisabeth Noelle Neumann (1974). A good summary of this approach is given by Katz (1983) as follows:

"(1) Individuals have opinions; (2) fearing isolation, individuals will not express their opinions if they perceive themselves unsupported by others; (3) a 'quasi-static' sense is employed by individuals to scan the environment for signs of support; (4) mass media constitute the major source of reference of information about the distribution of opinion and thus for the climate of support/non-support; (5) so do other reference groups; (6) the media tend to speak in one voice, almost monopolistically; (7)

the media tend to distort the distribution of opinion in society, biased as they are by the [leftist] views of journalists; (8) perceiving themselves unsupported, groups of individuals - who may, at times, even constitute a majority - will lose confidence and withdraw from public debate, thus speeding the demise of their position in the self-fulfilling spiral of silence. They may not change their minds, but they stop recruitment of others and abandon the fight; (9) society is manipulated and impoverished thereby. Thus the 'powerful effect' assigned to mass communication is a subtle one".

(Katz, 1983, p.89)

Neumann introduced the term "spiral of silence" to identify such phenomena because she believes that, as McQuail (1983) reported, "the more the dominant version of the opinion consensus is disseminated by mass media in society, the more the contrary individual voices remain silent, thus accelerating the media effect, hence a 'spiralling' process" (McQuail, 1983, p.202).

This sort of experience, as Neumann suggests, happened in Germany twice within a decade. The first occasion was in 1965 when public support for the government suddenly jumped as a result of media focusing on Chancellor Erhard's receptions and meetings with the Queen of England during her visit to Germany at that time. Though polls showed a split among voters between the two major political parties, the focusing of television on members of the government created a political climate which helped to create images of expectation that the ruling party would be the winner of the parliamentary election (Neumann, 1984). Such a shift in public opinion came as a repetition of a similar process observed in 1971 during the West German parliamentary elections and in favour of the same party.

The main hypothesis of the "spiral of silence" claims that people watch their social environment, that "they are alert to the thinking of those about them and are aware of changing trends, that they register which opinions are gaining ground and which will become dominant" (Ibid, p.8). It is also claimed that mass media bring a great deal of information to help

the public in finding answers which might fit their needs before taking the serious decisions.

The main leading point in Neumann's thesis is that she tried to bring together - as Katz noticed - public opinion research, mass communication research and public opinion theory after they had been separated for a long time. She also raised the call for a return to more powerful media. She sees the media as a means of distributing opinion and indicators to decide who should talk and who should remain silent.

In a paper entitled 'Publicity and Pluralistic Ignorance: Notes on the Spiral of Silence', Elihu Katz analysed Neumann's thesis with a critical approach, stating that if the media are to be regarded as a substitute for reference groups, and whether the people decide to be silent or not following the opinion expressed by the media, where then should the influence of the public and pressure groups be placed? Another point is the notion of reference groups introduced by Neumann, where one group retreats into silence and another becomes more vocal as a reference group. It becomes evident that the media loses its role as a reference group, and individuals would become more orientated to their local reference group. Elaborating on this point, Katz argued:

"It is basic to our entire perception of society whether the media are usurping and monopolising the role of reference groups. If reference groups are alive and well, individuals will not so quickly fall silent in the face of mass-communicated information about the opinion attributed by journalists to some vaguely defined majority, or by journalists to themselves"

(Katz, 1983, p.97)

The third approach relating to agenda-setting is the gatekeeper approach. The word gatekeeper is a sociological term coined in mass communication research by Kurt Lewin in 1947 to describe the process by which news stories flow through media channels after being cleared at certain check points along the way. Lewin called these points gates; and the individuals or organisations who give clearance he labelled as gatekeepers.

In the process of mass communication the gatekeepers take many forms; for example, magazine publishers, newspaper editors, radio station managers, TV news directors and movie producers may all be considered to act as gatekeepers. To understand the function of a gatekeeper we need to review the Model of Mass Communication (see Figure 2.4) developed by Bruce Westley and Malcolm MacLean Jr. (1957) who graphically illustrate the concept of gatekeeper in the mass communication process. In the model 'X's are events and sources of information. The communicator 'A' is the reporter who describes the event. The gatekeeper 'C' is the editor who deletes, de-emphasises or adds to the report of the event with or without the knowledge of the reporter. The audience 'B' reads, watches or listens to the report of the events. He might respond to the editor (fBC) or the reporter (fBA) showing the accuracy or importance of the news. The editor may also provide feedback to the reporter (fCA) and so on and so forth.




Fig. 2.4 Model of Mass Communication

Source: Bruce Westley and Malcolm MacLean (1957)  
 Journalism Quarterly, 34, Winter, p.35

It must be noted, however, that the gatekeepers in mass media are part of a wide institutionalised system. Within their formal roles and responsibilities, gatekeepers are considered highly vital to the proper functions of mass communications, at least from the media owner's point of view. Another main characteristic of gatekeepers is that they are a creation of the mass media. Historically,

"gatekeepers existed in the press in the singular form of owners . . . Today's gatekeepers are not as socially visible, and rarely do they exist in the form of a single person. Gatekeeping in mass media today takes place primarily behind the scenes. Instead of individuals, there are departments (e.g. Office of Broadcast Standards) staffed by publicly faceless but enormously powerful people"

(Hiebert et al, 1985, p.133)

It is also recognised that all mass media have large numbers of gatekeepers who exercise their functions and roles by deleting, modifying and/or filtering the message according to the values and policies emphasised by their organisations. They can stop a message by refusing to open the gate. But the major gatekeeper in mass media is the editor. In a world of tremendous news output, selectivity in news must be considered. Because of the huge amount of material available to the editors and the limitation of the medium time and space, editors are the people who seem to determine which story will reach the public.

But although the editor is the most recognised gatekeeper in the news process, many people tend to influence and sometimes force the gatekeepers hand. These people, whose function is similar to agenda builders in Gerbener's analysis of the institutional process of mass media, practise the control of media and build constraints to halt their roles. Such powers in Gerbener's judgement are:

"The authorities who issue licences and administer the laws, the patrons who invest in or subsidise the operations organisation, institutions and loose aggregations of the public that require attention and cultivation; (and) the management that set policies and supervise operations".

(Gerbener, 1972, pp.153-156)

Power influence on the media has been viewed by the majority of researchers as practise by expertise, such as creative talents, technicians or professionals who create, reorganise and transmit the media content. In specific cases researchers believe that journalists, reporters and editors are operators of the gates in the capitalist press. These findings concurred with the earlier study of gatekeeper by White who concluded that editors have considerable independence to choose media content and "the community shall hear as a fact only those events which newsmen, as representatives of the culture, believe to be true" (White, 1964, pp.160-171).

A more realistic approach, however, was introduced by Gieber, who noted that "The tale of the local news story is not determined by the needs of the audience or even by the values of the symbols it contains. The news story is controlled by the frame of reference created by the bureaucratic structure of which the communicator is a member" (Gieber, 1964, p.178).

Recent studies view the relationship between journalists and sources in a social and economic context. Gans describes that relationship between journalists and sources in a social context. He wrote "The relationship between sources and journalists resembles a dance, for sources seek access to journalists and journalists seek access to sources. Although it takes two to tango, either sources or journalists can lead, but more often than not, sources do the leading " (Gans, 1979, p.126). Journalists are obliged to meet their media deadlines; for self achievement and media requirement they need to establish strong ties with sources. It was observed that officials and bureaucratic institutions are the most reliable sources of news. Therefore, bureaucratic news is the most dominant information in the media agenda and bureaucratic sources are doing most of the work for journalists and journalists tend to give little effort to assist and examine officials' news and views.

The dominance of high position figures on the news made Hess believe that their news is automatically transferred to be published. "Reporters seek news sources they prefer to be with - they like each other because they are so much alike" (Hess, 1981, p.126). This interaction between journalists and officials sources, however, leads, over time as anticipated, to a gap between media institutions and their audience. The economic factor in the interaction between journalists and officials reduces this relationship to its mean social integration revolving around costs and benefits, investments and rewards.

Although journalists show tremendous resistance to all implications of being victims of bureaucratic propaganda and of siding more with some sources than others, the research findings discredited journalists on many occasions from such self-defence. Sigal's content analysis of the stories appearing on page 1 of The New York Times and The Washington Post, yielded supporting figures to the assumption of media bias. Out of 1,200 stories, 50% come through bureaucratic channels. Only 25.8% of important stories were a product of investigative and enterprise journalism (Sigal, 1973, p.119).

It was found, however, that to have the upper hand on the media, and to attract journalists sources, developed new techniques. For example, the techniques of press releases and briefings conferences are effective and less costly. The most contemporary technique is what Bonafede calls "Socialise Journalism" in which the new form of relationship between sources and media is shaped. For example, in a special breakfast or dinner for fifteen to twenty journalists, politicians and/or businessmen one could have a similar number of interviews in a single shot. On such occasions, officials could talk to journalists in a controlled atmosphere where unnecessary questions would cause embarrassment for the journalists (Bonafede, 1981, pp.487-491).

## B - BEYOND AGENDA-SETTING : THE SEARCH FOR AGENDA BUILDERS

Many British mass media scholars and some of their United States colleagues have anticipated the complicated relationship between the media and the institutional sources of news. They devoted most of their research to explore, then define, the linkage between the media personnel and the bureaucrats who possess the news and control the daily flood of news. They also tried to define the dynamics which govern the interactions between the media and the political institutions, government, political parties, pressure groups and other influential cultural sectors within societies.

Within this scholarly effort, two main schools dominate the British research of political communication. The first school is an approach which Blumler and Gurevitch (1986) call the economic power domain. It is based on the theoretical analysis of instrumentalist and structuralist British scholars. The main concern of this approach is to examine and study the relationship between the economical structure within the society and the content of the media. The emphasis is on the structure of ownership which is mainly dependent on the capitalist economic relations and advertising competition, and how such ownership and advertising revenues may constrain the content of the media. Instigators of this approach are Miliband (1969), Murdock and Golding (1977), and Bagdikian (1983). The second school is based on the pluralistic approach which perceives the relationship between media organisations and other power institutions as an engagement operating in a political context. The media roles are highly connected to the political orientation of the political institutions of the state. Nevertheless, the government, the parliament and political parties are likely to be the power that decides the relationship and initiates what is supposed to be included in the media content. Such an assumption was the thesis of Blumler and Gurevitch (1975), Seymour-Ure (1974) and Smith (1979). Various individual case studies have also focussed on the relationship between the



media and certain pressure groups like trade unions, as shown in the work of the Glasgow University Media Group (1976 and 1980), the women's movement (Tachman et al., 1978), the environmental lobby (Greenberg, 1985), organisations in general (Paletz and Entham, 1981) or reformist groups (Goldenberg, 1975). In a wide ranging discussion of the main ideas embodied in those approaches, I will examine part of the literature of each approach. This presentation will endeavour to clarify the different views of the relationship between media organisations and the sources of news which are, at the same time, the sources of strong influence on the media and which play a definite role in building the agenda and affecting their content.

#### THE INSTRUMENTALIST AND STRUCTURALIST APPROACH

An analysis of the cultural and economic factors and their implications for the mass media content and their uses in the U.K. was initiated by the socialist writer Ralph Miliband (1969) in his book, The State in the Capitalist Society : the Analysis of Power. His main views were that the mass media are a crucial element in the legitimation of the capitalist system, that the freedom of the press has to be functional in accordance with the political and economic context of capitalist societies, and that freedom of expression must be directed to sustaining the system and to the maintenance of power and privilege arrangements within it. Miliband also believes that:

"Most newspapers accept a certain degree of state intervention in economic and social life as inevitable and even praiseworthy, and some, greatly daring, may even support this or that piece of innocuous nationalisation. Even so, most organs of the press have always been utterly dedicated to the proposition that the enlargement of the 'public sector' was inimical to the 'national interest' and that the strengthening of private enterprise was the condition of economic prosperity, social welfare, freedom, democracy, and so forth."

(Miliband, 1969, p.198)

When it comes to the media responsibility to criticise and appraise a conservative establishment, the press may claim autonomy and independence or it may claim it is fulfilling its social responsibilities. Sometimes excusably rough treatment is the product of the left personnel who monitor the conservative press. It might be noticed that some popular newspapers show much concern to echo the opposite positions of the bureaucratic establishments and take a radical stand on some issues urging for reform, changes and progress. In fact, Miliband suggests that such "angry radicalism represents little more than an affectation of style, the noise is considerable but the battle is bogus" (Ibid, p.200).

The media in capitalist countries are not self governing nor autonomous. For example, Miliband found that the contribution of mass media to the political climate is affected by two main factors. The first and most obvious is the ownership factor on the control over the mentality of the manpower in the media. In a world of media overwhelmingly dominated by the private sector, and where that private sector is itself dominated to a large extent by the power of capitalist business, the media, press, magazines, book publishing, cinema, theatre, radio and television which were scattered in private ownership have been combined into fewer and larger organisations as takeovers have concentrated media ownership into the hands of a few enterprises. In Miliband's judgement, those who own the media and control their direction have ideological positions that range from highly conservative to absolute reactionaries. The consequence, especially in the case of newspapers, is that the content is closely controlled by those owners both in the editorial and in other political directions. In short, the newspapers become the vehicles of the personal views of the owners and a source of power they are keen to use.

The second factor in this analysis is the power of advertisers. The pressure on the media exercised directly or indirectly by advertisers is

undeniable. They are able to practise their ability to influence the media and even to dictate the content and the policy of the media to whom they are frequent valuable customers. Some customers are of such great value to the media to the extent that newspapers, magazines, radio and television are financially dependent on them.

The concentration of ownership and its consequent influence on media content was the subject of a discussion by Murdock and Golding (1977). In their analysis of the relation between capitalism, communication and class, the authors elaborated not only on the phenomena of concentration, but they also analysed intensively what they called "new mapping of communication industry from concentration to conglomeration." But, before discussing their analysis it is important to define the terms concentration and conglomeration. In a recent work, Glover (1984) defined the concentration in media ownership as a "phenomenon in which the firms in the same line of business merge with one another, " while the term "conglomeration is used to refer to firms with different business interests coming together to form a new giant co-operation" (Glover, 1984, pp.49-50). Also there are two levels of conglomeration. One is the general conglomeration in which a non-media organisation takes over a media industry for industrial or commercial interests as in the case of the take-over of The Observer by the Lonrho Group for £6 million in 1981. Such conglomeration could lead to a decline in efficiency and undermine the credibility of the news organisation on the assumption that the media, unlike other industries, cannot be subjugated to the business interests of the conglomerate, and that the media men may lose their integrity when they are taken for granted. Another conglomeration is one in which multi-media, or communication conglomeration, merge together with companies operating in the same field. A good example is the takeover of The Times by Rupert Murdoch in which he merged

it with other organisations of his own, including The Sun and The News of the World, (Ibid, p.50).

The new map of media ownership as Murdock and Golding write, was subject to dramatic changes between 1957 and 1968. In this period the concentration of media ownership was found to reach 68.9% for the media industry. This number increased in the next two years to 70.9% (Murdock and Golding, 1977, p.23). Murdock and Golding also noted that this significant concentration has taken place in daily newspapers during the mid-fifties, earlier than other industrial sectors. They noted also that conglomeration in Britain was not as typical as it was in the United States. For example, the Associated Television Corporation (ATC) and the Thomson Organisation were the only British multi-media conglomerates. But in the U.S. such conglomeration included RCA (Radio Corporation of America), CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System), NBC (National Broadcasting Company), and ABC (American Broadcasting Company).

It was noticed that the economic system in capitalist countries, which is founded on the basis of competition, has led to an economic situation which fosters monopoly. For example, Coulson (1986) in a recent report found that in the United States the number of newspapers has not changed but the number of monopoly newspapers was found to be growing dramatically. Statistics in 1920 showed that there were 700 cities in the United States with competing newspapers. By 1985, although the American population had more than doubled, the number of cities with competing dailies decreased to 30 only, with 670 cities deprived of a competitive press. Further statistics indicate that in the last 25 years chain ownership became the actual force in the industry of publishing. In America 1,750 dailies and 1,150 newspapers are owned by those chains. By 1982 there were 20 chains with complete control of more than half of the daily circulation of the 61 million daily editions. It was reported that in two years (1980-1982)

these chains acquired 48 of the 52 daily newspapers being sold. It was reported that those chains tended to merge with each other, where in one year only four chains had succeeded to take over six other similar chains and so on and so forth (Coulson, 1986, pp.35-42).

Such concentrations led to conflicts among newspapers; conflict of interests and loss of diversity. In tune with early observation by Murdock and Golding in the United States, Coulson concluded that the quality of the product turned out by the monopoly and chain newspapers is less important in the long run than growing public cynicism about an industry preoccupied with its profit margins (Ibid, p.40). For example, Elie Abel, the head of the Communications Department at Stanford University, and a Pulitzer prize winner, said in 1984 that: "most chain newspapers will invest not a penny more in editorial excellence than the minimum needed to meet their daily deadlines" (Abel, 1984, p.11). It is also observed, however, that regardless of any efforts by publishers to improve or distinguish their newspapers, the absence of traditional competition among those newspapers and the gathering of the press in small chains, led to the loss of confidence among American readers in the concentrated and conglomerated press (Coulson, 1986).

This conglomeration pattern has also dominated most West European countries. A good example is the case of the West German Bertelmann which is the second largest record company in the world, in addition to its substantial interests in general and specialist magazines and the film industry (Ibid, p.28).

The new patterns of concentrated-conglomerated ownership and control of mass media, in addition to the control of the marketing of media productions, led scholars to examine two tendencies underlying the relationship between the media and society. Firstly, they analysed the

relationship between the social structure and the production of the mass media in capitalist societies.

In this regard, Murdock and Golding criticised the assumption of Miliband in which he considered the media as "both the expression of a system of domination and a means of reinforcing it" (Miliband, 1969, p.22). They similarly objected to Nedznski's over-simplification expressed in his assertion that "it is evident that those who run and control the mass media are most likely to be the men whose ideological viewpoints are soundly conservative, and that in the case of newspapers the impact of their views is likely to be immediate and direct" (Nedznski, 1973, p.481). An additional example of the simplification of the ideological relationship between the media and the social system is portrayed in the analysis of the French Marxists (Althusser, 1971, pp.136-137; Poulantzas, 1972, p.251). They put the media in the same category as the churches, the schools and the family, who function as state ideological tools similar to other oppressive institutions such as the army, the police and so forth. Murdock and Golding observe that the news media are not:

".... a simple relay system for the direct transmission of a ruling ideology to subordinant groups. [Rather, they are] institutions [which] play important roles in legitimising an inequalitarian social order, but their relationship to that order is complex and variable and it is necessary to analyse what they do as well as what they are".

(Murdock and Golding, 1977, p.34)

The second tendency seen by Murdock and Golding is related to the mass media product. They observed that all previous assumptions aim at limiting the analysis in studying the direct intentions of the producers, so as to eliminate any active interpretation or awareness at the level of production. A good example of this limitation is the view of Paul Rock (1973) where he considered journalism as a product of "its organisation setting" and where the institutional imperatives give, as Rock believed, "the structure to the scheme which the journalists use to confront an ambiguous

world." Rock elaborates, by stating that "such imperatives set the categories of the news sense to which journalists hand [and] if journalists themselves are unable to articulate those categories, it is perhaps because they do not fully understand the larger contours of the context in which they work" (Rock, 1973, pp.65-66). Murdock and Golding argue that such thinking is an arrogation which fails to stipulate and investigate "The actual investigational imperatives, organisational routines, and working exigencies which do indeed explain a great deal of news production" (Murdock and Golding, 1977, p.34).

A careful reading of the work of the radical scholars under which the economic domain approach is classified will lead to the identification of two progressive views. The view of the radical instrumentalists, as in the analysis work of William Domhoff's "The Powers That Be" and the work of Ralph Miliband "The State in the Capitalist Society", and the view of the radical structuralists as in the work of Golding and Murdock.

The instrumentalists tried to identify the means by which the ruling class control other classes. They view the central feature of the social system as primarily "conflict between classes," between those who own the means of material and cultural production and those among the working classes who own none. This approach views mass media as an instrument of the ruling classes. Media, on this level, help the social order to ensure the security and well being of the dominant class by controlling information at all levels. This group defined the special interest of the ruling classes where the individuals, corporations, wealthy owners, and specialised industrial groups exercise control over government decision-making to satisfy their narrow personal needs.

The second radical structural approach emphasises the need to focus not on class conflict, but rather on the capitalist state itself. This position is exemplified in the work of Murdock and Golding's thesis in

which they emphasised their belief that "an adequate analysis of cultural productions needs to examine not only the class base of control, but also the general economic context in which this control is exercised" (Murdock and Golding, 1977, p.16). Murdock (1980) denied the need for direct ownership or capitalist involvement to shape the media productions. He argued that:

"Proprietors and other capitalists do not need to intervene in newspaper production since the logic of prevailing market structures ensures that by and large the output endorses rather than opposes their general interests".

(Murdock, 1980, p.57)

Also, Murdock and Golding found that it is impossible to understand the role of the media in the production of dominant ideology without due consideration of economic factors. They argue that "this process of ideological production cannot be fully understood without an analysis of the economic context within which it takes place and of the pressures and determination which this context exerts." They added that "economics is clearly not the only factor in play, but equally it cannot be ignored" (Ibid, 1977, p.19). They stress the need to begin intensive analysis of the economic relation, pointing out that if such analysis fails, it does not forecast the increasing conflict among sectors in capitalist systems.

A social analysis mostly applicable to the study of agenda building is the extensive analysis on social welfare news presented by Golding and Middleton (1982). In this study the authors showed that the ways in which social welfare news is presented in the media reflect the relationship between the media and the prevailing political and economic institutions. They found three broad views which might explain that relationship. The first is called the "biographical" approach which takes the journalists as "malevolent and ignorant." The news here comes as a product lacking sympathy and understanding, and serves as a mouthpiece of the capitalist class. The second view is called "the organisational" approach, in which



journalists are more involved than in the previous approach, but face constraints caused by the nature of the journalists' work, the nature of gathering and producing news, or the possible intervention from owners or other pressure individuals or groups. Thirdly, biographical and organisational ways merge to form what might be called the "dominant values" approach in which the news media is formed.

The influence of politicians and pressure groups in the news media was defined by John Whale (1977). He was cited by Golding thus: "Government in all its branches is a principal theme of news journalism and its greatest single source of information." But, the influence relationship is not that simple. In explaining its dimensions, Golding concluded that:

"Relations between press officers and journalists are not without frictions. Press officers tend to see many correspondents as inexperienced and lazy, too inclined to use the press office as a research service for information they ought to be able to uncover themselves from standard reference sources. For journalists it is a cliché of the trade to refer to suppress departments."

(Golding and Middleton, 1982, p.115)

Specialist correspondents deal with officials not as persons of ideology and power, but rather as individuals who sacrifice their dignity in order to earn more power and more influence within the centres of the establishment. The experience of some journalists with MPs and ministers was found to be very attractive to journalists. It drew their attention to an absolute belief that policies are indistinguishable and politicians are congruent. Golding and Middleton cited Malcolm Dean, a writer for the Guardian, admitting that:

"There is a lot of contact with junior ministers. They are often denied influence and discussion. Civil servants like these lunches. They see it as a way for their ministers to deflect criticism from the departments. Sometimes there is a bit of kite-flying. People give so much and think maybe for a £32 lunch something should be given. Departmental leaks allow them to see how it runs. It won't do any harm, and it keeps the reporter in debt, and it may just raise an issue."

(cited by Golding and Middleton, 1982, pp.116-117)

They concluded that, "Despite the common distrust of ministerial or administrative public relations, it is the machinery and the deliberations of the central political apparatus that dictate the agenda of social security news" (Ibid, p.152). Also the importance of the social security news to the news desk is similar to that of other areas of social life. Social security, in Golding and Middleton's observation, "has to be seasoned with drama, language and values of the entertainment media that the modern news service has become" (Ibid). The news producers consider that social security news is intrinsically boring, whilst political and criminal events are foremost in their minds.

Finally, although news is sought and campaigns waged within the social security field, "they are only part of the explanation for the general hostility to social security and its claimants that journalists concede is normal in British journalism" (Ibid). Golding and Middleton, examining the values of people working in the field, identified strong commitments "to self-help, individualism, anti-bureaucracy and the work ethic that reinforce the absorption of the values from the dominant culture, and that filter the more liberal and compassionate perceptions of the welfare state that are common among journalists in the field" (Golding and Middleton, 1982, p.153). In Golding's thesis, the contemporary press in Britain lacks the commitment to the lower classes or the poor. Such irresponsibility is caused by the financial restrictions and the "political economy of the newspaper industry" (Ibid, pp.221-222).

In a comparative study of the relationship between the media and politics, Golding and Elliot (1979) developed new models to analyse the relation between the broadcasting industry and the state. Alongside Siebert, Peterson and Schramm's suggestion of the four theories of the press - the authoritarian, the libertarian, the social responsibility and the

totalitarian theories (Siebert et al, 1956), and alongside the generalisation of Raymond Williams (1974), who added more concrete criteria to the notion of organisational form emphasising the role of the ruling minority and commercial forces in controlling communication, Golding and Elliott introduced four accounts of the role of journalism in relation to the state. First, the classic conception of journalism as the fourth estate. Journalism here acts independently, playing the role of the watchdog for liberal freedoms. Its independence is guarded by the constitution, and its public responsibility is guaranteed by the consumer power of a free market place. The second account is the role of journalism as a public relations wing of a totalitarian government. The third is journalism independent of government but relating its objectives to political views, such as a political party or a certain philosophy, denying impartiality and objectivity as journalistic ideals. The final view is of journalism making itself an independent watchdog and neutral observer of events.

Based on these four notions, Golding and Elliott conducted their study of news making in three nations; namely, Sweden, Ireland and Nigeria. They found that the broadcasting-state relationship in practice is basically founded on mediation, intervention or accommodation.

In the mediation relationship, the Radionämnden in Sweden presents a good example of an intermediary body to ensure impartiality and objectivity. It is a Radio Council with seven non-political members from the arts and culture. Golding and Elliott found that Radionämnden independently fought to maintain the autonomy of broadcasters and their right to select news on the basis of news value, without government intervention.

In the intervention relationship it is in the government's power to decide how the broadcasters should produce and interpret the news. It is also in the power of the government to ban the broadcasting of any programme, and to demand the broadcasting of its own news at any time. This

relationship was defined by Golding and Elliott as intervention based on constitutional acts. Government control over news is a serious matter and makes for a difficult relationship between broadcasting and the state. The journalists see it as a problem threatening their professional autonomy and the values of news and views. A good example of the intervention relationship is Ireland. This relationship, as the authors observed,

"failed to find a definition for journalistic practice. The solution is always to let the incidentally evolved norms of journalism, fairness, accuracy and comprehensiveness take their usual form while more broadly to fall back, not on news values but on social values that underpin the vision of society shared by broadcaster and the state alike".

(Golding and Elliott, 1979, p.64)

The third relationship is classified as accommodation linkage in which the media organisations accommodate policies in local or foreign affairs, especially in times of conflict and social campaigns. For example, Golding and Elliot found that Nigerian broadcasters not only agreed over the state social values in time of social stress, but accepted the values included in government policies. The accommodation type of relationship is understood as "much closer agreement between broadcasters and the government on the whole range of priorities." Also, "government objectives mean, at one level, deliberate assistance with the promotion of government sponsored campaigns" (Ibid, 1979, p.65).

#### THE PLURALISTIC APPROACH

Another school of thought in the analysis of the linkage between the media organisations and other powers in the society is the pluralists' school. The belief here is that there are variations of the media roles depending on their relation to state organisations, mainly government institutions and political parties. Blumler and Gurevitch are the founders of this paradigm. They introduced a conceptual framework to allow a comparative study of political communication. Their intention was to find the

answer to what they considered a highly important question, namely, "how does the articulation of a country's mass media institutions to its political institutions affect the processing of political communication content and the impact of such content on the orientations to the politics of audience members" (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975, p.169).

The authors believe that all political systems must by all means shape the agenda for the media, especially at the political level. That happens as the media share a constitutional and political role within the country and because the media have strong ties with the audience and therefore strong relations with what they called the independent powers within the society. Such phenomena, the regimes' involvement to bring the media content into consideration, can be observed in the most rooted liberal systems. To do this, many regimes found it important recently to set up special commissions with one task, that is to enquire into "the adequacy of press performance and to recommend remedies for any identified shortcomings" (Ibid, p.170).

Blumler and Gurevitch conceived some dimensions which in their thesis connect the media institutions with the political institutions in cross national research and from which the political communication in different nations could be hypothesised. The main dimension is the degree of state control over mass media organisation.

According to the configuration of societies, especially in those societies where the political organisations are monopolistic, political truth is in the production of authoritarian doctrines, and the mass media are expected to echo such truth in concert with the authoritarian representations. In contrast, professional journalists in the liberal camp enjoy more freedom to treat news according to their lights. Here the nature of the authority's minor involvement in controlling the media in liberal societies prevents intervention altogether or minimises state control.

Blumler and Gurevitch identify three areas in which the rulers in both camps strive to gain the media to their side, and in which the media men in less controlled societies struggle to insure their independence. They are: control over appointments of new media personnel, control over funds and subsidies of media organisations, and control over the media content.

Control over appointment is a powerful means to recruit loyal and reliable individuals who subsequently work as internal political agents who echo the politicians' views without being accused of violating the independence of the media. Media personnel could be recruited via a licensing system under state control, a power that allows or denies permission to any person to secure a job in the communications sector. Ironically, such involvements are not uncommon even in systems which are very sensitive to the freedom of the media as in the British system. The low control of this type is reflected in the appointment of the B.B.C. governors and the members of the Independent Broadcasting Authority, in which the Prime Minister is authorised to select the persons to occupy such posts. Such intervention becomes stronger in the case of some European systems where the government appoints executive posts, or by setting high posts for politicians to occupy.

As to control over funds, Blumler and Gurevitch's adducement of the maxim "he who pays the piper calls the tune" indicates the fact that control over media finance leads to strong media control. Those media organisations obtaining part of their revenues from direct government subsidies become directly subject to government control. Those organisations with independent income, i.e. from the sale of advertising, as in the press, or licence fees as in broadcasting, still need government approval and licence. The B.B.C. again is a good example of media receiving government funds and rights to fee collection from British set holders. In other European countries a great number of financially troubled newspapers have

been rescued by the authorities through newsprint subsidies, by reducing postal charges, or by direct grants. It was suggested, however, that the degree to which different government subsidies affect different media could "be placed in a continuum according to the proximity of their revenue sources to the government, the degree to which the government maintains legal hold over non-governmental sources of revenue, and the degree of discussion enjoyed by a political authority in allocating the funds at its disposal" (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975, p.174).

As to Blumler and Gurevitch's third factor - control over media content - it is obvious that control of this kind is important as it leaves its influence on the work of journalists before they start to write. Such tacit influence becomes a serious threat to the media system more than censoring some articles or threatening to punish writers. Content control is presented in the form of sanctions to influence the behaviour and attitudes of journalists, both prior to or during the preparation of the media output. Here again, the authors suggested the placement of content control on a continuum from high to low based on three variables: the range of content under regulation, the degree of specificity imposed by the regulation, and the degree to which such control is attached to political authorities in persons or to intermediate agents or communication councils (Ibid, p.175).

According to the pluralists, three dimensions affect the political communication arrangements. The first is the evaluation of politics as such. As an active field that attracts people or turns them off, politics sweep irresistibly through channels of political communication. Media organisations may select teams of political correspondents who vary in their political attitudes and to their approach to news whether "sacerdotal" or "pragmatic". By "sacerdotal news" the authors refer to news relating to such highly honourable social institutions as the Royal Family,

the Parliament and the Cabinet in Britain. By "pragmatic news" they refer to news of half-way institutions like Trade Unions, and groups or organisations standing in opposition to the central values of society. Some good examples of such institutions are the welfare spongers, the muggers and the I.R.A. The main tasks of these correspondents are to explain and interpret the news. On the other hand, the audience may respond positively or carelessly to the political affairs reflected in the media.

To elaborate on the structural differences between media and political institutions, Blumler and Gurevitch came up with two mutually exclusive hypotheses. The first is the subordination-promotes-politicisation hypothesis, in which the politicians take a subordination factor as a way to ensure the tendencies of the political process, at the content level and at the audience level, on the basis that the members of the audience become well informed of the politicians' point of view. The second hypothesis is the autonomy-promotes-politicisation hypothesis. According to this notion, professional journalists resist any intervention before messages are highly perceived by the audience. Therefore, subordination of any kind is considered counter-productive to the efforts of politicisation. In a subordination system, political intervention is understood by the journalists and the audience as a sort of external control on the media. It is understood, however, that "In systems that are already marked by a high degree of state subordination, trust and its other policing commitments might well increase as the media elites distance themselves from the political elites and develop a more self-conscious view of the independent political function they should be serving! (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975, p.181).

The second dimension of the political power domain approach is the degree of impartial commitment. What is meant here is not commitment to a particular side, rather it is openness to support the existing power. Such an attitude is not political apathy, it is the open-mindedness to hear



different areas. The association between party ties to the media and the degree of partisan commitment could be emphasised or loosened by parallel linkages between political elites and professional communicators. An example of non-partisanship is the B.B.C. Blumler (1969) considered the B.B.C. as a good example for non-partisanship media. He assessed the B.B.C. coverage of the 1966 British election campaign as follows:

"When the last Election Forum was being prepared, for example, the reporters spent much time looking for a suitable final question to put to Mr. Wilson. They sought one that would give to the Labour leader the same opportunity that Mr. Heath had enjoyed on the previous night to wind up with a positive and broad ranging summary of his party's election case. When preparing an item on floating voters for the Campaign Report, many filmed interviews were inspected before the producers were satisfied that the reason given by labour for supporting the Government would seem as convincing as the material they intended to present from a pro-Conservative leader. And during a 24-hour debate on housing, instructions were passed on to the interviewer to steer the discussion into an area of presumed Labour strength (rent and local authority housing) so that it would not be dominated by challenges to other aspects of the Government's record in this field."

(Blumler, 1969, pp.85-115)

Contrary to such fairness, however, is the coverage of the 1973 Parliamentary Election in France, where DRTF staff conceived that "it is quite normal for the Government to have special access to television" (Ibid, p.182).

The third dimension of the political power domain approach is the structure of the political agenda. This dimension is strongly related to our study of the agenda-setting function of the press in Kuwait as will be explained in Chapter III. Unlike other dimensions, the "agenda-setting" might have measurable consequences for the issues that shape the political agenda in a particular time. It allows investigations about the source of the agenda and whether it is the production of politicians or the media professionals. It is assumed that in free liberal systems, media nature and rules encourage journalists to reflect their convictions and views on

the issues under discussion. In subordinate systems, however, journalists are required to practise self-restraint and to watch the politicians' actual views and convictions. When it comes to media content, the degree of consensus on the issues varies from one system to another. In a relatively autonomous system not too burdened with external control, the presentation of news leads to consensual views on the political agenda. The content of the media is based on news values criteria designed and selected by media men. In a single party system, the degree of consensus becomes very high. The selection is basically taken on political grounds and not on news values. But in a multi-party system, it is expected that the media bring divergent views about the issue which, in fact, result in less consensus, yet the media bring a divergent national agenda. At the audience level, it is expected to echo similar patterns, where the consensus among the public over issues becomes higher in the autonomous and single party system and lower consensus could be traced in the multi-party system with low state control (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975, p.184).

Another approach to the relationship between media institutions and political institutions has been the subject of analysis by Gurevitch and Blumler (1977). In their view, such relation springs from the involvement of two sets of actors, the political spokesman from one side, and the media personnel from the other. Both need to agree on two plans: to set the boundaries which help the political and media organisations to maintain relations between the two, and to cease any emerging conflicts and define the boundaries which allow the system to function smoothly. Such policies require, in the first place, intensive interaction between selected professional media personnel. Relations as such happen in formal and non-formal contexts. Examples of formal contacts are press conferences, the briefings, interviews, while informal contacts are the personal exchanges of

views over a drink, or through personal relationship between officials and journalists.

This relationship, however, is usually governed, according to Gurevitch and Blumler, by three factors. The first factor is the base of legitimacy. Here, politicians base their legitimacy on authority or co-operation between public interests and the acceptance, by the public, of the methods taken by those officials to deal with these interests. On the other side, journalists base their legitimacy on their faithfulness to echo reality or their professional codes.

The second factor is the service function. As it is centred upon the beliefs of the media personnel that their concern is to serve the public and uphold "the right to know", the politicians' primary goal is to persuade these masses to support their policies and their goals. The third factor is the conflict which arises from the work rewards which media men enjoy. They take their professional autonomy as the rationale regulating their proper conduct. In the meantime, officials take media men as middlemen in the political process. The final situation, as Gurevitch and Blumler argued, "suggests an essential discrepancy between the codes of conduct accepted by political spokesmen and those that regulate the behaviour of professional communicators irrespective of any higher order principles that might be shared by both" (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1977, p.281).

In a recent analysis, Blumler and Gurevitch (1986) introduced a new framework to study the way in which mass media relates itself to other political institutions. They introduce two different paradigms which, in their view, characterise the relationship between the media and the prominent powers in society. The first is called the conventional journalistic paradigm, in which media professionals are required to follow objectively and impartially all media coverages. Such a view insists that journalists ignore any personal or ideological loyalty and commitments to political

parties, organisations and groups. The second is called the critical alternative in which the journalistic paradigm is totally rejected in favour of "an expression of professional ideology, which obscures and provides 'cover up' for the true loyalties of media professionals to the prevailing status quo" (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1986, p.67).

The authors found that journalists' preferences for news do not basically result from news value criteria, rather they result from the dominant system. Thus, Blumler and Gurevitch analysed the relationship between journalists and other groups, and came up with five different perspectives. The first is based on categorical definitions in which each group in the focus of the media is presented and portrayed according to pragmatic orientation. For example, the Royal Family in Britain enjoys more supportive treatment from the majority of the British media, with minor tacit criticism, as in the case of invading the privacy of its members, which on many occasions becomes a subject for self-censorship by other sectors of the media. A similar situation occurs in the case of the Church. The news here is presented honouring the source with minor interventions by the media especially when the spokesmen for the church are caught involving themselves in controversial discussions of a political nature. There are also half-way institutions portrayed in the media as part of the legitimate body of the society, like the trade union which is entitled to participate in the discussion of political issues and is presented in the media in pragmatic terms. Some unfortunate groups, however, fall at the far end of the reporting spectrum. They are the groups and organisations which stand on the opposite side of the central values of society, including welfare spongers (Golding and Middleton, 1982), muggers (Hall et al., 1978), teenage hooligans (Cohen and Young, 1973), and members of the IRA.

Another perspective considers journalism as a multi-sided enterprise. Viewed from this perspective, the media coverage reflects the interaction

between two or more sets of influences, and the media coverage, therefore, is a balanced position between the scale of social values and the momentary value of news, being subjects for pressure from both sides, journalists, obviously influenced by the sacerdotal, report news on the basis of prestigious needs, the influence of powerful institutions and the value of news according to what they think the audience might find most exciting and accurate.

Thirdly, some institutions believe that the media should treat them according to their position on the social scale and not according to what they actually do. This leads to a situation where certain media orientation to certain institutions becomes something in the nature of a client patron relationship (real or supposed) presenting patron released views, values and activities indiscriminately. Such media behaviour causes unavoidable conflicts with parties, trade unions and ethnic minorities which lack power and influence on the media. All the journalists, however, claim impartiality amid involvement in the sacerdotal game. The conflicts will continue even though not openly discussed.

Fourthly, the belief here is that, in Western societies, news is formed in a trans-cultural content. Blumler and Gurevitch found supportive evidence for this point in their study of the contribution of journalists from nine Common Market countries during the coverage of the European Parliamentary Elections of 1979. They found that the grade of similar institutions differed slightly or sharply according to the different traditions of European elections and the thinking of the various European parliaments.

The fifth and final factor in the Blumler and Gurevitch framework is based on the fact that mass media, like any social institution, are subject to the output and input process. This means that if all social institutions inspire their members with both sacerdotal and pragmatic attitudes, the mass media will be another example of similar behaviour. Mass media

themselves are liable to be credited and discredited by their audience and sources. They are perceived as respected for their principles of freedom of expression, but it is pragmatically recognised also that they could "distort and trivialize and may be harnessed to the service of particular interests" (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1986, p.181).

Nicholas Garnham (1986) approached the study of political communication from a different standpoint. The question he poses is: "how well or badly do the various media reflect the existing balance of political forces and the existing political agenda, and what is their effect upon political action, particularly on voting patterns?" In this regard, Garnham observed that "the institutions and process of public communication are themselves a central part of the political structure and process" (Garnham, 1986, p.37). For example, citizens seek access to the vote to echo their position, and they also seek access to the sources of information and participation in the political debates. Therefore, it is essential to have equal access to the media as a spectrum for political discussions and as a means of transmission from which political decisions rightly emerge.

#### MEDIA AND PRESSURE GROUPS

An extension of the pluralistic approach and other conflict theorists is the study of the relationship between the media and other political powers. The focus is on media relationship with various pressure groups, such as the trade unions, the women's movement, minority groups and the environmental lobby. Good examples are two particular studies, the study of Paletz and Entham (1981) of influential organisations and the media, and the case studies of the Glasgow University Media Group (1976 and 1980) of trade unions and the media coverage of their news.

Paletz and Entham (1981) discussed the role played by interested groups in shaping media messages and the ability of such groups to affect

media practices. They argue that, generally, what is considered true of the influence of the authorities on the media is also true of the manipulations of government authorities and pressure groups by the media. It is obvious that the more media coverage given to certain issues raised by pressure groups, the more these issues become salient, legitimate and of high concern to those who make decisions. It is noted, however, that such coverage by the media differs sharply from one group to another. As Paletz put it, "certain groups are scorned as pariahs, some ignored, others indulged. For a favoured few, the media serve as a conduit, transmitting whatever news and views the group's leader wishes to provide" (Paletz and Entham, 1981, p.124).

According to Paletz's analysis, two groups emerge, apart from the authority circle, who impose different levels of pressure on the media and share, to some extent, the building up of agenda-setting. The first, and the less powerful, are marginal groups. Structurally, the power of these groups is exhibited in the activities of, for example, unofficial strikers, urban rioters, welfare mothers and student militants. Being powerless, institutionally deprived and lacking resources, organisation, leadership, these groups are discredited and deemed unimportant by the media as well as the public and politicians. Marginal groups are not conventional news makers, nor are their leaders a source for front page exclusive news unless (backhandedly) their activities are viewed at a particular time, as a manifest threat to more establishment identities. The minimum attention given by the media to these groups is concerted with the reporters' routine coverage of other official or system election conduct. Goldenberg described such actual relations as "instances (which) involved a reporter or columnist who specialised in precisely the area of reporting that was of concern to the group, who agreed with the group's goals, and who accepted the desirability of advocacy reporting as necessary to correct what was

perceived as a pervasive imbalance against the poor in most metropolitan newspapers today" (Goldenberg, 1975, p.135). As Paletz and Entham noticed, whenever the leaders of marginal groups are allowed to demonstrate their policy objectives, this would occasion rebuttal in the same programmes, or the media would be accused of an advocacy journalism. The opponents of those objectives are usually more powerful and able to defend themselves against changes raised by the marginal groups. An example presented by the authors was cited from the Vietnam War. In the face of increasing anti-war groups, Nixon's aide, Charles Colson, created a supportive group of veterans to take the side of the administration and to increase the public acceptance for the policy of war.

The second group comprises business interests. It is understood that in capitalist economy, business people have the greatest voice in economic affairs and in matters of social, cultural and political change. The government's wish is to have flourishing economic support from the business sector. Also, it needs to ensure labour support and to narrow the gap between the demands of workers and the opposition of businessmen to any claims raised by the unions.

Here business power plays its role by supporting Conservative candidates who are expected to follow a policy leading to minimised changes within the system. Second, business interests maintain their position by establishing mutual relationships with officials and making sure that these officials reflect business interests and uphold their policy. The demands and interests of business, accordingly, become legitimate, and their goals prospectively achieved without unwanted cost to themselves or to politicians.

The media coverage of interest groups in Paletz and Entham's conclusion is basically directed to maintain the distribution of power and to enforce a policy which prevents the media from presenting demands for



changes. But, the groups who accept establishment rules and pursue incremental goals discreetly benefit from journalists' needs and practices. Groups whose methods violate conventions, whose objectives require a significant alteration of the structure of power, usually find their radical activities distorted or condemned, their radical analysis and proposals ignored or scorned!" (Ibid, p.145). In the face of all demands for changes proposed by radical groups, the legitimacy and the structure of the political, economic and social systems within the existing establishment must be maintained and kept safe and secure against all calls for change.

In their study of the way British television news covers industrial relations, the Glasgow University Group (1976) added another essential group with ample connections with the media - the trade unions. They found that for some unions, it was very easy to count the number of times in which the news mentioned their name or carried statements initiated by their members. With respect to some unions, heavy coverage was given during disputes, with respect to other unions of similar significance in the system the coverage became lower both in news aspect or in interviews. The authors noted that there were considerable differences in the level of coverage corresponding to the publicity of each union. The level of distortion and bias in the media was such that until now a trade unionist in this situation had regarded it "as a waste of time to attempt to redress the balance" (Glasgow University Group, 1975, p.243). On the other hand, white collar unions receive coverage with more chances of being addressed by name. Some unionists believe that efforts made by individual unions can affect the quality of the coverage given by the media.

The Glasgow University Group presented a similar analysis in 1980 in a book entitled "More Bad News". In a case study to define the way broadcasting reported economic affairs in 1975, the findings showed that the most important issue was that of wages, because it appeared between January

and April 1975 no less than 383 times. The second issue, though very important, was the investment issue which appeared only 89 times. In addition, the authors showed high sensitivity over the language in which the industrial news appeared in the news broadcasts. For example, the words usually associated with what the workers sought were "claims" or "demands", whereas the words used to describe the employers' reactions were always "offers" or "proposals".

The Glasgow Group also observed that in the reporting of industrial disputes, the interviews with the management were held in offices and the topics revolved around the damages caused to the firm by such disputes. But for the workers, the case was different; the workers were interviewed outdoors, and the questions were directed towards describing the justification for the industrial actions and the workers' reasons for being in dispute. "Such interviews never enquire about the problems created by the management against those workers" (Glasgow Media Group, 1980, p.189). The increasing or decreasing media focus on the news and the way issues are presented and discussed, will obviously decide the degree of importance conveyed to those issues. This degree of importance is responsible for the effect on public thinking of the issues and their impact on the public mind.

### C. APPLICATION TO THIRD WORLD MEDIA

As is evident in the material presented throughout this chapter, agenda-setting as a concept and as a research area in mass communication has been American in its inception and most of its development to date. A question arises as to how these hypotheses apply to other media systems. Obviously, it would be readily translatable to the Western media because of the similarity between these systems. But if the agenda-setting concept has any universality at all, its applicability to other media systems existing in societies other than the West must be demonstrated.

Although there has not been substantial research into agenda-setting outside of the U.S., there has nevertheless been much discussion and analysis of media systems in Third World countries. These discussions will be examined so as to show the nature of agenda-setting in Third World countries. Such an examination is based on the fact that most Third World media are fashioned after Western media in spite of the way in which the uniqueness of Third World socio-political systems affect the ground rules under which agenda-setting operates in these societies.

Golding (1977) made a study of media professionalism and the transfer of ideology from the industrial world to Third World countries. He built his thesis on the fact that mass media did not emerge as a part of the social evolution in their mother countries. Rather, the mass media in the Third World have developed as an extension of the media in the industrialised countries. Golding based his observation on two theoretical constructs:

"The first is the notion of the transfer of technology, which turns attention to the implications for development of exporting industrial technology from the rich nations to the Third World, particularly the frequent conflict between the need for appropriate technology and the exporting ambitions of technology manufactures. The second construct is "the problem of cultural imperialism, implying a normative component to the structural relations of dependence between advanced and under-developed societies".

(Golding, 1977, p.291)

On the basis of these constructs, he has discussed the concept of professionalism. The ideology of media professionalism in the industrial world has been transferred in parallel with the transfer of material technology. Such dynamics imply two prerequisites. On the one hand, the media equipment is devised, tested and marketed in its country of (Western) origin. On the other hand, to acquire media professionalism, the Third World nations became frequent consumers of advanced equipment. Consequently, the skills to use such equipment and the knowledge of its capability had to be obtained from advanced Western nations. Golding defined three main channels through which the spread of Western ideology has been maintained. Firstly, the institutional channel, namely the BBC model which was transferred to British colonial territories, and the French model which was transferred to the French territories. In the beginning those services were established to spread awareness amongst colonial settlers and provide them with important home news. But later the objectives shifted into transplanting colonial media models. Such policy convinced Golding to conclude that, "media institutional forms developed in the Third World grew as extensions and imitations of those in industrial societies" (Golding, Ibid, pp.294-295).

The second channel is through education, training and qualifications. On gaining independence, the Third World needed to expand media services, and it became more reliant on Western experts who had been in charge of the colonial media. Furthermore, thousands of Third World students enrolled in Western educational institutes. The results of these engagements led Golding to believe that "those who return take with them not only skills, but values and attitudes, and not least a receptivity to the men and machines they have learned to work with" (Ibid, p.295).

The third channel is occupational ideology. This factor is heavily echoed in the textual values transferred by media professionals into the media of the Third World. This factor, though not tangible, has been presented in the general models of media systems and in the bulk of canned programmes imported from Britain, France and the United States. Examples of the model are "public service" media. The American commercially-oriented model, pragmatic, persuasive and entertaining in context, and French style and context conveyed through eighteen hours of radio programmes sold and otherwise supplied, to, for example, African radio stations every year. Golding found such unrestricted influence made the "African producers, already aware of the professional superiority of these products, become bound to imitate them in style, philosophy and format. Professionalism becomes imitation" (Ibid, p.299).

McAnaney's remarks (1980) contributed to the study and understanding of the role of the media in mass communication in emerging and developing nations. "The media in these societies did not evolve gradually alongside other institutions. Rather they were important technologies and practices assigned a specific role in development" (McAnaney, 1980, p.21). Schramm, for example, made the point that mass media in developing countries bring about desired social change. They are not seen as a separate and independent institution. Instead they are considered as part and parcel of the entire development package, although the media position in developing countries varies from country to country. In some countries the media are assigned the primary role of responsibility for bringing about the entire development programme by providing needed adequate and effective information designed to help social transformation.

"Without adequate and effective communication, economic and social development will inevitably be retarded and may be counterproductive. With adequate and effective communication, the pathway to change can be made easier and shorter".

(Schramm, 1964, p.IX)

The role mass media play in the Third World is no longer viewed as mechanistic as has been understood in the past era of dominant assumptions. Rather it is a conception of a consensual role; namely, a large degree to which the orientations advocated by the producers of communication are shared by the rest of the populace or by the consumers of the communication. Attention should be directed to finding out whether the media, in their great enthusiasm to disseminate information, have simply been far out of step and out of tune with the rest of the populace, or whether they are able to create shared meaning and values.

The function of mass media in Third World developing countries is widely viewed as not restricted to the dissemination of information and technology. Rather the new role of the media should be to mobilise social energies and channel them towards the creation of new values that would ultimately help to commit the people to the programmes and projects necessary for development (McAnaney, 1980).

In a similar vein, Rogers advanced the idea that "development should be viewed as a social process." This position implies:

"... a questioning of the component approach to communication research, frequent finding, in which a source variable, a message variable, or a channel variable is investigated to determine how it is related to a communication effect (or effects)."

Instead, Rogers emphasises that:

"If development communication is indeed considered as a total process, the inter-relationships among the components must be investigated as well as the relevant environment in which a communication system is embedded."

(Rogers, 1976, p.13)

In such a view of mass communication, we can conclude here that the overall approach to the study of the media of mass communication has to stop segmenting the communication process and treating each segment separately. For example, the old way of dealing with the individual as a unit of analysis should be abandoned altogether. It is perfectly acceptable, of

course, to observe individual action and individual behaviour. But, the individual's action must be related to the actions of others by emphasising the inter-personal dimension. Third World developing countries provide media contexts which are less individualist, more communal, collective both in terms of culture setting and system orientation. Therefore, although the unit of observation may be the individual, the unit of analysis should be inter-individual, the interpersonal, or the social. Rogers summarised this point by noting that the monodic view of human behaviour, which is based on aggregate psychology, has led to the pulverisation of the communication process. He states that:

"The overwhelming focus on the individual as the unit of analysis in communication research ... is often due to the assumption that if the individual is the unit of response, he must consequently be the unit of analysis."

(Rogers, 1976, p.208)

Rogers showed the fallacy of that position and referred to the effectiveness of analysing the communication process by shifting attention from individuals to dyads, cliques, networks, a system of individuals, or communication relationships between individuals rather than on the separate, discrete individuals themselves. He noted that "even when the individual is the unit of response, the communication relationship (even though it can't speak) can be the unit of analysis via some type of sociometric measurement" (Ibid, p.212).

Professor Halleran, as the President of the International Association for Mass Communication Research and as the Director of the Centre for Mass Communication Research at the University of Leicester, gave his evaluation of development research in the Third World on two occasions. The first was in 1981, in a paper entitled "The Need for Mass Communication Research in Developing Societies". In 1986, Halleran wrote his second paper entitled "Beyond Development Communication: The International Research Experience" which he presented at a conference in Singapore.

Mass communication researchers, as Halloran noted in 1981, examined the relationship between means and ends; between social system, institutional form and organisational structure. The goals and objectives were to find the answers to questions such as "What proper institutions might be suitable to help in attaining the communications policies and development plans?", and "How could the media be used properly and adequately to satisfy those policies and needs?".

The type of research within developing societies, in Halloran's opinion, is "critical, problem and policy orientated research". The main characteristics of this type of research, Halloran's argues, are: "First that it deals with communication as a social process; second, that it studies the media institutions not in isolation but as, and together with, other institutions, and within the wider social context (nationally and internationally); and third, that it conceptualizes research in terms of structure, organization, professionalization, participation and so on" (Halloran, 1981, p.164). In this type of research, the emphasis is not on ownership, control, structure, organisation and production relationship; in Halloran's thesis, the research must examine the use, reaction, effects and influence of the communication process.

As the president of the International Association for Mass Communication Research, Halloran has made it his business to obtain and examine the available research covering the developing countries, or what is known as the Third World. One of his convictions is that in research

"the calls for an exploration of alternatives are bound to be seen as a threat and challenge by those who nationally and internationally own or control the media which regulate the global flow of communication, who will benefit from the maintenance of the status quo, and who stand to lose from any change".

(Ibid, p.165)

The conflict between independent researchers, scholars and intellectuals, on the one hand, and national and international forces on the other,



continues on the basis that the former try to investigate what Halloran called the "alternative forms of thinking", and the latter are displeased because they understand that those alternatives might result in alternative systems. They know that "they are in a most favourable position because they set the agenda and control the discourse" (Ibid).

In a recent analysis, Halloran presented, in June 1986, a paper entitled "Beyond Development Communication". He pointed to the general weakness of the Development Communication research and concluded that for researchers to make sense of studies of society and social processes, they need valid models of the organizations, structure and institutional relationships. They also need to understand the social process, mainly the communication process and influence.

However, such valid models and understanding have not yet featured in communication research. On the whole, the research has been media-centred, ignoring the important factors relating to the power which influences the operations of the media institutions and the industry of communication. The unit of analysis has been, as it was in the dominant paradigm, the individual while his disembodied attitude to the process was causal and simplistic, the methods narrowly failing to capture the nature of social processes and relationships. In short, the overall function of research, Halloran concluded, "has been to serve and service rather than criticise and challenge" (Halloran, 1986, p.6).

However, although the true understanding of research and its applications require understanding of the historical, economic, political, organizational, professional and personal factors, Halloran observed that "there were few, if any, questions about power, organisation and control; little reference to structural meaning of the media and the communications industries in historical and contemporary contexts" (Ibid, p.11).

The main concern in development communication research in the Third World is what Halloran called the "unbalanced or uneven distribution of research". This is because the quantity of mass communication research is dominated by research from the western industrialised nations. Although the topics chosen seem to cover the problems of development in the Third World, the bulk of research conducted and the thinking underlying that research have been, in Halloran's opinion, psychologic rather than sociologically holistic. The point of this objection is not that it is "western research but because it is bad research and bad social science. This research, with its inadequate models of society and limited notions of the communication process, is, and always has been, equally inapplicable and equally unsatisfactory in the industrialised nations where it was originally conceived" (Ibid, p.9, emphasis in original).

What meaningful research could be launched in Third World countries? What are the areas to be covered and what are the relevant approaches? Which questions need to be asked? It is essential that scholars from the west, or from the Third World countries themselves, find the answers to these questions before embarking on further study? The list of topics suggested by Halloran include media ownership and control; the formulation of communication policy; decision making in policy formulation; journalistic values; qualitative analysis of content; the agenda-setting function of the media; the role of the media in the formulation of social consciousness; the relationship between the media and other institutions and between communication process and other social process; and matters concerning international communication patterns, inequalities and imbalance.

## SUMMARY

In this chapter the literature on agenda-setting and related concepts has been reviewed. The following points are made on the basis of that review.

First of all, the point was made that although the ideas of the agenda-setting function of the press were presented by Walter Lippman in 1922, agenda-setting did not become a research area in mass communication until 1972 in the pioneer work of Shaw and McCombs.

Secondly, when the concept has been introduced, it appeared a seemingly promising research area in mass communication which attracted the attention of many scholars of mass media. However, early research, though plentiful, was, on the whole, shallow and limited to the simple notion that the issues which are portrayed in the media (i.e. the media agenda) correlate in a rank order form with the issues which occupy the thinking and attention of the public. Thus, it was concluded that the media sets the public agenda.

Thirdly, as the agenda-setting concept gained wider circulation, attention was directed to its methodological and theoretical dimensions. At this juncture, attention was directed beyond the agenda-setting function of the media to who sets the media agenda. In this regard, the British literature on the subject offered an analytical framework within which the socio-economic and political forces acting upon the media as a corporation or a social institution offered many insights as to how the media agenda is established.

Fourthly, and finally, the chapter intimates the consideration within which the subject of media and agenda setting in developing Third World countries may be fruitfully examined.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE RESEARCH SETTING

A great deal of mass media research in the last ten years has been directed to the study of the agenda-setting function of the press. As a result, agenda-setting did consequently "achieve an established position in the intellectual tradition of the field" (McCombs, 1981, p.209), as researchers directed their attention to examining the degree of correspondence between the importance people assign to an issue and the scope of its coverage in the press. A recent survey by Rogers and Dearing (1988) shows that 102 publications were conducted to study the public agenda-setting within the conceptual context defined above. However, a second parallel research was the equivalent number of studies in policy agenda-setting. As Rogers and Dearing found, the scholars in policy agenda tended to be political scientists or sociologists. Their main concern was to find out "how does a public issue get on the policy agenda" rather than "how do the mass media put an agenda item on the public agenda?" (Rogers and Dearing, 1988, p.560). The survey revealed 51 researches in policy agenda. Nevertheless, the bulk of the agenda-setting studies was devoted to tracking the opinion changes of voters in Western societies during and after presidential and other electoral campaigns. In contrast, however, with innovation studies, research in agenda setting has been almost completely lacking in Third World countries. The main reason seems to be that the press in developing countries was classified according to the assumptions of an authoritarian theory of the press, which talks about total control imposed by the authorities on the media and the press. It also seems that the lack of free

elections or free voting in authoritarian or traditional societies discourages researchers and causes scholars to avoid undertaking any replications of the agenda-setting research in those societies. Additional reasons include the paucity of indigenous intellectuals and researchers who specialise in media research, and the lack of grants and funds for them to undertake media research.

It is noteworthy that, in recent years traditional oil exporting Third World countries, such as the Gulf states, have achieved in recent years remarkable levels of political and economic development. These states have used their oil revenues to realise rapid development in an extremely short time. The speed of development among those countries and the resulting structural changes have varied from one state to another. In Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Qatar and Bahrain, for example, development efforts concentrated almost entirely on the material base, the substructure, such as building modern cities, motorways, airports, public utilities, and hospitals. In all these modernisation projects, however, they followed deliberate and conscious efforts to maintain their traditions meticulously and methodologically without any noticeable change. Thus, what they wanted was to carry out their traditional way of life but in a modern garb, and to continue in the practice of their long-established social, cultural and political institutions with minimal change, albeit conducting them on contemporary edifices equipped with the latest gadgetry and technology.

Among the traditional Gulf states, Kuwait followed a more tolerant way for her modernisation, infusing her institutions with more democratic practices than the rest of the Gulf states. It is for this reason that Kuwait was chosen as the site for this research. In order to acquaint the reader with the nature of the research setting, the conditions leading to Kuwait's contemporary social organisation will be presented.

Kuwait is one of the Arab Gulf societies which have emerged recently into the contemporary international scene, with great influence in terms of economic, political and strategic factors. The Gulf states, of which Kuwait is a member, possess great influence on the industrial world, partly because they are the main suppliers of the Western needs for oil, and partly because of the increasing demands by the Gulf countries for the Western industrial products and modern technology.

Contemporary Kuwait occupies a deviant position with respect to the theories of development which have been applied to the dynamics of Third World societies. Such deviation results from enormous capital-surplus making possible very high standards of living. Expectations prevail among authority and the people of achieving modernisation within a short period of time. By using this surplus, Kuwait has achieved rapid growth in a wide range of social, educational and political aspects. The rapid growth of Kuwait and other Gulf states was summarised by Ismael. She noted that these societies changed:

"from traditional Sheikdoms subjects to British colonial administration to independent urban-cosmopolitan centres of the world finance and trade within a decade or two - and they experienced these phenomenal transformations under relative sociopolitical stability."

(Ismael, 1982, pp.1-2).

#### THE TRIBAL FOUNDATION OF KUWAIT

The name Kuwait is a diminutive of the actual Arabic Kut which means a small tower. The old name of Kuwait was Graine the Arabic word for small horn, a name given to the island of Qurain, located not too far from the West shore of Kuwait (Lorimer, 1908).

The location of Kuwait adds to its viability. It is situated on the northwest of the Arabian Gulf (often known in the West as the Persian Gulf) about 50 miles to the north of Shatt-Al Arab in the southern part of Iraq

where the land distance to Basrah is 138 miles and the sea 100 miles distant. The southwest borders are with Saudi Arabia where Saudi Arabia jointly shares the ownership of the Neutral Zone on the shore of the Gulf.

Little was known about the early history of Kuwait and many questions about the old occupants are still without answers. For example, although many efforts were made by historians in this respect, they are still not certain when Kuwait was founded and when the first Arabian tribe of Bani'utub arrived in Kuwait or when they migrated from Central Arabia (Abu Hakima, 1965). The people of Kuwait, i.e. older men who have kept up oral traditions and tales from one generation to another, and few observations by European travellers, present the only source of information about the early settlers of Kuwait. The only certain fact is that the recent town of Kuwait was occupied by the first members of the Bani'utub tribe in 1710. The Bani'utub is a branch of a tribe of the Aniza confederation. The leader of the new settlers was of the family of AL-Sabah, the ancestors of the present ruling family in Kuwait (AL-Sabah, 1983).

When the Bani'utub arrived in Kuwait the area had no permanent settlements, rather it was inhabited by groups of nomadic tribes of Bedouin fishermen (AL-Quinaie, 1986). When the Bani'utub initially settled down, they constituted not more than 10-15% of the total occupants of Kuwait. Among the earliest tribes besides AL Sabah were AL-Jalaahmeh, AL-Khalifa, and AL-Maawdah (Ibid, p.9). It seems clear that the arrival of the new tribe (Bani'utub) speeded up the transition from nomadic to sedentary settlement. Lorimer (1970) wrote that the town of Kuwait grew rapidly in wealth and importance. In 1760 the German traveller Carsten Niebuhr passed through Kuwait on his way to Iraq. He noted that "it was a thriving commercial port of about 10,000 people which sustains itself on pearling, trading and fishing and had some 800 boats" (see Ismael, p.22). AL-Sabah reported a description given by Niebuhr (1760) after his visit to Kuwait.

He writes:

"Kuwait is a seaport town, three days journey from Zabeyer (part of Basrah). The inhabitants live by the fishing of pearls and fishes. They are said to employ in this species of naval industry more than eight hundred boats. In the favourable season of the year this town is left almost desolate, everybody going out either to the fishing or upon some trading adventure."

(cited by AL-Sabah, 1983, p.42)

The whole transition from nomadic life to a sedentary social system was built on the fishing industry, namely pearling, fishing and on trading with other coastal and inland tribes. Such dependency created the necessity to control the new productive forces in sea and land. Three main tribes who settled in Kuwait at that time came together in 1716 to sign a tripartite pact in favour of dividing the main resources of life among the members of these tribes. Khazal (1970) describes the event as follows:

"In the year 1129 Hijari (1716 AD) the chiefs of the most important three tribes that inhabited Kuwait entered into an alliance. These were Sabah Bin-Jabar Bin Salman Bin Ahmed, Khalifah Ben Mohammed and Jabar Ben Rahmat alibi (The chief of the Jalaahmeh). The conditions gave Sabah the leadership in the affairs of government, in consultations with other parties. Khalifah will have leadership of the financial affairs in commerce and Jabar will control the affairs of work on the sea. All profits were to be equally divided among them."

(Khazal, 1970. translated by Ismael 1982, p.23)

The 1716 agreements presented the basis for a nascent social class structure though produced in a tribal context. However, as an effect of the separation of powers among the three tribes, the Bani'utub had nominated themselves as the legitimate actors upon other tribes. They ascertained control over the means of production, mainly the pearling, the fishing and the work of commerce (Ismael, 1982).

#### DIVISION OF LABOUR IN TRIBAL KUWAIT

To understand the social structure of Kuwait in the early stages, mainly before the British colonial intrusion in 1897, it is important to know of the economic structure of the Emirate and the economic relations



between different organisations. As was noted before, the production of Kuwait's settlers was based on the sea with its dual resources - fishing and pearls, together with its maritime outlets. But the emergence of Kuwait in the eighteenth century was attributed to several geographical and political factors. For example, Kuwait is endowed with a great natural harbour not too far from the head of the Gulf. Because of the desperate poverty of land resources, the Bani'utub went to the sea to earn their living. They began to get involved in maritime trade, in boat building, fishing and pearl diving. They gradually earned a good trade reputation, until they became the commercial centre between the Gulf maritime trade and the Arabian Peninsula inland (Baz, 1981).

