

**ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
OF THE ROMAN HOUSEHOLD
DURING THE LATE REPUBLIC
AND EARLY PRINCIPATE**

**Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Leicester**

by

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HELEN M. PARKINS

**Aspects of the Economic Organization of the Roman Household
during the Late Republic and Early Principate**

(Ph.D. thesis, University of Leicester, March 1995)

ABSTRACT

This study seeks to put the economic organization of the élite Roman household into its social context. Despite the disdain for trade expressed by Roman writers, social and political competition required the *paterfamilias* to exploit every opportunity for gain, while socio-legal institutions, principally inheritance and dowry, required that, where possible, the household should comprise discrete, easily separated 'enterprises'.

Since urban property typically came in small units (*insulae*, shops, workshops) and generated rents, it met these criteria. Chapters 1-3 investigate how the élite managed urban properties without necessarily being visibly involved; Cicero's 'portfolio' forms one case study. A highly organized urban *familia* was also essential, like those of Cicero, the Statilii, or the Volusii: craftsmen, traders, and agents attached to the household were vital to its success. Using a database, the distribution of *tabernae*, fulleries, and brothels at Pompeii, and their spatial relationship to the houses in which they occur, are analysed.

Owners did not see their rural estates simply as sources of long-term, steady income: they were geared to profit, not merely self-sufficiency, and were not restricted to 'cash crops' (olives and vines): specialized crops yielded high profits. Inheritance and dowry promoted diversification and specialization, largely achieved by using additional forms of labour alongside the *familia rustica*. Chapters 4-6 use the agronomists and archaeology to explore specialized production, relations with markets (particularly the *macellum*), and the organization of the *familia rustica* (especially the *vilicus*).

While the *familia urbana* promoted the owner's ostentation and influence and his chances of receiving gifts, loans, and inheritances, his total household not only generated profits but was largely self-sufficient, reducing his dependency on rivals. Most importantly, he kept a stranglehold on both urban and rural resources, amassing the necessary profits while he remained in the town, the chief social and political arena.

Acknowledgements

This thesis took a number of detours *en route* to its completion; the fact that it is now finished, and is not still wending its way along yet another offbeat path, owes as much to the involvement of others as it does to my own - sometimes reluctant - perseverance.

The British Academy initially put me on track by awarding me a Major State Studentship. A subsequent Academy travel grant supported fieldwork, primarily in Pompeii, which helped provide the both the inspiration and the data for Chapter 2.

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Helen Parkins
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Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and their works follow those recommended in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (2nd edn, ed. N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard; Oxford, 1970: hereinafter referred to as *OCD*). Exceptions, and other abbreviations used in the text, are given below.

Cato, RR	Cato, <i>De agri cultura</i> (<i>De re rustica</i>)
CIL	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> (Berlin, 1876-1974)
Columella, RR	Columella, <i>De re rustica</i>
D.	<i>The Digest of Justinian</i> , ed. A. Watson (4 vols.; Philadelphia, 1985)
Dar.-Sag.	Ch. Daremberg and E. Saglio, <i>Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines d'après les textes et les monuments</i> (1877-1919)
DE	<i>Dizionario epigrafico di antichità romana</i> (Rome, 1886-)
ILS	Dessau, H. (ed.), <i>Inscriptiones Latinae selectae</i> , 3 vols. in 5 (2nd edn; Berlin, 1954-5)
PIR	<i>Prosopographia Imperii Romani</i> (Berlin, 1898)
RE	Wissowa, G., et al., <i>Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> (Stuttgart, 1897-1981)
TLL	<i>Thesaurus Linguae Latinae</i> (Munich)
Varro, RR	Varro, <i>De re rustica</i>

Introduction

'The ancient economy is an academic battleground'. Thus Keith Hopkins, just over ten years ago, at the start of his introduction to a major collection of papers on trade in the ancient economy (Hopkins 1983: 1). He went on to paint a bleak picture of ancient economists locked in mortal combat against one another, with members of differing 'schools' of thought - primitivists, modernists, marxists, and so on - converging on the battleground to defend their colours to the last. It is enough to put off even the most hardy from taking up the subject; yet new troops continue to arrive to take the place of the fallen, and still the battle goes on.

That the picture we are given of the study of the ancient economy is a particularly grim one has little to do with the ferocity of the fighting, but relates instead to what seems to be its ultimate futility. Hopkins himself ponders the underlying causes, the 'point of it all', suggesting that 'professional love of polemic, deep differences in beliefs and values, and irremediable ignorance about the classical world all contribute'.

This 'irremediable ignorance' lies at the heart of all that is contested. The bellicosity of some of those working on the ancient economy reflects not some kind of inherent

mutual dislike, but a shared frustration with the limitations of the extant evidence. Ancient 'economists' do not so much struggle with one another, as struggle to find ways of reconstructing the ancient economy that take sufficient account of both the evidence we do have and the evidence we do not.

Taking account of the non-existent (or as yet undiscovered) evidence is, I suggest, one of the factors that contributes most to the continual scholarly fighting. In order to reconcile extant with non-extant source material, much effort has been devoted to constructing or (dis)proving the validity of models of the ancient economy that provide a conceptual framework for both. Foremost among these, arguably, is Weber's 'consumer city' model (e.g. Weber 1978: 1215), which now has an extensive bibliography of its own.¹ However, it seems that the further we go down the path of model-making, the further away from the evidence we get. By this I mean, principally, that the sometimes rather anachronistic terms in which the ancient economy is discussed - urban and rural demand, import and export markets, production and consumption, and so forth - seem to bear little or no resemblance to the interests and concerns of the extant literary sources in particular.

¹ The bibliography on the 'consumer city' is now so huge as to prevent it being listed in full here. I offer a few of the more recent and notable contributions: Moeller (1976); Finley (1977/1981); Leveau (1983a; 1983b; ed. 1985); Bruhns (1987-9); Jongman (1988); Engels (1990); and Whittaker (1990; 1995). The two works of Whittaker give more comprehensive bibliographies.

In other words, there is a tendency in modern scholarship to abstract activity from its social context: there is little engagement with the level at which these activities occurred, and little real exploration of the relationships within which they took place. In order to confirm or refute the validity of the 'consumer city' model, for example, scholars have tried to ascertain the level of production and consumption of certain types of goods within the Roman city. What they have not done, on the whole, is to address the more important question of how, in terms of economic organization, the élite were able to dominate financially, and therefore socially and politically. The 'consumer city' model itself does not explain anything in this respect: the question of how trade was managed, organized, and delegated in practice therefore goes largely unanswered.

This work started life not as a diatribe against modern work on the ancient economy,² but a study of *tabernae*. From there it began to extend to élite involvement in small-scale trade, and more generally to urban property. At the same time I was made increasingly aware of the dangers of entering the ancient economic battlefield. Nevertheless, my work largely circumvents that battlefield (although it implicitly confronts the validity of the 'consumer city'

² Indeed, this introduction itself is not intended to be a diatribe, but rather an exploration of why modelling ancient economic behaviour seems peculiarly fraught with contention. It remains the case the models of the ancient economy continue to help illuminate those areas of activity that have remained elusive in the sources.

model), since it seemed that for the area of the 'economy' in which I was most interested there was ample evidence for the Romans' own conception of economic organization. Moreover, it became apparent through studying the élite use of urban property that underlying household economic strategies were discernible in the extant source material, and that it might be possible to begin to reconstruct other areas of economic activity from precisely this level (as represented in the sources): the household.

That this work is entitled 'Aspects of . . .' reflects the need to keep a study of the household within manageable limits. One of the first points to emerge from the initial chapter, on urban property, was that rather than depending for their income, as orthodox belief would have it, on large-scale economic activity - agriculture, shipping, and so forth - the élite actively pursued and exploited every smallest possible opportunity for financial gain. This was achieved partly by discreet household management and partly by a high degree of specialization and diversification. It is these specific types of organization with which this work is predominately concerned. That is not so say, as will become clear, that large-scale economic activity was not also important to the success of the household. But these are areas that are well covered in the secondary literature; I wanted to turn attention towards some of those aspects (I make no pretence of exhaustiveness) that were not normally considered, but seemed to me to be well

documented in the sources, and which need both explaining and incorporating in our accounts of the Roman 'economy'.

Since, according to my main argument, the *élite* pursued sources of income other than large-scale trade, this work in part tackles the problem of reconciling their involvement in small-scale interests with the prevailing moral rhetoric of the period, which explicitly shuns this kind of behaviour. This is a problem raised recently by Wallace-Hadrill (1991), who attempts to provide some answers; parts of this work venture to offer additional explanations based on a wider exploration of Roman economic behaviour.

Above all, however, it is the aim of this work to reconstruct elements of the organization of the *élite* Roman household through the sources, and in so doing to provide a way of looking at the economy that works 'from the bottom up' rather than 'from the top down'. The household, it is argued here, is an important component, a kind of building block, in the 'economy': it is also the locus of *élite* domination of economic, social, cultural, and political life.

THE SCOPE OF THE WORK

I chose initially to focus on the households of the Roman *élite* largely because it is they for whom we possess both the greatest quantity and the greatest range of evidence. I take 'élite' in a broad sense to mean those occupying the top social and political strata of Roman society, but it is

also principally a form of shorthand intended to cover senators, equites, members of a local *ordo*, and so forth. Similarly, for some stages of my argument I have needed to emphasize the differences between elite households and the households of others. Doing this has sometimes had the effect of creating a dichotomy between rich and poor, as though there were no social groups in between. To a considerable degree this dichotomy is the product of the extant source evidence: for much of the time the sources tell us only about the very highest and lowest levels of society. It does not mean that I am unaware that there will have been many layers between these two ends of the social spectrum; it is simply in the nature of the main subject of this work - the elite - that this dichotomy is perpetuated. To try to shed light on all the intervening variations would entail a much larger study than is possible here.

The chronological scope of the work extends mainly from the late Republic to the early principate. Again, this has been dictated primarily by the nature of the relevant source material, particularly that which relates to the urban parts of this study. That is the period for which there is a particularly wide range of relevant literary, epigraphic, archaeological, and legal evidence, much of it directly interrelated. Starting in the late Republic permits the inclusion of Cicero's letters, which for reasons discussed more fully in Chapter 1 are especially valuable for studying the use of urban property. Those used here date from 68 BC onwards (until 43 BC). The

chronological endpoint of the study is also determined by certain key evidence: the *columbaria* inscriptions, which are central to Chapter 3 (on the urban *familia*) and to a lesser extent Chapter 1, date only from the late Republic to approximately AD 90. Pompeii, the main source of archaeological evidence for Chapter 2, 'ends' in AD 79. The agronomic texts, which are crucial to all the chapters that deal with the rural aspects of the household (Chapters 4, 5, and 6), begin with Cato's work, written around 160 BC, and are completed by Columella's *De re rustica*, which dates from c. AD 60.

Thus most of the arguments relate to a period from around 100 BC to AD 100; the fact that I have chosen to refer to this period in broader terms simply reflects the fact that there is no single 'cut-off' date. In addition, I have inevitably, if only occasionally, strayed outside those parameters when it has proved helpful to my argument to do so. I have also made use (in Chapter 6) of comparative evidence - most of which dates from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries - to illuminate or to 'model' arguments that cannot be illustrated adequately from the ancient sources.

I have taken Roman Italy as my geographical area of enquiry, chiefly because the economic interests of those élite households for which we have most evidence are firmly concentrated and most amply documented in Italy. In practice Rome and Pompeii tend to dominate my argument, particularly in the chapters that have an urban focus. By

far the majority of the literary sources emanate from Rome, and it is Rome that provides the greatest number of urban inscriptions. While the non-monumental remains of the city are limited (see Patterson 1992), they can be partially reconstructed from the inscriptions; the Severan Marble Plan also gives some indication as to the layout of Rome in this period. Pompeii, by contrast, receives little mention in the literary sources, and does not have many inscriptions that are relevant to this study. However, the extent and nature of its urban remains is unparalleled not only in Italy, but arguably elsewhere in the Roman empire.

For the remaining chapters (on rural aspects of the household) I have used evidence from throughout Italy, but the nature of the source material (and in particular, the extent - to date - of field survey and villa excavations), has again meant that some areas tend to dominate the discussion. The area just to the north of Rome, especially South Etruria, is one example, and the villas around Pompeii provide another focus of attention. I make no attempt at comprehensive coverage of all the possible relevant evidence in Roman Italy; this would have entailed a study far beyond the scope of this work. At the same time, however, I am aware that this has sometimes resulted in drawing together evidence from areas that are very different in their geographical situations and, in so doing, apparently overlooking those differences. Again, to take special account of individual cases would have made this study overly cumbersome; in my defence I would argue

that I have tried to use this type of evidence to illuminate a large picture and that, where I have done so, that picture would not be altered significantly by the inclusion of specific geographical discussion.

PREVIOUS WORK

As already noted, there has been very little previous work on the economic organization of the Roman household. Aspects I have attempted to draw together in this work have in the past only been discussed separately or in isolation from one another.

The main study of Roman property remains a volume of papers edited by Moses Finley nearly twenty years ago (Finley 1976). Only three of these papers discuss urban property in much detail (see papers by Garnsey, Rawson, and Finley), and only Garnsey makes it the chief focus of his paper. Treggiari's study (1979a) of Roman property focuses on the place of sentiment in élite attitudes to their estates. Bruce Frier's work (1977; 1980) on rental property in Rome is important principally for its detailed discussion of legal aspects of tenancy.

The *familia urbana*, and urban labour more generally, have been the subject of many specialist discussions, too numerous to mention in detail here. Again, these do not include considerations of the economic aspect of the *familia*, but instead take as their focal point family relationships within the *familia* and especially those of slaves. Most recent and notable among these are those of

Treggiari (1975a; 1975b) and Flory (1975). On urban labour more generally, Huttunen (1974), Treggiari (1979; 1980), and Joshel (1992) have in recent years attempted to explore labour, status, and jobs via study of the 'occupational' inscriptions in Rome (principally those in *CTL* volume 6). These are essentially surveys of the relevant inscriptions; while they have shed some light on the relationship between some job titles and the status of the job holder (slave, freedman, or freeborn), none has specifically related its findings to the organization of labour from the household.

On rural property, and more generally the organization of the rural estate, there is an enormous bibliography of recent scholarship. This can be subdivided into specific subject areas: for example, there are specialist studies of Roman farming techniques, farming equipment, and the staff of the *familia rustica*. There has also been some emphasis on quantitative information, such as the size of landholdings, land values, and production (particularly of wine and olive oil). Considerable space has also been given to discussing the viability of alternatives to the labour of the *familia*, such as tenants, sharecroppers, and neighbouring free smallholders. All these studies are now increasingly taking into account the findings of field surveys from across the Roman empire, and of villa excavations. Again, however, the majority of these studies have not attempted to relate what we know of the rural household to other aspects of household organization.

THE STRUCTURE

As much by coincidence as by initial design, this work falls into two halves, each of three chapters. The first half deals with the urban aspects of the household, the second with the rural.

Chapter 1 examines the use of urban property by the élite, and argues for the importance of certain social and legal institutions for determining élite use of this kind of property. It also sets out some of the themes and arguments that underlie the thesis as a whole. In particular, it suggests that these social and legal institutions had far-reaching implications for the economic strategies of the élite household more generally; the exploration of these strategies is the aim of subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2 immediately picks up some of the arguments of Chapter 1 and aims to provide further corroboration for some of the suggestions made there. The main focus is on the urban archaeological evidence of Pompeii, which forms the basis for a database of *tabernae* in the town. This is used to shed light on the extent and use of rental property, and on possible élite attitudes to small-scale trade.

Chapter 3 then discusses the possible ways in which the élite were able to run their urban property without being visibly involved themselves. It also re-examines previous arguments which hold that by far the greater proportion of the *familia urbana* was intended to emphasize the owner's

status, and argues for the importance of craftsmen, traders, and agents attached to the *familia* and contributing to the economic well-being of the owner's household.

Attention is turned in Chapter 4 to those aspects of rural property ownership and estate organization which serve to underline some of the élite economic strategies highlighted in Chapter 1, and in so doing this chapter starts to outline the ways in which rural and urban parts of the household should be regarded as a continuum of economic interests.

Chapter 5 extends this theme by looking at how some specialized forms of production on the rural estate were aimed at satisfying the demand of the town and, in particular, of a wealthy urban clientele. These kinds of production also supplied the urban part of the élite household.

Finally, Chapter 6 concentrates more specifically on how the estate was managed through the *familia rustica*, and especially on how the élite landowner was able to keep a firm grasp on economic resources in and around the estate, and even in the town.

A concluding section briefly draws together and highlights some of the main themes in the work as a whole.

Chapter 1

Urban Property and Economic Strategies

The function of urban property in Roman society is a subject that has received relatively little attention in recent scholarship. A key reason for this, it has been suggested, may lie in the nature of the extant sources, for although urban investment was of concern only to the richer members of society, and 'Although the ancient sources overwhelmingly reflect, and normally emanate from, the same upper strata of the population, their indifference [to the matters this book is concerned with] is shattering' (Finley 1976: 2). The lack of apparent interest in urban investment implied by our sources may thus go some way to explain a similar indifference in modern scholarship. Although we are faced with apparently abundant and varied evidence - archaeological, epigraphic, legal, and literary - we can, for the most part, reconstruct Roman use of urban property only from incidental and anecdotal references that are also geographically 'bunched' (Finley 1976: 4). Nevertheless, the evidence need not take us down a dead-end: with due caution, it is in fact possible to make some well-founded

observations about the relevance of urban property to individuals such as Cicero.¹

We have, however, to ask the right kinds of questions of our sources.² To take the best-documented example, we know that Cicero invested extensively in urban holdings, both for his personal use and for 'speculation'. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the Roman élite liked to purchase town houses for their own personal use (Frier 1980: 24), and that to do so was perfectly normal. There is scarcely less evidence for élite 'speculation' in urban property. The question that arises is why and how someone like Cicero chose to invest in urban property, given the Romans' expressed preference for investment in agricultural land.

IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE

That the Roman élite invested in urban property is beyond doubt. But if there is some uncertainty as to the extent to which they did so, it is due largely to the marked distaste articulated in the extant literary sources for investing in anything other than land. If we were to judge by the literature, we might reasonably expect only limited urban investment by the élite, yet the available evidence indicates otherwise. Given the apparent discrepancy between

¹ Garnsey and Rawson, in Finley (1976). Garnsey, however, discusses urban investment mainly with a view to speculation or urban rents. Investment in 'industry' is for the most part ignored.

² Finley (1973: 118-19).

the attitudes expressed in the literary sources and actual practice, it is necessary first to understand why this was the case, before going on to assess the particular role of urban property in Roman economic rationality.

It is sometimes thought unlikely that the Roman élite would choose to invest in urban property, on the grounds that it was a high-risk operation. It was financially risky on a number of counts: if the owner did not invest in the upkeep of the property - either because he could not afford to do so or because it meant more profit - then he ran the risk of his property collapsing; alternatively, the safety of one's own property might be placed in jeopardy by neighbouring, badly maintained properties, making them particularly vulnerable if fire were to break out; one also ran the risk of defaulting tenants, or even bad middlemen. All these possibilities might wipe out one's profit and one's investment at a stroke.

On the other hand, such risks could be rationalized against the possibility of substantial financial gain. No doubt, if one could always find tenants, there was little incentive to maintain a tenement properly; Juvenal (*Satires*, 3. 165)³ hints that finding tenants to fill

³ It is worth noting that Juvenal goes on to mention (*Satires*, 3. 166) that as well as having to find money to pay the rent, plenty of money was also necessary to feed one's slaves. It is therefore questionable how wretched the lodgings are that he has in mind, or whether in fact he is adopting the persona of a grumbling member of the senatorial order; the context is partly one of moaning about social competition. It was certainly not uncommon for the senatorial orders to rent urban property for their personal use: see Frier (1980: 41-7) for sources and

wretched lodgings⁴ was not difficult, such was the demand. That demand meant that rents could be high in relative terms. Thus, although short-term profits might be spectacular, they were never guaranteed. Modern doubts over the attraction of urban property to the Roman élite are no doubt fuelled by apocryphal tales in the sources, and by the concern expressed by people such as Cato and Cicero (Pavis D'Escurac 1977: 343-4). The thought that urban investment was risky probably derives largely from Aulus Gellius (NA 15. 1. 1-3), in which the sight of an *insula* on fire provokes a discussion amongst Antonius Julianus and his friends about the high returns, but also about the correspondingly high risks, of urban investment.⁵ This anecdote does not, of course, stand alone as far as highlighting the risks of urban investment is concerned: the dangers of collapsing tenements, together with the fire risk that they posed, were widely recognized. Part of Juvenal's urban nightmare includes the dangers posed by poorly constructed (or badly maintained) *insulae*:

nos urbem colimus tenui tibicine fultam
 magna parte sui; nam sic labentibus obstat
 vilicus et, veteris rimae cum texit hiatus,
 securos pendente iubet dormire ruina.
 vivendum est illic ubi nulla incendia, nulli
 nocte metus . . .

commentary.

⁴ On living conditions generally, see especially Yavetz (1958) and Scobie (1986).

⁵ Discussed more fully by Frier (1980: 21-2).

(But here we inhabit a city supported for the most part by slender props: for that is how the bailiff holds up the tottering house, patches up gaping cracks in the old wall, bidding inmates sleep at their ease under a roof ready to tumble about their ears. No, no, I must live where there are no fires, no nightly alarms.)

(*Satires*, 3. 193-8; Loeb translation)

Building regulations designed to prevent both fire and collapse seem to have been a continual preoccupation, perhaps especially during the early principate.⁶ The constant enactment of new legislation, or the re-enactment of old laws, during this period is itself testimony to the problem, and also the difficulty of finding an effective remedy. Fire continued to be a hazard of urban life despite the efforts of the early emperors: clearly, the possibility of fire was still a real threat by the time Aulus Gellius was writing, and even in the time of Herodian (7. 12. 5-7).

It might be thought that having a number of urban properties would entail a fair amount of risk for the owner. But diversity actually made for security, reducing as it did the risk of complete household failure or bankruptcy. In a diverse household the loss of, say, one shop due to fire need not have meant financial ruin. In this respect, therefore, it is unlikely that, as is sometimes suggested, urban investment was high-risk. On its

⁶ For building regulations in the sources see Robinson (1992: 34-8 and, on the prevalence of fires and the organization of firefighting, 105-10).

own, perhaps, and in comparison to investing in land, urban investment was probably more risky. But if seen in the context of an economic portfolio that included - like Cicero's - enterprises both in the town and in the country, then the risk involved in urban investment was effectively limited; in any case, for the very rich the risk was undoubtedly worth taking, and could be coped with. We should not forget, either, that rural land was not wholly immune from disaster (*D.* 19. 2. 15. 2-5, 7), and, as has been suggested, it could be the case that urban property was regarded as a kind of insurance against such a possibility - reinforcing the idea that a 'balanced portfolio' was in fact the ideal. That we do not have much direct evidence for urban investment by the élite may be for a number of reasons: the very extent and diversity of property investment makes it difficult for us to reconstruct most senators' holdings: that diversity in itself may have been desirable for the sake of appearances - for reasons of social mores it may not have been desirable to 'advertise' one's urban investments. Again, it must be stressed that diversity of this kind was simply not an option for those lower down the social and economic scale.

The usual starting-point for such a discussion of Roman economic behaviour is a passage taken from Cicero's *De officiis*. The attitudes voiced in this passage (1. 150-1) are well known: agriculture is lauded as being the only

respectable living for a gentleman,⁷ whereas any involvement with *mercatura* (by implication, in this context, urban) is held to be the mark of vulgarity: *mercatura autem, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est.*⁸ Those who are in the business of profiteering, who buy from wholesalers to retail immediately, are considered vulgar since 'they would get no profits without a great deal of downright lying' (*nihil enim proficiant, nisi admodum mentiantur*).

Garnsey (1976: 127) argues that there may be two main reasons why urban property has been largely neglected in modern scholarship. The first is that, on the basis of rhetoric like Cicero's, there is 'a reluctance . . . to concede that the typical Roman aristocrat regarded the activity of rentier as respectable'. The second is that modern scholarship misrepresents Roman leasing practices so that urban leasing (particularly by Atticus) has been regarded as speculation, 'the characteristic activity of the capitalist, whose outlook is branded as unmistakably plebeian', that which Cicero despises. In addition, urban leasing has been taken to equate to direct involvement in

⁷ Off. 1. 151: *Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius* ('Of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a free man').

⁸ Off. 1. 151: 'Trade, if it is on a small scale, is to be considered vulgar'. See also Seneca, *Ep.* 88. 21, who, although not referring to *mercatura*, regards *opifices* - precisely those likely to be involved in small-scale trade - as *volgares*.

the kinds of trades to which Cicero objects, since urban properties could include shops, workshops, and warehouses.

This belief runs alongside one seen in the literature, the belief in the moral superiority of the countryside over the city. The shunning of petty trade (and the town) in favour of the countryside is a familiar theme in Roman literature; town and country are often 'played off' against one another to illustrate their moral opposition (Ramage 1973; MacMullen 1974: 28 ff.; Braund 1989; Wallace-Hadrill 1991). The predominance of this *topos*, rather abruptly dismissed by Garnsey,⁹ is, I suspect, no less significant in modern conceptions of Roman urban investment.

Recently Wallace-Hadrill has discussed some of the distinctions to be made between ideology and practice. Referring to the *De officiis*, he makes the following observation:

It is no surprise that Cicero and his contemporaries regarded the trades of fishmonger or slavedealer as sordid. But this did not prevent them from making use of their services, or even necessarily from deriving profit from them. . . . To look down on an activity is by no means to shun it . . .

⁹ Of *Off.* 1. 150-1, for example, Garnsey writes, 'Such passages must be recognized for what they are, statements of an antiquated value-system with only limited relevance to contemporary economic behaviour' (1976: 127). A more constructive approach to the kinds of passages in question is to be found in Wallace-Hadrill (1991).

To the élite it was important, nevertheless, that where involvement in trade was concerned they were not seen to be 'transgressing the line of etiquette, or not without incurring the reproach of their peers' (Wallace-Hadrill 1991: 245; cf. Pavis D'Escurac 1977). Wallace-Hadrill, however, fails to emphasize fully that the paramount consideration was therefore to avoid *direct* (or visible) connection with trade, or, to put it in Ciceronian terms, to be seen to be servile: that is, working for others. In an urban context this was particularly vital: since the town was the centre of political and social power, it was also the last place in which anyone hoping for political office should be seen to be involved in a demeaning occupation. On the other hand, as Wallace-Hadrill points out, there was nothing in the élite's ideology to stop them from owning the means of profit. 'The means' could, in theory, include revenue-earning urban property, such as shops and workshops, or houses and apartments. These might be rented out or, in the case of shops and workshops, worked by the owner's own slaves or freedmen, with at least some of the income going directly to the owner. Both alternatives - leasing the property, and putting it to direct productive use - allowed the owner the option of being engaged (albeit indirectly) in 'mean trades' without having to reveal any outward sign of involvement.

The ideological obstacle that still impedes modern acceptance of the significance of urban property is the issue of whether it amounted to speculation, and hence

'profiteering'. This obstacle is effectively removed by Garnsey, who points to a further passage in Cicero's *De officiis* (2. 88) as evidence that the Romans themselves did not regard urban investment as mere speculation. Instead,

the choice between urban and rural rents, *vectigalia*, is put on the same level as that between *gloria* and *divitiae*, or *bona valetudo* and *voluptas*, or *vires* and *celeritas*.

(Garnsey 1976: 127)

This kind of argument is taken one stage further by Wallace-Hadrill. Having accounted for élite involvement in trade by showing how it was possible for there to be no conflict with the dominant ideology, Wallace-Hadrill (1991: 249-50) goes on to explain élite contact with trade and traders in terms of social and political necessity. Traders, he argues, were simultaneously a source of revenue (renting élite-owned shops or warehouses, or, if they were freedmen, working a shop with income accruing directly to their patrons) and of social position (providing visible, even high-profile, electoral support). We might infer, therefore, that the ideology of *Off.* 2. 88 accommodated Roman practice and the actual needs, financial and otherwise, of the élite.

Still largely unexplained, however, is the extent of urban investment by individuals such as Cicero. Contact with traders may have been unavoidable for members of the urban élite, but it would seem that urban investment *per se*

was not by any means an *inevitable* consequence of that contact. There may have been social and political motives behind urban investment, as Wallace-Hadrill shows, but there must surely have been 'economic' reasons too. A study of urban property is thus a good 'test' of Roman ideology against practice (D'Arms 1981: esp. ch. 2).

SUBSISTENCE OR OTHER RATIONALITIES?

Without doubt, Finley's *The Ancient Economy* continues to be the most influential study of ancient economic thought. One of the basic premises underlying Finley's model is that both large and small households were organized along the same lines, and that there was no distinction 'between economic or personal or social behaviour'. In his analysis, both types of household therefore showed no overt signs of economic behaviour, and both were geared simply to subsistence. This subsistence principle clearly underlies, too, Finley's larger 'primitivist' thesis: in his opinion it was the principle of subsistence that prevented the development of an 'economy' in the modern sense, for once the immediate needs of the household had been met there was simply no need for further production. As a consequence, according to Finley, the ancients lacked the capacity for economic rationalization.

In discussing the *élite*, we are dealing with the heads of what were probably households of above average size. There is, unfortunately, no reliable way of gauging the size of any individual Roman household (although see Chapter 3);

even those that are relatively well documented (such as that of Cicero, or those of members of the imperial family) cannot provide reliable absolute figures. It can, however, be suggested with reasonable certainty that while the wealthy household may not necessarily have differed greatly from a less wealthy one in its number of kin members, the crucial difference lay in the presence and number of its non-kin members (i.e. slaves and freedmen), who may well have outnumbered the kin. (Shatzman (1975: 407), for example, counts twenty-five slaves in Cicero's immediate *familia* - a number that surely exceeded that of the kin members.)¹⁰ Potentially, therefore, the large-scale ownership, and consequently maintenance, of slaves and freedmen by wealthy households might constitute one reason to doubt Finley's argument that large and small households were organized along the same 'economic' lines.

But there is another problem in Finley's methodology. It has recently been argued that, with regard to the Greek household, and *contra* Finley, an 'economic rationality' was indeed at work (Foxhall 1990). It is bound up with social and political activity, but contrary to Finley (and, to some extent, Wallace-Hadrill (1991), it is not the *same* as those activities (Foxhall 1990: ch. 2). We are reminded of a similar case, made by Frederiksen and cited by D'Arms

¹⁰ Shatzman (1975: 407) also points out that, as the owner of over twenty houses and estates, Cicero probably owned a total of around a hundred 'domestics'. Garland (1992), meanwhile, argues that Cicero's *familia* was not particularly large for a man of his social rank, and may even have been smaller than the norm.

(1981: 16) with reference to the organization of Roman seaborne commerce:

in the final reckoning, we may submit that the status-based model [of Finley] is not wholly false, but it is not a substitute for economic history.

Foxhall has convincingly shown the principle of subsistence, at least in its application to Greek élite households, to be mistaken. Large-scale, wealthy households were always in competition with one another, not only trying to maintain their status but also vying with one another socially and politically in order to improve that status. Concerns such as these entailed a need to get ahead in economic terms, and to produce (and consume) surpluses well above subsistence, or survival, level. They also entailed, therefore, an 'economic rationality', even if that rationality was expressed in a different way from our own.

This theory is based on a variety of source material concerned with the economic activities of the Greek household. The extensive evidence for Roman social competition makes it possible to assess whether the same model offers an explanation for Roman behaviour, and in particular, Roman investment strategies.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL COMPETITION

For the larger Roman household, Finley's subsistence model simply cannot be maintained. The literary sources, and especially the works of Cicero, demonstrate most vividly the extent to which Roman households were bound up with social competition: it was essential to, as it were, 'keep up with the Joneses',¹¹ and it was preferable to get ahead of them. Expressing and articulating one's social status to others was all-important, at least, if one had social status to maintain, so it was inevitable that an élite household would be in constant competition with others of a similar rank. The need to keep up with one's social equals (let alone get ahead of them, or, by a similar token, keep ahead of one's inferiors) acted as a powerful incitement to consume lavishly and conspicuously. A famous illustration of peer pressure is given in Cicero's *De legibus*, 3. 30, in which he reports Lucullus's defence of his decision to build a luxury villa. Lucullus supposedly put forward the argument that both his neighbours had luxury villas; the problem, as he saw it, was that his neighbours - one a freedman, the other an *eques* - were of inferior social rank to himself. Lucullus was of the opinion that he, as a top general, should at least have the right to keep up with his neighbours. But perhaps the crucial point is that his villa had to be *better* than those

¹¹ Daube (1969) opts for a socially superior description of this problem by way of analogous reference to the habits of Oxford dons.

of his neighbours: he had to preserve superiority over his 'inferiors' and to get ahead of his peers. It can thus be seen that, helped by social competition, the demands of the household went way above simply that of subsistence.

Social competition was, of course, tightly bound up with political competition. A political career depended heavily upon social influence, and on stealing a march over rivals. Furthermore, this need increased commensurately with increased social standing; the higher one rose in civic life, the greater the social and economic obligations became.¹² (Widespread and large-scale economic obligations contributed to the distinctiveness of the senatorial order; perversely, those obligations could also put this group more in danger of debt and financial ruin than the poorer sections of the populace.) Social influence could partly be garnered, as is well documented, by making direct payments, and by providing loans and services; but the display of financial largesse and well-being also helped to make an impression, such as paying for civic buildings or for their repair, financing shows, buying grand residences, erecting private monuments,¹³ and so on.¹⁴ All these could add up to

¹² The economic pressure involved in rising up the social ranks is noted by Rawson (1976: 85). In her view, there was a direct correlation between social standing and a need to maximize one's financial resources.

¹³ Such as the *fanum* Cicero had built in memory of his deceased daughter, Tullia. On Tullia's *fanum*, see Att. 12. 12; 12. 18; 12. 19; 12. 23; 12. 35; 12. 36; 12. 37; 12. 38a; *Phil.* 9. 15.

¹⁴ On senatorial expenditure, see e.g. Shatzman (1975: ch. 4).

make a substantial claim on one's financial resources (Frederiksen 1966).

Competitive pressure is further reflected in the sumptuary legislation of the late Republic (including senatorial decrees and censorial edicts) and the early empire (imperial edicts). This took the form of measures to restrict both individual display and, interestingly, the consumption levels of individual households (*luxus mensae*).¹⁵ Thus, for example, the *luxus mensae* included in the *leges Corneliae* of 81 BC restricted table expenditure to 300 HS on special days (kalends, nones, *nundinae*, and ides), but only 30 HS on all others.¹⁶ While some laws in this period (c.100 BC-AD 50) were aimed specifically at restricting expenditure by electoral candidates,¹⁷ others had more general targets such as women.¹⁸ Broadly speaking, however, sumptuary laws (*leges sumptuariae*) enacted during this period were designed to put a brake on the extremes of ostentatious expenditure and to prevent the aristocracy from bankrupting themselves in the attempt to compete with

¹⁵ For the difficulties created by the *luxus mensae* and sumptuary laws generally, see *Fam.* 7. 26; 9. 15; 9. 19; 9. 20; 9. 23; 9. 24; 9. 26; *Att.* 13. 7; 13. 52.

¹⁶ This was not untypical; the *lex Licinia* (161 BC) limited expenditure to 30 *aeris* on kalends, nones, *nundinae*, and ides, to perhaps 10 *aeris* on all other days except wedding-days (200 *aeris*). For the *lex Iulia* (18 BC) the limits were 300, 200, and 1,000 HS respectively.

¹⁷ The *lex Antia* of 71 BC restricted dining out (aimed at magistrates and magistrates-elect); the *lex Tullia* (63 BC) put limits on gladiatorial shows held by electoral candidates.

¹⁸ In 49-46 BC the *leges Iuliae* restricted the wearing of scarlet robes and pearls by women; they also restricted the use of litters.

one another in this way.¹⁹ The restrictions also carried with them the aim of stopping any one individual or family from 'winning' the (political) competition and permanently carrying off the trophy (as did eventually happen with the establishment of the principate).²⁰ In effect, this was legislation enacted by the élite for both the maintenance and the protection of their own social group (Crawford 1992: 75-6, following Daube 1969: 117-28).

This kind of behaviour is, as Foxhall argues (1990: esp. ch. 2), in marked contrast to that of the peasant alongside whom, in terms of economic strategy, Finley places the élite. The peasant strategy, however, was and still is to concentrate simply on feeding the family unit in order to survive (e.g. Wolf 1966; Gallant 1992). Typically, a peasant farmer might concentrate on growing staples in order to meet the needs of the family. If at any time there was a surplus then this might well be sold (though this was only one option among several), but the proceeds were equally likely to be kept in reserve in anticipation of worse times ahead.

The *paterfamilias* of the richer household, by contrast, was obviously not concerned simply to meet subsistence

¹⁹ Daube (1969: 117 ff.) sees sumptuary legislation as acting to protect the 'non-tipper': 'the then prevailing strict notions of *officium*, of what was owing to one's friends and retainers, the problem of pressure was . . . so serious that it could not be left to convention.'

²⁰ The effectiveness of sumptuary legislation may, however, be doubted. Athenaeus (6. 274), on the subject of an earlier sumptuary law, the *lex Fannia* (161 bc), suggests that only a small minority strictly observed the restrictions.

needs, as Finley would have us believe. In order to get ahead of similar households it was vital to exploit as many opportunities for enrichment as possible (leading, hopefully, to improved status). To this end, it was not sufficient solely to invest in land: land might not always be available, and in any case financial gains from agricultural produce could not be relied upon from year to year to sustain consumption needs. In the case of Cicero and others of similar social and political rank, the necessity of exploiting any available opportunity for potential profit resulted in a branching out of the household and its economic interests. Not only did someone of Cicero's status have to keep up with his peers in terms of conspicuous consumption, but another aspect of that competition meant accumulating friends, clients, and dependants, some of whom might need financial help from time to time. In short, the élite were forced to look to income from a source other than land. One of those sources was the town.²¹

A PROPERTY 'PORTFOLIO': AN OVERVIEW

To discuss a Roman property 'portfolio' is to give the misleading impression that complete records of individual holdings exist. The reality is, of course, that there are no such records. We have the writings of a mere handful of individuals on which to base a discussion of Roman

²¹ Other options included investment in seaborne commerce; see, in particular, D'Arms (1981).

property; the task is magnified when we realize that the most prolific of these in terms of literary output - Cicero - discusses his property only incidentally. We cannot be sure, therefore, that anything more than a partial record survives of the extent and diversity even of Cicero's holdings. An additional problem, all too often overlooked, is that some of the information relating to the use of (and, where relevant, income from) his properties derives only from letters written towards the end of his life. Trying to reconstruct earlier years - particularly those when he was most politically active, c.60 BC onwards - is thus problematic. Nevertheless, since Cicero's letters provide almost the only sequential account we have of property ownership, maintenance, and management, what follows is a discussion based largely on his writings. It is not suggested here that his case is necessarily 'typical' of the Roman élite (although Frier (1980: 23) argues that his property holdings were 'perhaps typical'); but as a member of the senatorial order, it can at least be argued that he is broadly representative of their concerns and interests.²²

Cicero's properties were not as numerous as might be anticipated from reading his letters. As well as the

²² Moreover, since it is with Cicero's own idealized comments (*Off.* 1. 150-1) - which, incidentally, also date from his later years - that discussions on Roman attitudes to towns and trades tend to start, it is perhaps appropriate that his own behaviour should be examined so as to inform our understanding of the discrepancies between ideology and actual practice.

properties he secured, Cicero was also interested in a number of properties that - judging by his subsequent failure to mention them in his letters - he never seems to have actually acquired.²³ Rawson, for example, says of the letters that 'we get an impression of the Roman upper class . . . feverishly engaged in property deals' (1976: 85). To a certain degree, as Rawson herself acknowledges, this impression of frenetic property-dealing is the result of, and a reflection of, the particular social and political turbulence of the late Republic (see generally Shatzman 1975). Confiscation of holdings, arising from both conscriptions and prosecutions, added sporadically to the property 'market', causing concomitant flurries of activity from those who, like Cicero, were hunting for acquisitions that might boost their political and social standing. From time to time he was also concerned to help his brother by buying property on his behalf. The interest he showed in all possible deals, whether for himself or on behalf of others, is manifested in his letters by his concern to see the property in question or to start raising the funds necessary to secure its purchase, and adds notably to the impression of constant activity.

Cicero's properties, like those of the majority of senators during the late Republic (Shatzman 1975), were both urban and rural. At various times his 'portfolio'

²³ He considered buying property at Puteoli (*Att.* 7. 3. 9; 14. 45. 3; *Fin.* 2. 84), apparently with a view to profiteering; and also at Naples (*Fam.* 9. 15; 1. 6. 1).




FIG. 1. Map of southern Italy, showing Cicero's properties (adapted from Shackleton Bailey 1965-70, vi: map at end of volume).

TYPE	PLACE	U/R	R-E	DATE	DETAILS
HOUSE	CARINAE	U	N	68-62	INHERITANCE
HOUSE	PALATINE	U	N	62-43	PURCHASE
INSULAE	AVENTINE	U	Y	79-46	DOWRY
INSULAE	ARGILETUM	U	Y	79-46	DOWRY
PT. INSULA	ROME	U	Y?	44-43	INHERITANCE
INSULAE	?ROME /PUTEOLI	U	Y	45-43	INHERITANCE
ESTATE	ARPINUM	R	PART	68-43	INHERITANCE
ESTATE	TUSCULUM	R	PART	68-43	PURCHASE
ESTATE	TUSCULUM	R	?	56- ?43	PURCHASE
ESTATE	FORMIAE	R	?	67-43	?
HOUSE	ANTIUM	? (U)	?N	60-45	?
ESTATE	POMPEII	?R	PART	60-43	?
ESTATE	CUMAE	?R	PART	56-43	?
ESTATE	ALBA	?R	N	50- ?43	?
ESTATE	ASTURA	R	?N	45-43	?
ESTATE	PUTEOLI	R	?PART	45-43	?
FUNDUS	FRUSINO	R	?	?49	?
DEVERSORIA	LANUVIUM	?	?	45-43	?
DEVERSORIA	ANAGNIA	?	?	46-43	PURCHASE
DEVERSORIA	SINUSSA	?	?	44-43	?
DEVERSORIA	MINTURNAE	?	?	51-43	?
DEVERSORIA	AQUINUM	?	?	51-41	?
?DEVERSORIA	?	?	?	49-43	PURCHASE
PRAEDIA	?	?R	?	51	?

Key
U/R = URBAN OR RURAL
R-E = REVENUE-EARNING

Table 1. Cicero's property portfolio.

included shops (possibly also workshops), *deversoria*, houses, apartments, rural villas, and farms (TABLE 1). Geographically these were spread around, though not necessarily very widely: all his properties fall within Latium and Campania (FIG. 1). As Rawson notes (1976: 92), it seems to have been the norm 'rarely to own estates further north than Arretium, or further south than Pompeii'. Rawson's observation is largely borne out by Shatzman's prosopographical study (1975) of senators and their finances during the period from Sulla to Augustus; 71 senators owned property in Latium, for example, while a further 46 had property in Campania. By comparison, Shatzman (1975: 29) counts only 23 senators with property in the provinces, and suggests that, if this figure is contrasted with the number of senators owning property within Italy during the same period, 'we cannot conclude that such [provincial] ownership was very common'. A passage from *In Verrem II* (5. 45) leads Rawson to differ slightly from Shatzman: she suggests that the evidence for any case of senatorial property ownership in the provinces is 'highly uncertain', although there were one or two exceptions (1976: 90-1), and that senators were perhaps forbidden to own property in the provinces. (Whatever the case, ownership of property in non-Italian provinces does, on the whole, seem to have been a later phenomenon: Rawson 1976: 93.)

The property investments of Cicero and others can be characterized not only according to their location, but

also according to their use. Hence Garnsey (1976: 124) makes an important differentiation between those intended for revenue-earning, and those destined for what he terms 'non-economic' use. So, for instance, we can ascertain from his letters that a number of Cicero's properties were clearly intended mainly for his personal (hence, non-economic) use only, and were never intended to be primarily productive (or revenue-earning). The house on the Palatine that Cicero bought at considerable expense falls into this category, along with his houses or villas at Arpinum, Antium, Astura, Alba, Cumae, Tusculum, Formiae, and Puteoli.²⁴ These added greatly to the ostentatious consumption that needed paying for; purchasing the house on the Palatine, for instance, put Cicero into considerable debt (*Fam.* 5. 6).

To turn briefly to the revenue-earning properties: TABLE 1 shows the distribution of Cicero's known holdings. Even if we discount from the analysis all property for personal use, we are still left with a sizeable portfolio of holdings, both urban and rural, designed to raise income, (and, at least in part, to pay for the properties that fell into the 'conspicuous' category). These amount to approximately half of the total (if we include rural estates of which only parts were revenue-earning). The

²⁴ Some of these were not, however, exclusively non-revenue earning, but formed part of estates, other sections of which were designated as financially productive. I make the distinction on the basis of how Cicero himself regards the properties.

urban proportion of this portfolio, amounting to roughly one-fifth of the total number (and a half of the revenue-producing properties), is not wholly insignificant. This figure suggests a level of interest in urban property that went beyond casual speculation.

We cannot simply put this kind of urban investment down to the fact that Cicero, as a *novus homo*, was more in need of sources of income than his peers, and that urban investment represented a kind of desperation measure on his part. As noted above (p. 32), Shatzman's economic prosopography of senators in the late Republic (1975) tends to confirm that urban property ownership was common among the senatorial order during this period, even for senators with extensive hereditary wealth.²⁵ No similar study has yet been undertaken for senators during the early principate, but there is evidence to suggest that urban property investment continued to be a feature of property 'portfolios'. Frier (1980: 24) notes, for example, that Martial considered urban property investment to be typical among the élite, and that the *Digest* refers to brothels (*lupanaria*) owned by respectable men (*honestorum virorum*, D. 5. 3. 27. 1). These, however, are unsubstantiated examples. Perhaps the most striking evidence of actual

²⁵ An outstanding, but perhaps anecdotal, example is that of Crassus, who was supposed to have owned extensive property (Plut. *Crass.* 2. 4), among which only one house was for his personal use. For a fuller discussion of this passage see Frier (1980: 32-4). Frier also assembles literary references for urban property investment in the late Republic (1980: 24).

property investment concerns the Volusii family, one of the most prominent families of the period.²⁶ The Volusii appear to have owned the *horrea Volusiana* (CIL 6. 7289),²⁷ probably in Rome's thirteenth region, which is further attested by an inscription recording a *vestiarius de hor[reis]* (CIL 6. 9973).²⁸ A number of other *horrea* - as many as twenty - were probably located in the same region,²⁹ and were also owned by senatorial families. One belonged to M. Seius, a friend of Cicero's, and may have been let to private dealers (Loane 1938: 114). Ownership of most of these is unknown, with one or two exceptions: the *horrea Q. Tinei Sacerdotis* probably belonged to the consul of AD 158 and were available for private let (*horrea privata*, CIL 6. 33860 = ILS 5913); while the ownership of the *horrea Ummidiana* is unknown, they were available for private leasing (CIL 6. 37795). The

²⁶ See PIR iii, s.v. Volusii.

²⁷ Rickman (1971: 171-2) argues that the date for the erection of the warehouses is around AD 56, on the basis of this inscription (CIL 6. 7289) which records a *horrearius* belonging to Q. Volusius Saturninus. It has been thought that this Volusius was the consul of AD 56, hence Rickman's dating of the *horrea*. But the builder of the villa of the Volusii at Lucus Feroniae was probably L. Volusius Q. f. Saturninus, consul in AD 12, since the villa is known to date to the latter half of the first century BC (Moretti and Sgubini Moretti 1977). It seems more probable that this Volusius was also the builder of the *horrea*, especially if we take into account the fact that one of four wine amphorae found with the name of the Volusii dates to AD 3 (CIL 15. 4571), and that this is the Volusius referred to by Tacitus (Ann. 3. 30) as *primus adcumulator*.

²⁸ CIL 6. 9973: T. Aquilio / T. l. / Peloro / vestiario de hor(reis) Volusianis. That the *horrea* were almost certainly located in this area is suggested by the discovery of a water-pipe near Monte Testaccio bearing the name Volusius Saturninus (DE iii. 988).

²⁹ DE iii. 967-90. See also Staccioli (1959).

following, although they came under imperial ownership (Loane 1938: 115-16),³⁰ may have been originally for private use: the *horrea Lolliana* (CIL 6. 4226, 4226a = ILS 1620; see also 6. 9467, *Lolliae libertus horrearius*) may have been built by M. Lollius (cos. 21 BC) or his son (Rickman 1971: 164); the *horrea Galbana*, Rickman suggests (1971: 166-8), may be attributed to Ser. Sulpicius Galba (cos. 144 or 108 BC); and the *horrea Faeniana* may have belonged to L. Faenius Rufus, prefect of the corn supply in AD 55 (DE iii. 988).

In addition to the *horrea*, a travertine cippus from Rome, found next to the Porto Tiberino, suggests further ownership by the Volusii among the buildings in this area. The reconstruction of this area indicates a region of *insulae* and *tabernae*. The cippus dates to the Claudian era, and reaffirms the private use of the land (Augustus seems to have turned it over to public space in 27 BC; Panciera 1982: 93). An *insula Volusiana*³¹ is definitely indicated by the inscription;³² exactly how it was used is not known, although the Volusii had both an *insularius* and an *exactor*

³⁰ Several of those that come under imperial control are nevertheless leased to private dealers.

³¹ The difficulty, as with the *horrea* (above, n. 27), lies in dating the complex. Since it was already in place by 27 BC, it was in all probability built by L. Volusius Saturninus (d. AD 20), arguably the man responsible for erecting the *horrea*.

³² Imp [-----] / Aug[---]s vi[---]d[---] / Ti Claud Caesar Au[---] / Germ pontif max trib / po[---]est viii imp xv p p / L Vitellius censores / cognita causa ad / tributionem Divi / Aug pertinentem [.]d / Insulam Volusianam / con[...].maverunt. Panciera (1982: 92).

(see Chapter 3) who were almost certainly involved in the management of the property. The *exactor* probably collected rents (see below, Chapter 3, p. 168), so we can be almost certain that the *insula* was leased. There is little known about ownership of other *insulae* in Rome: the *insula Bolani* belonged to M. Vettius Bolanus (consul under Nero; *CIL* 6. 67 = *ILS* 3501a, and *CIL* 6. 65 = *ILS* 3500), the *insula Q. Critoni* (*CIL* 6. 9284) belonged to a freedman. These, however, are exceptional; for other known *insulae*³³ their ownership can only be guessed. Other urban property investment by the *élite* is suggested by inscriptions recording similar jobs - *horrearii*, *insularii*, and so forth - among members of other well-known *familiae* like the Statilii, but they are insufficient to permit a reconstruction of property holdings. Nevertheless, since the Statilii had five *insularii* and four *horrearii*, it is almost certain that they had urban property holdings in Rome. Similarly, it is virtually impossible to ascertain the ownership of *tabernae* in Rome from the extant inscriptions, although if a family as prominent as the Volusii owned *insulae*, and possibly *tabernae* (Panciera 1982: 90 n. 22), it seems likely that other members of the Roman *élite* owned *tabernae* too. That the Severan Marble Plan indicates that there were a number of *tabernae* (e.g. Tav. xxvii, xxx: see FIG. 2) in between the *élite*-owned

³³ See *DE* iv, s.v. *insula*, for references.

horrea already discussed is also strongly suggestive of this possibility.

There is some indication that the urban property ownership of the Roman élite was replicated among local élites in Pompeii. There are, of course, innumerable shops in Pompeii, but evidence that would help us to assign these to particular owners, let alone to élite ownership, is virtually non-existent. Only two inscriptions survive that pertain to property ownership (CIL 4. 138 and 1136), and only one of these is relevant here. It refers to the lease of *tabernae*, *pergulae*, and *cenacula*, and the owner is clearly Cn. Alleius Nigidius Maius, one of Pompeii's most prominent citizens: he was *quinquennalis* at least once, in AD 55, and seems also have stood for aedile and *duovir* at some time (Mouritsen 1988). Although this is an isolated example, it does tend to suggest - given that Nigidius is arguably Pompeii's most prominent citizen during the early principate - that both Roman and local élite had few qualms about owning property for the purpose of generating income.

AN URBAN PERSPECTIVE?

Having already outlined the 'social' motives for investment by the senatorial order, we still need to understand the particular attraction of urban investment, given that élite ideology, as already mentioned, would lead us to presuppose that it was a non-preferred option. If the aim is therefore to understand the specific 'economic' reasons behind urban investment, then it is preferable also to understand the

wider framework of élite economic activity, rather than look at urban investment in isolation. As mentioned earlier, the difficulty of assessing the particular value or function of urban property to the élite cannot be overemphasized. The richer household was characterized by the variety and scale of its economic activities: for example, landholding, loan-making, and investment in seaborne commerce. It is also the case that while many of these activities were functionally separate from one another, they all came under the organization of one single household. In other words, each activity contributed to, and formed part of, an overall, unifying economic strategy. It follows that we are unlikely to learn much about the particular use or attraction to Cicero of urban investment without reference to the broader concerns of the household.

Furthermore, the timespan of these investments covers the period from Cicero's politically active years until his death in 43 BC. His letters, though, date only from 68, by which time he had already embarked on a successful political career, having been quaestor in 75 (serving for a year in western Sicily) and praetor in 66; he had also established himself as a lawyer, making a reputation for himself by defending Roscius of Ameria in 80, and in 70 he famously secured the condemnation of Verres for extortion. He reached the pinnacle of political achievement in 63 BC, when he became consul. Such long-term interest, it may be argued, seems to confirm a genuine and constant need to finance a politically and socially prominent career. If

this is the case, then we should expect to find a correlation between the timing of Cicero's investments and strategic moments in his social, but more especially his political, career. Thus, while the main focus of the subsequent discussion will be on urban investment, it will be necessary to refer to some of Cicero's (and his household's) related activities.

CICERO'S PROPERTY AND POSSIBLE REVENUE

Dowry

The earliest of Cicero's properties known to us are the *insulae*, on the Aventine and Argiletum respectively, which are thought to have been included in Terentia's dowry.³⁴ When Terentia married Cicero in c.79, he was just beginning to establish himself among Rome's political élite. The marriage thus gave him a considerable and timely financial boost, for, in addition to the *insulae*, he received as part of the dowry some 400,000 HS (Plut. *Cic.* 8. 2). If, as seems likely, Cicero was subsequently the principal beneficiary of the rents from the *insulae*, this revenue must have represented an important part of his yearly income, since in the years running up to his consulship

³⁴ The *insulae* must have formed part of the dowry since, at the time of their divorce, there seems to have been some debate between Cicero and Terentia as to whether he should return the *insulae* to her. In the event, he retained the *insulae* to cover Marcus's expenses (Att. 15. 17. 1; 16. 1. 5); payment of children's expenses was one of the recognized functions of a dowry. See also Att. 15. 20. 4, on the mention of *praedia dotalia*, which seems to refer to the *insulae*.

Cicero had few other properties, or for that matter any other sources from which he could be sure of a *regular* income. Although there is no record of the initial revenue from the *insulae*, by 45 BC they were providing him with 80,000 to 100,000 HS annually (Att. 12. 24. 1; 16. 1. 5, from 44 BC). The use to which he put this income is not known until this date, when the same two letters to Atticus refer explicitly to paying Marcus's expenses from these rents. By this time he had divorced Terentia, but it seems to have been agreed between them that the income from the *insulae* would be used to cover their son's expenses in Athens.

Inheritance

Cicero's father died in 68 BC, leaving Cicero the ancestral estate at Arpinum and a house at Carinae. The house at Carinae seems to have been for personal use only; Cicero gave it to his brother Quintus once he had secured the Palatine house in 62. At least part of the estate at Arpinum, on the other hand, was put to productive use (see below, Chapter 4).³⁵

In c.45 BC Cicero inherited an estate from Cluvius at Puteoli (Att. 13. 46. 3; 13. 52. 1; 14. 9. 1; Plut. *Cic.* 8. 2) that included gardens (*horti*: Att. 13. 46. 3; 14. 16. 1). Cicero also inherited from Cluvius some *tabernae* (Att.

³⁵ Att. 1. 16. 18 implies only the *villa urbana*, probably for Cicero's personal use (as do *Leg. Agr.* 3. 8; *Leg.* 1. 1; 2. 1-3; Plut. *Cic.* 8. 2).

14. 9. 1), most probably in Puteoli.³⁶ These appear to have been leased, and Cicero hoped for quick profit once essential repairs had been carried out. In 14. 9. 10, Cicero writes that he has made 80,000 HS³⁷ from the Cluvian property in the first year, which went up to 100,000; presumably this included the rents from the *tabernae*, although *Cluvianum* could refer equally to the rural estate. A figure of 80,000 to 100,000 HS is not, however, an unreasonable sum for Cicero to have derived from the *tabernae* alone; the implication from the context of the letter is that he actually owned more than two shops. In addition, the fact that Puteoli was a harbour town and market centre probably put a premium on spaces for rent, perhaps making the cost of urban rental comparable to that at Rome; Puteoli had long since been recognized by Cicero as a potentially lucrative location (see above, n. 23).

The other urban property belonging to Cicero was a part (one-eighth) of an *insula* at Rome, perhaps inherited rather than purchased. Indeed, the fact that it is mentioned as a fraction of an *insula* is strongly suggestive of an inheritance (see further below, p. 52). In 44, the only time it is mentioned (*Att.* 15. 26. 4), Cicero was preparing to finalize its sale to Caerellia *ad eam summam* 380,000 HS.

³⁶ Garnsey (1976) and Rawson (1976: 97) opt for Puteoli. Shatzman (1975: 404) suggests that the *tabernae* are in Rome, though he gives no reason for so doing. He also reads *insulae* for *tabernae*, again for no particular reason.

³⁷ See also *Att.* 14. 11. 2: *de Cluviano . . . res ad centena perducitur*.

Shackleton Bailey (1965-70: iv, p. 275) argues that *ad eam summam* 'does not (and could not) mean "at the sum" but "in proportion to the total amount [i.e. 47,500 HS]" . . . It is hardly probable that the house was worth over three millions'. Although the Latin supports Shackleton Bailey's argument over the meaning of *ad eam summam*, there is no particular reason why the house could not be worth three million sesterces - Cicero, after all, paid three and a half million for his Palatine house. Rather, one suspects, Shackleton Bailey has fallen for the scholarly myth that plays down the significance of leased property. However, whatever the value of Cicero's fraction of the *insula*, again there is no indication as to the rents that he may have earned from it.³⁸

Purchases

Acquiring a house on the Palatine in 62 BC after he had reached the consulship (and after he had defended P. Cornelius Sulla) was, for Cicero, more than simply a matter of convenience. His enthusiasm to secure the Palatine house was fuelled by the knowledge that it would guarantee him a place in Rome's most exclusive district, and that it would, by its very location, confer significant prestige.³⁹

³⁸ Nor, one might note, is there any simple or consistent correspondence between the sale value of property and rents in the Roman world.

³⁹ On the recent archaeological identification of Cicero's house on the Palatine, and of others, also belonging to notable political figures of the period, see Patterson (1992: 200-3).

(Unsurprisingly, therefore, we learn next to nothing about the actual structure or furnishings of the house; to Cicero these are obviously of secondary importance.) For him as a *novus homo* the Palatine house was additionally desirable for its symbolic import: it represented and underlined his arrival among the old order.⁴⁰ He was thus prepared to buy the house at almost any cost: he paid 3,500,000 HS for it, putting himself so deeply into debt that he half-jokingly informs P. Sestius of his wish to join a political plot, 'if anyone would have me' (*Fam.* 5. 6. 2).

The cost of this purchase far exceeded any that Cicero had made previously. The main source of finance was, however, a loan of 2,000,000 HS made to Cicero by P. Cornelius Sulla after Cicero had defended him (Aulus Gellius, *NA* 12. 2; *Att.* 1. 13. 6),⁴¹ although since this sum covers only part of the total cost it is possible that some money came from Terentia's dowry and some from the inheritance left to Cicero by his father. Equally likely is that he used some of the indirect profits from his Sicilian quaestorship (*Plut. Cic.* 8. 2), together with fees earned from his legal career.⁴² For at this time, as far as we

⁴⁰ On the basis of known senatorial property holdings in the period from Sulla to Augustus, Shatzman (1975: 23) suggests that the Palatine was occupied mainly by *nobiles*, and that therefore, since they were non-*nobiles* (and *novi homines*), 'M. Caelius Rufus, M. Cicero and his brother are exceptional'.

⁴¹ Publius Sulla had been defended by Cicero on a charge of complicity with Catiline.

⁴² For other possibilities as to how Cicero raised the money for the purchase of the Palatine house - principally from a shady deal involving the sale of Milo's confiscated property - see

know, he was not indebted to anyone other than P. Sulla⁴³ (the next loan we hear about is in 60 BC, Att. 2. 1. 11), nor had he benefited from any inheritances other than from his father.

Possibly in the same year that he inherited the Arpinum estate, 68 BC, Cicero purchased another estate, at Tusculum (Att. 1. 5. 7; 1. 6. 2),⁴⁴ which, like that at Arpinum, seems to have been productive (see below, Chapter 4). Of Formiae, bought in 67 BC, we know very little. In 66, Cicero was concerned to decorate the house and to beautify it with statues 'if and when I begin to have a surplus' (Att. 1. 4. 3); it is thus probably safe to infer that it was a non-income-producing property.

Two other estates of Cicero's, possibly purchased (as opposed to inherited), were perhaps, like Tusculum and Arpinum, partly productive. These were at Pompeii (acquired c.60; first referred to in Att. 1. 20. 1) and Cumae (acquired c.56; QFr. 2. 8. 2).

Lange (1972).

⁴³ On the basis of Att. 1. 13. 6, *quod ea emptione et nos bene emissemus iudicati sumus et homines intellegere coeperunt licere amicorum facultatibus in emendo ad dignitatem aliquam pervenire* ('because by that purchase not only were we judged to have made a good buy, but men began to understand that when purchasing it is allowable to achieve a measure of *dignitas* through the assistance of friends'), Shatzman (1975: 416 n. 886) suggests that Cicero was helped by *friends*, i.e. not just P. Sulla. While the Latin admits to such a reading, the fact that Cicero mentions no other loan at all - either at the time, or in subsequent letters - renders this interpretation less likely.

⁴⁴ Another letter, Att. 1. 4. 3, refers to Tusculum but dates from c.66. Shatzman (1975: 404 and n. 818) gives the impression that it is from 68 BC.

Patterns of ownership?

In short, it can be seen that the majority of Cicero's properties date from around the time of his consulship (63 bc) or later (see TABLE 1: 17 out of 24 properties postdate his consulship).