Abu Hakima (1965) mentioned three factors which facilitated the growth of Kuwait in the first half of the eighteenth century. First, the location of the Shaikhdom in the trade caravan route between the centre of the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and the Mediterranean. This factor encouraged the Bani'utub to engage in maritime trade to the benefit of their Emirate. The second factor was related to the political situation in the neighbouring Gulf states. The Kuwait merchant emerged in a region of political weakness, namely of Persia and Ottoman-Iraq. The two countries were occupied by internal and external conflicts. In the case of Persia, the different Persian nationalities were involved in continuous fighting with their central authorities or among each other. In the case of Iraq the country was engaged in a continuous furious border war with Persia, not unlike what has been happening a short time ago in what was known as the Gulf War. Thirdly, Kuwait was guarded by Bani Khalid, the dominant tribe in East Arabia before the arrival of the Bani'utub. It was one of the strongest tribes in the region at that time. After Bani Khalid became loyal to Bani'utub they provided the latter with the security and defence which is crucial to trade activities in the sea and on land (Abu Hakima, 1965).

In these circumstances, the Bani'utub were able to establish a relationship between maritime activities and commerce. They organised relations in a way which allowed the former to provide the capital and the latter to provide the basis for the perpetuation of the pearling industry. Based on this inter-relationship, the technical and social organisations of pearling and commerce were shaped and provided the basis for the rapid development of production forces of Kuwait in the eighteenth century and after. As Ismael noted:

"This development took the form of tribal organisation articulated in Kuwait as nomadic, semi nomadic and sedentary labour. While the nomadic tribes still represented independent producers exchanging their surplus product as autonomous producers. The new articulation of the semi-nomadic and sedentary surmounted the boundaries of the tribe as a division of labour."

(Ismael, 1982, p.25)

Although the tribal system shaped the economic and political organisations, new factors helped to change the society into a self sufficient, self organised, productive nation developing and maintaining the urban base of its of social relations. For example, the new articulation of social relations led to the stratification of occupations. In the sea, while the Bahrainis built boats for sale, the Bani'utub emerged as a class having their own boats under private ownership for the purpose of pearling and fishing.

Commerce too was based on a clear distinction between capital and labour. To the benefit of Kuwait, the Persians occupied Basra between 1775 and 1779. During that period the trading centre between India and Arabia and Europe shifted from Basrah to Kuwait and the Kuwaitis were able to produce the labour and the means for trade to pass through their port with efficiency and skill. Wilson wrote:

"The bulk of the Indian trade of Basra with Baghdad, Aleppo, Sumyrna and Constantinople was diverted to Kuwait. By 1790 the town had begun to share in the commercial prosperity which the seizure of Bahrain and Bani'utub in 1783 had brought to these last, by drawing them into the carrying of trade of Arabia, goods were imported there from Muscat, Zubarra, and Quatif."

(Wilson, 1954, p.250)

Kuwait harbour therefore became one of the busiest ports in the Gulf, working as the transfer station between the caravans coming from India through the Gulf to the Arabian Peninsula, the Ottoman Empire and Europe.

The organisation of production and commerce needs to be viewed from the political perspectives as well. That is, for fishermen and divers to do their job and for caravans to shuttle between Kuwait and Aleppo in the Mediterranean, a powerful force of legitimate authority had to be in charge for security to be guaranteed. At the beginning, early in the eighteenth century, the Bani Khalid were in control of all nomadic tribes in the area. But throughout that century, new powers emerged in the area, namely the Wahhabis with AL-Saud in Central Arabia and the Bani'utub in the East. In the sixteenth century the Bani Khalid had their headquarters in AL-Hasa (now part of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia). They built Kuwait as a summer resort for their tribal Shaikh. But the strong Bani Khalid faced a terrible defeat in 1790 after fierce battles with the emerging power of AL-Saud who came from central Arabia. Bani Khalid faced their final defeat by AL-Saud in 1795 and accordingly they lost their main headquarters in AL-Hasa (Abu Hakima, 1965).

In these relationships between the tribes, the Bani'utub emerged as the new power in the East Coast and established their independence. Such independence was crowned later in the mid-eighteenth century when they agreed amongst themselves to elect Sabah I as the Sheik of Kuwait.

Ismael (1982) introduced a convincing analysis for the distribution of power among the Bani'utub. She considered the structural production of fishing and pearling in the sea and commerce on the land as the basis on

which the "functional division of power has great effect which helps to bring a social equilibrium between modes of production" (Ismael, 1982, p.28). Members of the Sabah family, from which the new Shaikh was elected, were oriented towards the desert. They played the role of securing the caravans trade between the Gulf and Aleppo (AL-Rashid, 1974). They kept attached to the desert tribes, camping with them, and encouraging marriages to women amongst them, in a long run strategy to secure these tribes' loyalty and secure the routes of trade. Other members of the Bani'utub tribe remained working in the sea in fishing and pearling. Between the two groups was the newly elected Shaikh whose strength was used to influence other tribes who, by remaining inland produced a shelter for the productive class in the sea and the land. AL-Shamlan noticed that Sabah was most of the time inland, while the work of the majority was on the sea with navigation, fishing and pearling (Al-Shamlan, 1959).

The separation of power, however, did not last long. The equilibrium mentioned by Ismael was momentary, because the change in the means of production led to similar change in the balance of power, not only within the Bani'utub tribe, but also within the members of the Sabah family themselves.

After his death in 1762, Sabah proved that he had succeeded in establishing his family as the Royal Family of Kuwait. Five Amirs, directly descending from him, ruled between the day of his death and 1892. But the political power of those Shaikhs was largely limited. They lost most of their privileges among the citizens. They were as AL-Shamlan described:

"No different from the rest of the population in any way. The Shaikhs were not rulers or Sultans, rather they were similar to Shaikhs of tribes where there is no distinction between the Shaikhs and other members of the tribe. In some cases, some notable Kuwaitis were more powerful than the Shaikhs."

(Ibid, p.117)

It was clear that the productive community with its active power had developed more than the political system of the tribal Shaikhdom. The Sabah family, as is happening with many ruling families in the Gulf at present, had not been strongly engaged in this development. The actual people responsible for development were from the financial and commercial classes. The Sabah family was dependent financially on these classes, and sought their political support.

With the arrival of the colonial powers, the British, the Germans and the Portuguese, the internal factors had to fade and the external factors led to dramatic changes in the region including Kuwait. One of those changes, and maybe the worst, happened in 1896 (Ismael 1982) when Shaikh Mubarak AL-Sabah, half-brother of the ruler at that time, assassinated Shaikh Mohammad, the ruler, and his brother Jarrah. After he succeeded in controlling the country, he proclaimed himself the new ruler of Kuwait. This coup d'etat was "the beginning of new development in Kuwaiti life and its modern history" (Husayn, 1960, p.92).

#### THE SUPERPOWERS STRUGGLE

Through history, the Arabian Gulf has been the highway of maritime trade between India and the Far East in the east, and the Mediterranean and Europe in the west. Several ports on its coast were established, the first among them being Basrah in Iraq, Kuwait in Kuwait and Hormuz in Oman. These ports encouraged the foreign powers in the eighteenth century to bring their naval forces to fight the locals, or fight each other, in order to control them and benefit from their commercial profits. Such ambitions were quickly achieved, especially by the British who succeeded in maintaining their presence through history from 1600 until 1971 when they finally withdrew. The rivalry between the super powers began, i.e. between the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, Holland, France, Russia, Germany and Britain.

Such rivalry dominated the Gulf from the 17th Century until the British put an end to the presence of the Ottomans, in the First World War. The voyage of Vasco da Gama from Portugal to India stimulated the Portuguese Empire to sail eastwards to Hormuz and spread their domain in Muscat of Oman, Ras AL-Khima (of present day U.A.E.) and Kuwait in which they built the fortress of Qurain. With their settlement in Kuwait, the Portuguese began to establish their political and commercial influence in the Gulf (AL-Baharina, 1973, p.17). They began to protect their interests against local resistance by the Arabs, the Persians, the Turks, and later the British. Their resistance began to yield in 1622 when the British, with the assistance of the Persians, succeeded in ousting the Portuguese from Hormuz, then with the help of the Arabs in 1650 they drove the rest of the Portuguese out of Muscat (Ibid, pp.143-147). Their sad end came when the British, the Persians and the Arabs forced them to concede their political and commercial rights in the region to the British (Amin, 1967, p.13).

Other European adventurers were the Dutch, who appeared on the scene simultaneously with the British in the 17th Century. The Dutch came with mercantile knowledge more sufficient than that of the Portuguese. From the beginning they established a company similar to the British; not only that, they also shared the British desire to oust the Portuguese. The Dutch-British alliance did not last long. They gradually found their interests clashing. The British again were found to have the upper hand in the Gulf. By the middle of the eighteenth century the Dutch began to lose their power and then faded away, leaving the Gulf trade for the power which dominated the Gulf for almost two and a half centuries - the British (Hay, 1959, p.11).

The French also made two appearances in the Gulf; the first was in 1664 when they established the French East India Company. From the beginning they were faced with a fierce challenge from the British. The seven

years war (1756-1763) between the two powers forced the French to leave the Gulf (Wilson, 1954, pp.189-190). The second appearance of the French in the Gulf came precisely thirty years later, in 1793. The French declared war on the British, but again they were forced to leave and the French were banned entirely from the Gulf and from the Eastern seas after their second defeat by the British in 1810 (Ibid, p.191).

The Russians and the Germans were latecomers to the waters of the Gulf. The Russians came from Persia and the Ottoman gates. With the British they engaged in a successful mediation to stop the war of the late 1890s on the Persia-Iraq borders. As a sign of friendship they asked the Ottoman government to grant them a concession to build a railway from Moscow to Baghdad. Such ambition, however, was barred by the British before its birth. Fear was the theme of British policy in the Gulf -especially with Russia and Germany. For example, Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy of India between 1899 and 1905, noted that the lands of the Middle East "are the pieces of a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the dominion of the world" (Curzon, 1966, pp.4-5).

The story of the British presence in the Gulf, however, is the main chapter in the adventurers' rivalries from the first year of the seventeenth century until the declaration of Harold Wilson of the British withdrawal of their forces from East of Suez in 1971. The British role in the Gulf was initially activated through the function of the British East India Company which was established on the last day of the year 1600 as the "Governor and Company of the Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies" (Lorimer, 1970, V.I., p.10). Fifteen years later the company established its first factory (trading house) in Persia and in 1623 more factories were established in two Persian ports - Jask and Bandar Abass on the eastern coast of the Gulf (Ismael, 1982). The British gradually dominated the Gulf, either by emphasising their trade superiority compared

with other European merchants or by approaching local power in a soft diplomatic style to gain their confidence. But, when the time came they showed a hard face against rivals in the region, ousting the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, the Russians, the Germans and finally the Ottomans who lost their Islamic rule of the area in 1918 after the First World War.

#### THE BRITISH IN KUWAIT

For more than 170 years following their arrival in the Gulf, the British considered Kuwait as insignificant for their trading purposes. But when their trading centre in Basra began to shake in 1793, the staff of the British and East India Company left for Kuwait. Kuwait then became the new centre. This has never changed. The stability of the Emirate and the commitment of its Amirs to trade and to business encouraged the British to take Kuwait as the first choice to build the new base for their trading activities in the Gulf (Kelly, 1968). Although Kuwait became active in maritime and trading business mainly with Basra, the Ottomans did not seem interested in expanding their rule south into Kuwait and in adding it to their territories. They were busy fighting the Persians and confronting the tribes of Iraq and other Arabian tribes. The independence of Kuwait was reflected by the manner in which the British handled their policy with it in 1779. During this period the caravans to Baghdad and Aleppo were transferred from Basrah to Kuwait, especially after the port fell into the hands of the Persians. This included goods of the British East India Company carried from Bombay in India to the West. From that time on the importance of Kuwait harbour became well known to the world outside and was widely noted by all the powers (Abu Hakima, 1967).

As was noted before, the British established their first factory in Kuwait in 1793, following the setting up of their trading business. The British, therefore, became obliged to share responsibility for the security



of Kuwait against external threats, especially those of the Ottomans, the Saudis and the Persians. Lorimer wrote, "For the protection of the British factory at Kuwait a small cruiser was kept anchored in the bay, and a guard of sepoy under a native officer was stationed on shore" (Lorimer, 1970, Vol.1, p.1004). Lorimer also reported British support to the Kuwaitis in their difficult war with the Wahhabies by supplying them with guns and ammunition.

The British began their political game in the internal affairs of Kuwait in 1896. In this year, when Shaikh Mubarak assassinated his half brother, the ruler, and announced himself the ruler of Kuwait, the British officially denied any involvement in the internal affairs of Kuwait. The official memorandum of the legal adviser of the British Embassy in Istanbul however, pointed to the incident indicating that Mubarak spent one month in Bushire with the British Resident in the Gulf, F. A. Wilson, a fact that had not been denied by Wilson himself (Bidwell, 1971). As on many similar occasions, however, the British authorities were divided amongst themselves as to how far the British should commit themselves with regard to their security obligations to Kuwait. Busch (1967) reported two different views - the view of the Foreign Office which objected to any direct hostility against the Ottomans regarding the rights of the Ottomans in Kuwait and the second view which was the policy of the Government of India which showed eagerness to act in favour of Kuwait whenever it was possible. The Ottomans themselves seemed not to be moved by the coup in Kuwait, as was indicated earlier. Even when there was a rumour about an Ottoman gunboat sailing towards Kuwait, the British dispatched a similar gunboat to meet it, the Ottomans had not uttered a word against British interference and their gunboat never appeared (Ibid, p.23).

The integration of Kuwait into the British colonial system resulted not only from commercial interests, but also from a political factor

(Ismael, 1982). The British were very anxious to contain the Russian influence which had begun to increase rapidly in the late nineteenth century and to prevent the latter's extension into the Gulf water and land. One of the main tasks of the British at that time was to cancel the Russians' plans to find a sea port in the Gulf and to construct a railway from Russia to Persia and the Gulf Arab States. On the other hand, the British were aware of the new German activity in the Gulf which began in the closing years of the nineteenth century. Robert Worckhaus, a German businessman, opened a firm in the Gulf in 1897 and was very successful. Suspicious of his fast rise in popularity, the British believed that he was an agent planted by the Germans to undermine British interests (Staley, 1933). The visit of the German Emperor William II to Constantinople, the seat of the Ottoman Empire, in 1898 added to British suspicion because he signed an agreement with the Ottomans to construct a railway from Constantinople to Baghdad (Kumar, 1965). Both the Russian eagerness to expand their influence in the Gulf (with the co-operation of the Persians and Ottomans) and the growing German interest which the Ottomans were willing to allow forced the British to sign an agreement with the Sheikdom of Kuwait. For example, in December 1898 the British Ambassador to Istanbul wrote a letter to his Prime Minister to recommend signing an agreement with Kuwait. He wrote to his government warning that the acts of piracy and regular traffic in slaves would, in his judgement, justify the interference of the British. He emphasised the need to sign an agreement with the Shaikh of Kuwait (Holdich, 1901).

A few days after the Ambassador's letter, in January 1899, a secret agreement between Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait and the British was signed. The agreement bound Mubarak and his family, his heirs and successors not to meet the representative of any other countries without British permission,

and not to cede and sell, lease, mortgage or give any land or territory without British permission (Bidwell, ed. 1971, Vol.1).

Mubarak also insisted that the British had promised to protect his authority and his properties (which had not been mentioned in the Treaty). Colonel Meade, the British Resident in the Gulf, wrote to Mubarak: "of the good offices of the British Government towards you, your heirs and successors as long as you ... scrupulously and faithfully observe the conditions of the said bond" (Ibid, p.50). The agreement was designed to be a secret, especially on the part of the British, who insisted that the Shaikh was not to reveal it without their prior permission.

However, the agreement was not welcomed by Mubarak's brothers. They refused to sign the Treaty without British commitment to protect the family landholdings in Fao in southern Iraq. For the sake of goodwill the Foreign Office approved the suggestion and added to the agreement that "Her Majesty's Government will do what they can to protect the family estates of the Sheikh of Koweit in Fao" (Ibid, p.41). It was not unexpected that the Ottomans would wish to show their dominance in Kuwait, but this was resisted by the British who brought their naval power to the northern waters of the Gulf. Finally, by 1902, the Ottoman and the European governments recognised the British control over Kuwait.

Many historians and scholars (Arabs and Westerners) regarded the Mubarak British agreement as the start of the integration of Kuwait into the political colonial system. The agreement was to come to bring Kuwait from a tribal society to a new form of labour production (Ismael, 1982; Baz, 1983; Birks and Sinclair, 1977) [see below]. The effects of the Kuwait-British agreement influenced other nations beyond Kuwait. The co-operation between Kuwait and Britain helped to lay the foundation of the second Saudi State in the Arab Peninsula in 1902. However the Ottomans in alliance with Ibn AL-Rashid, the ruler of Najd, were greatly opposed to the

Kuwait-British agreement and a struggle for power began. Kuwait provided a link between the British and Abd AL-Aziz AL-Saud to help the latter to oust Ibn AL-Rashid and recover his family's territories in Riyadh. The British tended to avoid direct involvement in power struggles on the Arab Peninsula, but according to Ismael (p.52) British arms reached Saudi hands through Kuwait and were denied to Ibn AL-Rashid. The supply of sophisticated weapons at that time such as British manufactured rifles, was the main factor in giving the Saudis victory over Ibn AL-Rashid and allowed Abd AL-Aziz Bin Saud to establish the new Saudi Kingdom in the Arab Peninsula in what is now called Saudi Arabia.

#### KUWAIT DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN THE TWO WARS

The development of Kuwait between the late nineteenth century and World War I was marked by three main features. The first was the transformation from a nomadic type of production to a mercantile one. Using their location in the trade route in the Gulf, the Kuwaitis promoted development of their country. They used British protection to facilitate their rapid transformation from being a tribal state to a modern state. The second feature was the transformation of Kuwait's political system. The basis on which Sabah founded this authority after his coup d'état was tribal. Gradually, with the assistance of the British he changed himself from a tribal leader to an authoritative ruler and the house of Sabah to a royal family which became the centre of Kuwaiti society (Khazal, 1962, Vol.5). The third and final feature was the use of accumulated wealth and the integration into the division of labour in the British mercantile system with an ultimate goal to expand the commercial activities of the Bani'utub whenever it was possible. Mubarak was credited for his commercial ambitions although these led on many occasions to the extortion of the divers'

and merchants' wealth. AL-Rushaid, the Kuwaiti historian, assessed Mubarak by saying:

"Mubarak was a tyrant, stubborn and unjust. He was an absolute ruler who loved the accumulation of wealth and was always seeking ways to increase his wealth. He assessed high fines against law-breakers; continuously invented taxes .... and made himself a partner in all building and property [transactions]. As a matter of fact, he was better off than a partner. He received one-third of what was sold or rented, even if this was repeated a number of times a day."

(AL-Rushaid, 1971, translated by Ismael, 1981, p.55)

Like the mono-resource economic system under British occupation, the pre-oil era was dominantly a sea industry system relying on fishing and pearling. Under the British colonial system, the Kuwaiti class system led, as Ismael argued, to "the framework of contradictions of peripheral capitalism ..... these contradictions were: (1) the contradictions of capital accumulation/expropriation; (2) the contradiction of independence/dependence (Ismael, p.59).

Ismael's description of class structure demonstrates the character of relations between the producers and the accumulation of capital by draining off the surpluses of production. The increasing market demand for pearls led to rapid growth in the pearl industry. The highest pearl production was in 1911, which the Kuwaitis called the year of AL-Tafha, meaning the (abundance year) in the local dialect (AL-Qatami, 1968, p.200). The pearl industry was based on two different methods of production. The first was based on the 'Khamamis' or the fifths. The wholesale distribution of the pearls under this method meant the financier would take Khumus (a fifth, meaning that the interest rate was 20 per cent), another Khumus would go to the owner of the boat, then there was the deduction of the costs for food and the tax of the Shaikh, which usually accounted for 30 per cent; the remainder was divided amongst the crew or the divers. An example of the share distribution among crew is shown in Table 3.1. The whole system was based on the exploitation of labour. It concentrated the earnings in the

hands of the merchants. For example, the price of the pearls given to producers in the local market was four to six times lower than the price received by the merchant in the sale market in Manama of Bahrain, or in Bombay in India (Villier, 1984).

Table 3.1. Distribution of Pearling Crew's Income

Haulers' Assistants	Number	Shares Drawn	Shares
Captain	1	3	3
Divers	10	3	30
Haulers	10	2	20
Cook	1	2	2
Haulers Assistants	2	1	2
Tax *		3	3
Total	24		60

(Al-Qatami, 1976, p.222. Amended by Ismael 1981, p.62)

The second method of finance was the System of AL-Salafiah (or System of Advance). In this system the captain and his crew maintained a degree of independence. The whole procedure depended on the captain and crew borrowing from the merchants at the beginning of the season. This could be disastrous for the borrowers if there was a poor season and they did not earn enough to cover their debt to the merchants. Villiers found the mode of pearl exploitation in the System of Advance, as economic in the whole structure is based on debt. It was part of industry in which everybody is indebted to somebody. The diver to the nakoda, who is the Captain of the ship, the nakoda to the financier, the financier to other, bigger merchants, and the bigger merchants to the Shaikh (Villiers, 1948).

Therefore, the whole burden of the debts fell on the head of the divers. They had to face two devils at one time - the Court of Divers, which was constituted by the Amir to keep law and order in the fishing

community (most judgements in that court were against poor divers), and the bottom of the Gulf where they had to dive to a depth of 8 to 16 fathoms.

The British presence, and the discovery of oil in the 1930s added more importance to the Emirate of Kuwait and led to the growth of a merchant class which, by the end of World War II, exerted political pressure on the ruling family to share the formulation and the execution of state policies (Baz, 1981). The Kuwaiti slogan at that time was: "All Kuwaitis are members of one family." The notion was that the spirit of one family governing the country would alleviate internal conflicts and guard against factional feuds (Ibid). The point was made that the relationship between the ruling family and the merchants of Kuwait was as old as Kuwait itself, and the government emphasised that the ruling family and the rest of the society "constituted a relatively homogeneous group, related to one another by kinship" (Al-Naqeeb, 1976).

The emergence of modern Kuwaiti political institutions, however, occurred in 1921 when a group of merchants submitted a memorandum to the Royal Family demanding the creation of a consultative council. They made it clear to the Amir that it was time to set up a constitutional group to assist him in ruling the country. The Amir, under pressure, agreed to choose twelve members to form the new council, with a Chairman from the merchants. He promised to work with the Council, but it failed to hold regular meetings (Al-Rushaid, 1971).

In a letter directed to the members he provided an agreement of five points:

"In the name of God, the beneficent, the munificent: This is what is agreed upon between the ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Ahmed al-Jabir, and his group [the Council]:

First: All rulings among the subjects in [governmental] relations and criminal acts will be in accordance with the honourable Shari [Islamic] law.

Second: If the convicted claim that the judgement is contrary to the Shari, the case of the plaintiff and defendant and the ruling judge will be written and will be forwarded to Islamic Ulama [religious leaders], and their decision will be the accepted judgement to be implemented.

Third: If the two opposing parties to a dispute agree to find a third person who can mediate between them and find accommodation between them, accommodation is better because it is one of the accepted means of Shari.

Fourth: Consultation in the internal affairs of the country and the external affairs that affect the country and may bring prosperity, inhibit corruption and [encourage the development of] a good system.

Fifth: Everyone who has an opinion which may benefit the religious or material well-being of the country and its people can bring it to the attention of the ruler who will consult with his group [Consultative Council]. If they found it to be beneficial, it will be enacted."

However, a second council with legislative overtones was formed in 1938. The Amir for the second time approval a draft consisting of five articles presented as follows:

"We, the Ruler of Kuwait, in accordance with the decision of the People's Legislative Council, approve this law on the authority of the Council and We have ordered its execution.

Article 1: The people are the source of authority represented in the person of its elected deputies.

Article 2: The Legislative Council must legislate the following laws:

1. The Budget Law, which organizes all the income of the country and its expenditure and directs it in a just manner, with the exception of the private property of al-Sabah which the Council has no right to interfere with.
2. The Law of Justice, the purpose of which is to establish religious and traditional laws in such a manner as to ensure the proper administration of justice among the people.
3. The Law of Public Security, the purpose of which is the maintenance of security inside the country and outside to the further borders.
4. The Law of Education, the purpose of which is the enactment of a law for education, following in it the example of the advanced countries.



5. The Law of Health, the purpose of which is the enactment of a health law which protects the country and its people from the dangers of sickness and disease of whatever kind.

6. The Law of Construction: this includes the pavement of roads outside the city and the building of prisons, digging wells, and whatever may help in building the country internally and externally.

However, conflicts arose between the ruling family and some of the members of the Council which led to the government cracking down on the opponents who fled to Iraq.

On 19th August 1961, Kuwait gained independence from Britain. The Amir of the new state, Abdullah Al-Sabah, issued a decree calling for an elected constituent assembly. The assembly was then directed to draft a permanent constitution and to act as a legislative body. The first general election, held on 30th December the same year, was considered as free as any election in Western countries.

The text of the constitution was clearly influenced by British, French, American and Russian legal principles, as well as local tradition and Islamic Law (Daniel, 1971). It guaranteed freedom of belief, opinions, the press and communications, immunity against illegal search and seizure, and the freedom to establish associations and unions (Constitution Articles 1-60).

Under this constitution the political system has been based on separation of powers, but the Amir was both ruler who owns the land and governor who holds the absolute power. Legislative power was vested in the Amir and the National Assembly; executive power was vested in the Amir and the cabinet of ministers; and the judicial power was vested in the courts. However, the ministers who were not elected were nevertheless voting members of the National Assembly (Baz, 1981).

Since its establishment in 1962, the National Assembly has been facing pressures from within and sharp criticism from neighbouring Gulf States.

The Kuwaiti democratic ambitions have been looked upon as a serious threat to both internal conservatives and to the traditional regimes in the Gulf. In addition to the merchant class, the ruling Kuwaiti family had to contend with a rising intellectual elite and a wave of liberalism, which they reluctantly tolerated up to a point. However, although change was permitted and at times encouraged, it seemed to have proceeded at too fast a pace for the traditional authorities to cope with. To maintain the balance, the National Assembly, on the whole, kept to the left of centre and, along with the intellectuals and journalists, maintained a free rein in liberal matters. The ruling family and the government kept to the right of centre and championed conservative causes.

The first accommodation to this political reality in Kuwait occurred in 1980 when the Assembly was established and the constitution was amended, increasing its members from 50 to 60, one-third of whom are ministers (Ibid). The newly elected Assembly included elites of Kuwaiti intellectuals and liberals who were generally at odds with the government. They exerted so high a pressure on the government that for the first time in the history of the Gulf they forced the Minister of Justice, who was a member of the ruling family, to resign. Furthermore, the Assembly was dissolved once more in July 1986, when it stood firmly against the government forcing five Ministers to resign under a vote of no confidence. The government allegations, however, were to accommodate the existing political conflict caused by the Iran-Iraq war, in which Kuwait became one of the main targets for terrorist attacks by Shi'ite groups backed by Iran.

These events show that the Amir of Kuwait is not a ceremonial figure. Under the constitution his powers range from those personally executed by him to other areas shared with the cabinet or shared with the National Assembly (Constitution, Articles 5-8). In this case, traditional authority

is juxtaposed on modern democratic institutions, in which checks and balances are applied to maintain an equilibrium between the liberals, including most journalists, intellectuals and the majority of the Assembly, and the conservatives including the Amir, the ruling family, the cabinet and the government.

#### SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE

To understand relations among the social groups in the Kuwaiti society, it is important to apply a relevant type of analysis, taking into account the rapid social changes especially in the last forty years and the change in the relations among newly-emerging powers, with the dynamics which govern the social interaction within these powers. The most common assumption in contemporary social analysis appears to be that a given mode of production produces a class society. The social structure is comprised of two polar classes: the capitalist and the proletariat. In Third World countries, however, the production of any model requires acknowledgement of intermediate complex social structures. The total social configuration would initially involve other classes which are not represented in the polars of 'capitalist' and 'proletariat'. The intermediate 'class' comprises what, in the Middle East is called "The Middle Class".

However, in analysing the social structure of contemporary Kuwait and in examining the dynamics of its powers, account has to be taken of the special characteristics of the primary source of wealth - oil. In all societies, it can be said, power relates to access to wealth, especially to structures which underwrite limited or monopoly access to wealth and to production of wealth. Thus, Aijaz Ahmad (1985) notices that there is an entirely different sort of dynamic in the countries of the Gulf region

where the oil and gas revenues apparently accrue to the State. Furthermore, such revenues are often deposited in the accounts of the ruler and members of the Royal Family. Ahmad concludes that:

"Perhaps for the first time in history we have a type of state which is fabulously wealthy but which obtains most of its revenues not from domestic taxation or expropriation of domestic labour, but from the exploitation largely of foreign labour migrating to oil centres and from the production and the sale of industrial raw materials to the international market."  
(Ahmed, 1985, p.50)

In the case of the Gulf States, of which Kuwait is one, the State is the dominant owner of wealth, with, however, traditional ruling houses exploiting their special access to the resources of the state. The traditional merchant class has now lost its economic ascendancy, and so also its dominant influence in the State. The oil-based modern economy has given rise to the emergence of a new bureaucratic class which is to be identified as a political group rather than an economic class, the more so as they are drawn from the total spectrum of society - including non-Kuwaitis who, however, are excluded from the upper reaches of the system. Whilst the traditional Royal House retains its hold on the upper reaches of power, access to power, influence and policy has inevitably been more widely diffused in the society.

To analyse the composition of social groups within the Kuwaiti society, it would seem appropriate to follow the historical framework, meanwhile highlighting the relations among different social groups both traditional and emergent ones. It is possible, for example, to define the groups which are related to the ruling family and to examine their role in the dynamics of the socio-economic and political development. It is also possible to define the role of the merchants class, bearing in mind the fact that the merchant class in Kuwait, as Baz noticed, "has both social and economic role instead of purely economic points of view" (Baz, 1981, p.87). Similarly, this approach could be applied to the socio-political

position of other groups, namely the Bedouin who had recently settled in urban communities, and the liberal nationalists. This latter are a heterogeneous group, defined less in economic and social terms and not easily fixed in a class spectrum but more in terms of their place in the political dynamics of the system (see below). What follows will, therefore, present those social groups in terms of their historical backgrounds, and their formations. Moreover, illustrations will be given of group roles within the socio-political spectrum, together with the relations within each group and cross group relationships. Since the Royal Family had been at the core of all social dynamics in Kuwait, it will be presented first.

#### AL-SABAH : THE RULING FAMILY

The background of the Al-Sabah family goes back to the seventeenth century. According to Dickson (1956), a severe drought hit central Arabia and forced many tribes to move east to the coasts of the Arabian Gulf. The Autubs were among those tribes and the Al-Sabah family was a member of the Autubs. In 1756, several tribes gathered around Kuwaiti's natural bay. They were united in one group under the leadership of the Sabah family. The name given to the Amirate was 'Al-Kuwait', with Sabah al-Jabir as the first Amir, having been selected by the heads of the tribes. He was in charge of the security of the Emirate, of fostering good relations among the tribes and fishing groups, and of the external relations with the Ottomans, Persians and neighbouring tribes. Since then, for the last two and a half centuries, thirteen Amirs of the Sabah family have ruled in Kuwait, the present Amir being Amir Jabir al-Ahmad (see Table 3.2).

As Baz (1981) concludes, the legitimacy of the Sabah family is based on two factors. First, the free election of their grandfather, Sabah I, in 1756 whose successor carried his name as a sign of royalty. The rulership in Kuwait since then does not depend wholly upon primogeniture as is

Table 3.2 Al-Sabah Line of Succession

Name of Ruler	Date of Reign	Relationship to predecessor
Sabah Al-Jaber	1756-1762	---
Abdullah Al-Sabah	1762-1812	Son
Jaber Al-Abdullah	1812-1859	Son
Sabah Al-Jaber	1859-1866	Son
Abdullah Al-Sabah	1866-1892	Son
Mohammad Al-Sabah	1892-1896	Brother
Mubarak Al-Sabah	1896-1915	Brother
Jaber Al-Mubarak	1915-1917	Son
Salem Al-Mubarak	1917-1921	Brother
Ahmed Al-Jaber	1921-1950	Uncle
Abdullah Al-Salem	1950-1965	Cousin
Sabah Al-Salem	1965-1977*	Brother
Jaber Al-Ahmed	1978-the present	Cousin

\*The late Amir Sabah Al-Salem died on December 31, 1977

often the case in other Gulf countries. The Amirs of Kuwait are chosen according to Arab traditions, which are based on such attributes as courage, leadership, and seniority. New elements have also been added to reflect Sabah's adoption of a modern type leadership: e.g. experience in local and foreign affairs, the capability to influence social groups, and level of education. Thus age and primogeniture were replaced by new qualifications which echo the new style of leadership. The Sabah's traditions in this regard had begun with the first successor for Sabah I (1762-1812). On his death, Sabah left behind five sons, but although Abdullah was the

youngest among his brothers, he was chosen by the members of the family and the notables of Kuwait to succeed his father. They were certain of his capability to lead the Emirate and his age did not hinder his role as the successor of his father (Khazal, 1970, vol.1, p.44-45). Recently, with the establishment of a Constitution and a democratic political system, new conditions were added to the old traditions such as the successor's mental ability, predicated upon the approval of the National Assembly.

Secondly, the Al-Sabahs intentionally secured their legitimacy on an occupational factor. Influential and sensitive government posts, such as those of the Interior, the Military, the Oil Industry, and Information are held by members of the Sabah family. The numerous members of the family are credited by their ambition to attain higher education and political experience. A new breed of Sabahs have obtained posts in the diplomatic field. They accumulate experience and knowledge to meet the needs of the new administration and to keep abreast with the intellectuals who are increasingly on the ascendant among other social groups.

Since independence in 1962, many Sabahs took the lead in the new management. Many were recruited in the government to maintain the need for balancing the political power. But, regardless of the criticism against the Sabah family, and the accusations of monopolising the oil wealth to strengthen the regime and the family as such, the Sabahs have been given credit for being able to carry out a peaceful transformation of Kuwait from a patriarchal system to a democratic monarchy.

Throughout the centuries the Sabah family has striven to obtain legitimacy. It was, however, the only one among Arab ruling families that, to some extent, did not base its legitimacy on absolute political rule. It did not pose as the sole absolute power on top of all. Until the late 50s, the Amir has not attached his rule to the members of his family. Instead,

he based his power upon integration with the Courts and/or with the merchants. For example, Lorimer, noted that at the beginning of the century Amir Mubarak was:

"Personal and absolute . . . the heads of his department are mostly slaves; his near relatives are excluded from his councils; even his sons wield no exclusive powers . . . in the town the smallest disputes, whether civil or criminal, are settled by the Shaikh himself."  
(Lorimer, 1908-15, p.1074)

Likewise, the later Amirs followed the same policy of separating the members of the family from the Amir. The family political entity, as Crystal (1986) concludes, was basically de-centralised and fragmented. On the one hand, the Amir pursued his rule without paying any attention to his relatives' point of view. Consequently, having lost ambition to participate in decision-making and separating themselves from the Amir, the members of his family left the ruling affairs exclusively to him. But, with the discovery of oil and the increase in oil revenues, the political system created new political institutions which led to the emergence of such socio-political powers as the nationalists and the intellectuals. The Amir was forced to develop a new line of relationship between himself and other members of the family. Henceforward the separation within the family ended and the Sabah family emerged as a royal political institution.

After independence in 1962, the Amir started to institutionalise the Royal Family as a political power correlative to those of the merchants, the nationalists and other groups. He gave to the eldest member access to oil revenues. He also ordered salaries to be paid to every single Shaikh, young and old. The Shaikhs were invited to occupy many managerial posts, especially those of a high calibre. He encouraged the family members to compete with the growing skills and professions in the public sector. He knew the increasing social powers and the sophistication of individuals in terms of wealth and education. He also understood the increasing influence of intellectuals and how this would affect the social political system.



Thus, the need to match their power by the Royal Family was imperative. After his death, Shaikh Abdullah Al-Salim claimed the rulership of Kuwait in 1951. With his leadership, Kuwait experienced the most dynamic social and political changes, i.e. Independence, the transformation of Kuwait into a democratic monarchy, the Constitution, the elected National Assembly, and the re-organisation of the Royal Family as well. Abdullah had participated in the pre-independence activities of the country. During the uprising of the merchants in 1938 he was in charge of the Department of Finance, in which he showed great shrewdness and flexibility. It was alleged that he showed sympathy to the merchants' demands, and when the time was ripe he implemented them.

As the Finance Chief, then as Amir in the fifties, Shaikh Abdullah was intent on participating in oil wealth with the foreign companies which were exploiting it. At that time, in Iran (east of Kuwait) Prime Minister Mussadeq rebelled against the British and American oil companies. He declared the nationalisation of the entire oil industry, a declaration that cost him his political life in 1952. Shaikh Abdullah was aware that his Emirate could not confront the British military power in a time when it was still under British rule. He decided to resort to diplomatic negotiations and peaceful means, and in 1951 succeeded in signing an agreement entitling him to a 50-50 share in all the oil companies in Kuwait (Crystal, 1985). Such an achievement was strongly welcomed by Kuwaiti citizens and a flood of new domestic development projects were embarked upon.

According to Ismael (1982), Shaikh Abdullah had always been an active supporter of the reformers throughout his reign (1950-1965). He attempted to lessen the "more oppressive aspects of autocracy in Kuwait" (Ismael, 1982, p.82). This assessment is valid on the basis that: firstly, during his reign, Kuwait had enjoyed tremendous changes and experienced a rapid evolution in all aspects of life - political, economic, and social. He

stood firmly behind progress and used all means available to develop and modernise Kuwait. Notable examples of Abdullah's achievements were: the drafting of the first Kuwaiti constitution, the formation of the National Assembly and the introduction of free elections. In December 1962, a few months after independence, Abdullah created the first constituent committee to draft the Constitution and after two months the first general elections were held to choose members of the new National Assembly. The Constitution designated Kuwait as a hereditary monarchy with succession limited to the descendants of Mubarak. In the Constitution, the Amir was declared immune and his person inviolable. The Heir Apparent would be nominated by the Amir and approved by a simple majority at the National Assembly. He should be designated within one year of the succession of the new Amir. Under the Amir's supervision, the Royal Family was thoroughly re-organised to constitute a governing power within the social structure. Also, the administration was developed and the Cabinet members selected from within the elected members of the National Assembly. The members of the National Assembly were given the right to participate in drafting new legislations as well as freedom to debate on any issue, regardless of whether they vote for or against the government.

Secondly, during Abdullah's regime the press began to play a strong role and the political press was established with the publication of daily newspapers. The press then became a crucial part of the spectrum for most political debates. The National Assembly and the political associations as well as the intellectuals considered the press the right medium to use in order to reach public opinion. They used the press to reflect their views on the issues. Again, as Abdullah was behind the efforts to establish the National Assembly, he was partially behind the efforts to establish a strong press as part of his ambitions. Hence he was given the name "The Father of Modern Kuwait".

Thirdly, during Abdullah's regime, a Youth Association was established. Most intellectuals and men of letters became members. In Kuwait, where political parties were prohibited, this Association provided a cultural circle accommodating political and social activities. Inside the Youth Association, progressive ideas and calls for political change began to be voiced. But the most outstanding achievement of the Association was its active role in fostering the modern press of Kuwait.

#### THE MERCHANTS

If, in terms of power and influence, the Sabah's family occupies the top position of the political pyramid in Kuwait, the merchant class comes in the second position, or so it did until before Independence in 1961. Since the establishment of Kuwait, in 1765, the merchant class has played an important role in balancing the power between the Royal Family and the people of Kuwait. The merchants have always tried to eliminate unjust ambitions of some autocratic Amirs and members of the Royal Family and to stress the need for political participation and for the formation of a democratic political system in a modern state.

According to Hewins (1963) the merchants background goes back to the roots of the Utubs, the earliest settlers who moved in human waves from Central Arabia in the early 16th century when, as mentioned elsewhere, a severe drought hit the centre of the Arab Peninsula. Numbers of merchants came from Basra especially after it had been captured by the Persians between 1775-1779, while some of them came to Kuwait, over a period from Iran and other Arab States. Well known names, such as Bahbahani and Gabazard, are of Persian origin. When the Utubs and other heads of nomadic East Arabian tribes met in Kuwait and concluded an agreement to establish Kuwait, many of them headed off to the sea for fishing and pearling-diving, others joined trade caravans on the trade routes from East Arabia and

Aleppo on the Syrian coast of the Mediterranean. The simple nature of the division of labour characteristic of such activities made the sea sector more organised, integrated, and more receptive to the dynamics of forming a social class. The sea work extended for two centuries until the discovery of oil in the 30s, when the merchant group became the wealthiest class in the region of the Middle East.

To analyse the socio-political role of the merchants, it is important to examine the structure of their class in terms of demographic formation, political influence and economic status. It was found, however, that the merchants of Kuwait could be easily classified into two different segments. First, the merchants whose family status is based on their social background and economic strength. These include the powerful families of old merchants such as Al-Saqir, Al-Ghanim, Al-Nist, Al-Shakean and others. Along with them come the families whose members claimed equal tribal background and a social status similar to that of the Al-Sabah ruling family (Dickson, 1987). It is this sector of merchants who have the power and exercise influence on the socio-political scene. They are the grandfathers of the recent commercial group which has participated effectively in shaping the structural form of Kuwaiti society with its contemporary political and social institutions (Abu Hakima, 1965).

The second segment comprises the merchants who base their status and influence on the wealth which was accumulated in the oil era. Kuwait's rapid development began in the early 1950s. The tremendous use of oil revenues in massive projects of development added a great deal to those revenues and added to the wealth of the traditional segment of the merchants. It led, in the meantime, to the creation of new wealthy merchants whose wealth exceeded, in many cases, the wealth of the traditional merchants. The emergence of new merchants with tremendous wealth did not,

however, qualify merchants with weak family backgrounds to play a political role within their class or in society at large commensurate to the size of their wealth. Their political influence was limited in comparison with that of merchants with traditional tribal backgrounds, or yet with members of contemporary classes, including the nationalists of strong tribal lines. But, on the whole, the merchants constitute one of the main social pillars, holding together the social structure of Kuwait. As Baz (1981) noticed, the efficiency of professionalism among Kuwaiti merchants relied on two supportive factors: the demographic factor on which tribal Kuwait stood, and the cleverness and wisdom they showed by following liberal policy and low tariffs to develop their maritime industry prior to the discovery of oil. Secondly, the geographic factor, which made Kuwait a trading centre for East Arabia. The efficiency of sea and land activities and services introduced by those merchants made Kuwait a favourable location on the route for the trading caravans between the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, and between Kuwait and Aleppo in the Mediterranean and also helped Kuwait to flourish and Kuwaiti merchants to accumulate early wealth in the last century. The wealth obtained from fishing and pearl-diving before the discovery of oil, made the merchants capable of participating actively in Kuwaiti social formations. Their enterprises and adventures in the pre-oil era constituted the basis on which the popular Kuwaiti pearling industry was found. In this context, Khoja and Sadler, wrote:

"The Kuwaiti merchant families grew up as trading dynasties, centred on Kuwait, but with an intricate network of relationships, often based on kinship, which spanned the Middle East and a greater part of the Indian Ocean, and it was these merchant families which provided that echelon of social and political leadership to the country and gave it that special brand of mental adroitness and financial astuteness which characterises it today."  
(Khoja and Sadler, 1979, p.13)

As they have contributed to the success of the economic development, the merchants played an effective role in fostering such public services as

education and the health care. They gave financial aid towards the building of schools, hospitals, and the headquarters of social aid organisations. Such activities were consonant with their role in the pre-oil era when they provided the main lever for change. On many occasions, especially in the 1921 and 1938 uprisings, they were locked with the Royal Family in tests of power aiming at establishing political participation. The strong uprising of 1938, for example, constituted a serious challenge to the Amir, as it presented a new marathon in the struggle between the traditional absolute rulership of the Amirs and the growing demands by the merchants to share power on behalf of other social groups.

However, the merchants' challenge was not an event to be forgotten by the Amir. The palace was alerted; the members of the Royal Family were called and grouped around the Amir in a confrontation with the merchants who were under suspicion by the regime. It seemed from the outset that the Amir had made up his mind to undermine the merchants and eliminate their social, economic and political role. He started a secret war so that members of the Royal Family and their partners in the British companies working in Kuwait might monopolise the contracts of the development projects. Under this secret war, the merchants were prevented from benefiting from the oil revenues. The Amir used the oil revenues to pay the money borrowed by the government on various occasions from the merchants thereby reducing their political role. By 1950, the Amir was able to pay all the government debts to the merchants and in 1951 he decreed the lowering of the custom tariffs.

This socio-political battle between the Amir and the merchants showed that the regime had the confidence and capability of controlling the economy without the merchants' support. He thus wanted to use the oil revenues, to make sure that the merchants understood that the State no longer needed to borrow from them. In a political show of power, he replaced the

role of the municipality in administration with the Development Board in the administration of which he instructed that the merchants were not to participate. This measure against the merchants made them aware that their power was in jeopardy and their commercial position threatened. Not only were the new regulations designed to damage their interests, but so did also the political and commercial monopoly which the members of the Royal Family came to enjoy. In 1951, for example, the five year state plan was announced with priority given to the projects of the infrastructure. Some projects were in social services, health and education, municipal, and public works. In the same year, the government revealed an ambitious plan to rebuild the city of Kuwait, with the estimated time for completion of the project being 15 years. The whole contract was given to British companies on condition that the companies pay to commission to the members of the Royal Family. Johnston noted that:

"The entire 15 year development plan was apportioned out among five British firms. The government did not carry out preliminary cost surveys, did not call for tender and supply awarded contracts on a cost-plus basis . . . no anti-inflationary precautions were taken, labour and materials costs rocketed, much of the finished work was of inferior quality, and the ruler's rage overflowed when the time came to pay the prices . . ."

(Johnston, 1957, p.54)

The time factor indicated by Johnston above was the straw which broke the camel's back. When the corruption among the members of the Royal Family, in charge of the new administration was uncovered, it revealed the lack of competence among members of the Cabinet and the slow down in major projects with the high cost of contracts. The whole country was thrown into an economic crisis and the State was seized in a severe depression. By 1953, the Amir and the regime were threatened when "the richest man in the world wanted to resign" (Crystal, 1986, p.164). The Amir had to make hard decisions, especially as regards the suspension of all development projects except for those of major importance, such as the power plant and health

services. He ordered the reorganisation of the government, relieving of their posts those with direct involvement and responsibility for the crisis. The Amir established the High Executive Committee to carry out the desired reforms. The members were chosen partly from among the capable and neutral shaikhs and highly experienced Kuwaitis with economic and political backgrounds. Supported by the Amir, the first decision taken by the Committee was to relieve two Shaikhs of their posts - Abdullah Mubarak, the powerful Shaikh, and Fahd Al-Salim, the brother of the Amir.

In an unexpected move, the Amir made his second important decision when he called the merchants to negotiate a patch up deal, allowing them to gain back part of the power they had lost. The Amir was thus able to have the new loans which he needed to overcome the State's economic depression. These deals also included an offer from the Amir to guarantee the merchants a proper share of the oil revenues which had hitherto never reached them. Under these terms the Amir was to give all his support to the merchants by offering them a monopoly of all major dealerships in Kuwait. Furthermore, he gave them a guarantee to preserve the private sector from any government restrictions, promising that free trading which was based, from the beginning, on free enterprise, would continue without change. The Amir kept his promise and abandoned most of the original contracts with British companies, and prohibited them from submitting any tenders before six months had elapsed on ongoing projects so as to ease the time factor on behalf of the merchants. The merchants found the Amir's proposals of mutual interest; thus both the Amir and the merchants began a new alliance based on trust and co-operation. Though he had before the deal been harsh on the merchants, Amir Abdullah was known to the merchants as a man of his word. They had kept faith in him since the uprising of 1938 when they went out in demonstrations demanding the Majlis. At that time, regardless of his position as the man in charge of the Financing Department, he had the



courage to protest in favour of the merchants' demands. In the three years following the economic crisis, Amir Abdullah showed wisdom in his economic and political decisions. Development was thus on track once again and the social structure had accordingly been undergoing marked changes. Work on government projects once again passed into the hands of merchants employed by local firms. The merchants new deal with the Amir led to huge capital investment in trade, construction and the public services. The government, on the other hand, restricted its involvement in trade, leaving it exclusively to the merchants. The Amir opposed members of his family, preventing any interference in trade activities, and he vowed to stop the return of corruption in the administration. Such policy was reflected in the Chamber of Commerce and the Cooperative Board, and not one member of the Royal Family was allowed to sit on either council.

The popular merchant families, therefore, began to regain their economic power, and soon they began to play a political role in the internal and external affairs of Kuwait. Learning from their earlier experience in economic and inter-class relations, when the Amir had imposed isolation on their class, they began to strengthen social ties by increasing the number of marriages between members of merchant families. Back in history, tribal wars and social conflict had dominated relations between the tribes of the desert, and inter-marriage was the accepted sign of conciliation. Similarly, the merchants used an aspect of the old traditional way of life, i.e. the Diwaniyah, which still plays an important social and political role in the relationship between certain members of Kuwaiti society similar to that of political parties in the free world. Diwaniyah, established in the pre-oil era, and featured regular male gatherings in the houses of prominent citizens, unintentionally became meetings for the discussion of current social, economic and political issues. As Kuwaiti merchants grew richer and modernised their lifestyle, the Diwaniyah changed from a stage

where merchants met to trade or plan fishing or pearling expeditions to a debate on current affairs. This change was recognised by Farah when he wrote:

A Diwaniah today will tend to embrace members of similar social standing, religion, even age. Thus a man cannot really choose to 'join' a Diwaniah; he is born into one. A group of friends from similar backgrounds may, at their coming of age, join an existing Diwaniah of older men or they may form their own. One can be invited to a Diwaniah, or eventually become part of it, but subtle and long standing ties among the members generally characterise Diwaniah . . . Certain subjects are taboo, while others are approached in prescribed ways. Politics is not taboo. Above all, a Diwaniah is where wealth, connections or influence become tangible or are felt . . . The members of a Diwaniah form a society which operates for their collective benefit. Here, appointments are decided, contracts settled, introductions made, jobs awarded . . .

(Farah, 1979, p.51)

Since the establishment of the National Assembly, the social role of the Diwaniah has increased and it has become a forum for politicians to raise issues. Both MPs and members of the Cabinet use the Diwaniah to test reactions to their points of view before discussion reaches the National Assembly. Sometimes the role of the Diwaniah becomes even more important, especially during times of political crisis such as the dissolution of the National Assembly. For example, between 1976 and 1981, the Diwaniah virtually replaced the National Assembly after it had been dissolved by the Amir. The Diwaniah thus became a social and political platform used by various groups to test their strength and the power of their opponents.

#### THE EMERGENT POWER: THE NATIONALISTS

By the emergent power I mean the new Kuwaiti elite that gathered strength outside the political debate in the National Assembly. Its members are the product of better education, rapid economic growth, the power of the press and increasing Arab nationalism amongst both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaiti Arabs.

The power of the nationalists differed in both structure and ideology from that of the other three social groups; the ruling family, the merchants and the Bedouins. Halpern (1970), for example, found the nationalists to be a heterogeneous group with members originating from a variety of social and economic strata. It included the sons of merchants who adopted radical political ideology, professionals and intellectuals such as university professors, high school teachers, journalists in the privately owned media, writers, lawyers, doctors and many civil servants. Together they constitute what the Arabs call the growing middle class.

In Kuwaiti socio-political terms, the members of the Royal Family hold the values of the sovereignty which they inherited from the 18th century, and alongside them the merchants hold the values of trade and adventure. At the other end of the social spectrum, the Bedouin hold the traditional values of the Arabian desert, while the members of the emergent power share the desire to build a new reformed state based on a democratic system, with free elections and equal access to oil wealth.

The renaissance of Kuwait in the 1950s and 1960s increased the liberal circles of liberal nationalists who were acting from the beginning to achieve radical changes. Thus, besides their demands for political reforms, they also called for the formation of political parties, the recruitment of professionals to posts regardless of their social background and they called for a guided and planned economic system in which the oil revenues are equally distributed among the members of Kuwaiti society both rich and poor. They also demanded justice, equality and freedom for all Kuwaitis. The nationalists' power began to build up early in the 1950s. Similar to their impact on the Bedouin whose lives were changed when they settled in remote villages, the oil revenues helped to facilitate the growth of new social classes, one of which was the nationalists. The

growth of education in Kuwait, and the increasing number of Kuwaiti students who won scholarships to Arab universities led consequently to the increase of intellectuals and highly educated citizens. The nationalist movement, as indicated earlier, flourished among educated Kuwaitis and it was obvious that the more graduates there were from the universities, the more participants in the movement.

A second source of power for the movement came from abroad in the 'fifties when the government began growth plans in services and utilities which needed tens of thousands of skilled labourers from Arab and non-Arab countries, besides hundreds of thousands of non-skilled labourers. The skilled jobs were mostly occupied by Arab migrants to Kuwait with educated Kuwaitis occupying the managerial posts. The non-Kuwaiti Arabs founded a good alliance with the Kuwaiti nationalists. They, on the other hand, put more energy into the nationalist movement and for this reason, besides the socio-political growth in the state, the social structure of the Kuwaiti political elite began to show dramatic changes, with the nationalists becoming the centre for calls for socio-political reforms. A main characteristic in the nationalist movement is the difference from other social groups. The nationalists had no self-interest or class demands. Their main goals were to find the means to reform the country and ways in which they should be ruled. Their call for modernization and justice reflects the fact that they were themselves a product of modernization. Similarly, their call for Arab unity and Arab integration in economy, politics and social life was not unusual because it reflects the fact that they are themselves intellectually the product of the new intellectual Arabs whose ambitions for unity and modernization dominated the pan-Arab political scene in the 50s and 60s. It could be concluded that the nationalists based their social reputation on their outstanding social achievements

which more or less emphasized public interests in Kuwait, regardless of the movement's self gains.

The available literature, though limited, introduces strong evidence about the political role of the nationalist movement. For example, Kazziha believes that the story of the nationalists, whose demands focused on the call for radical socio-political reformation, is the story of the political democratic achievements in Kuwait and its political institutions, especially the National Assembly. Kazziha believes, moreover that after meeting the Amir in 1955, the delegation headed by Dr. Ahmed Al-Katib set the tone for all political reforms. The delegation submitted to the Amir a list of national demands which were called petitions. "The advocates were to establish a democratic state with a democratic constitution and institution of representative assembly" (Kazziha, 1975, p.34). The assumption was at that time that these revolutionary groups were set on revolutionising Kuwait from within and not from without. In other words, to keep the monarchic system and let the changes gradually affect the structure of the system through the evolutionary process.

Since the National Assembly was established in 1962, the nationalists have never had the majority of MPs. Rather, that status has always been shared by the merchants and the Bedouins. The MPs of this majority, though the rubber stamp for the government, lacked the dynamism and understanding needed for political debates. The lack of political experience and the ignorance of the techniques of debates among the MPs of other groups allowed the nationalists (who were on the whole intellectuals) to take the initiative in discussions on many issues. Though a minority, the nationalists were outspoken with clear views in the debates and discussions which took place in the National Assembly. Formally, the nationalists were viewed by the government as dangerous opponents who had to be confronted and minimized. But, although they were the subject of many political

measures, such as dissolving the Assembly, imposing censorship on more than one occasion, and encouraging minorities, such as the Bedouin and Shi'ites to attack them in the Assembly, the government was occasionally forced to yield to their demands as far as these reflected the demands of the public and ordinary Kuwaitis.

The constitution of Kuwait does not explicitly forbid the formation of political parties. The government with its tacit means has prevented any intention by different groups to establish parties, allowing only groups to be organized without legal declaration. The nationalists, however, showed a strong ability to organize their political activities. They succeeded, for example, in forming certain political groups who shared the same beliefs and same political views. They were also able to organize effective political campaigns to promote their ideas. At the same time, they were able to organize sympathetic alliances with other political groups and to encourage them to champion them in public. They mobilized many Kuwaitis within the 'middle class' to press for more political liberalisation, for the right to form political parties, for more women's rights, better treatment for women, for more rights for Arab workers and for more efficient economic and social policies (Baz, 1981). In the pan-Arab issues, they supported Arab unity, closer identification with Arab states and unlimited support for the Palestinian cause.

During the first ever elections in 1962, the nationalists participated in the race for membership of the National Assembly. They wanted to use parliament as a platform from which more Kuwaitis could hear their demands and political views. In spite of the limited number of their MPs in the Assembly (which had not exceeded 12 MPs), their political role in decision making had exceeded that of the majorities, including the government. For example, in 1963, during negotiations with Egypt, Syria and Iraq to create an Arab Federal State, the nationalist MPs succeeded in mobilising behind

them their opponent MPs to sign a memorandum calling upon the government to join the three Arab nations and participate in any agreement. The government replied positively by expressing their support for any Arab unity, but asked for enough time to see the final arrangements among the three states (Ibid). Shortly before the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1976, the nationalists led the Assembly to pass a resolution condemning the Syrian intervention in Lebanon and calling for the government to cut off financial aid to Syria. The press provided a strong ally for the nationalists; it supported the National Assembly by increasing its criticism of Syrian aggressiveness against the citizens of Lebanon and against the Palestinian camps. Such harsh criticism of the Syrians was the straw that broke the camel's back; the government had already been upset by the criticism against the Amir and Cabinet. The argument was that the Assembly's offensive against the Syrians had hindered its attempts to mediate amongst disputants in Lebanon. In fact, it was this whole sorry affair which led to the dissolution of the Assembly.

Immediately after the Assembly was dissolved, the nationalists launched a strong campaign in the press and elsewhere calling for the restoration of the parliament. They used the power of the press and the Constitution to force the government to restore democratic life. There were numerous editorials and interviews, with some notable Kuwaitis calling for elections. The interviews, for example, were so geared as to bring about a discussion of the best methods of revising the Constitution and restoring the parliamentary system. By the same token, in May 1979 the former MPs signed a long memorandum and presented it to the Heir Apparent/Prime Minister, Shaikh Jabir Al-Ahmed protesting against any delay in restoration of the Assembly and demanding immediate elections for a new National Assembly. After the memorandum was submitted in February 1980, the Amir gave instructions for a committee of 35 members to be set up to

revise the Constitution. Within six months, their task was finished. Finally in August of the same year, the Amir issued a decree calling for new elections which took place in February 1981.

#### THE BEDOUIN

The Bedouin class is considered the weakest among all the social classes in Kuwait. Having been the first social group in Arabia, the Bedouin became the weakest social group in most modern societies, including Kuwait. The tribes of Kuwait, however, have relatives in all Gulf states. Their cousins have spread all over the eastern coast of the Gulf so much so that one might everywhere encounter the same popular names of tribes such as Ajman, Anzah, Awazem, Mutair, Rashadiah, Sharma, and many others who had settled in Kuwait. In the last twenty years, the traditional nomadic life of the Bedouin has been weakened and almost halted by emerging modernization. Socio-economic and political changes have undermined the powerful and deep-ingrained customs of the Bedouin way of life. Socially, the growth of urban development and the spread of education among the Bedouin spurred the deterioration of the traditions and customs of the desert. Furthermore, the mass media have effectively fostered the government's plans to modernise the nomads. For example, the television and radio have definitely played a part in the Bedouins' tolerance of new ways and of life in urban houses among a younger and forward looking generation. Television and radio created admiration in the Bedouin and acceptance of the new values and manners. Hence the weakening of the traditions and strong ties to desert life, thanks to the oil revenues, cheap or free housing and mass media (Saeed-Subaihi, 1979). In addition to the above factors, the norms of employment, salaries and money, motivated the Bedouin to settle to an urban life. They came to enjoy new shopping habits and admired mostly owning cars. The traditional relationship between the Bedouin and the best



means of desert transportation, the camel, became weak and was later replaced by the car, the symbol of city transportation.

The oil revenues were obviously the main source of money to finance government projects changing tribal nomadic life to modern settlements. The Arabian Gulf states launched a long-term policy to encourage the Bedouin to adopt an urban way of life. They allowed them to merge with the existing working cadres, expecting that such a merger would increase the Bedouins' relations with the urban life and decrease the ties between them and desert life. Traditionally work was a dishonour to Bedouins; the status of a tribesman would be damaged if he were to undertake any physical work. Oil cash, however, undermined all such traditions. Governments in the Gulf agreed to tighten checks on travel documents and to toughen the procedures for departure visas. The borders were thus tightly guarded in the face of nomads. Such measures seem to have been successful in curbing the Bedouins' travelling, especially in Kuwait.

The Bedouin of Kuwait were further promoted beyond any settlement plans. The political debates generated in the National Assembly and the weak position of the government have led, as already pointed out, to a power conflict between the government, the merchants, and the nationalists. In the elections of 1975, the government's critical position in the National Assembly spurred it to look for a new alliance. Meanwhile the Bedouins, in spite of their large numbers and because of their unsettled life, were socially weak and had no political role in Kuwaiti society. They have always, however, considered any Amir from the Al-Sabah family as the head of all tribes. They expected all tribes to be loyal, obedient and respectful to the Amir. Early in the century, the Sabahs, anticipating the power of the tribes, had planned to strengthen their family ties with the heads of those tribes. They contracted several marriages with Bedouins' daughters to ensure new alliances with the tribes (Dickson, 1972).

Before the election of the Assembly, in 1975, the government decided to weaken the position of its opponents, using the Bedouin as a buffer zone between the regime and those opponents. It found the Bedouin receptive to the idea of a political alliance and strongly desirous to participate in the elections for the National Assembly. The deal was for them to support the government policy in the National Assembly and give their votes in favour of the position it took on various issues. The government would, in return, start services and development programmes allowing them more education, health services, employment opportunities and housing than ever before. Furthermore, the government allowed the Bedouin to claim the right to vote by relaxing the laws of naturalization thereby granting them full Kuwaiti citizenship. By these measures, the Bedouins, who for centuries had lived in the desert herding camels and goats, won 10 seats in the new elections. Henceforth the Bedouin became a political power in alliance with the government. Their power, however, did not leave any impact on the social structure. Their political role faded after a year, when the Amir declared the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1976. It was argued, however, that the Bedouin not only could not influence the social and political life, but also that they were manipulated by a system which hastened their withdrawal from the desert to urban settlements.

#### TRANSFORMATION OF KUWAIT'S PATRIARCHAL SYSTEM TO INSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

After sixty-two years of British occupation, Kuwait became an independent state on 19th June 1961. But while the nation was celebrating the occasion, the astonishing news came through from the northern borders that the Iraqis had made a claim to the new independent state which they intended to annexe. Their evidence was that it had been part of Iraq until the British signed their agreement with Kuwait in 1899. Kuwaiti officials were under pressure to act swiftly and form a new state with its

constitutional and political institutions. The wind of change which dominated the Middle East in the 1960s, including liberal pan-Arab nationalism, exacerbated the need to change Kuwait from a tribal political structure to a modern socio-political system. The Iraqi claim forced the patriarchal system to adopt a different internal and external policy. The need for change was paramount, so as to ease the external pressure exerted upon the regime from Iraq and to hasten the internal socio-political reforms which Kuwait needed after independence from the British. The threat which the Kuwaitis experienced in the early days of their independence was not the only challenge they faced. The internal pressure on the regime which had increased with the growth of nationalist graduates of Cairo, Baghdad and Lebanese universities was another factor confronting the regime. At that time the nationalists had raised many demands to the Amir expressing their wish to participate in Kuwait's internal affairs. The graduates thus wished to take part in the democratization of the political system by fostering social and economic development, modernizing the entire social life of the people and by participating in the Arab dialogue to ascertain pan-Arab integration as the only path to establish Arab unity, which was and still is the main issue in the political and national circles in Kuwait.

In reaction to all these challenges, foreign and domestic, the government decided to follow a rapid transformation of the political system in which the Al-Sabah family would keep its dynasty and oversee the transition of the state. Thus the decision was to end the old patriarchal rule and replace it with a democratic parliamentary monarchy similar to the British system, and other democracies in Europe, with the difference that the Kuwaiti Royal Family, especially the sovereign or the Amir, would enjoy even more political power. The Amir, in particular, was extremely eager to

put immediate political plans on the move so as to establish a modern state. He was occupied by the newly rising external and internal political factors.

#### THE EXTERNAL FACTOR

The threat from Iraq to annexe Kuwait came within a few days of the declaration of the independence of the new state, or precisely seven days after the British recognition of Kuwait as an independent state. Such claims by Iraq put the legitimacy of the regime into question. At the beginning it was not clear if Iraq had made its claims with or without consulting other Arab states. Fortunately, most Arab states supported Kuwait, thanks to the hostility between Nasser of Egypt and Qasim of Iraq, whose challenges of Nasser led to the rise of many opponents on the Iraqi domestic political scene and among other Arab governments. Qasim was clear in his declaration on the Kuwaiti issue. Kuwait, he claimed, was an integral part of Iraq which had been detached from the mainland after the British colonial agreement with Shaikh Mubarak in 1899. According to him, the time had come for Iraq to annexe the land on the basis that the Kuwait state was illegal. In the face of the Iraqi threat, the British dispatched some military units (mainly Royal Air Force) to meet any Iraqi military threat, a measure which partly eased the Iraqi pressure on Kuwait. Along with the British, many Arabs sided with Kuwait, not only because they were concerned about the future of the independence of Kuwait, but also because they had not accepted the Iraqi's claims and did not wish them to annexe an oilfield like Kuwait. The Arab League, with Nasser's aid, dispatched some military units to the borders between Kuwait and Iraq and both the British and the Arab League succeeded in halting all Iraqi military preparations against Kuwait. Kuwait, on the other hand, reviewing the whole circumstances, found that the generous support from the British and the Arabs

must not undermine Kuwait's efforts to establish a democratic state. They were acting in the belief that the Iraqis could renew their claims in the future and because of this belief they wanted to secure an international stature by seeking recognition from the United Nations and the Arab League. Kuwait therefore applied first for membership of the Arab League and was accepted unanimously by all Arab states except for Iraq. In the case of the United Nations, Kuwait was not allowed to enjoy membership because the Soviet Union vetoed the proposition and took the Iraqi side. After one year, however, the United Nations accepted Kuwait's application and the State of Kuwait now enjoys full membership in all of the organizations of the United Nations.