The ways in which Cicero came to own some of his properties were apparently haphazard. Two of his urban properties were (probably) part of Terentia's dowry; at least three of his revenue-earning properties were inherited; another one, the part-*insula* at Rome, was probably also inherited. The *praedia* that were possibly sold in 51 may similarly have been inherited.

However, the pattern of Cicero's purchases correlates closely with success in his political and legal career. His Tusculan estate was bought shortly after his quaestorship and the securing of Verres' condemnation. The expensive house on the Palatine was bought during his consulship, not simply for practical reasons but also to mark his social and political status. In the years that followed, Cicero continued to acquire (probably by purchase) rural estates and retreats, capitalizing on his success just like any other member of the senatorial élite. The *deversoria* that he most probably bought were undoubtedly for his personal convenience, situated as they were on the roads to his favourite estates.

PROPERTY AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Cicero's 'portfolio' of property shows, apart from purchase, two social and legal institutions constantly at work: dowry and inheritance. Both of these forms of property transmission had the potential to extend greatly a household's economic interests, and equally, to add to the well-being of its economy. The particular implications of dowry and inheritance for the economic significance of urban property have not, however, been specifically considered, despite a spate of recent and major studies of the Roman family and Roman women (e.g. Gardner 1986; Rawson (ed.) 1986 and (ed.) 1991; Dixon 1988 and 1992; Treggiari 1991). What follows here is an attempt to show that dowry and inheritance had a direct bearing on the economic outlook of a household, and that urban property represented an important part - certainly, today, an underestimated part - of an élite household's portfolio.

INHERITANCE

Roman law concerning inheritance was extensive (occupying eleven books of the *Digest*) and complex. However, only a few basic principles directly concern us here.

If a *paterfamilias* (or anyone *sui iuris*)⁴⁵ died intestate, his heirs (*sui heredes*)⁴⁶ - regardless of sex or

⁴⁵ A *paterfamilias* was most the most likely person to be *sui iuris*, since he was not in anyone else's *potestas*. Children (even adult sons) and wives *in manu* could not be *sui iuris*, and a wife *sine manu* could only be *sui iuris* if her father was dead.

⁴⁶ That is, those who became *sui iuris* on the testator's death,

age - received equal shares of everything. However, it seems that it was preferable to make a will. In theory (and in law) the *paterfamilias* could leave his estate to anyone, although it was customary to assume that his children would be the heirs (Saller 1991; Dixon 1992: 41; Crook 1967: 119), especially in the case of large-scale property (Dixon 1992: 26). The heirs to a will were 'universal successors' to everything, which meant that they did not inherit specific things, but instead inherited the estate in fractions stipulated by the testator. It was possible, though, to leave specific items by way of legacy. An heir to a will could also be the beneficiary of a legacy; as a legatee, he or she stood to benefit twice over, since the legacy could not be deducted from his or her rightful share in the estate. However, legacies could also be made to those who were not the testator's *sui heredes*, so friends and distant relatives might hope to benefit. Indeed, it has recently been argued that the Romans never fully developed, or took advantage of the legal instruments available to them to ensure the perpetuation of the family (male) line, or name (Saller 1991). It is suggested that there were good reasons, social ones in particular, to explain this: it was often convenient for the testator, or more advantageous to his beneficiaries, if property could be passed on in some way other than directly down the family line.

which typically meant his children and his wife (if *in manu*).

It remains to investigate the effects of the practical application of Roman law. We have seen (above, p. 37) that inheritance accounts for roughly one-fifth of all Cicero's property. In addition, there are another half-dozen properties of his whose provenance is unknown, but some of which may have been inherited. (I exclude the *deversoria*, since the fact that they were so conveniently located with respect to Cicero's estates (see above, p. 50) suggests that they were bought rather than inherited.)

We know that Cicero inherited the Arpinum and Tusculum estates and the house at Carinae from his father. We do not know whether his father made a will or died intestate; it is possible that he made a will, since Cicero's brother Quintus seems not to have benefited so substantially as Cicero himself,⁴⁷ or to have received an equal share in the inheritance. In addition, Cicero was one among several co-heirs to Cluvius's will, initially inheriting an estate and also some *tabernae*. The part-*insula* at Rome was almost certainly inherited, and the same is probably also true of some *praedia* that Cicero sells in 51, about which we have no other information (but see below, p. 56).

It is noticeable that, for the most part, separate entities were kept intact on inheritance. That is to say, although an estate might be divided into fractions, the beneficiaries could expect to receive whole 'enterprises'

⁴⁷ Quintus may have inherited only the *Laterium* at Arpinum from his father (Cic. *Fam.* 1. 9. 24; *Att.* 4. 7. 3; 10. 1; *QFr.* 2. 5. 4; 3. 1. 4-5; 3. 1).

rather than, for example, a quarter-share of a workshop. This practice can be illustrated by Cluvius's will, in which Cicero received a rural estate at Puteoli, and at least two *tabernae*. He may have bought out the share of one Balbus (Att. 13. 46. 3), which comprised some *horti*. These were all separate entities, and the heirs do not seem to have had part shares in any one enterprise. Being able potentially to have one's estate divided into separate economic units in this way was, we may assume, preferable to leaving one's heirs to argue about how an estate was to be split up into fractions if there was no obvious way of doing so. Indeed, in 45, Cicero was a co-heir under Brinnius's will (Att. 13. 13. 4) to what is simply referred to as a *fundus* (Att. 13. 50. 2). This appears to be an example of a single enterprise which it may have proved impossible (or at least not in the heirs' interests) to divide satisfactorily,⁴⁸ since Cicero sold his share (and other heirs may have done the same; Att. 13. 50. 2). This kind of problem appears in the *Digest*; a testator left a plot of land with a shop to fifteen freedmen on the condition that none of them disposed of his share to anybody else (32. 38. 5). The case of Brinnius possibly demonstrates, too, the differences in economic strategy between the wealthy and those who were not so well off: it must have been easier for a wealthy household to have a

⁴⁸ Perhaps the division of the *fundus* into the fractions stipulated by the will would not have left each single plot arising from that division economically viable.

number of divisible units than for a poorer one (cf. Foxhall 1990: 32, on Greek practice). We can reasonably assume that Brinnius fell into the latter category, for although the exact extent or value of Brinnius's *fundus* is not known, a sarcastic remark by Cicero⁴⁹ suggests that it was not particularly large.

Having an estate comprising discrete units also meant that making legacies was an option for a testator. Ties of patronage, friendship, and so on could be numerous for someone in as public and influential a position as Cicero. Although one might make a friend an heir to one's will, another way of publicly acknowledging a personal connection, without perhaps significantly diminishing the estate for the main heirs of the will, was to leave a (small) legacy to the person concerned.⁵⁰ In practice, leaving legacies may have been more of an obligation than an option: Gardner (1986: 179) argues that 'legacies to one's friends and social equals were . . . a normal and, indeed, expected provision'.⁵¹ Again, these considerations

⁴⁹ In *Att.* 13. 13. 4, Cicero mentions that one of his co-heirs to the estate, Brinnius's freedman, wants to visit him. Perhaps (pretending to be?) repelled by the thought of having to deal with a mere freedman, Cicero expresses his dislike of the prospect: *id ego plane nolo. hereditas tanti non est* ('clearly I don't want that. The inheritance isn't worth that much').

⁵⁰ Although Cicero was often co-heir to a will, he also received numerous legacies. Shatzman (1975: 409-11) lists all Cicero's testators.

⁵¹ While the identities of some are unknown, Shatzman notes that Cicero himself writes of his inheritances generally as being left to him by *amici et necessarii* (*Phil.* 2. 40), which broadly confirms Gardner's comment. But legacies were not confined, as Gardner implies, simply to these categories. It was possible to

may well have encouraged the creation and maintenance of small, discrete 'enterprises'. Some indication of how urban property might be used in this context is provided by the *Digest*; an example of a legacy includes the bequest of a purple shop with its slave *institores* and the purple (32. 91. 2), but the legacy did not include the shop's debts and arrears. The legacy of a house could include an adjoining *insula* provided that they had been purchased as one and that the rents from both has been entered in the accounts together (32. 91. 6). Two adjoining shops might be legated to two different people (33. 3. 1). Small enterprises seem to be a common feature of legacies; thus it is reasonable to suggest that Cicero's part-*insula* in Rome was probably a legacy, as perhaps were the *praedia* sold in 51.

We should also remember that property offered the possibility of leaving the usufruct. That heirs or legates could be left the usufruct of property seems to have been a common expectation (*D.* 7). *Insulae* feature among the examples given by the jurists; *insulae* could be built by the usufruct of vacant land (7. 1. 36); equally, one could become the usufruct of an *insula* (7. 53). A usufructuary of *tabernae* was entitled to let them for hire, or even to use the shops to sell different merchandise from that of the

leave legacies to one's patron, or perhaps a former owner, as the list of Cicero's testators seems to demonstrate (Shatzman 1975: 409-11), although it is uncertain whether any of these specifically made Cicero a legatee, rather than an heir. Nevertheless, it may be the case - to take Gardner at her word - that the expectation of receiving a legacy was greatest among social equals and friends.

testator (7. 1. 27. 1). Urban property must have been particularly suitable in this respect.

In short, inheritance was the main way in which a (wealthy) household might accrue economic enterprises. By being either heir to a will or a legatee, someone like Cicero might see his household grow in a way that could not be predicted; he might inherit an agricultural estate or a tiny urban workshop. At the same time, the laws pertaining to the division of an estate on the death of the testator, together with social considerations and obligations, probably encouraged the formation - at least among those possessing a large household - of a multi-faceted estate, with easily separable units that were economically productive.

Dowry

Another way in which a household might acquire or give away property was via a dowry. As with inheritance, the laws concerning the giving, use, and recovery (and even inheritance) of a dowry were many and complex. By Cicero's time, however, some fundamental principles had become established.⁵²

In the early Republic the most common form of marriage was *manus* marriage, in which the woman left her natal

⁵² Gardner (1986) and Treggiari (1991) contain the most useful recent discussions of more specific social and legal aspects of dowry than it is possible to cover here. Older, but still valuable, is Corbett (1930).

household (and the *potestas* of her father) for that of her husband. She then belonged in her husband's *potestas*, and any dowry that she brought with her (usually comprising some property) was completely merged with that of her new household.

By the later Republic, though, *manus* marriage seems to have become less popular, for reasons that are not explicitly referred to in the sources and which therefore remain insufficiently understood. However, non-*manus* marriage, in which the woman remained in her natal family (and in the *potestas* of her father), appears to have taken preference over *manus* marriage (Dixon 1992: 41-2, 114). In marriage *sine manu*, any property the wife brought with her as dowry remained hers. (This was also apparently the case, by this time, for a woman *in manu* (Cic. *Top.* 23), although the legal force behind this observation is not known.)⁵³ The husband was thus regarded not as the absolute owner of the dowry, but simply as a kind of temporary administrator (Dixon 1992: 52). He was expected to maintain the dowry's value at all times (Dixon 1992: 51; Gardner 1986: 102-3); if he alienated any part of it or incurred damages, he was ultimately liable to make good to his wife any losses on the value of the dowry.

A dowry belonging to a woman of a well-off family was perhaps typically expected to comprise property and cash, and in practice 'many families would probably make up a

⁵³ See Treggiari (1991: 325).

package of cash, movables and real estate' (Treggiari 1991: 346).⁵⁴ Our knowledge of actual dowries and their composition is, however, rather more tenuous than Treggiari's remark suggests. To illustrate the scale of the problem: there are 144 Roman senators from the period from Sulla to Augustus about whose financial affairs something is known (Shatzman 1975). Of these, only seven are known to have definitely received a dowry, of whom two are Cicero and his brother Quintus. Cicero's first wife Terentia is thought by Plutarch to have brought to the marriage a dowry worth 400,000 HS. Plutarch probably refers only to the cash element; the *insulae* on the Aventine and the Argiletum are generally assumed to have formed the property part of the dowry.⁵⁵ But given the paucity of evidence for other dowries it is difficult to know whether this kind of property, urban property, was commonly included in a generous dowry (although this seems to be the expectation of the jurists: see, generally, *D.* 23 and 24). Cicero's chance mentions of Terentia's *insulae*, together with Plutarch's reference to the probable cash component, are among the only details we have of any Roman senatorial dowry (see Shatzman 1975: 53 for a handful of other examples). Another one we hear of is that which Cicero

⁵⁴ It should be noted that, strictly speaking, a dowry was optional: it was not a legal requirement for a marriage. However, social pressure, particularly among the élite, probably made the provision of a dowry 'customary, though not compulsory' (Gardner 1986: 97).

⁵⁵ See above, n. 34.

intended to provide for his daughter Tullia: in *Att.* 11. 2. 2 he refers to *fructus praediorum* that he clearly has it in mind to set aside for the dowry. The *praedia* he is referring to could mean either his urban *praedia* or his rural estates, although the former seems to be implied. The younger Pliny mentions a dowry given to Calvina (*Ep.* 2. 4). However, it is only for Terentia's dowry that we have virtually certain confirmation of a property component; Tullia's dowry is only discussed in terms of *fructus*, and Calvina seems to have received only cash from Pliny.

'Real estate', the modern term used by Treggiari, is arguably most suggestive of rural property or land, and it is true that farms, orchards, vineyards, and so forth are most frequently mentioned in the *Digest*. However, that non-agricultural property like Terentia's *insulae* could equally be a feature of a dowry is also indicated by the *Digest*; dotal land was taken to refer to both urban and rural land (*D.* 23. 13. pr.). According to the jurists, examples of what a dowry might comprise include quarries and mines (*D.* 23. 3. 32; 23. 5. 18; 24. 3. 7), but, as suggested, could also comprise 'urban lands' (*praedia*, 24. 3. 7. 11; Treggiari 1991: 349 n. 138) and other, presumably urban, property such as a bakery (*pistrinum*), a shop (*taberna*, 25. 1. 6), or *horrea* (25. 1. 1. 5). That urban property was often included in dowries is indicated by measures to be taken for recovery of dowry, or for the maintenance of its original value. If a dowry were to be recovered then rents from urban land needed to be taken into account (*D.* 24. 3.

11). Repayment for expenses on dotal property had normally to be deemed 'useful'; expenses of this kind included the addition of a shop or bakery to the wife's property (*D.* 25. 1. 5. 3-21. 1. 6).

If there was a property component, it was handed over to the husband immediately; any cash to be included in the dowry was paid in instalments, usually over a period of months. Cicero paid his daughter Tullia's dowry,⁵⁶ for example, over a period of at least a year in three separate instalments (*Att.* 11. 4a; 11. 25. 3; 12. 5c).

The ultimate purpose of the dowry was to provide for, or at least contribute to the expenses of, any children of the marriage. More immediately, however, the social and legal expectations were that it would be used to benefit the conjugal household in general. The extent of that contribution is not altogether clear: it may have been intended simply to supplement the household's income or produce or, to take a more positive view, to 'enhance the conjugal economy' (Dixon 1992: 51-2; my emphasis). Whatever the case, it was clearly supposed to be more than just a token gift.

In sum, if a wife were to bring a dowry to her marriage, then, whether she was in a *manus* marriage or not, two considerations above all were important: property (if forming part of the dowry) had to be made available straightaway, and it had to be both revenue-earning and,

⁵⁶ On the occasion of her third marriage, to Dolabella.

preferably, profitable. For the provider of the dowry - usually the woman's *paterfamilias* - this obviously meant that it was essential to have one or more parts of his estate that were instantly 'detachable'. The necessity of providing a dowry for a daughter must therefore have encouraged, as did considerations of inheritance, the formation of small economic enterprises within the estate.

CONCLUSIONS: THE FUNCTION OF URBAN PROPERTY

In order to understand the role of urban property, we first have to look at its wider context. For reasons of social and political competition above all, the Roman élite looked to exploit any possible opportunity for potential enrichment. To judge from Cicero's investments, it would seem that politically prominent Romans were likely to try to increase the number of their revenue-raising sources in the period leading up to, and subsequently during, their period of office, since a political career could initially be a heavy drain on one's finances. While land represented the most socially acceptable form of investment, urban property could provide a source of lucrative and, if necessary, short-term profit. If we view urban property as being part of a larger portfolio that included rural land, then there is no reason to regard urban investment as being exceptionally risky.

But urban property was useful for more than just raising cash. Investment in urban property can also be seen as a response to, and a reflection of, the socio-legal

institutions of inheritance and dowry. Both these institutions could require the resources of the household to be divided at relatively short notice; they effectively encouraged the organization of the household into small, readily detachable units. Urban property was arguably ideal for the purpose of household division, since it could comprise *insulae*, shops, workshops, and so forth, which were likely to be small units and to be individually viable in the event of their being detached from the household.

On the basis of these arguments, it can be seen that far from being a minor or tangential concern of the Roman élite (as both the contemporary sources and modern scholarship might lead us to believe, given their apparent neglect of the subject), urban property can be viewed as almost an essential part of a 'portfolio' of investments. On the one hand, it could provide the revenue that members of the Roman élite needed in order to compete with one another socially and politically; at the same time, it could be readily divisible in response to the demands that inheritance and dowry could place on a household's resources.

Chapter 2

'Useful Connections': The Urban Household,

Rental, and Trade

An élite household, as we have seen (Chapter 1), was highly likely to have an urban interest, not least because it proved convenient: urban investments were typically more readily divisible than rural estates, and allowed Romans to meet the demands that inheritance and dowry, above all, made on their resources. So far the arguments for urban investment rest largely on the literary, epigraphic, and juristic sources; but how did that interest manifest itself 'on the ground'? If the suggestions made on the basis of non-archaeological sources are largely correct, it follows that we should look for evidence for both divisible and rental properties in the archaeological record.

At the same time it has emerged that élite attitudes to trade were not what we might anticipate from reading the literary sources. That Cicero, for example, should moralize about petty trade and yet possess his own shops and workshops clearly highlights the dissonance between rhetoric and practice. To date, however, there has been

little specific research into this dissonance using the archaeological evidence, although a preliminary study (Wallace-Hadrill 1991) does much to emphasize the need for a survey of this kind.

Thus there are two phenomena attested in the literary sources that could usefully be explored in the archaeological record: the extent of élite ownership of rental property, and the nature of élite involvement in small-scale trade in contrast to literary attitudes. Since most of the non-archaeological sources centre around Rome, it would clearly be most appropriate to sample Rome's physical remains in order to shed further light on these problems; but since ancient Rome has, for the most part, been built over or destroyed, or both, the non-monumental parts of the urban centre do not lend themselves to a study of this kind. By contrast, and by historical accident, Pompeii offers precisely the extensive and relatively well-preserved urban remains that might permit a valid study of the use of urban property, and of élite attitudes to trade. However, despite its extensive remains, and despite the major excavations carried out, Pompeii presents the historian with a number of difficulties.

THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF POMPEII (see FIG. 3)

Previous studies of Pompeii have demonstrated that, while it may be the best-preserved 'Roman' town, the interpretation of its archaeological evidence is fraught with problems, whose nature has been discussed at length in

recent years (Wallace-Hadrill 1990; 1995; Allison 1992a; 1992b; Parkins 1993). Some of the problems pose more of an obstacle to understanding Pompeii than others, but foremost among them, without doubt, are the inadequate recording of material finds and the failure to publish the results of past excavations (Wallace-Hadrill 1995: 41), not least those of Regio I. These problems have been further highlighted by the recent attempt to commit plans and past excavation reports to computer. The publication of initial results from analysis of a computerized database of the site (*Pompei: l'informatica*, 1988) has served to underline further the difficulties in generating meaningful results and interpretations (Allison 1992b; Parkins 1993; Wallace-Hadrill 1995: 42). That having been said, Pompeii still has considerable potential: new interpretations are being offered of the old excavation reports, such as they are (Wallace-Hadrill 1995: 2-3), and recent work, especially that of Wallace-Hadrill (1988; 1990; 1991; 1995) and Laurence (1994), has done much to demonstrate the ways in which Pompeii can be used to shed light on Roman social and cultural life. Despite the problems, then, the message seems to be that we still have a great deal more to learn from the site, and that Pompeii has a vital part to play in our understanding of Roman urban property.

Some problems still remain in using Pompeii for a study of urban property or of attitudes to trade. The literary sources, for example, are predominantly concerned with urban investment and trade, either in Rome or in towns and

cities favoured by the Roman élite, such as Puteoli. Pompeii rarely receives a mention in this context. We should therefore be extremely wary of regarding the material evidence of Pompeii as evidence for urban property use, or for attitudes to trade, in Rome or Puteoli, any more than the Rome-based literary sources should be taken as necessarily suggestive of Pompeian behaviour. For example, there is no equivalent literary evidence to Cicero's letters that can describe for us the concerns and interests of property-owners in Pompeii, and it would therefore be rash simply to transplant Roman habits onto Pompeian ones, and vice versa.

PREVIOUS STUDIES

There are no studies specifically of Pompeian households and their ownership of urban property, nor have élite attitudes to trade been explored in detail with reference to the archaeology. However, surveys of Pompeian and Herculanean houses, together with a study of land use in the town, have touched indirectly on attitudes to trade. Their findings have important implications for methodologies of studying attitudes to trade in particular, but also for methodologies of studying the use of rental property in the archaeology.

Maiuri and Pompeian houses

Amadeo Maiuri was responsible for much of the excavation work carried out in Pompeii in first half of this century.

This formed the basis for his study of the houses in Pompeii (1942), which was followed by his publication of the excavations at Herculaneum (1958). In his study of Pompeii he concludes that the aristocracy was largely supplanted by a commercial class in the last few years of Pompeii's existence. To Maiuri the 'grand' houses which showed signs of having at some stage been split into shops and apartments signify an invasion by a commercial class, probably after the earthquake of AD 62. In his scheme the patrician element of the town, already under threat from a new wave of commercialism, took the opportunity to move out after the earthquake, leaving the way clear for the commercial classes to move in and render the old houses more accommodating to trade. Much the same thesis is fleshed out with more detailed reference to the houses in his publication of the Herculaneum excavations.

Land use in Pompeii

While Maiuri's work focuses on houses, Raper (1977) concentrates more generally on land usage in Pompeii. Using Eschebach's (1970) plan of the town, and also Eschebach's assignment of functions to each building, Raper divides the town into a grid of 100 x 100 m squares. He then counts the types of building (of which he devises eleven categories: Raper 1977: 207-8) occurring in each square. I list Raper's categories (in slightly abbreviated form) to help illustrate the argument that follows:

- (1) common shops
- (2) workshops
- (3) inns, post houses, taverns, and brothels
- (4) houses of trade and business houses
- (5) storerooms, adjacent rooms, and stables
- (6) private houses, flats, and *domii*
- (7) larger houses, manors and urban *villae*
- (8) places of entertainment
- (9) places of education
- (10) public and administrative buildings
- (11) religious places

Raper's categories are largely arbitrary, and they offer little or no improvement on those of Maiuri. The main problem is that while each category may take into account certain structural characteristics of each type of building, they also incorporate subjective assumptions about use. One drawback of this methodology is that it is impossible to replicate Raper's results, especially without prior access to Eschebach's work. I would suggest, for example, that it is difficult to distinguish with certainty between Raper's first five categories. This must be especially true of the smaller premises and those whose archaeological record is poor; in Pompeii, small buildings and a poor archaeological record often go hand in hand. Other categories are similarly problematic. Category 9, for example, includes 'places of education, schools and business schools'; but schools are notoriously difficult to

identify in the archaeological record, and Raper's term 'business schools' (presumably his interpretation of *collegia*) is quite simply misleading. Nevertheless, Raper finds that commerce was pervasive throughout the town (a result duplicated, via a different route, by La Torre 1988, on which see Wallace-Hadrill 1991 and 1995), and he attributes this, following Maiuri, to a commercial invasion or 'democratization' (1977: 217).

A re-examination

The main problem with the analyses of both Maiuri and Raper is that they implicitly assume the picture of élite attitudes to trade painted by the literary sources to be an accurate presentation of actual practice. In other words, they both imagine a commercial invasion of Pompeii because the literary sources suggest that there is no possibility that élite houses would have incorporated trading premises, since the élite - according to the rhetoric - kept small-scale trade and traders very much at arm's length.

Another, related problem with Maiuri's and Raper's studies is that their identifications of 'élite houses' are highly subjective and arbitrary. Maiuri, for example, bases his analysis of Pompeii, and particularly of Herculaneum, on classifying houses by 'social class', something that he thinks is indicated by decor and architectural form. Maiuri devises eight categories of houses, which he then arranges in hierarchical order. The overriding problems with this classification are that Maiuri assumes that houses

incorporating commercial structures are socially inferior to those lacking them, and that 'traditional' houses (those possessing an atrium) are inherently socially superior to those of 'non-traditional' form (Wallace-Hadrill 1991: 254).

The kinds of assumptions on which both Maiuri's and Raper's analyses are based have recently been re-examined and criticized in detail by Wallace-Hadrill (1991). Wallace-Hadrill proposes that if, as he believes, Maiuri's assumptions are unfounded, there should be no way of telling from the archaeology the social 'class' of a house or the social status of its owner, and, by the same token, no way of adducing a 'commercial invasion'. Sampling 182 Pompeian houses from supposedly residential and supposedly commercial regions of the town, Wallace-Hadrill shows not only that commercial usage is pervasive, but that of the thirty houses potentially belonging to the élite - that is, those with an area of 350 sq m or more - fewer than half (thirteen) have no commercial usage. Most importantly, he finds that these so-called élite houses (on Maiuri's reckoning) are, in decoration and architectural form, 'very difficult to distinguish as a group from those which have commercial usage', and concludes that 'examination of potentially élite housing in Pompeii shows no . . . trace of a social pattern of the avoidance of the commercial' (1991: 260).¹

¹ In addition, another recent argument against the 'commercial invasion' theory is implicit in Gassner's study (1986) of

STUDYING ATTITUDES TO TRADE AND RENTAL PROPERTY IN

POMPEII: SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Given the problems encountered in past studies, it might be thought that trying to distinguish rental property, let alone investigating élite attitudes to trade in the archaeological record, is bound to be a hazardous, even fruitless exercise. Neither problem, however, is insoluble, although it is important that we are aware of the limitations, as well as the potential, of the archaeological evidence.

Identifying rental property

Identifying a leased property 'on the ground' is particularly problematic since rental notices (especially in the form of *dipinti*) are very scarce. Furthermore, rental notices are not necessarily found on the property that was leased, which raises the issue of how to identify the property concerned.

To tackle this problem of identifying the type of property likely to have been leased, it is helpful to look at two well-known rental notices (*CIL* 4. 138; 1136)² from

Pompeian *tabernae*, which demonstrates that the majority of shops pre-date AD 62, while only a small handful, about twenty (3.2 per cent of the total), can be assumed with any certainty to be post-earthquake buildings.

² *CIL* 4. 138: *Insula Arriana / Polliana [C]n Al[le]i Nigidi Mai / locantur ex [k(alendis)] Iulis primis tabernae / cum pergulis suis et c[e]nacula / equestria et domus conductor / convenito Primum [C]n Al[le]i / Nigidi Mai ser(vum). CIL 4. 1136: *In praedis I[ul]i[ae] SP F Felicis / locantur / balneum venerium et nongentum tabernae pergulae / cenacula ex idibus Aug primis in**

Pompeii. They refer to buildings belonging to Cn. Nigidius Alleius Maius and Julia Felix respectively, and mention between them the leasing of shops, baths, apartments, and a town house. The advertisement for the buildings belonging to Cn. Alleius Nigidius Maius is generally thought to refer to the insula where the notice itself was found, the Insula Arriana Polliana (Regio VI, insula vi).³ The notice brings into question the type of buildings that might be thought suitable for leasing.

There are *tabernae* on both sides of the main entrance to the insula (VI. vi. 1). One of these (VI. vi. 22) is connected to the main house by a doorway. There is good reason to suppose that the fact that the *taberna* is connected directly to the house, and to the atrium, can be taken as suggesting that this shop was leased to a tenant. This is because, according to our extant literary sources, the atrium represented the focal point of the (élite) house: its very presence distinguished a 'man of fortune' from one of only everyday means (Vitr. *De architectura*, 6. 5. 1; cf. FIG. 4). It was part of the house's public façade, the area which both accommodated and reflected the social relationships of the owner; it was the place where guests were received, but more particularly where the owner's clients came for the morning *salutatio*. It was therefore a vital element in the expression of one's social

idus Aug sextas anno[s] / [co]ntinuos / [qu]inque / S Q D L E N C.

³ On the location of *CIL* 4. 138 see Fiorelli (1875: 105-6).




FIG. 4. Isometric diagram of a Pompeian house, showing entrance passage (*fauces*: 1), atrium (2), *tablinum* (3), and peristyle (4) (Ling 1988: 309).

status (Saller 1984; Wallace-Hadrill 1988). It would have been detrimental to the owner's status to allow his tenants direct, uninvited access to the atrium. Instead, the connecting doorway is suggestive of some kind of direct social and economic continuity between the house and the *taberna*; it is therefore possible that this *taberna* was run by a member of the owner's *familia*, a slave or freedman.

The other *tabernae*, at VI. vi. 2-4 and 23, do not share a connecting doorway with the house, but are self-contained units. Further confirmation that these latter *tabernae* are the ones referred to in the rental notice comes from a recent review of the architectural remains of the *tabernae* (Pirson 1994). Beam-holes and downpipes in the partition walls between the *tabernae* are evidence for upper floors, which means that the *tabernae* would conform to the *tabernae cum pergulis suis* of the rental advertisement. Pirson (1994) suggests that another three units on the west side of the *insula* (VI. vi. 14-16), likewise incorporating mezzanine floors, should also be considered. Although they are clearly not shops or workshops (none of them possesses the chief characteristic of either, namely a wide entrance), he points out that this does not conflict with the use of the word *taberna* in literary texts, where no layout is specified and where *taberna* can have a variety of meanings, from a small residential building to a public eating- and drinking-place (cf. Gassner 1986: 1-7). Given that *taberna* can mean the former, and that both the structure and location of the units at VI. vi. 14-16 is

suggestive of leasing, Pirson argues that these *tabernae* should be regarded in this context as 'living-*tabernae*', and are among those meant in the rental notice.

I have already argued that any identification of function based on the literary texts should be regarded with caution. To assume (on the basis of Vitruvius) that a Pompeian atrium had the same function as one in Rome may therefore be mistaken: it may be that the Pompeian atrium had a significantly less social and status-related function than its equivalent in Rome. If so, there would be little or no basis on which to distinguish potential rental and non-rental property attached to an atrium house. That the Pompeian atrium was fundamentally similar to its Roman counterpart is, however, suggested by the very fact that some house-owners were clearly bothered about having the *taberna* or *tabernae* physically separated from the atrium by a wall. If the atrium was not the focal point of the house, as it was at Rome, there would simply be little point in making this distinction. Moreover, since we can identify with some confidence the separate *tabernae* at VI. vi. 2-4 as the *tabernae* offered for rent in *CIL* 4. 138, it would seem that, where there is no connecting doorway between an atrium (or atrium house) and a *taberna*, it suggests that the *taberna* was leased. It also suggests that the role of the atrium may have been equally important to the Pompeians as it was to the Romans.

Thus the lack of a connection between *tabernae* and the main structure (usually a *domus*) can be regarded as a

probable signifier of rental property. Conversely, where the atrium and *taberna* do share a connecting doorway, this is strongly suggestive of non-rental property, since it indicates continuity between house-owner and business (e.g. Gassner 1986; Pirson 1994). To date, however, there has been no further analysis of connectivity (or its absence) and rental property in the town.