The Iraqi threat to annexe Kuwait had contributed to the speeding up of efforts by the government and the Kuwaiti people to transform their country. Al-Ebraheem, for example, considered the Iraqi challenge as the main factor leading to the rapid political transformation of the Kuwaiti political system from a patriarchal state to a parliamentary democratic political system (Al-Ebraheem, 1975). Kijazi, in the heat of the event, also wrote: "The ruler of Kuwait set in motion the machinery for the confirmation of his position and that of his government through popular elections, and this, in turn, set in motion the machinery for the introduction of constitutional government" (Hijazy, 1964, p.436).

The Iraqi claim was waived by the new regime of the Second Iraqi Republic of 1963, after Qasim was murdered and his regime brought to an end by a coup d'etat. The Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations from then on acquired a new light, with mutual co-operation and friendship; a clear illustration of this was the strong support which Kuwait gave to the Iraqis in their long lasting war with Iran (1979-1988).

#### THE INTERNAL FACTOR

Following the uprising of the Kuwaiti merchants in 1938, the political social structure of Kuwait began to change and take a new form. This change was mostly in the relations between the different social powers and political groups. Such a policy was consistent with Abdullah's position during the uprising of 1938, when he was siding with the merchants against Ahmed Al-Jabir, the Amir at that time. Now that the time was ripe, he put his preaching into practice thereby favouring a wide political participation in which the merchants and other social groups might share in the rule of the state.

Along with the growth of the merchants' role, a new political force began to develop, especially among students of Kuwaiti schools and graduates of Arab universities in Cairo, Baghdad, and other Arab capitals. This force as was noted before was known as the nationalists group, consisting of the sons of the merchants and other citizens who were able to finance their sons' higher education abroad. Both the merchants and the nationalists began an early alliance, if not against the Amir, then to emphasise the need for more reforms. The two groups, especially in the 'fifties, maintained strong political pressures on the regime which had not ended without political gains. For the first time in the history of the Arabian Gulf, Kuwait was changed into a social welfare state. People under the welfare state had the right to free education, free health services and medical care, and even subsidized houses were distributed among the low income citizens. In Kuwait the poor had access to state financial assistance, and those who sought employment were guaranteed suitable jobs. In other words, the government wanted to ensure that every citizen had the chance to improve his income and material condition. The oil revenues were channeled to benefit every citizen in Kuwait (Kouja and Sadler, 1979).

The wisdom behind government's socio-economic programmes was to establish a state that was prosperous and stable. The long-term goals were to ensure that the citizens were more dependent on their government in a way that would help to secure the regime against any internal or external threat. It was evident that the outcome of this policy was, from the government's point of view, sufficient. For example, Baz in assessing this policy wrote: "If a Kuwaiti citizen wants a loan to build his house, or medical treatment, or even a public job, the government is expected to provide that for him" (Baz, 1981, p.141). That policy succeeded to the point that made Mubarak note: "The decision of the Sabah Royal Family to diffuse Kuwaiti oil wealth throughout the society was a pragmatic, deliberate move to rally the people behind the regime" (Mubarak, 1983, p.112).

The mutual interests of the government and citizens was a political deal from which both parties greatly benefited. On the one hand, the citizens wanted access to the oil wealth, anticipating that the government was able to meet their demands if it was willing to do so. On the other hand, the government wanted the citizens to rally behind the regime and to give it their support in domestic and foreign policies, anticipating that they would be eager to do so if they were satisfied with the government. Even the nationalists, who usually severely criticised the government could not call for more reforms. In other words, the opposition was not planning to change the political system to the extent of replacing it with another. Rather, the call was to adopt more political reforms and to increase the efforts for the modernization of socio-political economic organizations.

#### THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The National Assembly in Kuwait was considered one of the most important political achievements in the history of the monarchy. The decision to establish a constituent political institution began in 1961 when Amir

Abdullah, the 'Father of Kuwait', established in the wake of Independence, a political committee to draft a constitution in order to emphasise legislation allowing the designation of a national assembly. The decision was a political U-turn because for the first time in the history of the monarchies of the Gulf, an Emirate was proceeding to elect an assembly breaking away thereby from the subtle tradition of hierarchical systems which had existed for centuries in the Gulf region.

However, from the beginning many observers had cast doubts on the actual intentions of the regime. For example, Ismael supported the general political reaction to the Amir's decision by proclaiming that the assembly was "a rubber stamp for policies set forth by the ruling class as embodied in the executive" (Ismael, 1982, p.86). With time, and after many trials and errors, the National Assembly proved independent and effective. It set up the legislative body at which most influential and important political and economic decisions were taken. The National Assembly was found to be, as Crystal noted, "an important institutional mechanism for removing the merchants from politics and replacing them with new, more controlled allies" (Crystal, 1986, p.189). Subsequently the relationship among political powers had been shaped drew on the basis of new alignments inside the National Assembly. The opponents of the regime became more organized, able to reflect their policy in the sessions of the National Assembly and in the press. In the following pages the formation and the function of the National Assembly will be analyzed. The evolution of political debates and the socio-political role played by the National Assembly will be elaborated upon. Also the new dynamics created inside the National Assembly will be illustrated in relation to the different political groups.

It was demonstrated elsewhere that with independence from British rule in 1961, the ruling family began to demand a larger share in political rule and the oil revenues. The Amir, however, was similarly eager to allow



other social groups to participate in the political and economic institutions. He adopted a scheme of transforming his regime from an hierarchy to a parliamentary monarchy in the belief that he could strike in two directions. First, by establishing the National Assembly, he could cut to size the ambitions of some of the senior members of the Royal Family as regards controlling the economy and monopolising the regime. In this way, the Amir was able to support the Royal Family without allowing them to believe that they owned the state as other families in the Gulf region did. On the other hand, he was certain that, with the National Assembly, he would be able to encourage other groups to participate in political activities on the assumption that the new state would enjoy political stability. The unstable surrounding Arab states, where nations were exhausted from political feuds and military confrontations, added to the Amir's conviction that his small, wealthy state was vulnerable and must not be thrown into unrest. The accommodation of various political groups was crucial and the National Assembly could present the supporting factor to satisfy all parties, including the veteran members of the Royal Family who could join the parliament membership as members of the Cabinet.

External circumstances, however, presented an auxiliary factor for early democratization of the Kuwaiti political system. The Iraqi threat to annexe Kuwait speeded the efforts to establish contemporary institutions. The Amir needed to mobilize the public and all political groups behind him in a vital resistance to the Iraqi claims. Such claims sent the Kuwaitis into the streets demonstrating against Iraq and insisting on their right to independence. The Amir's decision, on the other hand, shook the social balance at its highest level. The leading members of the Royal Family, for example, viewed the Amir's decision as an indication of his desire to curb their power. They understood his position as leaning towards the merchants' and nationalists' side. The Amir, however, was not in a position

to change his mind or to give in to any pressure whatsoever. In August 1961, Independence year, the Amir ordered a working team, composed of merchants, to take charge of the political transition. A constituent assembly of 20 members was selected to draw up the Constitution. Then, the following year the National Assembly held its first session. This left no doubt that the Amir had kept his promise and a new era of democratic political rule began in Kuwait.

At first most political observers in the Gulf opened widely their eyes and ears watching the new born democratic system in Kuwait. To the astonishment of many of them, the outcome of the National Assembly session did not match their expectations, nor to some extent those of the Amir. The MPs seemed not to accept the role of a rubber stamp. The regime was taken by surprise because, it had underestimated the growing power which consisted of educated Kuwaitis who had graduated from various Arab universities, mainly Egyptian and Iraqi. Among them rose the political star of Dr. Ahmed Al-Katib, the leader of the Radical Nationalists Group. According to Tariq Ismael (1970) Al-Katib was one of the first Kuwaitis from a poor family to move into the limelight of politics in Kuwait. He had studied medicine in Beirut (Lebanon) where he had met Dr. George Habash, the influential Palestinian leader. Al-Katib with Habash were the earliest founders of the Arab Nationalist movement, in the early 'fifties. From this movement, several branches were born in the early 'sixties - the National Front in Aden, South Yemen, which led the guerilla war against the British in 1963 and which after the British left Aden in 1967 took over the new independent state and is still in charge of the Republic of South Yemen. The main branch was established in Beirut mainly among the Palestinian refugees. Goerge Habash has been leading what recently has been called the Palestinian Front, a member in the coalition of the PLO.

The third branch was that of Dr. Al-Katib which was established in Kuwait. Al-Katib is the son of a member of staff in the Amir's palace. He became the first Kuwaiti personal medical consultant to the Amir. He has an influential personality to the degree that he convinced the Amir to side with the Kuwaiti public against the wishes of members of his family. He is behind the Amir's tolerance of the various political and social groups, especially the merchants and the new growing nationalists (Ismael, 1976). In the first elections for the National Assembly, he won his first parliamentary seat and with nationalist colleagues began to lead debates against the wrong deeds of the government. Throughout his political career, Al-Katib was able to reflect the position of his movement on numerous issues and to form alliances with other political groups, especially the merchants. For example, Al-Katib was able to change the merchants' opposition which had so far been highly subdued. They found in Al-Katib the mouthpiece who was capable of expressing their grievances; this was originally the mouthpiece of the nationalists.

To numerous Kuwaiti socio-political groups the National Assembly became a stage for debates similar to Speakers' Corner in Central London. Those who suffered political pressure could go and express freely not only their ideas but also their anguish against authorities elsewhere. Kuwaitis found in the National Assembly an institution which allowed them to criticise, initiate and practise political participation. The nationalists, in particular, did not limit their debates to criticisms of the executive power. Rather, they extended their campaign to include reactionaries who occupied some seats at the National Assembly and whose power began to cluster around Islamic Shar'ia as the main legitimate source for the constitution. With the increasing heat of National Assembly debates, the political groups began to polarize. The nationalists, demanded reforms held one side, while the reactionaries who reflected traditional ideas,

held the other. Both sides used the National Assembly as a battle field. The press, though in favour to some extent, of the nationalists, reflected the convictions of both camps. It was obvious from the start that the National Assembly, with its loudly sounding nationalists, had begun its sessions in high spirits. It was more independent than the architects had expected.

From this limited analysis of the socio-political structure of Kuwait, the test of power between the government and the National Assembly reveals examples of shifting alliances among different social and political groups. The political experience and the new dynamics which govern the relations among those powers were rich and politically mature. The first clash between the government and the National Assembly began in the first session, in early 1962, when the government sought a vote of confidence. The issue was the inclusion of wealthy merchants in the Cabinet. The MPs found that such inclusion would violate Article (131) of the Constitution which denies merchants the right to participate in the Cabinet because of possible conflicts of interest. Thus, while a Minister should not hold membership on the board of directors of any company, he should also not participate in any concession granted by the government (Constitution Article 131). Although the debate ended in anger when 27 MPs left the hall and the Cabinet failed to take the oath, the Amir softened the affair by lobbying and the conflict was halted with tacit concession by the MPs. The first test of power, however, showed that the Royal Family and the merchants did not have the dominant power in the National Assembly. It showed also that, despite the wealth owned by the Shaikhs and the top merchants, they were not able to confront the emerging power of the nationalists. These made the National Assembly function on their behalf, especially in the shifting powers among the Kuwaiti political groups contributing to their political demands.

Few historians and political scientists have studied the nature of the political system in Kuwait. Most of them, however, agree that the Kuwaiti National Assembly was not a rubber-stamp institution as is the case in many third world parliaments. Baz (1982), Ismael (1982), and Crystal (1986) emphasised this fact, agreeing that the National Assembly has been a socially responsible legislative institution from which most economic and social instruments were derived. Likewise, Hudson (1979) concluded that:

"The National Assembly did function as a constant and vociferous forum for criticizing the government, as a visitor to one of its meetings would quickly ascertain. Moreover, it had given an institutionalized means of expression and access to the main socio-political elements in contemporary Kuwait - the nomadic and sedentary tribes, the urban merchants and businessmen, and the politicized, nationalist intellectuals and professionals."

(Hudson, 1979, pp.185-186)

From the beginning, Kuwaiti MPs evinced a mature understanding of many tough issues, such as security, the oil wealth, and development. For example, in 1963 a group of MPs pressed the government to end the defence treaty with Britain in preparation for Kuwait to join the ongoing treaty between Egypt, Syria and Iraq. In 1964, too, the MPs fought the government and, as mentioned before, were able to stop the Cabinet oath of confidence by a whole month, demanding the elimination of merchants from the Cabinet. Fighting oil companies was another great achievement of the National Assembly and the state of Kuwait owes to its MPs the full scale ownership of the oil companies. The confrontation between the National Assembly and the government on oil issues began in 1965 with the former refusing to ratify the agreement with the oil companies. The debate reached a peak on 12th, 19th and 26th January 1965. In spite of the government's desire to approve the agreement, the National Assembly referred it to the Financial Legislative Committee for recommendations so as to secure a better deal for the State. A revised version of the agreement was submitted on 2nd May 1967, and only then was it ratified. As this victory was credited to the

National Assembly, it was also credited to the emergence of a group of radical nationalists who were the tacit power which created the solid position taken by the MPs forcing the government to press the oil companies for better deals (Stocking, 1970, p.373).

Another confrontation around the oil issue was repeated in 1972. The National Assembly again proved its independence and showed vitality and determination to play its socio-political role independently of the government or any other pressure group. The new agreement called, at the beginning, for a 50 per cent share of the oil revenues for the state of Kuwait and 50 per cent for the oil companies. It called also one per cent addition to the government's share after the duration of 10 years. The National Assembly began a new war similar to that of 1965. By May 1972, the Financial Legislative Committee had written its recommendations, asking for further terms and higher percentages for Kuwait. Thus this deal, too, was changed in favour of Kuwait, as the state's share was increased to 60 per cent, the deviation was decreased to six years, after which the government could negotiate for the takeover of the remaining shares owned by the oil companies, i.e. 40 per cent.

The National Assembly's challenge to the government was not, however, without a price. It took the government fourteen years to prepare for the final stroke on the National Assembly, when, on 29th August 1975, the Prime Minister, Shaikh Jabir Al-Ahmed, who is the Amir at present, submitted his resignation, his reasons being the absence of co-operation between his Cabinet and the National Assembly. Accordingly, Amir Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah who was the Amir then used his constitutional prerogative to dissolve the parliament and suspend four articles in the Constitution. Knowing that these dramatic changes would not pass without criticism from the press, the Amir issued a decree on the Law of Publication restricting the freedom of the press (Kuwait Al-Youm No. 1087, 30, 9, 1976). The Amir charged the

National Assembly with exploiting democracy, freezing most legislation and using the constitution as a means for realizing personal gain (Ibid, p.5). This was further expounded upon by the Prime Minister who accused the press of misusing its freedom and of becoming a forum for different political groups internal and external which led to the deterioration of brotherly relationships between Kuwait and other Arab states (Middle East Economic Survey, 44, 3, 9, 1976). It was understood, however, that the main reason for the decision was the harsh criticism from the National Assembly and the press for the Syrian decision to send its troops to Lebanon, and under external pressure the unfortunate decision was made (Baz, 1981, p.219).

The suspension of democracy extended nearly five years during which the press kept pressing for the resumption of the Assembly, by running frequent editorials, conducting interviews, and exhorting notable Kuwaitis to participate in the discussions on the democratic life. In May 1979, when, as mentioned before, thirty members of the Assembly submitted, to the Heir Apparent/Prime Minister, a memorandum calling for the immediate restoration of parliamentary rule. Crown Prince Saad Al-Abdullah was criticized for being the main force behind the resumption of the National Assembly. He ordered a committee to review the Constitution and called for elections in February 1981. The elections led to an imbalance of power in the National Assembly. The majority in the Assembly went to the Islamic fundamentalists who immediately started a campaign calling for the establishment of the Sharia Islamic law as the basis of the constitution, exhorting Kuwaiti women to wear the veil, and asking for a ban on alcohol including that for foreign diplomats in Kuwait. Fundamentalist MPs kept up the momentum by expanding support for Islamic financial houses, like the Islamic Funds. The government however was planning a hard stroke when it influenced the electoral results, even determined it. In the election of 1985, the fate of the Fundamentalist group was decided. The majority at this time went to

the nationalists and those loyal to the regime. These results which were announced in February 1985 showed that 85 per cent of the former MPs most of whom were Muslim fundamentalists had lost. The new Assembly included 28 new MPs, with the nationalists taking five seats and the government maintaining a great majority of the Bedouin and loyalists.

But it was not possible to predict that such a majority would be vulnerable and easily drawn away by the minority nationalist representatives. These last, who represent the Kuwaiti intellectuals, maintained the opposition role with their influence spreading to other MPs day by day. It took the government one year and four months to lose its majority and patience as well. For the first time in the short history of Kuwait, the National Assembly managed to force the resignation of the Minister of Justice, Shaikh Salman Al-Douij, a member of the Royal Family. He was forced to resign following parliamentary accusations that he had abused his authority. It was considered, as the Financial Times noted "a public humiliation of the man who had long been a close friend and adviser to Shaikh Jabir Al Ahmad, the Amir and the head of state" (Financial Times, 3.7.86, p.2). In July 1986, the National Assembly demanded the investigation of three government ministers, including Shaikh Ali, a member of the Royal Family and the Oil Minister. On 3rd July the same year, the Amir dissolved the parliament saying that the nation was the target of a destructive foreign conspiracy. He said, in a televised speech -

"Democracy is shaking, the situation is critical and the series of terrorism will continue until everyone co-operates against the enemies of the homeland. Its security has been exposed to a fierce foreign conspiracy which threatened lives and almost destroyed the wealth of the homeland."

(Khalij Times, 4.7.86, [p.11])

There is hardly any doubt that the dissolution of the National Assembly has more reasons behind it. In recent years, before the dissolution of the National Assembly on 3rd July 1986, a terrorist campaign against



Kuwait was under way, exemplified, among other things, in the attempted bombing of the Amir's car. It was revealed that some of the Shi'ite Kuwaitis of Iranian origin were behind most of the terrorist attacks. The Iran-Iraq war and the financial aid given to Iraq by Kuwait led to the outrages. Iran and some Shi'ite Kuwaitis seemed partially mobilized against the regime. The conflict between the National Assembly and the government increased the latter's feelings of threat and insecurity. The dissatisfaction and disillusionment of Gulf states and other non-Gulf Arab states with the "noises of freedom" rising from Kuwait could have contributed to the decision of the Amir to dissolve the National Assembly. With this, the second only elected parliament, after the Egyptian National Assembly, disappeared from the Arab political scene.

#### THE INSTITUTIONAL AND BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM IN KUWAIT "THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS"

Our focus throughout this chapter was intended to identify the major turning points in the historical social development of Kuwait and to find out to what degree this development contributed to the transformation in the socio-political structure. In doing that one can trace three main historical periods in which structural shifts can be observed. (1) From the early eighteenth century during which the tribal federal Kuwait was established, to the British occupation which began effectively in 1899. (2) The early twentieth century to the end of World War II in which the old division of labour helped to crystallise the merchants power expressed in the two popular uprisings against the autocracy of the Amir in 1922 and in 1938. (3) From 1948 to the present, in which Kuwait secured its independence from the British in June 1961 and then established the new welfare state. Also, as our decision will show, this period saw the establishment

of the new political institutions, including the modern sophisticated mass media with the press on the top of all.

However, because of the broad nature of the chronological order of these three phases and because our purpose is to focus on, and analyse the structure of government officials, including the ruler, the executives and the bureaucrats, the following section will be dealing with the last phase and in particular with the period from 1961 to the present.

In June 1961, Kuwait became independent and sovereign, and with the declaration of the new state it seemed to enter a new era. However, difficulties generated internally and externally were to be expected. As was noted earlier in this chapter, the Iraqi from without and the political pressure by Kuwaiti Nationalists from within, presented an unexpected and sudden challenge for the new regime mainly for the dynasty of Al-Sabah the ruling family. The Iraqi's claim for sovereignty over Kuwait and the threat to annexe it was thought to be a serious threat from the north. The nationalists were very active demanding social reforms and political participation, constituting for the regime another serious threat, from inside Kuwait. It was also mentioned before, that the Amir with his close advisors, including Dr. Al-Katib the leader of the National Movement, decided to take an historical decision, to create a modern constitutional authority which turned out to be a system of government which combined autocracy and democracy. The inception of Parliament was a very significant political development which symbolised popular political participation. It was constitutionally empowered to undertake legislative tasks and to supervise the executive. The election of the Mps was another sign of acceptance of political participation by the regime, allying itself with the country's aspirations. This sudden and abrupt transformative process went on as Al-Naqeeb (1976) identified, through three specific phases:

1. The year leading to 1953 which witnessed the rise of commercial enterprise in anticipation of the great potential of the oil economy.
2. The years between 1953 and 1961 during which the emergence of the modern state system and the powerful financial oligarchy took place. The manning of both bureaucracies called for the large-scale importation of labour and trained personnel.
- (3) The years from 1961 to the present have been devoted to political stabilisation and the stabilisation of other social activities, the result of which was the emergence of the welfare state (Al-Naqeeb, 1976, p.137).

The period of socio-political rebuilding of the state, beginning with the independence, was associated with dramatic economic and social circumstances. Economically, the production of crude oil underwent a dramatic increase. It jumped from 204.9 million barrels in 1951 to 633.3 million barrels in 1961. The result was that the oil revenue provided the Kuwaiti citizens with a high annual income, free health care, subsidised housing and many other social services. It was evident that the increase in oil revenues generated capital for increased industrialisation in petrochemical, fresh water and electrical power, building materials and other varied manufacturing.

The oil wealth provided the regime with enormous means to modernise the state. This led, according to the Stanford Research Institute, to the creation of four eminent types of pressures.

1. The mere existence of the wealth required that it must be used, instead of being allowed to accumulate to no purpose. A new government apparatus, with its attendant policies and practices, had to be established to dispose of the wealth in accordance with the distribution ethics of the past and the need for new opportunities for the sort of development now possible.

2. The new wealth forced the state to cope with a series of internal and external pressures it had created. To protect itself from these pressures and demands, Kuwait had to gain international "weight". A vigorous foreign policy and a dynamic population policy helped to reduce these pressures considerably.
3. The growth rate of Kuwait's economy and the rapid expansion of the labour force required the society to reorganise its labour force patterns. The size and level of skill of the indigenous population were inadequate. As the Kuwaitis individually shared increasingly large revenues, their ability to hire foreign labour grew. Thus, a non-Kuwaiti labour force developed freely on an "as-needed" basis. With the passage of time this labour force expanded into a large discreet population.
4. The new wealth also changed cultural patterns. Traditional patterns of inter-dependence between individuals, families and sectors of the population gave way to the development of life-styles based on the growing economic independence of individuals. Increasingly, certain trends were visible: the nuclear family became more important, foreign schooling and alien patterns of thought became prominent and the individual's involvement in economic, social and recreational affairs and interests outside Kuwait grew rapidly (Stanford Research Institute, 1981, pp.111.3-4).

To sum up, with the oil wealth the need for new political structures, functionally and administratively discreet arose. With the declaration of the constitution in 1962, the powers of the Amir and the function of a new cabinet were made specific.

#### THE RULER OF THE STATE (THE AMIR)

In general, political systems in the Middle East have similar characteristics, foremost among which is that the Head of State is not a ceremonial figure, as is the case in modern Western democracies. He has the power to dissolve any political institution, including the parliament. He has the power to postpone any written law, including articles agreed upon in the Constitution. The Amir in Kuwait with the approval of the National Assembly and by the Constitution, can "exercise his powers through his ministers" (Article 55). His power derives from a wide range of exclusions from power-sharing with the National Assembly or the Cabinet.

In the Kuwait constitution, Articles defining the powers of the Head of State allow him to appoint the Prime Minister and select or relieve Cabinet Ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Through the Cabinet, the Amir actually rules the country and remains in charge of its policy. The Amir also has the power to impose sanctions or regulate the laws. The constitution has a specific deadline date, by which the Amir should confirm or reject laws submitted to him by the National Assembly (30 days in normal cases and seven days in cases of emergency). If the Amir fails to answer within that period, the law will be considered as sanctioned by the Amir and must be repromulgated (Article 65).

In the political systems of the Middle East, the source of power and the guardian of security has always been the military forces. The Amir of Kuwait is closely connected to the armed forces. He is the Commander-in-Chief of the Kuwaiti armed forces with power to dismiss officers or appoint others to strengthen his own power. This was included in Article 93. His military power allows him to declare defensive war. In the Kuwaiti constitution, however, an offensive war is not allowed (Article 94). The law gives the Amir the right to proclaim martial law, on condition that the decree is put before the National Assembly within 15 days during which MPs

should have decided to approve or not. But the most dramatic Article in the constitution is No. 106. This empowers the Amir to convene or adjourn the National Assembly. According to this Article he can adjourn the National Assembly for one month during its session. He also has the right to dissolve it and call for new elections within two months. If elections do not take place within that period, the National Assembly automatically reconvenes and carries on its functions until a new Assembly is elected (Article 107). The Amir, however, has ordered the dissolution of the National Assembly twice. In the first case, the dissolution lasted five years from 1976 to 1981. The second time was in 1986 and continues. In both cases, he used the Articles which allow him to initiate sanctions and promulgate laws to suspend the articles which impose restrictions on him, such as Article No. 107 which defines his relationship with the National Assembly in connection with any temporary suspension not exceeding two months.

To ensure a peaceful transition in the event of the Amir's death, the Constitution requires that the Heir Apparent be selected by the Amir in his lifetime. The Heir Apparent must be a descendant of Mubarak, the grandfather of the Royal Family. He must be a male, at the time he succeeds thirty years of age and in good mental health. The next Heir Apparent, according to the Constitution, must be appointed within one year from the day the Amir claims the Throne. In one specific case the Cabinet has the right to rule the state - that is if the Amir dies before appointing an Heir Apparent, the Cabinet immediately assumes the power and the duty of the Head of State. The new Amir must be chosen within eight days. (Article 60).

#### THE CABINET (EXECUTIVE)

After Independence in 1961, and the election of the National Assembly in 1962, the organization of the state required the formation of an executive power to assess the Amir and to act on his behalf in social, economic, and political matters. According to Kuwaiti laws the Cabinet determines the policy through the submission of programmes to the National Assembly. The Cabinet members in the Kuwaiti political system are considered ex-officio members in the National Assembly. They can debate and vote with one exception, i.e. if a minister is subjected to a vote of non-confidence (Article 101).

The Constitution allows the recruitment of ministers from inside and outside the National Assembly, the number of ministers not exceeding one-third the number of the National Assembly. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet members, including those without portfolio, should not exceed sixteen members to keep the National Assembly holding the power of the majority on voting. However, the Prime Minister recruits the Minister from within the social elite without need to consult the National Assembly. As shown in Table 3.3 in 1962 the number of ministers from within the Royal Family comprised 78% of the total members of the Cabinet. The rest of the ministers were entirely from the merchant class. With the development of the state and the increased role of the National Assembly an enormous shift in favour of the technocrats became evident. In the Cabinet of 1971, 2 members were from the Royal Family, 5 members from the merchants and 6 members from the technocrats. According to the Constitution, the new Cabinet must submit its programme to the National Assembly. It must be presented, by the Prime Minister, in a speech in front of the MPs. The speech must outline the actual trends and directions of domestic and foreign policy of the government (Article 98). As head of the executives the Amir is asked to attend the first session of the Assembly and make a speech

briefing the members on the achievements of the government and the plans of the Cabinet for the future (Article 104). In most annual sessions, the Prime Minister makes the speech on behalf of the Amir. The National Assembly accordingly selects a special committee to make suggestions for the text of the reply to the Amir's speech. The government is required to submit to the National Assembly a financial statement including the economic situation of the state at least once every year (Article 105).

Table 3.3 The Cabinet Composition from January 1962 to March 1985

Cabinet	The Sabah Family		Merchant Family		Others		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1. January 17, 1962	11	78.5	3	21.3	-	-	14	100
2. January 28, 1963	9	64.3	4	28.6	1	7.1	14	100
3. December 6, 1964	4	28.6	7	50.0	3	21.4	14	100
4. January 3, 1965	4	30.8	5	38.4	4	30.8	13	100
5. December 4, 1965	4	33.3	4	33.3	4	33.3	12	100
6. February 4, 1967	4	28.6	6	42.8	4	28.6	14	100
7. February 2, 1971	2	15.4	5	38.5	6	46.1	13	100
8. February 9, 1975	4	26.7	5	33.3	6	40.0	15	100
9. September 6, 1976	5	27.8	6	33.3	7	38.9	18	100
10. February 16, 1978	5	27.8	6	33.3	7	38.9	18	100
11. March 4, 1981	6	37.5	3	18.8	7	43.7	16	100
12. March 3, 1985	6	40.0	5	33.3	4	26.7	15	100
	17	25.4	29	43.3	21	31.3	67	100

Source: Kamal Al-Munufi, Al-Hukumat al-Kuwaitiyya (The Kuwaiti Governments) Kuwait, Al-Rubai'an Company for Publication and Distribution, May 1985, Table 6, p.28. See also A.A.S. Baz, Political Elite and Political Development in Kuwait (The George Washington University, 1981), p.173.

Kuwait has adapted the parliamentary system in a particular way. In Kuwait, the Constitution allows recruitment from inside and outside the National Assembly. When it comes to a vote of confidence, the National Assembly does not have the right to vote against the whole Cabinet. It can, however, vote against individual Cabinet members, but excluding the



Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the National Assembly can declare that it is unable to co-operate with the Prime Minister, leaving the decision to the Amir. He could ask the Prime Minister to dissolve the National Assembly and call for new elections. He could also relieve the Prime Minister of his office and appoint a new Cabinet. The second choice seems improbable. It has been the National Assembly that has been dissolved twice.

#### BUREAUCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

An oil rich, independent, constitutional monarchy subject to external threat, pressured by internal socio-political demands, the new state of Kuwait set for a policy of rapid economic and political changes. To execute this an effective and efficient public bureaucracy was essential. The public bureaucracy was to become the main provider of jobs for Kuwaiti citizens. The economic resource capabilities to undertake development were expressed in the Five Years Development Plans of 1967-72 and 1977-81. The first plan put the emphasis on five main objectives:

1. The aim is to achieve an accelerating rate of economic growth consistent with the rate of population growth. At the same time, every individual should have the opportunity to earn a larger income in order to raise both his material and intellectual standing.
2. Since "inequitable distribution of national income not only conflicts with the principles of social justice and social security, but also disturbs the balance of the overall economic situation", the plan stressed the principle of ensuring "a more equitable distribution of income in order to achieve a reasonable degree of social justice and to secure a continuously dynamic economy".
3. The plan noticed that the per capita income level is closely associated with oil production. To depend continually upon oil resources would only impede the consolidation of the Kuwaiti economy on firm

foundation. The third overall objective, therefore, was "the achievement of a greater degree of diversification in the sources of Kuwaiti's national income, while at the same time, increasing the relative contribution of the non-oil sector of the economy".

4. Human skills, both in technical dexterity and scientific proficiency had been seen as the driving force behind the expansion of production capabilities. In this respect the plan linked society's progress with indigenous skills and technical experience "essential for achieving a balance between society's needs and its basic economic structure". Dependence on "imported foreign skills, without a continuously increasing flow of local skills, will prove futile". Thus the fourth overall objective was "the training of human resources of Kuwaiti citizens in order to create those specialised human skills in science and technology that will be able to fulfil the development requirements of the Kuwaiti economy".
5. Since economic integration is one of the human common links between aims and destiny, "the development pattern of Kuwait should be co-ordinated with those Arab states working towards Arab economic integration and rapid economic development" (Five Year Plan, 1967, pp.1-10).

The second Five Year Development Plan, 1977-81, has echoed the same objectives, but also states them with longer term perspective in view.

1. Preservation of the state of Kuwait as part of the Arab nation and the preservation of its free democratic system.
2. Finding out diversified and developed productive alternatives to oil in the future.
3. Development of human resources and technical and professional qualifications.

4. Undertaking the necessary initiatives to deepen economic and social ties within the Arab world, with the aim of realising Arab unity and starting Gulf economic integration.
5. Consolidating an integral civilised structure and realising a balanced social development for man and society (Five Year Development Plan, 1976, p.7).

The above mentioned objectives emphasised the need for a Public Administration to be responsible for processing the social and economic development goals. In the first five year plan it was hinted that the public administrative responsibility was not only restricted to the traditional concern for law and order and the protection of public interests, it would need to be directed to cover all forms of public conduct as this relates particularly to economic and social objectives involved in the development process (First Five Year Development Plan, 1967, p.151).


The second five year plan stated the crucial factor in development plans as being the human element. It stated that the success of the plan depended on the capacities of the country's human resources to utilise available material resources in the most political and economic cost-effective ways.

There were no doubts that the traditional administration was unable to cope with the demanding social and political aspirations. This was gradually superseded by an enlarged and increasingly experienced bureaucracy, based on cadres trained in the ways of modern administration.

The old Supreme Council of the 1950s was replaced by a Council of Ministers as chart 3.1 shows. The Ministry is divided into three major categories:

- (i) Ministries of sovereignty, e.g. Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice.

Chart 3.1 The Re-Organisation of the Government of Kuwait, as of January 1963



Source: Saif Abbas Abdulla, Politics, Administration and Urban Planning in a Welfare Society: Kuwait, Indiana University, Ph.D., 1973, p.238


- (ii) Ministries of services: most having direct contact with the public by rendering indispensable services, e.g. Health, Education, Electricity and Water, Communications, Housing, Social Affairs and Labour.
- (iii) Ministries of development, which includes most of the service ministries in addition to the Ministry of Planning, Oil, Finance, Commerce and Industry.

Expansion of the bureaucracy was prominently in response to demands for new and improved public services and for development initiatives. However, the form and structure of the administration and ministries within it had to be adapted to enlarging state roles. A huge number and complexity of public bureaucratic agencies was involved as shown in Chart 3.2.

It is clear from the above presentation that unlike any other oil exporting country, Kuwait endeavoured to reinvest her oil revenues in a diversified portfolio of modern state services and development functions. A successful and experienced mercantile class combined with spreading political awareness and social aspiration in the community to urge the country towards modernist and developmental goals. However, as the social structure of Kuwait differentiated into major groups, definable more clearly in terms of socio-economic characteristics (notably their access to and command over the burgeoning wealth of the country) so the social configuration of the government officials and the public service has become an issue of increasing significance. We shall come also to see that this issue is relevant to government-media relations.

Government officials are taken to include the Amir, The Ruling Family and the members of the Cabinet, or the Ministers, and by extension, the most senior bureaucratic officials who rank next below the ministers. Based on this understanding we will proceed to introduce our discussion in

Chart 3.2 The Organisational Structure of the State of Kuwait, as of November 1983



Source: The Civil Service Commission al-Haykal al-Ianzimi Li al-Dawla  
(The Organisational Structure of the State, November 1983)

response to the first question; as to the social configuration of this group.

Let us examine, first of all, the phenomenon of social power and take into account the conceptualisation of the three variables of social power produced by Bierstedt (1967). Those are:

- Concomitants, including prestige, dominance and influence.
- Forms, including latent (potential power), force (manifest power) and authority (institutionalised power).
- Sources, including numerical strength (numbers), social organisations (organised power) and resources (property and wealth).

Each social group is assumed to receive a certain share of prestige (significant or limited) which is a form of evaluation associated with rank. The judgement will express a perception of a social stratum and an evaluation of it in the general social image of the group (Al-Naqeeb, 1976). Prestige and so ranking, is a concomitant of power, including wealth, by processes by which the power is converted to sources and forms of power (Weber, 1958).

The growth of bureaucracy is a process of institutionalising power (Dahrendorf, 1968). This takes place in both the formal (public) and informal (private business, parties, unions, etc.) sectors. Separately and together a concentration of power-holding occurs, set off from the general social system. Power correlates with occupation. Social rank and status, the possession of prestige, converts into power by gain of access to office and control of it. The effect is both individual and group-aggregative.

The distribution of social power tends to be standardised along the lines of a certain established stratification order, the bureaucratic expansion reinforces the structural forms of inequality. The stratification system is reinforced. For example, Marshall suggests that "It would be rash to conclude that class has been losing its importance, but it may

be true that it has been changing its character" (Marshall, 1972, p.632). The change in the class charter, he believes, due to the political factor, consists in a detachment from social stratification in the "old sense". This argument explains the current trends of power concepts which contends that the growth and expansion of the modern bureaucracy is producing a new political bureaucratic class which is not economically determined.

Politically, the authority of the Amir, though absolute is buttressed by tribal values which require not only acquiescence but also consensus. The Amir and the ruling family endeavour to maintain their authority by retaining the Kuwaiti traditions and values, which include their reign over the country. Accordingly, although they encouraged gradual changes towards modernisation, there were definite limits beyond which social, political or economic changes could not be permitted to go. The ruling family are basically conservative, encouraging only those changes which fit into their perceptions of the country. They suppose themselves to know the interests of the country better than anyone else, demonstrated in their retaining key government positions, championing conservative causes and undertaking only conservative changes consistent with the perpetuation of the Kuwait they have ruled too long which keep them entrenched as the country's rulers. Their authority is therefore retained not by oppression and conversion, but by appealing to a set of traditions and values entrenched in a continuing tribal ethos. As far as they are concerned, Kuwait would not be what it is without them; a view which is not uncommon among the majority of Kuwaitis.

Thus, just as it has been from the beginning of Kuwait as an autonomous Emirate (especially since Mubarak), higher political matters are the prime concern of the Ruling Family. Their right to rule is based on their adaptability and success in maintaining Kuwait's integrity and providing sufficient stability to pursue the country's economic growth and wellbeing. Maintenance of the discreet ruling role was even strengthened after the



export of oil began in 1946, though not without friction and occasional confrontations. However, after independence in 1961, the democratic underpinnings of the constitution did not much affect the indisputable authority of the Amir to govern and to rule. He remained the indisputable arbiter in political matters, whether executive or legislative.

The Amir, the Ruling Family and the government have consistently maintained conservative stances on major public issues, a stance which is predicated on maintaining Kuwait's integrity and the conditions in which the other major social class, the merchants, can continue in the pursuit of their interests. The relationship between the Ruling Family and the merchants is based on a symbiosis of economic interests. The economic prosperity of the state is a growing source of wealth for the Ruling Family, a resource of more numerous and more profitable pursuits for the merchants and the distributable pool which satisfies claims to rightful shares and purchases support for the regime among the people.

As in other modern monarchies, the influence of the Kuwaiti sovereign and the Ruling Family is mediated largely, though not exclusively, through a bureaucratic organisation of government officials whose upper echelons the ruler appoints and who serve his pleasure. They usually become the mouthpiece of the government, and consequently, identify with the sovereign's conservative orientation. Their contact with and influence on the media is an extension of his. Nor is this influence left to chance. In Kuwait the Crown Prince maintains a regular relationship with the journalists and meets with them occasionally to brief them about the position of the government on the issues of the day. These meetings not only constitute a formulation of the news of the day, they may also result in instigating editorials and debates.

As if this mechanism is not enough, the Minister of Information, who is usually a member of the Ruling Family, holds a weekly meeting with

journalists in his office, not only to brief them about the government's position on the issues of the day, but also to engage them in debates and discussions of these issues.

One point should be made clear. We should not conclude that the Kuwaiti government and the Ruling Family oppress the media or intimidate the journalists. As pointed out earlier, the traditional socio-political division of labour gives the Ruling Family and the government officials the right to lead and obligates the media to co-operate with them. It should be noted, however, that the journalists are not completely passive in that process. At these regular meetings both groups benefit from the exchange and discussion. This is usually frank and at times serious and occasionally blunt. Each knows the position of the other within the understanding that they can differ on the issues but only up to a certain point. Journalists are obliged to present the differing views and differing positions in the daily media with its fare of news, views and editorials. They are also obliged to present the differing views of the government and themselves in the media with openness and fairness of editorial presentation, reporting and commentary.

#### THE JOURNALISTS

The background of the development of the Kuwaiti press is a source of national pride. Rapid development in the last twenty years as a result of huge oil revenues (\$9,802.8 million in 1976) allowed many citizens, including the owners of local newspapers, to acquire tremendous wealth. They established modern media plants with the most up-to-date technology, and imported top-notch journalists from other Arab states, including Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan (see Table 3.4). Rapid improvement in the quality and availability of education produced more educated people and increased the demand for news and information, mainly through the press

Table 3.4 Labour Force in the Mass Media by Nationality  
-- Census 1975 --

NATIONALITY	AUTHORS & JOURNALISTS	ELECTRICAL ELECTRONIC & CINEMA TECHNICIANS	PRINTERS & RELATED WORKERS
Kuwait	48	1,331	389
Iraq	11	479	43
Saudi Arabia	1	58	4
Yemen North & South	2	108	25
Jordan & Palestine	82	2,163	319
Syria	29	542	29
Lebanon	22	371	47
Egypt	47	396	87
Sudan	4	13	2
North Africa	1	10	-
Other Gulf Arabs	-	62	13
Other Arabs	-	3	-
<b>Total Arabs</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>5,536</b>	<b>958</b>
Iran	-	804	21
Pakistan	6	1,449	24
India	5	867	76
Other Asians	1	32	1
Other Africans	-	2	1
U.K.	-	10	-
France	-	2	-
Other Europeans	1	6	-
U.S.A.	1	1	-

since the electronic media (TV and radio) and government-owned. The Law of Publication permitted outspokenness, diversity and even criticism of the government and its policies to a wide range of publications.

The role of non-Kuwaiti Arab journalists could be recognised by comparing the limited role played by the press during the 1950s with, for example, the strongly established role of the press in the 1960s. Abd Allah (1985) points out some reasons behind the press's failure at first to fulfil its social and political tasks. First, in the '50s most political developments and spectacular events took place in the northern part of the Arab World in Cairo (Egypt), Bagdad (Iraq) and Damascus (Syria). Cairo had been the centre for Arab nationalism, which fostered the spirit of the new resistance to British and French colonial power and the challenge to Western interests in the Arab World. At that time, Kuwait, as a British colony, had no relations or linkages with other Arab states. As a consequence, the Kuwaiti press had no direct access to Arab news, nor had Kuwaiti journalists placed themselves, while under British occupation, in the current of the Arab political stream.

Secondly, the circulation of newspapers was very limited. In some cases, the number of issues could be counted in hundreds and merchants felt no desire or inclination to advertise in those newspapers. Many papers were thus doubtfully viable.

Thirdly, newspaper owners resisted the idea of publishing daily newspapers. Their policy was not to indulge in such costly projects which demanded high investments of money and time. Besides, most owners relied on journalists who were lacking in professionalism; they were part-time journalists attached to other jobs which they viewed as primary, whereas their press work was merely part-time.

Fourthly, before independence in 1961, Kuwait did not even own a single printing press. It was not unusual for periodicals and other publi-

cations to be printed in Lebanon and from there to be sent by air to Kuwait. The cost of printing, together with frequent delays, caused many newspapers to cease publication and go out of business; of such were Al-Rayed (The Leader) and Al-Eman (The Faith) which ceased publication respectively in 1954 and in 1955 (Abd Allah, 1985).

Finally, the merchant owners of newspapers were on the whole without political ambitions or ideological commitment. Furthermore, they were mostly half-educated men who had established newspapers for personal prestige and status. The relationship between those owners and the press was so feeble that they, not infrequently, would cease publication at the least provocation at the first sign of possible confrontation with the political authorities or the first sign of financial loss.

With the independence of Kuwait in 1961, a new press was established which was highly interested in political issues. Thus at first, newspapers such as Al-Ray Al-Am and Kuwait Times were politically oriented. Because the majority of journalists were non-Kuwaiti Arabs and because of the far-reaching freedom of the press, newspapers and magazines differed in ideology from the Marxist radical to the religiously and politically conservative.

But the real story of the press in Kuwait began in the mid-seventies when many notable Arab journalists made their way to Kuwait and to other Gulf states. Their ambition was to join the Gulf media where higher salaries were given and personal security was guaranteed, conditions less likely in their home states. The journalists who immigrated to Kuwait were mainly from Egypt, Syria, Iraq with some highly professionals from Lebanon.

There is an Arab expression equivalent to the English, "One man's meat is another man's poison". The expression was often used to describe how the Lebanese civil war (1976 up to the present) brought about significant consequences. The Arabic expression says: "Disaster for some are gains for

others". It describes the losses that the Lebanese suffered in lives and capital on the one hand and on the other, the benefits that the other Arab states, especially in the Gulf, gained. The Kuwaiti press has had a share in those gains when Lebanese professional and highly trained journalists left Lebanon to join in large numbers the daily newspapers in Kuwait. (Al-Watan, 18.3.86., p.13). It was clear from the first day of the war that among the Lebanese factions their main targets included: newspapers' headquarters. This led in 1976 to the murder of two chief editors. As a result, the majority of Lebanese journalists emigrated to London and Paris to start new Arabic publications, or in the case of many skilled writers, reporters and printers, they went to the Gulf. In Kuwait the new Arab media migrants were welcome. According to the Kuwait census of 1975, the numbers of authors and journalists working in the Kuwaiti press in 1975, were 247. Of these 200 were recent immigrants. More recent statistics of the number of journalists is lacking. Personal interviews, however, have revealed that in Al-Anba daily there are more than 80 editors, reporters and section-directors. In Al-Qabas, apart from its international correspondents, the numbers of staff including those of the international edition published in London is more than 180 journalists.

The figures in Table 4.6 show, however, that the majority of non-Kuwaiti Arab journalists were of Palestinian origin. Among 199 non-Kuwaiti Arab journalists in 1975, the numbers of Palestinian journalists were 82 or 45%. Second come the Egyptians who numbered 47 journalists or 23%, the Syrians who numbered 29 journalists, the Lebanese 22 journalists and the Iraqis 11 journalists.

Because the journalists of Kuwaiti citizenship were in a minority the issue was under strong debate in 1979. The main problem was how to maintain Kuwaitization for media and manpower and what means the Ministry of Information in co-ordination with the media establishments and the Kuwaiti

University could use to persuade Kuwaiti intellectual and educated youths to accept working for the press.

In a series of interviews with editors-in-chief, intellectuals and some officials carried out by Al-Qabas in November 1979, Al-Marzouk, the editor-in-chief of Al-Anba daily expressed his desire to recruit capable Kuwaitis onto his staff. Al-Marzouk, however, voiced reservations by drawing attention to the fact that Kuwait:

"In general lacks the trained human power and in particular in the field of the media. The Law of Publication requires that the Editor-in-Chief of a press establishment must be a Kuwaiti citizen even though those Editors-in-chief are not full-time journalists. They have their private business and could not comply with a demanding career such as working for the press".

(Al-Qabas, 28.11.79)

When analysing the ideas and attitudes of the participants in discussions on the Kuwaitization of the press, it was found that there were two different attitudes and two different suggestions. For example, some Kuwaitis, especially those who represented the Government's views together with some high-ranking and senior Kuwaiti journalists in the conservative news organisations, tended to emphasise the need for urgent short and long-term plans to allow Kuwaitis to replace non-Kuwaiti Arab journalists. The assumption here is that such goals could be achieved by increasing financial rewards to Kuwaiti youths eager to join the press. The financial factor draws its importance from the fact that private work and business ventures are usually sources of more profit than working in the press. Therefore the supporters of Kuwaitization called for increasing monthly salaries in the first place and in the meantime for establishing academic training as a part of the Kuwait University Educational programmes. Al-Omar, the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Information has reflected the need for urging Kuwaitis to join the press. He emphasised the need for educational programmes in an interview published in Al-Qabas:

"The University of Kuwait must do its best to meet the need of the government and the whole society for educated and professional Kuwaitis in Mass Communication. The Ministry of Information has supported, from the beginning, the idea of establishing a mass communication department within the University, because it understands the fact that a strong mass media needs an academic programme and high scientific training. Such programmes will help to supply the government's information departments and the press establishments with professional and well-trained journalists from within Kuwait.

(Al Qabas, 29.11.79)

The second attitude is that of some pan-Arab nationalists who view the question of Kuwaitizing the press as a narrow-minded approach created by those who tend to impose segregation on non-Kuwaiti Arabs. The editors of Kuwaiti radical newspapers opposed the idea of replacing Arab journalists with Kuwaitis, arguing that the professionalism in the media has no identity or citizenship. They based their argument on the conviction that the gain was mutual, i.e. just as Arab journalists might gain from their work in Kuwaiti news organisations, the Kuwaiti press scores higher financial and reputational profits by having those journalists working there. A radical view was introduced by Al-Salih, the Chief Editor of Al-Watan at that time. He argued that:

"It is not ideal, rather impossible, to believe in the Kuwaitization of the press in Kuwait, both in the short or the long run. Because of the nature of the press and the social structure in which the Kuwaiti population consists of many citizenships with national Kuwaitis as a minority, it would be unrealistic to take such a plan for granted.

(Ibid, 1.11.79)

Since this debate took place in 1979 there does not seem to be any evidence whatsoever of an increase in the number of Kuwaitis in the press organizations. Also, it was not until last year, 1987, that the Faculty of Arts in Kuwait University began a mass communication programme of four years.

In a traditional society in transit from a tribal system to a modern, urbanised society, like Kuwait, it is not unexpected for social sectors to experience disagreement on the issues of development. The issue of the Kuwaitization of the press agitated a political debate which seemed to span



several social and political issues. For example, it raised the question of the relations between local citizens and non-Kuwaiti Arabs; it also activated regionalism versus pan-Arab nationalism and consideration of the way non-Kuwaiti Arabs were treated in Kuwait. And finally it raised the issue of the availability of Kuwaiti citizens to replace non-Kuwaiti Arabs, particularly those in the media.

When it comes to the presence of Arab professionals many pan-Arab Kuwaiti nationalists defended their cause upholding their right to work and benefit from the oil wealth. Just as Al-Salih quoted above, cast doubt on the ability of Kuwaitis to fill the vacancy for media professionalism, many other intellectuals put the matter in a scholarly perspective. For example, Fatima Al-Ali, a Kuwaiti scholar, wrote:

"Now and after we agreed not to allow the Kuwaiti press to shrink or be reduced to the size of a Kuwaiti Deshdashah (Arab men's white robe) we need to emphasise the fact that our country is in desperate need of Arab writers who give Kuwait sincerely of their talents and creative minds. We have to admit that without their professionalism it would not be possible for our press to achieve the popularity and confidence it enjoys among other Arab press. Therefore, it is not just to call for the Kuwaitization of the press, rather it will be just to call for Arabizing it, by encouraging enrolment of more and more Arab journalists into our media organisations".  
(Al-Qabas, 31.12.79)

Al-Ali and other nationalists, with her enthusiastic supportive tone for the presence of the Arab journalists in the Kuwait media, thus fostered the social status of those journalists in the face of an aggressive attitude against foreign journalists by the government and a few jealous Kuwaitis who hate to see other Arabs sharing the oil revenues and the popularity of the media. The relationship between Kuwaiti nationalists who have been defined before as scholars, professionals, teachers, professors, writers, and the intellectuals, on the one hand, and journalists on the other, provides the basis on which the latter used to place themselves in the social spectrum in Kuwait. Two social factors, however, contributed to the security of Arab journalists in the midst of these conflicting social

tendencies, i.e. the press, with its tremendous political influence which permitted supportive voices like Al-Salih to spell out their views contradicting the government and other Kuwaitis who tended to humiliate Arab journalists, and secondly, the pan-Arab attitude which none of the Kuwaitis, at least publicly, could deny or resist.

Al-Rumaihi is one of the most popular scholars in Kuwait, a Ph.D. holder besides being the Chief Editor of Al-Arabi magazine, and a Kuwaiti citizen, in a symposium entitled "A discussion of Press, Democracy and Arabism" led by Ghali Shukery, a popular Arab liberal writer from Egypt working for Al-Watan Al-Arabi, a magazine published in Paris, Al-Rumaihi analysed the role of the journalists in Kuwait and the position they actually occupy in the socio-political structure. His argument was based on certain elements which regulate the actual dynamics of the press and of the major part of the press personnel composed mainly of non-Kuwaiti Arabs. Those elements according to Al-Rumaihi are:

1. That the press in Kuwait are an additional socio-political power which has orchestrated itself with the National Assembly, both thereby functioning as a spur to development in Kuwait, guiding the democratic process and guarding the constitutional system. This relation, however, is occasionally subject to certain conflicts, sometimes because of the fact that a small society like Kuwait emerging recently from a tribal social base must be subject to side effects which demand closer control and sometimes because of conflicting interests among the heads of each institution. It is obvious, nevertheless, that the two continually watch over each other, with the National Assembly usually bound to give advice to the press in case of overstepping the limits of criticism. Similarly on the other side, the press draws the attention of the Assembly in cases where it overlooks the extent of democratic practices and parliamentary norms. The press was, as always,

the watchdog for social awareness, reporting social events through which the MPs could see the very small details of the movement of society.

2. At least up to the present, the press has not reflected the economic interests of any one party, or if it did, such an item would not be part of its priorities. The logic behind this assumption is that the financial background of the owners of the media seems to be fairly similar. The differences are in the social and political backgrounds of those owners. Therefore, because the per-capita income in Kuwait in general is extremely high and the sophisticated national services, education and health care and housing are mostly free, the financial factor becomes secondary and of no importance. The diversity in the Kuwaiti press, therefore, is not based on differences in economic interests, rather it is based on the ideals of the people and the capacity of Kuwait to adopt the ideological currents and to test their applicability in the society. Such characteristics might provide the reason for the puzzling composition of journalists with different ideological backgrounds working in one newspaper, where the Nasserists, the Muslim Brotherhood and Arab nationalists work side-by-side in an interesting mosaic in one and the same media organisation.
3. Major political events have taken place in the last thirty years in the Middle East, and the Arab World has had the lion's share of political unrest. Al-Rumaihi, among others, believes that the political attitudes of that unrest acquired different magnitude. He points out that:

"Some of those uprisings tended to discredit its citizens and found the courage to expel them out of their home lands. Those Arab citizens had found in the Gulf a warm welcome then the passion because of the Arabic ties and the simple nature of the Gulf citizens, also because of their admiration and enthusiasm for modernisation. In this content the chance was wide open for the Arab intellectuals to exercise

creativity also for the manpower to work honourably in this generous land. In such a social atmosphere, liberalism found supportive circumstances and the socio-political mosaic of the different ideological backgrounds may have, for the first time, experienced in Kuwait, a peaceful development in peaceful exchange of ideas and discussion".

Al-Rumaihi concludes that:

"In my judgement the Kuwaiti press is proceeding towards maturity in both the editorial and the technical sides. This could be differently achieved as long as the staff in the press organisation includes professionals, personnel with bright minds from within and outside Kuwait. Thanks to the Arab mind which has generously contributed to Kuwait's intellectual life by means of Arab intellectuals who work in Kuwait and Arab writers who contribute to the media content from other Arab countries. Both groups are participating in the modernisation projects taking place in Kuwait."

(Al-Watan, 18.3.86, p.13)

The location of journalists in the social structure is to a large extent governed by the fact that they are on the whole expatriate Arabs firmly supported by some Kuwaitis, especially the intellectuals, literates, radicals and nationalists. They also found strong support from the owners and editors of the press organisations. Such support was strong enough to set the tone for the press content which happens to be critical of government policies in many ways, diverse in views and most of the time aggressive in presenting the issues in contention with the government.

Analysis of the internal characteristics of the journalist group and its placement in the political and social system of Kuwait would not be complete without accounting for the journalists' own view of their position. To do this I conducted several interviews with top journalists in Kuwait, the findings of these will be discussed in Chapter VI. The assumption of an active role by journalists has been exhibited in the conservative, neutral and liberal newspapers. The criterion they followed was that the policy of presenting issues in the media depends on the nature of the issues. In general the government avoids dictating policy. This is not uncommon in traditional systems. But, on the other hand, there were

implied limits to the freedom of the press and the frontiers of publication. In other words, as one journalist put it, "journalists understand that if the government decides to take a certain position on the issues then journalists must follow the line". This notion, however, falls short of the whole truth and does not fit the efforts to draw a theoretical generalisation for the relation between journalists and other socio-political groups in Kuwait, especially the government. The reason is that journalists do not have the solid structure of political parties for instance, nor even that of certain other social groups such as the nationalists or the merchants. In interviews with notable journalists I have noticed that there are sub-groups among the community of journalists, the conservative expatriate journalists, the liberal expatriates and similarly both conservative and liberal Kuwaiti journalists. It must be noted, however, that this ideological division has no relation to or connection with the ideological background of the press organisations in terms of their general trend, whether conservative or liberal, because it is not uncommon to meet liberal journalists or supporters of nationalists working in conservative newspapers and vice-versa.

It might be pertinent, here, to elaborate on the journalists' sub-grouping among expatriate conservative journalists working in large numbers in Al-Ray Al-Am, Al-Sayasah and Al-Anba newspapers. According to the managing editor of Al-Sayasah the members of this sub-group define their position on any issue in terms of definitions given by the government. They relate themselves professionally to the government, assuming that, as the same managing editor has put it, their duty is bound by the semi-weekly occasions on which the Kuwaiti government invites journalists to the Ministry of Information. Under the title of News Brief the Ministry dictates the policies covering local and foreign news. This relation in his views does not have a negative impact on the freedom of the press. It is part of

the mutual understanding of the particular relationship between different political institutions including the press in which the Amir orchestrates the national concerts. He and only he is in a position to harmonise the relation between all political and social institutions (Managing Editor, Al-Sayrasah).

Such an approach is supported by many conservative Kuwaiti journalists and in particular by the owners and editors of the press organisations. For example, Al-Marzouk, the Chief Editor of Al-Anba considered the relationship between the government and the press as a prime example of the integration among Kuwaiti citizens which has long been reflected in the popular slogan: "All Kuwaitis are members of one Kuwaiti family" He believes that this prevents the press from making mistakes as happens occasionally in some Western newspapers which thrive on scandals and inflammatory reports intended at times to embarrass politicians and businessmen (Al-Marzouk, Chief Editor, Al-Anba).

The second sub-group is the liberal journalists who occupy strong newspapers and magazines. According to a conservative journalist, the Managing Editor of Al-Sayrasah, most journalists are well-known to be radical Arabists and, therefore, present the same radical positions in the newspapers most of the time. The radical journalists generally gathered in two major newspapers, namely: Al-Watan and to some extent Al-Qabas. Another strong base for them is Al-Talia magazine which has developed a position against the government over many years reflecting the views of Kuwaiti nationalists and adopting many radical Arab views in addition to its accommodation for many Arab radical writers.

It has already been recorded that the relation between the Arab expatriates and the Kuwaiti nationalists had been developed in the 'fifties during the awakening of Arab nationalism. Therefore, liberal journalists coming from other Arab states had the courage to include much of their

convictions in the Kuwaiti press. This made the Kuwaiti press appear critical of its own governments while, in fact, the regime was not. Both non-Kuwaiti Arabs and Kuwaitis devoted most of their writing to investigate the proper bases on which a state could rely. Other issues of importance were suitable socio-political and economic changes which would allow the people to share equally the oil wealth and to enjoy political participation in free elections and democratic institutions. Also, pan-Arab policy of support for the Palestinian cause and sharing in the struggle against Arab enemies, especially Israel and the U.S., featured in liberal and radical journalism. The relation between liberal journalists and the government is defined by Mohammed Al-Saad, a liberal journalist and Managing Editor of Al-Talia magazine who is Palestinian by origin. In an interview, he said that the failure of the press to emphasise an objective stand on the issue is part of the fact that journalists are similar to other Arab expatriates who are mostly concerned about their jobs and how to secure them. Journalists, therefore, in Al-Saad's view, have no intellectual impact in Kuwait; they fear participation in the intellectual battle of defending freedom in Kuwait. They are mostly passive. It was his assessment of the role which journalists play in the country's socio-political affairs that for him cast a strong doubt on their viability to mobilise themselves to defend the freedom of the press against government efforts to control it. Al-Saad argues that:

"The expatriate journalist is required to be a machine or a typewriter with keyboards which could be pressed by the newspaper's owner to product the material which the owner wants to see."  
(Al-Saad, Managing Editor, Al-Talia)

Al-Saad believes, however, that the Kuwaiti press is much freer and influential than any other Arab press. But this is "based on a comparison between complete darkness and a spot of light at the end of a long dark tunnel" (Ibid).

Obviously Kuwaiti journalists have a wider margin of freedom and self-confidence; they are at least secure against harsh punishments such as losing their jobs or facing expulsion from Kuwait. Similarly, intellectuals who contribute to the press on a freelancing basis from Kuwait and abroad, have the courage to raise sensitive issues and to contradict the authority's point of view. Such a fact made Ali Al-Hashim, a popular columnist in Al-Watan to conclude that:

"The press gets its news from official sources, but the journalists strive to produce opinions that mostly contradict that opinion of government officials. (But) There are some issues on which all journalists, citizens and non-citizens avoid, wider discussion or elaborations. Journalists do not wish to undermine the efforts taken by government to keep order, especially in matters of security."  
(Al-Hashim, Al-Watan)

In this chapter the development of Kuwait was traced from its very early beginning to the present. Special attention was given to the conditions which led to the emergence and formation of different social groups which play definite roles in the balance of power in contemporary Kuwait.

It was shown that the power of the Royal Family was sustained by maintaining the balance between the Bedouins, the merchants and the nationalists. It was also shown that the press occupied an important social position, in that it served as the main base through which the liberal influence of the nationalists was exerted and translated into pressure on the government - which was generally conservative. The journalists have also played a central role by espousing liberal positions on the issues, mainly those related to modernisation, but reflecting the conservative position of the government on others.

Since the Kuwaiti press and the journalists who work in it constitute a central institution in contemporary Kuwait, it would be useful to provide an elaborate analysis of the rise and development of the Kuwaiti press and to examine the relationship between the press and the power structure, including the government. This will be presented in the following chapter.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE KUWAITI PRESS : STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT

The first part of this chapter deals with the Kuwaiti press. A historical background is presented beginning with the first newspaper ever published in the 1920s and ending with current crises which led in 1986 to direct control of the press and pre-printing censorship by the government for the first time. The second part analyses the relationship between the press and other socio-political institutions, particularly the government. It illustrates examples of efforts to persuade the press to reflect the government's views, and the measures taken by the government to minimize the press criticism of the regime. But to begin with, a brief introduction to the Arab press, to which the Kuwaiti press is related, will be presented.

#### THE ARAB PRESS

The Arab press has always had strong connections with other components of the Arab culture. From the beginning, newspapers published in the Arab world were found to have established a very rich tradition. They tended, since the first newspapers appeared in Egypt in the 1820s, to facilitate the dissemination of Arab literature, poetry, tales rhetoric and social stories (Marua, 1961).

The development of the Arab press has been riddled with problems from the very beginning. For instance, Rough (1979) found that economic, political and cultural factors influenced and shaped the Arab media in three ways. First, the limited financial resources of the major Arab newspapers led them to seek government subsidies as well as financial gifts from private sources. On the other hand, because of the perceived importance of

those newspapers, politicians were encouraged to patronise the emerging Arab press. Secondly, the Arab press has become very fragmented in different ways, partly because of the extreme ideological differences among political systems of the Arab states and among the patrons of the press itself. It is fragmented too because of the emergence of the press in Arab countries at different times. For example, most Arab newspapers limit circulation within the country of origin, and difficulties of transportation, and the eagerness of governments to keep their printed media from being controlled by other countries led to this fragmentation.

A third factor is the tendency for newspapers to concentrate in highly populated areas and to be attached to centres of political discussions and the quarters of news making. Although transportation has recently been improved and education is more widely spread, Arab newspapers are still concentrated in the cities. It is rare to hear about any newspaper registered in the countryside of any Arab state. Furthermore, political control, economic constraints, and the lack of professional journalists constitute the main problems of the Arab press. These factors slowed down the development of the Arab press, limited its achievements, stunted its growth and lowered its status among the international media.

These factors, affecting the development of the Arab press, make it difficult to put the Arab media into conventional classifications. Thus, Rough noticed that the Arab press system did not fit any of the four categories used by Siebert et al (1956). The Arab press could not be considered authoritarian, libertarian, socially responsible or totalitarian. "The Arab media do not fit neatly and completely into any one of those categories. There are some elements of all four present in the Arab world" (Rough, 1979, p.25).

Rough added that the Arab press could be listed under three sub-types. The first type is the press of the Republics of Egypt, Syria, Algeria,

Libya, Iraq, the Sudan and the South Yemen. In these countries the media are nationalised and the regimes have mobilised the media in a systematic way so that all news treatment have to be guided by the authorities and the content must reflect the government positions and the regimes goals.

Secondly come the presses of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. In these countries the press has undergone considerable development in structure and function. The growth in per-capita income as well as education led to a similar increase in the number of publications and the size of circulations. This sophistication, however, has been subject to government control and censorship; hence journalists are requested to follow a line drawn by government.

The third and final type of Arab press is the Lebanese, the Kuwaiti and the Moroccan press. This type has enjoyed a high degree of diversity, freedom of expression and private ownership. Within this type, the Kuwaiti press reached a considerable reputation, especially after the independence of Kuwait in 1961. During the independence period, oil revenues increased, the investment in education was multiplied several times over, and the growth of the economic and social sectors led to increasing demands for alien labour, Arab and non-Arab. Such dramatic changes, beside the modernisation of the political institutions, created the need for a modern Kuwaiti press. Thanks to the flood of journalists from other Arab nations - Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and the Sudan, who emigrated to Kuwait hoping for a better life - the task of producing a press of high quality and style in Kuwait was made easier, to the extent that it became the strongest amongst all Arab presses.

#### EARLY FOUNDATION OF KUWAITI PRESS

The Kuwaiti press developed along lines slightly different from those governing the growth of the Arab press elsewhere, perhaps mainly because it assumed a pan-Arab orientation from the outset. Actually, the press of Kuwait began early in the 1920s when Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Rashid, a Kuwaiti intellectual graduated from Al-Azher University in Cairo, and in June 1928 published Al-Kuwait magazine. The magazine was printed in Cairo, Egypt, because at that time Kuwait had no printing facilities. It dealt mainly with religious, historical, artistic, linguistic and literary matters and was subsidised by Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah, the Amir of Kuwait at that time, who was a man of letters himself (Badr et al., 1977, P.103).