Examining attitudes to trade

If we are to explore attitudes to small-scale trade through the archaeology, we obviously need to be certain that we can correctly identify the buildings in which this level of trade took place. That this is more problematic than it might appear is reflected in previous attempts to identify shops and workshops in Pompeii. Kléberg's *Hôtels, restaurants et cabarets* (1957) attempts to differentiate between types of 'entertainment houses' in Pompeii, including *tabernae*. Much of that study is, as its subtitle suggests, based on philological analysis. The first chapter (1957: 1-25), for example, is concerned with etymology and with the literary use of terminology. Kléberg's subsequent identification of *tabernae* and so forth throughout Pompeii and elsewhere (1957: 26-73) is heavily dependent on the literary terminology explored in his previous chapter. Kléberg is not alone in his reliance on the literary texts: the assumption that literary terminology can be translated into archaeological identification is implicit in other studies of non-public buildings, particularly those of

Pompeii and Herculaneum, but also at Ostia (e.g. Packer 1975; 1978; Hermansen 1974).

Allison's work on Pompeii (e.g. 1992a; 1993) has begun to show that this literature-led approach may be fundamentally flawed. She has systematically exposed the discrepancies between the excavations as published and the unpublished site record, the *Giornale*, and has at the same time highlighted the problems of over-reliance on the literary texts when identifying material remains. For example, working from the *Giornale*, Allison found that the excavators had not only moved artefacts from their original findspot to the place where, according to the literary texts, such items would 'normally' be found, but had even moved artefacts from one house to another in order to make them correspond to the literary texts (Allison 1993: 6)! Differences such as these between the findspot as predicted from literature and the actual findspot clearly highlight the potential hazards of relying on the literary texts when assigning location and functions to artefacts, and may have similar implications for the identification of buildings, since, for the most part, past reliance on literary texts has been no less unquestioning in this respect (Allison 1993: esp. 1-2).

One way of overcoming our reliance on the literary sources is to pay more heed to the main characteristics of the buildings themselves. This is, to a large extent, the method adopted by Gassner (1986) in her study of Pompeian *tabernae*. As well as conducting her own survey of the

literary sources for *tabernae*, Gassner catalogues all possible *tabernae* in Pompeii and constructs a typology based solely upon their structural characteristics.⁴ While Kléberg (1957) differentiates between, for example, *tabernae*, *popinae*, and *thermopolia* wholly on the basis of literary texts, and in particular on the basis of the etymology of the individual words, it is not always possible to make these distinctions in the archaeology, or even to be certain as to the usage of a given space. So rather than using the literature to identify *tabernae* in the archaeological record, Gassner identifies *tabernae* simply by the single common characteristic of a wide doorway or entrance.⁵ Although this may seem arbitrary, her approach is justified: it is a fundamental characteristic of shops to have wide entrances.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that Gassner's approach is not without some ambiguity. For example, her main class of *taberna*, type C, is described as a *taberna* 'attached to a dwelling in the manner of "irregular houses"' (Gassner 1986: 68); but there is no discussion of how a 'dwelling' or 'irregular house' is to be identified, although her definition seems to include every type of structure except atrium houses. The same problem is true of type D, '*tabernae* with attached dwelling': the criterion for a

⁴ It should be noted that Gassner uses '*tabernae*' (*Kaufläden*) in this context as a generic term.

⁵ For her definition of a wide entrance, see Gassner (1986: 30).

'dwelling' is not made clear. Typically the 'dwelling' is no more than a room behind, or perhaps to one side of, the *taberna*.

Just as connecting doorways, or rather their absence, can help us to identify rental properties, so too they are relevant to studying attitudes to trade. The significance of the atrium has already been noted: continuity between an atrium and, for example, a shop suggests a continuity of interests between the house owner and the business of the shop. Where there is no connecting doorway, not only does this indicate rental property, it also suggests that trade is being kept at arm's length by the house-owner. In other words, where shop and house share a connecting doorway we can infer that the house-owner had an active interest in the business of the shop, and that he or she did not reflect the moralizing attitudes held towards small-scale trade and traders in the literary sources. Since atria are held by the sources to be the mark of social status, atrium houses are uniquely valuable for a study of attitudes to trade since they should be the houses of owners most likely to discriminate against small-scale trade. Unfortunately, in the case of *tabernae*, in practice it is impossible to tell whether the absence of a connecting doorway is indicative primarily of the owner's desire to distance himself or herself from trade, or of a desire to derive income from leasing part of the property. But, since possible rental property in Pompeii was often used for trading purposes, it is reasonable to assume that even if

the absence of a connecting doorway principally indicates that the property was let, it also partly suggests the owner's wish to keep trade and traders at a distance.

Of particular interest in this respect is the connection, if any, between 'petty' or 'vulgar' trade and houses. It is reasonable to assume that brothels fall into the 'vulgar' category, since the job of the prostitute is surely among those professions, according to Cicero, *quae ministrae sunt voluptatem* (*Off.* 1. 150), though he does not mention prostitution directly. The marked distaste expressed in the sources for this kind of occupation should, on the face of it, mean that brothels are not found in élite houses. The connection between brothels and the remaining fabric of the town has recently been touched upon by Wallace-Hadrill (1995), and to a similar extent by Laurence (1994). In his study of deviant behaviour Laurence specifically mentions the nature of the physical connection between the house and the brothel as being relevant to our understanding of the sources' attitudes. He notes (1994: 75) that one house (VII. xiii. 4) has two different entrances on separate streets: one of the two (on a side street) was the entrance to a brothel, while the main entrance was on one of Pompeii's principal thoroughfares, the Via dell'Abbondanza. The effect was, as Laurence suggests, that no one need realize that this impressive house had anything to do with a seedy brothel.

In other words, it was possible for a well-to-do member of Pompeian society to run (if only indirectly, for example

by lease) a 'vulgar' business. As yet, however, this idea has not been substantiated by empirical analysis. The main caveat concerns the secure identification of these types of buildings. In this instance traditional identifications based on the visual evidence have been used; this is less dubious than it might seem, since the identification of brothels in Pompeii is not particularly contentious. Wallace-Hadrill (1995: 51-2) cites the 'three reliable criteria' of masonry beds, pornographic paintings (if not in an isolated context), and explicit graffiti. All are instantly recognizable.

Similarly, fulleries should be especially relevant to a study of attitudes to trade. While fulling was not necessarily one of Cicero's 'unbecoming' (*illiberales*) trades, it is not likely to have been highly esteemed either. Fulleries were not, and are not, the kind of business one might anticipate finding in close proximity to residential buildings: they were notoriously smelly, relying as they did on using urine in the treatment of wool. It is difficult to imagine that a member of the Pompeian élite could have enhanced his visible status by adding a fullery to the front of his house; the presence of a fullery could be revealed not just by the general smell but by the placement of amphorae on the street to encourage passers-by to donate their urine.

Moeller (1976: 29-56) identified a number of Pompeian fulleries based on three main types of evidence: loom-weights, graffiti, and vats and treading-stools. His

methodology and his interpretations of the evidence have since been heavily criticized; most problematic is his use of graffiti to identify fulleries (Mouritsen 1988: 18-27; cf. Laurence 1994: 61). The identification of buildings according to nearby graffiti, which Moeller does following Della Corte's *Case ed abitanti*, has been shown to be seriously questionable since there is no necessary relationship between them (Laurence 1994: 61), and it is a method for which Della Corte, who used it in his identification of Pompeian houses and their occupants, had long since been criticized (see, most recently, Mouritsen 1988). Nevertheless, the presence of vats and treading-stools is now generally taken to be a reliable criterion for identifying fulleries (Laurence 1994: 61).

The patterns of distribution not only of the fulleries identified by Moeller but also of *textrinae*, *officinae lanifricariae*, *officinae coactiliariae*, and *officinae tinctoriae*⁶ are examined in more detail by Laurence (1994: 61 ff. and maps). He finds that the majority of *officinae lanifricariae* (based on Moeller's identifications) are clustered in Regio VII; that the fulleries are distributed throughout the town (concentrating slightly around the

⁶ The distinctions noted by Moeller between fulleries, *officinae lanifricariae*, and *officinae tinctoriae* are made on archaeological grounds (according to the presence of vats, treading-stools, and so forth). *Textrinae*, however, are identified on the basis of epigraphic evidence since, according to Moeller (1976: 56), they are virtually impossible to distinguish archaeologically, their (portable) equipment having long since perished or been carried off.

Porta del Vesuvio); and that the *officinae tinctoriae* follow much the same pattern as the fulleries. Moreover, both of the last two tend to be situated on or near the main thoroughfares - though Laurence fails to note one practical reason for locating a fullery on a main route and near the centre of the town, namely the need to collect urine. Laurence's suggested interpretation of this pattern is that 'these workshops were located in areas that were not dominated by the residential requirements of the inhabitants' (1994: 64). In other words, it would seem that Pompeian houses actively avoided fulleries and related buildings. If, for the sake of argument, we accept the initial identifications, though they are far from uncontentious, then this 'semi-micro' (cf. Raper 1977) scale of analysis is a starting-point for understanding the relationship between certain types of 'industry' and individual households, and perhaps for understanding the scale of manufacturing. But even if we leave aside the identification problem, this analysis still permits only very general observations, since it does not reveal whether the workshops were independent structures or were incorporated within, or between, houses. Equally, if a fullery is part of a house it is important to know whether it is linked to it by a connecting doorway. Only by asking these more specific questions can we legitimately comment upon the degree to which commerce was avoided in residential areas.

Connections between houses and business premises, and the absence thereof, thus have the potential to increase our understanding of both the use of rental property and attitudes to trade. To date, however, neither has been the subject of a study of this kind. To this end, Gassner's catalogue and structural typology of *tabernae* represent a starting-point, since they provide the basis for studying attitudes to small-scale trade. Since it is also possible to infer whether *tabernae* are rental or non-rental property (above, p. 78), we can use the same catalogue to construct a database to give some indication of the extent and characteristics of rental property in the town.

A DATABASE OF TABERNAE IN POMPEII

The data: Gassner's typology (FIG. 5)

From the six hundred or so structures that possess the characteristic feature of a wide doorway, Gassner (1986: 46) constructs a typology comprising four different kinds of *tabernae* (types A, B, C, and D). Type A *tabernae* are those that form part of the front of an atrium house, and are located either to the left or right of the main entrance to the house. The type B *taberna*, by comparison, does not form part of an atrium house, but is instead a 'self-standing' (*eigenständiges*), independent element or unit of an insula. Type C *tabernae* are attached to dwellings in the manner of 'irregular' houses. The type D *taberna* has an attached dwelling that possesses no entrance of its own, and can be entered only through the business




FIG. 5. Examples of *taberna* types (Gassner 1986: pls. 1, 4, 8, 10).

space. These four main types are further subdivided according to six numbered categories of structural characteristics, as follows:

- (1) one-roomed *taberna* or *taberna* in which the space is divided by pilasters or short dividing walls
- (2) *taberna* with one adjacent room
- (3) *taberna* with several adjacent rooms
- (4) *taberna* in which one or more rooms are built in, in a corner
- (5) *taberna* in which one room is built in, in a corner, and behind them is a further 'cross-oriented' room, or eventually a court with adjacent rooms
- (6) so-called 'double-*tabernae*', joined together, which may belong to the same or different main types

Thus for each main type there are six possible sub-categories (e.g. A1, A2, A3, etc.), making twenty-four possible types altogether.

Some modifications

Gassner's catalogue of *tabernae* (1986) offers a coherent body of data with which to construct a database that will allow a study both of rental property and attitudes to trade. I have, however, made some modifications where the data are incomplete. For example, due to the incompleteness

of excavation in some of the Pompeian regions (namely Regiones III, IV, and IX, but also to a lesser extent I, II, and V), not all of the *tabernae* in these regions have been included in the database. That is to say, all *tabernae* that are included in Gassner's catalogue, but which have not been assigned to a Gassner type, have been excluded on the grounds that their identification is not secure, and because it is usually impossible in such cases to make any inferences about the absence or presence of 'connectivity' to other structures.

Similarly, the unexcavated areas of the town are completely excluded from the database. To posit the numbers and types of *tabernae* in the unexcavated regions would clearly be hazardous, even though Gassner (1986: 84) suggests ways in which the distribution of *tabernae* might be affected if excavation were to be extended to these areas (those east of the Via Stabiana).⁷

⁷ According to Gassner (1986: 84) we might expect the total number of type C and type D *tabernae* to go up, since these only begin to appear throughout Pompeii in the first century AD, and the areas where they appear are precisely those that were built up in this period. We cannot, however, be absolutely certain of this scheme of development: the fact that Nappo's recent archaeological investigations in the area behind the amphitheatre have shown this area to be second-century BC in origin has implications for our understanding of the development of the town. We can no longer assume, as has conventionally been done, that the town expanded from the forum outwards (Nappo 1988). Nappo's findings thus militate against assuming Gassner's supposed scheme of development to be correct in all parts of the unexcavated areas. If, for example, the areas were not developed uniformly in the imperial period, we might expect to find a number of the 'old'-type *tabernae* (A and B) as well as the later types C and D.

For the remaining *tabernae* - those that have been excavated and assigned a type - the RICA plans of Pompeii (Van der Poel 1984; 1986) are arguably the most thorough survey plans available to date, especially the large-scale (1 : 500) plans of regions I to V. They are used here to help ascertain 'connectivity' between the *taberna* and its attendant structures, since these were not available to Gassner at the time.

It should be noted that the database does not incorporate any upper-floor property. For the most part the upper levels of Pompeian buildings no longer exist, and while current work is beginning to re-examine the archaeological evidence for mezzanine floors (e.g. Pirson 1994), it is as yet a long way from allowing further reconstruction - not just of floors but also room divisions (on the basis of beam-holes, and so forth) - for the whole of Pompeii. Any such reconstruction would therefore be highly dubious.

The database structure

The main table of the database records all Gassner's *tabernae*. Each is uniquely identified by its 'address', following the system used in the RICA plans: the *taberna* has a Regio number (represented by an upper-case Roman numeral: I, III, VII), an insula number (small Roman numeral: i, ii, iii, etc.),⁸ and a doorway number (arabic numeral: 1, 2, 3, etc.). All three parts of the address are

⁸ Except in the case of the Insula Occidentalis, which is given the insula address of 'occ' rather than a number.

given a separate column in the database. In addition to the address, each *taberna* is assigned a Gassner type (A, B, C, or D), and an additional column records the sub-type (1 to 6).

Another column denotes whether or not a *taberna* shares a connecting doorway with the main house. 'Connecting doorway' in this context includes not only those that connect a *taberna* to an atrium, but also those that connect it, alternatively, to the *fauces* (hallway). A connection with the *fauces* is hardly less significant than one with the atrium, since the *fauces* was a part of the house through which the public façade of the house was viewed (Laurence 1994: 75). Sometimes a *taberna* has two connecting doorways, one to the atrium and one to the *fauces*; in these cases the *taberna* is recorded simply as having one connecting doorway (for the purposes of this study it makes little difference how many connections there are). This column is relevant only to type A and C *tabernae*, since they are defined by their attachment to a 'dwelling'. For type A the connection to a house is unambiguous: the *taberna* is typically connected either to the atrium or to the *fauces*. With type C, however, a connecting doorway simply means a doorway that connects the shop to the larger structure of which it forms part; since type C *tabernae* are defined by their attachment to 'irregular' houses, it follows that the connection will not be with an atrium. By definition (see above, p. 86) type B and type D *tabernae* do not have connecting doorways; with type D in particular,

the business space is synonymous with the 'residential' space.

Further columns denote the type of trade conducted on the premises, and whether or not the premises were engaged in 'productive' business. These two columns are relatively contentious, depending as they do on identification based on archaeological evidence; so in the interests of consistency I have followed Gassner's identifications, which are based on old excavation reports (published primarily in *Notizie degli scavi*).

Additional information was added to the database in order to build as complete a picture as possible of the nature of the links between Pompeian houses and *tabernae*. This includes the date of the *taberna* (Samnite, Republican, or imperial period) and any doorways or windows blocked up in antiquity (indicated on the RICA plans by 'o.m.ab a.', *ostium muratum ab antiquo*). There has as yet been no systematic study of these doorways and windows; any such study would surely increase our understanding of phases of ownership. At the moment we are heavily reliant on individual house surveys, such as that of the Insula of the Menander (Ling 1983) or those being carried out by German teams (e.g. Strocka 1984; Erhardt 1988; Michel 1990), to tell us about changes and key phases of development in the structure of houses or *insulae*.

In the case of the insula of the Menander, Ling was able to distinguish eight separate phases in the development of the insula as whole, a process that itself depended on

being able to date (albeit provisionally) changes in specific parts of the block. Changes were dated on the basis of the style of wall-painting, the fabric used in construction, and the actual style of building technique (Ling 1983: 37-9). In this way the *tabernae* were found to belong to different periods: I. x. 17 'can hardly antedate the early Augustan period', the shop in room 2 of I. x. 1 'must post-date the building of the Augustan aqueduct', a 'possible' shop in room 3 of the Casa del Menandro 'was perhaps opened during the period of the Third Style' (first half of first century AD), I. x. 2 probably dates to the Fourth Style (c. AD 50-79), I. x. 13 post-dates phase 4B (c. AD 50), and I. x. 5 probably dates to the early Fourth Style (Ling 1983: 54). Taken individually none of these changes may seem especially interesting; taken as a whole, however, they may signify changes in use over time (perhaps, for example, from rental to non-rental property) and possibly changes of ownership (Ling 1983: 54).

Studies such as that of the Insula of the Menander, however, are in short supply, and while the RICA plans do at least mark those doorways and windows blocked in antiquity, they do not date them precisely. Equally, while blockages can be indicated, the creation of new doorways cannot. Thus the RICA plans can only indicate connecting doorways relevant to Pompeii's final phase; we have no way of telling whether, or when, individual *tabernae* appeared before AD 79. Thus the corresponding database column simply records a doorway or window blocked in antiquity, which

might suggest, first, that at some stage the *taberna* may have communicated with the main house, and, second, that it may have been a more integral part of the house, perhaps a bedroom, since we do not know when wide entrances opening on to the street were made. In short, we cannot necessarily tell whether a blocked doorway indicates a change in the use of a *taberna*, or whether it was formerly a room used for domestic purposes.

It was not always possible to enter a value: for example, dates can be assigned to roughly one-third of all the *tabernae*. Moreover, assigning trade types to individual *tabernae*, as with other identifying categories, must be regarded as provisional. As we have seen (above, p. 78), the discrepancies in the definitive identifications of *tabernae* in the modern scholarship are indicative of the problems involved. The identification of the type of business for each *taberna* in Pompeii is particularly hazardous for those *tabernae* whose material remains have largely been destroyed or have never been published fully. Allison's work (above, p. 79) on the material artefacts and their functions at Pompeii should serve as a further caution in this respect.

Separate tables have been created in the database for fulleries and brothels. These record the region, insula, and doorway 'address' (in separate columns), whether or not the fullery or brothel is part of an atrium house, and whether or not it shares a connecting doorway with the house. For both fulleries and brothels the results are

intended to provide a basis for provisional suggestions only; the sample number of both is too small - nine brothels and seven fulleries - to permit broader conclusions.

THE DATABASE: THE MAIN RESULTS

Numbers of different types of tabernae⁹

The total number of *tabernae* is 504. The total of identified types is 503; for one *taberna* it is impossible to designate a type. The most common type is the independent structure, the type B *taberna* (245). The second most common type is the *taberna* that forms part of an atrium house, type A (177). The scarcest is type D (33), closely followed by type C (48). (See TABLE 2).

Distribution of the main types of tabernae


The distribution of each type of *taberna* is shown in TABLE 3 (see also CHART 1). It is noticeable that the greatest numbers of each type of *taberna* cluster in Regio VII (cf. Gassner 1986: 84). The numbers of type B *tabernae* are particularly marked: there are 114 type B *tabernae* in this region, more than three times as many as in any other region and just under half the overall total of this type. Similarly, even though the total number of type D *tabernae*

⁹ I include among each type those whose identification is queried (e.g. A?); for type A, I also include the sub-group AII (*tabernae* that are part of an atrium house but are situated along the sides rather than the front of the house; Gassner 1986: 49).

TYPE A	TYPE B	TYPE C	TYPE D
177	245	48	33

Table 2. Numbers of different types of *tabernae*.

DISTRIBUTION OF MAIN TYPES OF TABERNA

Chart 1. Distribution of main types of *taberna*.

is small in comparison to other types, there are still twice the number of type D *tabernae* (13) in this region as in any other. By contrast, type A *tabernae* are only marginally more numerous (50) in this region than in Region VI (46). There are 12 type C *tabernae* in Region VII, two more than in the region with the next highest number of this type (i.e. Region I, with 10).

*Numbers of sub-types*¹⁰

TABLE 4 shows the numbers of sub-types for each of the main types of *tabernae*. The simplest forms of each type of *taberna*, single-room types, are most numerous overall (cf. Gassner 1986: 84). This is particularly noticeable in types A and B, with over half of each main type belonging to sub-type 1: types A1 and B1, respectively, number 122 and 124. The same is true of type C *tabernae*, of which 29 out of a total of 47 are the single-roomed type C1. (Type D *tabernae* are not divisible into sub-types.) The next most common sub-type is sub-type 2 (*tabernae* with one adjacent room): there are 42 *tabernae* of sub-type A2, 69 of sub-type B2,

¹⁰ The total of all the sub-types does not tally with that of a main type. For example, the total number of sub-types for type A *tabernae* is 176, whereas the total of type A *tabernae* is 177; the total of B sub-types is 244, compared with a total of 245 for type B *tabernae*; and there are 48 C-type *tabernae* as opposed to a total of all the C sub-types of 47. These discrepancies are due to the fact that it is not always possible to assign a sub-type to a *taberna* (represented by a question mark in the 'Gassner number' column of the database). Since all main types run into this problem, all the totals of sub-types for each main type add up to less than the total of the main type.

REGIO	TYPE A	TYPE B	TYPE C	TYPE D
I	27	22	10	5
II	-	1	3	-
III	-	-	2	1
V	14	9	4	1
VI	46	35	7	5
VII	50	114	12	13
VIII	25	28	2	5
IX	15	36	8	3
TOTAL	177	245	48	33

Table 3. Distribution of main types of *tabernae* by region.

	TYPE A	TYPE B	TYPE C
SUB-TYPE 1	122	124	29
SUB-TYPE 2	41	69	14
SUB-TYPE 3	5	14	3
SUB-TYPE 4	2	11	1
SUB-TYPE 5	-	16	-
SUB-TYPE 6	5	10	-

Table 4. Numbers of sub-types.

and 14 of sub-type C2. Of the other, more structurally complex, sub-types (3, 4, 5, and 6), there are very few in types A and C, and there is none of sub-type 5 for either type. For type B *tabernae*, however, every sub-type is represented.

Distribution of sub-types

Since sub-type 1 of each main type of *taberna* is the most common of all the sub-types, it is perhaps not surprising that it is also the most numerous of all the sub-types in each region in all but three cases (see TABLE 5; CHARTS 2-3).¹¹ Furthermore, most of this sub-type clusters most noticeably in Region VII: in this region there are 35 *tabernae* of sub-type A1, 67 of B1, and 11 of C1. In the case of B1 and C1 these figures represent more than double the figures for any other region; by contrast, there is one more type A1 *taberna* in Region VI than in Region VII. This picture of a clustering in Region VII is broadly repeated (although with fewer overall numbers) for all the other sub-types. After Region VII, Regions VI, VIII, IX, and I also show some clustering for each of the sub-types (particularly of main types A and B; the numbers of C sub-types, apart from C1, are too small to be regarded as significant in this context). There is, however, a marked avoidance by all sub-types of Regions II and III.

¹¹ There are two more *tabernae* of type B2 than of B1 in Region V; in Region I there are four of type C2 as opposed to three of C1; in Region II there are three of C2 and none of C1.

DISTRIBUTION OF MAIN TYPES AND SUB-TYPES 1 BY REGION




Chart 2. Distribution of main types and sub-types 1 by region.

DISTRIBUTION OF A1 AND B1 TABERNAE




Chart 3. Distribution of A1 and B1 tabernae.

	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6
REG I	14	11	-	1	-	1
REG II	-	-	-	-	-	-
REG III	-	-	-	-	-	-
REG V	9	4	1	-	-	-
REG VI	36	8	2	-	-	-
REG VII	35	11	2	-	-	2
REG VIII	18	4	-	-	-	1
REG IX	10	3	-	1	-	1

	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6
REG I	9	6	3	2	2	-
REG II	-	1	-	-	-	-
REG III	-	-	-	-	-	-
REG V	3	5	-	1	-	-
REG VI	16	11	3	1	3	1
REG VII	67	23	4	5	7	7
REG VIII	10	10	2	1	3	2
REG IX	19	13	2	1	1	-

	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6
REG I	3	4	1	1	-	-
REG II	-	3	-	-	-	-
REG III	2	-	-	-	-	-
REG V	2	1	1	-	-	-
REG VI	5	2	-	-	-	-
REG VII	11	1	-	-	-	-
REG VIII	1	-	1	-	-	-
REG IX	5	3	-	-	-	-

Table 5. Distribution of sub-types by region.

Numbers of tabernae with or without connecting doorways
(TABLE 6)

The presence or absence of connecting doorways is relevant only to type A and type C *tabernae*, since both type B and type D are independent, self-contained structures.

Of 177 type A *tabernae*, 69 share a connecting doorway with the main house, either to the atrium or *fauces*. Ninety-six do not share a connecting doorway with the main house, while in a further 12 cases it was not possible to ascertain whether or not the *taberna* shared a doorway with the house.

For type C, of a total of 48 *tabernae*, 36 shared a connecting doorway with a residential building and only two did not share a connection. For 10 of the 48 it was impossible to tell whether there was a connecting doorway.

Distribution of tabernae with or without connecting doorways (TABLE 7; CHART 4)

For type A *tabernae* there is little significant difference in the distribution of those with and those without doorways in each region. The major exception is Region VII, in which 33 type A *tabernae* do not share a connecting doorway, as compared with 12 that do.

The same pattern of distribution holds for type C *tabernae*, although it is hardly valid to discuss the distribution of those without connecting doorways since, as noted above, there are only two that fit this description.

	TYPE A	TYPE C
CONNECTING DOORWAY	69	36
NO CONNECTING DOORWAY	96	2
UNCERTAIN	12	10

Table 6. Presence and absence of connecting doorways.

DISTRIBUTION OF A1 TABERNAE WITH AND WITHOUT CONNECTING DOORWAYS




Chart 4. Distribution of A1 *tabernae* with and without connecting doorways.

	TYPE A WITH D/WAY	TYPE A WITHOUT D/WAY	TYPE C WITH D/WAY	TYPE C WITHOUT D/WAY
REG I	15	11	9	1
REG II	-	-	3	-
REG III	-	-	-	-
REG V	4	10	3	-
REG VI	23	22	5	-
REG VII	12	33	11	1
REG VIII	12	12	2	-
REG IX	3	8	3	-

Table 7. Distribution of connectivity.

For those that have connecting doorways the largest quantity (11) is to be found in Region VII, with the next highest number in Region I.

Dates, types, and distribution of dated tabernae

It is possible to assign dates to 177 *tabernae* out of a total of 504 (35 per cent). Twenty-eight are of Samnite or probable Samnite date. Twenty-five are Republican, with a further two also likely to date to the Republic. By far the majority, however, date to the imperial period: 98 date to the early principate (roughly pre-AD 62) and 20 to the period after AD 62, while another 3 cannot be dated more precisely than to the imperial period (TABLE 8).


Eighteen of the Samnite *tabernae* are of type A, of which 14 are sub-type A1. With respect to the distribution of Samnite *tabernae*, 4 are in Region I, 7 in Region VI, 2 in Region VIII, and 3 in Region IX. The majority (12), however, are to be found in Region VII (TABLE 9; CHART 5).

Ten of the Republican *tabernae* are of type A, and all of them also belong to sub-type A1. Most of the remainder (17) are of type B, of which 11 are of sub-type B1. There is only one type C *taberna*. The distribution of Republican *tabernae* is as follows: both Region I and Region VI have 1 Republican *taberna* each, Region VIII has 7, and Region IX has 3. Like the Samnite *tabernae*, the majority of the Republican *tabernae* (16) are located in Region VII (TABLE 9; CHART 5).

	NUMBERS
SAMNITE	22
PROBABLE SAMNITE	6
REPUBLICAN	25
PROBABLE REPUBLICAN	3
IMPERIAL	3
PRE-AD 62	98
POST-AD 62	20

Table 8. Dates of *tabernae*.

DISTRIBUTION OF DATED TABERNAE BY REGION

Chart 5. Distribution of dated *tabernae* by region.

	SAMNITE	REPUBLICAN	IMPERIAL
REG I	4	1	4
REG II	-	-	1
REG V	-	-	3
REG VI	7	1	28
REG VII	12	16	51
REG VIII	2	7	7
REG IX	3	3	27

Table 9. Distribution of dated *tabernae*.

Most of the *tabernae* dated to the imperial period are of type B (89), of which 63 are of the simplest sub-type, B1. There are 14 type A *tabernae*, 10 of type C, and 8 of type D. Their distribution follows a similar pattern to those of Samnite and Republican dates: there are a handful of *tabernae* of imperial date in each of Regions I (4), II (1), V (3), and VIII (7), but there are noticeably greater numbers in Regions VI (28) and IX (27). Once again, however, most are to be found in Region VII (51), which has nearly twice the number of any other region (TABLE 9; CHART 5). The majority in this region (40) are of type B, and most of these (36) are of sub-type B1.

Trade types and production (see Appendix)

For 59 *tabernae* it is possible to assign a trade type. Only 6 *tabernae* can with certainty be assumed to have been productive; none of them is attached to an atrium house, but 4 are of type B with 1 in each of types C and D.

Out of these 59, nearly half (25) probably dealt in provisions; 15 of these are type B *tabernae*, 6 are type D, 4 are type A, and only 1 is type C. Four are located in Region I, 2 in Region VI, 2 in Region IX, and the majority (18) in Region VII. Thirteen *tabernae* dealt in metalware, of which 8 are type A, 4 type B, and 1 type C. Four are in Region I, 2 in Region VI, 2 in Region VII, and 1 each in Regions VIII and IX. There are 7 possible dye-shops: 1 of type C, 2 of type A, 3 of type B, and 1 of type D. One dye-

shop is in Region VII, 2 in Region VIII, and the remaining 4 in Region IX.

Other types of trade are represented only minimally. For example, there are two 'thermopolia' (probably hot food shops), three textile shops, and two *tabernae vasariae*. There are several single instances of particular types of *taberna*: for instance, there is a carpenter's shop, a possible shoemaker's *taberna*, a bakery, and a perfumer's shop. For others, certain identification is impossible, but there may be a *taberna musivaria*, a garum shop, and a lampmaker's shop.

Fulleries and brothels (see Appendix)

There are nine brothels, of which two form part of a possible atrium house. One of the brothels attached to the possible atrium house has a connecting doorway to the main house street, while the other does not.

There are six fulleries included in the database; three are directly attached to an atrium house, and share a connecting doorway, while the other three are not.

Changes in taberna structures (= o.m.ab a.) (see Appendix)

Only twelve *tabernae* show definite signs of having been structurally altered in antiquity; all are in Region I. Four are of type A, 6 of type B (1 is of questionable identification), and the remainder (2) are type C.

SOME PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS

Distribution of main types of tabernae

There is, as we have seen, a pronounced clustering of all the main types in Region VII. Broadly speaking, Region VII represents the public-civic region of Pompeii, which encompasses not only the forum (see FIG. 3) but also its accompanying buildings: baths, temples, curia, basilica, and *macellum*. To some extent the relatively high proportions of each type of *taberna* in this region can be accounted for by the presence of the baths and, in particular, of the *macellum*, both of which would have attracted attendant trade (Wallace-Hadrill 1995).

That there are so many type B *tabernae* as opposed to type A *tabernae* in this region (even taking into account the greater numbers of type B overall) reflects the type of residential building around the forum: since there are relatively few atrium houses here, it is not entirely surprising that there are fewer type A *tabernae*. This analysis by itself, though, does not tell us much about the relationship between households and trade. Nevertheless, if we are right to assume (see Chapter 1) that there is no necessary relationship between household and location - that is, that a shop belonging to a household does not have to be in or even near the main *domus* of the household - then perhaps we can see that households were well able to see, and to exploit, the 'economic' opportunities offered by the better-frequented parts of town. That B-type *tabernae* are dominant is therefore perhaps to be expected:

they are, as Gassner describes them, 'independent' elements of *insulae*, and did not depend on attachment to a larger residential building. Since Region VII is one occupied largely by public and civic buildings, leaving little space for large (atrium) houses, we might anticipate the greater presence of *tabernae* not attached to larger dwellings. Their 'independent' structure means that type B *tabernae* are the most adaptable; they are particularly likely to have been constructed, perhaps by the town council, for a specific purpose such as providing selling-space for market-stall holders. Implicit in their structural type as independent buildings is the assumption that they are almost purpose-built for renting out; since Region VII incorporates the *macellum*, this assumption seems to be correct. Two sets of baths (the Forum and Stabian baths) also occupy parts of the region and we should also anticipate type B *tabernae* there, since in the extant literature shops, particularly *popinae*, tend to be associated with baths. Since we are dealing with public baths, it is likely that the shops that cluster around the baths were also publicly owned and leased out to private individuals (cf. Gassner 1986: 13-14).

That Region VII was an attractive place to be for a trader is also borne out to some extent by the relatively large proportions of type C and D *tabernae* there. In addition, the presence of these *tabernae* may shed further light on the development of the town. As already noted (above, n. 7), Gassner (1986) argues that both these types

of *tabernae* belong to the last phase of Pompeii's urban development. If this is the case, then it is slightly surprising that numbers of types C and D *tabernae* are relatively high in this region, for Gassner anticipates that urban development worked its way out from the centre. According to her scheme we should not expect to find these 'last phase' shops precisely in the centre. The fact that types C and D occur more often in Region VII than in any other region would seem to confirm that, in accordance with Nappo's (1988) recent findings, we cannot assume that the town developed uniformly from the centre outwards.

Numbers of sub-types

For each of the main types, sub-type 1 is by far the most frequent. It obviously suggests that one-roomed *tabernae* were the most popular type. This may be for two main reasons: they were most convenient and practicable for letting and renting purposes, and they were the most easily constructed types, either in and between existing houses or on vacant land.

For type A, in particular, the fact that sub-type 1 is most common must to some extent demonstrate that *tabernae* of the single-roomed type were most easily created from existing rooms of an atrium house. Rooms facing onto the street, perhaps typically bedrooms, were readily opened up to create them. This option must have been particularly attractive for owners of houses situated on one of the main streets, such as the Via dell'Abbondanza or the Via di

Stabia, or among the *insulae* that clustered around the forum.

The fact that there are relatively few examples of the other sub-types of type A suggests that, as might be expected, creating larger *tabernae* in atrium houses presented practical difficulties since it involved a further intrusion into the main house. By the same token, we might not anticipate this trend among sub-types of types B and D, since these were originally independent structures and therefore had no connection to a residential building. That the numbers of the more complex sub-types of these *tabernae* are also relatively few, as compared to the various sub-type 1 *tabernae*, tends to suggest that sub-type 1 was the most practicable and most readily leased form. Since the B1 sub-type predominates over all other sub-types, this may in itself be a fair indication of the prevalence of leasing in the town.

Distribution of sub-types

That, broadly speaking, the largest numbers of each sub-type noticeably cluster in Region VII, and to a lesser extent in Region VI, underlines the suggestion that these two regions (particularly VII) represented the hub of the town's activities. For sub-type 1 of types B and C this clustering is especially marked in Region VII. This perhaps serves to emphasize the possibility that one-roomed *tabernae* were most popular in these regions since they were most easily let.

Changes in tabernae structures

Among the *tabernae* in the present database only a small number revealed any structural changes. Three-quarters of them, however, were apparently productive, and only one shares a doorway with the rest of the house. From this (admittedly very limited) evidence, it seems possible that connections with the main house may have been blocked off at the time when the *tabernae* became productive, since all but one of the businesses that were run in these *tabernae* - two clay, stone, or woodworking shops; a carpenter's establishment; a metalworking business; and a bakery - were potentially messy and noisy.

Connectivity (1): rental practice in Pompeii

If we are right to assume that non-connectivity signifies probable rental property, then the prevalence of non-connected *tabernae* among atrium houses seems to bear out the idea that Pompeians were not averse to renting (or leasing) property, and in fact showed a marked preference for doing so. In addition, it is noteworthy that type B *tabernae* outnumber all others in the town; and since these are by definition, along with type D, 'independent' structures (and therefore ideal for leasing purposes), they are also more likely than not to have been leased.

The largest numbers of type A *tabernae* that do not share a connecting doorway with the main house occur in Region VII, which tends to imply that the owners of atrium houses were well aware of the potential profit to be gained from

renting out *tabernae* in this particular region. That Region VII was the central trading area of the town (as well as the political, social, and religious centre) suggests that the demand from traders for *tabernae* to rent must have been particularly high. This demand was met partly by financially opportunistic owners of atrium houses.

Again, however, since type B is the most dominant of all types in Region VII, it is probable that the owners of these *tabernae* were perfectly well aware of the demand for rental property in this area of the town. Indeed, many of these type B *tabernae* were probably owned, leased, and regulated by the town council (cf. Gassner 1986: 13-14; Wallace-Hadrill 1995).

At the same time it is worth remembering that 'unconnected' *tabernae*, particularly single-roomed types, need not have had anything directly to do with the house to which they belonged. We have already seen (Chapter 1) that it was possible to build up a 'portfolio' of properties, including shops and workshops, that were not located in the main residence of the *paterfamilias*. Shops and workshops might default to you by inheritance, just as Cicero inherited his *tabernae* in Rome and Puteoli, and his *part-insula*. It is clear that some of the property belonging to Nigidius Maius was not located in his *domus*, and the extent and range of the property belonging to Julia Felix suggests the same. Unfortunately, there is no way in which we can distinguish these types of property from those that directly belonged to the *paterfamilias*'s main house; we can

only suggest whether or not the property (or part of it) was likely to be leased.

Connectivity (2): attitudes to trade in Pompeii?

In practice, as already noted (p. 81) it is difficult to separate attitudes to trade from attitudes towards rental property, since the absence of a connection between house and shop can mean either that the owner of the house intended to keep trade at arm's length, or that he or she was keen to lease a part of the premises. Nevertheless, the fact that rental property was often used for trading purposes may partly indicate the desire on the part of the owner to physically distance himself from trade.

The clear tendency for atrium houses to possess non-connected *tabernae* in Region VII, which in effect represented the juncture of the town's social, political and economic activity, could thus suggest, first, that the owners of these houses were well aware of the potential for good business in this area; and, second, the very fact that Region VII represented the hub of social and political power meant that it was an area in which it was important to maintain the façade of social status if you aspired to political success. Maintaining a physical distance from trade, particularly by not having a connecting doorway from the atrium, allowed a member of the élite to maintain the façade of social status as expressed by the focal point of the house, the atrium. This may have been especially important to owners of houses in Region VII, since, as

already mentioned, the area is full of public-civic amenities and one's house was perhaps likely to be seen by more people in this region than in any other. More important still, it was undoubtedly the urban centre in which the fight for social supremacy was most conspicuously played out. Members of the *élite* hoping to propel themselves into office realized the possible benefit of living as close to the centre as possible. Cicero, as we have seen (Chapter 1), was most keen to obtain a house on the Palatine for this reason, and the continued excavations on the Palatine suggest that he was not alone (Patterson 1992). The corollary of this is that, since the centre of the town was also the centre of political and social power, it was also the last place in which anyone hoping for political office should be seen to be involved in a demeaning occupation, particularly in 'petty' or small-scale trade.

I suggest that the concern to 'keep up appearances' thus partly explains the relatively high proportion of type A *tabernae* without connecting doorways in Region VII. This was achieved, to some extent, by preserving the sanctity of the focal point of one's house, the atrium, which was done simply by ensuring that the *tabernae* did not permit internal access to the house, so that nobody could see the atrium by looking through the *taberna*.

Further confirmation of this hypothesis may come from *CIL* 4. 138, the notice for the Insula Arriana Polliana. It is now thought (see above, p. 76) that the *tabernae* referred

to in the advertisement included those at VI. vi. 23 and VI. vi. 2-4. None of these share a connecting doorway to the atrium, or to any other part of the house to which they are attached. Although this insula is in Region VI rather than in Region VII, similar concerns about 'keeping up appearances' in this region are no less applicable since it lies just behind the Forum and the Forum baths. The house (and therefore the *tabernae* also) faces on to what the RICA maps refer to as the Strada delle Terme, which is the western end of the Via di Nola, arguably the second major east-west thoroughfare after the Via dell'Abbondanza. If the house to which the *tabernae* are attached belonged to, or more importantly, was lived in by, Cn. Alleius Nigidius Maius, then we have a firmer basis on which to suggest a relationship between status and trade, since we know a little about Nigidius's status.

If the insula at VI. vi belonged, as is thought, to Nigidius Maius then it is clear that its owner must have derived a reasonable income from his rental property; this must also have helped supplement the costs of political office. Second, all the *tabernae* along the front of VI. vi have no connecting doorway with the main house, with the single exception of VI. vi. 22. This *taberna* shares a connecting doorway with the atrium, but only indirectly: it has an adjacent room at the back, and this connects to the atrium from the side in the manner of a *cubiculum*. The effect, for the outsider looking in or the visitor ushered into the atrium, was as though there were no connection

between the shop and the house. The atrium visitor is very unlikely to have been able to see through the supposed *cubiculum* to the *taberna*, any more than the outsider could see through from the *taberna* to the atrium. In other words, neither the outsider nor the visitor was likely to associate the owner of the house with direct involvement in the trade of VI. vi. 22.

The fact that these *tabernae* were located just across the road from the Forum baths may have acted as an additional incentive for the owner of the house to create this distance between himself and his *tabernae*. To some extent his *tabernae* may have benefited financially from their proximity to the baths: the baths were accessible to the public, and *tabernae* located near them could expect good business, which no doubt explains why Nigidius had shops here at all. But the baths are associated particularly with *tabernae* (in the generic sense) of the less reputable kind: *popinae* and *ganeae*, for instance (Wallace-Hadrill 1995). Whether or not the *tabernae* belonging to VI. vi were of this kind is not strictly relevant (though there is nothing to indicate one way or the other), but the kind of business that might have been carried out in the vicinity of the baths - especially prostitution - increased the likelihood that someone of Nigidius's standing needed to maintain the furthest possible physical distance from such activities. Thus there appears to be a probable correlation between status and the avoidance of trade, not just in this

particular block but also across the whole of Region VII, where type A1 (and also B1) *tabernae* predominate.

In this respect the attitudes expressed towards trade in the (Roman) sources may have been relevant - as far as we can discern - to Pompeii, and seem to have been sufficiently powerful for its more prominent citizens to have avoided the appearance of being involved in trading activity. Thus we can perhaps refine Wallace-Hadrill's suggestion (1991: 268) about the relationship between élites and trade in Pompeii; he says that 'we must reconstruct a world in which the rich lived in close contiguity with their dependants, slaves and freedmen, clients and tenants . . . In this respect, it may not be the Roman world that proves to be strange, but our own.' The Pompeian élite may have lived in close contiguity with their dependants, but that contiguity was measured (we might therefore redefine 'dependants' in this context). Members of the household lived and worked in significantly closer proximity to their *paterfamilias* than tenants did to their landlord. Letting *tabernae* within one's house may have been a way of increasing the numbers of one's dependants or tenants, but it represented an arrangement of financial convenience only, and it would not have been acceptable (from the élite perspective) to extend the parameters of that relationship too far.

Thus far, it seems that the type of house and the location of the house or *taberna* had an important bearing on whether or not the *taberna* was likely to share a

connecting doorway with the main house. If the house has an atrium, then more often than not the *taberna* does not share a connecting doorway; the likelihood of non-connection seems to increase the closer the house is to the forum. This in turn suggests that the status of the house-owner ran a greater risk of being compromised if he was seen to be directly involved in trade, particularly if he lived in an area associated with social and political power like the forum. Status compromise was avoided by having no connection from the *taberna* to the house; at the same time, non-connection allowed the owner to reap the financial benefits in the form of rents from having *tabernae* incorporated in his house. Thus, although in most cases we do not know either the owner of the house or his status, there seems to be something 'special' about an atrium house that requires its separation from trading activity.

We can perhaps see this even more clearly by comparing type C *tabernae*, those that belong to 'irregular' (or non-atrium) houses. In total these are less numerous than A or B types. These *tabernae* and the nature of their connection, incidentally, highlight the difficulty of assigning a 'name' or a function to a particular room. We have seen that identifying structure and function of atrium houses is largely dependent on the literary references, and that this in itself is problematic. As soon as the house is of non-atrium type, however, even these traditional identifications are difficult to make, since the layout of the house does not start from the organizational basis of

the atrium. This means, of course, that the houses attached to type C *tabernae* have no immediately recognizable rooms with a reception function, like the atrium. This could mean one of two things: either the house does not have a principal reception room, or we do not recognize it as such. Vitruvius identifies houses without atria only negatively, and only in relation to the atrium:

men of everyday fortune do not need entrance courts, tablina, or atriums built in grand style, because such men are more apt to discharge their social obligations by going round to others than to have others come to them.

(Vitruvius, *De arch.* 6. 5. 1)

For Vitruvius, then, status is signified by the presence of an atrium; its absence correspondingly denotes lack of status. Those without a reception room lack this type of room because they do not have the status (and the attendant visitors that come with it) to merit one. If Vitruvius's ideology holds true in Pompeii, then we might anticipate that those houses without atria were more closely associated with trade than those that had them, because the owners of these houses were not concerned with the possibility of compromising their status. Thus the type C *tabernae* provide a good test of Vitruvius, since logically there should be no, or little, disconnection between the shops and the house to which they are attached.

We could start by looking at Region VII, since, following the trend shown by the atrium houses, this is where we would expect the most concern for status maintenance. There are 12 type C *tabernae* in Region VII, 11 of which are the single-roomed C1 type. All but one of these (VII. iii. 18) are directly connected by a doorway to the main house. So, whereas A1 type *tabernae* in this region show a marked tendency to be increasingly distanced from the main house, with C1 *tabernae* the reverse is true. In Region VI, the next most central area, we can make the same observation: while there are only a small number of C1 *tabernae* here (5), they are all connected. Furthermore, if we extend the enquiry to the rest of Pompeii we can see that the very high proportion of 'connected' *tabernae* in Region VII is repeated across the site. Discounting those in Region VII, there are 17 type C1 *tabernae* in the other regions of the town, 15 of which are directly connected to the main house. If we include all C type *tabernae*, then the proportion of connected : unconnected *tabernae* increases still further: of a total of 48 type C *tabernae*, 46 are directly connected to the main house. There is no real difference between type C *tabernae* in Region VII and those in the rest of Pompeii; that is, there is no real trend in connectivity that varies with location.

It thus seems that if you did not possess a conventional reception room - the atrium - then the need to separate shops from the rest of the house virtually disappeared. If we can assume that status is to some extent marked by an

atrium, then perhaps the owners of these houses were of lower status than atrium house-owners; accordingly, since their status was not sufficiently high to warrant an atrium, perhaps they would not compromise it by having shops directly connected to the house. There is a clear difference in this respect between A1 *tabernae* and C1 *tabernae*. If, on the other hand, we assume that there is no necessary connection between the status of the owner and the presence or absence of an atrium, then it seems that the atrium itself was regarded as important or prestigious enough to 'keep free' from trade. However, this would be a problematic answer: it is clear from the literature that the atrium is important not in isolation, but precisely because it reflects the status and identity of the owner of the house (Saller 1984; Wallace-Hadrill 1988); we need think only of Trimalchio to realize this.

Ultimately, of course, we cannot be certain that those who possessed an atrium house in Pompeii were of higher status than those who did not, since we have no way of assigning occupants to houses; Della Corte's (1954) attempt to assign owners to houses by using the graffiti and dipinti around the town has since been shown to be thoroughly flawed (Mouritsen 1988).

However, it does follow that the owners of type C1 *tabernae* were likely to be the owners of the house (or vice versa) of which the *tabernae* formed part, since the *tabernae* and houses were directly connected in all but two cases. The business and residential spaces were practically

inseparable, which strongly suggests that the owner of the house was involved in the business of the *taberna*. So, while we cannot necessarily make any firm inferences about the status of the owners of houses attached to C1 *tabernae*, we can suggest that they were directly involved in trading activity, and that they were far more likely to be involved in trade than the owners of atrium houses who had *tabernae* on their properties.

Another way of trying to discern possible attitudes to trade is to look at *tabernae* to which a trade can be provisionally assigned. Unfortunately, the instances of this type of *taberna* in the database are in practice too few to allow any firm conclusions. Only *tabernae* dealing in 'provisions', metalware, and dye are at all numerous. Of the 'provisions' shops, 21 are of types B and D; of the other 5, 4 are type A and 1 is type C. Since types B and D are independent structures, they are the premises that were usually given over entirely to 'economic' (or non-residential) space. The fact that they have nothing to do with houses strongly suggests that these small-scale trading premises were kept at a distance from house-owners. That there are so few that are part of a house further supports this theory, although of the four A type *tabernae*, three share a connecting doorway with the main house, which implies that distancing was not so important as the numbers of B and D *tabernae* suggest. It is, however, also worth noticing that none of these type A *tabernae* occur in Region

VII, where, as I have argued, the preservation of status appearance may have been paramount.

No firm conclusions can be drawn, either, from the metalware *tabernae*. The majority are A type *tabernae*, of which three share a connecting doorway, two are uncertain, and three do not. However, in the case of the dye shops, all the B and D type *tabernae* (4), by definition, have no connection to a house, while of the two type A *tabernae*, one has no connecting doorway and the other is uncertain. The remaining example, a type C *taberna*, does share a connecting doorway to the main house. Thus the limited evidence for dye shops tends to suggest that this type of trade was more likely to be distanced from a house.¹²

For fulleries and brothels, our other source of evidence for possible attitudes to trade, little further progress can be made. Of nine brothels, only two form part of a possible atrium house, which may imply that brothels tended to be distanced from houses and house owners. One of the brothels attached to the possible atrium house shares a connecting doorway to the main house, but it is located in Region IX and, moreover, is tucked away along a back street. Since we cannot even be sure that this is an atrium house (it is only partially excavated), it would be unwise to attach much significance to this particular brothel.

¹² On the possible relationship between this kind of trade (in Pompeii) and the social status of the owner, see Lyapustin (1983).

The evidence for fulleries is equally tenuous. There are six fulleries included in the database; three are directly connected to an atrium house, the other three are not. Again, from such a small sample it would be pointless to make general inferences about the relationship between houses and fulleries in Pompeii; but for particular fulleries it is clear that there is no marked avoidance of, or preference for, connectivity with this kind of business.

CONCLUSION

The evidence of Pompeian *tabernae* seems to suggest that perhaps most of them were leased. We cannot know the status of the vast majority of the owners, but the rental notice relating to the property of Nigidius Maius certainly indicates that the Pompeian élite were likely to be the owners of at least some of these *tabernae*, and that they derived an income from them. We should also bear in mind that, as well as the *tabernae*, some houses and apartments must have been leased; there is, however, no obvious way of identifying these in the archaeological record. The advertisements for property belonging to Julia Felix and Nigidius both refer to houses for rent, as well as shops and apartments. While it may be possible to work out which house is referred to in *CIL* 4. 138, this is not the case for the properties of Julia Felix; and given that these are the only two notices we have to work from, there is little hope of our ever being able to reconstruct rental practice in Pompeii more generally. As has been pointed out

(Wallace-Hadrill 1991: 264-7; Frier 1980), the word *insula* is a specific legal term signifying a unit of ownership. An *insula* could, in theory, extend over several houses and shops. The problem at Pompeii is that we have no way of recreating legal boundaries: a 'block' of houses might all belong to the same unit of ownership, but might just as easily be separately owned. This acts as a further reminder that we cannot necessarily infer that shops incorporated in houses, but not sharing a connecting doorway, were leased by the owner of the house of which they were structurally a part. But neither can we 'assume that every physically separate unit was a legally independent owner-occupied unit' (Wallace-Hadrill 1991: 265). Again, this serves to re-emphasize that the only distinction we can make with any certainty is between those *tabernae* that potentially were leased, and those that probably were not.

From the notices, however, it would appear that the multiplicity of urban investments of a Roman like Cicero are replicated at Pompeii; if we add in the number of *tabernae* that may have been leased, then the opportunity for leasing and renting in Pompeii was considerable. It therefore seems likely that the 'rental habit' was no less common in Pompeii than at Rome, and was perhaps even more prevalent. If it was more prevalent, it would lend credence to the view that moral attitudes in Rome were more powerful than elsewhere. Political aspirants had the most to gain in Rome, but at the same time the most to lose. Involvement in urban investments, either through trade or through leasing,

had to be carefully managed in order to avoid clashing with social mores. It might therefore have seemed preferable to avoid having extensive holdings in Rome itself, and perhaps to have some outside the capital where they were less in the public view. It remains the case that individual large 'portfolios' of Roman urban property are difficult to trace in the sources. The possible exception is Crassus, but there is no real evidence for his holdings of urban property: all we have is one literary reference, now regarded as anecdotal, to which we should attach no overriding significance.

The apparent lack of evidence may reflect careful management, rendering urban investments almost invisible to us; on the other hand, it may be that there were very few extensive holdings in Rome itself. In Pompeii, by contrast, although there was clearly an avoidance of trade in atrium houses around the forum, that avoidance is limited to a physical distancing. There were shops in these houses, and the majority of them were probably leased. The fact that we can link one large *insula* to one of Pompeii's most prominent citizens, Nigidius Maius, suggests that Pompeian citizens did not feel obliged to 'cover their tracks', although, as in his case, they may still have felt the need to avoid direct involvement with the leasing arrangements. In this respect the role of the *familia*, slaves and freedmen in particular, was crucial.

Chapter 3

The Urban Familia and Aspects of its Management

We have seen (Chapter 1) that a wealthy Roman household could be extraordinarily diverse, incorporating a range of urban (as well as rural) properties that might be spread over a huge area. The economic fortunes of the household rested not simply on property ownership, but on the organization of the *familia* itself. The discussion that follows attempts to highlight some of the ways in which the *familia urbana* was organized so as to contribute to the success of the household and the *dominus*.

SOURCES FOR THE FAMILIA URBANA

While the (ideal) *familia rustica* can be reconstructed from the agronomic treatises, there is no equivalent corpus of texts that will inform us of the expected jobs and tasks of the *familia urbana* (Treggiari 1976: 76). Instead the main sources are the epitaphs from the *columbaria* of a small handful of prominent families in Rome during the late Republic and early principate. These refer particularly to the households of the Volusii and the Statilii, but also include that of the empress Livia. In addition to the

epigraphic sources there are scattered references to household staff in some of the extant literary sources, particularly the letters of Cicero and the younger Pliny. We are fortunate to have this evidence for these particular *familiae* since they are also the *familiae* for whom we have some evidence of property ownership, so they enable us to make some inferences about the management of urban property and the organization of the household in this respect.

For the purpose of reconstructing the composition of the household, however, the literary and epigraphic sources pose a number of problems. With the literary sources, it is not often that we actually hear of job titles as such; more usual is a description of the job done by one slave or another. Thus we cannot be sure that in Cicero's letters, for example, an isolated mention of a slave, together with their particular task, necessarily means that that job was their normal or assigned job. Neither can we be certain what their title was, if any.

The opposite problem is posed by the epigraphic sources. For the most part, only the job title is recorded, with no description of what the job entailed. Furthermore, while the meaning, implications, and nuances of a particular job title may have been perfectly obvious to the Romans themselves, it is not always possible for us to ascertain its exact meaning, which may well also have differed from household to household. For example, the *horrearii* recorded in both the Volusian and Statilian households could mean either 'warehouse supervisors', or, more likely, 'storeroom

supervisors', referring to a storeroom within the *domus* rather than warehouses owned (and perhaps let) by the two families. As with the literary sources, we cannot know exactly what tasks the job entailed.

Equally, while the literary texts may not accurately reflect the extent and composition of the household - it is quite possible that Cicero had many more slaves than he ever mentions in his letters¹ - we cannot be any more certain of how accurately the inscriptions reflect either the total number in the *familia*, or the number of job titles. First, it is impossible to know for certain whether all the epitaphs that were originally erected have survived, even though the sheer number of epitaphs from the *columbaria* - as many as 541 for the Statilii - suggests that we may have a fairly complete record. Moreover, the numbers and variety of job titles compare favourably with the numbers of slaves and freedmen that we know about from the literary sources; as might be expected, given that the households of Livia, the Statilii, and the Volusii were among the richest of their time, they contain numbers well in excess of others that are known to us. On the other hand, the most serious problem is one of securely identifying some epitaphs as belonging to a particular *familia*, particularly those that have been found outside

¹ Shatzman (1975: 407) estimates that since Cicero owned at least twenty estates and houses he must have had at least a hundred domestics. It is impossible to know how many of these belonged to his main urban residence.

the *columbaria*.² The main recent studies of these *familiae* are all based on the *columbarium* inscriptions; for the purposes of this work I, too, refer only to the *columbarium* epitaphs, since these form homogeneous groups and are readily comparable.

It has been argued that the slaves and freedmen recorded in the inscriptions are a selective group, who were 'disproportionately often the most successful', and that if they could afford epitaphs they are likely to have been among the richer members of the *familia* (Flory 1975: 3-4; Treggiari 1975a: 57). While this is probably true for the most part, there are other reasons why the name of a slave or freedman might appear among the epitaphs. It is not always apparent, for example, who has paid for the inscription; while it might be the slave or freedman himself, it might also be his friends (sometimes fellow *collegium*³ members) or relatives within the *familia*⁴, or

² The severity of the problem can be gauged by comparing the studies of Flory (1975) and Buonocore (1982; 1984), who differ at several points over both the composition (as indicated by job titles) and the extent (total numbers) of the *familia* of the Volusii. Flory takes the epitaphs from the *columbarium* of the Volusii, as does Treggiari (1975a), for the purpose of studying comparable sets of epitaphs (i.e. those of Volusii, the Statilii, and the *familia* of Livia). Buonocore's study, however, also incorporates some inscriptions published by Manacorda (1979), along with the epitaphs from the *columbarium*, and also those either previously unpublished or unedited in *CIL* (Buonocore 1982: 17).

³ The *collegia* referred to in the *columbarium* inscriptions include both trade *collegia* and domestic *collegia* (usually specifically for funeral purposes).

⁴ This was particularly true of slaves (Joshel 1992: 59). Freedmen were less likely to record family relations, instead

even the *domina* or *dominus*. There was a strong possibility of having one's epitaph paid for by one's friends or relatives, since a number of epitaphs in the *columbaria* of the Statilian and Volusian *familiae* are put up by someone other than the slave or freedman being commemorated. Joshel has recently reinforced this point through a study of occupational inscriptions from Rome (Joshel 1992: esp. 19 ff.), which, while admitting the importance of financial resources, argues for the significance of other factors too, particularly the role of burial clubs (*collegia*). In the case of the large households studied here, wealth may have had little to do with commemoration, since slaves were given a space in the *columbarium* because of their connection with the household. The reason why some are commemorated with job titles and others not is much more likely to be their personal proximity to the *paterfamilias* rather than their wealth. The point remains, however, that ultimately we cannot be sure of the basis of selectivity of the inscriptions. All we can be sure of is that the inscriptions testify simply to 'a certain self-consciousness about the role of work' in the existence of those being commemorated (Joshel 1992: 17), especially since it is usually the deceased (or, as suggested, his or her fellow slave or freedman) rather than the owner that is responsible for the words of commemoration. In a recent study of over 1,500 epitaphs, in only 1.4 per cent of cases preferring their occupational title.

was the owner the commemorator (Joshel 1992: 50). In the specific case of *columbarium* epitaphs, this figure increases only slightly, to 2.3 per cent (Joshel 1992: 76).

In addition, it should be noted that those persons recorded with job titles form a select group within a select group. The total number of staff commemorated on the *columbarium* epitaphs is 149 for Livia's household, 214 for that of the Volusii, and perhaps more exceptionally 541 for the Statilian household. For the household of the Statilii only 169 epitaphs include job titles (31 per cent of the total), for that of the Volusii 44 (21 per cent), and for Livia's household 78 (52 per cent). This may go some way to explaining why, as Treggiari notes (1975a), there appear to be some notable gaps in the composition of Livia's staff. There are, for example, no cooks recorded (1975a: 54 n. 75). It is unthinkable that someone of Livia's status had no cooks, so we may assume that they are among those epitaphs that mention no specific job, perhaps because, at least within Livia's household, cooks were not of especially high status. Along with those whose names are recorded but not their jobs, we should also note that there are likely to have been other slaves (and freedmen) who have left no record at all of their existence. Thus for all those slaves and freedmen who may have achieved moderate success (and possibly wealth), and whose names and perhaps job titles are recorded, there were almost certainly just as many who did not. In sum, we cannot be certain how far

the inscriptions reflect the full extent of the *familia*, or exactly what criteria were necessary for commemoration.⁵

There is another problem that has to be remembered when studying Roman *familiae* via the inscriptions, which, though apparently self-evident, is often overlooked in practice. The *columbaria* were not filled instantaneously, but over a period of years. That is to say, the epitaphs are not a record of a frozen moment in time, Pompeii-style. They do not record the members of a household as it existed at any one time, but record an accumulated number of household members. Thus the Volusian *columbarium* was in use from about AD 20 to AD 97 (Buonocore 1984: 57),⁶ that of the Statilii from the time of Augustus to the reign of Nero. It is not always possible to date the epitaphs: some, but by no means all, of those from the *columbaria* of the Statilian and Volusian *familiae* can be dated to a particular owner,⁷

⁵ It should also be noted that it is often impossible to tell the legal status of the person being commemorated. Generally speaking, slaves are indicated by single names and no genitive; freedmen can be indicated by a *nomen*, and/or by 'l.' (*libertus*). Frequently (and particularly in the principate) this designation is missing and there is nothing to distinguish the freed from the freeborn. The addition of an *agnomen*, usually ending in '-ianus', can refer to either slaves or freedmen, but at least (typically) indicates the owner.

⁶ Buonocore revises Mommsen's estimate (*CIL* 6, pp. 1043-4), and e.g. Treggiari (1975b, following Mommsen). Joshel (1992) glosses over the dating of inscriptions from the Volusii *columbarium*, and makes no reference to Buonocore.