Al-Kuwait was in print for only two years, however, when the editor (Sheikh Al-Rashid) went into partnership with an Iraqi, Younis Bahri, and they published another monthly magazine entitled Al-Kuwaiti Wa Al-Iraqi. This latter ceased publication following the death of Al-Rashid in 1937. Between 1937 and 1946 Kuwait was without a national press until a new magazine was published in Cairo by a group of students enrolled in Egyptian schools and universities. The new magazine, Al-Baatha, was introduced in the form of a newsletter, and included Kuwaiti students news as well as the historical records of the main events taking place in Kuwait between 1946 and 1954 (Al-Samawi, 1984, p.88).

The increasing number of educated Kuwaitis in the 1940s and 1950s helped to facilitate the rapid flourishing of the press in Kuwait. By 1978 the number of newspapers and magazines published in Kuwait reached 189 (Badr et al., 1979, p.33). Some enjoyed a large circulation, such as Al-Arabi, a monthly magazine published by the Ministry of Information in 1958. Al-Arabi is one of the most widely read magazines in the Arab world, with a monthly circulation of 250,000 copies (Kuwait Facts and Figures, 1986, p.174). This wide circulation has been achieved mainly because the

magazine tends to avoid being involved in Arab politics and because it varies its content to cover all aspects of information with absolute neutrality and impartiality, and without taking the side of any party, including that of Kuwait.

Many other magazines and newspapers, which were privately owned, tended to reflect different ideologies and viewpoints. By 1979, as presented in Table 4.1, there were five major daily newspapers published in Arabic and two dailies in English. Besides these newspapers, there were sixty weekly magazines and the rest were specialised publications (Al-Rumaihi, 1983). The Kuwait dailies and magazines enjoy wide circulation in the Gulf State countries and in the Arab world outside the Gulf region.

#### LAW OF PUBLICATION

The government of Kuwait believes that intervention in the press is needed, but its measures should not be as harsh as those applied in other Third World or Arab countries. Thus, the Kuwaiti government tends to limit its role in manipulating the press according to the constitution which stipulates that "freedom of the press, printing and publishing shall be guaranteed in accordance with the conditions and manners specified by Law." The constitution of Kuwait also stipulates that: "Freedom of opinion and scientific research shall be guaranteed. Every person shall have the right to express and propagate his opinion verbally, in writing or otherwise, in accordance with the condition and procedures specified by Law" (Constitution, Article 37).

Table 4.1. Kuwaiti Papers and Magazines published between 1950-1978  
Chronologically listed. (Newspapers are marked with an asterisk).

Name of Paper	Date of Publication	Editors/ Editorial Responsibility
1. Al-Bath	1950	Hammad Al-Rojaib and Ahmad Al-Adwani
2. Al-Fokaha	1950	Farhan Rashed Al-Farhan
3. Al-Koweit	1950	Yakoob Abdel-Aziz Al-Rashid
4. Al-Sihhah	1952	Department of Health
5. Al-Raed	1952	Fahd Al-Duwairi
6. Al-Yakada	1952	Ahmed Al-Adwani, Abdulla Al-Dashioti, Zuhair Al-Karmi, Labib Shafiq
7. Al-Irshad	1953	Abdel-Aziz Al-Mutawwa
8. Al-Iman	1953	Ahmad Al-Khatib and others
9. Molhag Al-Iman	1953	Cultural National Club
10. Majalat Al-Mahad Al-Din	1954	Religious Institute
11. Al-Koweit Al-Yom	1954	Ministry of Information
12. Al-Raed Al-Isbuei	1954	Institute of Teachers
13. Al-Itihad	1955	Kuwaiti Students in Egypt
14. Akhbar Al-Isbua	1955	Daud Mosa'd Al-Saleh
15. Al-Fajr	1955	Yagib Al-Homaidi and others
16. Al-Rabeta	1957	Ahmad Al-Doaij
17. Resalat Al-Naft	1957	Khaled Khalaf
18. Al-Sha'b	1957	Khaled Khalaf
19. Al-Seha Al-Madrasiya	1957	Ahmad Al-Khatib, Abdel-Razak Al-Basir and Khaled Al-Zaid
20. Majalat Al-Irshad	1957	Islamic Guidance Association
21. Sawt Al-Aamel	1958	Mohammed Ali Muhana

Table 4.1 (continued)

Name of Paper	Date of Publication	Editors/ Editorial Responsibility
22. Sawt Al-Koweit	1958	Kuwaiti Students in Damascus
23. Al-Arabi	1958	Mohammed Al-Rumaihi
24. Al-Mojtam'a	1958	Ministry of Social Affairs
25. Saut Al-Motanabi	1959	Al-Motanabi Secondary School
26. Al-Iktisadi Al-Koweit	1960	Chamber of Commerce
27. Humat Al-Watan	1960	Ministry of Defence
28. Al-Raed Al-Arabi	1960	Abdulla Al-Ganem and others
29. Al-Moadhaf	1960	Civil Servants Bureau
30. Al-Istiklal	1961	Omar Summer Club
31. Al-Bashir	1961	Sadun Al-Jassem Al-Yqub
32. Al-Jomahir	1961	Sami Ahmed Al-Monaies
33. Al-Rai Al-Aam*	1961	Abdel-Aziz Al-Mosaid
34. Al-Risala	1961	Jassem Mubarak Al-Jassem
35. Tabib Al-Mojtam'a	1961	Ministry of Public Health
36. Al-Koweit	1961	Ministry of Information
37. Al-Koweit	1961	Kuwait Oil Company (KOC)
38. Al-Hadaf	1961	Mohammed Mosa'd Al-Saleh
39. Daily News*	1961	Yousef Al-Mosaid
40. Akhbar Al-Koweit	1962	Abdel-Aziz Al-Folaij
41. Al-Islah	1962	Social Reform Society
42. Adwa' Al-Koweit	1962	Khaled Al-Hamad
43. Sawt Al-Khalij	1962	Baqer Ali Khoraiabut
44. Al-Tariq	1962	Ministry of Social Affairs
45. Ali-Tali'a	1962	Sami Ahmed Al-Monaies
46. Nashrat Falastin	1962	Ministry of Information

Table 4.1 (continued)

Name of Paper	Date of Publication	Editors/ Editorial Responsibility
47. Adwa' Al-Madina	1963	Badr Sulaiman Al-Issa
48. Al-Dakheliya	1963	Ministry of Interior
49. Hada Al-Isbo'	1963	Badr Sulaiman Al-Issa
50. Kuwait Times*	1963	Abdel-Aziz Al-Aolayan
51. Al-Iktisad Al-Koweiti	1964	Ministry of Commerce
52. Al-Itihad	1965	National Union of Kuwaiti Students
53. Ausrati	1965	Ganima Fahd Al-Marzook
54. Al-Kalema	1965	Arabian Gulf Theatre
55. Naft Al-Arab	1965	Abdulla Al-Toraiki
56. Al-Wai Al-Islami	1966	Ministry of Waqf and Islamic Affairs
57. Al-Baian	1966	Association of Writers
58. Nashrat Al-Amin Aoiel	1966	Aminoil Company
59. Al-Rabeta	1967	Assn. of Social Workers
60. Al-Sahel	1967	Al-Sahel Club
61. Al-Nahda	1967	Yousef Al-Mosaid
62. Al-Yqada	1967	Abdulla Bishara then Ahmed Banbahani
63. The Journal of Kuwait Medical Association	1967	Dr. Abdel-Razak Al-Adwani
64. Al-Burak	1968	Kuwait Airways Corporation
65. Al-Sayasah	1968	Ahmed Al-Jaralla
66. Al-Shohad'a	1968	Al-Shohad'a Club
67. Al-Balak	1969	Abdel-Rahman Al-Wilayti
68. Sa'd	1969	Yousef Al-Mosaid
69. Al-Mohami	1969	Association of Lawyers



Table 4.1 (continued)

Name of Paper	Date of Publication	Editors/ Editorial Responsibility
70. Al-Jam'iyay	1970	University of Kuwait
71. Al-/raed	1970	Association of Teachers
72. Aalam Al-Tikr	1970	Ahmed Al-Adwani
73. Al-Majales Al-Mosawara	1970	Hidaya Sultan Al-Salem
74. Al-Mojtam'a	1970	Social Reform Society
75. Majalat Al-Iktisad Wa Al-Siyyasa	1970	Politics/Economics Students Assn. (Kuwait University)
76. Majalat Al-Qada Wa Al-Kunun	1970	Ministry of Justice
77. Manalat Al-Mohasaba	1970	Accountancy Students Assn. (Kuwait University)
78. Anba Al-Riyada	1971	Kuwait Olympic Association
79. Al-Khalij	1971	Teriam Omran Teriam and Fajhan Al-Motairi
80. Al-Riyadh Al-Arabi	1971	Abkal Al-Abkal
81. Sawt Al-Shahab	1971	Ministry of Education
82. Aslam Al-Fan	1971	Muhammad Al-Nashmi
83. Meraat Al-Auma	1971	Ali Yousef Al-Rumi
84. Al-Mokawel	1971	Association of Contractors
85. Journal of Palestine Studies	1971	Hisam Sharabi
86. Al-Thakafa Al-Arabiya	1972	Dept. of Arabic Language (Kuwait University)
87. Al-Jeyoloji	1972	Geology Students Assn.
88. Hayatona	1972	Dr. Seddika Al-Awadi
89. Al-Qabas	1972	Jassem Al-Nasf
90. Majalat Al-Idarat Wa Al-Mojtam'a	1972	Business Administration Students Association

Table 4.1 (continued)

Name of Paper	Date of Publication	Editors/ Editorial Responsibility
91. Majalat Al-Adab Wa Al-Tarbiya	1972	Faculty of Arts & Education (Kuwait University)
92. Al-Muawakun	1972	Disabled Association
93. Maktabat Al-Jamea	1972	Sulaiman Kalandar
94. Al-Samita	1973	National Union of Kuwait Students
95. Tarik Al-Nur	1973	Social Culture Society
96. Al-Kafela	1973	Students Affairs Bureau (Kuwait University)
97. Majalat Al-Aolum Al-Ijtimaeia	1973	Asaad Abdel-Rahman
98. Mawaheb	1973	Abdulla Khalaf Club
99. Al Sambuk	1974	Press Club (Kuwait University)
100. Aalam Al-Ihsa	1974	Statistics Students Society (Kuwait University)
101. Majalat Sawt Al-Itihad	1974	National Union of Kuwait Students
102. Al-Watan*	1974	Jassem Al-Motawa
103. Journal of the University of Kuwait	1974	Faculty of Science (Kuwait University)
104. Al-Adib	1975	Arabic Students Society (Kuwait University)
105. Al-Islam Wa Al-Hayat	1975	Maktabat Al-Rasiil Al-A'dam
106. Al-Tarbiya Fi Isbu'	1975	Ministry of Education
107. Al-Jikrafi	1975	Geography Students Society (Kuwait University)
108. Al-Sena'at Al Wataniya	1975	National Industries Company
109. Al-A'mel	1975	Trade Union Federation
110. Kimya	1975	Petrochemicals Company

Table 4.1 (continued)

Name of Paper	Date of Publication	Editors/ Editorial Responsibility
111. Majalat Dirasat Al-Khalij Wa Al-Jazira Al-Arabiya	1975	Abdulla Al-Gunaim
112. Al-Motaqa	1975	Chemistry Students Society (Kuwait University)
113. Nashrat Awapek	1975	OAPEC
114. Al-Naft Wa Al-Ta'won Al-Arabi	1975	Walid Khaduri, Yousef Sagegh
115. Al-Wataniya	1975	Ahmad Al-Jaralla
116. Arab Oil	1975	
117. Al-Ijtima'i	1976	Sociology, Philosophy and Psychology Students Society (Kuwait University)
118. Akhbar Al-Mahad	1976	Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research
119. Al-Anba*	1976	Faisal Al-Marzuk
120. Al-Kherij	1976	Graduate Bureau (Kuwait University)
121. Al-Forusiya	1976	Horse-riding Club
122. Al-Moarekh	1976	History Students Society (Kuwait University)
123. Aalam Al-Hayat	1977	Biology Students Society (Kuwait University)
124. Majalat Al-Hokuk Wa Al-Shari'a	1977	Faculty of Law and Shari'a (Kuwait University)
125. Al-Hoda	1977	Bonaire Al-Kar Mosque
126. Al-Hilal Al-Ahmar	1977	Red Crescent Association
127. Arab Times	1977	Mohammed Al-Rumaihi
128. Afak Jameiya	1978	Students Affairs Bureau (Kuwait University)
129. Al-Tarwin	1978	Ministry of Information

Table 4.1 (continued)

Name of Paper	Date of Publication	Editors/ Editorial Responsibility
130. Tiknologia Al-Talim	1978	Arab Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
131. Al-Sambuk	1978	Students Activities Bureau (Business Studies Institute)
132. Ala Al-Tarik	1978	Mansur Bandar, Riyad Khazal and others
133. Al-Kanuni	1978	Law Students Society (Kuwait University)
134. Al-Majala Al-Zera'iya	1978	Agricultural Engineers Assn.
135. Al-Nokheda	1978	Business Studies Students Society (Business Studies Institute)
136. Al-Wafra	1978	Al-Wafra Oil Company
137. Kuwait-Japan Society	1978	Kuwait-Japan Society
138. Al-Manakj	1978	Languages Centre (Kuwait University)
139. Technology and Development	1978	Arab Union of Fertilizer Producers
140. Al-Qabas*	1979	Mohammad Al-Saqir

Source: Ahmed Badr, Abdel-Rahman Al-Shaikh, Nabil Al-Jaddai, (1979)  
Al-Sahafa Al-Koweitiya (The Kuwaiti Press)

The relationship between the press and the government in Kuwait, however, is not always friendly. There is hardly any Kuwaiti paper that has not clashed with the government at some stage. In 1973, for example, more than 19 cases reviewed by the courts involved Kuwaiti papers accused by the government of "trying to harm Kuwait's relations with friendly Arab countries" (Al-Sayrasah, May 1973, p.1).

According to Badr, Al-Shaikh and Al-Jaddai, the main cause of confrontation between the government and the press is that the latter "enjoys a high degree of freedom which other Arab papers do not enjoy" (Badr et al., 1979). In January 1961, the law was suspended completely, giving way to a new law of the press, issued on 26th January 1961. Of the many important articles which the new law contained, the controversial Article 35 remains the most important. This article gave the right to the Minister of Information to suspend any publication for a maximum of one year, or to cancel its permission, "if it is found to serve the interests of a foreign country whose interests clash with the national interests of Kuwait" or, in the case of a non-political paper, "who dealt with political issues" (Ibid, p.216). The right to suspend papers was given to the Cabinet as a whole and the right to appeal against suspension was also dealt with by the Cabinet. In addition, the right to cancel the licence of a paper was taken from the judicial authorities (i.e. the High Court) and given to the Cabinet. Article 35 of the 1961 law, which was amended in 1972, also gave the Cabinet a wide range of reasons for which a paper could be suspended for a maximum period of one year. These included:

1. Criticising the Amir or quoting him without prior permission from the Department of Publications at the Ministry of Information (Article 23)
2. Criticising heads of states or harming Kuwait's relations with Arab and other friendly countries (Article 24).
3. Instigating crimes or creating divisions in society (Article 27).
4. Instigating the overthrowing of the regime by force or other illegal means (Article 30).
5. Encouraging the spread of communism or criticising severely the social and economic systems of the country (Ibid).
6. Despising other people's religions or creeds (Ibid).

From the issuing of the new Publication Law in 1976 until 1982 it was found, as presented in Table 4.2, that the government ordered the suspension of 48 newspapers and magazines. All orders, however, were issued by the Minister of Information without direct involvement by the Cabinet.

After independence in 1961, Kuwait developed a large number of newspapers with standard size. In 1979, seven daily newspapers (five in Arabic and two in English) were being published in Kuwait. Moreover, sixteen weekly and an equal number of other periodicals now appear regularly in Kuwait. These publications enjoy a high reputation among non-Kuwaiti Arabs in the Gulf States and other Arab countries. Kuwaiti daily newspapers are, at present, circulating widely in the Western capitals with large Arab communities such as London and Paris. Al-Qabas the most popular in Kuwait began an international edition from London in 1985.

It should be noted that although the government was given the right to suspend any paper before the 1972 amendment, it did not frequently exercise this right. The government preferred to resort to the courts instead. In all the cases heard by the High Court, the radical left wing magazine Al-Tali'ah had the lion's share of suspension orders. Between 1963-1973, it was taken to court 19 times (Al-Rumaihi, 1983).

It should be noted, however, that the impact of the press on the government is rather substantial, particularly with regard to liberal dispositions. It is noteworthy that newspapers and magazines were often suspended because of their stand on liberal issues even when these issues dealt with foreign policy.

**Table 4.2** Publications suspended in Kuwait 1976-1982  
including Cause, Date and Period of Suspension

Name of the Paper	Cause of Suspension	Date of Suspension	Period of Suspension
1. Al-Watan	Writing about democracy in Kuwait	31. 8.76.	1 month
2. Al-Taili'ah	Writing about democracy in Kuwait	1. 9.76	3 months
3. Al-Hadaf	Writing about democracy in Kuwait	2. 9.76.	3 months
4. Al-Risala	Writing about democracy in Kuwait	5. 9.76.	3 months
5. Al-Raid	Writing about democracy in Kuwait	6. 9.76.	3 months
6. Al-Rai Al-Aam	Publishing a foreign announcement	4.11.76.	1 week
7. Al-Sayasa	Publishing a foreign announcement	31.12.76.	10 days
8. Al-Tali'ah	Criticising the government's internal policy	5. 1.77.	3 months
9. Al-Risala	Criticising the government's internal policy	31. 5.76	3 months
10. Al-Sayasa	Criticising the government's internal policy	12. 6.77.	3 days
11. Kuwait Times	Criticising the government's internal policy	28. 7.77.	1 week
12. Al-Rai A-Aam	Criticising President Sadat	21.12.77.	3 days
13. Sawt Al-Khalij	Criticising the Egyptian Regime	24.12.77.	1 week
14. Al-Rai Al-Aam	Criticising the government's internal policy	13. 1.78.	1 week

Table 4.2 (continued)

Name of the Paper	Cause of Suspension	Date of Suspension	Period of Suspension
15. Al-Rai Al-Aam	Criticising the government's internal policy	11. 6.78.	3 days
16. Al-Rai Al-Aam	Criticising the government's internal policy	22.11.78.	3 days
17. Al-Watan	Speculating about the new Cabinet	27.11.78.	1 week
18. Al-Balagh	Criticising the government's internal policy	18. 4.78.	1 month
19. Al-Mojtam'a	Criticising the University through an interview with Abdulla Al-Nafisi and others	1. 5.78.	2 months
20. Mira't Al-Uma	Criticising the government's internal policy	10. 5.78.	3 months
21. Mira't Al-Uma	Criticising President Sadat's wife	21. 8.78.	2 weeks
22. Al-Qabas	Criticising President Sadat and Numeiri for their links with the CIA	15. 6.78.	3 days
23. Al-Hadaf	Criticising President Sadat and Numeiri for their links with the CIA	17. 6.78.	1 month
24. Al-Nahda	Criticising the government's internal policy	17. 6.78.	1 month
25. Al-Itihad	Criticising wearing Islamic veil	31. 8.78.	2 months
26. Al-Tall'ah	Criticising the government's internal policy	24. 6.79.	3 months



Table 4.2 (continued)

Name of the Paper	Cause of Suspension	Date of Suspension	Period of Suspension
27. Al-Tali'ah	Criticising the government's internal policy	12.12.79.	1 month
28. Al-Hadaf	Criticising the government's internal policy	24. 6.79.	1 month
29. Al-Balagh	Criticising the government's internal policy	16. 7.79.	1 month
30. Al-Balagh	Criticising President Asad of Syria	31.12.79.	2 weeks
31. Al-Mojtam's	Criticising the government's internal policy	16. 7.79.	1 month
32. Al-Mojtam'a	Criticising the Iranian Revolution	5. 9.79.	1 month
33. Al-Mojtam'a	Criticising the government's internal policy	24.12.79.	2 weeks
34. Al-Sayasah	Criticising the government's internal policy	10. 9.79.	3 days
35. Al-Nahda	Criticising the government's internal policy	30. 9.79.	1 week
36. Al-Watan	Publishing an obscene picture	30. 9.79.	1 day
37. Al-Mojtam'a	Criticising the situation in Syria	26. 3.80.	2 weeks
38. Al-Mojtam'a	Criticising the government's internal policy	18.11.80.	2 weeks
39. Al-Rai Al-Aam	Interviewing the Iranian Ambassador	28. 4.80.	2 weeks
40. Al-Tali'ah	Criticising the Saudi regime	28. 5.80.	2 weeks (reduced to 1 week)

Table 4.2 (continued)

Name of the Paper	Cause of Suspension	Date of Suspension	Period of Suspension
41. Al-Tali'ah	Criticising Gulf and North Yemen regimes	23.11.80.	2 weeks
42. Al-Sayrasah	Speculating about a visit by the Amir to London	28. 6.80.	2 days
43. Al-Mojtam'a	Criticising Colonel Gaddafi of Libya	17. 6.81.	1 week
44. Al-Mojtam'a	Criticising the situation in Syria	21. 7.81.	2 weeks
45. Al-Mojtam'a	Criticising the government's internal policy	16.11.81.	1 month
46. Al-Tali'ah	Criticising the situation in Bahrain	27. 6.81.	3 weeks
47. Al-Rai Al-Aam	Criticising President Numeiri of Sudan	19.10.81.	3 days
48. Al-Mojtam'a	Criticising the situation in Syria	2. 3.82.	2 weeks

Source: A written answer by the Minister of Information to a question by Ahmed Al-Sadoon MP., Al-Sayrasah, 6th April 1982. Introduced by Al-Rumaihi, 1983.

For example, it is well-known that Kuwaiti papers had influenced the government's decision to suspend aid to Jordan during the Civil War of 1970. Kuwaiti liberal papers and magazines severely attacked the conservative position of the regime in Jordan and demanded that the government of Kuwait should take some action. The pressure by the liberal press forced the government to suspend aid to Jordan. Similarly, the government's assistance in the peace moves that took place in the Middle East after the October War of 1973 was largely a reaction to the popular daily treatment as reflected in the press (Al-Rumaihi, 1973, p.368).

#### THE DAILY PRESS

In spite of the small size population (about 1.5 million) with a literacy rate of 60%, Kuwait has the following 5 major Arabic newspapers: Al-Ray Al-Aam (Public Opinion). This is a conservative paper which was established on 16th April 1961, a year before the nation's independence. The owner is Al-Mussaeed, a member of parliament, who has consistently supported the government on all issues. Although Al-Ray Al-Aam is the first daily to be published in Kuwait, it ranks lowest in circulation at the present time. As Jerkhi argued, "this newspaper backed the government regarding such issues as dissolving the Assembly, revising the constitution and signing the Gulf security agreement. These issues were rejected by the public" (Jerkhi, 1984, p.256).

Al-Sayrasah (The Politics). This is a moderate to conservative newspaper published weekly since June 1965. Al-Jar Aliah, its recent owner and editor, took over after he bought it on 8th April 1968. Because of the mercurial style of its editor, Al-Sayrasah at times takes moderate or even liberal positions on some issues, but it also follows a pro-government position on other issues and espouses blind loyalty to the Amir's authority. In 1976, for example, it gave total support to the government measure of dissolving the parliament and unabashedly argued that the government's bureaucrats and technocrats under the Amir's authority knew the public interests far better than the members of the Assembly. Similarly, in the summer of 1986, Al-Sayrasah praised the Amir for dissolving the National Assembly and imposing government censorship on the press and characterized the members of the National Assembly as a bunch of disloyal Kuwaitis who had begun to sell their nation to external powers (Al-Sayrasah, 1986, p.1). Al-Jar Allah, nonetheless, has strongly endorsed modern institutions, social movements, and many liberal issues, including admiration of the

revolutionary regime in Iraq and the radical regime of the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen (Rough, 1979). He conducted impressive interviews with the heads of Middle Eastern and other Third World countries, and was once quoted as saying that he wished to interview Mrs. Golda Meir of Israel, a circumstance which even the most radical papers dare not contemplate (Jerkhi, 1984).

Al-Qabas (The Beacon). This is a non-partisan newspaper which was found, in a 1985 survey by the Pan Arab Research Centre (PARC), to be, as shown in Table 4.3, the most respected newspaper among Kuwaiti readers. It was established in 1972 by five of the richest families in Kuwait, and has gained the respect of a wide range of Kuwaiti and Arab readers within and outside Kuwait. It is reputed for its non-partisan objectivity, especially in the way it deals with news during crises. Because of its objective position on various issues, Al-Qabas has succeeded in gaining the attention of a large national and international readership. As was indicated before, in 1985, Al-Qabas launched an international edition from London in which the original pages are transmitted every evening by satellite from Kuwait to London and published the next morning simultaneously with its equivalent copy in Kuwait. In general, Al Qabas emphasises the Arab and international issues more than local issues. Each policy led to the increase of non-Kuwaiti Arab readers inside Kuwait and abroad.

Al-Watan (The Home Land). This is a liberal-radical newspaper which was established in early 1962 by a group of merchants. It was published at first on a weekly basis, then in 1974 it became a daily. From its inception, it has opened its columns to many liberal and radical writers in Kuwait, a policy which enabled many intellectual writers and journalists to find an outlet in which to publish their ideas. This newspaper has been

well received by Arab readers in the Gulf states, and because of its liberal-radical orientation, its circulation increased among Arabs in European cities, particularly those who oppose their regimes or who are dissatisfied with the current policies of the Arab States. Al-Watan strongly rejected the government's tendency to restrict freedom by revising the constitution. It also rejected the Gulf security agreement which was perceived by the newspaper as a policy designed to restrain general freedoms within the Gulf States. Al-Watan has been suspended many times because of its radical stance.

AL-Anba (The News). This is a conservative newspaper which is owned by several wealthy families and controlled by the Al-Marzouq family, one of the wealthiest in Kuwait. Soon after its initial publication in 1976, it published for a whole month a series of articles entitled "Every Kuwaiti is a Guard", meaning that there is no need for the parliament since every Kuwaiti is aware of his interests and can defend his country's interests.

This campaign was the prelude which the Amir needed before decreeing the dissolution of the National Assembly on 29th August 1976. Al-Anba opposes the wide range of freedoms given to the public, the immunity granted to the members of the National Assembly and the freedom of the press. Al-Anba frequently advocates that what some call freedom is a serious threat to the security of Kuwait, arguing that what brought Lebanon to a twelve-year civil war was the unrestricted freedom given to the press and to parliament, and contends that such freedom will lead Kuwait to a similar civil war (Ibid). The position of each newspaper in terms of circulation, date of publication, and predominant orientation is illustrated in Table 4.4.

In addition to these five Arabic newspapers published in Kuwait, there are two English dailies: The Daily News, published by Al-Rai Al-Amm Association since 23rd Sept. 1961, and The Arab Times, published by Al-Sayrasah Association and launched in February 1977. These two newspapers are widely circulated among English readers in Kuwait who are part of the manpower working in the oil industry and on development projects (Rough, 1979).

**Table 4.3** Readership of the Kuwaiti Daily Newspapers in 1985

	MALES			FEMALES			AGE GROUPS			NATIONALITY			
	TOTAL	16- 34Y	OVER 34Y	TOTAL	16- 34Y	OVER 34Y	16- 24Y	25- 34Y	OVER 34Y	KWT	ARAB EXPAT	OTHER EXPAT	
BASE = NEWSPAPER READERS	1076.	704.	367.0	337.0	372.0	273.0	99.0	292.0	348.0	436.0	362.0	568.0	146.0
		65.4	34.1	31.3	34.6	25.4	9.2	27.1	32.3	40.5	33.6	52.8	13.6
NEWSPAPERS:													
AL-ANBAA	53.2	53.7	56.7	50.4	52.2	53.8	47.5	58.6	52.9	49.8	69.3	56.5	0.0
AL-QABAS	64.1	62.2	64.6	59.6	67.7	69.6	62.6	72.3	62.1	60.3	77.9	71.7	0.7
AL-RAI AL-AAM	27.6	27.4	24.5	30.6	28.0	26.4	32.3	28.1	23.0	31.0	31.2	32.2	0.7
AL-SAYASAH	38.0	38.2	33.8	43.0	37.6	37.0	39.4	26.4	42.5	42.2	38.4	47.5	0.0
AL-WATAN	57.2	58.0	56.9	59.1	55.9	54.2	60.6	52.4	58.6	59.4	60.5	69.7	0.7
ARAB TIMES	14.5	16.2	14.4	18.1	11.3	8.4	19.2	7.5	15.5	18.3	1.1	4.8	85.6
KUWAITI TIMES	12.1	13.4	11.2	15.7	9.7	7.0	17.2	6.5	11.8	16.1	1.1	3.9	71.2

Preliminary Data: The Kuwaiti Media Index by Pan Arab Media Research  
Centre Member of Gallup International, Spring 1985

**Table 4.4** Kuwait Daily Newspapers, Estimated Circulation and Predominant Orientation.

Name	Est. Circ.	First Pub.	Predominant Orientation
AL-Qabas (The Beacon)	55,000	1972	Free Enterprise Kuwait Nationalist Pro-Arab Nationalism
AL-Watan (The Homeland)	43,000	1974	Liberal, critical of government, free mouthpiece of democrats and left-wing Kuwaitis
AL-Anba (the News)	33,000	1976	Pro-government conservative, mouthpiece for commercial groups.
AL-Sayrasah (Politics)	33,000	1965	Moderate pro-government, pro-Egypt and other moderate Arab States
AL-Ray Al-Am	20,000	1961	Conservative, governmental in sound, anti-left and pro-West.
The Kuwaiti Times	10,000	1961	Published for non-Arab foreigners.
The Arab Time	8,000	1977	Liberal, popular focused in regional news.

Sources : Figures obtained from authoritative sources in the same newspapers (May 1986). Table based on Rough (1979)

#### THE FUNCTION OF KUWAITI PRESS

The discussions presented above suggest that the Kuwaiti press plays a vital role in influencing domestic and foreign policy. That influence, however, must be considered from the standpoint of the Kuwaiti social and political structure which can be characterised as quasi-traditional. The authority of the Amir is indisputable, but he is not an absolute ruler, as his legislative functions are delegated to the Assembly and executive powers to the Cabinet. Drawing mostly from liberal elements, the Assembly



has, in its short history, demonstrated a commitment to modernisation and democracy which, when addressed seriously, antagonizes the government and clashes with the traditional authority of the Amir and his Cabinet. The Amir and the government, on the other hand, are seen as the guardians of traditions and the saviours of Kuwaiti culture and values.

In this dynamism the press plays a balancing act which connects these power centres and co-ordinates their influence. When it comes to traditional conservative matters, the press yields to the traditional authority of the Amir and his government. The press is obliged by custom to present the conservative line of the government not only to appease traditional authority, but also to assure the readers of cultural continuity and normative stability. From this perspective, journalists can be said to play a dual role. They agitate for change and modernisation; in this role they are reluctantly tolerated. But when they push their arguments beyond the tolerable limits defined by the Amir and the government, the latter control them promptly. They do so supported by the heavy armour of traditions and values to move the populace and awaken their national fervour especially when they define liberalism as a disintegrating influence and argue that leaving it unchecked would undermine Kuwaiti integrity and national unity. The point is that respect for traditional authority in Kuwait not only commands the attention of the populace, but also gives government officials, and above all, the Amir, ready access to the shaping of public opinion on matters of conservative nature. Above all, they are seen as the guardians of the ethos of the culture.

When it comes to the question of who sets the agenda in the Kuwaiti press, the answer would have to be: it depends upon the issues. Issues which are seen as stemming from or touching upon preserving the Kuwaiti character and maintaining its integrity are expected to be advocated by the government. The primary role of the Amir, the Cabinet, and government

officials, is preserving the culture and conserving it. Decisions on all other issues are widely expected to be influenced, even governed, by these considerations. As mentioned above, contemporary democratic institutions such as the National Assembly came about initially as advisory bodies. Although its constitutional function is defined as a fully fledged legislative body, it still has to act within the bounds prescribed by the Amir who is the ruler. So does the press.

It should be noted that the function of the Amir as the ultimate authority, and of the government as the guardian of the culture, are widely accepted and supported even by the intellectuals, the merchants, and the journalists. Only the radicals from among fundamentalist pro-Iran Shi'ites question their authority, which is seen by others as the bedrock upon which the stability of Kuwait rests.

The relationship between the government and the press, therefore, is well established. The freedom of the press is guaranteed by the constitution which tacitly and explicitly gives the government the right to demarcate the boundaries beyond which this freedom would undermine the culture. Thus, when it comes to conserving the culture, the government is expected to take the lead, and it unabashedly does so because it is usually supported on conservative stands by the populace.

In such a case, the media are expected to yield to the government on matters of a conservative nature. As mentioned above, when newspapers stepped beyond these bounds, they have been promptly suspended on constitutional grounds. Thus, when it comes to agenda setting, it is expected that conservative content will be set in the press by the government. We would expect, therefore, to find that journalists would, on the whole, present the government's position on conservative matters, even when the government's views do not correspond with their own. We would also expect that, out of expediency or by default, journalists would not only let government

officials set the agenda on conservative matters but also share with them the acceptance of those matters without advocating them.

This does not mean, however, that the government's powers go unchecked. The democratic strides in Kuwait firmly established the Assembly and the press as basic institutions. The members of the National Assembly who are freely elected are drawn from diverse backgrounds, but, as mentioned earlier, they represent, on the whole, a liberal stand. Apart from representing the people, their main function, which is legitimised not only by the constitution but also by the emerging democratic norms, is to act as a counter balance to the government. Thus, as the government is expected to lead in conservative matters, the Assembly is expected to champion liberal causes.

In this setting, journalists play a role which is similar, in many ways, to that of the Assembly members. Like them, journalists are widely recruited from among the intellectuals. Many are highly educated, and those among them who lack on that score make up for it by demonstrating a level of awareness and expertise on liberal matters and causes that match their rivals. Their function is to forge ahead towards modernisation and change, and their position is generally liberal. When it comes to agenda setting, they are expected to lead in liberal causes. On the whole they serve as opinion leaders on liberal matters, even for government officials.

#### GOVERNMENT AND PRESS : A QUEST FOR POWER

Like its equivalent elsewhere, the Kuwaiti press though a strong political institution, requires certain political harmonies; the differences between its political position and ideological backgrounds are so wide that the diversity gives it a special identity quite unlike the press in other Arab countries. The Kuwaiti press also reflects, as already discussed, several political stands, ranging from the radical liberal

position, as is the case with Al Talia, a weekly magazine, which is known for its radical leftism and its call for social reforms based on socialist ideology, and the daily newspaper, Al Watan: a patriotic national liberal newspaper which opens Kuwait up to Arab patriotic currents. Al Sayasah, on the other hand, is moderate in its support of the government. The most moderate newspaper, however, is Al Qabas which, besides topping the others in popularity, has the highest circulation in Kuwait and abroad. It is neutral in presenting the political issues regardless of the position the government or the opposition take on those issues, and is therefore respected by both the government and the opposition. There is, furthermore, the conservative rightist Al-Ray Al-Am, which supports the authority's position and has on many occasions opposed and challenged the liberal view which expresses itself through the pulpits of the liberal newspapers and from within the National Assembly. Finally, Al-Anba which mostly opposes the National Assembly and leans more or less towards the government side.

This diversity of ideological positions among the press does not mean that the Kuwaiti press has no united stands. On the contrary, on several occasions, these newspapers have found themselves adopting one position and fighting the same battle sometimes against the government, at others against the National Assembly, or yet again against the imposition of restrictions on procedures and legitimate pursuits. But the government's position, on the whole, poses the main challenge to the press. Every now and then, the government resorts to legitimate channels with a view to restricting the freedom of the press. It often attempts to obstruct and belittle the press, or else hinder it from playing its role as a social institution with a great responsibility towards the Kuwaiti society.

### THE PRESS VERSUS THE GOVERNMENT

It is essential to keep in mind that the Kuwaiti press was not, as is the case in most Arab countries, initiated by governments, nor established under the auspices of the ruling family (as was the case in most Gulf states), nor yet by any ruling political parties as was the case in Arab republican states. The press in Kuwait resulted from the personal effort of certain Kuwaiti citizens who initially produced press releases or small tabloids, or newspapers with only a few pages before oil wealth revenues filled the State Treasury and the pockets of the citizens. As the oil wealth multiplied, the Press Association of Kuwait issued several strong daily newspapers, scores of magazines, periodicals and special bulletins. These were, in fact, so many that Dr. Baskis Al-Awach, the Amir Diwan Counsellor in Kuwait, commented: "Kuwait cannot support the publication of five daily newspapers! If it were not for the wealth which the state enjoys, or the competition created by the financial differences and the ideological differences, Kuwait would only need no more than two newspapers with fewer pages" (Abu Shanab, 1987, p.130) Abu Shanab noted that the flood of newspapers produced in Shara' Al-Sahafah, the 'Fleet Street' of Kuwait, was the result of several factors, namely:

"the financial affluence and wealth, commercial and economical competition, family groupings and ties, political and ideological groupings, the professional and academic competition; personal efficiencies and individual ambitions, the relative freedom of the media, the official attention to the media, a strong influence on public opinion, the large number of private and official associations and corporations, and the public relations sections and information departments in the ministries and corporations."  
(Ibid, p.130)

It seems clear, therefore, that, by virtue of the country enjoying a high income, the Kuwaiti press was maintained in spite of the low rate of circulation among the small population. There was a necessity to search for financial support from local or foreign sources as has been the case for other Arab newspapers which often had to balance their budget by

obtaining internal support, mostly offered by the government. Having financial resources is an old issue which has evoked some measure of excessive sensitivity in some Kuwaiti newspapers. In 1971, the leading article of Al Sayasah newspaper, categorized as, relatively speaking a government supporter, under the title "Stop the Aid If You Wish" the writer addressed the government in the following terms:

"Reliance on the government's financial aid means that in one way or another we follow the state's wishes and become a tool in other hands, that we do not enjoy the freedom of the press. Hence, we do not feel embarrassed or at a loss when we ask the government to stop what is called financial aid, to lift our embarrassment. As some people understand, the aid allows government interference in our affairs, our convictions and writing. We want to say to the wrongdoer 'you made a mistake' and all we ask from the government is to support the freedom of the press in a way that keeps the press apart from the administrative decisions."  
(Al-Sayasah, 11.4.71)

Such articles, by which a newspaper expresses its keen desire to publish independently of government's financial subsidies to newspapers, is an example rarely encountered in newspapers in other Arab countries. Dependency on the government is due to the severe financial difficulties which confront Arab newspapers and to the large annual losses they sustain. As the advertising trade is weak, the resources for these newspapers are limited. Low circulation rates, the high prices of papers and the extra expenses of the staff add to the burden of those newspapers. For example, despite being the most popular daily in the UAE Al Itihad, receives an annual subsidy from the government's treasury which covers 70% of its expenses. A member of a top secret committee reporting on its financial position, in 1987, revealed to the author that its debts in two years amounted to 75 million Dirham, i.e. about \$20 million.

As argued before the call of Al Sayasah to the government to stop aid to newspapers, draws more importance from the fact that it was made at an early stage when advertising was not widespread as at present, and before the increased newspapers circulation had brought that in. Contrary to

expectations, the weekly magazine, Saut Al-Khalij made an angry reply to Al Sayasah. It accused the latter of trying to act as executor on behalf of other newspapers. Al-Hadaf newspaper, too, commented on the subject, saying "no newspaper has the right to comment on behalf of the whole journalistic body, and, without anybody's recommendation, call for the halt of the subsidy or at all speak for them".

Throwing doubts on the intentions of Al Sayasah newspaper, was like throwing a pebble onto a pond's surface with the surface starting to move and whirl. This early example, which defines the relationship between the Kuwaiti press and the government of Kuwait, still stands today. On the one hand, the government, in different ways and methods, tries to dictate to newspapers ranging from confiscation to the issuing of strong laws and even resorting to court. On the other hand, the newspapers firmly defended their freedom, either by evoking the issue of the freedom of the press in a loud voice in an intelligent attempt to draw the support of the Kuwaiti public, or by resorting to an alliance with the National Assembly and using MPs as a buffer between the press and government.

However, in spite of numerous examples on the conflict between the press and the government in Kuwait, there is a lack of historical records or documentation on this subject. I have conducted a thorough and extensive review of newspaper archives which led to the conclusion that the relationship between the government and the press could be divided into two levels. The first point of entanglement was the government's attempts to issue certain laws restricting the freedom of the press, and preventing the criticism of officials; an illustration is Article (35) of the Law of Publication which gives the Cabinet the right to suspend any newspaper for a period that does not exceed two years, if it was proved that it had dealings with a foreign country. The second point of entanglement was in the government's taking to court some newspapers which had been outspoken

and had harshly criticised the establishment. The radical press, such as the Al-Talia magazine and the daily newspaper Al Watan, besides some religious magazines such as Al Mujtama were on the top of those prosecuted. A fierce battle between the press and the government took place in May 1981, over the review of the Law of Publications. It was a battle that basically concentrated around Article (35). The government wanted to impose further restrictions on the press, while journalists, backed by MPs, wanted to defend the freedom of the press which Kuwaiti newspapers have enjoyed under the freedom of expression, protected by the terms of the constitution which had hitherto been emphasized in the Law of Publication.

#### A TEST OF POWER

In many traditional political systems, a free press is seen as a source of danger which could threaten the stability of a regime. The fear of the press in authoritarian regimes is simply based on the fact that the press has the power to influence the populace by indicating to them the possibilities, the development and the direction of acceptable social and political changes. The press makes itself available to the public as a guardian of public rights in the face of personalised and dictatorial whims prevalent in many Third World countries.

Although the ruling families in the Gulf present typical examples of the old hereditary regimes established in the seventh century by the Caliph Mu'awiyah Ben Abu Sofyan, the pressures of the modern age raise new social expectations for those regimes to meet. The press, as Sa'ud, the father of Fahd, the present King of Saudi Arabia believed, must behave as part of the body of the regime. This was his first sentiment during the celebrations of the first broadcasting service from Saudi Arabia in the late 1940s. The Gulf regimes are, as already argued, traditional and hereditary, while the power of the media, journalists, men of letters, etc., as a means for



change is a creation of our age. Hence the fear of the authorities and the attempts at curbing them.

In Kuwait there was a certain readiness to allow public participation. The Royal Family's acceptance of the principles of democracy made Kuwait an exception in the political milieu of the Gulf. The Arab people realized that it is an oasis of democracy in a vast and boundless desert of traditional and autocratic regimes. The nature of the Gulf political context, however, including Kuwait, does not allow more than a well-calculated range of public rights and a limited freedom of political choice. Kuwait, as already mentioned, had the good fortune to be ruled by a family that came to the forefront in the eighteenth century through the tribes' free choice and unanimous approval. With the agreement between the Sabah family and the other tribes, part of the authority passed to the chiefs of those tribes. But the passage of time, bringing about changes in the social structure, has led to the creation of a new social class, namely the merchants. The grandsons of the pearl divers and fishermen of the past are today's merchants, who are still keen on getting their share of power in the leadership of the state and would not approve of absolute power for the Amir and the Royal Family. While the ruling family controlled the power of the executive, as represented in the police and the armed forces, never before resorted to, the merchants and other social groups found that they had new powers and influence, resulting from modernisation and the evolution of social institutions among which was the press.

In the last two decades, however, the Kuwaiti press has fought harsh battles with the Ministry of Information. The latter, according to the Law of Publication, has the right, within certain limits, to prosecute newspapers. The Kuwaiti Law of Publication has preserved the press' right of free expression without government censorship. If any newspaper exceeded the limits, however, the Courts have the legal power to pass judgement on

it. Under the influence of this partial freedom, the Kuwaiti press passed through a flourishing period of expansion in which newspapers became the only Arab information pulpit where Arab intellectuals could express their ideas. Arab intellectuals from all over the Arab world became frequent readers of Kuwaiti newspapers. The efficiency of their editorials, coverage and exclusive news stories raised the credit of the Kuwaiti press among Arab readers. Meanwhile, the talents of Arab writers found their way onto the pages of Kuwaiti newspapers. But this did not last long without provoking opposition from the other Arab systems.

Opponents of Arab governments found in the Kuwaiti press the means to air their ideas and spread them around. In the meantime, other Arab regimes started exerting external pressure on the Kuwaiti authorities. For example, in a speech on receiving the editors-in-chief of Kuwaiti newspapers in Riyadh, Prince Salman Bin Abdul Aziz, the Amir of Riyadh in Saudi Arabia and brother of King Fahd, said:

"Be kind to my country, and be kind to your country Kuwait -because whoever reads what you write about Kuwait while ignorant of the acts of the regime there, will imagine that Kuwait is a bankrupt country and that the officials are robbers (thieves), and that security there is not stable. In other words, a fallen country, while, in fact, this is far from the truth and facts. So, have mercy on your motherland, Kuwait, because the characteristics of what is written in the newspapers is the generalization in your criticism of your ministries and corporations and this is the biggest mistake you have made against Kuwait."

(Al-Ray Al-Am, 30.3.86)

From the Saudi Prince's speech, it becomes immediately clear that he was advising the Kuwaiti journalists to stop practising their right of criticizing the government. The intention, however, was not to protect Kuwait from the press, rather it was a signal of agitation for the government in Kuwait to take strong measures against journalists and the freedom of the press. The Saudi Prince understood the difference between the press in Kuwait and the press in his own country, and that the media of Saudi Arabia could not criticize him and other Gulf Royal Families.

The freedom of the press, however, did not last long after Prince Salman's speech, as the pressure on Kuwait from Arab officials began to yield its negative results. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Information added some articles to the Law of Publication restricting the freedom of the press. For example, Article (35), which caused much trouble between the government and the press for five long years, resulted primarily from external Arab pressures on the government of Kuwait. The period between the addition of this article, in 1976, and the suggestion of a new Law of Publications in 1981, was the time in which the government controlled completely the whole political life, including the freedom of the press. But with the renewal of parliamentary life in 1981, things began to change in favour of the press. But what was the story behind Article (35). How did the confrontations between the government and the press develop? What position had the National Assembly taken in the conflict between the press and the government and what were the political factors which made for settlement of the affair in favour of the press?

To begin with, the content of Article (35) reads:

"With the Cabinet's decision, it is permitted to suspend the newspaper for a period that does not exceed two years, or cancel its licence, if it was proven that it is serving the interests of a foreign country or organization, or that its policy contradicts the national interest, or if it is proven that it had any aid or help or advantages, from any foreign country or organization, in any or for any reason and under any circumstances or titles without the permission of the Ministry of Information."

(Al-Watan, 27.5.81)

The uproar which this article caused was no less than the one made at the suggestion of a revised press law in 1981. The reason is that during the suspension of parliamentary life the government imposed direct censorship on the press which left the press defenceless. But when democracy was restored and an elected parliament began practising its socio-political role, the press found, in the parliament, strong support for demands for the cancellation of Article (35). It was time, it was felt, that the

article which gave the Cabinet the right to suspend any newspaper for two years or cancel its licence be withdrawn. For example, Hamoud Al Roumni, MP and Chairman of a Parliamentary Committee selected to study the law of publication, once said:

Freedom and democracy are two connected ideals in which the press is the mind that supports democracy. And because the press is the source and the creator of frank opinions, the government tries its best to restrict the dynamics of the press."

(Al-Watan, 7.4.82)

Dr. Khalid Alasmi, MP, one of the wealthy radicals of Kuwait, believes that the new Law of Publication reflects the political situation in the Arab nation. Kuwait, according to him, is "part of the political map in which most of the Arab states are bounded by treaties or security agreements with the United States. The press thus is now allowed to play a contradictory role against the wishes of the U.S. Kuwait in comparison with its neighbours, enjoys a democratic life, prosperity and wealth and without doubt this makes others envious." (Ibid).

However, in approving the new law, the Cabinet was emphasising its position. Many Kuwaitis demonstrated their support for the press against the government's desperate attempts to pass the Article (35). The furious reactions from all the Kuwaiti newspapers, including those which normally supported the government, added to the grief of the article supporters. Newspapers with different positions and ideological backgrounds, devoted their main stories and editorials to demonstrate their anguish against the government. It was obvious that when it came to the freedom of the press and its right to function with no restrictions, all newspapers took the same position against the government in order to avert the threat to the press and attempt to put its future in jeopardy.

The government, on the other hand, wanted legal pretexts to confiscate, suspend and prosecute newspapers. It was an unbalanced political battle in which the government allowed free elections for members of the

National Assembly while at the same time imposing more restrictions on the press. Al-Ray Al-Am became one of the newspapers most fiercely opposed to this policy. For example, in an editorial article "The Publications Law and its Serious Dimensions" Yousef Al Masaeed, the newspaper's Editor-in-Chief and Chairman of the Kuwait Press Association, wrote:

"The draft Law of Publication which the government submitted to parliament, is still a project under discussion but it is an exhausting project for the press and threat to the democracy of Kuwait. The press refused it, not because it restricts the freedom of expression, but because it contradicts the democratic system which protects our rights. The law means, in short, saying farewell to the press, democracy and the freedom of expression.

We still say that we, in Kuwait, lived and live as one family and our ties are built on compassion and sharing. That is why the mentioned draft law is a plot against the spirit of the one family concept. It assumes the presence of imaginary enemies wishing evil for Kuwait, for its security, and for its Arab, Islamic and international relationships.

The restraining laws are not of our custom or spirit, and when the Ministry of Information, who is tending this project, looks around in the Arab sphere it would see it that the restraining laws are of no use in solving problems. On the contrary, they lead to more problems and complications, causing blood to flow and prisons to fill.

We do not want to mourn the opposition as we still believe in the spirit of the one family as a measurement of our work, and a way of our behaviour. So, there is no need to submit a draft as that which would put barriers between us, and hinder the spirit of this family. We are positive that this spirit must stay as our greatest unwritten constitution, as it is the great protection for us, for our country, for our system and for our future. While living our democracy, we did not notice any occurring or danger approaching by God we were fine. There is no need for such an article to be put in a law as if the press were an enemy of the country and people. Could it be that it was the caricature of Numeri that did all that and raised hell?"

(Al-Ray Al-Am, 7.11.81)

Al Sayasah took the same position against the government. For example, Ahmed Al Jar Allah, the owner and Editor-in-Chief, has the reputation of being a highly professional practising journalist as well as an accumulator of wealth. According to some private sources in Kuwait, he rose to power by taking the side of the government in order to protect his private interests

and to guarantee the prosperity of his commercial projects. But, here again, like Al Masaeed, Ahmad Al-Jar Alla stood, personally, against the government's attempts to undermine the freedom of the press. He wrote an article, entitled "The Law of Publications without consulting its people," saying:

"Although the logic is that the government understands the role of the press, but it seems that the government is lending its ears to the justifications of officials, without even studying those justifications. Clearing the atmosphere of the press is not by issuing a law that kills it or tarnishes its brilliance and ambition. That is if the submitted law is the same rejected law about which we expressed our opinion.

This is not what matters, but it is a pity that the government is thinking of issuing a law that could affect the bringing up of a generation of press and information people, as it is not feasible that any person would make a career of a risky profession whether the risks are a result of difficult laws or of practising free information opposing opinions in a merciless world. If anyone accepts those risks, one will feel upset facing the risk of laws which are supposed to protect him as a journalist and not to be a burden.

The role now is the role of parliament, as it is the only power able to refuse the draft law or amending it. The parliament will be in harmony with its constitutional rules if it consulted the professionals and this can happen by the Culture and Information Committee's invitation to newspaper owners and show them the new law and ask their point of view before making a decision.

We are completely convinced that His Highness, the Amir, and the Crown Prince are most keen to create a free press and bringing up new journalistic vanguards fearless of items of a law that forces the courts to give unjustifiable sentences. If the Ministry of Information wishes to have a vital role in managing the press' affairs the way it likes, we say that without the good intentions, every letter in the Kuwaiti newspapers could be explained as black or white at the same time. Every word could be explained according to the good or harm of what the news or the comment is about. The good intention is stronger than the law and more welcome. We are one family used to discussion and consultation . . . that is unless the Ministry of Information has other intentions.  
(Al-Sayasah, 4.11.81)

Al Jar Allah here accuses the government of superficiality, irresponsibility, and adopting points of view without understanding or studying their true dimensions. He also accuses the government of seeking to deprive the press of the privilege of freedom, without which Kuwait cannot

develop nor bring up a qualified journalistic generation, especially when working in the press would only result in disasters, risks and intimidation. Tightening the siege around the press means, at the end of the road, punishing its people savagely, which, in turn, would result in disheartening many intellectuals from working in the press.

Liberal newspapers were even more aggressive, though nationalistic in their comments. Al-Qabas, a moderate newspaper, shared the grief of the press camp. In one of its editorials, entitled "The disarmament of the Kuwaiti Press", Al Qabas moves further than the debate around Article (35) throwing doubt on the Law of Publications itself. Al-Qabas wrote:

"During its journalistic march, the press was keen to move a step forward every day to occupy a distinct place among the Arab Press. The first factor that pushed the local press in large paces in the way of its vital journalistic message is the free press atmosphere provided by the state, and which made it move among all the political and journalistic sides, local, Arab and international, depending on presenting the complete news, frank opinions and the clear nationalistic and patriotic stands.

Why does the state today when it has been the one that protected the press, cared for it and prepared every factor of success and progress, want to stop its movement and drag it backwards instead of pushing it miles ahead?

Article 35 of the publications law is a restricting bond to the movement of the Kuwait Press, and a predominant sword on its freed of writing and covering the successive events in the Arab world.

But it seems that this article - in spite of the criticism directed to it and all the negative consequences it caused to the local press - is more merciful than the new draft law for publishing and publications which the Cabinet approved yesterday and transferred to the Parliament".

(Al-Qabas, 3.11.81)

The reactions of the radical press, such as the weekly Al-Talia magazine and the daily newspaper Al Watan, was voiced in the form of a demand for a democratic settlement for the political dilemma of Kuwait.

Al Talia, representing the nationalists, presented the matter from a different social point of view. The freedom of the press, the magazine argued was connected to the freedom of thought, in different mediums, like

books, periodicals, films, plays and lectures. The question first then was, what was the framework through which the freedom of the press could best be practised. The magazine wrote:

"The press does not reflect the opinion of its owner, or that should be the case, it is a medium that reflects the opinions of wider social groups, such as the writers, thinkers, artists, and the widest local sections of intellectuals who practise the social thinking.

This realistic think makes us view in the freedom of the press an issue that does concern, not only newspaper owners and reporters, but also the citizens at large, as depriving all those people from getting information about some issues is a deprivation that touches the human right and citizenship."

(Al-Talia, 12.5.82)

Al-Talia wanted to explain that the government, when issuing the new Law of Publications, did not wish to restrict the movement of the owners of newspapers or journalists alone, but to put in jeopardy the freedom of the whole society. The issue was, therefore, not only the freedom of the press or of the persons working in media, but it meant the freedom of the society and its members at large, confiscating their right to express themselves and defend their civil liberties.

In the same analytic pattern, Al Watan contributed to the discussion via its Editor-in-Chief, Jassem Al Mutawa. In a leading article he raised several issues. The first was that concerning the actual value of article (35) which had been in existence for five years without the government resorting to it, not because it did not wish to, but because in his view "the Kuwaiti press was an example of national commitment, not because it fears suspension which the article guarantees, but because of its willingness to protect the state's interest which is above any other profitable or personal interest." The second issue concerned the importance of balancing policies between various democratic institutions such as "how could a government allow a door for democracy to open, i.e. parliament, while closing another, i.e. the press." If the government accepted the principle of



democracy and revived its body, life had to run in all its parts. It is inconceivable for democracy to exist in a country where free elections for the people's parliament was guaranteed and an unjust Law of Publications against the press was drafted.

The third issue concerned doubting the press' commitment to the principle of social responsibility, doubting, that is, its integrity, honesty and loyalty to Kuwait, and its preservation of professional honour. Such doubts were groundless and, as Al-Watan claimed:

"We must deal with it (the press) on a basis of confidence not a basis of suspicion and doubt, as success to any press' corporation cannot be fulfilled if it lacks the confidence, if it has a bad reputation and if there is any doubt or suspicion around it."  
(Al-Watan, 23.5.81)

Even Al-Anba' which became known later for its strong enmity towards parliament and towards its liberal groups, contributed a leading article under the title "An Open Letter to the members of Parliament". In it, it emphasised the nature of the strong connections between the press institution and the legislative body:

"The new drafted law represents a sword not only on our freedom, because our freedom is the freedom of every citizen and every member in this parliament. The birth of the parliamentary life adhered to the birth of the journalistic life, and when the first stopped it was associated with the introduction of the article (35). The draft of the Law of Publications came as an invitation to strangle the press, as it dictates the imposing of suspension sentence on the newspaper, even when it is innocent of the claim it is charged with. The freedom of the press is in danger. The project forms a gag over the mouths not only of the journalists, but also the MPs themselves. The newspapers will no longer be able to convey spontaneously what goes on during the sessions."  
(Al-Anba', 9.11.81)

#### PRESS VICTORY - A HIGH PRICE

The press' confrontation with the government to stop Article (35) was not an easy battle. The press was on alert waiting on tenterhooks for the vote on the new Law of Publications to take place. Journalists, nationalists and all Kuwaiti intellectuals were cautious, living in hope that the

government would face a humiliating defeat. Most MPs in the parliament of 1981 belonged to minority parties representing the Shi'ite Kuwaitis and the Bedouin (Crystal, 1986). They were introduced by the government to face the merchants, the nationalists and intellectuals whose influence has been on the increase with the expansion of education and the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the merchants. The press was, at the time of voting, extremely critical of the government's attempts to urge MPs to stand against the freedom of the press in its battle of destiny. For example, Al Anba's leading article on election day was an appeal to Parliament to support the press as a close ally. Al Anba wrote:

"Today, while the draft Law of Publication found its way to each member of this parliament, we find ourselves invited to address you from the position of responsibility which we carry and with the honour of the duty and the flags we raised sky high when other flags were absent, we say to you gentlemen, the freedom of the press is in danger." (Ibid)

Much evidence led to uncertainty as to how parliament would vote. The defeat of the press was possible. As is well known poll results showed that votes were very close. The government had 14 votes from among the MPs over and above 10 votes from its Cabinet MPs, thus losing its chance of getting the approval of Parliament for the drafted law, and Article (35) failed to gain the necessary majority of 31 votes, the minimum required for approval. These results convinced the government not to submit the law for a second reading, believing that the outcome would be worse. But Shaikh Sabah Al Ahmad, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, who led the government's battle against Parliament, wanted to defend the government's position. His comment was that:

"Restricting the press' relations with foreign associations is a necessity unless the press should become a tool working to change Kuwait into another Lebanon, and lest the press should become what is called 'journalistic stores' such as those spread in Lebanon and contributing in deteriorating the political and safety standards there."

He also tried to cast doubt on the press, when he threw into question the integrity and honesty of the journalists. He said:

"I am ready to produce evidence of the abundant information about this matter to the Chairman and the Members of the Culture and Information Committee in the Parliament."

(Al-Mustakbal, 7.11.81)

As the decision to suspend Parliament in 1976 was a relapse from democracy, and the restrictions imposed on the freedom of expression allowed the government to add some articles, such as Article (35), the refusal of Parliament to approve the new draft law in 1981 came as a victory that restored dignity to democratic institutions. It was a test that restored the soul to public forces. Afterwards the parliamentary experiment in Kuwait flourished, and the strength of the press increased beyond all expectations.

The government's defeat echoed outside Kuwait, especially in the Arab media when the news was received by many Arab newspapers, reviving those deprived of freedom, including those newspapers which had emigrated outside the Arab world, to start publication abroad, mainly in London and Paris. For example, the exiled Lebanese magazine, Al-Mustakbal, issued in Paris, published the triumph of the press in Kuwait using "sarcastic and gloating" language against the government. It published a report sent from Kuwait, beginning with the old Arabic expression "Barakish brought it on its own head" which means that the government wanting to emasculate the press had humiliated itself. The report reads:

"At the last, the Kuwaiti government lost a battle with the parliament and with the press which stood up to defend its freedom and its position as one of the fronts of democracy represented in the Parliament and the Press. After this hot session in the Kuwaiti Parliament, the press started a concentrated charge against the government and the MPs who supported the presence of the item and its continuity, an item which the press considered a sword stretched to its head."

(Ibid)

It was not an easy matter for the Kuwaiti press to challenge the power of authority and win such a battle. A remarkable celebration spread over the Kuwaiti political scene. Journalists and patriotic leadership echoed the joy in their writings. Newspapers appeared loaded with articles expressing the national victory over the government and journalists with intellectuals introduced their reaction in two ways. Firstly, they showed a feeling of gratitude to the MPs who voted in favour of the decision and siding with the freedom of the press. For example, Mohamed Al Salih, a known lawyer, MP and member of the Board of Directors of the liberal Al-Watan newspaper, wrote in his daily column congratulating the press for the triumph over the government, saying:

"We congratulate ourselves for the failure of the Article (35) of the Law of Publications. The article stayed with us a long time, an unwelcome guest to the freedom of opinion. We thank the thirty-nine voters who stood by the freedom of opinion. This is a stand that the public will never forget when it is time to evaluate their membership. If a barrier of the fences in the way of the freedom of opinion is removed by the approval of the majority of MPs, we wish that their government was not in favour of the presence of this article and its continuity, especially when it, in more than the one situation, expressed its faith in the freedom of opinion and it considered the newspaper owners members of the one family. Its opposing position to cancel the article contradicts its faith and oath to guard democracy. At any rate, the press will prove its honour on the people's trust by committing itself to the Kuwait main interests. The press, however, has shown during the existence of Article (35) that it was not fear of suspension that caused the press to avoid topics other than patriotic commitment. Regardless of what happened, the government will discover that the Kuwaiti press is able to carry the social responsibility and uses the freedom of the press. It is a heavy responsibility, we feel its weight in the atmosphere which was cleared by the cancellation of the article (35)."

(Al-Watan, 5.5.81)

Al Salih, known for opposing the policy of the government, again insists here on not promising the government that the press will be cautious - rather he gave these promises to the Kuwaiti people when he said, "the press will prove to be trustworthy through commitment to Kuwait's interests." The only time he referred to the government was when he was

almost accused it of being stubborn, saying: "We wished that the government did not stand against the press by the presence of the article especially when it, in more than one position, expressed its faith in the freedom of opinion."

Meanwhile, the conservative press, such as Al-Ray Al-Am joined in the celebrations when Al Masaeed, its owner and the chief of Kuwaiti journalists, wrote in his column, 'Good Morning':

"The parliament's decision yesterday to cancel this article was an admirable stand and worthy of estimation. It deserves thanks for those who rejected the article and they are the majority, and those who were against its cancellation and they are the minority. The decision emphasized the MPs understanding of what the free press means in Kuwait and what strength it represents for Kuwait, among other nations. Our strength is in the ability to be free. Also in our ability of government and public together to understand and realize that the commitment to freedom represents the brightest civilized face of Kuwait which we all are proud of. This is the strength which builds our reputation and status in the international community.

The parliament, in this situation, emphasized the national relationship with the Press that there are two sides of one coin which is democracy. He also emphasizes an old tradition in an unbreakable relationship between the two faces of freedom, the press and the parliament." (Al-Ray Al-Am, 5.5.81)

The second direction taken by the press was waging a concentrated attack on the MPs who opposed and stood against the freedom of the press and freedom of expression. In a tacit address to the Shi'ites and the Bedouins, the press considered their position, as representative of the political dilemma in which they had found themselves. The question raised was how was it that some elected members stood against the freedom of the press and agreed to support the government's position seeking to intimidate the press under the new Law of Publication. These MPs, as Al-Talia magazine argued:

". . . were the individuals who owe their presence in the public service to the practising of democracy and the freedom it entails. With their claim of ignorance, they seemed to be willing to halt the democratic march. The ironic contrast is their

stand against a constitutional act which demands the distinction among authorities. Article (35) is an attempt to deprive the judicial system of the right to examine the disagreements between the individuals or between themselves and the legislative and executive authorities." (Al-Talia, 4.11.81)

Thus while some writers, like Al Masaeed and Al Salih, held the stick in the middle, wishing not to blame other MPs who supported the government's stand, a number of editors-in-chief and notable Kuwaiti writers launched severe attacks and criticism against the supporters of the government. For example, Jassem Al-Nisf, the former Editor-in-Chief of Al-Qabas wrote in this regard, saying:

"The refrain of a large number of the MPs yesterday from voting against this article is surprising. It raised exclamation marks of how do those MPs agree to the freedom of elections which brought them to their parliamentary seats and agree to the suspension of the freedom of the press and its right to resist government restrictions or influence. How those MPs failed to understand that the freedom of the press and free elections are two faces of one coin and both of them are an integral part of the public freedom." (Al Qabas, 28.11.81)

In the same vein, Al Anba aimed a concerted attack on the opposition MPs, accusing them of illiteracy and treason. It wrote:

"The meaning of freedom of the press is further apart from those who hardly read and write. Some MPs who undermine the freedom of the press and supported the government and who at the same time tried to play on the rapes of balance, history will brand them with disgrace. They definitely will be accused of treason." (Al-Anba, 2.11.81)

#### LEGAL PROSECUTION

As the government had attempted to use legislation and draft laws to limit the freedom of the press, it also attempted to use the same weapon with particular newspapers - i.e. suspension, harsh criticism and prosecution. Thus between 1976-1980 when parliamentary life in Kuwait was halted, the government issued Article No. 35 giving it the right to suspend newspapers without a court injunction if the government found that what was

published had special relations with a foreign country. Secondly, the government used Article No. 24 which forbids Kuwaiti newspapers from criticizing any country friendly to Kuwait, or any leading figure in that country. It also tended to use confiscation and suspension, so much so that the number of suspension injunctions during the five years 1976-1982 reached 48 cases. 32 cases were related to government internal policy, the rest were on Kuwaiti foreign affairs. Furthermore, the Kuwaiti court examined 52 cases in one year in which the newspapers were accused of referring to the Ruler, therefore, the best Editors-in-Chief were charged that their papers exceeded the limits of the Law of Publications (Al-Sayasah, 27.3.85). The press became permanently accused of violating the Law of Publication. Newspapers were nonetheless mostly acquitted of these accusations. The acquittals were from first degree courts and the defendants were described as ex-convicts, with a past record which shows the frequent presence of the journalists of some newspapers more than others (Ibid).