⁷ For the Volusii, see most recently Buonocore (1984: 57-8), who dates members of the *familia* - attested in the *columbarium* and elsewhere - to 12 different Volusii owners. For dating members of Livia's *familia*, see Treggiari (1975a). There is no comparable modern study of the Statilian *familia*.

but not to a particular date or period within the lifetime of the owner. Equally it is not always possible to reconstruct the composition of the household for any one moment, or even to know which members of the household were contemporary with one another. Although large numbers of household members were not unusual, especially in the early principate - Tacitus suggests that 400 was not an uncommon size⁸ - it is highly unlikely that the number of inscriptions pertaining to the Statilian *familia* (541), reflects its totality at any one moment. Livia's household is an exception to the problem of assigning more specific dates to household members; some of the epitaphs of *liberti* in her *familia* can at least be dated pre- or post-AD 14, since on the death of Augustus Livia changed her name to Iulia Augusta, while occasionally an epitaph can be dated more precisely within the pre-AD 14 period (Treggiari 1975a: 49). However, although Treggiari highlights the unique potential for discussing the composition of Livia's household more accurately in temporal terms and is aware of the problems of extrapolating figures for the *familia* for any one moment in time (1975a: 57), she proceeds as though all the staff recorded in the epitaphs were in fact contemporaries. In this chapter, some temporal distinctions

⁸ Tac. Ann. 14. 43. The elder Pliny mentions the freedman C. Caecilius Isidorus as having over 4,000 slaves (HN 33. 135); the younger Pliny may have had over 500 slaves (De Neeve 1990: 370), although what proportion of these were urban slaves is not known. According to Plutarch (Crass. 2. 2. 6), Crassus had innumerable slaves (even discounting his 500 masons and architects), including readers, clerks, silversmiths, stewards and waiters.

are made on the basis of ownership; where there are no distinctions, this is either because none can be made with certainty or because they do not illuminate aspects of household organization under discussion.

The household of Livia presents its own special problems. Since Livia was a member of the imperial household, some of her staff were specific to her status, such as the *a purpura* (CIL 6. 4016: custodian of royal garments) and the *ab ornamentis sacerdotalibus* (8955: custodian of equipment used for religious purposes). Other jobs, such as a *tabulis* (3970: custodian of the art gallery) may also have been specific to the imperial household. Because of the potential anomalies in Livia's *familia* - which are therefore best served by a specific study, as Treggiari (1975a) recognizes - this household is not the special focus of this chapter, since 'the minute divisions of labour [are] characteristic only of the imperial establishment' (Flory 1975: 95). That is not to say, however, that the *familiae* of the Statilii or the Volusii are at the same time regarded as being in any way 'typical' of Roman households; we know from other sources that they were not, and the fact that we have their extensive epitaphs at all suggests that they were very wealthy, perhaps extraordinarily so.

Whereas the agronomists suggest that the *familia rustica* centred around the *vilicus* (and perhaps the *vilica*), there is no clear indication from the sources as to who was pivotal to the *familia urbana*. We may presume that this is

partly due to the fact that there is no corpus of texts that deal directly with the *familia urbana* in the way that the agronomic texts deal with its rural counterpart.⁹ The fact that there is no 'manual' on urban household management or production must bear out the argument that the urban environment was principally one in which the emphasis was on ostentation. At the same time, it probably reflects also the dominant ideology of the Roman élite: to avoid at all costs direct association with urban trade or, to put in another way, with production that was not so morally sound. In keeping with the *mos maiorum*, the way in which the Roman élite liked and chose to depict themselves was as farmers, or at least as country-dwellers. Urban trade or production did not fit in with that cherished ideal. Dissociation from trade is a recurrent theme, particularly in the literature (e.g. Cicero, *De officiis*, 1. 150-1; see also Chapter 1), and we should probably regard the lack of an urban household treatise partly as an extension of the same ideology. But the fact that no one member of the *familia urbana* stands out from the sources might also be an argument for the regular and largely continuous presence of the *paterfamilias*; there was no practical need, unlike in the rural *familia* (see Chapter 6), for one particular slave or freedman to supervise the

⁹ While we must allow for the possibility that such manuals have simply not survived, the fact that none are cited or named in other sources makes it extremely improbable that any such text was ever written.

others in place of the *paterfamilias*, since the *paterfamilias* was almost always present.

The urban familia and conspicuous consumption

I have suggested (above, p. 135) that the economic fortunes of the household rested upon the *familia urbana*, and more specifically, upon its good management. But the most apparent aspects of its organization influenced the economic well-being of the household only tangentially. Nevertheless, they cannot be discounted from a study of the economic organization of the household, since they contributed greatly to the conspicuous consumption that the owner needed to finance.

Among the more numerous members of the *familia* were those involved in the 'domestic' duties of the *paterfamilias*'s main residence. Cicero had a domestic entourage of *servi et ancillae*, between whom he failed to differentiate. By contrast, the Statilii had two 'wardrobe attendants' (*ad vestem*: 6372, 6374 = 9960), and a *puer capsarius* (6245), a valet (*vestiarius*: 6373), three *pedisequi* (6332-4), as well as three *pedisequae* (6335-6, 9775), two *tonsores* (barbers: 6336-7), and seven *unctores* (perfumers? 6215, 6343, 6376-8, 6380-2). There were other female attendants, too; two nurses (*nutrices*: 6323-4), a midwife (*opstetrix*: 6325), and a *tonstrix* (hairdresser: 6368). The Volusii did not boast quite such a specialized entourage, but in addition to their *cubicularii* (7287-8, 7369, 9304) they had a *capsarius idem a cubiculo* (wardrobe attendant and chamberlain? 7368),

a *vestiplicus* (valet: 7301), four *nutrices* (7290, 7355, 7393, 29950), two *ornatrices* (7296-7), and, furthermore, an *a speculum* (sic) (mirror-holder: 7297).

Cicero only ever mentions one *cubicularius* (Att. 6. 2. 5), whereas the Statilii had as many as twelve *cubicularii* (attendants: 6254 = 6255, 6256-65, 6595) who were, moreover, headed by a *supra cubicularios* (9287); the Volusii had just four *cubicularii*. The Statilii had five *atrienses* (porters? 6215, 6239-42), compared to Cicero's one. The Statilii had two *velarii* (6258, 6371), slaves whose job it was to pull the curtains aside for guests (Seneca, *Ep.* 70. 1).

Cicero took the above-mentioned *cubicularius* with him to Cilicia in 51 BC, mildly bemoaning that in the province he has to see everyone personally, thus doing *nihil per cubicularium* (Att. 6. 2. 5), perhaps implying that when in Rome, he might expect that some business would reach him via his valet. We hear of very few other staff who attended Cicero personally. He refers to his *domesticae convictiones* (*QFr.* 1. 1. 12) as though there was no particular differentiation to be made between them in terms of their individual tasks, and gives us no clues as to their specialisms, perhaps because there were none. Alternatively, it is possible that this general way of referring to his domestic staff is something of a literary pose adopted by Cicero. As a man of high social status (and especially, perhaps, one who is sensitive to 'only' being a *novus homo*), it may be that he wants to give the

impression of being above discussing the minutiae of domestic staff,¹⁰ or perhaps he wants - for similar reasons - to dissociate himself from details that are personal or potentially repulsive. He is not likely, for example, to discuss the slaves who clean out the toilet or the bathroom.

Although not exactly 'domestic' staff we may also include in this category the fourteen litter-carriers (*lecticarii*: 6218, 6302-13), including one *supra lecticarios*: 6301), and the ten *Germani* (slave bodyguards: 6221, 6229-37) of the Statilii, and perhaps the *asturconarius* (groom: 6238) and a *balneator* (bath attendant: 6243). The Volusii, although they did not have their own bodyguard, may have had their own gladiator, Petraitēs (Manacorda 1979: 38, no. 21),¹¹ although it should be noted that the relevant inscription does not appear among the *columbarium* epitaphs.

Cicero had an *anagnosta* (1. 12. 4), or reader, for dinner parties. This was a slave called Sositheus, who died either at the very end of 62 BC or at the beginning of 61; Cicero never talks of a replacement. But this was hardly an extravagance, since dinner entertainment was entirely

¹⁰ This situation is taken to satirical extremes with Petronius's Trimalchio, who appears not to know how many staff he has, nor what their particular jobs are, in an attempt to impress his visitors with his apparent wealth, and personal removal from the mundane.

¹¹ That one of the most prominent families during the early principate may have had their own gladiator again indicates that the moral rhetoric of the period cannot be taken as a reflection of actual behaviour.

expected of someone of Cicero's social standing.¹² There is no comparison with the number of entertainers owned by the Statilii, who had two *comoedi* (6252-3), a *pumilio* (jester: 9842), a *symphoniacus* (musician: 6356), and even a *silentarius* (keeper of order in the household: 6217). Similarly, the Volusii had a lutanist (*citharoedus*: 7286) and a female singer (*cantrix*: 7285).

A household might also have its own 'professionals'. It is possible that Cicero did not have his own doctor; while he seems to have used Alexio (a *medicus*, Att. 15. 1. 1), Alexio was not obliged to tend to Tiro when the latter fell ill at Patrae, and Cicero had to pay a local doctor (*Fam.* 16. 4. 1). Either Alexio was particularly senior (perhaps a freedman) in Cicero's household, and was therefore to be spared the inconvenience of travelling to Patrae (unlikely, given Cicero's fondness for Tiro), or, as seems more likely, he was not (or no longer?) a member of Cicero's *familia*, which would account for the rarity with which he is mentioned in Cicero's letters (cf. Garland 1992: 167-8). Perhaps surprisingly, Cicero seems not to have had a teacher: he appears to have had trouble in finding a teacher for Marcus, and had to borrow the freedman Pomponius Dionysius from Atticus (Att. 5. 9. 3).

¹² That an *anagnosta* was considered unexceptional is perhaps underlined by the lack of inscriptional evidence: there is only one possible *anagnosta* recorded in *CIL* 6. 33830: Daphne Iulia / anagnos / P. Longenius / P. l. Licinius).

Both the Statilii and Volusii had their own tutors, in contrast to Cicero's struggle to secure just one; the Statilii had four male tutors and one female compared with the Volusii's single *paedagogus* (7298). The Volusii apparently even had a teacher for their slaves, an *ab hospitibus et paedagogus puerorum* (7290 = 9474). Similarly, both households possessed their own doctors, the Statilii having two (6319-20), the Volusii one (7295).

Members of the domestic staff also included 'administrative' staff. In this category we should perhaps place Tiro, Cicero's *ad manum*, a title which probably equates to 'personal secretary'. It is never clear exactly what duties Tiro was expected to carry out, although Cicero seems to find him particularly invaluable in helping him with his literary work. It is clear, however, that he was indispensable in other ways too, including in helping Cicero with his business affairs (*quem quidem ego, etsi mirabilis utilitates mihi praebet, cum valet, in omni genere vel negotiorum vel studiorum meorum: Att. 7. 5. 2*).¹³ When the occasion demanded it seems that he could be called upon to perform a wide variety of tasks, from entertaining Cicero's guests to helping Atticus arrange Cicero's divorce (*Att. 16. 15*). Tiro appears to be Cicero's sole *ad manum*; the Statilian household, however, had two (6273, 6595), the Volusian three (7281, 7372-3).

¹³ 'He is extraordinarily useful to me when well in all sorts of ways, both in business and in my literary work' (trans. Shackleton Bailey 1968).

Of the other 'administrators' of Cicero's *familia urbana* we hear almost nothing, and very few are mentioned individually by name. Few, too, are named along with their job title, which makes identification of their respective titles somewhat speculative (cf. Garland 1992: 164). Among those mentioned are Hilarus, a *librarius* (Att. 13. 19. 1: delivering a letter). We may assume that Cicero had more than one *librarius*, and that they were important to Cicero, given his dedication to his literary work. For the bookkeeping, Cicero does specifically mention an accountant (*ratiocinator*: Att. 1. 12. 2) of his, a freedman (another Hilarus, probably not the same man as the *librarius*). He may have had more, but none are mentioned. The Statilii, however, had three recorded *tabularii* (6358-9, 6596).

Tabellarii (roughly, 'messengers') are not perhaps 'administrators' as we would recognize them, but nevertheless should probably be regarded as a sub-category of administrators, as they were primarily responsible for the transmission of Cicero's letters. Indeed, Cicero's *tabellarii* may have represented some of Cicero's more trusted (and well-used) slaves, given the sheer volume of his epistolary output and its political and personal sensitivity. Cicero's *tabellarii* are mentioned throughout his letters, sometimes by name, sometimes not. Examples include a *tabellarius* mentioned in Att. 13. 46. 5; it is possibly one of his *tabellarii* whom he refers to in Att. 15. 5; and it is probably *tabellarii* that he refers to in Att. 15. 8 when he sends them to Atticus along with Tiro in

order that letters can be despatched to him as necessary. Garland (1992: 167) identifies a certain Aegypta, sent to stay with Tiro, as a *tabellarius*; this is, however, rather tenuous since Aegypta is referred to only by name.¹⁴ Two *tabellarii* are recorded in the *familia* of the Statilii (6342, 6357), but none for the Volusii.

Perhaps also relevant to this category is Pollex, described as an *a pedibus* (Att. 8. 5. 1),¹⁵ who is sent to Rome in order to ensure that a particular letter is returned to Cicero, and, at a later date is sent to deliver a letter (Att. 11. 4a). The same Pollex is sent to accept Cluvius's will, on Cicero's instructions. Cicero chooses Pollex to act directly as his representative, and Pollex seems to be his automatic choice for this responsible job (*idem igitur Pollex*). Pollex's trustworthiness is indicated by the pun at the start of the letter: Cicero says of him *sed plane pollex, non index*, punning on the secondary meaning of *index*, meaning 'informer'. Pollex is also used by Cicero to tell Atticus the figures for Cicero's outgoings (Att. 13. 47), presumably because Cicero did not want to commit them to a letter (cf. Garland 1992: 167).

We should also include under 'domestic' staff those whose jobs relate to the provisions of the household. Livia, as we have already seen (above, p. 140), most probably had

¹⁴ Shackleton Bailey is not certain whether Aegypta is even Cicero's freedman (1970: vol. 9, s.v. Aegypta).

¹⁵ For Livia's household, Treggiari places the *a pedibus* among 'attendants' (1975: 53). It seems to me that Pollex is something more than just a 'footman'.

cooks even though none are recorded. Cicero mentions a cook just once (*Fam.* 9. 20. 2). The Statilii had four cooks (*coci*: 6246-9), a specialist pastry chef (*fartor*: 6286), and three bakers (*pistores*: 6219, 6337-8), together with a wine steward (*cellarius*: 6216). There is no cook recorded for the Volusii, but there was a *cellarius* (7281), three *a frumento* (custodians of food supplies: 9423-5), and a *horrearius* (either a storeroom or warehouse supervisor: 7289). Cicero does not seem to have had any of these additional staff concerned with the provisioning of the household.

It is clear that all the households under discussion comprised a large number of 'domestic' staff. It is equally evident that Cicero's staff are less numerous than those of the other households. This marked difference between the sizes of Cicero's household and those of the Statilii and Volusii can partly be accounted for in terms of the timespan over which the respective sets of *familiae* were recorded; it must be remembered that the slaves and freedmen that we know of from Cicero's letters are mentioned over a period of roughly twenty years, whereas the *columbaria* of both the Statilii and Volusii were in use for fifty years or so (above, p. 141). Even so, it seems a strong possibility that the latter were at all times larger households than Cicero's; while it may be argued that Cicero almost certainly had more slaves and freedmen than are ever mentioned in his letters, in a similar way the Statilian and Volusian households probably had more members

than were recorded in the *columbaria*. Thus it is reasonably safe to assume that, even allowing for the temporal disparity of the Volusii and Statilii epitaphs, their respective households were larger at any one time than that of Cicero, not least because of their relative known wealth: both were prominent and wealthy aristocratic families in the early imperial period, whereas Cicero was a Republican *novus homo* who, though not poor, seems to have been less well off than many of his peers.¹⁶ This is supported further by the level of specialization within the respective *familiae*: in general, there are far fewer individual job titles for Cicero's staff than for the others.

Having numerous job specializations within one's *familia* was a means by which one's status was advertised (cf. Joshel 1992: 55). As Treggiari suggests, a large *familia* made for conspicuous consumption, and conspicuous consumption was essential to the prestige of prominent families. This status and prestige could be further emphasized by having 'expensive slaves whose function was largely decorative' (Treggiari 1975a: 60).¹⁷ Although I would suggest that there is no necessary correlation

¹⁶ See generally Shatzman (1975).

¹⁷ Status and prestige is, of course, precisely what Trimalchio aspires to, and which he tries to attain by having large numbers of decorative slaves. The satire lies in the fact that Trimalchio does not know how to use these slaves to achieve the effect he wants to achieve; he appears to know none to his slaves' names, and the jobs they perform are almost wholly random, rather than being minutely divided and specialized.

between 'decorativeness' and expense, it is true that the Volusian and Statilian households had a greater number and a greater variety of domestic servants than Cicero. Thus ostentation was emphasized not simply by the size of the *familia*, but particularly by specialization within it. To have specialist slaves within one's *familia* added to the impression of one's wealth and status. Thus while Livia's household was a little over half the size of that of the Volusii and less than a quarter the size of the Statilian *familia*, it actually had a greater number of jobs (46 as opposed to 40). This must have been even more the case if one had a number of slaves employed only in apparently decorative jobs. Petronius's Trimalchio has a huge entourage of 'decorative' slaves; being a *parvenu*, however, he has little idea of the appropriate manner in which to try to articulate his status. The result is a mockery of the rich freedman trying to buy his way into 'upper-class' society.

If we count the domestic staff and personal attendants of the Statilii and the Volusii as being 'decorative' - though they clearly had a functional purpose as well - then we can see that perhaps the larger part of both households were given over to consumption. Some were no doubt more decorative than others: the two *velarii* of the Statilii, or the mirror-holder, for example, cannot have been 'functional' for much of the time. More to the point are the several different types of 'entertainers', whose functions were observable by visitors and who were

particularly useful, no doubt, at dinner-parties. Again, one is reminded of Trimalchio, who, although he has a large number of entertainers, has a habit of asking them to perform at inappropriate moments. Cicero, in contrast, had few slaves at all, and fewer still that were purely 'decorative'; he seems to have no slave or freedman who fits this description. Even though he clearly had some domestic staff, he himself lumps most of them together as *domesticis convictionibus*, and *servi et ancillae*. Apart from these, we hear only of an *atriensis*. While it was no doubt the mark of a poor household that it had few slaves in the first place, it was surely a more emphatic mark of that poorer status that one had few slaves given over to what might seem to be almost frivolous tasks.

Treggiari's comment on slaves' decorativeness and expense seems to stem from a belief that because these slaves did not directly contribute to the productivity of the household they were proportionately more expensive to 'run' than others. A similar line is taken by Shatzman (1975: 424), who suggests that, for Cicero, 'a large staff of domestics surely involved some waste'. But it could be argued that conspicuous consumption, while deemed necessary for those families wanting to maintain their prestige, also represented a form of indirect and long-term investment, since the greater one's prestige, the greater the likelihood that others would, for example, leave you legacies or bequests, extend credit to you, and so forth. The economic well-being of one's household could thus rest

as much upon consumption and ostentation as on those activities regarded as 'productive', such as weaving.

THE URBAN FAMILIA AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Among the households under discussion there were also a number of staff engaged in ensuring that the household was largely self-sufficient. In the Statilian household, for example, there was a baker, a tailor (*sarcinator*: 6348), two shoemakers (*sutor*: 6355; *sutorianus*: 6316), and at least one, possibly two weavers (6361; 6360?). A number of the female members of the *familia* were involved in wool-working. There were eight *quasillariae* (spinners: 6339-46), three *sarcinatrices* (seamstresses or dressmakers: 6349-51), and a *testrix* (weaver: 6362).¹⁸ By comparison, the Volusii have only a *specularius* (mirror-maker? glass artisan?) recorded. In Livia's household may be included all those involved in wool-working and in the making and maintenance of clothes for the household, including, most famously, the making of togas for Augustus (Treggiari 1975a: 54).

For example, while Cicero had just the one *operarius* that we know of, the Statilii had three *fabri* ('artisans', rather than just 'workmen': 6283-5), a *marmorarius* (marble-worker: 6318), a *ensor* (surveyor: 6321), a *structor*

¹⁸ A household as big as that of the Statilii almost certainly needed more spinners and weavers than are attested in the inscriptions. I suspect that most weavers were of low status, and are therefore not commemorated; the *testrix* is likely to be the 'chief weaver', perhaps analogous to the foremen (*magistri*, *praefecti*) of the rural estate (see further, Chapter 6).

(6353), four *fabri tignuarii* (carpenters: 6363-5, 6365a), and a *faber structurae parietariae* (wall-mason: 6354). It is possible that all these craftsmen were engaged in working on the *paterfamilias*'s main residence. But they make more sense if we remember that the Statilii, the Volusii, and Cicero all owned urban property which needed constant maintenance. Thus Cicero had an *operarius*, a general term roughly equivalent to 'workman', perhaps for the maintenance of his *insulae* in Rome and shops in Puteoli. In a letter to Atticus (7. 2. 8) Cicero mentions an *operarius* under the supervision of one Chrysippus. He also expresses little surprise at the disappearance of the *operarius* ('mere mechanic' in Shackleton Bailey's translation), but more so at that of Chrysippus, who has 'a smattering of letters'. Since no other letter reveals what job title, if any, Chrysippus had, we can only guess that he was at least superior to the *operarius* (though both seem to have been freedmen).

Similarly, carpenters in the Statilian *familia*, although known principally for their construction of T. Statilius Taurus's (cos. 26) amphitheatre in the Campus Martius,¹⁹ may have worked on the fabric of the residential houses of the Statilii and on their *insulae*. They probably did not constitute a workshop (perhaps with the exception of the *fabri tignuarii*), since there are insufficient numbers of them, particularly in the separate crafts. A workshop is

¹⁹ Cassius Dio, 51. 23; Suet. Aug. 29.

also practically ruled out if we bear in mind that not all of these craftsmen are likely to have been employed at the same time.²⁰

These were certainly some of the specialist staff that added to the ostentation of the owner, but at the same time most were engaged in production or in providing services directly for the household, and in this respect specialization may have been geared towards ensuring the household's self-sufficiency.

THE URBAN FAMILIA AND HOUSEHOLD MANAGEMENT

Cicero, so far as we can tell from his letters, had possibly two *dispensatores*: Philotimus (who, in reality, belonged to Terentia rather than to Cicero), and Eros. The activities of Philotimus show that as well as being responsible for the 'dispensing' of monies for the domestic needs of the household, the *dispensator* might also be involved in external business transactions that affected the household. We read of him being involved in the minutiae of household financial matters (e.g. the building or repair of a wall, Att. 2. 4. 7; examining and sorting out accounts, 5. 4. 3 and 7. 3. 9; buying property, 5. 8. 2-3 and 10. 5. 3; collecting debts, 5. 19. 1-2 and 10. 15. 1; making payments, 6. 1. 19; sorting out travel-money

²⁰ Only two of the four *fabri* yield clues as to their date: the owner of CIL 6365 is Cornelia, wife of T. Statilius Taurus (cos. AD 11); 6365a belongs to T. Statilius Taurus, almost certainly referring to Cornelia's husband (although his father and son are possibilities: see PIR s.v. T. Statilius Taurus for stemma).

(*viaticum*) for Atticus). Eros had similar responsibilities and, like Philotimus, seems to have been primarily concerned with aspects of Cicero's finances (e.g. *Att.* 12. 18. 3; 12. 21. 4; 13. 12. 4; 13. 50. 5; 14. 18. 2; 15. 15; 15. 17. 1-2; 15. 20. 4; 16. 2. 1; 16. 15. 5). But while Cicero seems to have been dependent on two stewards, the Statilii, by comparison, had as many as ten *dispensatores* (6266, 6271-5, 6277-9, 9191),²¹ acting as stewards for the household. The Volusii possibly had three *dispensatores* (9325-7), all of whom probably belonged to different owners.²²

During the Republic it was the expectation that the arrangements of the household were looked after by the *dispensator*; during the imperial period it became increasingly common to appoint a *procurator* who was senior to the *dispensator* (Treggiari 1975a: 49-50). No *procurator* is in evidence for either household (with the exception of the a *cubiculo et procurator* in the *familia* of the Volusii), so we can probably assume that the arrangements for each household came under the direction of the

²¹ Again, it is impossible to know how many of these were contemporaries. Five (*CIL* 6. 6266, 6268, 6269, 6274, 9191) belong to a T. Statilius Taurus, but it is unclear which Statilius is meant. One is a *dispensator* of Corvinus, probably T. Statilius Corvinus, consul in AD 45.

²² *CIL* 6. 9343 is included among the staff of the Volusii by Hanslik (1962) in *RE* (suppl. 9, s.v. Volusius) and has been subsequently; for bibliography, see Buonocore (1984: 139, catalogue no. 109). Flory (1975) is the exception in excluding this epitaph from her discussions of the size and composition of the Volusii's *familia*, presumably because of the slight uncertainty in identification.

dispensatores. The absence of a *procurator* in Livia's household is explained in terms of his importance; Treggiari (1975a: 49) suggests that the *procurator* was probably too important to be buried in the Monumentum along with the bulk of the *familia* - a suggestion that further underlines the *procurator*'s seniority and importance. Quite how important the *a cubiculo et procurator* was to the Volusian household we can only speculate since the inscription is problematic. For example, it seems strange that the first job to be recorded is that of 'chamberlain', not normally a prestigious job in its own right, although potentially it could be so, given that the job entailed 'intimate contact' with the *dominus* or *domina* (Flory 1975: 106). If this *a cubiculo* was one such influential slave or freedman, then the additional responsibility of *procurator* must have made him perhaps the most important member of the household. On the other hand, it is possible that this individual held his job titles in sequence and not simultaneously. There is no way of telling from the inscription alone; he appears to have been a slave, so is probably recording jobs held simultaneously (if he had been a freedman he might equally have been recording jobs held in sequence, thus highlighting a promotion). There is no comparable inscription where these two particular jobs are recorded together (although among other staff of the Volusii there was a *capsarius idem a cubiculo* and a certain *ab hospitibus et paedagogus puerorum*, the former of whom was most probably a freedman, and the latter a slave), so

neither scenario can be assured. This particular example highlights the difficulties of charting a 'career structure' - and therefore also of ascertaining the importance of jobs relative to one another - within the household. As Treggiari notes, a reason for the 'under-representation' of slaves in lower-grade jobs among the inscriptions is that many were promoted and recorded only the last job that they held. The evidence for moving up or between jobs is therefore likely to be rare, and, in the case of Livia's household, is non-existent (Treggiari 1975a: 57 n. 123).

Cicero's *dispensatores*, as has already been noted, were responsible for a variety of jobs, from sorting out the household accounts to arranging the repair of a wall. The Statilii had ten *dispensatores* (though in all probability not simultaneously); in the first instance this is probably a reflection simply of the considerably greater size of the household. Presumably, with more than one *dispensator*, each one may have had slightly different areas of responsibility, and there may have been no single *dispensator* in charge of all the arrangements. Cicero's *dispensatores* were apparently entrusted with the household finances, to the extent that once, when Philotimus went missing, Cicero was completely at a loss as to the state of his financial affairs. Despite claims that Tiro was the most important figure in Cicero's household, in reality Philotimus and Eros can hardly have been less so. We have already seen that the jobs Philotimus was called on to do

were many and various. In part this must be due to the fact that Cicero had relatively few members of his *familia*, not enough to afford the minute specialization of other more wealthy households. Thus his *dispensatores* often found themselves carrying out tasks that *dispensatores* might not normally be expected to do, like delivering letters and helping Cicero with his electioneering. Nevertheless, the range of tasks that probably fell within the scope of their appointment - for example, collecting debts and buying property - shows, first, the responsibility invested in them and, second, the potential links between the domestic sphere and the 'outside' economic interests of the *paterfamilias*.

THE URBAN FAMILIA AND URBAN PROPERTY

One of the immediate concerns of the *paterfamilias* outside the *domus* must have been for the management of his urban property. We have seen (Chapters 1 and 2) that members of the Roman élite were connected with small-scale trade by virtue of owning shops and workshops, and that a considerable number of Pompeian households also included these types of premises. Household staff were probably involved in the maintenance of that property. But the direct incorporation of shops within élite houses, and in particular those shops that share connecting doorways with houses, raises the question of how and by whom they were worked, and to whom the profits accrued (see e.g. Pavis D'Escurac 1977).

The fact that many of the Pompeian shops and workshops share a connecting doorway with a residential building suggests that they were almost certainly worked by members of the owner's own household. The *paterfamilias* was able to have businesses run on his behalf, and even at a distance from his main residence by virtue of the *actio institoria* (D. 14. 3). The Romans had no concept of direct agency, and slaves had no legal capacity of their own to carry out transactions of their own. But if a slave was appointed as *institor*,²³ then the slave was legally empowered to carry out any business on his master's behalf that fell within the scope of his appointment (D. 14. 3. 11). Anybody who contracted with the slave then had the right of action against the master should the slave not honour the contract, for the master was made fully liable for his slave's action.²⁴

Appointing one's own freedman, or even someone else's freedman, to run a workshop was one possible option, but this does not appear to have been the norm - the freedman is hardly mentioned in the *actio institoria*. Typically, anyone appointed *institor* had the scope of that appointment laid down by *proscriptio*. If a free or freed man undertook transactions that ignored the *proscriptio*, then those

²³ *Institor* is frequently translated as 'business manager'. However, there was nothing necessarily 'managerial' about an *institor*; s/he was simply legally empowered, as an agent, to make transactions on the owner's behalf. Several *institores* could be appointed to a single business (D. 32. 91. 2; 33. 7. 7).

²⁴ On the full legal implications of the *institor's* appointment, see most recently Kirschenbaum (1987) and Aubert (1994).

transactions were still valid since freeborn men or freedmen had juristic capacity of their own. In other words, there was nothing a principal could do to prevent such a person from simultaneously doing business on their own behalf as well as his (Garnsey 1981: 365). The appointment of freeborn or freedmen was subject to other legal complexities too, since they themselves had to form a contractual relationship with the principal.

A slave's appointment as *institor*, however, was based not on a contract but on the principal's power of *potestas*, and the slave had no room for manoeuvre in the way that freeborn and freedmen, theoretically at least, did. Indeed, the full liability of the principal was recognized only when the *institor* was a dependant of the principal, so perhaps the legal complexities in practice put people off transacting with those whose liability was unclear. The main advantage in making a slave an *institor* was that he could legally take 'managerial' decisions concerning the business. Indeed, he could make a business profitable by shrewd decision-making and by responsiveness to local situations. Appointing an *institor* to run a business some distance from the *paterfamilias*'s main residence was thus a good idea from the *paterfamilias*'s viewpoint; in theory, at least, the business could be more adaptable than if managed from afar. Lastly, a slave *institor* had, of course, little or no scope for doing deals on his own account.

The fact that no *institores* are mentioned by Cicero or listed among the staff of the Volusii or the Statilii

should not necessarily be regarded as surprising. There are only three inscriptions recording *institores* in Italy,²⁵ from Rome, Teate Marrucinorum (near Chieti), and Florence. The scarcity of inscriptions recording *institores* in itself suggests that being an *institor* was not regarded as a mark of status. A study of *institores* in the literary sources (Aubert 1994: 16 ff.) tends to bear this out: particularly during the early empire, they were associated with excessive greed which they typically pursued through petty trade. The *Digest* also indicates that *institores* were connected particularly to small-scale or socially undesirable businesses, from moneylenders through muleteers to undertakers (D. 14. 3. 5. 1-15). They also included shopkeepers (*tabernarii*: D. 14. 3. 3), and the *actio institoria* is in fact mostly concerned with these. The negative connotations of *institores* suggest that slaves were more likely than freed or freeborn to become *institores*, and this is reflected in the *Digest*; slaves are envisaged throughout as *institores*, whereas freedmen are scarcely mentioned. The stigma attached to being an *institor* must partly explain the lack of inscriptions; most *institores*, including slaves, were more likely to record their specific profession on their epitaphs than the fact that they were *institores*. For slaves, recording 'institor' on one's epitaph was probably largely omitted because it

²⁵ Rome: *CIL* 6. 10007 (= *ILS* 7608); Florence: *CIL* 11. 1621 (= *ILS* 7607); Teate Marrucinorum: *CIL* 9. 3027 (= *ILS* 7546).

drew attention specifically to one's legal status, something slaves might be especially keen to avoid.