The cases which were related to the violation of the law of publications fell into four categories: offences against the state, and financial and economic, religious and violation of private life cases.

For offences against the state the Editor-in-Chief of Al Watan newspaper was summoned to court three times. At the first, he was charged together with Dr. Ahmad Al Rabie, MP, and a popular writer in Kuwait. Al Rabie had written an article entitled "In the Anniversary of the National Day Democracy is turning into a Decoration". The article according to a letter from the Ministry of Information sent to the General Prosecutor, was provocative of crime, hatred, and the spread of disruption among the citizens. In the defence statement, as a reminder to the people of the birth of the new Kuwait, the Constitution and democracy, the court stated that the regime in Kuwait was democratic and the nation had a constitution

which guaranteed the citizens' rights and individual freedom. The Court also noticed that the article emphasized the fact that democracy played an important role in developing the country and securing its stability. The sensitivity of internal political openness was reflected in the foreign policy of the country and it gave Kuwait's foreign policy a true picture of the situation as Kuwait had established relations with the nations which supported its position. But the country's life had changed dramatically which led to two major problems. The first one was that government officials didn't take the democratic issues seriously, while Kuwaiti society was changing rapidly in all spheres of life. The second point included in the article was that government officials were so busy trying to emphasize the political side of democracy while they forgot the social and economic aspects of that democracy. The pretence that Kuwait was a democratic state required a close look at the social and economic way of life. This required a re-distribution of wealth and an application of the law without interference by officials or any power. The defence refuted the charge that the defendant aimed, with his article to spread disruption and hatred or that he had in mind a coup d'etat. The court recognised, too, that he had, on the contrary, praised the regime in his writings. He wrote many articles praising the regime and wishing that other regimes would prove similar (Al-Watan, 3.6.84).

The court's acquittal read, "The article provides mere criticism of some aspects of the country hoping that Kuwait will always be an oasis for freedom and a home for democracy, and recommending that the constitution will remain alive with all it contained of items protecting freedom and social justice. The defendant called for the protection of the general good and putting the right man in the right place. The Court found that he did not aim to provoke hatred and disruption among the members of society." (Ibid).



Al-Matawa, Al-Watan's Editor-in-Chief, and Dr. Ghanim Al Najjar, a lecturer in Kuwait University, faced similar publication charges. The story this time revolved around a Kuwaiti citizen who, in 1961, was a real estate agent and was found dead in suspicious circumstances. Dr. Al Najjar, who wrote the article, called for re-opening the victim's story casting doubt on the evidence already put forward. As the defence showed there was nothing provocative. Freedom of opinion is guaranteed under the Constitution and there was no criminal intention by the writer. Once more the Kuwaiti law supported the freedom of the press when the judge referred to Article 36 of the Kuwaiti Constitution which reads "freedom of opinion and of scientific research is guaranteed, and each citizen has the right to express his opinion and broadcast it orally or in writing, or otherwise, according to the position stated in the law which ensures the freedom of the press and the freedom of expression the Court found the defendant was not guilty". (Al-Watan, 26.2.85)

The Kuwaiti judicial system has, therefore, adopted an honourable position siding with the law which protects the freedom of the press regardless of the government's wishes. On many occasions, the Court passed fair verdicts, supporting freedom of opinion and of publications.

Examples abound of the way the government tried to restrain the press and subject it to the Law for offensive publications against the Arab State. Al-Ray Al-Am was suspended for three days after the publication of a caricature in which Numeri, former President of the Sudan, appears to give way to America to build military bases on Sudanese soil. Similarly, other newspapers were subjected to the law because they criticised President Sadat and his wife and the Syrian President Hafez Al Asad.

On other occasions, the government resorted to religion to chastise newspapers and magazines. Among many religious cases was one about Prophet Muhammad's discourse in which he adjured people to give a special care to

women because of their physical weakness. "Commend women well, there is a rib in the woman and it is crooked." Al Watan was accused of publishing a caricature showing a woman writhing in a dance, with the caption "crooked". Saleh Al Shayji, a columnist, on another occasion wondered about the woman's rib, and he wrote "Who checked her Rib?" The government modified the case, claiming that both the caricature and the column were mocking the Prophet's discourse and trying to belittle the teachings of Islam. The accused feared the consequences and from the beginning were doubtful of their acquittal. But once again, the Kuwaiti law surprised everyone and dashed all expectations by acquitting the defendants. The justification drawn by the Court was that freedom of the press must be sustained. This emphasises that the Kuwaiti Constitution stipulates for committing a crime the presence of the material which required that the article or the caricature must include clear mockery, disguise or belittling of religion. Intention to mock must be clearly shown "verbally or written". As the intent was not available the Court saw that "what the accused were charged of was not valid; the Court dismissed the charge and acquitted them."

The examples of the financial cases was the acquittal of Al-Ray Al-Am of the charge of slander against Jassem Mohamad Khalid Al Mutawa, one of the tycoons of Kuwait's stock exchange 'Souk Al Manakh' which crashed in 1984 with disastrous effects on the Kuwaiti economy. Share prices plunged causing debts of \$74 billion. It was said that Jassem Al Mutawa owed about \$14 billion of this figure. The charge against its Editor-in-Chief was that his newspaper published news concerning that person and his wife in which the news claimed Al-Mutawa had smuggled his money to Egypt during the Al-Manakh crisis, that the amount of money he transferred to his wife's name was about \$2 billion and that the news was published with the intention of harming his honour and abusing his reputation. As a result, grave damages were brought on him and his family, and the effect on the settle-

ment agreed upon between him and his creditors. During the case the Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ray Al-Am confessed that he published four articles showing Al-Mutawa owned property and bank deposits in Egypt that amounted in value to \$2 billion. As this person was required to pay the share owners, Kuwait had a right to claim back that money. The newspaper's office in Egypt contacted some Egyptian lawyers to investigate the legalities of claiming those sums. Some of them showed their readiness to take legal and court procedures supporting that claim. The Court, after much speculation, saw that the newspaper did not slander Al Mutawa personally as it was defending a large number of creditors. As we have shown above, though the Court acquitted them, Al-Ray Al-Am had handled that subject in successive articles. The main theme was to encourage officials to take note of the issue and begin investigations to protect the national economy on one hand, and the small debtors and creditors who were harmed by the Al Manakh crisis, on the other. The newspaper appealed to the officials in the government, as the authority in charge, to pursue a tough policy against people like Al-Mutawa and in this case not to let some unconscientious persons to smuggle or even try to smuggle the national wealth.

The Court found that the newspaper was not involved in any slander on the dignity of Al Matawa and his family, and no blame was due for news that was published in other Arab newspapers as well. On the contrary, in the Court judgement Al Ray Al-Am initiated the whole affair and offered the opportunity for Al Mutawa to issue a denial of this news, which he did from the newspaper bureau in Cairo. The newspaper followed the report from its sources in Cairo and all it wrote was objective and plain, and carried no insult, or abuse to the person of the plaintiff or his family. The Court, moreover, highly praised the newspaper for good manners and good words and the noble aim which it followed. Thus, it was acquitted of all blame. The Court found the true intention of the newspaper to be the defence of

national interests. Hence, the accusation of the defendant lacked evidence, in law. The newspaper was pronounced innocent of the charges against it. For all these reasons, the Court's verdict was 'not guilty' (Al-Ray Al-Am, 10.1.86).

In spite of the many cases raised against the press by the government or by individuals, the Kuwaiti Court was determined all along to guard the freedom of the press and the role of the press and its responsibility in the social life of Kuwait. However, there was one case in which the verdict was in favour of an Arabian lady to whom the Chief Editor was made to pay \$3,000 in damages. Litigation began when the Kuwaiti magazine Al-Nahda printed the lady's picture on the cover with more pictures on inner pages without having secured the lady's permission prior to publication - the Kuwaiti lady then sued the magazine for damages. The Court found that the magazine had violated the lady's personal freedom and dignity. This was considered to have contravened Article 26 of the law No. 3, for 1961, regarding the Law of Publications which is considered the point of reference for such cases. Hence, the Court endorsed full damages to the lady in question, the total being set at one thousand Kuwaiti dinars (three thousand US dollars).

From such cases it could be deduced that the Kuwaiti judicial system, like many Arab legal authorities, can dismiss the cases of publication pertaining to political and financial matters, and to some extent, religious cases, too, since they permit interpretation more than one way. But, in the meantime, it stands firm and unwavering when it comes to cases concerned with honour or morals. When it is a matter of violating morals and customs, traditions in Arab culture are more firm and more strict in comparison with other elements of its heritage, such as the religious and political ideologies. Customs are even stricter when the case concerns women and what is called, in Arab tradition, "the violation of women's

honour and personal dignity". This was illustrated in the Court statement which concluded that:

"The reference when considering something an insult to a person's integrity (pride) and one's personal freedom, is to the customs and the conditions of social environment. Without a doubt, a Muslim woman in the Arab East with Islamic and Arabic upbringing would not allow her photo to be printed on the cover of magazines which enters every house and are handled by many people, since by doing that she is not only disobedient to her faith but it is also greatly insulting her integrity.

Therefore, the accused did not refute the charge with an acceptable defence."  
(Al-Watan, 12.2.86)

Though Arab newspapers and magazines are full of the photos of women from various countries, the tradition is defined according to personal contentment. With respect of a woman who does not see any wrong in having her photo printed, the custom has no authority to stop her from choosing to do so. But if the publishing is without her permission, the custom is strong in her defence. In general, Gulf societies have stricter customs in comparison to other Arab societies especially when it comes to a woman's affairs, her political and social rights and her right to practise her freedom as much as it suits her role in society.

An ironical pursuit by the government was the case of the Deputy Prime Minister. The government wished to emphasise the predominance of the law, that there would be no exceptions to it, not even members of the Royal Family themselves. The case was connected with Shaikh Fahad Al Ahmad Al Sabah, the brother of the Deputy Prime Minister, Shaikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah. Shaikh Fahad wrote an article in 1984, in Al-Watan newspaper, criticizing the Kuwaiti MPs for their claim to diplomatic passports. After the publication of the article, the Deputy Prime Minister ordered the suing of his brother and the Editor-in-Chief of Al-Watan leaving the final word to the Court. Jassem Al Matawa, commented on the affair in a column entitled, "Brothers' democracy". In a sarcastic tone he wrote:

"Our happiness lies in one brother submitting his brother to the general prosecutor under the power of the law. The blood relationship did not stop him from submitting his brother to the prosecution leaving the decision to the integrity and honesty of the law. Definitely, this is one positive side of democracy."  
(Al-Watan, 8.1.84)

#### THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND THE PRESS

The independence of the judicial authority is one of the main cultural and political challenges in Arab countries. It is assumed that the Court is the place where conflicts and differences among the social and political powers must be finally decided. The government in Kuwait used different means to draw the Court closer to its side in conflicts with the opposition, the press and others even though such a position might contravene the law and contradict the constitution.

The government, in the example of the Deputy Prime Minister suing his brother, both being brothers to the Amir, wanted to assure the public that in applying the law citizens were equal - shaikhs or servants. The government built its image on the same ideals in which there was no distinction between citizens and the integrity of the Court was upheld. Concerning the independence of the judicial system, the government attempted to deny the charge of a mere democratic facade or that the ones who set the laws were the first to break them. In most cases in the Gulf and other Arab states, the same governments put the law under their wings, while at other times upholding its authority as a weapon with which to threaten the opposition. There are many examples in which formal trials end, always in the sentence of treason and capital punishment verdicts. This happened in the Sudan during the reign of Numeiri when his regime sentenced the leader of the Socialist Party to death having accused him of apostasy. It also happened in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, when the court passed, in 1987, death sentences on a large number of the opponents who were defeated

in the civil war of January 1986, including the late president Ali Nesser Mohammad. Furthermore Anwar Al-Sadat used the Egyptian law in 1971 to have life sentences passed on a number of ministers, among them those of Defence, Information and the Interior, after they were charged with plotting a coup in 1971.

Most Arab officials show little enthusiasm to resort to the law, especially in political trials against their opponents. Death sentences without consulting the law are, however, not unusual and show trials replace just trials in many Arab states. For example, this happened in Syria in 1986 when the city of Hems rebelled under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood against the regime of Hafiz Al-Asad. The government used military forces, killing thousands of citizens, without trial or mercy. It happened also in Iraq, in 1979, when Saddam Hussein discovered that a number of colleagues, leaders in the ruling party Al Baath, were plotting a coup against him with the help of the Syrian President Hafiz Al-Asad. Saddam ordered the execution of a large number of them without trial. Iraqi embassies in Arab capitals distributed some video tapes showing the personal statements of the accused confessing their involvement in the claimed coup and admitting their guilt. It was believed by the Iraqi authority that the video tapes were enough to make up for the absence of the law and of fair trials. Similarly, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a high ranking source revealed to the author that in 1980 twelve citizens of the Eastern part of the Kingdom, i.e. Shi'ite Muslims, had formed a delegation to meet Khalid, the king of Saudi Arabia to submit certain demands to ensure their rights to practise some Shi'ite religious rites, together with other demands concerning the improvement of the services in the Eastern region. The twelve Shi'ites were encouraged by the triumph of Ayat Allah Khomeini in Iran, thinking that the new Islamic Republic in Iran brought shelter to the Shi'ites and improved their political position in Saudi

Arabia, and formed a new source of pressure on the Saudi system. That was the last thing in their life and that was the last they did, they were never heard of again. Therefore, the Arab judicial system is subject to violation by the executives. The violation of human rights and the lack of fair trial, is a routine practice by the governments. The only exception is the Kuwaiti law which found its shelter in the Kuwaiti Constitution for it is considered the most progressive law among all the Arabs in the whole Middle East (Baz, 1981).

The Kuwaiti law sought protection from the traditional relations to which the Kuwaitis were committed through history. It was also secured by the clear separations of the jurisdictions of the political system, the state, the parliament, the law and the press. An example of the modernity of the political system in Kuwait is the integrity and honesty of the law. The legislator had incorporated many progressive articles into the law restricting the freedom of the Amir and the government over other political institutions. The government was whipped into ratification and it proved too late to make any changes later. The 'appropriate' chance came when the press seemed vulnerable. The government found in the Iran-Iraq war, the way out for the political dilemma based on the increase of tension in the Gulf zone, the sabotage attempts upon Kuwaiti institutions and officials, especially the attempt on the Amir's life in May 1985, and the threat by the Prime Minister to submit his Cabinet's resignation. The chance had thus come to suspend some articles in the Constitution, to dissolve the National Assembly and to abolish any restriction on the wishes of the government. The Amir announced the dissolution of the National Assembly on 3rd July 1986, imposing pre-publication censorship on the press.

After the suspension of law, the Amir consolidated his authority while other groups became vulnerable. Hence the disillusionment of the Arab



people with the Kuwaiti democratic system. Domestically, a new era of uncertainty in political relations between the government and other social groups has started.

While researching this topic, I have noticed that relations between the government and the National Assembly were at their worst, in relation to the organizing of the judicial powers. The government submitted the law to Parliament for verification. The National Assembly led several discussions during the last three months prior to its dissolution. It was clear, though not publicised, that the differences between MPs and the government had been centred around a number of articles which gave more power to the Amir at the expense of the Court. Opposing this, the MPs insisted upon reducing those jurisdictions and refused to approve the draft law. The government repeated its effort at a number of sessions, but the parliament stood firm. So the crisis came to a head between the government on the one hand and parliament on the other. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs announced in the middle of May 1986, the same month in which this study data was collected, i.e. fifty days before the dissolution of the parliament, that the MPs must know that the Amir can dissolve the parliament whenever he wishes and that the Constitution gives him the right to issue an order to that effect.

It so chanced that I was present at three parliamentary sessions in the same month where I witnessed a strong argument full of altercation between the Deputy Prime Minister and some MPs, e.g. Dr. Abdullah Al Nafeesy, an MP and a lecturer of political science in Kuwait University. Addressing Shaikh Sabah in one of the sessions, Al Nafeesy said: "It should be known to the Deputy Prime Minister that democracy in Kuwait is not a gift from anybody, it belongs to the Kuwaiti people who are all concerned with it." He added that "When he makes his statements [the Shaikh] must be cautious, as his words about the possibility of dissolving the parliament

is excessive and that parliament came through the will of the Kuwaiti people, the only power which has the right to dissolve the Assembly and nobody else" (Personal notes, May 1986). The Shaikh's reply was more provocative. He answered Al Nafeesy saying: "If wisdom would come from someone like Al Nafeesy, I am sure I can do without it. Al Nafeesy knows who he is and knows his limits" (Ibid). Fifty days after those sessions, Dr. Al Nafeesy found himself out of the political arena and the Deputy Prime Minister had become the head of the advisory committee which was appointed by the Amir to act on behalf of the National Assembly besides his post as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In the above discussion, the history and development of the Kuwaiti press was presented in elaborate detail, and the position of the press in the power structure was thoroughly examined. The material presented in this chapter is intended to complete the analysis of the social forces which contribute to the balance of power in Kuwait. Taken together, therefore, this and the preceeding chapter provide a total view of the situation from which certain generalisations can be derived. These will be presented in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER V

### THEORETICAL GENERALISATIONS, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

In this chapter a discussion and theoretical generalisation will be presented. It is intended to draw upon the ideas presented in the analysis of the social dynamics in Kuwait and the role of the Kuwaiti press presented in the last two chapters in order to arrive at certain theoretical generalisations which would guide this study. In this chapter, research hypotheses will be advanced on the basis of that discussion and research methods will be highlighted.

It was shown in particular that the delegation of political control to the Sabah dynasty was established by consensus at the beginning of the eighteenth century, whereas the remainder of their Baniutub cousins were relegated control of trade and of the thriving pearling industry.

It was also shown that the convenient harbour of Kuwait made it a trade centre which played an active role as a main trade centre in the Gulf. It competed with Basra, in Iraq, and Bandar Abbas, in Iran, in the continuing rivalries between the Ottoman Empire and the European colonialists, particularly the British. Throughout these rivalries, a well-established merchant class finally settled in Kuwait and strengthened its position in the latter half of the 19th Century, especially as the East India Company (with Britain behind it) controlled trade and secured trade routes between India and the West via the Gulf. For all practical purposes, Kuwait became a British protectorate when a secret agreement was promulgated with Mubarak, which safeguarded Kuwait from any threats or ambitions of the Wahabites from the south or the Ottomans from the north.

The point was also made that the fast emerging merchant class was soon rendered dormant when the trade routes shifted to Suez at the turn of the

century. However, Kuwait remained in the British orbit after the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the discovery of oil in the mid-1930s.

At that time the Amir endeavoured to establish his authority by maintaining a position independent of the Royal Family and an alliance with the British since the latter paid his subsidies and protected him politically. This arrangement was necessitated by the requirement of the British that they should deal with only one authority, the Amir, who is dependent upon and responsible to them. The income of the Emirate (that is to say the Amir) came from the British and whatever taxes could be collected from the depressed merchants. There was not much to go round and the Amir could only sustain himself without much being left for the rest of the Royal Family.

It was also pointed out that the pumping of oil after World War II ushered in a revival of the merchant class and an entrenchment of the Ruling Family. The pouring in of oil revenues in the 1950s put the Amir on the spot as to what he was to do with that wealth. Luckily Shaikh Abdullah, who ruled from 1950 to 1965, was able to work well with the forces facing him, mainly the Royal Family, who demanded their share of the oil revenues, the merchants who wanted the new prosperity to spill over to them and the British who wanted a stable Kuwait which they could continue to exploit and control. Members of the Royal Family received steady allowances and salaries and were included in the Supreme Council which the Amir created specifically to diffuse his absolute hold over Kuwait. The merchants received concessions including abolishing income tax, waiving of their debts to the State and lowering of tariffs, but they were totally excluded both from power and from receiving direct income from the oil revenues. The British companies got exclusive control over development projects and dealerships, which included Royal Family members as partners.

The establishment of service oriented development projects, such as schools, hospitals, roads, utilities and the rebuilding of the city of Kuwait set the stage for the emergence of new groups on the Kuwaiti political scene. Many non-Kuwaiti Arabs, mostly Palestinians, flocked to Kuwait. These were professionals, such as teachers, doctors, lawyers, journalists and civil servants who were needed to build a young and flourishing state. Their contributions and ideas were needed, but without political control which was vested exclusively in the Amir and the Supreme Council. However, many of the non-Kuwaiti Arabs were allied with the emerging Kuwaiti nationalists and intellectuals who returned to create a modern Kuwait after they completed their higher education in Arab and foreign universities.

It was also shown that Independence (1961) had to be predicated upon modern institutions. But with independence some new challenges came to the state from within and from without. Iraq wanted to annexe Kuwait, and the Kuwaiti nationalists were forcefully demanding fundamental reforms. In order to meet these conditions, the Amir created a modern constitution, calling for the establishment of a Cabinet, free elections (which were held in 1962) and an Assembly (which commenced in 1963). The experiment proved successful, especially under Amir Abdullah's leadership, but it also set the stage for rigorous political fermentation, polarization among Assembly members, intellectuals, nationalists, merchants and the rest of the populace. The result was the emergence and crystallisation of certain institutions and groups which now constitute the Kuwaiti social structure. These are the ruling authority including the Amir, the Cabinet and government officials, then the Royal Family, the Assembly, the merchants, the nationalists, the journalists and the bedouins. Throughout, the press and the rest of the media played a basic and fundamental role in the articulation of the ideas and views of these groups.

The ambitious plans of Amir Abdullah under the new-found democracy led to state bankruptcy in 1964, partly due to the corruption of some ministers of the Royal Family and some British companies. In this state of flux, new alliances were made and new realities were created to establish a balance of power among the existing social groups.

The Amir investigated the affairs of some members of the Royal Family and removed some from positions of control. He also made a tacit deal with the merchants to support the state and in return get the lion's share of the concessions and deals which were previously controlled by members of the Royal Family and British companies. In addition, the Amir established a more stable and efficient administration. High level professionals and educated merchants were recruited to leading positions in the Cabinet and the municipalities. The civil service was strengthened and government officials were given authority to carry government mandates. Government officials, especially those in higher echelons, became the recognised executives of the Amir and the Cabinet.

The National Assembly attracted members from different ranges of the political spectrum including radicals, nationalists, royalists and the Bedouin who were encouraged by the Amir to run for office in the elections. The latter were, in fact, courted by the Amir and drawn to the political arena to widen the political base of the Assembly and counter balance the vocal and demanding nationalists and radicals.

The nationalists, some of whom came from the conservative right, but the majority of whom were leftists and radicals, became restless and active. On the whole they were vocal and influential by writing in the newspapers advocating their cause in the Assembly. Confrontations and showdowns in the Assembly and the media led to the establishment of conservative and liberal positions on the issues. The advocates of each position tenaciously fought for their cause in the Assembly and in the media.

Government officials with the Cabinet, the royalists, the merchants, and the Bedouin took the conservative position to establish modern Kuwait on the basis of the traditional ethos. The nationalists and intellectuals, including Marxists, Nasserists and Pan-Arabs were vehemently advocating progressive reforms and liberal causes. The confrontations between the two groups led to the suspension of the National Assembly in 1976, and resulted in a period of retrenchment which lasted until 1981.

It was pointed out that in 1976 the Amir dissolved the Assembly and strengthened the role of government officials. He provided further support to the Royal Family by appointing highly educated members in leading civil and governmental posts. Most importantly, he abolished certain Articles in the Law of Publication and replaced them with others which authorised suspension of publications for up to two years without due legal process. The nationalists were curtailed and the only recourse they had was that they get their views in the media , but now under difficult and threatening conditions. It was during this period that an unspoken alliance occurred between the nationalists and journalists. The latter were in a vulnerable position mainly because many of them were non-Kuwaiti nationals, subject to pressure by government officials, and under threat of deportation if they exceeded their boundaries.

The Iraq/Iran war of 1981 had a discernible impact on the organization of the balance of power in Kuwait. The nationalists, in spite of their heated and incessant calls for reform, were suddenly taken very seriously because of the government's concern to secure the internal front. The nationalists, allied with the journalists, were pressing for free elections, civil rights, an equal distribution of wealth and social political reforms. On the whole, they followed a liberal orientation in that they called for rapid changes and opposed orthodoxy or traditionalism as a negative norm.

They were calling for a secular pan-Arab progressive government, support for the PLO and the Palestinian cause, replacing of non-Arab foreigners in Kuwait by non-Kuwait Arabs, support of Iraq in its war efforts against Iran, opposition to the G.C.C. security arrangements. They were further calling for Kuwaiti independence from Western influence, for full control of the oil wealth and utilization of it to develop the state. Social justice to combat terrorism instead of state oppression and above all parliamentary reforms and the freedom of the press featured prominently in nationalist demands.

The nationalists, intellectuals and the journalists were viewed by the government as a volatile element that must be contained at all costs. The Amir yielded to their pressure and agreed to hold free elections to appease some and co-opt others. The Amir knew of the scope of their influence, especially of those who by their eloquence commanded the sympathy of the Kuwaiti progressive elements, such as the educated sector, professionals and the low income class. They were ignored before the Iran-Iraq war because their weight was counter-balanced by the minorities of the Bedouin and Shi'ites who were drawn into positions of power and influence. However, due to the Iranian threat to Kuwait and certain acts of terrorism, the Shi'ites were neutralized and the vacuum they left was partly filled by the nationalists and intellectuals.

The history of the 1981 Assembly was a replay of the Assembly before 1976 albeit with more vehemence and more confrontations. The nationalists and intellectuals, in alliance with the journalists, used the Assembly as a forum in which to pressure the government for drastic reforms. In order to face the increasing influence of nationalists, the Amir and the government undertook three main tasks. First of all, they gathered the bedouins, settled them in Kuwait City, granted them citizenship and groomed their leaders for political participation such that they constituted 38% of the



1981 Assembly. They voted en bloc for the government. Secondly, the Amir and the government got into a long drawn out battle with the press in an effort to restrict its influence and lessen the impact of the nationalists and the intellectuals. They presented the restrictions of the Law of Publication introduced in 1981 to the Assembly which, if passed, would have curtailed the freedom of the press and confined the influence of the journalists. For more than six months an extremely intense debate took place between the liberal and conservative MPs and resulted in the defeat of the proposed law. This enervated the government and gave the journalists more confidence to pursue the liberal cause. The government reacted by strengthening the role and authority of government officials to espouse conservative causes and to intimidate the journalists particularly by resorting to bureaucratic, legal, economic and political measures. For example, the Minister of Information demanded that a weekly meeting be held with the journalists at which he could impress upon them the government's line. Many lawsuits were raised against the press in long drawn out litigations. Journalists were accused, by the government, of being agents of foreign governments, and newspapers were threatened that unless they followed the government line they would lose their subsidies.

All this turmoil, along with many other factors which were smouldering since the middle of the 1970s, led to the dissolution of the Assembly in July 1986. (This occurred two months after the completion of collecting the data for this study). During this period, the expanding scope and extent of economic development and rapid urbanisation, required that the government strengthen their administrative apparatus in order to attain tight control. Thus, after the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1976, there was a wide reorganization of the administrative system which aimed at increasing the power of government officials and allowing them to play fundamental roles to carry out the government's programmes. Their

authority was expanded in most directions and they became active in the pursuit of government goals and directives. In spite of the fact that they did not participate directly in politics, they were nevertheless the main arm of the government whose role exceeded administrative matters and included influencing the populace including the media to follow the conservative line of the government. They pursued a carrot and stick policy towards the journalists. They established a strong and functional relationship with the journalists based upon feeding them with news and information about governmental policies and activities, domestic and foreign. This supplied the journalists with a free stream of news and information. They also invited their journalist friends to attend government functions and social gatherings. Additionally, they exchanged favours with the editors and the owners of the media who were themselves merchants and could use the influence of government officials for their own benefit.

The relationship between the journalists and government officials was tenuous and led to continual conflict. The journalists knew that they could be rejected and hurt at any time if they entered into open conflict with government officials. They also knew that they would be tolerated to a certain point beyond which they would be restricted. In this tug-of-war, in the world of ideas, a division of labour occurred to demarcate the sphere of influence of each group. Government officials took it upon themselves to act as the guardians of the interests of the state. In this regard, on the whole, they followed a conservative direction on all issues and saw to it that this conservative position appeared in the media by holding press conferences to issue new releases, granting interviews, and controlling the flow of news in the government-run Kuwait News Agency. In this role, government officials were not interested in intimidating the journalists; rather they were acting on their convictions; that they were serving God and country and so guarding the state from slipping into

anarchy or from being subverted by a neighbouring country. Thus they tended to support a free economy and non-centralized Arab Unity, augmenting the police power to maintain peace and order so that Kuwait was a bright example of how oil wealth was best utilized to develop the country and to raise the standard of living to one of the highest in the world. They exercised tight controls over entry and exit visas and asserted that deportation of certain undesirable elements was necessary for the security of the country. A firm and unyielding stand was adopted to fight terrorism. Government officials asserted themselves to be just as concerned with the national interests, or even more so, than the National Assembly, and that they had as much right to influence public opinion as the National Assembly and the press. They insisted that the press and other publications must meet certain standards which did not impair government authority or "mislead" public opinion. As far as they were concerned, Kuwait would not be what it was without them, a view, as we have said, which is not uncommon among many Kuwaitis.

So far, the discussion has been confined to Kuwait, the research site chosen for this study, as if the interest of this study does not exceed Kuwaiti boundaries. This, of course, is not the intention. Although Kuwait is unique in many ways, it, nonetheless, presents a form of socio-political division of labour which is not without parallel in many other developing Third World nations. Of course, the transformation of a traditional society, in the Third World, takes different forms depending on the institutional underpinnings of prevailing institutions. In societies in which traditional authority has been overthrown by an emergent institution, usually the army, the media are usually usurped by the regime to serve its revolutionary ends. But in Third World societies in which the traditional authority contributes, along with other emerging social institutions, to its transformation, the media attain a certain degree of freedom and

reflect the positions of traditionalism and modernity, or conservatism and liberalism, along the socio-political lines characteristic of the existing social organisation. Thus, what is found in Kuwait may be equally found in such Arab countries as Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Lebanon (before the civil war), as well as many other developing nations which are similarly organised.

From the above discussion, the following generalization is derived for research purposes. In a socio-political system, which is characterized by a rapid (almost in one generation) transformation from a traditional society to a highly urbanised one, both the traditional authorities and the journalists (along with the intellectuals) strove to influence the content of the press. Put differently, the control of the press in such a society was equally influenced by the rulers through government officials, who led the march of social change to best serve the interests of the state and see to it that their views and news were continuously portrayed in the press, as well as by the journalists in alliance with the intellectuals, who considered themselves the avant garde of progress and therefore continuously agitate for modernization. In such societies, both groups are bound to feel that they have equal claims to shape the content of the press and through it influence public opinion. In such a society the right to inform is not exclusively reserved for the journalists. Government officials feel that they also have the right to inform, and to influence and shape the ideas of the populace.

From this perspective, it would be reasonable to expect that the degree of coverage of certain issues in the press (i.e. their salience in the press) would correspond to the degree of importance (i.e. salience) assigned to them both by the journalists and by government officials. By the same token, it would also be expected that both government officials and journalists would agree between themselves as to the degree of

importance (i.e. salience) they assign to different issues. Put succinctly, it is expected that the agenda of the press would be set by both government officials and journalists in that (1) there would be agreement between government officials and the press as to the salience of the issues; (2) government officials and journalists would agree as to the salience of the issues; and (3) there would be agreement between journalists and the press as to the salience of the issues.

However, since the two groups take different positions on the issues, it is expected that although they agree as to salience of those issues in general, they would, nevertheless, at times agree and at times differ on their "attitudes over those issues". By this is meant the point of view they take in their assessment of the issues, such difference being "a matter that is in dispute between two or more parties : a point of debate or controversy." (Merriam-Webster, 1983, p.624).

These points of view, or attitudes on the issues, are categorized for research purposes as exhibiting a liberal position or a conservative one. Thus, a liberal position on an issue would be one which is "broad-minded, especially not bound by authoritarianism, orthodoxy, or traditional norms." (Ibid, p.688). Conversely, a conservative position on an issue would be one which is "tending or disposed to maintain existing views; conditions, or institutions, i.e. traditional; or marked by moderation or caution; or marked by or relating to traditional norms" (Ibid, p.270). This line of thinking is not only defensible conceptually, it is also based upon and supported by the findings of a pilot study of the Kuwaiti press which will be reported in some detail in this Chapter and presented in Appendix V. Suffice it for the moment to argue that the press usually presents both sides of the issue either in the same item, which may indicate differing views, or in different items which are usually partisan. There is also the case of partisan papers which consistently take one position or the other.

(Conceptually there is also a neutral position on the issues, but it is ignored here for research purposes). More discussion to justify the position on the issues will be presented below in the section "Issues Appearing in the Kuwaiti Press".

We argued earlier that the Kuwaiti rulers, through government officials and the journalists in alliance with the intellectuals, could hold differing positions on some social, political and economic issues. On the whole, it was shown that each group wishes to build a modern Kuwait in its own image. The government's position on the issues, which are advocated by the Cabinet and government officials, is rather conservative in that it espouses caution or moderation, and supports existing or traditional conditions, or institutions and norms. They have done well to rule from that perspective and to develop Kuwait as a modern state, but with a traditional flavour. The attitudes of the journalists on the issues (along with the intellectuals and the nationalists) tend, at least on some issues, to be rather liberal, more ready to depart from authoritarianism or traditional norms. They advocate these attitudes within existing institutions, e.g. the National Assembly, and, most importantly, in the press. In the absence of political parties, this arrangement works well to generate opposition and political fermentation.

The above perspective goes beyond agenda setting and proposes certain refinements in the concept. Agenda setting dealt generally with overall salience of the issues in the press and the corresponding overall salience of these issues among a given population. What we propose here is that besides the above concept of the "public agenda-setting" it is of great importance in this study to go beyond the public agenda-setting to research what scientists have defined as the "policy agenda-setting". The central research question for the "policy agenda-setting" is "How does a public issue get on the policy agenda?" (Rogers and Darling, 1988, p.560).

Thus, if the content of an issue in the press contains more items espousing conservative arguments than non-conservative, it could be reasonably said that that piece is presenting a conservative disposition. By the same token, if the liberal items in a given issue in the press are more than the conservative ones, it is reasonable to state that that issue is presenting a liberal disposition. In short, issues can be classified not only in terms of their general salience (i.e. the overall coverage), but also in terms of their attitudinal directions, that is, whether they emphasize the liberal or the conservative sides of the issues. By the same token, it is possible to ascertain the attitudinal mood of the issues in a given population if they are allowed to indicate not only how important these issues are to them, but also the disposition (i.e. liberal or conservative) they take as our instrument was designed to ascertain.

If the press is taken as the frame of reference to classify the salience in terms of conservative and liberal disposition, and an enquiry is made about the correspondence between the attitude of the press, government officials and journalists on the issues, it is reasonable to expect a direct relationship with regard to conservative dispositions on the issues (1) between the attitudes of the government officials and the journalists, (2) between the attitudes of the government officials and the attitudes of the press indicated in the press content. Upon these five generalizations, research hypotheses will be designed and tested.

#### RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Certain hypotheses are advanced on the basis of the discussion presented explaining the relationship between the salience of issues in the Kuwaiti press and the degree of importance (i.e. salience) assigned to these issues by journalists and government officials. All in all, five hypotheses will be advanced. The first three hypotheses deal with salience

in general. They are similar to the agenda setting hypotheses common in the literature. The remaining two hypotheses go beyond the common agenda setting hypotheses in that they examine the attitudes of government officials and journalists on the issues.

#### AGENDA-SETTING HYPOTHESES

These hypotheses are concerned with the relationship between the overall extent of coverage of the issues in the press and the overall degree of importance assigned to these issues by the journalists and government officials.

#### THE FIRST HYPOTHESIS

In a socio-political system characterised by rapid transformation from a tribal-traditional level to a highly urbanised level with a high standard of living and a high level of education, the government represents the sovereign (King, Sultan, Amir, or Sheikh). The sovereign, in turn, is seen as the guardian of sacred traditions and values; he embodies them, personifies them, and is entrusted by all to protect them. In this case the sovereign is not a ceremonial figure. He rules, and he governs. He is the final authority.

The Cabinet, which is chosen by the sovereign, is considered by all as the extension of his authority. Government officials, especially at the highest level, in turn are considered to be "the King's men," his servants. They enjoy a traditional authority which gives them power and influence over most, if not all, social institutions.

Modern social institutions, such as the press, do not dispute the authority of government officials in matters which revolve around upholding traditions and values. Government officials not only present the position of the sovereign to the press, they are also sought by the press to include



their news and views on a regular basis in newspapers. A substantial amount of news, views and commentary is, therefore, initiated or suggested by government officials. These views might not necessarily be endorsed by the journalists, and might not correspond to the latter's views. But the journalists, along with almost everybody else, expect government officials to participate in setting the press agenda and contributing to the issues, whether directly or indirectly. It is expected, therefore, government officials participate in setting the agenda for the press. Consequently, it is hypothesised that:

Hypothesis 1. There is a positive rank order correlation between the overall differential coverage of the issues appearing in the press and the overall degree of importance assigned to these issues by government officials.

#### THE SECOND HYPOTHESIS

Similarly, the expectation is that the degree of importance assigned by government officials to the issues usually correspond to the degree of importance assigned by journalists to the same issues. In this case, journalists may serve as mouthpieces for the sovereign or they may dwell on the same issue albeit in their own way. In general the relationship between officials and journalists may be based on the latter's duty and obligation to present the position of the government in the press. Such a relationship is usually reflected in the different ways in which government officials influence, pressure, suggest, encourage or even activate or prod journalists to emphasise issues in the press which become jointly defined as important by both groups. Eventually, the journalists' salience of the issues becomes very similar to that of the officials. Therefore, it is hypothesised that:

Hypothesis 2. There is a positive rank order correlation between the overall degree of importance assigned to the issues appearing in the press by the journalists and by government officials.

### THE THIRD HYPOTHESIS

By virtue of their professional position, journalists are obliged to keep up with the content of the news and become consistently aware of the issues that comprise leading headlines and occupy a considerable amount of space. In most cases, they directly contribute to making the news and emphasising the issues. In other cases, by responding to issues raised by others, they contribute to the debate and participate in the discussions of these issues. They simply cannot afford to ignore the issues, become oblivious to them, or stay aloof when issues are raised and discussed. It is, therefore, hypothesised that:

Hypothesis 3. There is a positive rank order correlation between the overall differential coverage of the issues appearing in the press and the overall degree of importance assigned to these issues by the journalists.

### BEYOND AGENDA-SETTING HYPOTHESIS

In the following, two hypotheses are not based on overall salience of the issues, but rather on the attitudes which govern the positions of government officials, journalists and the attitudinal positions found in the content of the press, in relation to conservative or liberal aspects of prevalent issues in Kuwait.

As indicated earlier, the quest here is to find out the degree of correspondence between the positions of the three variables on issues which either lean predominantly towards conservatism or liberalism, and to examine the relationship between government officials, journalists and the press in terms of (a) their attitudes on the conservative/liberal dichotomy on prevalent issues, (b) the attitudinal tendency of officials, journalists and the press with relation to the conservative/liberal dichotomy, in order to determine the similarity or differences among them, based on the degree of their attitudinal positions on the issues. In other words, while the

first three hypotheses examined the overall importance of the issues assigned by officials and journalists, and the salience of those issues in the press content, the following two hypotheses take the attitudes of each group into account.

#### THE FOURTH HYPOTHESIS

In a traditional system infused with modern democratic institutions, such as Kuwait, in which the government represents the sovereign (King, Sultan, Amir or Shaikh), modern social groups such as journalists and social institutions such as the press do not dispute the authority of government officials mainly in issues relating to government policy and the undisputable traditions and values. The position of journalists, hence of the press, taken on the issues in terms of conservativeness or liberalism, would reflect in different ways the position taken by government officials on the same issues. In this case the journalists and the press, to a degree usually serve as a mouthpiece for the sovereign, particularly with regard to the conservative position on the issues. In such a system, the relationship between journalists together with the press, on one side, and government officials, on the other, regarding the conservative position on the issues may be that of duty and obligation. Officials believe that the press is part of the components of the system; it must therefore act in harmony with other political institutions, with the ruler at the top, then the Cabinet and the management (government officials). Thus journalists would represent, to a certain extent, in response to the actual conservative attitudes they take, the government officials' conservative attitudes regarding the issues, thus:

- Hypothesis 4. There is a similarity in the conservative disposition taken by the government officials and the conservative positions taken by the journalists on issues prevalent in the Kuwaiti press.

#### THE FIFTH HYPOTHESIS

Following the same argument in which the tendency of the attitudinal position of journalists coincides with the attitudinal positions of officials on the conservative side of the issues, it is predicted that the attitudinal positions found in the press content will show a similar tendency by the press coverage towards the conservative side of the issues. Such an assumption is based on the notion that government officials have a heavy handed influence on the press mainly in conservative dispositions which by virtue of their position they are expected to champion and to guard. Just as expected, the relationship between officials and the press is at any rate determined by the nature of the relationship between the press and the journalists who, without much astuteness, are the content designers and supposedly those who set the agenda for the press. Therefore, it is expected that the same logic underlying the fourth hypothesis would also give direction to the relationship between government officials and the press. The assumption was made all along that government officials and the press might take opposite positions on some issues by virtue of their positions in the social structure. This contention is based on the argument that the press role in developing societies is to lead the cause for change by the social movement for modernization, and that one of the many functions of the press in traditional societies is to lead the trends for changes. It serves as a counter-balance against the rigidity of traditional authority.

However, in a traditional system in which the government represents the sovereign (King, Sultan, Amir or Sheik), regardless of the fact that it enjoys a great deal of freedom, diversity and sufficient financial sources, in such a system the relationship between officials and the press is governed by the fact that the press usually serves as the mouthpieces for the

sovereign particularly in matters related to legitimacy, security, defence, wealth, therefore:

Hypothesis 5. There is a similarity in the conservative disposition taken by the government officials and the position taken by the press on issues prevalent in the press content.

#### METHODS AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to test the hypotheses, two types of measurements were needed. First of all, a rank ordering of the issues appearing in the Kuwaiti newspapers over a definite span of time had to be ascertained. Secondly, a rank ordering of these issues by a sample of government officials and journalists had to be obtained. The rank ordering of these issues in the newspapers will indicate the agenda of the press. The point would be to find out the degree to which the agenda of the press corresponds directly or inversely with the agenda of journalists and government officials, as indicated by the rank ordering of these issues.

Also, to define the attitudes taken by officials, journalists and the press coverage on the dichotomy, conservative and liberal.

It was essential at the beginning of the study to locate the type of issues prevalent in the Kuwaiti press. Once located, these would then constitute the bases upon which the content analysis of newspapers and measuring instruments such as the questionnaire, and the interview schedule would be constructed. A pilot study was therefore designed and carried out for that purpose. Five newspapers were reviewed for a four months period during the months of April, May, June and July, 1985. These were Al-Qabas, Al-Anba, Al-Ray Al-Am, Al-Sayasah, and Al-Watan. The front pages, the local pages, and the editorial pages of the newspapers were item analysed according to topics column inch length and numbers of publication. A listing of the topics appearing in these pages was then compiled. All in

all, there were 120 topics ranging in space between 10 and 3,123 column inches. Topics occupying less than 100 column inches were removed, resulting in 50 topics and fell into the following nine categories:

1. Arab Unity; 2. Arab-Israeli conflict; 3. Iran-Iraq War; 4. Security in Kuwait; 5. Distribution of wealth; 6. Terrorism; 7. The relationship between the government and the parliament; and, 8. The freedom of the press. The ninth category, the Decline in Oil Prices, was added after the pilot study as it became a current issue.

The items falling in each topic were further analysed. It was found that each topic includes presentations, discussions and debates which represent different and opposing positions. For example, the five topics in the category of Arab unity were:

1. Arab renaissance without or with Arab unity; 2. Arab unity in stages or immediate and total; 3. Arab unity founded on religious or secular values; 4. Arab unity founded on free or controlled economy; 5. Arab unity with federal or control government.

The remaining topics as shown in Table 5.1 included similar polarizations. It was consequently concluded that each topic actually represented an issue, in that it dealt with a matter that was in dispute between two or more parties, a point of debate or controversy (Webster, 1983, p.642). This conclusion is based on the fact that each issue contained a traditional conservative disposition and a modern liberal one.

#### THE SALIENCE QUESTIONNAIRE

On the basis of the issues revealed in the pilot study, a salience questionnaire was developed and a probing interview protocol was designed. The questionnaire consisted of two sections in Arabic, shown in Appendix I (translated into English, and included in Appendix II). Exceeding previous research in agenda-setting, issues in this study were presented in a

bipolar form, representing liberal or conservative dispositions. Thus, each issue was presented in its two controversial forms, i.e. the conservative and the liberal dispositions. Respondents of the two sample groups (government officials and journalists) were asked to rate the degree of importance of the side of each issue on a four-point scale for each polar. All statements located at the right side of the Arabic questionnaire presented the conservative disposition, while statements located on the left side presented the liberal disposition. Conversely, in the English translation of the questionnaire, the left side presented the conservative dispositions while the statement located in the right side presented the liberal.

In addition to the above-mentioned issues, the questionnaire also contains nine other sections. For example, it stimulates the respondents of government official groups to evaluate journalists' sincerity and their degree of honesty when they deal with news. This section also contains certain questions regarding journalists' credibility and confidence and their perception of social events. One major factor included socio-demographic variables, such as age, sex, and income. The second major factor involved the position of the individual in the social matrix and included such variables as occupation, seniority and education, all of which indicated the individual's status within the social structure of Kuwait. A third factor concerned the individual's scale of values, basically in terms of traditional or modern attitudes. Especially in the last 25 years in which Kuwait has undergone rapid transformation and fast social change, value orientations have been crucial in determining perceptions of social issues. In general, the researcher found two value orientations. The first was traditionalism which, although it accepts Western technology, believes that the answer to social problems can only be found in old traditions. The second was modernism which considers that traditions are not

only an impediment to coping with modern life, but that they are also unsuitable and almost useless as guides to contemporary values.

Finally, an important factor was readership behaviour. In some groups it is not uncommon for people to read daily newspapers and magazines published either weekly, monthly or quarterly, plus other local Arabic and/or foreign periodicals. It is also common to find many people in leading positions who read many different newspapers, regardless of the country of origin. The demographic variables appeared as shown in Appendix III.

The questionnaire contained a preamble explaining to the respondents the object of the study and giving examples of how to answer the items. The second section consisting of items 1 to 50 of Table 5.1, contained the nine categories mentioned above. Respondents were asked to ascertain the degree of importance of each issue to them on a four-point scale ranging from extremely important, very important, somewhat important to not important at all. They indicated their rating on each issue either on the conservative side or on the liberal depending on how the issue was presented in the questionnaire. For example, on the issue of Arab unity, the conservative disposition read "Arab renaissance can occur before Arab unity", the liberal form of the same issue read "Arab renaissance is impossible without Arab unity". The scales were pre-coded from 1 to 4, in two opposite directions and above each number in each cell the definition of the scale was presented. As an example, the item of the issue related to the system in a future Arab unity is as follows:

When it occurs, Arab unity must follow a federal government system

When it occurs, Arab unity must be based on a controlled economy

1	2	3	4	0	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant



The actual questionnaire used in the study, as well as the interview protocol which was designed to probe certain issues, (see below) are presented, respectively, in Appendices II and IV.

Table 5.1 The Fifty Issues Listed According to the Nine Categories into which they fall

I. Issues relating to Arab unity:

1. Arab renaissance with or without Arab unity.
2. Arab unity immediate or in stages.
3. Arab unity religious or secular.
4. Arab unity with free or controlled economy.
5. Arab unity with federal or controlled government.

II. Issues relating to the Arab/Israeli conflict:

6. Resolving the Palestinian problem by treaty or by confrontation.
7. Peaceful settlement regain rights or surrender.
8. Resolving the Arab/Israeli conflict in stages or immediate.
9. Palestinian rights gained by supporting moderate Palestinians or extremists.
10. PLO effective under Arafat or under leader opponents.
11. Effective policy to solve Palestinian problem is that of moderate or rejectionist Arab states.
12. Jordan/PLO agreement return or impedes rights.
13. Solution with or without Egypt's participation.

III. Issues relating to security in Kuwait:

14. Non-Arab foreigners threaten security.
15. Non-Kuwaiti Arabs threaten security.
16. Non-Kuwaiti Shi'ite threaten security.
17. Open resistance to Khomeini regime threat to security.
18. Existing policy authority maintains law and order.

IV. Issues relating to Iran/Iraq war:

19. Iran-Iraq war ends by negotiation or defeat.
20. Gulf states should subsidise Iraq or stay neutral.
21. Great Powers are invited to patrol the Gulf by Iran or by others.
22. Iran undermines Gulf states by continuing war.
23. GCC military preparations sufficient or not sufficient.
24. Iran-Iraq war religious or nationalistic.

V. Issues relating to the decline in oil prices and its impact on the future of the Gulf region.

- 25. OPEC caused the decline in oil prices or the West.
- 26. Decline in oil prices temporary or lasting.
- 27. Lowering oil prices threaten stability of the Gulf region.
- 28. Lower oil prices lead to economic depression in Gulf commerce.
- 29. Drop in oil wealth lessens or aggravates inter-Arab conflict.

VI. Issues relating to oil wealth:

- 30. Kuwaiti oil income spent wisely or unwisely.
- 31. Kuwait authority conserve oil revenue or waste it.
- 32. Oil reserve is plenty need or not to be conserved.
- 33. All or limited classes benefit from oil revenues.
- 34. Social services adequate or inadequate because of oil revenues.
- 35. Kuwait foreign investment contribute to the national income or waste it.

VII. Issues relating to terrorism:

- 36. Terrorism in Kuwait undermining the government or part of international campaign.
- 37. Rejecting terrorists demands ends or increases terrorism.
- 38. Restricting visa entry for Arab groups prevents or has no impact on terrorism.
- 39. Security arrangements sufficient or insufficient.
- 40. Kuwaiti war on terrorism independently or in co-ordination with Arab states.
- 41. Kuwait can best fight terrorism with or without co-ordination with other countries affected by terrorism.

VIII. Issues relating to relationship between the government and parliament in Kuwait:

- 42. Government does or does not follow the recommendations of parliament.
- 43. The government or parliament is more capable of safeguarding public interests.
- 44. Parliament is secure against or subject to dissolution.
- 45. Kuwaiti government does or does not support some MPs and undermine others.
- 46. Kuwaiti government does or does not believe that some MPs create conflicts in parliament.

IX. Issues relating to the freedom of the press:

- 47. Kuwaiti press is free or censored.
- 48. Press owners restrict criticism to the government.
- 49. Journalists do or do not fear losing jobs if they write against the government.
- 50. Kuwaiti press partial or impartial.

### RESEARCH SAMPLES

Three samples were selected for research in this study, from among officials, journalists and the press. The sample of government officials consisted of 45 individuals selected on an availability quota basis from government departments which varied in size and function according to the actual power which they wielded. An attempt was made to include as much a representation of the composition of the population as possible. An examination of the government power structure revealed that it was reasonable to draw the officials' sample from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Oil and Natural Resources, Labour and Social Affairs, and Planning since these are the ministries which deal mostly with the press. The number of cases from each of these ministries are respectively 12, 10, 13 and 10. Sample was determined by drawing respondents from the ministries' staffs. with the inclusion of one Minister, seven Undersecretaries, nineteen Departmental Heads, eight Head of Sections and advisors, experts, administrative assistants and consultants.

The second sample was drawn from the total number of journalists working in the Kuwaiti press in newspapers and magazines, who are located in Shari Al Sahafa (i.e. Press Street) in the city of Kuwait (which corresponds to "Fleet Street" in London, England). Forty-five journalists were chosen on an availability quota basis to represent all newspapers and all ranks within each paper as follows: 10 from Al-Watan, 10 from Al-Anba, 10 from Al Sayasah, 6 from Al-Qabas, 5 from Al-Rai Al-Aam, 4 from Al-Talia. The sample was determined by drawing respondents from the journalists to include one Head of Management, two Editors-in-Chief, six Managing Editors, 15 Heads of Editorial Section, ten Editors and eleven Senior Reporters and Reporters.

In the third sample, the press, it was important to specify the pool of newspapers which are most geared to Kuwaiti readers and which represent differing points of view and political leanings. The choice of such a pool was evident. As stated earlier, Kuwait has five Arabic and two English dailies. The two English dailies had to be excluded because they are geared to the non-Arab community working in Kuwait. Also, two of the Arabic newspapers had to be excluded; one was Al-Ray Al-Am because of its limited circulation and extreme right wing position (it seems to cater only to a small fraction of the Kuwaiti public), and the second was Al-Qabas. Although Al-Qabas is by far the favourite Kuwaiti newspaper, it is, nonetheless, by reviewing its content and by estimating the impression of some professionals it was found that it tends to follow unbalanced policy in terms of daily treatments. It is more geared to international issues and news than to the national and local ones. The three remaining newspapers turned out to be an ideal pool. They are Al-Anba, a conservative newspaper which represents traditional authority, Al-Sayasah, a newspaper to the centre, and Al-Watan, a liberal newspaper. All three papers are heavily involved in Kuwaiti politics. They represent the spectrum of opinion and commentary which is typically Kuwaiti. A synopsis of each of these papers has been presented earlier in the discussion of the Kuwaiti press.

Having chosen the pool of newspapers which represented the Kuwaiti press, the second order of business was to ascertain the issues prevalent in these papers within a given time span. The time span, which was chosen on the basis of convenience, covered a five month period between January and May 1986. This was considered to be a large enough period which contained the wide range of issues occupying the attention of Kuwaitis on a regular basis, but short enough to reflect the differential importance given to these issues by virtue of the amount of coverage given to each issue by the press.

Once the time span had been chosen, a method of selecting newspaper issues was used. Within this time span of five months, every other month was chosen, beginning with January. The months from which selections were made were therefore reduced to three, namely, January, March and May. Furthermore, only the first 15 days of each month were chosen for sampling. However, although the choice of the first fifteen days of each month (as opposed to the second fifteen days) was arbitrary, a systematic rotation method was followed to ensure that an equal number of published newspaper issues would be selected from each month. Consequently, the fifteen day period was divided in three ways. Period number 1 referred to days 1 to 5; period number 2 referred to days 6 to 10; and period number 3 referred to days 11 to 15. Accordingly, as shown in Table 5.2, fifteen newspaper issues of Al-Watan were selected including days 1 to 5 in January, days 11 to 15 in March, and 6 to 10 days in May. Similarly, the issues chosen from Al-Sayrasah were days 6 to 10 in January, days 1 to 5 in March, days 11 to 15 in May. From Al-Anba, the issues selected were days 11 to 15 in January, days 6 to 10 in March and days 1 to 5 in May. The total number of newspapers selected for analysis was, according to this method, 45; fifteen from each newspaper and, simultaneously, fifteen from each month. This whole methodological process was followed by coding the salience of the 50 issues in the press content. The content frame consisted of all the stories appearing on the front page, the local news page, and the editorial section of each of the 45 newspaper issues chosen. In the meantime, the dispositions or the attitudes of the press on the same issues on the dichotomy, conservative or liberal, was coded. The coding method followed was a calculation of the number of topics found under each issue as well as the total number of column inches found under the same issue.

#### ISSUES APPEARING IN THE PRESS SAMPLE

Stories dealing with a particular issue in all 45 newspapers were located as conservative, neutral, or liberal according to their content. Then the frequency with which they appeared was noted. The total column inches devoted to them was then calculated. Following Stone and McComb (1981), an index for each issue was then devised by multiplying the number of times the story appeared by the total column inches devoted to it, including printed text, graphs and photographs, then that index was root squared.

Table 5.2 Rotation Method for Selection of Newspaper Samples.

Newspaper	January	March	May	Total
<u>Al-Watan</u>	1*	3	2	15
<u>Al-Sayasih</u>	2	1	3	15
<u>Al-Anba</u>	3	2	1	15
Total	15	15	15	45

\* Number 1 refers to newspapers issued in days 1 to 5;  
Number 2 to days 6 to 10; and number 3 to days 11 to 15

The result of the content analysis yield thirty-six issues falling within the range of the nine categories presented in Table 5.1. The following is a discussion for these issues based on the way they were presented in the press.

#### **a. Issues Related to Arab Unity**

Issues pertaining to Arab unity were the most prevalent. On the whole the papers indicated that Kuwait has always been an active member in the Arab "family" and played an important role in Pan Arab affairs from the

first day of its independence in 1961. In spite of limitations in terms of population and size of land, Kuwait used her oil revenues effectively to influence Arab affairs, e.g. financial support to the poorer Arab states and contributing to the military expenditure of the Arab States threatened or occupied by Israel. Kuwaitis, the articles indicated, have always had an extremely supportive attitude towards the idea of establishing a unified Arab nation. Such an attitude is reflected in the government's Pan Arab orientation, and translated into tangible support for political, economic and social development projects. Issues relating to Arab unity occupy the populace and revolve around the methods by which unity would occur whether immediately or in stages, the basis of the unity (whether religious or secular), the form of government (whether a federal or military system), and the economic structure (whether free or controlled).

There has also been preoccupation on the question of whether Arab renaissance could be achieved with or without Arab unity.

#### **b. Issues Related to Arab-Israeli Conflict**

News, editorials and commentary about the Arab-Israeli conflict were next in prevalence. The Kuwaiti press seemed to be occupied by the Palestinian problem for various reasons. On the one hand, the authorities in Kuwait did sponsor certain factions of the Palestinian guerillas, and they continue to support the Palestinian grievance against Israel; on the other hand, Palestinian immigrants to Kuwait have gradually increased during the last 25 years, to the extent that they now constitute about 32 percent of the total population as shown in Table 5.3. Most of those Palestinians occupy high and important jobs, with more concentration in the media and education sectors. Almost one-third of the journalists in Kuwait are Palestinians or 33.2 per cent of the press corps and 38.2 per cent of its labour force. Furthermore, it is known that some of the PLO political

leaders use Kuwait as a temporary home. Issues concerning the Arab-Israeli conflicts were found to concern the achievement of a solution, either by peaceful initiatives or by militancy. In the face of a hopeless situation, the press exhorts the various Palestinian factions to continue guerilla fighting against Israel because of the latter's unwillingness to solve the problem peacefully. Also, the question of loyalty to Yaser Arafat or to his opponents was a common theme, along with discussions about the need for a timely solution to the problem versus considering the whole problem to be insoluble at present, and leaving it to be solved by the coming generations. There was also discussion of whether the radical or the moderate Arab states would be more able to influence or to negotiate the future of the Palestinian problem as a part of ending the conflict between the Arabs and Israel.

c. Issues Related to the Security of Kuwait

The third prevalent issues of concern in the Kuwaiti press were those relating to security problems imposed from within by terrorism or from without by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The concern is the stability of the State of Kuwait. Kuwaitis were repeatedly reminded that within a year, and for the first time in its history, a group of terrorists had led many effective assaults in the heart of the capital of Kuwait igniting high explosive devices which set the Embassies of the United States and France on fire, and throwing bombs at civilians sitting in traditional public coffee shops, killing and wounding more than seventy people. There was also concern about the security of the Head of State as if in anticipation of the attack on the Amir's car in June 1985, which inflicted several deep wounds in his face necessitating hospital treatment. Deep concerns were raised about the security arrangements of Kuwait. Several questions were asked concerning the adequacy of the security arrangements made in the



Table 5.3 Arab Population by Nationality in Kuwait

NATIONALITY	Percentages			Totals		
	1975 Census	1970 Census	1965 Census	1975 Census	1970 Census	1965 Census
Kuwaitis	47.5	47.0	47.1	472,088	347,396	220,059
Palestine	20.5	20.0	16.6	204,178	147,696	77,712
Iraq	4.5	5.3	5.5	45,070	39,066	25,897
Saudi Arabia	1.3	1.5	1.0	12,527	10,897	4,632
Lebanon	2.5	3.4	4.5	24,776	25,387	20,877
Syria	4.1	3.7	3.6	40,962	27,217	16,849
Egypt	6.1	4.1	2.4	60,534	30,421	11,021
Tunisia	-	-	-	127	74	-
Algeria	-	-	-	69	113	75
Libya	-	-	-	46	10	-
Morocco	-	-	-	59	40	-
Sudan	0.2	0.1	0.1	1,553	773	418
South Yemen	1.2	1.2	0.6	12,332	8,604	2,635
North Yemen	0.5	0.3	-	4,831	2,363	144
Bahrain	0.1	0.1	0.2	1,359	966	747
Qatar	-	-	-	112	117	159
U. A. E.	0.3	0.6	0.2	2,585	4,435	1,105
Muscat & Oman	0.7	2.0	4.2	7,313	14,670	19,584
Other Arabs	0.1	-	1.3	754	-	6,068
<b>Total Non-Kuwaiti Arabs</b>	<b>42.1</b>	<b>42.4</b>	<b>40.2</b>	<b>719,187</b>	<b>312,849</b>	<b>187,923</b>
<b>Total Arabs</b>	<b>89.6</b>	<b>89.4</b>	<b>87.3</b>	<b>891,275</b>	<b>660,245</b>	<b>407,982</b>

Source : Central Statistical Office, The Ministry of Planning  
Annual Statistical Abstract, 1980, p.28

country and the capability of the Kuwaiti security forces to protect the country from extremist Shias and Iran, especially with the presence of a large number of non-Kuwaiti Arabs and non-Arab foreigners in Kuwait.

In this latter category, issues centred on questions of whether the large number of non-Arab foreigners and non-Kuwaiti Arabs constituted a threat to Kuwaiti security. There were discussions as to whether they be reduced in number, and whether they should be expelled from the country in their loyalty to other states undermined Kuwaiti security. Discussions also arose on the role of the Shias inside and outside Kuwait and their ability to create disturbance and instability in Kuwait. The Iranian role of encouraging and planning terrorist attacks inside Kuwait was repeatedly presented. There was also concern about existing police arrangements in terms of sufficiency to maintain order and stability in the face of growing terrorism inside Kuwait and attacks on Kuwaiti targets outside Kuwait.

d. Issues Related to the Iraq-Iran War

Issues under this category included the political differences between the two countries, the territorial claims on Shaat Al-Arab, and the personal feuds between Emam Khomeini of Iran and Saddam Hussein of Iraq. A great deal of space was devoted to the devastating impact of the lengthy confrontation, and the pressures it created on the small, vulnerable Gulf States, especially Kuwait. There was also concern that the Islamic revolution in Iran had aroused the political fever of the extremists in the Gulf and sought the exportation of revolution to the neighbouring countries as an ideological priority. Furthermore, there were discussions regarding the consequences of the Gulf States' decision to support Iraq and fund a part of its military needs, as well as establishing security arrangements through the Gulf Co-operation Council (G.C.C) to protect the moderate regimes and secure their oil industry against the possible spread of the war into their territories.

**e. Issues Related to the Crises in Oil Prices**

The main focus in this category was the decline in oil prices, which began in 1981, and the ensuing problems of balancing budgets, priorities in the financing of projects, or the low priority programmes. There seemed to be an effort to educate Kuwaitis about the impact of the low oil prices (which reached a bottom level of \$7 per barrel) and the economic and political implications of price fluctuations. There were assurances that, unlike Saudi Arabia, Kuwait seemed better able to balance her budget because of extensive foreign investment in industrial countries which kept revenues greater than expenditure (York and Turner, 1986). There were discussions of the circumstances surrounding the collapse of Al Manakh, the Kuwaiti stock market. There were also debates as to the causes of falling oil prices, and whether it was due to the unsuccessful policies of OPEC, or the inability of some of its members to follow the recommended policy to limit production in order to raise oil prices. There were also questions as to whether the United States and the Europeans conspired in secret to bring about the downfall of oil-producing countries and thus end the influence of OPEC.

**f. Issues Related to Oil Wealth**

The Kuwaitis are reminded of the times before oil when the main national resources were primitive fishing and the diving for pearls. They are also told that their oil wealth reached \$308 million in 1956; \$760 million in 1964; \$907.6 million in 1966, and \$9,802.8 million in 1976 before it started declining in the early 1980s (Ministry of Information 1986, p.84). There were discussions as to how well the Kuwaiti authorities invested large sums of oil revenues to improve the Kuwaiti infrastructure and the local economy. They were assured that the government carefully planned substantial external enterprises and established foreign invest-

ments all over the world which brought in additional income of 3,456 million U.S. dollars in 1985 (Ibid). Questions were raised, however, about the methods taken and the economic plans designed by the Kuwaiti government to spend the oil revenues wisely in order to attain national goals.

**g. Issues Related to Terrorism**

The press pointed out that as an oil producer and international commercial centre, Kuwait could not tolerate violent attacks and counter-attacks. It reported how all political institutions, including the National Assembly, held intensive discussions to find proper measures to bolster security and to thwart any future terrorist attacks against Kuwait. The press showed wide response to terrorism by reflecting on and discussing the different methods of combatting terrorism. There was preoccupation with devising the most effective internal arrangements, and of the origin and goal of terrorism in Kuwait. Some argued that terrorism in Kuwait is not organised to undermine the regime, stating that it is a part of international violence. Others believed that terrorists carefully plan their attacks in order to undermine and abolish entirely the Kuwaiti regime. There was also wide support for the government not to yield to any pressure or demands by the terrorists, nor to negotiate with them under any circumstances. Others argued that it is the political system which makes Kuwait vulnerable to violence coming from abroad. There were discussions that restricting entry visas to certain Arabs would decrease violence, but this idea was opposed on the grounds that it would lead to more violence and more political conflicts with other Arab states. Some put the whole blame on the heads of the Kuwait security forces which, in their view, failed to take tough security measures against terrorists. Others defended the police force, arguing that even the great powers had failed to defend their citizens against terrorist attacks.

**h. Issues Related to the Relationship between the Government and Parliament**

Kuwaitis are reminded of their democratic achievements since the establishment of the National Council in 1963. A great deal of discussion revolved around the confrontations between the government and the National Assembly, especially when the latter was dissolved. Constitutional matters occupy much space, especially with reference to the expectations of the Amir to moderate political life when it steps out of bounds, the Constitutional Articles which regulate his power in relation to the Parliament, and the question of direct censorship of the press. There were arguments that the government was not obliged to follow the recommendations of the National Assembly because the government is more capable of charting national policies and more aware of public interests than parliament. There were also discussions that the parliament must be cautious because it is subject to dissolution at any time. There were indications that the government gives support to certain groups within the parliament to weaken and threaten the Assembly, and the belief that certain MPs are creating conflict between the government and the Parliament. Finally, there were discussions pointing to the possible constraints between the government and the parliament and the consequences for the democratic political system in Kuwait.

**i. Issues Related to the Freedom of the Press**

Since independence in 1961, the growth of the Kuwaiti press paralleled the growth of other political institutions, particularly the National Assembly. As the country was transformed from the tribal autocratic system to a modern welfare state where considerable liberties, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and free elections and the separations of socio political authorities. The press enjoy, under encouraging circumstances,

independence, diversity and financial success. Such advantages, however, were hindered on some occasions, once by some owners who shared common interests with the Royal Family and the government officials and once by journalists of non-Kuwaiti origin who work under a threat of losing their jobs or expulsion from the country. In these circumstances, the issues covered in the press are at most a reflection of the owners' efforts to direct publication in favour of government officials, towards the journalists' fear of losing their jobs or of being expelled from the country, and the government measures to restrict criticism and censored the press.

For each one of these issues, a decision was first made as to whether the tone and the context are liberal or conservative. Generally, there was a definite consistency within each item analysed and there was no difficulty in locating the item analysed between the liberal-conservative dichotomy.

The total of items analysed were 36. The indices of all items were the product of calculating the number of topics multiplied by the number of column inches in each topic root squared. The result yield a range from 246 to 4.

#### THE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

The researcher carried out ten personal interviews with selected individuals - high ranking officials and very senior journalists. The five high ranking officials consisted of two Under Secretaries, one Assistant Under Secretary, and two Heads of Department. The five senior journalists interviewed included two Editors in Chief, one Managing Editor, a famous columnist and an astute intellectual journalist.

The interview was designed and carried out in a systematic way. In its first stage, subjects were contacted and meetings arranged. At each meeting the researcher followed a set protocol, beginning with greeting the

subject, putting him at ease by talking about matters of common interest until he was ready for the interview. In the second stage, the subjects and the goals of interviews were explained, beginning with thanking the subject for allowing the interview and assuring him that it would not take long. The interview protocol is presented in Appendix IV.

#### ADMINISTERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE JOURNALISTS

As mentioned earlier, the sample of journalists used in this study consisted of forty-five subjects drawn from the staff and administration of Al-Watan, Al-Sayrasah and Al-Anba, Al-Qabas, Al-Rai Al-Aam, and Al-Taliah which constitute the newspapers used in this study and some from other newspapers. Subjects were chosen equally from six newspapers on an availability basis, but great effort was made to include as many ranks as possible from each paper. This was accomplished by distributing the questionnaire at the morning staff meeting of each paper which was attended by the entire staff.

Before the questionnaire was distributed, the researcher gave a brief presentation about the object of the study, and stressed the fact that the main interest was in analysing and comparing aggregate data. The subjects were assured of confidentiality and anonymity, and were told not to write their names on the questionnaire. They were also instructed to complete all parts of the questionnaire carefully but expeditiously. As mentioned earlier, only fifteen questionnaires were distributed to each of the newspapers, but all ranks were represented. Thus, in each paper, almost all the senior and most of the mid-level staff were included, but no more than seven of the junior staff. On the whole, subjects were very co-operative and eager to help the researcher, whom they considered to be a colleague.

#### ADMINISTERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

The sample of government officials consisted of forty-five subjects drawn from four Kuwaiti ministries. These were the Ministers of Labour and Social Affairs, Oil and Industry, Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Planning. There were three reasons for the selection of these ministries. One was that they are known to contain the least number of non-Kuwaitis, especially in the upper ranks (it is known that a substantial number of government officials in Kuwait are foreign nationals, many of whom have high seniority). The proportion of non-Kuwaiti nationals varied from one ministry to another. For example, the Ministry of Public Works has the highest proportion, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the lowest proportion - almost nil.

The second reason for choosing these four ministries is that they command relatively higher governmental influence and power than the rest of the ministries, and they have more say in the day-to-day policy making. These ministries are also older and thus more established.

Group meetings were organised to include the representative sample from each Ministry. These groups ranged from 10 to 13 people. At these meetings they were asked to complete the questionnaire. The researcher gave each group a short presentation about the goal of the study explaining that the main concern was to compare aggregate data and not individual responses. He also assured the respondents of confidentiality and anonymity, and requested them to follow the written instructions and not to discuss the questionnaire amongst themselves, not to look at previous answers, not to copy responses from previous sections, not to give more than one answer, and not to hesitate in giving their responses but give direct and honest reaction to each question. When the questionnaires were collected they were checked for completeness.



Unlike the journalists, some government officials were bothered by a few items on the questionnaire and somewhat suspicious of the real purpose of the study. Others wondered if they would be paid for completing the questionnaire. Still others worried about what they called the "semi-investigative" tone of the questionnaire which is considered an unusual practice in Kuwait. All these concerns were alleviated by explaining the nature of the study and the way in which the data would be handled. These explanations seemed to assure them, and they proceeded to complete the questionnaire.

All the data were gathered in a time span of four weeks, from 5th May to 6th June 1985.

#### SUMMARY

In this chapter a theoretical generalisation was put forward to guide the study and the research hypotheses were presented, as were the research design and methods. Five research hypotheses were drawn from the theoretical generalisation. Each hypothesis defines the differential importance assigned by officials and journalists to an overall issue and the differential directioned importance of the same issues with conservative and liberal positions on those issues, and the degree to which those issues were emphasised in the press within a time-frame of five months, from January to May 1986. The overall hypothesis which underlay this study was that government officials set the agenda for the press, and that journalists are not passive; they share setting the agenda for the press as do government officials, especially when the agenda has a liberal tone calling for change and modernisation.

On this basis certain hypotheses were derived, that there would be significant positive rank order correlation between (1) the overall differential coverage of the issues appearing in the press and the overall degree

of importance assigned by government officials, (2) between journalists and government officials, (3) between the press and journalists, (4) a similarity in the conservative disposition taken by both officials and journalists on the issues, (5) a similarity in the conservative disposition taken by officials and the press on the issues.

In order to test these hypotheses, a questionnaire was developed on the basis of a pilot study to determine the prevalent press issues. Nine important groups of issues were listed under nine categories. They were issues related to Arab unity, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq war, security affairs in Kuwait, the decline in oil prices, the distribution of oil wealth, terrorism, relations between the government and the parliament, and freedom of the press. Based on those issues, a questionnaire was designed and distributed among officials and journalists on the basis of availability quota sample. Data were collected by the researcher who also carried out personal interviews with five high ranking officials and five senior journalists. The interviews were mainly designed to support the findings.

## CHAPTER VI

### FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the findings of this research and illustrates the salience of issues in press coverage and the importance assigned to the same issues by government officials and journalists in Kuwait. In addition, the chapter includes findings relating to 'beyond agenda setting' in which the positions taken on certain issues by officials and journalists in Kuwait was presented. Furthermore, the chapter investigates the results obtained from testing the nine hypotheses regarding agenda setting and the beyond agenda setting in the Kuwaiti press. It also presents additional analyses which suggest further definitions of the relations governing research samples with the resultant descriptive findings arrived at from the interview protocol.

#### SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

The composition of the officials' sample is presented in Table 6.1. As shown in this Table, there were (7) 15.6% Under Secretaries, (19) 42.2% Heads of Departments, (8) 17.8% Heads of Section, and a Minister who is a current member of the Kuwaiti Cabinet. The composition of the journalists' sample is presented in Table 6.2. That table indicates that among the journalists there were (15) 33.3% Heads of Editorial Sections, (10) 22.2% Editors, (6) 13.3% Managing Editors, (11) 24.5% Reporters, and two Editors in Chief and one Head of Management.

Regarding the education of officials, Table 6.3 shows that there were (6) 13.3% with Secondary School degrees, (31) 68.9% with University degrees and, an impressive (8) 17.8% holding Post Graduate degrees. This shows that the educational level among officials was, on the whole, much higher

than could be anticipated by any observer, especially when it is borne in mind that in Kuwait higher education and post-graduate studies were established recently, less than 23 years ago, mainly after the University of Kuwait was founded in 1965. It should be noted that all officials were entirely Kuwaiti nationals. This characteristic is of great importance because the majority of the population are either non-Kuwaiti Arabs or non-Arab foreigners who have settled in Kuwait.

Table 6.1 Occupational Echelons Amongst Officials

Occupation	Number	Percent
Minister	1	2.2
Under Secretary	7	15.6
Head of Department	19	42.2
Head of Section	8	17.8
Other	10	22.2
Total	45	100

The educational level of the journalists, as shown in Table 6.4, was remarkably similar to that of government officials. In both samples (6) 13.3% had secondary school education. The proportion of journalists with college education was exactly the same as that of the officials, namely, 68.9% (31). However, whereas 17.8% of the officials had post graduate degrees, only 13.3% (6) of the journalists had similar qualifications. Had it not been for this, the educational profile of both groups would have been identical. These findings are all the more remarkable since the population of Kuwait, on the whole, still suffers from high levels of illiteracy. In fact, the spread of education coincided with the increase of the oil revenues in the early 1970s.

**Table 6.2 Occupational Echelons Amongst Journalists**

Occupation	Number	Percent
Head of Management	1	2.2
Editor-in-Chief	2	4.4
Managing Editor	6	13.3
Head of Ed. Section	15	33.3
Editor	10	22.2
Reporter	11	24.5
Total	45	100

**Table 6.3 Education Levels Amongst Officials**

Degrees held	Numbers	Percent
Secondary	6	13.3
University level	31	68.9
Post Graduate	8	17.8
Total	45	100

**Table 6.4 Education Levels Amongst Journalists**

Degrees held	Numbers	Percent
Secondary	6	13.3
University level	31	68.9
Post Graduate	6	13.3
Missing	2	4.4
Total	45	100

Table 6.5 Level of Readership Amongst Officials

Number of newspapers	Number	Percent
Read one newspaper	4	8.9
Read two newspapers	7	15.6
Read three newspapers	9	20.0
Read four newspapers	24	53.3
Missing	1	2.2
Total	45	100

Table 6.6 Level of Readership Amongst Journalists

Number of newspapers	Number	Percent
Read one newspaper	4	8.9
Read two newspapers	8	17.8
Read four newspapers	33	73.3
Total	45	100

Regarding the daily media readership among officials, the findings recorded in Table 6.5 show that (24) 53.3% of them reported reading four newspapers a day, (9) 20% read three newspapers and (7) 15.6% read two a day. Those officials who read one newspaper per day were (4) 8.9%. As to the daily media readership among journalists, Table 6.6 indicates higher ratios of readership. Not surprisingly journalists read more publications since this is part of their daily job. It seems that the demands of their day to day writing required frequent and wide reviews of local and foreign newspapers. Thus, it was found that (33) 73.3% of the journalists sampled read four newspapers per day, (8) 17.8% read two newspapers per day and (4) 8.9% read only one newspaper per day. The high level of readership amongst

both officials and journalists may also reflect the high level of education which the two groups enjoy.

Concerning the differential perceptions of the officials and the journalists and the latter's self ratings of their integrity and willingness to include their convictions in their writings, it was found, as shown in Table 6.7, that the views of the two groups are rather similar but with notable exceptions. Amongst both groups, one third (or 35.6%) believed that journalists included most of their convictions in their writings. However, whereas 13.3% of the journalists said they included all their convictions in their writings, 4.4% of the officials believed this to be so. This indicates that fewer officials than journalists believe in the total integrity of the journalists. Conversely, three times as many journalists as officials believe that the former include all their convictions in their writing. By the same token, almost twice as many officials as journalists believe that the latter include few of their convictions in their writings, with corresponding percentages of 15.6% and 8.9% respectively. This indicates that, on the whole, journalists perceive themselves as more willing to include their convictions in their writings than officials are willing to credit them with.

The reasons given by officials for the journalists' unwillingness, in their opinion, to include their convictions in their writing are classified in Table 6.8. The results show that 22% to 38% of officials believe that journalists include all their convictions in their writings. Similarly, when journalists were asked to indicate the reasons and the degree to which they include their convictions in their writings, those among them who stated that they included all or most of their convictions ranged between 18% and 33% as shown in Table 6.9.

Table 6.7 Officials and Journalists' Reactions to the Journalists  
Inclusion of their Convictions in their Writings.

	Officials		Journalists	
	No.	%	No.	%
Include all convictions	2	4.4	6	13.3
Include most	16	35.6	16	35.6
Include some	15	33.3	13	28.9
Include few	7	15.6	4	8.9
Rarely include	3	6.7	4	8.9
Include none of their convictions	2	4.4	1	2.2
Missing data	0	0	1	2.2
Total	45	100	45	100

However, a comparison of the results shown in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show that, with only one exception (not free to choose the topic) more officials than journalists rated the reasons given as extremely important or very important. The corresponding percentages of officials and journalists designating the reason to be government censorship, censure from colleagues, restrictions from unions, not free to choose, fear of losing jobs, desire to please readers, were respectively 44 versus 33, 22 versus 13, 18 versus 9, 11 versus 8, 38 versus 27, and 38 versus 18. This means that officials tend to over-rate the reasons for the journalists' reluctance to include their convictions in their writings. Put differently, journalists believe, on the whole, that they are less restricted than officials believe them to be when it comes to including their personal convictions in their writings.

This relationship is further dramatised in the officials' and journalists' ratings for the reason as "not at all important" when it comes to including the latter's convictions in their writings. The corresponding percentages of the two groups are, respectively, 9 versus 18 for government censorship, 4 versus 29 for censure from colleagues, 13 versus 29 for



**Table 6.8** The Officials' Reasons and Degrees of Importance Given for Journalists Not Including their Convictions in their Writings

Reasons	Journalists do not include their convictions in their writings						Journalists include their convictions in their work	
	Extremely or very important			Somewhat or minor importance			Not at all important	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Government Censorship	20	44	11	25	4	9	10	22
Censure from Colleagues	10	22	16	36	2	4	17	38
Restriction from Press Unions	8	18	16	36	6	13	15	33
Not Free to Choose Topics	5	11	13	29	10	22	17	38
Fear of Losing Jobs	17	38	12	27	3	7	13	29
Desire to Please Readers	17	38	10	22	2	4	16	36

**Table 6.9** The Reasons and Degrees of Importance Cited by Journalists  
for Not Including their Convictions in their Writings

Reasons	Journalists do not include their convictions in their writings						Journalists include their con- victions in their work	
	Extremely or very important		Somewhat or minor importance		Not at all important		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Government Censorship	15	33	14	31	8	18	8	18
Censure from Colleagues	6	13	13	29	13	29	13	29
Restriction from Press Unions	4	9	13	29	13	29	15	33
Not Free to Choose Topics	8	18	10	22	17	38	10	22
Fear of Losing Jobs	12	27	14	31	9	20	10	22
Desire to Please Readers	8	18	12	27	11	25	14	31

restrictions from press unions, 22 versus 38 for lack of freedom to choose topics 7 versus 20 for fear of losing jobs, and 4 versus 25 for the desire to please readers. This affirms the conclusion that officials view journalists as reluctant to express their convictions than the journalists view of themselves.

Both officials and journalists were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with four positions pertaining to the suitability of Arab traditions and heritage to modern life. They were asked to respond specifically to the following four statements:

1. I believe that for every problem which we now face there is a solution in our heritage.
2. Clinging to the traditions is the ideal way to build our contemporary civilisation.
3. Many of our traditions do not suit the requirements of our modern life.
4. We will not be able to realise our contemporary progress unless we substitute our decayed values with new ones.

Table 6.10 summarises the reactions of officials and journalists to these four questions.

A general inspection of these results indicates, first of all, that both groups seem to want to have their cake and eat it when it comes to their support of traditions. For example, twice as many officials agree than disagree, (28) 61.6% versus (14) 33.3% with the statement that every problem has a solution in heritage; and almost four times as many agree than disagree, (34) 74.8% versus (9) 19.8% with the statement that clinging to traditions is the best way to build the future. Yet considerably more of them still agree than disagree with the position that many traditions do not suit modern life (23) 50.6% versus (19) 41.8%, and nearly three times as many of them agree as disagree with the position that modernity requires replacing the old values with new ones (33) 73.2% VERSUS (12) 26.8%. The situation repeats itself with the journalists. More of them

**Table 6.10** Number and Percentage of Officials and Journalists who Agree or Disagree on the Role of Traditions in Modern Life

Statement	Officials				Journalists			
	Strongly agree or agree	Disagree or strongly disagree	N	%	Strongly agree or agree	Disagree or strongly disagree	N	%
Every Problem has a Solution in our Heritage	28	14	61.6	30.3	23	18	50.6	39.6
Clinging to Traditions is the Best Way to Build the Future	34	9	74.8	19.8	24	17	52.6	37.4
Many Traditions do not Suit Modern Life	23	19	50.6	41.8	31	8	68.2	17.6
Modernity Requires Replacing Old Values with New Ones	33	12	73.2	26.8	33	8	73.2	17.6

Percentages do not total 100% because of missing answers or data

agree than disagree with the statement that every problem has a solution in heritage (23) 50.6% versus (18) 39.6% and with the statement that clinging to traditions is the ideal way to build the future (24) 52.6% versus (17) 37.9%. Yet, four times as many of them still agree with the statement that many traditions do not suit modern life (31) 68.2% versus (8) 17.6%, and with the statement that modernity requires replacing old values with new ones (33) 73.2% versus (8) 17.6%. These results may reflect the ambivalence with which the Kuwaitis view traditions. On the one hand, they consider these traditions as the basis of the glories which the Arabs attained up until the 13th century A.D., yet they become flustered when they realise that meeting the demands of modern life requires changing their traditions.

**Table 6.11** Number of Responses Showing Conservative or Liberal Positions of Officials and Journalists on the Role of Traditions in Modern Life.

	Officials		Journalists	
	Cons	Lib	Cons	Lib
Every problem has a solution in heritage	28	14	23	18
Clinging to tradition is the best way to build the future	34	9	24	17
Many traditions do not suit modern life	19	23	8	31
Modernity requires replacing old traditions with new ones	12	33	8	33

To find out which of the two groups is the more conservative, the total responses of the officials and the journalists to these four statements were re-tabulated as in Table 6.11. It is worth noting that the

table contains conservative and liberal responses made by officials or journalists. Thus, a conservative response would be agreement with the first two statements, but disagreement with the last two. A liberal response would be the exact opposite, disagreement with the first two issues, but agreement with the last two issues. A chi square in Table 6.12 was calculated for each table. It was found that in Table 6.12 (A)  $\chi^2 = 0.98$ , not significant; and in Table 6.12 (D)  $\chi^2 = 0.62$ , also not significant. However, in Table 6.12 (B)  $\chi^2 = 5.52$  ( $P < .05$ ). Also in Table 6.12 (C)  $\chi^2 = 5.56$  ( $P < .05$ ). Thus officials were found to be more conservative than journalists.

#### TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

This study was designed to examine the socio-political influences on the press in a traditional system, especially that with modern political institutions, i.e. a modern constitution, a parliament and free elections. It examined the degree to which government officials and journalists set the agenda for the press in Kuwait. In addition to agenda-setting hypotheses, this study examined a beyond agenda setting inquiry in which two directions of the issues were defined and the positions of the press, the journalists and government officials on the two sides of the issues were measured. Five hypotheses were advanced in the previous chapter to examine the relationship between officials, journalists and the press in Kuwait. In this chapter each hypothesis will be advanced and pertinent data will be presented to find out if it is supported or refuted. A summary for agenda setting findings is provided in Table 6.13. (All tables relating to listing the hypotheses and other findings are presented at the end of the chapter to avoid cluttering the text.)

**Table 6.12** Number of Responses Connoting Conservative or Liberal Positions of Officials and Journalists on the Role of Traditions in Modern Life.

Issues		Offi- cials	Journ- alists	
- (A) -				
1. Every problem has a solution in heritage	YES	28 25.8	23 25.2	51
	NO	14 16.2	18 15.8	32
		42	41	83
$\chi^2 = 0.98$ (not significant)				
- (B) -				
2. Clinging to tradition is the best way to build the future	YES	34 29.69	24 28.31	58
	NO	9 13.31	17 12.69	26
		43	41	84
$\chi^2 = 5.52$ (P<.05)				
- (C) -				
3. Many traditions do not suit modern life	YES	19 14	8 13	27
	NO	23 28	31 26	54
		42	39	81
$\chi^2 = 5.56$ (P<.05)				
- (D) -				
4. Modernity requires replacing old traditions with new ones	YES	12 10.5	8 9.5	20
	NO	33 34.5	33 31.5	66
		43	41	86
$\chi^2 = 0.62$ (not significant)				

#### HYPOTHESIS NO. 1

There is a positive rank order correlation between the overall differential coverage of the issues appearing in the press and the overall degree of importance assigned to these issues by government officials.

This hypothesis was substantiated by the data. The rank order correlation between the overall differential coverage of the press and the overall degree of importance assigned to these issues by government officials are presented in Table 6.14. The Spearman rank order correlation coefficient calculated from these data was  $r_s = .366$   $N = 36$ , ( $P < .05$ ). This confirms the notion that government officials in Kuwait maintain strong influence on the press.

This notion is further substantiated by the result of interviews with officials. For example, an official who occupies the position of Under Secretary in one of the Kuwaiti ministries has described the relationship between the government and the press in terms of the agenda setting hypothesis by saying:

"It is not certain which of the two institutions, the government or the press, build the agenda for the press in some issues, such as Arab unity and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is understood among Arabs outside Kuwait that the Kuwaiti press has always the initiative mainly in setting the dialogues and debates around Arab solidarity and Arab justifiable causes. But in Kuwait, it is not certain who initiates the press content and instigates the directions of publications for those issues. It is assumed, however, that the government adopts Arab leaders initiatives and shows admiration and acceptance for Pan Arab policies. The government signals to the press to echo such policies in newspapers daily treatments of the news." (Emphasis added).

The same official believes that:

"It remains true that there are some issues on which the government is in full charge, setting the press agenda, specific issues such as security, oil wealth and fighting terrorism. The government, through relevant ministers, sets the limits within which publication is permitted. Although such government control does not imply direct interference in press affairs, but it could be achieved in a way that reflects government policies."



It is worth mentioning here that the press shows increasing signs of desire not to plunge itself into the security issues in detail. Perceiving the gravity of the situation and understanding the seriousness of the issues threatening the home front, it plays a greater role in securing the safety of the country and its stability. Whether it knows it or not, the press plays the role of a watchdog for the security of the country as significantly as the government does.

Another official expressed, views about the relationship between the government and the press of Kuwait:

"It is not the law of publication that restricts the freedom of the press. On the contrary the law of publications defends the press against aggressive officials and their interference in press affairs."

It is the relationship between the newspapers and officials that has the great role in forming the policy and direction of publications in newspapers.

The financial interests of newspaper owners play an effective and strong role in the news policy. In a traditional oil country like Kuwait, the main source for wealth is the government. For those owners to build capitals, they need to please the government and satisfy the needs to fulfil the requirement of following pro-government news. To a great extent, the owners are always willing to meet government terms and accept the flow of agenda from government sources onto their news desks.

The presence of Arab journalists in Kuwait (more than 70 per cent of the editorial staff) increases the possibility of the involvement by government officials in press affairs. For none of the non-Kuwaiti Arab journalists, is of high professional rank. They understand that their presence in Kuwait is temporary. The majority of those journalists believe that they have come to Kuwait to earn a living. The task of raising hot issues against government, well, will cost them their jobs."

This hypothesis was further supported by the interviews with journalists. For example, an Editor-in-Chief of a major newspaper confirmed the notion of officials' superiority in terms of building the agenda for the press, he considered the relationship between the press and officials as another example of integration among Kuwaiti citizens which comes under the Kuwaiti slogan: "All Kuwaitis are members of one Kuwaiti family." Such

ties, in his words, do not permit the press to make mistakes, as occasionally happens in some Western newspapers which thrive on scandals and inflammatory items, or at times, on news stories to embarrass politicians and businessmen. The Editor-in-Chief's answer, on the whole, was found to support the assumption that existing governments control the press.

#### HYPOTHESIS NO. 2

There is a positive rank order correlation between the overall degree of importance assigned to the issues appearing in the press by the journalists and by government officials.

This hypothesis was also substantiated by the data. The rank order correlation between the overall importance appearing in the press by journalists and by government officials are presented in Table 6.15. The Spearman rank order correlation coefficient calculated from these data was,  $r_s = .646$ ,  $N = 36$  ( $P = <.001$ ). These findings confirm the notion that government officials, to a considerable extent, set the agenda for the press in Kuwait. Government officials could well use different means to influence journalists, thereby influencing the press agenda.

Furthermore, these findings were substantiated by the results of the interviews with journalists. For example, the fact that officials have an upper hand in defining the news has been clearly supported by one of the managing editors of a daily moderate newspaper. His answers, at the interview, were found to include the following opinions:

"It is obvious that journalists are mostly of non-Kuwaiti origin and that they are from radical Arab States. As a consequence, in general, they present radical positions in their newspapers most of the time. This situation helps the regime to be presented as a radical institution very keen to modernise the country and listen to the calls for reform raised by the press. But these journalists, as non-Kuwaitis, understand the limits of freedom of opinion and the frontiers of publication. They also now understand that when the government decides to have a certain position on the issues, they must follow the line.

On semi-weekly basis, the Kuwaiti government invites journalists to the Ministry of Information. The Minister dictates under the title of giving news briefs, the policies on local and foreign issues. In other words, the government appears as the main instigator who decides what must or must not be published.

It must be noted that journalists as well as officials understand the particular relationship between different political institutions, including the press, in Kuwait. The Amir orchestrates the national concerts, he, and only he, is in a position to harmonise the relations between all political and social institutions.

The fact that may not be known to many people is that when the security forces arrest any journalist who has allegedly threatened national security, and supposing he were a member of my staff, I would be the first person to welcome his expulsion from the country. This person would represent a threat to Kuwait and more so to my newspaper. (He meant expulsion of foreign journalists and not of the locals)."

### HYPOTHESIS NO. 3

There is a positive rank order correlation between the overall differential coverage of the issues appearing in the press and the overall degree of importance assigned to these issues by the journalists.

This hypothesis was substantiated by the findings. The differential coverage of the issues appearing in the press and the degree of importance assigned to the issues by journalists are presented in Table 6.16. The Spearman rank order coefficient calculated from these data was  $r_s = .510$ ,  $N = 36$ , ( $P = <.01$ ). This confirms the notion that there is a high tendency among journalists to reflect conservative officials' stands on the issues and therefore their agenda too.

Such a notion is further substantiated by the results of the interviews with journalists. For example, a Chief Editor of a conservative daily newspaper confirmed the fact that "the government and the press are two establishments sharing the responsibility for defining what should or should not be published in the press." He believed that:

"On certain issues, the government has the upper hand to decide what should or should not be released. Those issues are generally the ones relating to oil wealth, issues relating to national security and issues relating to the measures taken to fight terrorists.

On those issues, the government's position is presented in every column/inch appearing in newspapers. Although government's interference is indirect, it is the power that permits or prevents publishing the news.

The co-operation between newspapers owners and government officials by all means is based on a positive relationship. It helps to decrease government anger, it also prevents the press from being subject o aggressive government acts.

In another comment, a high ranking official seemed to believe that, regardless of the source and the instigator of the agenda, the press in Kuwait is an honest transmitter of news. There were, however, certain reservations to be noted by journalists before they wrote in their papers. First, they needed to clarify the government's position and explore the interpretations for such news. Secondly, they needed to give more concern to the classified information and judge what the government meant by secret information. Ironically, on many occasions journalists were found to be lacking in the skill and knowledge to evaluate news and make the right decisions because they did not have access to the news in detail and sometimes because they lacked professionalism as in most Third World media. Therefore, most journalists found it safer to abandon publishing any controversial news. Thirdly, journalists themselves sometimes fear discussing sensitive issues, particularly because they are aware that there are often missing links in such news. They tend to wait for bureaucratic sources to add any details and comments from the government's point of view.

#### HYPOTHESIS NO. 4

There is a similarity in the conservative disposition taken by the government officials and the conservative disposition taken by the journalists on issues prevalent in the Kuwaiti press.

This hypothesis was substantiated by data. On the one hand, the conservative dispositions taken by government officials on issues prevalent in the Kuwaiti press is presented in Table 6.17. The mean scores of government officials on the scale (-50 for conservatives, +50 for liberal

attitudes) is ( $\bar{X}$  -3.6). On the other hand, the conservative disposition taken by the journalists on issues prevalent in the Kuwaiti press is presented in Table 6.18. The mean scores for journalists on a scale (-50 for conservative, +50 for liberal attitudes) is ( $\bar{X}$  -4.00).

This confirms the notion that the disposition taken by both officials and journalists is dominated by a strong tendency toward the conservative side of the issues. This confirms once again the notion of government officials as a main conservative force in Kuwait, for whom their duty is to guard the regime, uphold its security and strive to keep the status quo, and to strive also to influence the attitudes of journalists. These findings, therefore, and the findings of the interviews with officials and journalists, confirmed the fact that journalists had been heavily influenced by the position taken by the government. Officials were able to influence the attitudes of journalists, to take the conservative disposition on issues prevalent in the Kuwaiti press and relevant to the conservative disposition taken by the government.

The notion was also confirmed by the data presented in Table 6.19 in which the score of government officials' attitudes fall on 26 conservative sides of the issues in a total number of 36. While the dispositions on the liberal sides of the issues were found to cover 10 issues presented in Table 6.20. Similarly, data presented in Table 6.21 show that the journalists' conservative scores fall on 22 sides of the issues in a total of 36 issues. In another analysis the findings showed a high Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the overall attitudes of the officials and journalists significant at  $r = .787$   $n = 36$  ( $P < .001$ ).

This hypothesis was further supported by an interview in which the Editor-in-Chief of a daily newspaper in Kuwait pointed out that government

officials sometimes use tacit and/or subtle measures to control journalists. For example:

"The Amir (ruler) is always keen on inviting journalists to meet him. He occasionally has a frank discussion of all issues of concern, and journalists take the Amir's points as messages to be conveyed to the public.

There is another traditional routine in which the Crown Prince, who is at the same time the Prime Minister, invites journalists to meet him privately at home or in his office. In these meetings the co-ordination between the government and the press is defined without direct interference in the affairs of others. If any current event or urgent issue suddenly occurs, consultations and dialogues are called for.

The Minister of Information (a member of the ruling family) has semi-weekly meetings with editors-in-chief and managing editors. Such routine helps to clarify government policies. It could be hot or cool discussion, but at the end it satisfies government wishes and demands."

The manner in which journalists related themselves to government policies was explained by another Editor-in-Chief when he said:

"In the press we do not care much how issues are raised. There is no definite line between the press and the government. In our newspaper we are convinced that the government is no less patriotic or less responsible than the press. Take, for example, the terrorists issue, the treatment of the issue in the press was in harmony with the authority's position. Both the press and the government called for taking strong measures against terrorists and following hardline policies against any persons who planned the attacks and carried out the violent campaign against Kuwait. The press call for tough measures against terrorists inspired the government to give the issue the utmost attention and concern."

This notion is further substantiated by the results of interviews with journalists in radical newspapers. A popular columnist in a daily newspaper argued throughout that "undoubtedly the press gets its news from official sources, but there are journalists who strive to produce opinions that may contradict those of officials". It is pertinent here to note that he is a Kuwaiti citizen. He then raised several points:

"There are some issues on which all journalists avoid wider discussion or elaboration. Journalists do not wish to undermine the efforts taken by the government to keep order, especially in matters of security.

However, if the government finds it necessary to publicise an issue, the press does not hesitate to give priority and emphasis to that issue.

A very good example of the relationship between the press and the government is the support which the former gives to the latter as it resists the liberal demands introduced by the members of the National Assembly.

Generally, the press still has a great deal of autonomy, but it is still also considered the vessel which carries whatever the government wishes to ship. In other words, what the government wants to convey to the public minds, the press is considered the best means of transmitting such information.

A high ranking official sees the relationship between officials and journalists traceable to the conservative position of the owners of the newspapers. He argued that:

"The more journalists take the government's side the more their occupational position becomes secure. By secure I mean the degree of tolerance by the owners of the newspapers for their members of staff. This tolerance correlates with the journalists' ability to relate their convictions to those of the owners. In matters which are related to traditional views and conservative attitudes of the owners of newspapers, journalists are, nevertheless, not far removed from the position of the government. The press therefore becomes the means through which journalists reflect the traditional conservative beliefs of government officials through the press agenda."

#### HYPOTHESIS NO. 5

There is a similarity in the conservative disposition taken by the government officials and the disposition taken by the press on issues which appeared in the press content.

This hypothesis was also substantiated by the data. The positions of the press emphasized in the press content is presented in Table 6.23. The total scores in the press content which resulted from the calculation of the number of topics multiplied by the number of column inches for each topic square rooted, show that the conservative disposition taken by the press covered 21 issues in a total of 36 issues. It was also found that the total conservative scores on the issue were greater than the total liberal scores for the issues presented in table 6.24. The total proportion of conservative scores of the total press content scores was 59.4%

while the proportion for liberal scores was 40.6%. This confirms the notion that the press was heavily influenced by government officials who strive to build the agenda for the press in a way that would reflect the policy of the government and uphold the socio-political status quo.

This notion was further substantiated by the findings of the interviews with government officials and journalists. A high ranking official summarised the relationship between the officials and the press as mutual understanding for the sake of the national interests of Kuwait. he admitted that:

"There is no doubt that the Kuwaiti press, like any press in other countries, has its internal and external obligations. But the law of publication in Kuwait defines the limits in which the press can play its role and avoid becoming captive to the private interests of certain groups at home or abroad."

He added:

"Non-Kuwaiti Arabs who work in Kuwaiti newspapers allow further risk to the press to be manipulated, especially because those journalists are generally of radical backgrounds. But in such important issues as security, wealth, and relations with foreign countries, those journalists are told to echo the government's position. The state, to maintain law and order, must have an open eye to protect the citizens and guard the independence of Kuwait as well as other Gulf countries. As a country with laws and a constitution, Kuwait expects the press to protect the political and social institutions against all threats, regarding it as but another social institution that should share the social responsibility of protecting the independence of Kuwait".

This notion was observed throughout the results of interviews with radical journalists. For example, a popular journalist known for his social ideals, pointed out that his analysis of the relationship between the government and the press has led him to the following conclusions:

"The main factor leading to press failure to emphasise objectivity on the issues, is the work power of huge numbers of immigrant journalists of Egyptian, Palestinian and Lebanese origins. Their existence in Kuwait is similar to other Arab groups in Kuwait. This existence is always connected with their jobs and the demands to secure them.

No Arab in Kuwait, however strong his nationalist feelings, has any intellectual effect and journalists are not apart from this fact. They do not play an actual role in the intellectual



battles to defend the freedom of Kuwait. They are passive elements, not positive ones by any means.

The immigrant journalist is required to be a machine or a typewriter with keys which could be pressed by the newspaper owner to produce the press material the owner wishes to see. Naturally, Kuwaiti journalists are excluded. The Kuwaiti citizens working for the press have a wide margin of freedom. At least they do not fear cancellation of their job contracts or expulsion from the country. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti press is still freer and more influential in the affairs of Kuwait than any other Arab newspapers. It is however a comparison between complete darkness and a spot of light at the end of a long dark tunnel."

#### ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES

As mentioned earlier, the press content analysis produced 36 issues, some of which yielded clearly conservative responses and interpretations while other issues yielded clearly liberal responses and interpretations. Attitudes of the press were reported from the press coverage coded in the press content, while government officials' and journalists' attitudes were computed and statistically analysed from data obtained from the questionnaire.

In the following will be presented the attitudes yielded from the three variables - the officials, the journalists and the press - as these are placed on the continuum extremely conservative to extremely liberal. The term conservative disposition in this study, on the one, hand stands for those groups or individuals who tend to or are disposed to maintain existing views, conditions or institutions. Their disposition is marked by moderation or caution relating to traditional norms, while on the other hand the term liberal reflects the dispositions of those who are broad-minded, not bounded by authoritarianism, orthodoxy or traditionalism.

It was suggested in Chapter 5, in the theoretical generalisation section, that the analysis of the social structure of Kuwait and the ideologies that can be seen to influence the socio-political attitudes of

social groups, show that the conservative disposition on the issues represents, on the whole, the attitudes of the regime, the Amir, the Cabinet and the government officials. In the meantime, the liberal disposition on the same issues reflects, on the whole, the attitudes of individuals who oppose the government's policies and are drawn from different social groups. However, both the government and those who are juxtaposed to it, even in opposition, are considered agents of development. Relevant literature reviewed in Chapter 3 revealed the extent to which the government, with the supervision of the Amir, undertook daring and generous development projects in Kuwait. Both the government, with its bureaucrats, and the liberals sought the means for rapid socio-economic political modernisation. Differences arise mainly over the means and the manner in which such development should be achieved.

The Kuwaiti government began in the early 1950s an effective transformation of Kuwaiti society in profound social and political ways. It was shown in Chapter 3 that the government promoted change with a view to modernising the new state and to changing the gloomy desert face of Kuwait. This apparently forward-looking and enlightened policy of government was, however, vitiated by the occasional autocratic decisions taken by the Amir and other regime leaders. For example, the regime promptly dissolved the National Assembly on two occasions; in 1976 and 1986. Tendencies to authoritarianism were exposed too as the regime balanced its political options in favour of fundamentalists, Shi'ites and Sunnies as opposed to the left nationalists and liberal intellectuals. Further, by allying itself to other autocratic Gulf traditionalist regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain, notably in security affairs, the Kuwaiti regime seemed to contradict the drift of modernisation upon which its legitimacy at home was based.

In what follows the data for the attitudes of officials and journalists on the issues will be presented. In order to analyse the positions of each group regarding the contrary dispositions on the conservative and liberal spectrum over the aggregate of the issues, two sets of data were designed. The first set relates to the respondents who placed themselves on the conservative sides of the issues. Each respondent was given a score on a scale of four values ranging from (-50) for "extremely conservative" to (-1) for "of low conservatism". Similarly with the second set which relates to the respondents who placed themselves on the liberal sides of the issues. Each respondent was given a score on a scale of four values ranging from (+50) for "extremely liberal" to (+1) for "of low liberalism". The object was to determine the location of each group on the issues, and also to determine the differences or similarity between the attitudes of officials and journalists.

The first column in Tables 6.17 and 6.18 shows the attitudinal position of respondents, and in the second column the scale of conservative-liberal values. The third column presents the actual score of respondents corresponding to the relevant values, and the final fourth column the proportion of attitudes in percentage terms. Before proceeding in reporting these findings a test for reliability was carried out for each item issue and the total items (issues). The items construction was checked by running non-parametric correlation coefficient between each item and the total score. Kendall Tau correlation coefficient revealed significant relation at ( $N = 90$ ,  $P = <.001$ ).

As shown in Table 6.17 and Chart 6.1, the findings reveal that a proportion of 71.1% of government officials hold conservative attitudes, while a proportion of 28.9% were found to hold liberal attitudes on the same issues. Within this frame, however, the data show that a majority of 42.2% of officials were of low conservatism. By adding the proportion of


13.3%, shown in the same table to be of moderate conservatism, the majority of conservative respondents (55.5%) were of low to moderate conservative attitudes. This leaning towards moderation was disturbed, however, by the fact that there is a proportion of 13.3% of extremist or very conservative officials among the given population.

By the same token, the findings shown in the lower section of Table 6.17 show a low tendency of government officials to liberal attitudes. In a proportion of 28.9% officials standing on the liberal side of issues, a majority of 17.8% are of low to moderate attitudes. Proportionally close to their colleagues on the conservative side, the extremists and very liberal officials amounted to 13.3% of the total population.

By relating the findings on conservative and liberal officials the observed pattern would be that over both dispositional ranges the overwhelming majority of government officials cluster in the low to moderate scales. In the conservative camp it was found that the majority of 55.5% in a total of 71.1% had moderate to low attitudes. This was followed by a similar majority of liberal officials, 15.6% in a total of 28.9% had moderate to low attitudes. Therefore it was found that the total proportion of government officials classed as centre or moderate amounted to 71.1%. The correlative observed pattern then is that, similar to all extremists in any social, religious or political group, the extremists on both sides constitute a minority among officials. Ironically, the proportion of extremist conservative and liberal officials is relatively similar. The conservative consisted of 11.1% of the total population and held very strong to extreme attitudes, while the liberal consisted of 13.3%.


The same analysis applied to government officials was also applied to the data obtained from the journalists' sample. Findings presented in Table 6.18 and plotted in Chart 6.2 revealed that the proportion of

Chart 6.1 Officials Attitudes on Conservative/Liberal Dichotomy



where (-1) = extremely conservative and (-5) = of low conservatism  
 (+1) = of low liberalism and (+5) = extremely liberal

Chart 6.2 Journalists Attitudes on Conservative/Liberal Dichotomy



where (-1) = extremely conservative and (-5) = of low conservatism  
 (+1) = of low liberalism and (+5) = extremely liberal

journalists with conservative attitudes was 58.9% of the total population. At the same time, the proportion of journalists with liberal scores consisted of 41.1% of the total population of journalists.

For conservative journalists the bulk of respondents occupied the scales of moderation or low commitment to conservatism. For example, it was found that out of 58.9% journalists with conservative preferences a proportion of 47.9% were found to hold low to moderate conservative attitudes on the issues. In similar findings, moderate liberal journalists proved to be an overwhelming majority among their sub-group. It was found that those journalists with low to moderate liberal attitudes numbered 32.3% out of 41.1% of total liberal journalists.

Most journalists (47.9%) were found to have moderate to low conservative values. 32.3% out of the 41.1% of journalists who occupied positions in the liberal camp were found to hold moderate to low attitudes. Reinforcing this impression of moderation, there was no instance of extremism among either the conservative or liberal journalists. The overall finding among the journalists, then, was one of pronounced moderation.

Regarding the tendency to conservativeness and liberalness among officials and journalists on the issues, Charts 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate the curve of each group over the conservative and liberal dichotomy. Whilst the curve is irregular in both cases, a pronounced bump in the centre over both dispositions is visible.

Extreme conservatism was not registered among the journalists. Whilst the number of conservatives is greater amongst officials than amongst journalists, there is a noticeable and interesting similarity of moderate conservative scores between the two groups; i.e. 55.5% and 47.9% respectively. Whilst 11% of journalists score high in conservatism, apparently higher than among officials, this effect is clearly offset by the presence of extreme conservatism only among officials.

As far as the journalists' attitudes are concerned, the liberal sides of the findings in Table 6.18 illustrate once more that, similar to the findings of the conservative journalists, there is an absence of extreme attitudes. On the contrary, 32.3% of journalists scored low to moderate liberal attitudes on the issues. Therefore it can be concluded that the overwhelming majority of journalists over both the conservative and liberal sides of the issues, exhibit moderate commitments. 47.9% conservative journalists and 32.3% liberals demonstrate an overwhelming 80.2% disposition to moderation.

One could say in conclusion, therefore, that data in Tables 6.17 and 6.18 reveal some indicative points that could be interpreted as follows:

1. That the majority of government officials are on the whole conservative in attitudes. Amongst the officials population, a majority of 71.1% adopted the conservative positions on the issues. By comparing this with the 28.9% of officials who chose the liberal side of the issues, the conclusion to be derived is that these data support the research general hypothesis; that the majority of government officials ought to stand in the conservative camp supporting the regime to which they belong and guarding its socio-political norms and traditions.
2. That government officials are more conservative than journalists. Their conservative position on the issues exceeded in terms of number of respondents the number of journalists, regardless of the fact that a majority of journalists are found to be of (moderate) conservative disposition. The ratio of conservative officials is 71.1% to 58.9% for journalists.
3. That unlike journalists, the population of government officials contains a considerable number of extremists who stand firmly in the conservative side in support of the policy of the government on issues

both local and foreign, and are probably then unlikely to be accommodating to liberal positions.

The general dispositions of the officials speak clearly for the high level of regime support and maintenance. They show the extent to which officials concert their views regarding prevalent issues in Kuwait with the views of the establishment. It may be noted too that the authority of these officials at the formal level is not reserved only to their roles in administration. Beyond this their authority is exercised directly in relation to the people and is brought directly to bear on the media. Of course, officials are bound by strong professional ties to support the regime, part of which must be to represent its ideology. However, in principle these professional obligations are compatible with an ideological variance. Ideological compatibility between the regime and officials is probably widely substantial rather than cynical. Regime supporting dispositions are significant in influencing the extension of professional contact and influence beyond the administration, especially to the media.

4. Regarding journalists, these findings made it evident that in spite of the fact that 58.9% of the journalists were found to adopt conservative positions on issues the ratio of liberal disposition was higher than that of liberal officials. Not only that, but in both directions the journalists showed moderate attitudes in conservative and liberal matters. This was unlike officials who were found in considerable numbers holding extreme attitudes, in both cases, conservative and liberal.

However, the ratio of conservative journalists to liberal, 58.9% to 41.1% did not come as a surprise in this study. It was mentioned earlier both in Chapter 4 on The Press and in the last section of Chapter 3 on journalists that the majority of journalists who work in



the Kuwaiti press are non-Kuwaiti Arabs who emigrated to Kuwait in search of security and income opportunities. The host government in Kuwait was in possession of considerable resources of sanction. Job loss and deportation are ever-present possibilities. More positively, the media are facilitated by the regime through its officials with a constant flow of news and information. Briefings and receptions aid the passage of media resources. Yet more informal influences of gift and favour between officials and media representatives (especially owners, who are mostly drawn from the merchant class) abound. There is much to induce and to encourage regional support in addition to the inclinations of the journalists.

5. The common Arab identity of Kuwaitis and the non-Kuwaitis in the country's media is a fragile overlay on the heterogeneity of nationality, culture and political affiliation. Our interview findings nevertheless supported the view expressed by one editor-in-chief "As non-Kuwaitis they understand the limits of freedom and the frontiers of publication. They also understand that when the government decides to take a certain position on the issues, they must follow the line". Notwithstanding the constraints placed on them, most journalists are from radical backgrounds, the influence of which is not wholly relinquished. They tend to sweep part of their beliefs into the content of the press. On the whole such liberalism is clear in external issues than in the locally more sensitive issues such as security, oil wealth and defence.

#### REPORTING ATTITUDINAL RESULTS

As mentioned earlier in the agenda-setting analysis the press content revealed 36 issues upon which the analysis of groups relationships was based. In the following section the attitudes of officials, journalists and

the press will be presented and the underlying patterns in those attitudes will be analysed. For each group two lists of attitudes, conservative and liberal, will be examined and results will be reported. In order to locate the attitudes of government officials and journalists, the original data were coded on a scale of three values, (-4) for conservative, (+4) for liberal and (0) for don't know. Then the coded data was re-coded to a three point scale (-1) for conservative, (0) for the don't knows and (+1) for liberal in order to indicate the general attitudes to each issue. Finally, the re-coded values were summed over cases omitting the zeros (which indicate the non-response). For the press, the scores of the press content was coded to (-1) for conservative and (1) for liberal so as to indicate the general attitudes of the press coverage to each issue.

#### GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS : ATTITUDINAL RESULTS

In the following the attitudes findings of government officials will be reported. It was found, as presented in Table 6.19, that the majority of issues attracted conservative responses. For example, 72.2% of all the issues (26 out of 36) attracted conservative responses corresponding with the attitudes of the government. These findings present an early indication that government officials on the whole support the government and keep faith in the establishment to which they belong and in which they serve.

The same findings show that most of the emphases by the officials were given to local issues as compared with those of external interest or concern. For example, among 26 issues with conservative emphases shown in Table 6.19, it was found that 18 issues were local and 4 issues related to affairs of the Gulf, but with strong relevance to the local affairs of Kuwait. Additionally, the data reveal that these issues include two main categories which clearly attracted conservative responses from government

officials. These categories are "oil wealth and oil prices" and the "relationship between the government and the national Assembly". In relation to the first, the majority of officials showed conservative attitudes on seven issues. These issues are "OPEC caused the decline in oil prices and not the West", "the decline in oil prices is temporary and not lasting", "the drop in oil revenues will lessen the inter-Arab conflicts", "lower prices will not lead to depression for Gulf commerce", "Kuwait authority conserves oil reserves", "all classes benefit from oil revenues" and "Kuwaiti foreign investments contribute to the national wealth".

The emphasis by officials on oil wealth is of great importance because oil wealth has always been the subject of long political debate, since the first shipment of Kuwaiti crude in 1946 and the increased quantity of exported oil. The question has been whether the regime would be able to maintain a wise policy in the use of oil revenues to modernise the country, improve its social services and in particular to establish a welfare state. Government officials overwhelmingly supported the government position and confirmed its liability to pursue a successful policy in oil affairs.

The second major area as far as government officials are concerned is the relationship between the government and the National Assembly. It was mentioned in Chapter 3 that during the data collection the conflict between the government and the national Assembly was at its worst. On the one hand, the government was greatly pre-occupied with the interior crises. Terrorist attacks became a national nightmare, especially after the incident in which the Amir himself was the subject of a mid-day attempted assassination in the centre of Kuwait. Simultaneously, the Iran-Iraq war was knocking hard on the north border of the state. The Iranians, once in verbal accusations and once with terrorist attacks aided by the Shi'ites in Kuwait, demonstrated their belief that Kuwait was a partner to Iraq in the

war. In these circumstances, the regime tried more than once to impose a state of emergency and to tighten security.

The National Assembly, on the other hand, tried to play down the security issue by emphasising the need for more democracy and political participation as the way to mobilise the public behind the regime against domestic and foreign threats.

Therefore, issues prevalent in the conflict between the two institutions, the government and the National Assembly, were found to be of great concern to the government officials. The data yielded a tremendous support by officials for the government's policies on these issues. For example, conservative officials believe that "the government follows Assembly recommendations", "the government is more capable of safeguarding public interests than Parliament against dissolution", "government doesn't support certain MPs against others" and "there are some MPs who create conflicts between the government and the Assembly". In Gulf affairs, officials believe that "open resistance to the Khomini regime will cause threat to the security of the Gulf states", "Gulf states should subsidise Iraq against Iran", "Iran undermines the Gulf by continuing the war" and "GCC military preparations are sufficient to confront Iran".

A third area in officials' concern is the terrorist crisis which caused a serious threat to the security of Kuwait. For example, conservative officials believe that "terrorism in Kuwait aims to undermine the government", "rejecting terrorists' demands weakens their positions", "security arrangements against terrorists are sufficient" and "Kuwait can best fight terrorism without any arrangements with other countries".

Reading the implications of these findings, one would conclude that the attitudes of officials in Kuwait regarding issues of local affairs are, on the whole, in tune with the attitudes of government. They are mostly loyal to the establishment, adopting its views, holding the same ideology

and showing the same convictions reserved for the regime. Concerning the relationships between officials and the press, this data is greatly significant. It was shown earlier that one of the government officials' tasks is to influence the press and to direct it in a way that would ensure a continuous flow of government news and a wide coverage of its views. The assumption thus was for officials to pursue journalists to direct the press content in favour of the ideology of the regime. They need to put certain pressure on journalists in order to gain their loyalty to the regime and to follow a conservative line when writing on the issues. It was found, however, that the conservative attitudes of government officials are not only based on the fact that they are employed to serve the government, but also because these attitudes are part of their cognitive and valulative belief system.

However, similar to any social stratum, the government officials group includes a minority whose positions on some issues are in contradiction to the dominant line of the majority beliefs, and thus with the original position of the regime. For example, findings show that on the 36 issues involved, a sub-group of government officials chose to take a liberal view on 10. Obviously it is not expected that all government officials will agree with the government's position on all issues, and it was not unusual for government officials to hold liberal views on matters of broad concern, such as issues related to foreign affairs. Therefore it was found, as shown in Table 6.20, that liberal officials tended to cluster in large number around five issues relating to foreign affairs. These issues are "Arab unity must be immediate", "the PLO is more effective under leaders opposed to Arafat", "the Jordan/PLO agreement disputes the Palestinian rights", "the solution of the Palestinian problem could be achieved without the participation of Egypt" and "the Iran/Iraq war ends by defeating Iran".

Regarding the liberal positions in domestic issues, the most striking findings by officials was on the issues relating to the expenditure of oil revenues and the degree of improvement in social services. The findings indicated that 58% of government officials believe that "Kuwait oil income is not spent wisely" and 77% think that the "social services are not adequate because of oil revenues".

In another contradictory position against the government, government officials opposed the government attitude which considers the non-Kuwaiti Arabs as a source of threat to the national security, especially after terrorist attacks against government targets and against the Amir. They were not in accord with the government playing down the threat which the numerous presence of non-Arab foreigners imposes on Kuwait's security. On the contrary, officials believed that non-Arab foreigners did threaten state security while non-Kuwaiti Arabs did not.

Regarding the officials' strongest conservative attitudes on the given issues, it was found, as the marked (\*) mean scores ( $\bar{X}$ ) show in Table 6.19, that the strongest attitudes taken by government officials was on the issue "OPEC caused the decline in oil prices, not the West". The mean score was -.92 with the proportion of conservative officials at 96% of respondents. However, this issue was found to be of certain importance. It was found that the number of valid cases was limited to 25 (out of 45) respondents of which 23 (96%) went to the conservative side and only 2 (6%) went to the liberal side. This was a highly variant instance of response; contradistinguished from a normal full response. Two reasons might explain this. One possibility is design of the measurement statements in which the crisis in oil prices was blamed on the OPEC organisation which is based on the view of the government, or was blamed on the West, an assertion based on the liberal group's point of view. The confusion results from the possibility that both sides could be blamed for the crisis. A second explanation

could possibly have been the lack of knowledge about the issues, especially during the collection of the data when the oil prices were sharply declining without much discussion about whose plans led to the destruction of the oil industry. Response to the second issue concerning oil prices, however, was consistent with other findings. It was subject to high scores by conservative officials, of which 77% were confident that "the decline in oil prices will not lead to a depression in Gulf commerce". A final high score was found on the issue "Parliament is secure against dissolution", in respect of which 79% of officials granted the government goodwill towards the elected MPs. Ironically, in a few weeks the confidence in the government's attitudes turned out to be misplaced, when the Amir decided to dissolve the Parliament and to cancel some articles in the constitution. Therefore the liberal forebodings came true.

The next strongest attitudes of officials were directed to an issue related to terrorism, namely "rejecting the terrorists' demands would help to end terrorism". It was found that 81% of officials with a strong mean score of -.63 supported the 'no yielding to terrorism' position taken by the government, objecting to any negotiation with terrorists.

There is a widespread coalescence of anxiety between the populace and the administration about terrorism in the country. More than 80 citizens were killed in explosions caused by terrorists in an open-air public coffee shop, and the Amir received facial injuries in a bomb attack. Furthermore, there were several highjackings of Kuwaiti airliners by terrorists.

Officials affected strong attitudes in respect of the issue of the Iran/Iraq war. 80% of officials strongly believed that the Gulf states should subsidise Iraq in the war against Iran. The mean scores of officials is -.61. Iran asserted a very explicit and visible threat to the other Gulf states. Similarly, another issue related to the Iran/Iraq war attracted strong attitudes by officials. This was "the great powers are

invited to patrol the Gulf, as a result of the Iranian threat to navigation". The mean score is -.50 with a proportion of 75% of conservative officials.

In another finding, the liberal sub-group of officials considered the issue of Arab unity to be top of their liberal priorities. It was found that 84% of all officials wanted "Arab unity immediately", while a proportion of 78% believed that "the solution of the Palestinian problem could be achieved without the participation of Egypt". A third issue with high liberal agreement among officials is the one of wide public concern about "social services". Unexpectedly, 77% of officials believe that "the social services are not adequate, because of oil revenues". This expresses an aspiration common among Kuwaitis, including officials, for more development projects and more social services.

#### JOURNALISTS ATTITUDINAL FINDINGS

In the following, the findings of journalists' attitudes will be presented, their mean scores on each of the issues will be analysed and issues in respect of which strong attitudes are shown will be illustrated.

As presented in Table 6.21, the sorting of the conservative scores by journalists revealed 22 issues. It was found that in spite of the fact that the majority of journalists exhibit conservative dispositions they were found on the whole, as far as the number of conservative positions is concerned, to be less conservative overall compared with conservative officials overall.

In reviewing the journalists' positions on the issues certain patterns were observed and reported. Firstly, it was found that there are three main areas of journalist interest. These areas are pan-Arab and Gulf affairs, oil wealth, and the Government and Parliament. In the category of pan-Arab affairs, journalists, being in the majority Arab ex-patriates,



were found to hold strong views on foreign issues, especially those related to Arab affairs. For example, in the category of Arab unity, it was found that 68% of journalists believe that "Arab renaissance could be achieved without Arab unity". However, a split in attitudes occurs around the second issue relating to Arab unity. It was found that 51% of journalists believe that "when it occurs, Arab unity must be based on a free economy". hence, 49% (only marginally lower) were of the opposite opinion; "when it occurs, Arab unity must be based on a controlled economy". This, in fact, echoes the ideology of most radical Arabs who believe in central rule and a controlled economy.

The most striking finding among journalists was that relating to their position on the issue of the Arab/Israeli conflict. It was found that most journalists (76%) believe that "the Arab/Israeli conflict could be resolved by treaty". This issue is of strong significance for many reasons. It is significant because the majority of Arab journalists who work in the Kuwaiti press are either of Palestinian origins, or from other Arab states which they left for radical reasons and which oppose the option of peaceful settlement for the Palestinian problem. It is also significant because during the time these data were collected the PLO, with other Arab rejectionist states, was not in a position to accept direct negotiations with Israel. The PLO approved UN resolutions 424 and 339 only in November 1988. The inference, therefore, is that the majority of journalists in the Kuwaiti press have foreseen, from the beginning, the developing outcome of the stalemate in the Middle East conflict, even to the point that they have been able to foresee what has been hidden in diplomatic circles for two years.

The most predominant affair in the attitudes of the journalists was "the oil wealth and oil prices". As the data shows in Table 6.21, journalists were more conservative on oil issues than was the case with officials.

It was found that in eight issues (9 to 16) journalists show conservative attitudes. Those issues are "OPEC caused the crises in oil prices", "decline in oil prices is temporary", "oil prices will not cause depression to Gulf commerce", "drop in oil wealth lessens inter-Arab conflict", "Kuwaiti oil income is spent wisely", "Kuwaiti oil authority conserves oil wealth", "all classes benefitted from oil revenues" and "foreign investments contribute to the national wealth". Such impressive support by journalists for government views is relevant to one of the hypotheses, that in a traditional socio-economic system such as Kuwait, where the government represents the sovereign and the press as a modern institution does not dispute the authority of government officials, the journalists by belief or by persuasion reflect in their writing the ideology of the sovereign and thus in their judgement, echo the views of the establishment. The journalists, by virtue of their views, honoured the government's oil policies. Because of their access to government and to information relating to oil affairs, they are well placed to test, evaluate and judge how the government deals with oil issues.

Table 6.21 shows that journalists sided with the government in confrontation with the MPs which led in 1986 to the dissolution of parliament. For example, in accord with officials, journalists agreed that "the government follows Parliament's recommendations", that "the government is more capable of safeguarding public interests than Parliament", that "Parliament is secure against dissolution" and that "the government does not support some MPs and undermines others".

It should be noted, however, that the amount of support given by journalists to the government position against Parliament does not correspond with the attitudes journalists strike towards the two political institutions. It was mentioned before that journalists have on many occasions orchestrated their position in many political issues with the posi-

tion taken by the MPs and vice-versa. For example, in 1976 when the former Amir dissolved Parliament the press conducted a long and fierce campaign demanding the resumption of parliamentary life. It was also mentioned in Chapter 4 that when the press came under government attack in 1981 and suggested amendments to the Law of Publication, most MPs sided with the press up to the point that they rejected the draft and voted against the government. It is to be observed here that since the early arrival of Arab ex-patriates to Kuwait, with many joining the journalistic ranks, the nationalists and the intellectuals inside and outside Parliament have shown strong support for the non-Kuwaiti Arabs and demanded equal rights for Arab foreigners along with the rights enjoyed by Kuwaiti citizens.

That the journalists supported the government against Parliament, however, sheds light on a controversial issue which was believed to be behind the dissolution of Parliament. It was widely recognised that during the session of 1986 some MPs lacked the attributes of astuteness and wisdom needed for politicians who work in public life. For instance, some MPs tended to agitate the regime by asserting challenges to the authority of the Amir and the Royal Family, as shown in the case of the confrontation between Dr. AL-Nafeesy and the Deputy Prime Minister referred to in Chapter 4. Other MPs tended to sabotage urgent drafted laws or to put embargoes on others. The low profile adopted by some MPs in critical circumstances, especially in matters of security caused by the Iran/Iraq war, was probably among the reasons for the dissatisfaction of journalists with Parliament. These circumstances will have explained in part the data results showing the supportive attitudes of the journalists towards the government against Parliament.

The findings of liberal journalists' attitudes are presented in Table 6.22. Firstly, it was found that 76% of journalists wanted Arab unity to be achieved immediately. Secondly, a small majority of journalists (52%)

have no confidence in the ability of Yasser Arafat to pursue an effective leadership for the Palestinian people, preferring opponents to his leadership. Journalists (69%) also discredited Egypt's role in the Middle East as a result of the Egypt/Israeli Camp David treaty in 1979. Finally, journalists maintained strong tolerance for the presence of non-Kuwaiti Arabs in Kuwait, apparently confident (72%) that they do not threaten the security of Kuwait.

Regarding the Iran/Iraq war, the journalists took liberal positions on three issues. They call for "open resistance to the Khomini regime"; they believe that "the war between Iran and Iraq would end with the defeat of Iran"; and that "Iran tends to undermine the Gulf states by continuing the war".

In issues relating to the press, most journalists defended their reputation by demonstrating positively (66%) that they had no "fear [of] losing their jobs when they [wrote] against the government". However, such hypothetical courage was not strong enough for journalists to deny that the "Kuwaiti press is censored and not as free as the government alleges". 55% took the pessimistic view.

It is noticed that, in addition to the two press positions in local affairs mentioned above, journalists believed that "existing security arrangements against terrorism are insufficient", "social services are not adequate because of oil revenues" and "government believes that some MPs create the conflict between government and Parliament". These findings are consistent with the fact that more than 90% of journalists are from other Arab countries, and they would therefore be more receptive to foreign issues than to local ones. The expectation might more naturally be that journalists would concede to government positions on local issues but retain their own judgements on foreign issues without fear of unpleasant reaction by the government.

So far as the strongest attitudes of journalists are concerned, it was found, as shown marked (\*) in Table 6.21, to mean that there was astonishing similarity between the highest conservative mean scores given by journalists (Issue 17 - 87%) and officials (Issue 18 - 81%) to the issue "rejecting terrorists demands will lead to the end of terrorism". In accord with the officials, the journalists' attitudes were strongly conservative where the mean scores on the above position was (-.75), which means that 87% of journalists were found to hold a conservative position and believe that the best method to fight terrorism is to reject their demands and not to yield to their threats. Interestingly, however, the journalists were slightly more conservative on this issue.

The second highest mean score (-.62) was given to the assertion that the "great powers be invited to police the Gulf after Iranian threats to navigation". A proportion of 80% of journalists believed that Iran is the aggressor which led to foreign involvement in the Gulf zone; again, this is slightly more conservative than the officials were (Issue 7 - 75%).

In a third high mean score, it was found that journalists were misled in their judgement of government policy concerning Parliament. For example, it was found that 80% of journalists believed that "Parliament is secure against dissolution". This conviction proved to be wrong, either because the government was able to hide its plans to dissolve Parliament or because the journalists were unable to predict the course of events in the conflict between the government and Parliament which ended in the dissolution of Parliament. It is noticeable that there is an almost exact correspondence between officials and journalists on this issue.

A fourth strong conservative position was on the issue of Arab/Israeli conflict where the mean score for journalists was (-.51). The unexpected trend here was not only that 76% of journalists were found in support of a peaceful settlement, but also because their choice was taken ahead of all

the speculation about Palestinian concessions in Algiers in November 1988. Finally, journalists findings showed some high mean scores in the case of the issue "lower oil prices will not lead to depression of Gulf commerce" (-.46), 73% "Gulf states should subsidise Iraq against Iran" (-.93), 67%, "Kuwaiti authority conserves oil wealth" (-.45), 73% and "foreign investments contribute to the national income" (-.37) 68%.

Regarding journalists mean scores in the liberal range of the issues, data in Table 6.22 shows that the highest mean score (.52) was given to an issue related to Arab unity. This constitutes a proportion of 76% of the journalists who believe that "Arab unity must occur immediately". There were similarities in mean scores of conservative response on issues among officials and journalists. The same is to be found among officials' and journalists' liberal responses. In both liberal findings the highest liberal mean scores were given to the issues of Arab unity, where the mean score for officials was (.68) 84% and the mean score for journalists was (.52) 76%.

The second highest liberal mean score was given to the proposition that "the Iran/Iraq war would end with the defeat of Iran" with a score of (.51) 77%. The third highest mean score (.49) 74% was given to the view that "social services are not adequate because of oil revenue".

In other considerable scores, journalists were relatively high in such issues as "non-Kuwaiti Arabs do not threaten security" (.45) 72%, "solution of the Arab/Israeli conflict could be attained without the participation of Egypt" (.38) 69% and "journalists don't fear losing jobs" (.32) 66%.

#### ATTITUDINAL FINDINGS OF PRESS CONTENT

It was mentioned in Chapter 4 on the press that the general disposition of newspapers ranges widely from the far right conservative to the far left liberal. Accordingly it was clear from the outset of coding analysis that the press content would reveal two sets of attitudes. On the one hand, the set conservative attitudes which reflect the status quo; the existing socio-political system sustained by the traditional sovereign, guarded by the government and maintained by the bureaucratic managerial system of government officials. On the other hand, the press content also revealed a set of liberal attitudes expressed in calls for change, swifter socio-political modernisation, equality for women, rights to political participation and equitable access to oil revenue. This liberal set consists of the nationalists, the intellectuals and apparently a large section of the media.

In the previous sections the findings regarding the attitudes of officials and journalists over the conservative/liberal spectrum was presented in some detail. In the following section the findings of the press attitudes obtained from the content of newspaper samples will be illustrated.