Thus social expectations and legal devices made it desirable that urban business activities - particularly those on a small scale - should be kept within the scope of the household; since the object was to get ahead of one's social peers, it was preferable not to appoint someone who might act surreptitiously on behalf of another household and not one's own.

Thus the following staff, principally because they were bound to have to deal with others on the master's behalf, were most probably *institores*, even though 'institor' is not recorded on the inscriptions. For example, the Statilii had four *horrearii* (6292-5). There are two plausible alternatives for the role of these *horrearii*: first, that they were simply in charge of the personal household storerooms; second, that they were in charge of warehouses, perhaps let to others, or perhaps used for a grain business. The latter is perhaps the more likely scenario for the Statilii, for they erected other buildings: their own amphitheatre and their own family tomb. Unfortunately, the epitaphs yield no further clues as to the *horrea* to which these *horrearii* were connected; each is recorded simply as *horrearius*. The fact that they were probably slaves does not rule out the possibility that they were connected to a business, since they may all have been *institores*. However, the Statilian *familia* also included a *salaris* (6347). This may bear out the warehouse

hypothesis: if the *horrearii* were warehouse 'managers', then perhaps the *salarius* was a salt dealer who used the warehouse(s) for storing salt. Since there is no other certain *salarius* attested in *CIL* 6, we have no other indication of what his job might have involved. For the Volusii, the existence of a warehouse in their name is borne out by both the epitaph of a *horrearius*, and perhaps more precisely by another epitaph to a *vestiarius* of the *horrea Volusiana*²⁶ (together with a small number of wine amphorae found bearing the family name: see Chapter 1, n. 27). Thus the *horrearius* of the Volusii must surely have been concerned with an external *horrea*, in the sense of 'warehouse', rather than with a domestic storeroom. He seems to have been a slave rather than a freedman.²⁷

The Statilii had five *insularii* (6215, 6296-8), probably responsible either for the daily care of apartment blocks, like a modern concierge, or for collecting the rents, or both. While we cannot be sure how, if at all, the job of the *insularii* differed from that of the *ad aedificia* (superintendent of rental properties: 6225),²⁸ their

²⁶ *CIL* 6. 9973: T. Aquilio, T. l., Peloro, vestiario de hor(reis) Volusianis.

²⁷ *CIL* 6. 7289: Felix Q(uinti) Volusi / Saturnini / hor(r)earius.

²⁸ The exact function of the *insularius* probably differed slightly from household to household. Frier (1980: 29) discusses the meanings of *insularius*: it seems unlikely that he equated to a 'manager' in any sense; in *D.* 7. 8. 16. 1, an *insularius* guards a property for the owner against the fructuary, whereas in *Petron. Sat.* 95. 8, it is suggested that the *insularii* who threaten Eumolpus are 'building attendants under the procurator', though this is far from certain. In this context it is just as

presence nevertheless clearly testifies to the use of urban property by the Statilii, although for exactly what purpose remains uncertain. The *insularii* may have been responsible for apartments owned (and perhaps built) by the family. It is possible that the *ad aedificia* was directly responsible for collecting rents. The Volusii, too, had an *insularius* (7291); it seems likely that this *insularius* was connected with the *insula Volusiana* (see Chapter 1, p. 39). It seems as though, in this case, the rents were possibly collected by the *exactor* (7371), like the *exactor ad insulas* of *CIL* 6. 9383 (*D.* 22. 1. 33; 49. 18. 5. 1). Since we know that Cicero has a number of urban properties, it seems possible that he had an *insularius* or two, and perhaps an *exactor*, or the equivalent, for collecting the rents from these properties. All we know for certain is that Eros (referred to by Cicero, *Att.* 15. 15. 3) as *dispensator* rather than *exactor*) collected the rents from the dotal *insulae* (*Att.* 15. 20. 4; 16. 15. 1), and perhaps from Cicero's other *insulae*, too (*Att.* 15. 17. 1). Trimalchio had a *procurator* of an *insula* (*Petron. Sat.* 96. 4).

There are other members of the *familiae* who, although not directly engaged in the 'management' of urban property may have been involved in business that made use of the owner's property. For example, as well as the *exactor* the Volusii had a *negotiator* (9653). The literary sources tend to suggest that the word *negotiator* had negative connotations:

likely that they are tenants. (For other *insularii* belonging to Julio-Claudian families, see Frier 1977: 28 n. 8.)

Joshel (1992: 68) draws particular attention to Martial (11. 66),²⁹ who associates the activities of a *negotiator* with those of a *fellator*. However, she fails to draw out other contexts in which *negotiator* was used. For example, men of equestrian rank are sometimes spoken of as conducting business (*negotiarum*) in a manner in accordance with their *dignitas* (D'Arms 1981: 24). This specifically set them above more lowly *mercatura* and its cognates, which are never mentioned in connection with men of this kind of social rank. Even though *mercatura* could form part of the activities of a *negotiator*, it is thought that what distinguished him was the 'scale and the sphere' of his business. Thus being a *negotiator* was not necessarily incompatible with being a member of an élite household. A *negotiator* could be involved in anything from moneylending to shipping to trading works of art (D'Arms 1981: 24-31), and perhaps what characterized the *negotiator* was a multiplicity of interests. Although none is indicated on this particular epitaph (CIL 6. 9653), there was possibly some connection with the *horrea*. This is further supported by the fact that, among the inscriptions more generally, a *negotiator* who did not specify a trade was more likely to be involved in large-scale business (Joshel 1992: 112); *horrea* strongly imply large-scale activity.

The Volusii also had two *actores* (7284, 7367). An *actor* was most usually a business agent (and an *institor*), like

²⁹ Mart. 11. 66: Et delator es et calumniator / et fraudator es et negotiator / et fellator es et lanista.

the *negotiator*. Generally, their responsibilities seem to have been largely financial, including the collection of rents (D. 40. 7. 40. 5; 32. 91, pr.; 32. 97). *Actores* belonging to private (non-imperial) households are also well represented in the management of agricultural estates (Aubert 1994: 186 ff.). There is no particular reason, however, to think that the Volusii's *actores* were middlemen between the agricultural estate and the urban household. The *columbarium* inscriptions (at least those that record job titles) pertain solely to the *familia urbana*, and in an urban context *actores* are more likely to have been business agents, or to have had charge of shops or workshops (Aubert 1994: 192).³⁰

The presence of agents at all in the *familia* of the Volusii refutes the idea that the élite distanced themselves from (urban) trade. It also suggests that the élite were not wholly reliant on external middlemen, but instead had their own incorporated within their households. Nevertheless, agents are recorded for all the households under discussion; it is therefore reasonable to assume that they 'represent the basic staff attached to any large Roman establishment' (Flory 1975: 99) - or not-so-large establishment, if we include Cicero's. The presence of

³⁰ The evidence is inconclusive either way for the Volusii's *actores*. Aubert (1994: 186) suggests that those inscriptions that do not also record a trade or field of work, 'should be regarded as referring to agricultural agents'. This criterion applies to the Volusii *actores* (CIL 6. 7284, 7367), but their presence in the *columbarium* of the *familia urbana* would appear to militate against Aubert's suggestion.

agents, businessmen, and craftsmen in the *familiae* of some of the most well-known households in Rome casts some doubt on the viability of numerous 'independent' freedmen (cf. Garnsey 1981), or the running of shops by a freedman bourgeoisie, as Finley would have it. The *actores* of the Volusii were probably slaves; the *exactor*, too, was probably a slave; the *negotiator* was almost certainly a freedman.³¹ The sample of households given here is, of course, too small to permit any statistical conclusions about the employment of freedmen in trade. Nevertheless, it does raise the possibility that many slaves and freedmen³² were not independent in any real sense, but in fact remained tied to the *familia* of their owner or patron. One wonders how much scope there was for truly independent freedmen - those without any ties or obligations to any household - to operate entirely on their own behalf.

CONCLUSIONS

The social function of the *familia* is not in question; it seems that the greater the numbers of the *familia* and the greater the degree of specialization, the more one was likely to impress one's peers. But this does not tell the whole story of the *familia*; the number of agents and

³¹ [Eux]ino L. Volusi Saturnini P. / negotiatori / Acanthus L. Volusi Heleni l. / H. C. fecit.

³² With the possible exception of those slaves who were freed on the event of their patron's death (*libertini orcini*), and those who bought their freedom, thus exempting themselves from *operae* (cf. Garnsey 1981: 363-4).

artisans of one kind or another, for example, suggests more than just social display. While, to a certain extent, it is possible to characterize the wealthy household as a centre of consumption - the Statilii had a total of 73 'ostentatious' staff (among a possible 173) - doing so rather obscures the importance of some of the other activities that were organized from the household. Many persons in the *familiae* of the Statilii and Volusii, as well as a few from Cicero's household, were not engaged in simply 'decorative' jobs. Indeed, the studies of Flory, Treggiari, Joshel, and others have shown that a significant proportion of the members of the *familia* were occupied in 'industrial' or 'productive' tasks. Rather than being used to change the terms in which the household is studied, or simply to illuminate the broader spectrum of household organization, these have been largely assimilated into the 'ostentation' arguments. This may be partly due to the nature of our sources; perhaps the literary texts' concern with social competition has led to the role of 'production' within the household being played down, since production does not appear to be directly compatible with what appears to be most central to the household: ostentation.

So, for example, Treggiari (1975a: 61) gives three reasons for specialization among Livia's household. First, as we have seen, specialization added to the prestige of the *paterfamilias*. Second, specialization also went hand in hand with self-sufficiency, which was 'proper for a gentleman'. Third, and related to the second argument, the

'better reason for the proliferation of specialist staff is that things worked better that way'. To support this latter argument, Treggiari reverts to the ostentation theme, stating that a poor household was characterized by its lack of specialist staff, with a small number of staff doing many tasks. By contrast, she suggests, in the large household 'functions were minutely categorised and carefully organised'. The implication is that such organization was somehow more 'efficient' than that in a poorer household, although at the same time Treggiari appears to doubt her own reasoning: 'the suspicion persists that many of Livia's servants, unlike the *vilica* or the Victorian housemaid, were not very busy'. In addition, while it would be difficult to disagree with the view that specialized production added to the ostentation of the household, this is hardly illuminating, since it is unlikely that a household large enough and sufficiently wealthy to support a number of 'decorative' staff would not also support specialized production.

Yet there were justifiable reasons for including specialized 'productive' staff in one's *familia urbana*. In part, financial success was derived from the ownership of urban property; but that property needed to be constantly maintained and managed in order for it to be of any use, and we can assume that this was not done by the *dominus*. It would seem that the maintenance of property fell to members of the urban *familia* - thus contributing more to self-sufficiency than ostentation - and that, similarly,

management was provided by a *paterfamilias*'s slaves and freedmen. Even Cicero, whose close interest in his economic affairs may have been unusual, was not able to cover everything, and 'the main work of inspection and management was done by others' (Shatzman 1975: 423). In this respect it was not 'efficiency' that was important - indeed, 'efficiency' is rather meaningless in this context - but that *insularii*, *horrearii*, *actores*, and so forth should all help to ensure that the owner could run a multiplicity of urban business interests without necessarily giving the appearance of being directly involved himself.

The role, in particular, of agents and 'managers' within the *familia* is one that has been almost entirely unexplored in recent scholarship. Most of all, the appointment of agents highlights the connection(s) between the household and the larger Roman 'economy'. The latter group worked at the margins of the household, providing points of contact with the outside world. That they did so, clearly, enabled the *paterfamilias* to 'run' businesses from, and outside, the *domus*, but at the same time they seem to have created difficulties: their relative freedom of movement, and in particular, their scope to do business with third parties, constantly jeopardized the *paterfamilias*'s control over their activities. Of *dispensatores*, for example, Treggiari (1975a: 50) suggests that 'masters desired absolute control over their stewards and because a slave had no legal personality and could therefore act conveniently for his owner, it became standard practice to employ slaves as

dispensatores'. What Treggiari does not tackle is the question of why masters should desire 'absolute control' over these stewards. The *vilicus* would appear to offer an answer: according to the agronomists, his movements should be strictly limited (Foxhall 1990b; see also Chapter 6). The obsession with restricting the *vilicus*'s movements is taken to reflect his tendency (in the absence of the owner) to operate on his own behalf and against the interests of his owner's household. If the employment of slave, rather than freed or free, *dispensatores* reflects, as Treggiari suggests, the desire for control, then we can better understand the significance of the *dispensator* and similar members of the *familia* - *procuratores*, *negotiatores*, *actores*, and so forth. Like the *vilicus*, their responsibilities gave them the scope to do business outside the *domus*, and therefore outside the immediate control of the *dominus*.³³ We might therefore explain the possession of numerous 'managers' or 'stewards' by large households not as specialization for the sake of ostentation or 'efficiency', but as a kind of risk avoidance by the owner.

While more has been written about the operation of ties of patronage in the countryside (e.g. Foxhall 1990b; Garnsey and Woolf 1989), little has been said about the same kind of possibilities operating in the urban environment (even though Treggiari recognizes the ability

³³ The fundamental reluctance to trust the *dispensator* was, of course, justified in the behaviour of Cicero's steward, Philotimus.

of the *familia* to 'snowball' in numbers, as slaves and freedmen employed their own staff). Thus we can see that the management of the urban household involved some inherent risks: the agents and managers included among the *familia*'s dependants were also those who had most scope to do business on their own behalf, perhaps even establishing their own patron-client networks. Nevertheless, the fact that the élite had agents within their own households must have limited that possibility, since the *paterfamilias* was always close at hand (unlike on the rural estate) demonstrates once more their relative unwillingness to trust 'outsiders' to act in their interests. The risks to the financial success of one's own household could be limited particularly by using slaves, but also by using one's freedmen. In this respect it is interesting that these members of the *familia* are among the select - and therefore supposedly successful - group commemorated in the *columbaria*. This would seem to suggest one of two possibilities (or perhaps both): first, that they were among the more important members of the *familia* as far as the *paterfamilias* was concerned; second, that they were sufficiently successful in their own right to afford or merit an epitaph. Neither rules out the possibility that these agents were acting in their own interests as well as those of their owner or patron.

In conclusion, if urban property was essential to the élite, then so too was a highly organized urban *familia*. Part of the *familia* was organized in such a way as to draw

attention to and to reflect the owner's status, and part was geared towards maintaining a level of self-sufficiency. But arguably the most important part was that which lay behind the ostentation and made lavish social display possible: workmen, shopkeepers, managers, and agents. Some of these were no doubt engaged in large-scale business, but there must also have been many who were involved in the running of *insulae*, *tabernae*, and *officinae*. We have already seen (Chapter 1) that, despite their own moral rhetoric, the élite invested out of financial need in urban property, and some of them reaped the profits from shops and workshops incorporated in their houses (Chapter 2, and Wallace-Hadrill 1991). But this picture can now be modified still further: the élite may sometimes have lived with these same small-scale traders and artisans that they effected to despise. They - including the moralizing Cicero - did so because it made sound economic sense.

Chapter 4

Rural Property and Elite Economic Strategies:

Some Reassessments

Thus far the main focus of this thesis has been on the urban household. My contention has been that, contrary to the orthodox view which holds that the Roman élite derived most of its wealth (and status) from rural estates, the wealthy household can be shown to be characterized not so much by its investment in rural land as by the diversity of its economic enterprises. That diversity, I have argued, is reflected particularly in the investment or accumulation (such as by inheritance) of urban property, and by strategic management of the urban *familia*.

It would, however, be futile to underestimate the importance of agriculture, or rural estates, in the interests of the Roman élite. Land represented, above all, an investment in social and political status. Indeed, so powerful were the incentives to invest in land that it has been argued that the élite's concentration on investing in rural estates effectively prevented the development of the wider economy (Finley 1985; cf. Garnsey and Saller 1987:

74). There is certainly plenty of evidence for élite investment in land on a large scale; the younger Pliny, for example, boasted to a friend that almost all of his investments were in agriculture (*Ep.* 3. 19), and he was probably fairly typical of the senatorial order in the late Republic and the early principate (cf. Shatzman 1975). Similarly, we have already seen (Chapter 1) that Cicero, one senator for whom we have reasonable evidence of urban investments, himself had a considerable number of rural estates, even though he was not among the wealthier members of the senatorial order. Aside from the social and political value of rural investment, it should be remembered that there were sound economic reasons for owning rural estates. It may be the case that, on a long-term basis, the major part of the élite's income came from rural land. Barring natural catastrophes - drought, floods, and so forth - the élite landowner could look forward to steady yields and a steady, if unspectacular, income year after year. The same applied to any land that he let out to tenant farmers, from which he derived rents and/or payment in kind.

The traditional view thus holds that while the élite were concerned to invest in rural land, their interest in their estates went little further than regarding land as a source of long-term, steady income, mainly via rents. Alternatively, or concomitantly, large estates are regarded as being given over mostly to the production of the so-called 'cash crops': vines and olives. In recent years,

however, these views have been challenged in specialist studies of rural investment (e.g. de Neeve 1984; 1985; 1990; Kehoe 1988a; 1988b; 1989; 1993). Nevertheless, there is still a tendency to see Roman agricultural investment as a largely conservative operation (e.g. Kehoe 1988a; 1989) dominated by the concern to avoid risk as far as possible.

However, élite investment in urban property has been shown (Chapter 1) to be characterized by opportunism, even though prevalent moral attitudes might have led us to anticipate conservative investment, if any. Since the scale and nature of urban investment by the élite did not, apparently, conform to predicted or accepted views of their investment activities, we may similarly question the sometimes static or conservative view of rural investment by looking at some of the fundamental characteristics of large estate organization.

In addition, we have already seen (Chapter 1) that the Roman élite were constantly looking to make the most from their investments in order to finance their political careers, maintain their status, and keep up appearances. That these same landowners were content to leave their rural estates simply to generate steady revenue year upon year does not seem entirely consistent with the need to derive as much income from them as possible in order to keep up with the competition.

RURAL ESTATE RATIONALES

The cultivation of 'cash crops'

Without doubt, during the late Republic and early principate, the large estate was characterized by its ability (via slave labour) to grow 'cash crops', principally vines and olives (e.g. Hopkins 1978: 107). Discussion of the profitability of large estates frequently rests on the basic assumption that these were the main crops around which the estate was organized. In part, the agronomists are responsible for highlighting the importance of cash crops to large estates: all contain detailed accounts of how best to grow olives and vines, how to market them, and so forth. The relevant information from Cato and Varro (as to size of estate, cost of slave labour, and so forth) provides the basis for Rathbone's calculations (1981) of the profitability of the villa estate at Settefinestre, while Duncan-Jones (1982: 139 ff.) uses Columella's figures to calculate the net yield from vines.

More recently, however, the dominance of 'cash crops' on large estates has been questioned. In particular, the idea that they were grown exclusively on large estates has been re-examined in specialist studies of Roman agriculture and of olive-growing and viticulture (Spurr 1986; Mattingly 1988a; 1988b; 1988c).

It has been suggested, first, that olives were less popular as a 'cash crop' than vines (e.g. Duncan-Jones 1982: 36), and that they 'were certainly never grown in

monoculture' (Foxhall 1990a: 198). In defence of the latter claim it is argued that the olive tree's demand for cultivation and labour makes it a less obvious choice for a 'cash crop'; it produces fruit in good quantities usually only every other year at best, surpluses cannot be predicted, and labour requirements - such as for pruning - are 'erratic and seasonal' (Foxhall 1990a: 69-70). Particularly for the novice estate owner, perhaps trying to grow olives from scratch, monoculture will have made little sense: depending on its location with regard to soil type, irrigation, access to sunlight, and so forth, an olive grove planted from scratch might take seven to ten years before bearing fruit, and even then the fruiting will be relatively light and possibly sporadic (Foxhall, pers. comm.). While other crops could be, and still are, grown in the spaces between olive trees, seven to ten years nevertheless represents quite a wait for the major 'cash' crop, and might have been a factor to be considered seriously by a novice estate owner looking to create a saleable surplus quickly. While, to some extent, the problems involved in growing olives can be absorbed on a large estate by using slave labour, they were still unlikely to be grown in monoculture. The archaeological findings from excavated villa estates like Settefinestre similarly militate against the idea that olives are likely to have been the specialist crop; specialist wine production is much more in evidence (Foxhall 1990a: 337-8).

Like olives, vines can be unpredictable, particularly if affected by sudden changes in the weather, but Purcell (1985) gives the impression that the inherent risks of viticulture were outweighed by the substantial profits that could be made, particularly from the Augustan period onwards. Additionally, the threat posed to vines by sudden weather variations can be offset by planting the vines in a number of different locations (Foxhall 1990a: 73-4), which made them suitable for cultivation on large estates. It therefore seems that, despite the possible riskiness of viticulture, vines were the favoured crop of the estate owner; wine's essential role in social and cultural spheres (Purcell 1985: 2) meant that there was a continual demand for its production, and repeated profits to be made. The argument for the popularity of the vine (particularly in relation to the olive) as a cash crop is further supported by both Greek and Roman agricultural writers, who devote far more space to discussing the cultivation of vines than of olives. Thus, while we can assume that growing vines was a priority for the large estate owner, olive trees were perhaps less important, at least as a 'cash crop', although they were often grown for domestic usage (see also Chapter 5).¹ Vines must therefore have provided the bulk of 'cash crop' production on the large estate² - this is clearly the

¹ Foxhall (1990a: 71 and ch. 4) argues that wealthy estate owners were likely to grow olives to satisfy domestic consumption needs. Not only that, but the 'high prestige value both for food and non-food uses' of olives and olive oil 'provided an impetus for large proprietors to grow quite large numbers of olives'.

² Purcell (1985) cautions that the evidence - particularly the

expectation of the agronomists - and were expected to be highly profitable.

One of the extracts from the agronomists sometimes used to support the notion that vineyards were the preferred crop - especially in relation to olives - comes from Cato. In a discussion of types of farm which, by him at least, would be considered best (*primum*), Cato appears to make a vineyard the priority, provided that it produces plentiful, good wine (*si vino bono et multo est: RR 1. 7*).³ Second only to the vineyard, however, is a watered garden (*hortus irriguus*), while an osier-bed is placed third. An olive grove, by comparison, comes only fourth on Cato's list, while grain-land comes a lowly sixth.

This passage is usually taken to be a list in order of preference (e.g. White 1970: 391-2; Shatzman 1975: 16-17; Duncan-Jones 1982: 34; Foxhall 1990a: 237), an 'either-or' listing of crops to be grown on good land, in order of desirability. Since it would seem that vines were the most profitable crop to be grown on a large estate, it is not

anti-wine moralizing of Cicero and others - suggests that until the early principate the senatorial order were unlikely to invest in viticulture, and that wine production was mostly in the hands of 'very small-town landowners' (cf. also Rathbone 1983: 162). Since we have seen (Chapter 1) that prevailing moral attitudes did not prevent the élite from investing in urban property, this supposition may appear questionable. However, the fact that there is no other evidence from the late Republican period to point to large élite-owned estates - the largest estate attested archaeologically is only 480 *iugera* - would seem to clinch the argument. This situation can be seen to change markedly in the early principate (Purcell 1985: 10 ff.).

³ Echoed in Varro, *RR* 1. 7. 9.

surprising that a vineyard is placed top of Cato's list. Similarly, the fact that the olive grove is placed fourth does not seem incompatible with this reading, since we have seen that olive production was neither particularly reliable nor especially profitable if compared to vineyards. On the other hand, there are some anomalies that cannot easily be accommodated in an 'either-or' interpretation. Foremost among these is that an osier-bed comes third on the list, above both the olive grove and grain land. It would seem that, rather than taking this passage to be a list of alternatives, it can be regarded as a list, in order of priority, of the different types of land usage that most readily support a vineyard. Quite simply, an osier-bed is a higher priority than, for example, grain land because osiers were essential for supporting vines (Cato, RR 6. 4; 33. 5; apparently echoed by Varro, RR 1. 8. 2-4; Columella, RR 4. 13. 2; Pliny, *HN* 16. 174), although it seems that osiers could be profitable in their own right too (Cato, RR 9; Columella, RR 3. 3. 1, 3; perhaps Varro, RR 1. 16. 3; Pliny *Ep.* 3. 19; cf. Foxhall 1990a: 242). Osiers were also necessary for making and repairing the baskets used for gathering the grape (and possibly the olive) harvest (Cato, RR 23. 1; Pliny, *HN* 16. 174). The elder Pliny emphatically underlines the importance of osiers: they are, he says, the most useful of water-plants (*qua nulla aquaticarum utilior*: *HN* 16. 173). The importance of producing suitable 'supporting' materials, especially for vines, would also explain the

presence at all of a 'wood lot' (*silva caedua*) and an arbustum, which, perhaps significantly, are the subjects of Columella's Book 12 (esp. section 16, which specifically discusses trees for supporting vines). By comparison, osiers, wood lots, and an arbustum make relatively little sense on an 'either-or' reading of the passage. Thus, while the traditional reading supports the importance of vine-growing, the alternative interpretation is arguably more persuasive still in this respect.

However, whether or not vines were preferred to olives as the major cash crop, the ancient agronomists nowhere suggest that vines (or olives) should be grown exclusively or in monoculture. In fact, both the agronomists and modern studies of the profitability of olive-growing and viticulture suggest that olives and vines (particularly the former) are best supported by mixed farming (Duncan-Jones 1982: 34). Indeed, Foxhall's major study of olive cultivation concludes that olives are not particularly productive or profitable if grown in monoculture, but would normally be grown in a system which both maximizes profits and minimizes risks; the ideal system thus means that olive cultivation 'is carefully integrated with polycropped arable (mostly fodder crops) and livestock, pigs and sheep' (1990a: 384-5). In addition, given the likelihood that most estates comprised fragmented, widely dispersed plots of land (see below), exclusive production of vines or olives seems even more unlikely.

Slaves and specialization

It is often argued that it was the ability to grow and harvest 'cash crops' by using slave labour that made the large estate particularly distinctive and profitable. But it can also be argued that the major distinction between the large estate and the smallholding (apart from, most obviously, its size) lay in the presence or absence of a permanent slave-labour force. Smallholdings depended for the labour mainly upon the resident family unit. It has been argued that in classical Greece 'small farmers would not usually have had the labour reserves available within the household to develop land to the degree of productivity that large-scale farmers could have done' (Foxhall 1990a: 63; see also Wolf 1966). The contrast between a farm worked by a family unit and a farm worked by slave labour was probably all the greater in Roman Italy, where slave ownership, especially after the Hannibalic wars, was on a bigger scale still⁴ (and where large landholdings were considerably bigger than their Greek equivalents: Foxhall 1990a: 205). Slaves allowed the estate owner to specialize and to grow the so-called 'cash crops' (vines and olives), for which special skills or intensive techniques of cultivation were required. This is relatively uncontentious. But, as has recently been shown (Foxhall

⁴ See Hopkins (1978: 8 n. 14) for a collection of estimates of slave numbers in Italy by the first century bc. Jongman (1988: 67) uses all the estimates gathered together by Hopkins to calculate a population density for Italy during the same period, but adds no new figure.

1990a: chs 3, 6), other factors make it extremely unlikely that 'cash crops' were the *only* crops to be grown, and likely that the élite landowner aimed to squeeze as much from his land as possible by growing other crops as well (see also below). Slave labour therefore allowed the specialist cultivation of some of these other crops as well as of those crops more conventionally designated as cash crops.

Land fragmentation and its implications

First, although the view (Rostovtzeff 1926; Frank 1940; Yeo 1952) that a large estate comprised one single tract of land - plantation-style - has now largely been discarded, there is still a persistent orthodoxy which holds that individual farms comprising an estate were based on single plots (see Foxhall 1990a: 207, for references). Thus, while Duncan-Jones (1976: 12) abandons the plantation concept and claims that 'large landholdings typically took the form of non-adjacent components', he does not discuss the further possibility that single farms might comprise dispersed plots. De Neeve (1984: 224 ff.), trying to illustrate Duncan-Jones's supposition, discusses the fragmentation of estates as attested by the *Ligures Baebiani* and *Veleia* tablets (*CIL* 11. 1147 and 9. 1455 respectively). But these only show that for each region, individual owners had a number of separate farms (*fundi*).⁵ In other words, while

⁵ For example, one of the largest landowners, M. Mommeius Persicus, owned at least twenty-two *fundi* in the *pagus*

they tend to confirm Duncan-Jones's hypothesis that estates comprised several plots of land rather than contiguous tracts, they do not tell us about the composition of each farm. However, it is now increasingly believed - particularly on the basis of survey evidence - that dispersed plots of land were probably typical, even for single farms within an estate. As with urban property, one could expect to inherit rural property from wills and legacies; the effect must often have been that one's landholdings were widely dispersed. The expectation that one's landholdings would be fragmented in this way is, moreover, reflected in the agronomists, who appear to write with dispersed plots in mind (e.g. Columella, RR 1. 2. 3). This possibility, I suggest, allows a better understanding of Cato's response to a hypothetical query as to the best kind of farm: *de omnibus agris optimoque loco iugera agri centum* (RR 1. 7: 'a hundred iugera of land, comprising all sorts of soils, and in a good situation'). Although *de omnibus agris* does not necessarily exclude the possibility of a single plot of land, it makes better sense if we regard it as a reference to fragmented land. Similarly, Varro (RR 1. 14. 1) talks about protecting parts of the farm, which only makes sense if parts of the farm were physically separate from one another (cf. Foxhall 1990a:

Ambitrebis and eight in the *pagus Venerius*. For extensive discussions of the Ligures Baebiani and Veleia tablets and the patterns of landholding they suggest, see De Pachtère (1920) and Veyne (1957; 1958), with additions and corrections by Champlin (1981) and de Neeve (1984).

209). There also seems to be evidence of land fragmentation in Pliny's letters: the neighbouring estate at Tifernum is not only next to his but completely surrounded by his fields (*Ep.* 3. 19; de Neeve 1990: 373, 383). That most estates comprised dispersed plots does not always seem to have been entirely accidental or the result only of legacies, dowries, and so forth: indeed, a passage from the elder Pliny (*HN* 18. 35) implies that Pompey took great care especially to buy non-adjacent plots.

Single ownership of dispersed plots of land makes it extremely unlikely that vines and olives were grown in isolation: for example, some plots might be relatively small, making cash-crop cultivation unviable. In addition, dispersed plots will naturally have varied in their micro-environments (particularly as regards soil types, irrigation needs, and so forth), making it probable, or even necessary, that mixed farming and intercropping were practised across a single estate and even within a single plot.⁶ That elite landowners recognized the need to diversify is reflected in the agronomic texts, in which as much space is given over to mixed cultivation as to the cultivation of vines and olives. In part, then, mixed farming helped to make cash-crop cultivation viable.