For conservative attitudes in the press, the data in Table 6.23 showed that the press content revealed 21 issues eliciting conservative responses. A notable pattern in these data showed that the predominant area in the conservative content concerned oil prices and oil wealth. For example, the conservative scores of the press includes six issues in the oil category, namely "OPEC caused the decline in oil prices", "the decline in oil prices is temporary", "the drop in oil prices lessens inter-Arab conflicts", "Kuwaiti oil income is spent wisely", "Kuwaiti authority conserves oil wealth" and "Kuwaiti foreign investments contribute to the national income". It is not uncommon in Kuwait to see extensive media coverage of

oil issues. Such coverage in the Kuwaiti press sometimes includes contradictory views with respect to government policy. However, the data in Table 6.23 reveal that there is a high degree of consensus between the attitudes of the government on oil issues and the attitudes shown in press coverage.

A second notable pattern in the press coverage is the overwhelming correspondence of the views of the government in its confrontation with Parliament and the positions detected in press content concerning this confrontation. For example, it was found that the press reflected the position of the government on issues such as "the government is more capable of safeguarding the public interest than Parliament", "the government doesn't support some MPs and undermine others", "Parliament is secure against dissolution" and "the government believes that some MPs create conflict in Parliament". An explanation of these positions would be similar to that among the journalists section. The main explanations seem to be in uncertainties about the MP's arguments and a prevailing sense that Parliament was careless regarding security matters and threats to Kuwaiti security vis a vis Iran. These were allegations made by government supporters. The majority of journalists and most newspapers were found to prefer the government position as opposed to that prevailing in Parliament.

A third notable pattern is the conservative emphases in the press on the issue of Arab unity. For example, it was found that similar to officials and journalists the press content was directed to emphasising the belief that "Arab renaissance could be achieved without Arab unity" and "Arab unity must be based on a free economy". However, unlike the two groups the press suggests that "when it occurs, Arab unity must come in stages rather than immediately".



A fourth set of conservative attitudes exhibited in the press content was directed to the war between Iran and Iraq. For example, it was found that the press maintained the need for the Gulf states to support the Iraqi military campaign against Iran under the impression that if Iraq was defeated the next military destination for Iranian forces would be the small Gulf states including Kuwait. The assertion which was raised by the press was that the "Gulf states should subsidise Iraq against Iran" especially after "the great powers become involved in the Gulf following Iran's threat to navigation".

On foreign issues it was found that the press content, in contradiction with the distrustful attitudes of government officials and journalists, credited Yasser Arafat as the actual and acceptable leader of the Palestinians. The assertion was that the "solution of the Palestinian problem will be attained by the PLO under the leadership of Yasser Arafat". The press, also in contrast with the two groups, shows that "the solution will come with the participation of Egypt". In the event, these convictions have been vindicated, at least in part, by the outcome of recent meetings and negotiations relating to the situation in the Middle East. Arafat and Egypt became the main actors in the efforts for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, and Egypt has become the centre for all peaceful negotiations on Palestinian issues.

So far as liberal attitudes in the press are concerned, the findings in Table 6.24 show that there are 15 issues which elicit liberal attitudes in the press content. This figure constitutes 47% of the total issues in the press content.

Some notable patterns in liberal attitudes in the press coverage shown in Table 6.24 are, firstly, that in issues relating to the Arab/Israeli conflict the press showed liberal attitudes on two major issues; that "the Arab/Israeli conflict will be resolved through military confrontation" and

that "the Jordan/PL0 agreement impedes rather than helps the regaining of Palestinian rights". The positions of the press could be explained in two ways; that the press was reflecting the existing Arab political trends in relation to the conflict with Israel at that time (1986 and before). At that time it would have been quite improbable for direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis to take place. Any call for this would have been considered worse than treason. Secondly, Arab governments, including Kuwait, have agreed in many Arab summits that any direct negotiations with Israel were unlikely, especially as Israel kept occupying Arab lands taken in 1967. However, this policy was effective until the Palestinian National Council, Parliament in exile, entered into its new initiative and shifted the whole position in November 1988 towards direct face-to-face negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. A settlement of the issue was now put on that agenda. Regarding the Jordan/PL0 agreement, the differences between King Hussein of Jordan and the PL0 were at their worst at that time. The Jordanian approach was basically in favour of direct negotiations between representatives of the PL0 and Israel. The PL0 approach was that the PL0 should meet the Israelis under the auspices of the United Nations and within an international conference. The Kuwaiti press, with its large contingent of Palestinians, always favoured the PL0 point of view. Press speculation regarding King Hussein's negative attitude towards the Palestinians led to the conclusion that the treaty would not last long.

A second notable pattern in the press liberal attitudes is in the coverage of the Iran/Iraq war. As it happened, the data here were collected during the height of the war, when it was in its most violent phase. Kuwait was expecting an Iranian raid at any time, especially after the capture of the Iraqi island of Fao by Iranian troops in 1986. The island of Fao is located only a few miles north of the Kuwaiti border, and the Iranians considered Kuwait to be an active partner with Iraq in the war

because Kuwait offered generous subsidy to the Iraqi military forces. Additionally, Kuwait had been backing Iraq with strategic facilities, food transportation and diplomatic support. For the Kuwaiti government it was vital for the Iraqi cause to prevail, although Kuwaiti support for Iraq was not supposed to be formal or public. The intention behind this was that the Iranians should not acquire evidence to justify an attack on Kuwait. There was also an unwillingness to agitate the Shi'ite residents in Kuwait, whether they were Kuwaitis or non-Kuwaitis, as this would have posed a danger to the security of the state. The political institutions in Kuwait, Parliament, the press and the government, considered the war to be an issue for debate. Some believed that Kuwait should stay neutral; which was obviously the position of the Shi'ites. Others believed in active participation in support of Iraq; a view predominant among the nationalists and most journalists. Both groups influenced the press to encourage the government for further support for the Iraqis.

Therefore the review of press content as presented in Table 6.24 shows that "open resistance to the Khomini regime would protect the security of Kuwait", that "the war will end by defeating Iran", and that "Iran is undermining the Gulf states by continuing the war" were propositions supported by the press. On these four issues the press were placed in conflict with the government's policy, siding more or less with some Kuwaiti pan-Arab nationalists who consider the war to be another phase in the historical contradiction between Arab and Persian nationalism. This arose historically when the Arabs destroyed the Persian Empire in the wake of Islam in the sixth century.

A third noticeable pattern in the liberal press content is in the category relating to terrorism. The debate regarding the best way to face the increased violence manifested in terrorism revolves from the beginning

around two options. Firstly, to fight terrorism and not to yield to terrorists' pressure; which is the government's view. Secondly, to find the means to negotiate some deals and to turn terrorist attention away from Kuwait. For part of the press the assumption was that any acceleration of the confrontation with terrorism could lead to more violence, more casualties among the public and more destruction of property. It was noticed that in many leading articles and opinion columns the press was urging for appropriate methods to achieve a long term solution and end the Kuwait engagement with terrorism. Some of the suggested methods were, for example, to encourage public participation in safeguarding the country, which could be achieved by emphasising the need for more political participation and more mobilisation for low-income Kuwaitis. The logic behind this was that the more the citizens feel their country is generous to them the more they would be inclined to make sacrifices for their country against external threat, no matter from where or by whom it comes.

Some articles were written by liberal intellectuals such as Dr. AL-Rubai, MP and a member of the editorial board of AL-Watan newspaper. He emphasised the need for more democracy and political participation, noting that any security measures against terrorism or against external threats in an autocratic regime would not lead to the end of that terrorism or that threat if the regime lacked public support. The democratic system, on the contrary, would be able to mobilise the masses behind security forces and present a public defence against the state's enemies, terrorists or others (AL-Watan, 12.9.1985).

The actual position of the press content regarding terrorism issues, as presented in Table 6.24, shows that the press treatment of the issues emphasises the conviction that "terrorism in Kuwait is part of the international terrorist campaign" and that "rejecting terrorist demands would

eventually increase terrorism". Also "Kuwait can best fight terrorism by co-ordination with other countries".

A fourth area of liberal attitudes in the press content was in the category of oil prices and oil wealth. Three strong anti-government positions were traced in the press content; the press showed that "lower oil prices will lead to depression of Gulf commerce", that "social services are not adequate because of oil revenues", and that, more importantly, "only limited classes have benefitted from oil revenues". These raised another striking set of findings in which the press seemed to take a view in sharp contradiction to the government.

It is not uncommon in Kuwait, however, for the press to criticise government policies and point to inefficiency in services, or to complain about economic inequality where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Liberals were alert to this in a country with the highest per capita income in the world. Such criticism was, however, acceptable in some degree to both the government and the press. For the government it would cultivate a good impression with the public if freedom of opinion and the freedom of the press were guaranteed by law. From the press point of view, it would maintain the belief that they were alert and sensitive to public interests, and that the press is socially responsible in alliance with the public against any wrongdoing by the government.

Looking finally at the findings relating to the press, some issues stand out as particularly significant on both the conservative and liberal sides of the issues. In the conservative attitudes, as shown in the marked (\*) figures in Table 6.23, the press gave the strongest emphasis to the issue of Arab unity, "Arab unity must come in stages". The score (-259) was not only the highest on the conservative side but also the highest score in the press content over the whole conservative/liberal spectrum. Although Arab unity seems unattainable in the foreseeable

future, to most people it is a routine topic in the Arab media as well as among Arab officials and the public at large. In the press, concern for and commitment to Arab unity is the ground for credibility among readers; an assurance of more readers and more income from advertisements. It becomes conceivable that the more any paper relates its policy to Arabism and the more emphasis it puts on Arab unity, the more respect and trust it gains from readers. For the Arab officials the issue of Arab unity is a subject for daily political consumption and debate. There is hardly a single meeting between Arab officials without the issue of Arab unity being listed at the top of the agenda. For the public, the cultural, economic and military problems of their countries are the consequence of Arab failure to project a firm policy and commitment towards the unity of all Arab peoples and states.

The second highest score in the conservative press content (-230) was related to the issue that "the government follow the recommendations of Parliament". As was mentioned before, relations between the government and Parliament evoked a sharp debate. The position of the press in this finding showed strong support for the government side. Also this high score indicates the wide coverage of the issue in the press.

The third highest conservative score was given to oil wealth. The issue "Kuwaiti oil revenue is spent wisely" registered (-157). The fact remains, however, that there are some people of public prominence who believe that although oil wealth has provided enormous income for the country (US\$7.89bn in 1987) the efficiency of public services is still low. Furthermore, access to these enormous incomes is very unequal among Kuwaiti citizens. However, among our three research variables, officials, journalists and the press, there was apparent agreement that oil wealth in Kuwait is spent wisely and that foreign investment contributes to the national income. It seems that this conviction was based on the fact that, unlike

other Arab oil states where the Royal Families do not differentiate between the state income and their own income, the Kuwaiti Royal Family, the Amir and other Sheiks have specific salaries as members of the administration. Besides this, they are businessmen and have their own independent sources of income.

Secondly, the Kuwaiti government has pursued a vigorous programme of investment of its oil revenue in foreign countries, in Europe and in particular in Britain. A recent example has been the Kuwaiti purchase of 21% of the shares in British Petroleum (BP) last year, subsequently reduced by the British Department of Trade and Industry to a 10% holding. These investments are not only income-generating but are sometimes strategically placed. Kuwaiti income from foreign investment adds an annual 30% to 40% to the total oil revenues cited above. Therefore, Kuwait has a considerable reputation in terms of expenditure from oil revenue and in terms of successful investment in foreign countries. The press content, as shown in Table 6.23, exhibits awareness of this situation and satisfaction with it.

The fourth highest score in the conservative attitudes of the press is the press call for the Gulf states to subsidise Iraq against Iran, where the score was (-115). Finally, the fifth highest score in the conservative press coverage was noted in item number 9 shown in Table 6.23. The item reads "OPEC caused the decline in oil prices and not the West", with a score of (-76). In this item the press, similarly to the officials and the journalists, tended to give strong emphasis to the sharp division among the members of OPEC and the tendency among members to increase crude production in response to falling world prices but in spite of OPEC quota agreements, thereby threatening the destruction of the OPEC treaty. The three variables in our study agreed with the government and were in contradistinction from the liberal point of view which attributed the whole crises to the long and deliberate plans of the West to bring down prices, to humiliate

the members of OPEC, and even to destroy the economy of the exporting countries.

For the liberal attitudes of the press on the issues, four areas of concern were of special importance in the press content. For example it was found, as indicated in marked (\*) figures in Table 6.24, that the highest liberal score (200) was related to the item "the Iran/Iraq war will be ended by defeating Iran". The second highest score (117) was related to the issue "the Arab/Israeli conflict will be ended by military confrontation", while the third highest score (99) was related to the issue that "social services are not adequate because of oil revenues". Finally, in the series of highest scores for liberal attitudes, the fourth highest score (93) was related to the issue which assumes that "Kuwait could best fight terrorism in co-operation with other countries affected by terrorism". It should be noted that the four highest scores associated with liberal attitudes in the press were found to contradict the similar attitudes held by officials and journalists except the one related to the social services, which was found to be shared in the liberal attitudes of the three variables; a matter that could well attract future research.

#### ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE

In the following, further findings of agenda setting in the importance level will be presented. As a beginning, our analysis of the inter-relationship between journalists and officials indicated certain positive Pearson Correlation Coefficients ( $r$ ) between the emphases given by journalists to certain issues and the emphases given by government officials on the same issues. In the meantime, the same analysis showed that on other issues the Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the two groups was negative.



For example, the findings presented in Table 6.25 show a series of positive correlations on 28 issues. Before we proceed with this report on the data, it must be noted that our analysis of journalists and officials is based on the total of the 50 items utilised in our instrument and not on the 36 issues which were detected in the press content and were utilised to measure the relationship across the three variables, the press, the officials and the journalists. We also draw attention to the critical values of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient in which we arbitrarily selected ( $P = <.08$ ) as a significant level for the officials' and journalists' relationship on the issues. Taking these two points into account, we will then proceed with our analysis.

#### ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF IMPORTANCE

In order to test the relationship between the overall responses of government officials and the journalists on the 50 issues of the questionnaire we run Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the mean rates of officials and the mean rates of journalists. The results, which will be reported in detail, revealed two sets of correlations, i.e. positive and negative correlations. As was noted above, on some issues, the correlation was found to be close to the significant value of (.05). We present them partly because the level of significance is relatively close to the critical value, and partly because, by reporting them, they add to the emphases on some issues by either of the two groups. However, it is not possible to report on the total list of issues of correlation; but it is possible to point out some issues with certain importance, mainly those correlating with many issues. It is also possible to point to some pattern in which some issues predominate in domestic or foreign affairs.

To begin with data presented in Table 6.25 show seven issues in which the importance of some issues assigned by journalists positively correlated

with a long list of issues assigned by government officials. For example, the domestic issue, i.e. that the government knows that "Some MPs Create Conflicts between the Government and National Assembly" assigned by journalists, was found to correlate with 8 issues assigned by government officials. The Pearson Moment Product correlation coefficient presented in Table 6.25 shows that this issue correlates with three issues related to the Iran-Iraq war, namely, "the End of Iran-Iraq War in negotiations or defeat" ( $P < .01$ ), "Gulf State should subsidise Iraq or stay neutral, ( $P < .03$ ) and "The sufficiency of the G.C.C. military preparation against Iran" at ( $P < .02$ ).

The same issue was found to correlate with 3 issues related to terrorism. Those issues are "Rejecting Terrorists Demands weakens their positions" ( $P < .04$ ), "Restricting Visa entry for Arab Shi'ites" ( $P < .02$ ) and "Security Arrangements against Terrorists" ( $P < .05$ ). Finally, the same issue correlated with 2 issues related to oil wealth, namely "Crises in oil prices are caused by OPEC" .05 or at ( $P < .06$ ) and "The Government Conserves Oil Resources" ( $P < .03$ ).

Another important issue is "Resolving the Arab-Israeli Conflict by Peaceful Settlement or by Confrontation". Besides being rated issue number one by journalists, it was also found to correlate positively with 9 other issues assigned by government officials. Firstly, it correlated highly, as shown in Table 6.25, with the issues "Security Arrangements are Sufficient", at ( $P < .001$ ), with "Police Arrangements against Terrorists" at ( $P < .04$ ) while, in other two issues relating to Terrorism, i.e. "Rejecting Terrorists Demands" and "Terrorist Undermine the Government", the correlation was ( $P < .07$ ) and ( $P < .06$ ) respectively. The issue of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, furthermore, correlates with two other domestic issues, "The Government is not obligated to follow National Assembly Recommendation" and "National Assembly is not subject for resolution".

Correlation in the first issue is at ( $P < .05$ ) and in the second issue is at ( $P < .03$ ).

By referring to the same table more issues on the journalists' side correlate with other issues on the officials' side. For example, the issue "Solutions for Palestinian Problem, urgent or left for the future" was found to coincide with five issues, "Solution with Egypt Participation", "Oil Prices effects on Gulf Commerce", "Kuwait spends wisely Oil Revenue", "National Assembly is subject to resolution", and "Journalists fear expulsion". Each of the rest of the issues assigned by journalists, as presented in Table 6.25, correlate positively with one or more than one issue in the officials' list of issues. Many other issues were also found of great significance in the positive correlation context, the whole picture is presented in Table 6.25.

Like the findings in the positive form, the data in this study yielded negative correlation in many issues assigned by journalists and government officials. Each issue on the journalists' side correlates with one issue or more on the officials' side. Table 6.26 however presents certain issues which correlate negatively with others. For example, the issue "Jordanian-Palestinian agreement challenges or confirms the Palestinian rights" correlates negatively with "Arab Unity in stages or immediate", "Arab Unity : Religious or Secular", "Urgent solution for Palestinian problem or left for future time", "PLO effective under Arafat or his opponents", "Non-Kuwaiti Arabs Threaten Security", "Oil prices temporary or permanent" and "Oil Revenues are limited for certain Kuwaitis or for all".

A second strong issue in terms of negative correlations is "Kuwaiti Foreign Investment strengthens or weakens the economy". It was found that it correlates with 5 issues, namely "The Great Powers in the Gulf", "Iran undermines Gulf states", "Rejecting Terrorist Demands", "Kuwait war on Terrorism" and "Government leans to some MPs". In the same table, the

issue "Government does not follow the recommendation of the National Assembly" appears to contradict with 4 issues. Findings show negative correlation between this issue and the issues "Arab Unity Federal or Central", "Urgent solution or left for future time", "PLO effective under Arafat or his opponents", "Non-Kuwaiti Arabs Threaten Security", "Oil prices temporary or permanent" and "Oil revenues are limited for certain Kuwaitis or for all".

A second strong issue in terms of importance is "Kuwaiti Foreign Investment strengthens or weakens the Economy". It was found that it correlates with 5 issues, namely "The Great Powers in the Gulf", "Iran undermines Gulf states", "Rejecting Terrorist Demands", "Kuwait war on Terrorism" and "Government leans to some MPs". In the same table, the issue "Government does not follow the recommendation of the National Assembly" appears to correlate with 4 issues. Findings show negative correlation between this issue and the issues "Arab Unity Federal or Central", "Urgent solution or left for future time", "Solution with or without Egyptian participation" and "Government leans to some MPs". Many other issues on the journalists side correlate negatively with others on the officials' side. The whole picture is presented in Table 6.26.

**Table 6.13** An overall Press Index with Officials and Journalists ratings and Spearman rank order correlation Coefficient based on Press Coverages Saliency of the Issues.

ISSUES	PRESS		OFFICIALS		JOURNALISTS	
	Index	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank
1. Arab unity stages or immediate	259	1.0	3.32	5.5	3.50	5.0
2. Government does or does not follow National Assembly recommendations	230	2.0	2.90	20.0	3.12	17.5
3. Iran-Iraq war ends by negotiation or defeat	200	3.0	3.21	8.5	3.42	8.0
4. Kuwait oil income spent wisely or unwisely	175	4.0	2.69	26.0	2.95	23.5
5. Resolving the Palestinian problem by treaty or confrontation	117	5.0	3.0	15.5	3.64	1.0
6. Gulf states should subsidise Iraq or stay neutral	115	6.0	3.0	15.5	3.12	17.5
7. Social services adequate or inadequate with oil revenues	99	7.0	3.09	12.0	3.16	15.5
8. Kuwait war with terrorism independently or with Arab states	93	8.0	3.41	2.5	3.49	6.0
9. Non-Kuwaiti Shi-ites do or do not threaten security	90	9.0	2.68	27.0	2.95	23.5
10. Kuwait authority conserve or waste oil resources	76	10.5	3.43	1.0	3.08	19.0
11. OPEC caused the decline in oil prices or the West	76	10.5	3.41	2.5	3.57	2.0
12. Kuwait security needs or does not need more arrangements to ensure stability	51	12.0	2.95	17.5	3.21	13.0

ISSUES	PRESS		OFFICIALS		JOURNALISTS	
	Index	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank
13. Journalists do or do not fear losing their job	50	13.0	2.56	30.0	2.34	36.0
14. Lower prices will or will not lead to depression in Gulf Commerce	47	14.0	2.71	25.0	3.22	12.0
15. PLO effective under Arafat or under leader opponents	45	15.0	2.67	28.0	2.58	35.0
16. Rejecting terrorist demands ends or increases terrorism	41	16.0	3.40	4.0	3.56	3.0
17. The Government or the National Assembly is safeguarding public interests	37	17.0	2.92	19.0	3.16	15.5
18. The National Assembly is secure or subject to dissolution	36	18.0	2.95	17.5	3.17	14.0
19. C.C.C. military preparations sufficient or not sufficient	31	19.0	3.19	10.0	2.93	25.5
20. Great power was in the Gulf before or invited to the Gulf by Iran	30	20.0	3.21	8.5	3.45	7.0
21. Jordan-PL0 agreement disputes or returns rights	25	21.0	2.73	24.0	3.07	20.0
22. Arab unity with free of control economy	24	22.0	2.83	22.0	3.35	9.0
23. Kuwait government does or does not support some MPs	19	23.0	2.50	31.5	3.27	11.0

ISSUES	PRESS		OFFICIALS		JOURNALISTS	
	Index	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank
24. Terrorism undermines government or international campaign	17	24.0	3.27	7.0	2.93	25.5
25. Kuwaiti press is free or censored	16	25.0	2.50	31.5	2.91	28.0
26. Arab renaissance with or without Arab unity	15	26.0	3.32	5.5	3.51	4.0
27. Non-Kuwaiti Arab do or do not threaten security	10	27.5	2.38	35.0	2.80	31.5
28. Open resistance to Khomeni does or does not threaten Kuwaiti security	10	27.5	2.67	28.0	2.62	33.0
29. Iran does or does not undermine the Gulf States	10	27.5	3.13	11.0	2.98	22.0
30. The drop in oil wealth lessens or aggravates inter-Arab conflicts	10	27.5	2.18	36.0	2.92	27.0
31. Government does or does not believe MPs create conflicts	10	27.5	2.49	33.0	2.80	31.5
32. Solution with or without Egypt participation	9	32.0	3.05	13.5	3.31	10.0
33. Decline in oil prices temporary or lasting	8	33.0	2.76	23.0	3.05	21.5
34. Kuwait foreign investment secures or threatens economy	5	34.0	2.88	21.0	2.88	28.0
35. Non-Arab foreigners do or do not threaten security	4	35.5	2.40	34.0	2.59	34.0
36. Security measures to fight terrorism sufficient or not sufficient	4	35.5	3.05	13.5	2.75	32.0

**Table 6.14** An overall Press Index and Government Officials Ratings of the Issues with the Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficient based on Press Coverage Saliency of the Issues.

ISSUES	PRESS		OFFICIALS	
	Index	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank
1. Arab unity stages or immediate	259	1.0	3.32	5.5
2. Government does or does not follow National Assembly recommendations	230	2.0	2.90	20.0
3. Iran-Iraq war ends by negotiation or defeat	200	3.0	3.21	8.5
4. Kuwait oil income spent wisely or unwisely	175	4.0	2.69	26.0
5. Resolving the Palestinian problem by treaty or confrontation	117	5.0	3.0	15.5
6. Gulf states should subsidise Iraq or stay neutral	115	6.0	3.0	15.5
7. Social services adequate or inadequate with oil revenues	99	7.0	3.09	12.0
8. Kuwait war with terrorism independently or with Arab states	93	8.0	3.41	2.5
9. Non-Kuwaiti Shi-ites do or do not threaten security	90	9.0	2.68	27.0
10. Kuwait authority conserves or wastes oil resources	76	10.5	3.43	1.0
11. OPEC caused the decline in oil prices or the West	76	10.5	3.41	2.5
12. Kuwait security needs or does not need more arrangement to ensure stability	51	12.0	2.95	17.5
13. Journalists do or do not fear losing their jobs	50	13.0	2.56	30.0
14. Lower prices will or will not lead to depression in Gulf commerce	47	14.0	2.71	25.0



continued...

Table 6.14

ISSUES	PRESS		OFFICIALS	
	Index	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank
15. PLO effective under Arafat or under leader opponents	45	15.0	2.67	28.0
16. Rejecting terrorist demands ends or increases terrorism	41	16.0	3.40	4.0
17. The Government or the National Assembly is safeguarding public interests	37	17.0	2.92	19.0
18. The National Assembly is secure or subject to dissolution	36	18.0	2.95	17.5
19. G.C.C. military preparations are sufficient or not sufficient	31	19.0	3.19	10.0
20. Great power was in the Gulf before or invited to the Gulf by Iran	30	20.0	3.21	8.5
21. Jordan-PL0 agreement disputes or returns rights	25	21.0	2.73	24.0
22. Arab unity with free or control economy	24	22.0	2.83	22.0
23. The Kuwait government does or does not support some MPs	19	23.0	2.50	31.5
24. Terrorism undermines government or international campaign	17	24.0	3.27	7.0
25. The Kuwaiti press is free or censored	16	25.0	2.50	31.5
26. Arab renaissance with or without Arab unity	15	26.0	3.32	5.5
27. Non-Kuwaiti Arabs do or do not threaten security	10	27.5	2.38	35.0

continued...

Table 6.14

ISSUES	PRESS		OFFICIALS	
	Index	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank
28. Open resistance to Khomeini does or does not threaten Kuwait security	10	27.5	2.67	28.0
29. Iran does or does not undermine Gulf States	10	27.5	3.13	11.0
30. Drop in oil wealth lessens or aggravates inter-Arab conflicts	10	27.5	2.18	36.0
31. The Government does or does not believe MPs create conflict	10	27.5	2.49	33.0
32. Solution with or without Egypt participation	9	32.0	3.05	13.5
33. Decline in oil prices temporary or lasting	8	33.0	2.76	23.0
34. Kuwait foreign investment secures or threatens economy	5	34.0	2.88	21.0
35. Non-Arab foreigners do or do not threaten security	4	35.5	2.40	34.0
36. Security arrangements to fight terrorism are sufficient or not sufficient	4	35.5	3.05	13.5

$$rs = 1 - \frac{6 \sum d^2}{(N^3) - N}$$

$$rs = \frac{6 \times 4924.75}{46620} = .6338$$

$$rs = 1 - .6338 = .366$$

$$N = 36, (P < .05)$$

**Table 6.15** An overall Government Officials and Journalists Ratings of the Issues with the Rank Order Correlation Coefficient based on Press Coverage Saliency of the Issues.

ISSUES	OFFICIALS		JOURNALISTS	
	$\bar{X}$	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank
1. Arab unity stages or immediate	3.32	5.5	3.50	5.0
2. Government does or does not follow National Assembly recommendations	2.90	20.0	3.12	17.5
3. Iran-Iraq war ends by negotiation or defeat	3.21	8.5	3.42	8.0
4. Kuwait oil income spent wisely or unwisely	2.69	26.0	2.95	23.5
5. Resolving the Palestinian problem by treaty or confrontation	3.00	15.5	3.64	1.0
6. Gulf states should subsidise Iraq or stay neutral	3.00	15.5	3.12	17.5
7. Social services adequate or inadequate with oil revenues	3.09	12.0	3.16	15.5
8. Kuwait war with terrorism independently or with Arab states	3.41	2.5	3.49	6.0
9. Non-Kuwaiti Shi-ites do or do not threaten security	2.68	27.0	2.95	23.5
10. Kuwait authority conserves or wastes oil resources	3.43	1.0	3.08	19.0
11. OPEC caused the decline in oil prices or the West	3.41	2.5	3.57	2.0
12. Kuwait security needs or does not need more arrangement to ensure stability	2.95	17.5	3.21	13.0
13. Journalists do or do not fear losing their jobs	2.56	30	2.34	36.0
14. Lower prices will or will not lead to depression in Gulf commerce	2.71	25.0	3.22	12.0

continued...

Table 6.15

ISSUES	OFFICIALS		JOURNALISTS	
	$\bar{X}$	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank
15. PLO effective under Arafat or under leader opponents	2.67	28	2.58	35.0
16. Rejecting terrorist demands ends or increases terrorism	3.40	4.0	3.56	3.0
17. The Government or the National Assembly is safeguarding public interests	2.92	19.0	3.16	15.5
18. The National Assembly is secure or subject to dissolution	2.95	17.5	3.17	14.0
19. G.C.C. military preparations are sufficient or not sufficient	3.19	10.0	2.93	25.5
20. Great power was in the Gulf before or invited to the Gulf by Iran	3.21	8.5	3.45	7.0
21. Jordan-PL0 agreement disputes or returns rights	2.73	24	3.07	20.0
22. Arab unity with free or control economy	2.83	22.0	3.35	9.0
23. The Kuwait government does or does not support some MPs	2.50	31.5	3.27	11.0
24. Terrorism undermines government or international campaign	3.27	7.0	2.93	25.5
25. The Kuwaiti press is free or censored	2.50	31.5	2.91	28.0
26. Arab renaissance with or without Arab unity	3.32	5.5	3.51	4.0
27. Non-Kuwaiti Arabs do or do not threaten security	2.38	35.0	2.80	31.5

continued...

Table 6.15

ISSUES	OFFICIALS		JOURNALISTS	
	$\bar{X}$	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank
28. Open resistance to Khomeini does or does not threaten Kuwait security	2.67	28.0	2.62	33.0
29. Iran does or does not undermine Gulf States	3.13	11.0	2.98	22.0
30. Drop in oil wealth lessens or aggravates inter-Arab conflicts	2.18	36.0	2.92	27.0
31. The Government does or does not believe MPs create conflict	2.49	33.0	2.80	31.5
32. Solution with or without Egypt participation	3.05	13.5	3.31	10.0
33. Decline in oil prices temporary or lasting	2.76	23.0	3.05	21.5
34. Kuwait foreign investment secures or threatens economy	2.88	21.0	2.88	28.0
35. Non-Arab foreigners do or do not threaten security	2.40	34.0	2.59	34.0
36. Security arrangements to fight terrorism are sufficient or not sufficient	3.05	13.5	2.75	32.0

$$rs = 1 - \frac{6 \sum d^2}{(N^3) - N} \quad rs = 1 - \frac{2747.76 \times 6}{46620} = \frac{18486.5}{46620} = .35363$$

$$rs = 1 - .35363 = .646 \quad N = 36, (P < .001)$$

**Table 6.16** An overall Press Index and Journalists Ratings of the Issues with the Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficient based on Press Coverage Saliency of the Issues.

ISSUES	PRESS		JOURNALISTS	
	Index	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank
1. Arab unity stages or immediate	259	1.0	3.50	5.0
2. Government does or does not follow National Assembly recommendations	230	2.0	3.12	17.5
3. Iran-Iraq war ends by negotiation or defeat	200	3.0	3.42	8.0
4. Kuwait oil income spent wisely or unwisely	175	4.0	2.95	23.5
5. Resolving the Palestinian problem by treaty or confrontation	117	5.0	3.64	1.0
6. Gulf states should subsidise Iraq or stay neutral	115	6.0	3.12	17.5
7. Social services adequate or inadequate with oil revenues	99	7.0	3.16	15.5
8. Kuwait war with terrorism independently or with Arab states	93	8.0	3.49	6.0
9. Non-Kuwaiti Shi-ites do or do not threaten security	90	9.0	2.95	23.5
10. Kuwait authority conserves or wastes oil resources	76	10.5	3.08	19.0
11. OPEC caused the decline in oil prices or the West	76	10.5	3.57	2.0
12. Kuwait security needs or does not need more arrangement to ensure stability	51	12.0	3.21	13.0
13. Journalists do or do not fear losing their jobs	50	13.0	2.34	36.0
14. Lower prices will or will not lead to depression in Gulf commerce	47	14.0	3.22	12.0

continued...

Table 6.16

ISSUES	PRESS		JOURNALISTS	
	Index	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank
15. PLO effective under Arafat or under leader opponents	45	15.0	2.58	35.0
16. Rejecting terrorist demands ends or increases terrorism	41	16.0	3.56	3.0
17. The Government or the National Assembly is safeguarding public interests	37	17.0	3.16	15.5
18. The National Assembly is secure or subject to dissolution	36	18.0	3.17	14.0
19. G.C.C. military preparations are sufficient or not sufficient	31	19.0	2.93	25.5
20. Great power was in the Gulf before or invited to the Gulf by Iran	30	20.0	3.45	7.0
21. Jordan-PL0 agreement disputes or returns rights	25	21.0	3.07	20.0
22. Arab unity with free or control economy	24	22.0	3.35	9.5
23. The Kuwait government does or does not support some MPs	19	23.0	3.77	11.0
24. Terrorism undermines government or international campaign	17	24.0	2.93	25.5
25. The Kuwaiti press is free or censored	16	25.0	2.91	28.0
26. Arab renaissance with or without Arab unity	15	26.0	3.51	4.0
27. Non-Kuwaiti Arabs do or do not threaten security	10	27.5	2.80	31.5

continued...

Table 6.16

ISSUES	PRESS		JOURNALISTS	
	Index	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank
28. Open resistance to Khomeini does or does not threaten Kuwait security	10	27.5	2.62	33.0
29. Iran does or does not undermine Gulf States	10	27.5	2.98	22.0
30. Drop in oil wealth lessens or aggravates inter-Arab conflicts	10	27.5	2.92	27.0
31. The Government does or does not believe MPs create conflict	10	27.5	2.80	31.5
32. Solution with or without Egypt participation	9	32.0	3.31	10.0
33. Decline in oil prices temporary or lasting	8	33.0	3.05	21.5
34. Kuwait foreign investment secures or threatens economy	5	34.0	2.80	28.0
35. Non-Arab foreigners do or do not threaten security	4	35.5	2.59	34.0
36. Security arrangements to fight terrorism are sufficient or not sufficient	4	35.5	2.75	32.0

$$rs = 1 - \frac{6 \sum d^2}{(N^3) - N}$$

$$rs = 1 - \frac{3805 \times 6}{46620} = \frac{22830}{46620} = .4897$$

$$rs = 1 - .4897 = .510$$

$$N = 36, (P < .01)$$



**Table 6.17** Proportional Aggregate of Officials in Each Attitudinal Category on Overall Issues

Attitude	Scale	Score	%
CONSERVATIVE	Extremely Conservative	-50 : -40	6.7
	Very Conservative	-39 : -30	4.4
	Conservative to Large Degree	-29 : -20	4.4
	Of Moderate Conservatism	-19 : -10	13.3
	Of Low Conservatism	-9 : -1	42.2
	TOTAL % =		71.1%
LIBERAL	Of Low Liberalism	1 : 10	8.9
	Of Moderate Liberalism	11 : 20	6.7
	Liberal to Large Degree	21 : 30	-
	Very Liberal	31 : 40	6.7
	Extremely Liberal	41 : 50	6.6
	TOTAL % =		28.9%

Note : Each respondent has a score called TOTAL where

(-50) = Highest value in Conservative score, and

(+50) = Highest value in Liberal score.

Both values decrease respectively to the lowest value (-1 or +1)

$\bar{X}$  found to be (-3.6)

Table 6.18 Proportional Aggregate of Journalists in  
Each Attitudinal Category on Overall Issues

Attitude	Scale	Score	%
CONSER- VATIVE	Extremely Conservative	-50 : -40	-
	Very Conservative	-39 : -30	6.6
	Conservative to Large Degree	-29 : -20	4.4
	Of Moderate Conservatism	-19 : -10	30.5
	Of Low Conservatism	-9 : -1	17.4
		TOTAL % = 58.9%	
LIBERAL	Of Low Liberalism	1 : 10	23.5
	Of Moderate Liberalism	11 : 20	8.8
	Liberal to Large Degree	21 : 30	6.6
	Very Liberal	31 : 40	2.2
	Extremely Liberal	41 : 50	-
		TOTAL % = 41.1%	

Note : Each respondent has a score called TOTAL where

(-50) = Highest value in Conservative score, and

(+50) = Highest value in Liberal score.

Both values decrease respectively to the lowest value (-1 or +1)

$\bar{X}$  found to be (-4)

**Table 6.19** Conservative Officials Ratings Indicative of Their Attitudes on the Conservative Aspects of the Issues.

No.	Officials Conservative Attitudes	Valid Cases	Officials Scores	$\bar{X}$	%
1	Arab renaissance without Arab unity	45	-3.00	-.07	53
2	Arab unity with controlled economy	41	-11.00	-.27	63
3	Resolving Palestinian problem by treaty	44	-14.00	-.32	66
4	Open resistance to Khomini a threat to security	35	-5.00	-.14	57
5	Existing police authority maintains law and order	43	-9.00	-.21	60
6	Gulf states should subsidise Iraq against Iran	41	-25.00	-.61*	80
7	Great powers invited to Gulf on Iranian threat to navigation	44	-22.00	-.50*	75
8	Iran cannot undermine Gulf states by continuing war	39	-1.00	-.03	51
9	GCC military preparations are sufficient to confront Iran	38	-8.00	-.21	61
10	OPEC caused the decline in oil prices, not the West	25	-23.00	-.92*	96
11	Decline in oil prices is temporary	41	-3.00	-.07	54
12	Lower oil prices will not lead to depression of Gulf commerce	44	-24.00	-.55*	77
13	Drop in oil wealth lessens inter-Arab conflicts	36	-16.00	-.44	72
14	Kuwaiti authority conserves oil reserves	42	-8.00	-.19	60
15	All classes benefitted from oil revenue	41	-9.00	-.22	.61

No.	Officials Conservative Attitudes	Valid Cases	Officials Scores	X	%
16	Kuwaiti foreign investments contribute to national economy	45	-3.00	-.07	53
17	Terrorism in Kuwait aims to undermine the government	41	-11.00	-.27	63
18	Rejecting terrorist demands ends terrorism	43	-27.00	-.63	81
19	Security arrangements are sufficient	35	-5.00	-.14	57
20	Kuwait can best fight terrorism without co-operating with other countries affected by terrorism	43	-9.00	-.21	60
21	Government follows recommendations of Parliament	41	-25.00	-.61*	80
22	Government is more capable of safeguarding the public interest than Parliament	44	-22.00	-.50*	75
23	Parliament is secure against or subject to dissolution	39	-23.00	-.59*	79
24	Government doesn't support some MPs and undermines others	38	-8.00	-.21	61
25	Government believes some MPs create conflict in Parliament	25	-23.00	-.92*	96
26	Journalists don't fear losing jobs when writing against the government	41	-3.00	-.07	54

NOTES : Valid Cases = The actual number of respondents in a sample where maximum N = 45

Officials Scores = The conservative majority on the issues

$\bar{X}$  = Mean Score where -1 = Wholly Conservative

% = Proportion of respondents giving conservative responses on the issues

\* = Issues eliciting strong to extreme conservative attitudes.

**Table 6.20** Liberal Officials Ratings Indicative of Their Attitudes on the Liberal Aspects of the Issues.

No.	Officials Liberal Attitudes	Valid Cases	Officials Scores	$\bar{X}$	%
1	Arab unity immediate	44	30.00	.68*	84
2	PL0 effective under leaders opponents	39	5.00	.17	59
3	Jordan/PL0 agreement disputes rights	38	2.00	.05	53
4	Solution without Egypt's participation	40	22.00	.55*	78
5	Non-Arab foreigners threaten security	38	6.00	.16	58
6	Non-Kuwaiti Arabs do not threaten security	40	16.00	.40*	70
7	Iran/Iraq war ends by the defeat of Iran	33	9.00	.21	60
8	Kuwaiti oil income spent wisely	43	7.00	.16	58
9	Social services not adequate because of oil revenue	44	24.00	.55*	77
10	Kuwaiti press is censored	41	5.00	.12	56

NOTES : Valid Cases = The actual number of respondents in a sample where maximum N = 45

Officials Scores = The liberal majority on the issues

$\bar{X}$  = Mean Score where (1) = Wholly Liberal

% = Proportion of respondents giving liberal responses on the issues

\* = Issues eliciting strong to extreme liberal attitudes

**Table 6.21** Conservative Journalists Ratings Indicative of Their Attitudes on the Conservative Aspects of the Issues.

No.	Officials' Conservative Attitudes	Valid Cases	Journalist Scores	$\bar{X}$	%
1	Arab renaissance without Arab unity	41	-15.00	-.37	68
2	Arab unity with free economy	43	-1.00	-.02	51
3	Arab/Israeli conflict resolved by treaty	45	-23.00	-.51*	76
4	Jordan/PLO agreement helps to regain Palestinian rights	40	-14.00	-.35	68
5	Non-Arab foreigners threaten security	39	-5.00	-.13	56
6	Gulf states should subsidize Iraq against Iran	42	-18.00	-.43*	67
7	Great powers invited to Gulf on Iranian threat to navigation	42	-26.00	-.62	80
8	GCC military preparations are sufficient	42	-8.00	-.19	60
9	OPEC caused the decline in oil prices, not the West	44	-14.00	-.32	66
10	Decline in oil prices is temporary	42	-4.00	-.10	55
11	Lower oil prices will not lead to depression of Gulf commerce	41	-19.00	-.46*	73
12	Drop in oil wealth lessens inter-Arab conflicts	32	-17.00	-.46*	73
13	Kuwaiti oil income is spent wisely	41	-1.00	-.02	51
14	Kuwaiti authority conserves oil wealth	40	-18.00	-.45*	73
15	All classes benefitted from oil revenue	40	-12.00	-.30	65

continued . . .

Table 6.21

No.	Officials Conservative Attitudes	Valid Cases	Journalist Scores	$\bar{X}$	%
16	Kuwaiti foreign investments contribute to national income	41	-15.00	-.37*	68
17	Rejecting terrorist demands ends terrorism	39	-29.00	-.75*	87
18	Kuwait can best fight terrorism without co-operating with other countries affected by terrorism	42	-4.00	-.10	55
19	Government follows recommendations of Parliament	41	-13.00	-.32	66
20	Government is more capable of safeguarding the public interest than Parliament	43	-3.00	-.07	53
21	Parliament is secure against or subject to dissolution	41	-25.00	-.61*	80
22	Government doesn't support some MPs and undermines others	41	-9.00	-.22	61

NOTES : Valid Cases = The actual number of respondents in a sample where maximum N = 45

Journalists Scores = The conservative majority on the issues

$\bar{X}$  = Mean Score where (-1) = Wholly Conservative

% = Proportion of respondents giving conservative responses on the issues

\* = Issues eliciting strong to extreme conservative attitudes.

Table 6.22 Liberal Journalists Ratings Indicative of Their Attitudes on the Liberal Aspects of the Issues.

No.	Officials Liberal Attitudes	Valid Cases	Journalist Scores	$\bar{X}$	%
1	Arab unity immediate	42	22.00	.52*	76
2	PLO effective under opponents of Arafat	33	1.00	.03	52
3	Solution without Egypt's participation	40	16.00	.38	69
4	Non-Kuwaiti Arabs do not threaten security	39	17.00	.45*	72
5	Open resistance to Khomimi regime does not threaten security	34	4.00	.12	56
6	Existing police force note enough to maintain law and order	40	1.00	.03	51
7	Iran/Iraq war ends by the defeat of Iran	40	21.00	.51*	77
8	Iran undermines Gulf states by continuing war	39	5.00	.12	56
9	Social services not adequate because of oil revenue	43	21.00	.49*	74
10	Terrorism in Kuwait is part of international campaign	42	.00	.00	00
11	Security arrangements against terrorism are inadequate	41	9.00	.22	61
12	Government believes some MPs create conflict in Parliament	36	.00	.00	00
13	Kuwaiti press is censored by government	44	4.00	.09	55
14	Journalists don't fear losing their jobs when writing against the government	41	13.00	.32	66

NOTES : Valid Cases = The actual number of respondents in a sample where maximum N = 45

Journalists Scores  $\bar{X}$  = The liberal majority on the issues

% = Mean Score where (1) = Wholly Liberal

\* = Proportion of respondents giving liberal responses on the issues

\* = Issues eliciting strong to extreme liberal attitudes



**Table 6.23** The Press Scores Indicative of Conservative Attitudes as have been found in the Press Coverage.

Conservative Attitudes	Press Scores
1. Arab renaissance without Arab unity	-15.00
2. Arab unity must come in stages	-259.00*
3. Arab unity must be based on a free economy	-24.00
4. Solving Palestinian problem will come under Arafat	-45.00
5. Solution must come with the participation of Egypt	-9.00
6. Existing police authority is enough to maintain law and order	-51.00
7. Gulf states should subsidise Iraq against Iran	-115.00*
8. Great powers are invited to the Gulf following Iran's threat to navigation	-30.00
9. OPEC caused the decline in oil prices, not the West	-76.00*
10. The decline in oil prices is temporary	-8.00
11. The drop in oil wealth lessens inter-Arab conflicts	-10.00
12. Kuwaiti oil revenue is spent wisely	-157.00*
13. Kuwaiti authority conserves oil wealth	-76.00
14. Kuwaiti foreign investments contribute to the national income	-5.00
15. Security measures against terrorism are sufficient	-4.00
16. The government follows recommendations of Parliament	-230.00*
17. The government is more capable of safeguarding public interests	-37.00
18. Parliament is secure against dissolution	-36.00
19. The Kuwait government doesn't support some MPs and undermines others	-19.00
20. The Kuwait government believes that some MPs create conflict in Parliament	-10.00
21. The Kuwaiti Press is free.	-16.00

Press Score =  $\sqrt{\frac{\Sigma \text{ of topics } \times \Sigma \text{ of column inches per topic}}{\text{where highest score is } (-259) \text{ and lowest is } (-4)}}$

\* = Issues of highest frequency in press coverage

Table 6.24 The Press Scores Indicative of Liberal Attitudes as have been found in the Press Coverage.

Liberal Attitudes	Press Scores
1. Arab/Israeli conflict will end by military confrontation	117.00*
2. Jordan/PLO agreement disputes Palestinian rights	25.00
3. Non-Arab foreigners threaten security	4.00
4. Non-Kuwaiti Arabs do not threaten security	10.00
5. Open resistance to Khomini regime will protect Kuwait security	10.00
6. Iran/Iraq war will end by defeating Iran	200.00*
7. Iran undermines Gulf states by continuing the war	10.00
8. GCC military preparations are not sufficient	31.00
9. Lower oil prices will lead to depression for Gulf commerce	47.00
10. Only some classes have benefitted from oil revenue	90.00
11. Social services are not adequate because of oil revenue	99.00*
12. Terrorism in Kuwait is part of an international campaign	17.00
13. Rejecting terrorist demands would increase terrorism	41.00
14. Kuwait can best fight terrorism in co-operation with other countries affected by terrorism	93.00*
15. Journalists fear losing jobs if they write against the government	50.00

$$\text{Press Score} = \sqrt{\Sigma \text{ of topics} \times \Sigma \text{ of column inches per topic}}$$

where the highest score is (200) and lowest is (4)

\* = Issues of highest frequency in press coverage

**Table 6.25** Positive Pearson Correlation Coefficient between Officials and Journalists  
Ratings on Each Aspect of the Issues

JOURNALISTS		OFFICIALS	CORRELATIONS
1. Arab renaissance		Government and National Assembly to resolve National Assembly	(P= < .01)
2. Arab unity secular religious		Newspaper owners	(P= < .07)
3. Federated or central		Non-Kuwaiti Shi-ites	(P= < .02)
4. Treaty or confrontation		Security arrangements	(P= < .07)
5. Peaceful settlement or confrontation		Same issue	(P= < .001)
Same issue		Neutral support Iraq	(P= < .06)
Same issue		Iran undermines Gulf States	(P= < .03)
Same issue		Terrorists offensive	(P= < .06)
Same issue		Rejecting terrorists	(P= < .07)
Same Issue		Police arrangement	(P= < .04)
Same issue		Government and National Assembly recommendations	(P= < .05)
Same issue		Government resolving the National Assembly	(P= < .03)
Same issue		Newspaper owners	(P= < .001)

continued...

Table 6.25

JOURNALISTS		OFFICIALS	CORRELATIONS
6.	Urgent or for future	With or without Egypts	(P= < .007)
	Same issue	Oil prices and Gulf commerce	(P= < .07)
	Same issue	Reserving oil revenues	(P= < .07)
	Same issue	Government resolving the National Assembly	(P= < .02)
	Same issue	Journalists fear expulsion	(P= < .02)
7.	Support moderates or extremists	G.C.C. Military preparation	(P= < .01)
	Same issue	MPs cause conflict	(P= < .05)
8.	PLO under Arafat	Oil and social services	(P= < .03)
9.	Moderates or rejectionists Arab states	Oil prices OPEC or West	(P= < .02)
10.	Jordanian-Palestinian agreement	With moderates or rejectionists	(P= < .07)
	Same issue	Newspapers owners	(P= < .03)
11.	Non-Kuwaiti Arab	Non-Arab foreigners	(P= < .02)
	Same issue	Open resistance	(P= < .05)

continued....

Table 6.25

JOURNALISTS	OFFICIALS	CORRELATIONS
Same issue	Government leans to certain MPs	(P= < .01)
12. Non-Kuwaiti Shi-ites	Restricting visas	(P= < .001)
13. Open resistance	With or without Egypt	(P= < .02)
Same issue	Religions or nationalism	(P= < .06)
Same issue	Oil revenue wisely spent	(P= < .01)
14. Super Powers invited by Iran	Decline in oil prices	(P= < .04)
15. Gulf regimes ignored by Iran	Journalists fear expulsion	(P= < .008)
Same issue	Press bias or neutral	(P= < .04)
16. C.C.C. military preparation	Oil and social services	(P= < .04)
Same issue	Government and National Assembly recommendations	(P= < .02)
17. Religious or nationalism	Terrorism offensive	(P= < .05)
18. Temporary or lasting	Non-Kuwaiti Shi-ite	(P= < .07)
Same issue	Police arrangement	(P= < .03)

continued...

Table 6.25

	JOURNALISTS	OFFICIALS	CORRELATIONS
	Same issue	Foreign investment	(P= < .04)
19.	Lowering prices & political stability	Non-Arab foreigners	(P= < .06)
	Same issue	Restriction on oil production	(P= < .02)
20.	Lower prices and commerce	Non-Kuwaiti Shi-ite	(P= < .03)
	Same issue	Security arrangement	(P= < .04)
	Same issue	Religious or nationalism	(P= < .03)
21.	Drop in oil wealth and Arab conflicts	Lowering prices and commerce	(P= < .06)
22.	Oil income spent wisely	Restricting visa	(P= < .02)
	Same issue	Journalists fear expulsion	(P= < .04)
23.	Kuwaiti foreign investments	Arab unity free economy or controlled	(P= < .04)
24.	Rejecting terrorist demands ends or increases terrorism	Arab unity religious or secular	(P= < .06)
25.	War against terrorism	Non-Arab foreigners	(P= < .03)
	Same issue	Restriction on oil production	(P= < .02)

continued...

Table 6.25

JOURNALISTS	OFFICIALS	CORRELATIONS
26. Fight terrorism independently	Non-Arab foreigners	(P= < .03)
27. Government or National Assembly knows public interests	Arab unity religious or secular	(P= < .06)
Same issue	Newspapers owners	(P= < .02)
Undermine MPs	Terrorists offensive	(P= < .03)
Same issue	Open resistance to Khomeini	(P= < .05)
28. Government and certain MPs	End of Iran-Iraq War	(P= < .01)
Same issue	Neutral or support Iraq	(P= < .03)
Same issue	The C.C.C. military preparation	(P= < .02)
Same issue	Religious or nationalism	(P= < .006)
Same issue	Oil prices OPEC or the West	(P= < .06)
Same issue	Restricting oil production	(P= < .03)
Same issue	Rejecting terrorists demands	(P= < .04)
Same issue	Restricting visas	(P= < .02)
Same issue	Police arrangement	(P= < .05)

**Table 6.26** Negative Pearson Correlation Coefficient between Officials and Journalists  
Ratings on Each Aspect of the Issues

JOURNALISTS		OFFICIALS	CORRELATIONS
1. Arab renaissance		End of Iran and Iraw War	(P= < .05)
2. Arab unity secular religious		Restriction of oil production	(P= < .06)
3. Arab unity free or control		Moderates or radicals	(P= < .02)
4. Peace or confrontation		Reserving oil revenues	(P= < .08)
5. Immediate or not immediate		Religious or secular	(P= < .03)
6. PLO under Arafat		Immediate or not immediate	(P= < .002)
Same issue		Jordanian agreement	(P= < .03)
Same issue		Lowering prices and commerce	(P= < .01)
7. Moderate or extremists		Immediate or not immediate	(P= < .05)
Same issue		Religious or secular	(P= < .04)
Same issue		Oil prices temporary	(P= < .05)
Same issue		Lowering prices and commerce	(P= < .05)
8. Jordanian agreement		Immediate or not immediate	(P= < .02)
Same issue		Religious or secular	(P= < .05)
Same issue		Urgent solution or left for a time	(P= < .02)



continued...

Table 6.26

JOURNALISTS		OFFICIALS	CORRELATIONS
9. Same issue		PL0 under Arafat	(P= < .05)
Same issue		Non-Kuwaiti Arabs	(P= < .06)
Same issue		Oil prices temporary	(P= < .06)
Same issue		Revenues for all or certain Kuwaitis	(P= < .05)
10. Non-Arab foreigners		End of Iran-Iraq War	(P= < .07)
11. Non-Kuwaiti Shi-ites		Oil revenue and services	(P= < .05)
12. Open resistance to Khomeini		Religious or nationalism	(P= < .06)
13. Security arrangements		Oil prices temporary	(P= < .01)
Same issue		Lowering prices and Gulf commerce	(P= < .07)
Same issue		Government and National Assembly recommendations	(P= < .05)
14. End of Iran-Iraq War		Religious or secular	(P= < .07)
Same issue		Kuwaiti press free or censored	(P= < .06)
15. Gulf States neutral or with Iraq		Jordan agreement	(P= < .07)

continued...

Table 6.26

JOURNALISTS	OFFICIALS	CORRELATIONS
16. Iran undermines the Gulf States	By moderates or radicals	(P= < .05)
17. C.C.C. military preparation	Iran undermines Gulf States	(P= < .002)
18. Oil prices and Arab conflicts	Oil prices and gulf regimes	(P= < .005)
19. Oil revenues wisely spent	Urgent settlement or for future	(P= < .02)
20. Restriction of oil production	Immediate or not immediate	(P= < .03)
Same issue	Religious or secular	(P= < .04)
21. Restriction of oil production	Urgent settlement or for future	(P= < .03)
Same issue	With or without Egypt	(P= < .06)
22. Revenues for all or certain Kuwaitis	Urgent settlement or for future	(P= < .05)
23. Oil revenue and services	With or without Egypt	(P= < .04)
Same issue	End Iran-Iraq War	(P= < .03)
Same issue	Great powers presence	(P= < .03)
Same issue	Government and National Assembly recommendations	(P= < .01)

continued...

Table 6.26

JOURNALISTS		OFFICIALS	CORRELATIONS
24. Foreign investment		Great powers presence	(P= < .005)
Same issue		Iran undermines Gulf States	(P= < .01)
Same issue		Rejecting terrorists demands	(P= < .05)
Same issue		Kuwait war with terrorism	(P= < .06)
Same issue		Government leaning to some MPs	(P= < .05)
25. Terrorist offensive		Immediate or not immediate	(P= < .06)
Same issue		Kuwait war against terrorism	(P= < .004)
26. Journalists fear expulsion		Oil revenue wisely spent	(P= < .02)
27. Kuwait war against terrorism		Oil prices temporary	(P= < .04)
28. Kuwait arrangements with foreign nations		Same issue	(P= < .02)
29. Same issue		Revenue for all or certain Kuwaitis	(P= < .06)
Government not obligated to National Assembly recommendation		Federal or central	(P= < .01)
Same issue		Urgent settlement or for future	(P= < .06)
Same issue		With or without Egypt	(P= < .06)
Same issue		Government leans to some MPs	(P= < .05)

continued...

Table 6.26

JOURNALISTS	OFFICIALS	CORRELATIONS
30. Government knows national interest more than National Assembly	Peace or confrontation	(P= < .01)
Same issue	Government conserve revenues	(P= < .04)
31. Government leans to some MPs	Immediate or not immediate	(P= < .02)
Same issue	Kuwait war against terrorism	(P= < .06)
Same issue	Some MPs cause crisis	(P= < .06)
32. Press free or censored	With moderates or radical	(P= < .01)
Same issue	Government knows national interests	(P= < .003)
33. Newspapers owners	Restriction of oil production	(P= < .01)
Same issue	Same issue	(P= < .03)
34. Journalists fear expulsion	Same issue	(P= < .005)
35. Press bias or socially responsible	Peace or confrontation	(P= < .05)
Same issue	Urgent settlement or for future	(P= < .02)
Same issue	End of Iran-Iraq War	(P= < .03)

## SUMMARY

In this chapter where the research findings were presented, the results were subjected to a thorough statistical analysis including frequency distributions, cross-tabulations and rank order correlation coefficients. The demographic findings revealed a high educational level among both officials and journalists. The two groups are found to lean more towards conservatism in connection with the role of heritage and tradition in society, and with new values and modernisation.

The mean ratings of officials and journalists, with the index calculated from press content, were utilised to test the first three research hypotheses. Results of the analyses yielded positive rank order correlation (1) on the importance assigned by government officials and

journalists to the issues,

(2) between the importance assigned by officials and the salience, found in the content analysis of the same issues, and,

(3) the importance assigned by journalists and the salience given by the press to the same issues.

Additionally, the coding and re-coding of the attitudinal part of the data yielded the actual dispositions of officials, journalists and the press in the conservative/liberal dichotomy. The data also showed, that across the three samples, the majority were found to take conservative dispositions on the issues rather than liberal. The attitudinal findings substantiated the fourth and fifth hypotheses, in which a similarity between the conservative dispositions of the three samples was hypothesised.

Finally, certain attitudinal patterns on the issues were detected. An overall strong conservative bias was found on local issues, mainly those related to oil wealth, security and the measures taken by the government against terrorism.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The research undertaken in this study fills a gap in mass media research in the Arab World. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first study of agenda-setting in an Arab country, and certainly so in Kuwait. This, I believe, makes the study all the more important because the Kuwaiti press is the freest, most representative and professional overall of any in this part of the world.

The study also goes beyond early research of agenda-setting in the U.S. for instance. These studies were, on the whole, limited to showing a correlation between the media agenda and the public agenda with respect to certain issues. The present study, on the other hand, attempts to ascertain the relationship, in Kuwait, between the press agenda and specific power centres in that country which seek to influence the media agenda in order to protect their interests and optimise their socio-economic and political positions. A specific research strategy was followed because a review of British literature revealed that any contribution to agenda-setting must not only demonstrate that the media agenda and the public agenda coincide, but also reveal the underlying factors which influence the media agenda in the first place. Hence the 'Beyond Agenda Setting' approach.

The study starts with a review of the literature. This review shows that although the concept of agenda-setting was introduced by Walter Lippman in 1922, agenda-setting became a research area in mass communication half a century later, in 1972 to be precise, when Shaw and McCombs established a positive rank order correlation between the issues appearing in the press in a given period and the public agenda.

Shaw and McCombs' study ushered in a research area in mass communication at a time when the field was starving for new ideas and directions. Consequently, many studies were undertaken in the U.S. on that topic, so much so that agenda-setting came to constitute a recognised research area in the field. Not unexpectedly, however, early research in this area was, dominated by two research traditions (1) the public agenda setting in which the central research question was "how do the mass media put an agenda item on the public agenda?" and (2) policy agenda-setting, in which the central research question became "How does a public issue get on the policy agenda?".

Since most of the early agenda-setting studies in the U.S. were carried out at times of election campaigns, some of them focused on the potential of the media for structuring issues or, in other words, for defining what the important issues for the public were. That position was akin to the long discarded hypodermic notion that the media themselves do have a one way power over the public. There were assertions such as the following:

"... editors and broadcasters play an important part in the shaping of our social reality as they go about their day-to-day tasks of choosing and displaying news ... Here may lie the most important effects of mass communications, its ability to mentally order and organise our world for us."

(Shaw & McCombs, 1977, p.5 Emphasis not in original)

OR

"... The power of the press in America is a primordial one. It sets the agenda of public discussion; and this sweeping political power is unrestrained by any law. It determines what people will talk and think about, an authority that in other nations is reserved for tyrants, priests, parties and mandarins."

(White, 1972, p.327. Emphasis not in the original)

As research on agenda-setting progressed, however, new levels of sophistication were attained and a multitudinous host of different variables were studied. These variables related to such factors as the kinds

of events and issues, the positions and biases of editors or media personnel, the characteristics and capabilities of the mass medium observed, the degree of emphasis the issues received as evinced by the frequency of their presentation in the media, and the audience interest in the issues presented as evidence of the saliency of these issues among them (Little-John, 1983).

Other agenda-setting studies investigated the factors and conditions which led to the appearance of certain issues in the media. Questions were raised such as: Are the issues that appear in the media first devised and initiated, totally or in part, from within the media or from without, e.g. by politicians, public officials, and the like? (Bechtolt, Hilyard and Bybee, 1977); What is the share of local media and national media (e.g. networks or papers of high circulation) with regard to setting the agenda for a given public or with regard to certain issues? (Palmgreen and Clark, 1977); What is the difference between individual agenda and aggregate agenda with respect to economic, political and social issues? (Williams and Larsen, 1977); To what degree does agenda-setting differ in media-rich and media-poor communities? (Chaffee and Wilson, 1977); What are the implications of agenda-setting for public relations? (McCombs, 1977); What are the structural biases of each medium with regard to agenda-setting (Williams and Smelak, 1978)?; What is the time lag between the appearance of an issue in the media and its endorsement by the public (Stone and McCombs, 1981)?; and, What is the optimally effective time span for a given issue as far as agenda-setting is concerned? (Winter and Eyal, 1981).

As research on agenda-setting accumulated, the demand increased for methodological sophistication. Asp (1983), for example, devised a "matching index" to ascertain the degree of correspondence between the agendas of the media and the public, and Williams, Shapiro and Cutbirth (1983) emphasised the mediating variables involved in agenda-setting. Chang (1984)



showed that leaders (e.g. President Reagan) may at two different times initiate and influence the media agenda in two opposite directions; Culbertson and Stein (1984) showed that the topic's amenability to human interest is an important factor in agenda-setting. Graber (1980) explained agenda-setting as an adjustment process, and Eyal (1981) devised a time-frame paradigm for agenda-setting. In the same vein, agenda-setting models have been devised by DeGeorge (1981), McQuail and Windahl (1981) and McQuail (1983) to provide a framework which would account for the agenda-setting process.

In addition to reviewing American research on agenda-setting, the thesis also examines the British literature on the topic. This examination influenced the direction of this study to a great extent because the bulk of that literature revolved around the search for agenda builders and, therefore, looked beyond agenda-setting. From this perspective, the media are seen as a permeable system, a social institution which is as much affected by other institutions as it affects them, and which is subject to internal and external economic and political influences as are other contemporary institutions. Thus, it was shown that (in the West; the main focus of research) the media are structurally organised as business organisations not only subject to internal and external economic demands, but also faced with attaining viable relations with other social institutions, serving the interests of those who own and control them, and reacting to the contextual and dominant values of a capitalist society. For example, the economic domain of the media as an instrument in the hands of the establishment and as an institution influenced by the dominant culture of capitalism was examined by Miliband (1969), Murdock and Golding (1977), Westerguard (1977), Golding and Elliott (1979), Golding and Middleton (1982) and Bagdikian (1983), and the political domain according to the

pluralists' argument was explored and mapped out by Blumler (1969), Blumler and Gurevitch (1975), Cohen and Young (1973), and Whale (1977).

This section also examines the role of pressure groups on agenda-setting. A review of the work of such scholars as Paletz and Entnam (1981), Goldenberg (1975), and the Glasgow University Group (1976 and 1980) pointed out the degree to which the media agenda responds to the pressures and demands of interest groups who use various techniques to influence media content in their own favour. Last, but not least, the review of the literature concludes by showing both the need for and the possible contribution of studying agenda-setting in Third World countries. At present there are at least 153 research publications in agenda-setting. However, research in the agenda-setting process has been limited to 12 nations most of which have been in the United States and countries institutionally in the 'First World' (Salwen, 1985). Kuwait was selected as the research focus around which this study was conducted because the socio-economic development of that country and the development of its media render it most suited for examining the complementary roles played by government officials and journalists in setting the agenda for the press. The supposition that this particular research focus would be fruitful has been borne out by our findings.

The review of literature gives strong evidence of the feasibility of applying the agenda-setting hypotheses to Third World media studies. There is, for example, the fact that mass media did not emerge as an autogenous product of the internal social evolution of these countries. This development has come as an extension of the Western media (Golding 1977). There is also the fact that the type of research acquired in the Third World must be designed to deal with communication as a social process; it studies the media institutions not in isolation, but together with other

institutions and within a wider social context, nationally and internationally (Halloran, 1981). Halloran himself has observed that few, if any, studies in the Third World were designed to investigate the power, organisation and control of the media. Among the many topics he suggested for research was the agenda-setting function of the media. For this and other reasons, this thesis was designed to redress what Halloran called the "Unbalanced, or uneven distribution of research where the quantity of mass communication research is dominated by research from the Western industrial nations" (Ibid, 1986, p.9).

Then comes a brief survey of the history of Kuwait. Over the centuries, Kuwait grew from the 18th century small fortress, "Kut", where members of tribes and fishermen met on irregular occasions, to a prosperous welfare-state and multi-national society with one of the highest per capita income in the world at present. In the pre-oil era, its growth depended on the geographical factor, i.e. that Kuwait was on the commercial caravan route between India and Persia in the East and the Mediterranean and Europe in the West. The strategic factor was of similar importance, as the British found out towards the end of the eighteenth century. At that time the Ottomans in Iraq and the Persians had been exhausted in battle around Shat Al-Arab; as a result, the port of Basra lost its importance and Kuwait assumed the role of Trading Centre. This strategically important location led to the British-Kuwait agreement of 1899 by which Kuwait became a British protectorate, yet an active prosperous port.

After thus surveying the socio-political structure and the mode of development undertaken in Kuwait, two approaches were adopted to feed into the social analysis of this study. The first approach dealt with the formation of socio-political power. It was found for example, that such power could be defined in terms of traditional bases, including the Royal Family and the merchants on the one hand, and emergent power bases to be

found in the nationalists, the Bedouin and the media, on the other. The second approach, is a positional approach in which the division of power takes a different definition, based on the role playing and the intra and inter-relationship within each and among other groups. On this level of analysis, the social groups were defined according to their ideological dispositions; conservativeness and liberalism. Those who supported the status-quo and defended the existing political system were found to be the Royal Family and the Bedouin. Sub-groups of the ruling system are the Ruler's staff, the Cabinet and the management bureaucrats. The second social classification includes those who demand liberal changes and champion changing the status-quo, both on the social and the political levels. Those are the nationalists and, to some extent, the journalists. Sub-groups of the nationalists are the Marxists, the Nasserists and other radical groups. Certain secondary trends are composed of members of minorities, such as the Shi'ites, Muslims, or fundamental Sunnies connected to the organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In terms of political influence, the most powerful group is Al-Sabah Ruling Family. Having emigrated from central Arabia in the early 18th century, the Al-Sabah family is considered one of the earliest royal families still existing in the 'Arabian Gulf'. It has continued, since then, to govern Kuwait with undisputed legitimacy except when Mubarak assassinated his half brother in 1896 and proclaimed himself the Amir of Kuwait. The Al-Sababs base their legitimacy on two factors; one is the free election of their grandfather, the founder of Kuwait, Sabah I, by the existing tribes in Kuwait in the early seventeenth century. The second is the continuity of the family rulership without any opponents whatsoever claiming the right to govern or to share legitimacy.

When oil was discovered in Kuwait in the 'thirties of the present century and was exported in the late 'forties, the fortune of the Royal

Family was equal to that of the Kuwaiti people, who benefited from oil revenues by enjoying high per-capita income, free public services, and free housing for low income citizens. The oil revenues added more power and strength to the Al-Sabah family and consolidated the integration among its members including the Amirs who traditionally separated themselves from all other members. Furthermore, the availability of strong finances resulting from the oil revenues, added to the Amir's financial independence; it enabled him to entrench himself and his regime against any pressure from the merchants. He no longer needed the merchants' financial contributions, taxes or support. On the contrary, the availability of financial sources enabled him to run generous development programmes, establishing a welfare state for the first time in the region of the Arabian Gulf. By allowing free education, free health care or highly subsidised houses for low income citizens and jobs for public servants, the Amir succeeded in establishing strong relations between the people and the government; the same is true of the regime at large. To traditional norms and forms was added a further ground of legitimacy, the capacity to meet new expectations among the populace. (However, this forebodes a less certain legitimacy in the future). When one adds to this the political transformation and the modernisation of Kuwaiti political institutions, it is realised how much more solid, more stable and unshaken the political system has become.

It is pertinent here to note, however, that some special attributes in the Al-Sabah family have added to their political success to rule Kuwait for some 350 peaceful years. Unlike many Arabian Gulf royal families, the Al-Sababs have been, for instance, very receptive to socio-political modernisation. They skilfully share political power, sending Kuwaiti youth to highly specialised educational centres. They have permitted the creation of an elected National Assembly and participated in discussions and debates. Most importantly, they have shown a high degree of administrative

efficiency in top executive posts which are occupied by Shaikhs from Al-Sabah.

However, such positive attributes credited to the Al-Sabah Royal Family seem counter-poised with the setback in parliamentary rule which occurred twice in ten years. In 1976 the Amir, Sabah Al-Salim who ruled between 1965-1977, ordered the dissolution of the National Assembly in addition to the suspension of some Articles in the constitution. He also imposed strong control on the press by giving the government the right to suspend any publication for two years without investigation or reference to the Courts. Similarly, after the restoration of the National Assembly in 1981, the present Amir, Jaber Al-Ahmed, ordered its dissolution again in 1986 using his predecessors same measures against the National Assembly and the press. Besides, Al-Sabah were discredited when they interfered in the 1967 parliamentary elections by showing favouritism for the Bedouins. Their intention was to add more parliamentary allies regardless of the Bedouins' lack of necessary qualifications. The government encouraged the Bedouin to counter the growing influence of the emergent power of the nationalists regardless of the damage to the political performance of the National Assembly that they caused.

It was found that the merchant class came second in terms of socio-economic status and political influence. Being the descendents of members of the traditional tribes who nominated Sabah I, the merchants, besides their economic power throughout the centuries, maintained political power and influence similar to that of the Al-Sabah Royal Family. The merchants modified their tactics to accommodate the autocratic rule of the Amir during the uprisings of 1921 and 1938 and the oil era led to a further reduction in their political power. In the pre-oil era, the merchants had reached the highest peak in their political influence. They were the main

suppliers of the Amir's and the government's revenues. The Amir's dependence on the merchants' financial support gave them more influence than he had bargained for. It was that which aggravated the Amir's revenge when he ordered the isolation of the merchants in the 'fifties. Consequently, in the 'fifties, the merchants proceeded to withdraw from the political scene, leaving the arena to the Amir and the Royal Family. After the discovery of oil, the merchants lost their remaining political power. Such losses of influence were not however irrevocable without supplementary gains. A time was yet to come in which the Amir once more needed the merchants' aid.

In 1953, it was reported that the Amir and the whole country were thrown into an economic disaster. Corruption in high places, mostly filled by members of the Royal Family, led to a severe depression. In an attempt to avert disaster, the Amir called upon the merchants for new loans. In the meantime, he offered them generous terms of access to the oil wealth. Henceforth the merchants re-occupied an economic position second only to the Royal Family. As for the merchants' socio-political influence in the oil era, it was noted that, in spite of their secondary political role, they maintained an effective participation in contemporary political institutions. Some of them, for instance, hold high posts in the Cabinet, while others are MPs in the National Assembly. It was also noted that though, as a group, the merchants suffered severe losses in the political sphere, they nevertheless maintained great influence at the individual level. Most elderly merchants are so skilled in financial matters that the Amir and the government seek their advice. In the early days of independence, a committee of eleven merchants was selected to participate in the constitution drafting team. In 1976, merchant MPs joined the nationalists in protesting against the government by resigning from the National Assembly. In the 1986 parliamentary crisis, merchant MPs once more sided with the nationalists

against the government by withdrawing from the National Assembly in the session for organising the judicial law.

As for the emergent power of the nationalists, it was noted that after independence the new state experienced rapid and major political reforms which caused important changes in the establishment and among the political elites. The establishment of the National Assembly led to the widening of political debates and discussion of political issues. The spread of education among Kuwaitis in their country and abroad produced a new intelligentsia, thereby increasing the number of reformists and intellectuals. The flourishing and sophistication of the press added to the need for more intellectual personnel who were largely drawn from non-Kuwaiti Arabs who consequently strengthened the political power of Kuwaiti radical groups. In this new political environment, the nationalists became the most vocal political group in opposition to government policies, writing in the newspapers and advocating their demands in the National Assembly. The nationalists' demands centred, domestically, on calling for independence from Western influence, for control of the oil wealth, and for the use of oil revenues to develop the state, calling for social justice and social welfare and above all calling for a parliament and for freedom of the press. In regional and pan-Arab affairs, the nationalists' demands centred on opposing the security arrangements of the Gulf Co-operative Council (G.C.C.), on supporting Iraq against Iran, supporting the PLO and the Palestinian cause, calling for more inter-Arab co-operation and more initiatives to establish Arab unity, and calling for a brave decision to replace the non-Arab manpower working in Kuwait with Non-Kuwaiti Arabs.

The nationalists' political influence has been highly correlated with the power of the National Assembly and the power of the press. It was mentioned that with Dr. Al-Katib, the national activists' influence on Shaikh Abdullah Al-Salim, 1950-1965, the National Assembly and other modern



constituents in Kuwait was unbounded. It was the nationalists, however, who caused the dissolution of the National Assembly by their persistent calls for more reform. They had been the power that initiated the demand for the restoration of the National Assembly in 1981; yet their demands for a secular state restoring the independence of political institutions, the National Assembly, the press, and the judicial institutions led once more to the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1986.

Among other social groups, presented in Chapter III, the sedentary Bedouins arrived on to the political scene in the mid-sixties. The government needed to restore a supportive balance in the National Assembly. Its need to ensure majority votes for the regime led to the emergence of the Bedouin's political influence in Kuwait. Traditionally, the Bedouins are, and always have been, loyal to the Al-Sabah family and strong supporters of the Amir. In contrast to the nationalists and the merchants, the Bedouins are wholly pro-government, politically conservative and consider the Amir as the head of all tribes with a rightful claim to obedience and respect. Thus, the new economic and political circumstances thrust the Bedouins into the centre of the political life. Hence, to recapitulate, the increased oil revenues on the one hand, and the growing need of the government to ensure majority votes in the face of the growing influence of the nationalists, on the other, induced the government to draw thousands of Bedouins into the City of Kuwait, transforming them increasingly into a settled community, with the effects of their growing access to the benefits of the modern (oil) economy and related increasing expectations.

The government and the Bedouins, as earlier noted, came to a tacit deal by which the government allowed them to obtain Kuwaiti citizenship by relaxing the naturalization law in favour of the Bedouins. The government granted them also financial incentives in the form of free housing, free medical care, social security and suitable jobs in public offices. Under

the terms of that tacit deal, the Bedouins, with the assistance of the government selected some enlightened and elderly Bedouins, to run for the National Assembly and thus to become a rubber stamp in the hands of the government. It was not unexpected that the sedentary Bedouins, with the favour of the government, managed to increase their representation MPs in the National Assembly from 38% in 1963 to 48% in 1975, a proportion that has not been enjoyed by any other single political group in the Parliament of Kuwait.

These socio-political relationships among different social groups in Kuwait, provide the backdrop for the social developments that have taken place. It is evident that the rapid socio-economic and political transformation from a patriarchal society to a modern social welfare state and parliamentary political system has created internal stresses and external challenges. The growing national political forces of Kuwaiti intellectuals in alliance with non-Kuwaiti radical Arabs immigrating to Kuwait became socially vocal and politically restless. They stressed their demands for a modern state with modern political institutions, demanding no less than free elections and an elected National Assembly, an increase in the public use of oil revenues so as to realise better public services and equal opportunities for all Kuwaitis. They have demanded stronger alliances with Arab states in support of the Palestinian cause. The threat of annexation by Iraq, in the early days of independence, highlighted the need to ensure the national and international legitimacy of the regime. The new state felt the need to base its identity on a modern constitution and strong political institutions. Therefore, in less than two years from its independence, the constitution of Kuwait was drafted, the National Assembly established, and international recognition of the new state guaranteed. A modern state with rich resources, an elected parliament in a setting of

diverse ideological and social convictions and a spreading education presents ideal circumstances for strong media. In these circumstances, the Kuwaiti press flourished in such a way that within two decades it had become one of the most powerful in the Middle East.

It has been noted in this study that the rise and development of the Kuwaiti press paralleled the development of the political movement led by liberal groups. For instance, as a result of the merchants' uprising against the autocratic rule of the Amir in 1921, the first Kuwaiti newspaper was published in 1928. Similarly, after the second major political uprising, in 1938, several periodicals were published some of which were launched from abroad, especially from Cairo. The media constituted a modern institution which lay at the heart of modern Kuwaiti development. Thus it was that the first publication in Kuwaiti history was named after the country's name, Al Kuwaiti, issued in 1928 by a Kuwaiti intellectual. A few other weekly magazines appeared until independence in 1961, the first newspaper, Al-Ray Al-Am and the English Daily News were published in 1961. Both were conservative papers which have, since their inception, been the mouthpiece of the government. Soon afterwards, the Kuwaiti Times (English) and Al-Sayasah were published as moderate papers but sympathetic to the government. In the 1970s three dailies were established, two of which were liberal with a radical bent.

It was found that, in spite of the low population in Kuwait (one million four hundred thousand in 1987), the total number of papers, magazines and other periodicals published between 1950 and 1978 was 104. Financial affluence influencing promotion and ownership, increased advertisement incomes, a high level of professionalism, competition, and above all the guaranteed freedom of expression were, the main conditions of power and success which after the country's independence characterised the Kuwaiti press. The relation between the government and the press has been

governed by the Law of Publication which forbids criticism of the Amir or quoting him without authorisation. It is also not permissible to publish information that would "affect the value of the national currency or create misgivings about the Kuwaiti economy". After the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1976, the government added more restrictions on the press by way of amending Articles to the Law. The articles gave the government the power to suspend or even cancel any publication which "serves the interests of a foreign state or organisation, or obtains any sort of assistance from a foreign state, or whose policy contradicts the national interest". (Law of Publication, Amending Articles "35" and Article "59" 1976).

In spite of the aggressive measures taken by the government, the press has survived with considerable freedom to contradict government policies and to criticise the executives. The government occasionally uses that power, as Rugh noticed, in some significant political cases. "But as a rule the actions are relatively mild, involving brief suspensions by the Information Minister for less than three months rather than longer suspension or cancellations which the Council of Ministers was empowered to order" (Rugh, 1979, p.106). It was advanced in Chapter IV that whenever the press contradicted the government's points of view and/or used harsh criticism, the government's responses often took the shape of legal prosecutions. Between 1976-1980, during the period of suspension of parliament, the government took legal action against some editors-in-chief. In most cases, the accusations revolved around four main offences: against the interests of the state, financial offences, religious violations, and intruding upon private life. Eventually, the many cases raised against the press, either by the government or by individuals, were rejected by the Courts owing to the conviction that, the freedom of the press must be guarded.

The role of the Kuwaiti Courts in defending the press was remarkable. Under the shelter of the Constitution, with regard to the freedom of the press, the Courts showed strong independence, rejecting so many government charges that the Courts in many cases was accused, by the government, of taking the side of the accused newspapers. It was calculated that in one year the Courts examined 52 cases, in all but one of which the Courts cleared newspapers from all charges, emphasising the need for free and responsible media. The conflict between the government and the press was an honourable battle on behalf of freedom of expression, in which the press was the champion and the Kuwaiti Court was the legal power which guaranteed the champion safety in the face of government threats, and safeguarded its existence in times of political crisis.

It was noted that most press personnel were non-Kuwaiti Arabs, the total Kuwaiti journalists being less than 20 per cent of the total media personnel including the staff working in the government-owned media (radio stations, television and other periodicals). Until 1975, 45% of the journalists were of Palestinian origin, 23% of Egyptian, 14% of Syrian and an equal percentage of Lebanese origin. Therefore, the issue of Kuwaitizing the media manpower was under debate on many occasions. However, salaries are relatively low in comparison with those offered in the private sector. In spite of repeated encouragement by newspaper owners and editors to join the press staff, an increase in the number of local journalists from among Kuwaitis was not reported at all.

Because of the fact that the majority of journalists were expatriate Arabs, their location in the social structure was investigated. The result of the interviews conducted during the course of this study with high ranking journalists and similarly high ranking officials show that both administrative journalists and government officials agreed that the majority of non-Kuwaiti journalists were unable to defend the freedom of the

press as in principle they should do. On the contrary, they were, as a popular liberal journalist put it, "required to be typewriters with key-boards which produce the material that the owners want to see". Such assessment, however, does not include liberal journalists who champion the opposition as do most Kuwaiti journalists and the staff of liberal papers, such as Al-Talia, Al-Watan and, to some extent, Al-Qabas.

Even though the role of the press was weakened by the fact that the majority of its journalists were non-Kuwaitis, it was occasionally strong and effective. Al Rumaihi, a Kuwaiti journalistic figure, noticed that the power of journalists was orchestrated with the power of the National Assembly which presented a buffer for them against a government which flexed its muscles against foreign journalists who could be subjected to cancellation of their residence visas. Their social linkage to Kuwait was weak. They depended on the nationalists and the National Assembly to secure a fairly stable co-existence between themselves and a traditional hierarchical political system.

To conclude, one can say that the story of the press in Kuwait is a product of the modern Constitution drafted in 1962 to establish a balance between the growing political ambitions of the growing political power, i.e. the nationalists, the National Assembly and the press on the one hand, and the traditional conservative ruling family, the Cabinet and the managerial government officials on the other. It is also the story of new alliances between Arab radical journalists who immigrated to Kuwait in search of political and financial security on the one hand, and the Kuwaiti nationalists who inherited radical views from progressive Arab states on the other. It is, finally, the story of the heated political debates in the National Assembly which dominated the Kuwaiti political life throughout the years, from independence, in 1961, until the present.

From the investigation of the Kuwaiti socio-political relations, and the historical and functional analyses of the Kuwaiti press, a theoretical generalisation was deduced as a guide for the study. It was concluded that in a socio-political system such as that of Kuwait in which, in less than 20 years was effected a substantial transformation from a merchant, tribal and traditional society to a modern, urbanised state, with one of the highest per-capita income in the world and with the best education system in the Gulf, government officials and journalists alike strove to influence the content of the press and to build the press agenda in terms relevant to this transforming society. Government officials strive to lead the process of social change in a way that serves the interests of the existing state. They attempt to make sure that their views and news are portrayed by the press by all means. Official policy and practice alternates between inducement and sanction. Some journalists, in alliance with the nationalists and intellectuals, however, consider themselves the agents of development to whom others must listen for guidance as to how the future of Kuwait should be worked out. Both groups claim the right to assume a share in building the press agenda, a role most usually reserved for journalists.

On the basis of the theoretical presentation and the analyses of the press and the social power in Kuwait, five hypotheses were derived: that (1) there would be a positive rank order correlation between the overall differential importance found in the press coverage for the issues and the differential importance assigned by government officials. (2) There would be a positive rank order correlation between the overall differential importance assigned by officials for the same issues and the importance assigned by journalists. (3) There would be a positive rank order correlation between the overall differential importance found in the press coverage and importance assigned for the same issues by journalists.

As the above three hypotheses are based on the overall salience of the issues, reflecting the methods used in agenda-setting research, two hypotheses are based on the sample attitudes taken on the issues. The quest on the one hand was to find out the relationship between the attitudes of government officials and journalists on the spectrum of conservative and liberal dispositions and the relationship between the attitudes of government officials and the press from the other. Put differently, if the above three hypotheses deal with overall importance of the issues, the following two hypotheses deal with the correspondence between the attitudes of officials and journalists and officials and the press. Therefore, hypothesis No.(4) was that there is a similarity in the conservative dispositions taken by both officials and journalists on issues prevalent in the Kuwaiti press. Consequently, hypothesis No.(5) was that there is a similarity in the conservative dispositions taken by both officials and the press on issues prevalent in the content of the latter.

To acquire an empirical assessment of the above hypotheses, three methods of measurements were adopted, a content analysis to define the press agenda, a survey to define the government officials' and the journalists' agendas, an interview protocol to add more accuracy to the research findings and to enrich the data. For each of the three groups, government officials, journalists and the press, 45 subjects were chosen to represent the research samples. The press sample consisted of 45 editions of three major Kuwaiti newspapers, while each sample for officials and journalists consisted of 45 subjects.

The press content analysis covered a period of five months beginning January 1986. The questionnaire was administered to a sample of Kuwaiti government officials and journalists with the last 15 days overlapping with the press content. Also, some officials and journalists were interviewed.



In spite of any limitations in the research design, the results of this study substantiate the five hypotheses mentioned above. This lends support to the conclusion that the press agenda in Kuwait is not exclusively set by the journalists. This line of research is consistent with the current need to go beyond conventional agenda-setting research. As mentioned earlier, this study benefitted from the British literature relating to agenda-setting which directed attention to the underlying social and political dynamics which influence journalists in ways that lead them to reflect these influences in the press. From this view, the journalists are seen not as guardian angels sitting at the pinnacles of wisdom and imposing on the populace their impartial articulation of what people should think. Rather, they are considered ordinary mortals who, because of the positions they occupy in institutions owned, operated or controlled by certain groups, are caught in the tugs, pulls, pressures and counterpressures encountered in the pursuit of their trade. Thus, in Kuwait, their position on issues expressed in the media does not exclusively reflect their liberal views, but also supports the conservative policies of the government and the Ruling Family. They are expected to present, and at times defend, conservative positions, even though they do not necessarily endorse them themselves. Such a situation would naturally lead to differentiation amongst the journalists as well as the press, leading to diversity in the latter and polarization in the former, along conservative/liberal lines. But whatever the persuasion of journalists, they must take into account the actual or imagined position of the government and integrate it into their news.

The theoretical framework developed in this study reflects that position. On the whole, the relationship between journalists and government officials organised itself around the socio-political development which

characterises contemporary Kuwaiti society. Thus, Kuwaitis pride themselves on a free, diversified and sophisticated press. This is true to a very great extent, especially when the Kuwaiti press is compared with the press of other Arab countries. The forces pushing for modernity and change, which revolve around the nationalists and intellectuals, are well entrenched and deeply established. But the authority of the government and the political position of the Royal Family is even more deeply rooted. The culture legitimates the interference of the Royal Family and the government to safeguard the state, even when this includes influencing journalists or controlling the press. The two groups know their bounds and limits, however, and they work co-operatively for the attainment of their mutual goals.

Another consideration is political stability, which not only perpetuates the position of the government and the Royal Family but also provides an internal situation which allows the criticism or support of other groups without precipitating aggression or economic instability. Given Kuwait's prominent position in trade, commerce, investment and banking, political stability is a pre-requisite for prosperity, and in turn becomes the main goal of all social groups, regardless of their liberal or conservative orientations. The stability sought by these groups is not based on stagnation, but rather on modernisation and change. The press, which is privately owned, plays a delicate role in maintaining the balance between the conservative orientations of the Royal Family, the Cabinet, government officials and merchants on the one hand and, on the other, the progressive liberal orientations of the nationalists, journalists and intellectuals in their steady efforts to attain their ambitions and enhance their political participation. This was reflected in the issues which were found to be prevalent in the press, such as, for example, those relating to the effective use and fair distribution of oil wealth.

The fact that the hypotheses advanced in this study were substantiated by the data collected gives some assurance that the theoretical reasoning from which they were derived is adequate. If this is in fact true, then the results of this study are, on the whole, consistent with the work of Golding and Middleton (1982) in their study of social welfare and the media coverage thereof in Britain. Golding's assumption that the news is the voice of the capitalist class is similar to the view mentioned here, that Kuwaiti news reflects the voice of the Royal Family and the government. Also, Golding's notion that British journalists suffer intervention from the newspaper owners and other pressure groups found support in the results of this study. In our case, it is fair to conclude that government officials influence, and at times initiate, the agenda-setting of the press in Kuwait. This contention is also consistent with Blumer and Gurevitch's (1975) notion of the institutional control exerted by the political establishment over the press, directly or tacitly. Such control influences the behaviour and attitudes of journalists, and is reflected in the views they express in print.

The findings are, moreover, consistent with those of the Turk study in 1986, in which the influence of public relations practitioners and official agencies on the media was evident. The significant correlations between the agendas of the officials and the press, the officials and journalists, and the journalists and the press indicate that Kuwaiti government officials somehow affect media content. The interviews of both the officials and journalists indicate that Kuwaiti government officials contribute to the press agenda. Through personal contacts or in formal gatherings, the officials highlight the differential importance of daily news as they pertain to certain topics deemed vital to the nation such as, for example, the economy and national security. In this case, journalists do not write

in a vacuum, nor can they afford to ignore the government officials' subtle or direct influence.

Although parallels were drawn between the findings of this study and other agenda-setting research findings and conceptualisations, it should be borne in mind that the research setting in which this study was conducted is not identical to the research setting in Western countries. The differences in research settings should be spelled out in order to delineate the significance of the findings.

The main difference in the research settings is that Kuwait is a traditional society which has embarked on a rapid and fairly successful course of modernisation. They have modern Western institutions, such as the press, operating within the framework of a traditional society. Like other Third World countries, the most prominent institution in Kuwait is the political institution, which is orchestrated by the government and embodied in the person of the Amir. This study showed that agenda-setting is affected and influenced by government officials representing that predominant institution. It was shown, for example, that the media content was of great concern to the government, especially when the latter's vital interests were threatened. The Law of Publication in Kuwait, in fact, reiterates that relationship between the government and the mass media.

The generalisation of the results of this study (i.e. government officials influence journalists and set the press agenda) is consequently limited to developing nations. The Middle East area is a case in point. It is a standard expectation in that part of the world that the government either regulates the media directly or influences its content tacitly. The interview data from this study indicate that government officials as well as journalists consider the limitations imposed by the government on the media as legitimate, just and fair. If these kinds of considerations exist in Kuwait, which enjoys a truly Western and rather free press, one would

expect that the case would be even stronger in other Middle Eastern societies. Further research is therefore needed to ascertain the role of predominant government institutions in such societies as far as agenda-setting is concerned. Further research is also needed to spell out the dynamics and nature of the relationships between journalists and government officials. The interview protocol developed for this study dealt mainly with agenda-setting, attitudes, and perceptions of influence. Other aspects of such a relationship need to be known, such as the means of social control employed, the limits of deviations from official lines before publication is suspended, and the like. In fact, if an entire study is designed to ascertain that relationship, the result would definitely contribute to knowledge and fill the gap in our understanding of agenda-setting.

Although the research setting in Kuwait is different from those used in agenda-setting studies in Western societies, the results of this research are still instructive. The overall generalisation that the press in all societies is influenced by predominant social institutions still pertains. Whereas the predominant institution in Kuwait, for example, was the political institution, the predominant institution in Western society may very well be industry or business. After all, it is the extent of circulation and the advertising revenue in the Western press which influence the media content. As it has been shown earlier in the review of the British literature (e.g. Golding, 1977; Golding and Middleton, 1982; and Bagdikian, 1983), the point was made that journalists are not unaware and not unaffected by the needs and desires of industrial and business establishments. Due to the checks and balances of democracies, the political institutions in Western societies are based on solid grounds of civil liberties and the freedom of the press. The power of the government to influence the media is curtailed, and any interference with freedom of

speech is unacceptable. It is acceptable, however, for business, industry and other pressure groups to protect their interests, even when it comes to influencing the media content directly or indirectly. Thus, whereas the media in Western democracies serve the interest of the capitalists and are influenced by them, the media in a traditional society serve the interest of the ruler and the government and are influenced by them.

The results of this study should nevertheless be viewed within the limitations of the research. It is worth noting that collecting data in developing nations is fraught with difficulties and burdened by procedural constraints that have a certain bearing on the validity of the data collected. Efforts were made, for example, to select random samples of government officials and journalists. This proved to be almost impossible. Furthermore, the development of a questionnaire that would not be misconstrued was another important consideration. Asking or answering questions, even for scientific research, is usually suspect in developing nations. In many cases, particularly amongst the government officials, the subjects were doubtful regarding the purpose of the questioning, and they had to be reassured over and over again that the data would only be used in aggregate form and that their anonymity was assured. In spite of such assurances, personal trust had to be established before completing the questionnaire or conducting an interview, and worries about the abuse of information had to be alleviated. In the final analysis, the results should be considered within the context of these limitations, particularly so far as the validity of the data is concerned. In this research, much effort was exerted to secure valid data. For example, almost all questionnaires were completed in the presence of the researcher who answered the respondent's concerns on the spot.

Another conclusion is that in Third World socio-political-economic systems in which the press participates co-operatively with emerging institutions or groups who are bent on modernisation and change, the media would most likely attain a certain degree of freedom and diversity, especially to the extent that the media are privately owned, which reflects the need for socio-economic development and for more political participation. Thus it has been shown that the press was established in Kuwait by the merchants, as the source of finance, and the nationalists, as the source of ideas; and its content was supplied by the intellectuals with the blessing of the Amir and the Royal Family. This pattern may not be atypical, and may be followed in many Third World developing nations. The media serve as conduits through which the established ruler or emerging authority (e.g. the junta) channel the participation of interest groups such as the nationalists, intellectuals and journalists in a benign form and within specific bounds that ultimately serve the interests of the rulers. Since in such societies the interests of the ruler and the government are usually synonymous with national interests, government officials influence of the media is seen as natural and legitimate.

Finally, but importantly, it should be noted that this thesis breaks new ground in policy agenda-setting research in a Third World country. As such, it is at best exploratory. It should be replicated in other countries so as to provide a range of truly empirical knowledge representative of the Third World. Thus, further research would be warranted to the extent that the present thesis is based on research relating to one country, Kuwait, which has been identified in terms substantially specific to Kuwait. However, the author remains convinced that this research will be strongly indicative of officials/journalists/media relationships elsewhere in the Third World. Even so, the most convincing research findings require, in principle, corroboration by additional case-study.

More research is needed to spell out the nature of the relationship between officials and journalists in the Third World. This is a sensitive area which requires an astute approach, a sensible diplomatic manner, and commitment to detached systematic inquiry.



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## APPENDICES

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| APPENDIX I   | - | The Arabic Translation of the Questionnaire and the General Questionnaire |
| APPENDIX II  | - | The Questionnaire   |
| APPENDIX III | - | The General Questionnaire   |
| APPENDIX IV  | - | The Interview Protocol  |
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# الصحافة والسلطة في الكويت

استمارة إستمارة  
جزء من مشروع رسالة للدكتوراه

الباحث  
حسن قايد

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

تتضمن هذه الاستمارة عددا من القضايا التي تعالجها الصحف الكويتية بالنشر بصورة متكررة وعلى فترات متقاربة. والمطلوب التفضل بابداء موقفك حيال كل قضية على حدة.

لاحظ أن كل قضية وضعت على هيئة مقياس ذي قطبين متباعدين. يشتمل الجزء على يمين الصفحة على قضية وميزان ابجدي (أ، ب، ج، د) يحدد درجات متفاوتة لدى أهمية تلك القضية كما توجد قضية أخرى على يسار الصفحة وميزان رقمي (١، ٢، ٣، ٤) يحدد نفس درجات الأهمية للقضية المقابلة.

الرجاء التكرم ،

أولاً: باختيار القضية التي تتناسب مع قناعتك الشخصية.

ثانياً: اختيار درجة أهمية تلك القضية في نظرك ووضع علامة « ✓ » على الحرف أو الرقم الذي وقع عليه اختيارك. أما اذا وجدت أنك ليس لديك موقف من القضيتين فيمكنك اختيار درجة « صفر » التي تعني أنك ليس لك اهتمام بالقضيتين على السواء. وفيما يلي مثال تطبيقي يوضح مراحل تطوير اختيارك للقضايا المطروحة.

منح المرأة حق الانتخاب	يجب منح المرأة الكويتية
الترشيح عمل يتعارض مع العادات والتقاليد المرعية في الكويت	حق الانتخاب والترشيح لعضوية مجلس الأمة

أ	ب	ح	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى اقصى درجة	مهم جدا	مهم الى حد ما	لا ادري	مهم الى اقصى درجة	مهم جدا	مهم الى حد ما	مهم الى حد ما	مهم الى حد ما

فاذا وقع اختيارك على الجملة يمين الصفحة تبدأ بالنظر في الجدول الذي يحدد أهمية تلك القضية ثم تضع علامة « ✓ » على الدرجة التي تتفق مع تصورك لأهمية تلك القضية بدءاً بحرف « أ » الذي يمثل اقصى درجة من الأهمية ثم تبدأ بالأهمية في الانخفاض الى أن تصل لحرف « د » اقل الدرجات أهمية.

فاذا وقع اختيارك على الجملة الواقعة على يسار الصفحة فإن الارقام (١ - ٤) تمثل نفس درجات الأهمية السابقة والمطلوب أن تضع سلام « ✓ » على درجة الأهمية التي تتناسب مع موقفك الشخصي.

وفي حالة عدم اقتناعك بكل القضيتين ضع علامة « ✓ » على المربع المتوسط انشاز اليه برقم صفر وعبارة « لا أدري ». والان نرجو الانتقال للاجابة على كافة القضايا الواردة التالية:



أولاً: قضايا تتعلق بمفهوم الوحدة العربية:

- ١ - يمكن تحقيق النهضة العربية  
دون الحاجة لقيام الوحدة بين  
القطار العربية
- من المستحيل تحقيق النهضة العربية  
دون قيام الوحدة بين القطار  
العربية

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(4)

القضية الثانية:

- ٢ - أفضل وسيلة لقيام الوحدة  
العربية أن تتحقق على مراحل
- أفضل وسيلة لتحقيق الوحدة  
العربية أن تكون فورية وشاملة

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(5)

القضية الثالثة:

- ٣ - عندما تقوم الوحدة العربية لا  
بد أن تتركز على مبادئ القوانين  
الاسلامية
- عندما تقوم الوحدة العربية يجب  
أن تتركز على مبادئ القوانين  
الوضعية

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(6)

#### القضية الرابعة:

- ٤ - عندما تقوم الوحدة العربية  
يجب أن تركز على قوانين  
الاقتصاد الحر
- عندما تقوم الوحدة العربية يجب  
أن تركز على قوانين الاقتصاد  
الموجه

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(7)

#### القضية الخامسة:

- ٥ - عندما تقوم الوحدة العربية  
يجب أن تركز على أساس النظام  
الفيدرالي
- عندما تقوم الوحدة العربية يجب  
أن تركز على أسس الحكم المركزي

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(8)

والآن ننتقل إلى نوع آخر من القضايا تتعلق بطبيعة الصراع العربي - الاسرائيلي:

ثانياً: قضايا تتعلق بالصراع العربي - الاسرائيلي:

#### القضية السادسة:

- ٦ - لا يمكن حل الصراع العربي -  
الاسرائيلي باستخدام الوسائل  
السلمية
- لا يمكن حل الصراع العربي -  
الاسرائيلي دون اللجوء لاستخدام  
القوة العسكرية

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(9)

المحكمة الدستورية

- ٧ - يجب استغلال الفرص لتحقيق السلام بين العرب وإسرائيل حتى لا تتعرض الحقوق الفلسطينية للضياع
- السلام مع إسرائيل مرادف للخيانة والاستسلام

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (10)

القضية الثامنة:

- ٨ - يجب الإسراع بإيجاد الحلول الفورية للصراع العربي - الإسرائيلي
- ليس هناك ما يدعو لاستعجال الحل فالوقت يعمل لصالح العرب

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (11)

القضية التاسعة:

- ٩ - تأييد العناصر الفلسطينية المعتدلة هو السبيل الأكثر ضماناً لاستعادة الحقوق المشروعة للشعب الفلسطيني
- تأييد العناصر الفلسطينية المتطرفة هو السبيل الأكثر ضماناً لاستعادة الحقوق المشروعة للشعب الفلسطيني

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (12)

#### القضية العاشرة:

١٠ - حل القضية الفلسطينية  
يتوقف على تأييد السياسة الحالية  
لياسر عرفات

حل القضية الفلسطينية يتوقف على  
تأييد الاتجاه المعارض لياسر  
عرفات داخل منظمة التحرير

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(13)

#### القضية الحادية عشرة:

١١ - حل القضية الفلسطينية  
يتوقف على تأييد السياسة الحالية  
للدول العربية المعتدلة

حل القضية الفلسطينية يتوقف على  
تأييد السياسة الحالية لدول الرفض

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(14)

#### القضية الثانية عشرة:

١٢ - التنسيق الأردني -  
الفلسطيني هو السبيل الأكثر  
ضماناً لاستعادة الحقوق المشروعة  
للشعب الفلسطيني

التنسيق الأردني - الفلسطيني  
سوف يؤدي في نهاية المطاف إلى  
إحداً الحقوق المشروعة للشعب  
الفلسطيني

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(15)

القضية الثالثة عشرة:

١٣ - لا يمكن حل الصراع العربي الاسرائيلي  
دون اشتراك الجانب المصري  
يمكن حل الصراع  
اشترك الجانب المصري فيها

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(16)

ثالثاً: قضايا تتعلق بالنواحي الأمنية في الكويت:

القضية الرابعة عشرة:

١٤ - لا تشكل العناصر الأجنبية غير  
العربية في الكويت أي خطر على  
الاستقرار الأمني فيها ويجب  
الإبقاء عليهم في البلاد  
العناصر الأجنبية غير العربية خطر  
يبدد الاستقرار الأمني في الكويت  
ويجب العمل على ترحيلهم بكل  
الوسائل

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(17)

القضية الخامسة عشرة:

١٥ - العناصر العربية غير الكويتية خطر  
يبدد الاستقرار الأمني في البلاد  
ويجب العمل على ترحيلهم بكل  
الوسائل  
العناصر العربية غير الكويتية  
لا تشكل أي خطر على الاستقرار  
الأمني للبلاد ويجب الإبقاء عليهم  
الوسائل

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(18)

القضية السادسة عشرة:

١٦ - الشيعة من غير الكويتيين يبددون  
الاستقرار الأمني ويجب منعهم من  
دخول البلاد بمنحاً كلياً

بغلاً لقلّة نسبة الشيعة غير  
الكويتيين ممن يبددون الاستقرار  
الأمني في الكويت. فلا داعي لمنع  
العناصر الشيعة الأخرى من دخول  
البلاد

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(19)

القضية السابعة عشرة:

١٧ - أية معارضة كويتية مباشرة  
لنظام التكمي يؤدي إلى تهديد  
الأوضاع الأمنية.

المعارضة العريضة والمباشرة لنظام  
التكمي تؤدي إلى تهديد  
الأوضاع الأمنية في الكويت

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(20)

القضية الثامنة عشرة:

١٨ - الترتيبات الأمنية الحالية في  
الكويت كافية وزيادتها تؤدي إلى  
تهديد الحقوق المدنية في البلاد

الترتيبات الأمنية في الكويت ليست  
كافية للحفاظ على أمن واستقرار  
البلاد

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(21)

رابعاً: قضايا تتعلق بالحرب العراقية - الإيرانية:

#### القضية التاسعة عشرة:

- ١٩- تنتهي الحرب العراقية - الإيرانية إذا تم التوفيق بين الأطراف المتنازعة.
- ٢٠- تنتهي الحرب العراقية - الإيرانية الإيرانية إذا تعرضت إيران لهزيمة ساحقة أو نه انتهاكها بشكل كاس

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (22)

#### القضية العشرون:

- ٢٠- الدول الخليجية ملزمة بتقديم المعونات للعراق ومساعدتها في حربها مع إيران
- لا ينبغي أن تقدم الدول الخليجية أية مساعدة للعراق، ويجب عليها الحياد إزاء الحرب العراقية - الإيرانية

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (23)

#### القضية الواحدة والعشرون:

- ٢١- أصبحت الدول الكبرى مدعوة بشكل فعلي لضمان سلامة الملاحة في الخليج
- تهديد الإيرانيين بحرية الملاحة في الخليج، سوف يقود للتدخل العسكري من قبل الدول الكبرى دون موافقة من قبل دول المنطقة

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (24)

القضية الثانية والحشرون :

٢٢ - لا تستطيع إيران تجاهل دور  
الأنظمة الخليجية الأخرى وهي  
تعيش حالة الحرب مع العراق

ستعرض إيران إلى سبائل الانظمة  
الخليجية الأخرى عن طريق  
الإصرار على استمرار الحرب

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (25)

القضية الثالثة وعشرون :

الترتيبات العسكرية والأمنية لمجلس  
التعاون كافي للمحافظة على الدول  
الأعضاء في وجه التهديدات الإيرانية

٢٣ - لا تكفي الترتيبات العسكرية  
والأمنية لمجلس التعاون لمواجهة  
الآخطار الإيرانية

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (26)

القضية الرابعة وعشرون :

٢٤ - الحرب العراقية - الإيرانية وجه  
جديد للصراع الدائم بين السنة  
والشيعة

الحرب العراقية - الإيرانية  
وجه جديد للصراع التاريخي بين  
القومية العربية والقومية الفارسية

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (27)



خامساً: قضايا تتعلق بإنخفاض أسعار النفط وأثره على مستقبل الخليج

#### القضية الخامسة وعشرون :

٢٥ - الخلافات الحادة بين أعضاء منظمة أوبك حي التي تسببت في حدوث أزمة أسعار النفط تتحمل الدول العربية مسؤولية انخفاض أسعار النفط فقد عمدت للتخطيط لمثل هذه النتيجة منذ وقت طويل

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (28)

#### القضية السادسة وعشرون :

٢٦ - انخفاض أسعار النفط حالة مؤقتة ولن تمتد لفترة طويلة كما يعتقد البعض ليس هناك ما يدل على حدوث تحسن في أسعار النفط في المستقبل القريب

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (29)

#### القضية السابعة وعشرون :

٢٧ - ليس لإنخفاض أسعار النفط أية آثار سلبية على دول الخليج ولن يشكل أي تهديد لاستقرار وسلامة أمن الحكومات الخليجية انخفاض أسعار النفط تهدد مباشرة للأنظمة الخليجية ووسيلة لعدم الاستقرار في النظم السياسية في الخليج

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (30)

القضية الثامنة وعشرون:

٢٨ - لن تؤثر أزمة أسعار النفط على الأوضاع التجارية في دول الخليج، وحتى إذا حدثت فإنها سوف تكون ضعيفة الأثر وليست ذات شأن

ستفضي أزمة أسعار النفط لحدوث كساد تجاري وعجز مالي لكل الأنشطة التجارية في الخليج.

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(31)

القضية التاسعة وعشرون:

٢٩ - سوف يساعد انخفاض أسعار النفط على حل الصراعات الداخلية بين العرب، ومن ثم سوف يقلل من حالة التوتر بين الدول العربية

انخفاض أسعار النفط سيقود إلى تأجيج الخلافات العربية بصورة أكثر مما هي عليه الآن

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(32)

سادسا : قضايا تتعلق بالثروة البترولية :

#### القضية الثلاثون :

يتم اتفاق عوائد البترول بصورة  
تناسب وسياسة تحقيق أهداف  
التنمية الوطنية في الكويت

٣٠ - لا يتم اتفاق عوائد البترول  
بصورة تناسب وسياسة تحقيق  
أهداف التنمية الوطنية في الكويت

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم الى حد ما	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (33)

#### القضية الواحدة وثلاثون :

٣١ . تلتزم الحكومة الكويتية باتباع  
سياسة اتفاق حكيمة للمحافظة على  
عوائد الثروة البترولية

تعتمد السلطات الكويتية  
لاتباع سياسة اتفاق واسعة تقود الى  
تبذير عوائد الثروة النفطية

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم الى حد ما	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (34)

٣٢ - هناك احتياطي بترول ضخم  
ولا داعي لسن أية قيود لتحديد  
كميات الانتاج في الكويت

ينبغي وضع قيود مشددة على  
الكميات المنتجة من البترول ويجب  
الحفاظة عليها كأهم المصادر  
الوطنية

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (35)

#### القضية الثالثة وثلاثون :

٣٣ - عائدات البترول الكويتي  
تذهب لجيوب فئة معينة دون  
سواها في المجتمع الكويتي

تشمل العائدات البترولية الطبقات  
الاجتماعية في الكويت دون تمييز

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (36)

القضية الرابعة وثلاثون :

٣٤ - بفضل العائدات النفطية  
تتوفر في الكويت على نطاق واسع  
كافة الخدمات الاجتماعية والصحية  
والتعليمية

على الرغم من وجود العائدات  
النفطية العالية إلا أن الخدمات  
الاجتماعية والصحية والتعليمية لا  
تزال متخلفة في الكويت

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (١٦)

القضية الخامسة وثلاثون :

الاستثمارات الكويتية في الخارج  
عمل جليل من حيث أنها تشكل  
الآن أهم مصادر الدخل القومي

الودائع الكويتية في الخارج ضئيلة  
لدرجة التي أصبحت خطر يهدد  
بضياع العائد النفطي في الكويت

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (١٨)

## سابقاً : فصلاً يتعلق بالآليات

### الفصل السادسة والثلاثون :

٣٦ - يهدف من العمليات الإرهابية في الكويت  
تفويض أركان النظام الكويتي  
بشكل أساسي .  
٣٧ - يهدف من العمليات الإرهابية في الكويت  
تفويض أركان النظام الكويتي  
بشكل أساسي .  
٣٨ - يهدف من العمليات الإرهابية في الكويت  
تفويض أركان النظام الكويتي  
بشكل أساسي .

١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم جداً
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠

### الفصل السابعة والثلاثون :

٣٩ - رفض الحكومة الكويتية الانصياع  
لمطالب وضغوط الأرمانيين سوف  
يؤدي إلى كسر شوكة الأرتاب  
في الكويت  
٤٠ - رفض الحكومة الكويتية الانصياع  
لمطالب وضغوط الأرمانيين سوف  
يؤدي إلى كسر شوكة الأرتاب  
في الكويت  
٤١ - رفض الحكومة الكويتية الانصياع  
لمطالب وضغوط الأرمانيين سوف  
يؤدي إلى كسر شوكة الأرتاب  
في الكويت

١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم جداً
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠

### الفصل الثامنة والثلاثون :

٤٢ - قضية منح التأشيرات لبعض  
العناصر العربية لدخول الكويت  
سوف يؤدي إلى انتهاء العمليات  
فيها .  
٤٣ - قضية منح التأشيرات لبعض  
العناصر العربية لدخول الكويت  
سوف يؤدي إلى انتهاء العمليات  
فيها .  
٤٤ - قضية منح التأشيرات لبعض  
العناصر العربية لدخول الكويت  
سوف يؤدي إلى انتهاء العمليات  
فيها .

١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	مهم جداً
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠

القضية التاسعة والثلاثون :

٣٩- الاجراءات الامنية المعمول بها حاليا  
في الكويت كافية لمقاومة الارهاب فيها .  
لا تكفي الاجراءات الأمنية  
المعول بها حاليا في الكويت  
لمقاومة الارهاب

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم الى حد ما	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (42)

القضية أربعون :

٤٠- لا تحتاج الكويت في محاربتها  
للإرهاب لمساعدة أية جهات أجنبية  
الكويت بحاجة للتنسيق مع الدول  
الأخرى في محاربة الإرهاب

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم الى حد ما	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (43)

القضية الواحد وأربعون :

لكي تنجح في مقاومة الإرهاب على  
الكويت ، أن تعتمد على قدراتها  
الذاتية بصورة كاملة  
لكي تنجح في مقاومة الإرهاب على  
الكويت ، أن تبادر للتنسيق مع الدول  
الأخرى المتضررة من الإرهاب

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم الى حد ما	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (44)

ثامناً : قضايا تختص بالعلاقة بين الحكومة والبرلمان في الكويت

القضية الثانية وأربعون :

٤٢ - ليس مطلوباً من الحكومة  
الالتزام بتنفيذ التوصيات الصادرة  
عن مجلس الأمة في الكويت

الحكومة الكويتية ملزمة بتنفيذ  
سياسة مجلس الأمة الكويتي

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(45)

القضية الثالثة وأربعون :

٤٣ - الحكومة الكويتية أقدر على  
رسم السياسة العامة للبلاد والعناية  
بالصالح العام مقارنة بمجلس الأمة

مجلس الأمة أقدر على رسم  
السياسة العامة للبلاد والعناية  
بالصالح العام مقارنة بالحكومة

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(46)

القضية الرابعة وأربعون :

٤٤ - يملك مجلس الأمة الكويتي  
ضمانات قوية للبقاء ولا يمكن أن  
يتعرض للحل تحت أي ظرف من  
الظروف

على الرغم من قوة مجلس الأمة  
وتأثيره القوي فإنه يحتاج لبدء  
مزيد من الحرص حتى لا يتعرض  
للحل من قبل الحكومة في أي وقت

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(47)



#### القضية الخامسة وأربعون :

تميل الحكومة لدعم بعض  
القيادات العلمانية دون سواها بزدي  
الى اصحاب التجربة وينبذ التجديد  
الديمقراطية في البلاد.

٤٥ - الحكومة الكويتية لا تميل لدعم فئة  
على أخرى داخل البرلمان وتخذ  
السياسة غير واردة على الاطلاق

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم الى حد ما		
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (48)

#### القضية السادسة وأربعون :

على الرغم من تصلب بعض الأعضاء  
وحرصهم على استقرار الحكومة ، إلا  
أنها ليس لديها أي شك بتعمد  
بعض الأعضاء خلق الأزمات بين  
السلطتين

٤٦ - لدى الحكومة الكويتية يقين  
بأن بعض الأعضاء يعملون على دق  
اسفين بيننا من جهة ، وبين مجلس  
الامة من جهة أخرى

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم الى حد ما		
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (49)

تاسعا : فضايا تتعلق بحرية الصحافة في الكويت

القضية السابعة وأربعون :

الصحافة الكويتية حرة ولا تعاني  
من تدخل السلطة في شؤونها  
الخاصة

٤٧ - على الرغم من توفر مجال  
الحرية الواسع تتعرض الصحف  
الكويتية لرقابة شديدة من قبل  
السلطة في الكويت

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(50)

القضية الثامنة وأربعون :

٤٨ - يحرص أصحاب الصحف على  
مجاهلة السلطة عن طريق منع نشر  
الموضوعات التي تسيء للمسؤولين  
الحكوميين

لا تتخرج الصحف الكويتية في نشر  
الموضوعات التي تتعارض مع  
وجهات نظر المسؤولين وتثير  
غضبهم

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم إلى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم إلى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم إلى حد ما	
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

(51)

القضية التاسعة وأربعون :

٤٩ - خوف الصحفيين في الكويت  
من فقدان وظائفهم وتعرضهم  
للمساءلة بفرض عليهم نفاذي  
الخصوص في الموضوعات التي تنثير  
غضب المسؤولين وتتعارض مع  
المواقف الرسمية

لم يعد الصحفيون في الكويت  
يرهبون السلطة ، ولهذا فانهم  
يكتبون بحرية دون خوف من عقاب

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (52)

القضية الخمسون :

تتحلى الصحف الكويتية بالمسؤولية  
الاجتماعية ، ولهذا فإنها تعكس  
المصلحة العامة دون تحيز أو تأثير  
من أحد

٥٠ - لأن الصحافة الكويتية صحافة  
منابر ، فإن ذلك يقلل من التزامها  
بالمسؤولية الاجتماعية وبطبيعتها  
بصبغة التحيز كالصحافة الحزبية

أ	ب	ج	د	صفر	١	٢	٣	٤
مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما	لا أدري	مهم الى أقصى درجة	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم الى حد ما
9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 (53)

## APPENDIX II

### THE QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire contains issues which are currently common in the press. We would like to know your personal position on each of them.

Note that each issue is presented in a bi-polar scale. Please place a mark in each scale which corresponds with your position on the issue as shown in the following example.

Voting and running for office of Kuwaiti women runs against tradition.      Kuwaiti women should be permitted to vote and run for office now.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant

If the statement on the left expresses your position, indicate how strongly you feel by placing a mark in the appropriate space. If you feel very strongly, mark D. If you feel less strongly, mark C. If you feel still less strongly, mark B. If your feeling is even less strong, mark A. But if you don't have any position, then mark zero.

Similarly, if the statement on the right expresses your position very strongly, mark 4. If you feel less strongly, mark 3. If you feel still less strongly, mark 2. If your feeling is even less strong, mark 1. But if you don't have any position then mark ZERO.

Now please proceed to the next page and indicate your answers.

# I. ISSUES RELATING TO ARAB UNITY

- (1) Arab renaissance can occur without Arab Unity. Arab renaissance is impossible without Arab Unity.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (2) When it occurs Arab Unity must happen in stages. When it occurs Arab Unity must be total and immediate.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (3) When it occurs Arab Unity must be based on religious bases. When it occurs Arab Unity must be based on secular bases.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (4) When it occurs Arab Unity must be based on a free economy.      When it occurs Arab Unity must be based on a controlled economy.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (5) When it occurs Arab Unity must follow a federal government system.      When it occurs Arab Unity must follow a controlled government system.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

## II. ISSUES RELATING TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

- (6) The Arab-Israeli conflict can be resolved only by peaceful means.      The Arab-Israeli conflict can be resolved only by military confrontation.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(7) To regain Palestinian rights  
Arabs must sign peaceful  
settlement with Israel.

Any peace with Israel is tanta-  
mount to treason and surrender.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(8) We should solve the Arab-Israeli  
conflict immediately before  
Palestinian rights are lost.

There is no hurry to solve the  
Arab-Israeli conflict because  
time is on Arab side.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(9) Supporting the moderate elements  
is the best way to capture  
Palestinian rights.

Supporting the extremist Arab  
States is the best way to attain  
victory over Israel.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(10) Solving the Palestinian problem will be attained by the PLO under Arafat leadership.

Solving the Palestinian problem will be attained by those who oppose Yaser Arafat.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(11) Solving the Palestinian problem under moderate Arab states.

Solving the Palestinian problem under the opposition Arab states.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(12) PLO-Jordanian agreement will dissipate rights.

Supporting the PLO-Jordanian agreement is a sure way to retain Palestinian rights.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9



(13) The Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be solved without the participation of Egypt.

The Arab-Israeli conflict can be solved without Egypt.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

### III. ISSUES RELATING TO SECURITY IN KUWAIT

(14) Non-Arab foreigners do not threaten Kuwait security and should remain.

Non-Arab foreigners threaten Kuwait security and they must be expelled.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(15) Non-Kuwaiti Arabs constitute a threat to Kuwaiti security and should be returned to their own countries.

Non-Kuwaiti Arabs do not threaten Kuwaiti security and should be retained.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (16) Non-Kuwaiti Shiites constitute a threat to Kuwaiti security and they must be prevented from entering Kuwait. Only a very limited element of of non-Kuwaiti Shiites are a threat to Kuwaiti security, therefore, there is no need to ban all non-Kuwaiti Shiites from entering Kuwait.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (17) Open resistance to the Khomeni regime will threaten Kuwait security. Open resistance to the Khomeni regime is the best way to protect Kuwait security.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (18) Existing police authorities are sufficient to maintain law and order, The existing police authorities and practice are insufficient TO ensure Kuwait's security.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

#### IV. ISSUES RELATING TO IRAN-IRAQI WAR

- (19) The Iran-Iraq war can be solved only by agreement between all parties particularly Iran.      The Iran-Iraq war will be ended only when Iran is defeated or weakened enough.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (20) The Gulf States are obligated to subsidise Iraq's war against Iran.      The Gulf States should not subsidise Iraq and should be neutral in Iran/Iraq war.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (21) The great powers are already invited to protect navigation in the Gulf.      An Iranian threat to navigation will bring the navies of the great powers to police the Gulf.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(22) Iran cannot undermine the Gulf regimes even if it continues the war with Iraq.

Iran will undermine the Gulf regimes by continuing the Iran-Iraq war.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(23) Military and security arrangements of the Gulf Co-operative Council are able to protect the Gulf States from any Iranian threat.

Military and security arrangements of the Gulf Co-operative Council are insufficient to face any Iranian threat.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(24) The Iran-Iraq war reflects the conflict between the Shi'ites and Sunnies.

The Iran-Iraq war reflects the conflict between Arab and Persian nationalism.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

V. ISSUES RELATING TO DECLINE OF OIL PRICES  
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF THE GULF REGION

- (25) The sharp division among OPEC members caused the crises in oil prices. Western countries bear the responsibility for the oil crisis they deliberately planned for the end a long time ago.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant

- (26) The decline in oil prices is a temporary condition which will not last for as long as some people believe. There are no indications that oil prices will improve in the near future.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant

- (27) The decline in oil prices has no adverse effects on Gulf countries and will therefore not adversely affect the security and stability of the Gulf States. The decline in oil prices directly threatens the regions in the Gulf and constitutes a means to political institutions in the Gulf.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant

(28) The decline in oil prices will not affect the commercial activities in the Gulf.

The decline in oil prices will lead to commercial depression and may cause defects in all commercial activities in the Gulf

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(29) The decline in oil prices will help to integrate internal Arab states and will consequently lessen tensions among Arab countries.

The decline in oil prices will lead to intensifying inter-Arab conflict much more than it was before.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

#### VI. ISSUES RELATING TO OIL WEALTH

(30) Oil revenues are wisely spent to attain national goals.

Oil revenues are not wisely spent to attain national goals.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(31) Kuwaiti authorities are doing their best to conserve oil revenue and oversee spending them wisely.

Kuwaiti authorities pursue a policy which will dissipate and waste oil revenue.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(32) There is plenty of oil in Kuwait and there is no need to restrict production.

Oil production should be restricted and conserved as a national resource.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(33) All social classes and groups in Kuwait benefited from oil revenue.

Oil revenues benefited limited groups in Kuwaiti society.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (34) Services, including health and education, are more than adequate because of oil wealth. In spite of oil revenue there are great deficiencies in services such as health and education.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (35) Kuwaiti policies on foreign investments are so excellent that they now constitute an important national revenue source. Kuwait foreign investments have become so excessive that they represent a danger to waste oil revenues.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

#### VII. ISSUES RELATING TO TERRORISM

- (36) Terrorism in Kuwait is organised and aimed at undermining the regime. Terrorism in Kuwait is not organised to undermine the regime but is a part of international terrorism.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9



(37) The government's refusal to any negotiation with terrorists will weaken their position in Kuwait.

The government's refusal to negotiate or yield to pressure from terrorists encourages and leads to more terrorism.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(38) Restricting entry of certain Arab groups will help prevent terrorism.

Restricting entry of certain Arab groups has no impact on reducing or preventing terrorism.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(39) Security arrangements undertaken in Kuwait are sufficient to prevent terrorism.

Security arrangements undertaken in Kuwait are insufficient to prevent terrorism.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(40) Kuwait is not in need of other Arab States in her fight against terrorism.

Kuwait needs to start arrangements with other Arab States in her fight against terrorism.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(41) To fight terrorism successfully, Kuwait must rely entirely on herself.

To fight terrorism successfully, Kuwait must co-ordinate her efforts with other nations.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

#### VIII. ISSUES RELATING TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARLIAMENT OF KUWAIT

(42) The government need not be obliged to follow the recommendations of the Parliament.

The government must be obliged to follow the directions and recommendations of the Parliament.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(43) Government is more capable of charting national policies and care for public interest than the Parliament.

Parliament is more capable of charting national policies and care for public interest than the government.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(44) The Parliament is so secure that under no circumstances can it be dissolved.

In spite of the Parliament's powers and influence it must be cautious because it is subject to dissolution at any time.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(45) The government does not support certain groups within the Parliament and such policy is non-existent.

The government support to certain groups in Parliament threatens democracy in Kuwait.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (46) The Kuwaiti government believes that certain MPs are creating conflict between Government and Parliament.
- In contrast with the aggressiveness of some MPs, the Kuwaiti government does not believe that certain MPs are creating conflict between Government and Parliament

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

#### IX. ISSUES RELATED TO THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN KUWAIT

- (47) Kuwaiti press is free and it does not face any government censorship.
- In spite of the wide range of freedom to the press, it faces government censorship and state control.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (48) To please officials, newspaper owners restrict news which might cause anger to government officials.
- Kuwaiti journalists never hesitate to publish news which might contradict views.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (49) Because they do not fear authority, journalists write news regardless of government rewards or punishment. Fearing the loss of their jobs and being subject to investigation, no journalist avoids writing anti-government news.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- (50) Because it reflects political groups ideologies, the Kuwaiti press sounds partial and not carrying its social responsibility. Kuwaiti press carries social responsibility and reflects the public interests.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely impor- tant	Don't know	Some- what impor- tant	Impor- tant	Very impor- tant	Extre- mely Impor- tant
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

### APPENDIX III

#### THE GENERAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Please provide the following information which will be used for comparison purposes.

1. What school certificates do you hold?

- Education:
1. Elementary
  2. Preparatory
  3. Secondary
  4. University degree
  5. Post Graduate

2. What is your current occupation?

A. Occupation 1. Official:

1. Secretary
2. Under Secretary
3. Management Director
4. Head of Section
5. Others

B. Occupation 2. Journalist:

1. Head of Organisation
2. Editor-in-Chief
3. Managing Editor
4. Head of Editorial Section
5. Journalist
6. Senior Editor
7. Editor
8. Reporter
9. Correspondent

3. Please indicate your career experience:

- |                      |                  |                  |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------|
| 1. Less than 3 years | 4. 10 - 12 years | 7. 19 - 21 years |
| 2. 4 - 6 years       | 5. 13 - 15 years | 8. 22 - 24 years |
| 3. 7 - 9 years       | 6. 16 - 18 years | 9. 25 and over   |

4. How many newspapers do you read daily?

- |             |        |          |         |
|-------------|--------|----------|---------|
| 1. Only one | 2. Two | 3. Three | 4. Four |
|-------------|--------|----------|---------|

5. What aspects of stories do you favour?

- |                       |                            |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Local News         | 5. Scientific articles     |
| 2. Foreign news       | 6. Social affairs          |
| 3. Political articles | 7. Literature and the Arts |
| 4. Economic articles  | 8. Sport                   |

6. Please indicate to what extent, in your view, journalists endeavour to include their personal convictions in their writings:

1. Personal conviction in ALL.
2. Personal conviction in MOST.
3. Personal conviction in SOME.
4. Personal conviction in FEW.
5. Personal conviction RARELY.
6. Personal conviction NEVER.

7. Please indicate the degree to which the following reasons keep journalists from expressing their personal convictions in writing:

	Extremely important	Very important	Some-what important	Of minor importance	Not important at all
Government censor					
Censure from colleagues					
Restriction from P.Unions					
Not free to choose					
Fear of losing job					
Desire to please readers					

8. Please indicate your position on the following statements?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree
Every problem has a solution in our heritage				
Clinging to old traditions is the way to build a new civilisation				
Many traditions do not suit the demands of new life				

8. (continued)

Modern development will  
not occur unless we  
replace old values with  
new ones

Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree



APPENDIX IV  
THE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Initial contact and interview appointments to be arranged by phone or initial meeting with the subject. During that time:

THE INTERVIEW

- Contact subject and put him or her at ease by talking about matters of common interest, until he/she is ready for the interview (up to 5 minutes).
- Explain to the subject the goal of the interview.
- Thank you very much for allowing one to interview you. The whole interview will take no more than 15 minutes. As I want you to be aware of the whole matter, I am currently studying mass communication at the University of Leicester, Mass Communications Centre. This interview is part of a doctoral thesis.

I am hoping to find out the position taken by persons like you on issues of public concern and how these issues found their way to be part of the Kuwait press content. In other words, I am interested to know which powers instigate those issues and bring them to the press agenda. Is it the press that sets its own agenda, or another power that has the means to influence the media, in particular the press, and has the ability and power to bring those issues to newspapers' content?

My interest, therefore, is to ascertain the overall position taken by all members. But, of course, I can find this only by interviewing one person at a time ... That is why I am interviewing you now; I am interested in

your position on the issues, but your answers will be part of an overall pattern and will not be analysed individually.

As a matter of fact, there is no way of identifying those who have taken part in the interview. I am interested in aggregate information and not in individual answers.

First let me go over the five issues related to Arab Unity. I will cite them and ask you as to where you stand and then I will follow up with some questions to find out which groups or individuals start discussions in such issues and bring it to public concern through Kuwait's newspapers.

The same questions will be asked to investigate the position of the respondents on the following issue categories:

- The conflict between the Arabs (Palestinians) and Israel.
- The Iraqi-Iranian war.
- The Security arrangements in Kuwait.
- The crisis of declining oil prices.
- The distribution of oil revenues.
- Terrorism.
- Relations between the government and the National Assembly of Kuwait.
- Freedom of the press.

Following each category, subjects will be asked the following questions:

1. Now please tell me how these issues become a matter of public concern?

That is, who you suppose are the main instigators of these issues?

\_\_\_\_\_ Officials

\_\_\_\_\_ Journalists

\_\_\_\_\_ Others

2. (Probe) Can you give me an example? \_\_\_\_\_

3. Of these groups, who has the most influence on what appears in the press?

Officials \_\_\_\_\_ Journalists \_\_\_\_\_ Others \_\_\_\_\_

(Probe) Can you give me an example? \_\_\_\_\_

4. Regarding these issues, do you or your colleagues bring it to the attention of the media until it appears in the press?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

5. (Probe) What usually happens? \_\_\_\_\_

Further probing, the subject was asked to determine from his point of view the extent to which he believes the following factors restrict the role of the media and influence the freedom of the journalists to choose and decide the value of news?

(a) Law of Publications:

- explain \_\_\_\_\_

(b) Government censorship:

- explain \_\_\_\_\_

(c) Government annual subsidies:

- explain \_\_\_\_\_

(d) Owner of newspapers' interests

- explain \_\_\_\_\_

(e) Journalists' awareness of losing their job:

- explain \_\_\_\_\_

(f) Officials personal friendships with journalists:

- explain \_\_\_\_\_

(g) Publications Law Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

(h) Government Censorship Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

- explain \_\_\_\_\_

6. Please indicate how often you see or meet members of the following groups (exclude your own groups).

(a) Officials \_\_\_\_\_ (b) Journalists \_\_\_\_\_

(Never / Once in a while / Frequently / During work time)

7. (Probe) Would you give me an example of how and where you see or meet them? \_\_\_\_\_

8. Do you usually discuss publication concerns? \_\_\_\_\_

9. Who do you think has more say on what finally appears in print?

Journalists \_\_\_\_\_ Officials \_\_\_\_\_ Others \_\_\_\_\_ Who \_\_\_\_\_

(choose one)

APPENDIX V  
THE PILOT STUDY CODING FORM

		<u>Card No.</u>
1.	<u>Case No.</u>	1
		2
		3
		4
2.	<u>Newspaper ID</u> - AL-Watan	6
	- AL-Siyasa	7
	- AL-Anba	8
	- AL-Qabas	9
	- AL-Ray AL-Am	10
3.	<u>Date</u> (numeral)	11
		12
		13
		14
4.	<u>Item Location</u> - Front Page	15
	Local Page	16
	Editorial Page	17
5.	<u>Type of Story</u> - 1. News Story	18
	2. Leading Editorial	19
	3. Column	20
	4. Feature	21
	5. Readers' Letters	22
	6. Pictures only	23
	7. Others	24
6.	<u>Source of Item</u> - Local News Agency	25
	Foreign Agency	26
	Reporters or correspondents	27
	Contributors	28
	Others	29
7.	<u>Length of Column per Inch</u> - Less than 10	30
	10 -- 20	31
	21 -- 30	32
	31 -- 40	33
	41 -- 50	34
	51 -- 60	35
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