Yet it also seems that rural estate owners were keenly aware of, and took full advantage of, the opportunity for profit-making that diversification allowed, mixing the

⁶ See Foxhall (1990a: 342-58) on the logistics of intercropping on large estates.

cultivation of 'cash crops' with other specialized and luxury crops that would fetch high prices in neighbouring towns (see Chapter 5); this would certainly help to explain Pompey's purchasing strategies, although they may also have been designed to reduce the risk of crop failure (Shatzman 1975: 390). The rise of *villaticae pastiones* - specialized, non-'cash crop' production on large rural estates and on suburban farms - is particularly highlighted in Varro (cf. Rathbone 1983), although evidence for this kind of cultivation can also be found in Cato and Columella (see further, Chapter 5). Again, the sources indicate that growing goods (excluding cash crops) for nearby towns was potentially highly profitable: with this kind of production in mind, the agronomists suggest that buying an estate in close proximity to an urban centre should be a high priority (Cato, RR 1. 3; Varro, RR 1. 16. 2-3; Columella, RR 1. 2. 3; 1. 3. 3-4). The idea that the rural élite were content to depend on cash crops for their income (ignoring rents for the moment) must, therefore, be revised even on a brief survey of the evidence: the sources suggest an interest in profits that went beyond depending simply on cash crops.

Working marginal land

An important finding from the South Etruria survey, one of the largest and most comprehensive of its kind, is that during the late Republican and early imperial period marginal land was apparently exploited to an extent not




FIG. 6. Early imperial settlement in southern Etruria (Greene 1986: 104, fig. 43).




FIG. 7. Settlement in the Ager Cosanus (Greene 1986: 107, fig. 45). Class A and B sites are richer villas.

matched again until recent times (Potter 1979; see FIG. 6). The findings of the Ager Cosanus survey also suggest that although smallholdings generally seem to have disappeared in the late Republic, some continued to exist in marginal areas (Dyson 1978; Carandini and Settis 1979; Carlsen 1984: 52; see FIG. 7). Thus it seems that the cultivation of marginal land, probably by smallholders, may have been an important part of estate management even at a time (late Republic to early imperial period) when the use of slave labour was greatest.

While, as we shall see below, there are other good reasons for a large estate to have smaller farms occupying its land, it seems that the estate owner's desire to have marginal or less fertile land cultivated was not negligible. We have already seen that large estates, or even individual farms on large estates, were unlikely to comprise single tracts of land. It is reasonable to assume that most farms and estates probably contained not only some small plots of land, but also some marginal, relatively unproductive land. While Finley and others have argued that the wealthy Roman landowner had no need to exploit this kind of marginal land, it has been shown through the comparative study of systems of land exploitation in modern Spain, India, and Roman Italy, that in areas where marginal land exists the landowner in practice ensures its cultivation via tenants or sharecroppers (Foxhall 1990a).⁷

⁷ For an alternative view see de Neeve (1984: 113) who argues

Other forms of labour

The data provided by field surveys in Italy have been instrumental in suggesting a relationship between the large estate and other farms. Two of the most important of these surveys, in South Etruria and the Ager Cosanus, are particularly useful in this respect. The South Etruria survey has shown that, for the most part, small farms continued to exist alongside larger villa sites and that settlement reached its height in the early imperial period (Potter 1979; FIG. 6). In contrast, the Wesleyan University survey of the Ager Cosanus revealed that the very smallest rural sites did not endure long into the imperial period, but survived only until the beginning of that periods. In the early imperial period, however, the number of biggest sites (class A or villa sites) increases, as does that of the second smallest class of site, class C (FIG. 7). Nevertheless, the excavated villa at Settefinestre, the best-known site within the Ager Cosanus region and one with large slave quarters, was surrounded by a small cluster of class D sites (Dyson 1978). This representation of the area has since been questioned (Attolini et al. 1991), but not perhaps fundamentally altered: an Italian-led survey suggests that 90 per cent of the smallholdings disappeared in the late Republic and were replaced by medium-sized *villae rusticae* worked by slaves (Carandini and Settis 1979: 31-3).

that, at least in the second century BC, slaves were more likely to work marginal land.

This picture of a relationship between the large rural estate and other types of farm continues to be supported by archaeological survey. More recent surveys in Italy and elsewhere (e.g. Barker and Lloyd (eds) 1991) are continuing to uncover patterns of small and medium-sized farms clustered around, or in close proximity to, large farms, particularly in Italian surveys. Clearly, and despite old theories positing the widespread demise of small farms in the face of the apparent rise of *latifundia* (large estates), smaller farms did continue to exist alongside their larger counterparts; there is no necessary connection between the appearance of large farms and the disappearance of smallholdings (cf. Rathbone 1983). Those surveys that are especially relevant to the study of villa sites and their immediate environs in the period from the late Republic to the early principate, such as the South Etruria and Ager Cosanus surveys, are especially interesting since this corresponds to the period when the use of (rural) slave labour is generally agreed to have been at its peak. These surveys suggest that despite the large-scale and widespread use of slave labour, large estates were in some way bound up with smaller, neighbouring farms. But since surveys on their own cannot reveal what types of farmers occupied the smaller farms, and cannot necessarily establish the boundaries of an estate, it is generally impossible to determine whether the neighbouring farms belonged to tenants and sharecroppers or to free farmers. Nor is it possible to tell which of these groups were of

greater or lesser importance in relation to the large estate.

However, it is clear from this that we should not exclude the possibility that other forms of labour worked alongside the landlord's *familia rustica*. Some of the source evidence is highly suggestive: for example, in Horace's *Epistle* 1. 14. 14 the *vilicus* appears to supervise both the slaves (or *familia rustica*) and the tenants. In addition, Brunt's study (1974) of the estate of C. Caecilius Isidorus concludes that the *familia* (supposedly under the supervision of a *vilicus*) cannot possibly have coped with working the full extent of the estate, and that tenant farmers or free labourers must have worked the remainder. Although tenants are often regarded as the obvious choice for working more marginal land (e.g. Foxhall 1990b), free labour used in this context cannot be ruled out: Varro (RR 1. 17. 5) discusses the value of hiring free labour to work 'unwholesome' lands as well as for harvest periods (for which the use of hired labour is now generally agreed to be essential: Rathbone 1981). While it is impossible to tell whether tenants or free labourers were in fact preferred, the case cited is notable because it relates to a time when the use of slave labour was supposed to be at a peak. Unfortunately, no inscriptions from Italy testify with certainty to *vilici* and tenants working side by side, though a couple of references in the extant literature are arguably suggestive (Martial, 2. 11. 9; 3. 58. 9; Seneca, *Ep.* 123. 2). Since the younger Pliny never mentions a

vilicus in his letters about his rural estates, we have no confirmation from him, even though we know he had tenants. Columella (RR 1. 7) is also partly suggestive of slaves and tenants working in combination: while the context of this section of Columella is a discussion of slave labour and tenancy as alternative strategies, RR 1. 7. 6 concentrates on the best strategy for the landlord who owns distant estates (*in longinquis fundis*). In this situation, Columella argues, all land is better worked by tenants, but particularly grain land. The fact that he distinguishes grain land might be taken to imply that it was not always possible to find tenants for one's remoter estates, and that in such circumstances it was imperative to find at least some tenants to work the grain land.⁸ Given that it is unlikely that an entire farm, or estate, was entirely composed of grain land, one could infer that other types of land were more likely to be worked by other labour forms, which might include a *familia rustica*. More recent studies now largely support Brunt's argument, and show that in practice tenants and bailiffs worked together on both private and imperial estates (Aubert 1994: 136; on North Africa see also Kehoe 1988: 26-7). Clearly, slave labour was not always preferred, or practicable.

If tenants were handy for the rural landlord because they allowed the estate to be worked in his absence, the same is

⁸ Although cf. de Neeve (1984: 112), who takes this passage to imply that any farm that was not, in his words, a 'plantation' grew mostly grain.

largely true of sharecroppers. It seems, too, that to turn one's estate over to sharecropping when tenancy proved unsuccessful was a strategy employed by some landlords as an option involving minimal effort. The role of free farmers in the rural estate is less obvious. However, it has been demonstrated that the large farm growing 'cash crops', especially vines, depended on free labourers. Using the agronomic texts, Rathbone (1981) shows that at times of harvest the large farm needed to call on free labour to supplement the resident slave labour workforce simply in order to remain economically viable (see also Corbier 1981; Capogrossi Colognesi 1981; Evans 1980: 136). This reliance on free labourers helps explain Cato's recommendation (RR 4) that the estate owner should maintain good relations with neighbouring farmers (cf. de Neeve 1984: 110).

Increasingly, it seems as though the norm may have been not so much a choice between farming systems, such as between the *vilicus* system and tenancy, but rather a choice between a combination of 'systems', so that the landlord chose between various combinations of tenants, the *familia rustica*, sharecroppers, and free labourers to work his estate. From what we have already seen of Roman economic organization regarding the use of urban property, it seems clear that the Romans were keen to exploit every possible opportunity for financial gain. Using a combination of options would seem to fit with this rationale. In addition, part of the argument against the profitability of tenancy for Roman landowners is based on the assumption that

tenancy involved considerable risk, not just for the landowner but also for the small-scale farmer considering tenancy, and not least because of short-term contracts (cf. Foxhall 1990a: 99). In this respect, it might be argued that, on its own, tenancy might indeed prove risky or unprofitable, but that when it was used in conjunction with other forms of land use (slave labour, sharecropping, and so forth) the risk was considerably reduced.

It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss the relative merits of tenancy, slave tenancy, subletting, sharecropping, and so forth. The importance of each, but especially of tenancy, to the landlord has been extensively discussed in recent years (Corbier 1981; Capogrossi Colognesi 1981; de Neeve 1984; 1990; Kehoe 1988a; Foxhall 1990a), and this thesis is more concerned with the landlord's underlying economic strategies than with the individual economies offered by each type of labour. It is important, however, to stress that none of these options is in any way ruled out by the agronomists, and that all are considered worthwhile depending on the circumstances of the estate. The potential of all the options can be argued to be integral to the success of the estate, and thus in this respect a kind of co-existence with other types of farm was highly desirable.

We should therefore assume that the estate owner exercised discretion and made his choices according to local circumstances - precisely the context in which the

agronomists discuss the relative merits of tenancy versus other forms of labour.

Flexible tenancy and risk reduction

One of the most important ways in which an estate owner derived income from his land was by leasing it to tenants. Tenants could work the land in his absence, and thus the benefits - in the form of rents - would accrue to him with minimal effort on his part. With good tenants occupying his estate, the landlord could look forward to a steady income year after year. This was the ideal scenario: a member of the Volusii family⁹ who regarded keeping generation after generation of tenants as the best way to run an estate receives clear approval from Columella (RR 1. 7. 3). Two factors, however, fundamentally jeopardized this arrangement. The first was natural catastrophe, resulting in poor harvest. In this case, the landlord was legally bound to waive his tenants' rents (D. 19. 2. 15. 2; 19. 2. 25. 6; cf. de Neeve 1990: 384). The second factor that could put the owner's revenue in doubt was bad tenants. In this respect lease law minimized the risk to the landowner, and gave him some room to manoeuvre if the income generated from his rural estates was insufficient to meet his needs.

⁹ Columella writes simply 'P. Volusius': but there was no P. Volusius, which begs the question of who he was referring to. The Loeb edition opts for Q. Volusius Saturninus (cos. AD 55); more likely, as suggested by Kehoe (1988a: 31, following Hanslik, *RE* s.v. Volusius), is L. Volusius Saturninus, since he was the *adcumulator* referred to by Tac. *Ann.* 3. 30.

Tenancy contracts did not necessarily bind the owner in the long term, and lease law in fact allowed him a considerable degree of flexibility. First, leases were normally of relatively short duration - four, more usually five years (D. 19. 2. 13. 11; 19. 2. 24. 2, 4; Finley 1976: 106; Kehoe 1988a: 18) - which allowed the landlord to find new tenants and/or fix a higher rent at the end of the lease, even if his tenants were not technically 'bad'. Second, a land lease could demand the fulfilment of *opera rustica* (D. 19. 2. 25. 3), which, if not performed on time, entitled a landlord to dismiss a tenant on the grounds that he was unsatisfactory (cf. Kehoe 1988a: 21-2 n. 23). Demanding the performance of *opera rustica* was, of course, another way in which the estate owner could derive maximum benefit from his land by means of the tenancy agreement. Most important, it helped ensure that the land would remain cultivable (and therefore potentially profitable) and ready for new tenants, for cultivation by the landlord's own slave labour, or for disposal by sale.

Tenancy was acceptable to the élite not just because it allowed their estates to be worked in their absence or because it brought in a potentially steady income, but because it was also a flexible system. In theory tenants could be relatively short-term and could help maintain the value of the land, and the landlord did not have to tolerate reduced income if he found himself with bad tenants. It is inconceivable that the élite would have been prepared to invest on a large scale in land without this

kind of provision: too much, socially and politically, depended on the success of rural investment.

Minimal investment and risk avoidance

The younger Pliny's dilemma was to decide whether or not to provide his prospective tenants with slaves in order to make the estate more productive. In this respect, rural landlords appear to have sought to shift much of the obligation of maintaining the farm onto the tenants themselves, thus avoiding personal risk through investment (Kehoe 1988a: 37; de Neeve 1990: 396). It seems to have been the expectation that tenants provided movable capital such as livestock (which also represented security on the rent), although the landlord was obliged to supply fixed capital such as equipment, storage, and so forth (*D.* 19. 2; Kehoe 1988a). And, as we have already seen (above, p. 202), the imposition of *opera rustica* helped the landlord to shift the burden of maintaining, or even improving, the farm onto the tenants (Kehoe 1988a: 22).¹⁰

That Roman landlords of rural estates tried to avoid risk as much as possible is further suggested by recent arguments (Kehoe 1988a: 22; 1989: 556) that the writings of the younger Pliny, in particular those concerning his reluctance to supply his prospective tenant farmers with slaves, demonstrate that Roman landowners much preferred to

¹⁰ Cf. Varro, *RR* 1. 4. 2, on the general desirability of maintaining and improving land to keep up its value (although tenants are not mentioned in this context).

accumulate additional landholdings rather than continue investing in those they had.¹¹ A passage from Cato appears to support this view: the farm, he says, should be equipped as economically as possible (RR 1. 5-6), implying that one should avoid investment over and beyond what is necessary to make the farm viable. Certainly, to invest considerable capital in one, or a small number of, run-down or ill-equipped properties seems to have been the very rare exception (Kehoe 1988a: 26-7). By investing in many farms rather than a few, one minimized risk through the distribution of one's capital as widely as possible. The possible failure of a single farm - for whatever reason - did not then mean the entire loss of a significant source of income.

Risk avoidance in this way arguably sheds light on an aspect of elite investment in urban property. The literary sources in particular suggest that rented urban property was maintained only minimally if at all. This may be because to do so was to leave oneself open to unreasonable levels of risk; fires in Rome were notorious in the late Republic and early principate and could devastate entire *insulae* at once. This kind of risk must have seriously deterred owners from improving individual properties. Nevertheless, we should remember that urban property investment in itself entailed many risks; but at the same

¹¹ Varro, RR 1. 12. 2-3, recommends selling or even abandoning an 'unwholesome' (*non salubris*) farm, rather than investing in order to improve it.

time the élite were the social group most able to cope with and to afford risks of this kind (Chapter 1). In practice, there is little in the sources to differentiate risk avoidance from an arguably more probable consideration - that of the minimization of trouble or inconvenience for the owner. Given that Cicero's *tabernae* (inherited from Cluvius) fetched 80,000 HS even in their run-down state, there may have seemed to him little point in investing time, effort, and money on these buildings. Pliny's benevolence towards his tenants may also be seen as his way of avoiding the potential problem of finding new tenants.

There is little evidence to suggest that rural landlords felt differently from urban landlords about maintaining their property; the primary objective was simply to derive as much income as possible from the minimum effort and expense on their own part.¹² That this basic strategy - whether it is viewed as risk avoidance or the avoidance of inconvenience - appears to be common to both urban and rural landlords is not, perhaps, surprising, since urban and rural landlords were often the same men.

¹² It is likely that most élite landowners took little practical interest in their estates. The younger Pliny is exceptional among the extant sources for his apparent interest in his estates and in the well-being of his tenants. However, his interest may not have been entirely altruistic. Martin (1967; 1971) argues that his interest, as expressed in his letters, was born out of observing the *mos maiorum*, while Sherwin-White (1966) argues that his respective interest or detachment varied according to the recipient of the letter. The two views are 'not incompatible' (de Neeve 1990: 372); what they share, principally, is a concern with status and appearances.

Tenants and rents

The extant sources contain a great deal of information about private tenancy. The agronomists discuss the circumstances in which tenancy might be most appropriate; the legal sources, such as the *Digest*, discuss the legal problems arising from tenancy contracts; and the literary sources refer to a wide variety of aspects of tenancy. Despite this, specific references to actual rents paid are relatively rare; for the most part rents tend to be bound up with references to total income, so that we cannot tell the proportion derived from them. Thus there is usually no way in which we can estimate, for example, the average rent for certain sizes of plots, or the price of a particular holding (Finley 1976: 107; cf. de Neeve 1985: 82, 85 ff.). The one exception, not noted by Finley, is a reference by Varro to the level of rent one could expect to earn from a plot of 200 *iugera* (discussed further below). Hence recent scholarship (e.g. Duncan-Jones 1982; de Neeve 1985) has tended to be more interested in the value of land owned by Roman individuals than with the rents derived from landholdings, since the value of land is much more widely documented. I would suggest, however, that for reasons already discussed (Chapter 1, and above, p. 180) the Roman élite were themselves more often interested in the rents they received than in the actual value of their land.¹³

¹³ Land value was, however, important for the purposes of the census.

That the primary reason for owning an estate was to generate revenue through rents is beyond serious dispute. We have already seen that the younger Pliny's holdings were extensive; almost certainly the 'greater part' of them was given over to leasing (de Neeve 1990: 373). Of Cicero's estates and tenants we hear rather less, but there is some indication from his letters of the level of rents he received from one or two estates.

About Cicero's Pompeian estate there is little information: mentions of agricultural land (Att. 15. 13. 6; 16. 11. 6; Plut. Cic. 8. 2) are the sole basis for supposing that the estate may have been revenue-earning. At Cumae, Shatzman notes that Cicero mentions *vilici* and *procuratores*. The estate, he suggests (1975: 405), 'must have consisted of several units, each managed by a *vilicus*, none of which (to judge from the agronomists) is likely to have been less than 200 *iugera*' (51 ha). The agronomists certainly agree that the ideal size for an estate is 100 to 200 *iugera* (Cato, RR 1. 7; Varro, RR 1. 19. 1; Columella, RR 2. 12. 7), which is neither particularly small nor particularly large (White 1970: 387-8). Furthermore, Varro (RR 3. 2. 15) gives an estimate of what a property of 200 *iugera* could be expected to earn in terms of rents, namely 30,000 HS. Therefore, if, as the preceding brief discussion suggests, none of the units on the Cumae estate is likely to have been significantly less than 200 *iugera* in size, Cicero could have expected at least 30,000 HS annually, and

probably more if we take into account the fact that his ownership of several such units is implied.

In 49 BC Cicero mentions his desire *circum villulas nostras errare* (Att. 8. 9. 3). In 45 BC he tells Atticus that he has to go to Arpinum because his properties (*praediola*) need his attention (Att. 13. 9. 2), and that he needs to fix their rents (*constituerem mercedulas praediorum*, Att. 13. 11. 1). It is usually assumed that these *praedia* are *praedia rustica*, and that therefore Cicero had a number of tenant farmers on his Arpinum estate. We can only speculate as to the rents of these properties; nowhere in his letters does he mention a figure. It is, however, likely that he had in mind the Arpinum rents when he mentions in *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, chapter 49 - dating from around the same time, 46 BC¹⁴ - the sum of 100,000 HS as being his income from his rural holdings (*praedia*) (cf. Garnsey 1976: 126), since the only other *praedia* referred to in the letters (Att. 5. 1. 2) seem to have been sold in 51 BC (although *Fam.* 14. 6. 1, and Att. 11. 4. 2, both from c.48 BC, refer to *praedia* that Cicero seems to have difficulty selling). However, the rhetorical and philosophical nature of the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* probably precludes too literal a reading (Garnsey 1976: 127).

Like Arpinum, the Tusculum estate seems to have been partly productive, and may also have been leased to

¹⁴ OCD² s.v. Cicero (§15).

tenants: *De lege agraria*, 3. 8 (and 2. 78), refers to a *fundus*, and in *Fam.* 16. 18. 2 (from c. December 45 BC) Cicero urges Tiro to sort out the leasing of a *hortus* (perhaps a market garden) on the estate, worth a minimum of 1,000 HS in rents.¹⁵

From the little information we have of Cicero's rural rents it is clear that they were not necessarily substantial; the largest figure we hear of, namely 100,000 HS, amounted to little more than he received from his urban *insulae* at Rome. It is also striking that the tone of *Fam.* 16. 18. 2 is urgent, indicating that the rent from the *hortus*, although apparently a negligible sum, was important to Cicero.¹⁶ It is therefore a good example of how the élite were concerned to squeeze as much profit as they could from their estates.

Of the specific rents that Pliny earned from his estates we hear surprisingly little, given the additional information contained in letters about his tenants. However, in AD 98 he earned at least 400,000 HS (equivalent to the equestrian census qualification) from his *agri* at Tifernum alone (*Ep.* 10. 8. 5), and possibly from one single tenant (de Neeve 1984: 82); we cannot, however, be sure whether this letter refers to the whole estate or only one part of it (de Neeve 1990: 379 ff.). If it refers to only

¹⁵ Rawson (1976: 96) also sees *itaque abundo coronis* as a possible indication that Cicero took at least some of the flowers as rent in kind.

¹⁶ This seems to suggest that Cicero was particularly strapped for cash at this time.

one part of the estate, then clearly Pliny's income would have been more considerable still.

It would be pointless to try to generalize, on the basis of Cicero and the younger Pliny, about the level of rents that large estate owners expected to receive from their tenants. On the other hand, it is noticeable that Cicero was from time to time concerned to fix the rents on his rural estates, even including a tiny garden from which he received only 1,000 HS. To a certain extent this may show the extent to which his finances were in a constant state of flux (see e.g. Shatzman 1975: 403-25), and may indicate that the unpredictability of his financial situation at any given moment made him dependent upon even the smallest source of income. Cicero's financial circumstances may not have been typical of most senators at the time; being a *novus homo*, he seems to have had less family or inherited wealth to draw upon than most senators. Pliny, by comparison, seems to have been extremely wealthy even before he became a provincial governor; this may explain why he is less specifically concerned with rents than Cicero is. Added to this, Pliny's total landholdings were probably more extensive (de Neeve 1990: 369-7). Nevertheless, if we accept that 'the greater part' of Pliny's estates was leased to tenants, the chances are that he derived considerable revenue from his rural estates.

Both Pliny and Cicero seem to have expected to receive most of their rent in the form of cash (e.g. Pliny, *Ep.* 9. 37. 3; 10. 8. 5). It seems as though Pliny only implemented

sharecropping as a measure of expediency, designed both to help his impoverished tenants and to save himself the trouble of finding replacement tenants. It is unlikely that, all other things being equal, sharecropping was in principle preferred over tenancy,¹⁷ because sharecropping involved certain risks for the landlord, not least of which was that there was no incentive for the tenant to maintain or improve the general condition of the farm, since this would only benefit the landlord (White 1970: 408). Generally speaking, cash must have been the favoured form of rent payment - as far as the landlord was concerned - since it could more readily be used for loans, dowries, and so forth than rent in kind.

CONCLUSIONS

This has been a deliberately selective account of rural estate organization - selective if only to highlight the main characteristics of the aims of large estate management, in order to identify why and in what ways rural investment was important to the Roman élite. This has meant glossing over aspects of a number of complex issues or areas of debate, such as tenancy, in order to illuminate the larger picture.

¹⁷ In North Africa, by comparison, sharecropping may have been the preferred option, particularly for land not formerly under cultivation (White 1970: 411). For sharecropping as a favoured system on imperial estates in North Africa, and in particular the interest of the Fiscus in collecting rent in kind rather than in cash, see Kehoe (1988a: ch. 5).

Kehoe (1988a; 1989; 1993) stresses that the landowner's paramount concern was to avoid risk. More important still, I would argue, was the desire to make as much profit as possible. This can be shown by looking at the main characteristics of large estates; risk avoidance may have been an element of estate organization, but not, I think, the main one. It might also be argued that risk avoidance is sometimes inextricably bound up with a desire on the part of the estate owner to avoid personal inconvenience; what the Roman estate owner wanted most of all was an estate that would run itself, profitably, without requiring his personal intervention or supervision. Cicero, for example, seems to have regarded the need to visit his farms from time to time - particularly to fix rents - as an annoying distraction. Even the younger Pliny, who gives the impression of visiting his estates more often and of whom it is sometimes argued that he was an unusually caring and benevolent landlord, may only have affected such concern so as to impress his correspondents (de Neeve 1990: 372). On other occasions he is as ready as Cicero to complain about how tenants are an unwanted distraction.¹⁸ His apparent leniency towards his tenants (remitting their rents, then making them sharecroppers) might thus also be interpreted as the option involving the least trouble on his part. In any case, the idea that the élite always tried to avoid risk as far as possible does not wholly stand up to serious

¹⁸ *Ep.* 2. 15. 2; 4. 6. 2; 5. 14. 8; 7. 30. 3; 9. 15. 1; 9. 20. 2; 9. 30. 6.

scrutiny: not only have we seen that they were more than willing to invest in urban property, but they were also precisely those members of society who could afford - financially speaking - to take on risks from time to time.

We should also be wary of regarding the agronomic texts as evidence for the involvement of landlords in running their estates, given the moral tradition in which they are written. Thus Columella's recommendation (RR 1. 2. 1-2) that a landowner should not be idle when it comes to visiting his land -

Nam diligentem patrem familiae decet agri sui particulas omnis et omni tempore anni frequentius circumire, . . . nec ignoret quicquid in eo recte fieri poterit¹⁹

- may not reflect the active involvement of estate owners in their property, but instead the moral associations that farming had for the Romans.

Whether or not Columella's claim is largely rhetorical, it is clear that we should not underestimate the determination of the élite to squeeze as much profit from their estates as possible (cf. Kehoe 1993: 216). They did so in order to keep up with, or preferably get ahead of, their peers in terms of conspicuous expenditure. The problem of how to fund this expenditure was a source of

¹⁹ 'For a diligent *paterfamilias* must go around all the bits of his land quite frequently at all times of year . . . and must not be ignorant of whatever may properly be done on it'.

constant worry,²⁰ but it is clear that investment in rural landholdings could provide a substantial proportion of a landowner's necessary income. But it did so in a greater variety of ways than is generally realized. The large estate was characterized by the diversity of its production and its flexibility (particularly as regards tenancy arrangements) as much as by its cultivation of cash crops and its dependency on rents. Moreover, the élite were as opportunistic about buying estates as they were about buying urban property. They were certainly not inclined to buy land *simply* for the social prestige it conferred; the accumulation of, rather than investment in, land seems to have been typical. Social considerations undoubtedly contributed to the willingness of the élite to invest in rural land, but that it had to be financially viable was, perhaps, the more important consideration.

²⁰ e.g. Pliny, *Ep.* 2. 4. 3, although he seems to be affecting modest resources.

Chapter 5

Aspects of Rural Estate Production:

Specialization and Self-sufficiency

The agronomic treatises are an obvious starting-point for a discussion of rural estate production. Despite the continuing debate as to the 'accuracy' of these texts,¹ it remains the accepted view that they were written with the wealthy proprietor and his (or her) large estate in mind, and therefore give at least some idea of the aims and rationales of large estate production.

We have already seen (Chapter 4) that vines and olives were almost certainly a characteristic feature of large estates. These two crops have received a great deal of attention in modern scholarship, particularly in the light of their high profitability (e.g. most recently Mattingly 1988a; 1988b; 1988c; Foxhall 1990a; 1990b; Rathbone 1981; 1983; Purcell 1985). In this respect, the frequently made claim that the élite depended on cash crop production to bring in vital profits is uncontentious. But it has also

¹ For a full review of recent discussions see Foxhall (1990a: ch. 6).

emerged that large estates were typically based on fragmented plots, and this and other factors (Chapter 4) meant that estate owners sought to cultivate a variety of other crops. In addition, the evidence of the agronomists suggests that production of non-cash crops was also important to the success of the household. *Villatica pastio*, in particular, seem to have been geared towards generating high profits.

This chapter therefore aims to take the discussion away from 'cash crop' production - which may be defined for this purpose as the cultivation of olives and vines - and to explore the ways in which non-'cash crop' production (production of crops other than olive and vine products) could contribute to the success of the large estate, and consequently of the estate owner. I will suggest that there were two principal ways in which non-cash crop production helped to achieve this: first by enhancing the estate's ability to remain largely self-sufficient, and second, as has already been briefly suggested, by producing marketable surpluses of highly profitable goods.

NON-'CASH CROP' PRODUCTION ON THE RURAL ESTATE

All the agronomists provide instructions for the cultivation of cereal crops. Grain is mentioned by Cato (RR 1. 7), and more specifically wheat (RR 35). Varro includes barley and wheat (RR 1. 48. 1). Cereals are the subject of most of Columella's second book; they include wheat and emmer (RR 2. 6. 1), but also panic and millet.

Columella also discusses fodder crops in Book 2; these include lupines, beans, vetch, bitter vetch and chickling-vetch, and medic (RR 2. 10. 7), fenugreek (RR 2. 7. 10, 11. 2. 71; cf. Cato, RR 27 and 35), and barley (Varro, RR 1. 31. 5). Overlapping to some extent with fodder crops are legumes and pulses. In this category Columella lists beans, lentils, peas, chick-peas, hemp, millet, panic, sesame, lupine, and, more questionably, flax and barley (RR 2. 7. 1; cf. Varro, RR 1. 32. 2; Cato, RR 35).

Book 11 of Columella's *De re rustica* is given over to instructions for the seasonal cultivation of vegetables, fruits, and herbs (as well as vines, olive trees, and the other types of crops already discussed). These are to include fig trees (e.g. RR 11. 2. 59), cherry, tuber-apple, apricot, and almond trees (11. 2. 96). He recommends that these be grown generally on the estate. Others are to be grown specifically in the estate's gardens (*horti*: 11. 3. 1). Among the garden crops are cabbage, lettuce (with several different varieties, 11. 3. 25 ff.), cardoon, rocket, cress, coriander, chervil, dill, parsnip, skirwort, and poppy (11. 3. 14). Garlic, onion, and mustard may also be grown (11. 3. 15). In seasonal order asparagus, onion, and leek should be planted first in February, along with radish, turnip, and navew (11. 3. 16); in April cucumbers, gourds, and capers should be sown, and perhaps beet (11. 3. 17-18); in the summer only parsley should be sown (11. 3. 18). Other herbs might be basil (11. 3. 29), mint (11. 3. 37), rue (11. 3. 38), thyme, marjoram, and wild thyme (11.

3. 39). Elecampane should be sown in September (11. 3. 35).

As evidence for other products suitable for growing on an estate, Columella's ideal garden, the poetic subject of his tenth book, is problematic. According to Columella, the garden is to be planted with choice produce, including pear, plums, apple-trees, asparagus, leeks (371),² rocket (372), sorrel (373), figs (404), apricots, plums, and damsons (406), and peaches (409). Other vegetables mentioned include leeks (166), carrots (167), and lettuce (179), which supposedly symbolize the rebirth of Nature and the arrival of spring. Spring, says Columella, is also the time at which cress (231), cucumber (234), gourd (234), and asparagus (246) should be sown. Rocket (373) and wild asparagus (*asparagi corruda*: 375) are to be cut at about harvest-time. This particular book of Columella's treatise is obviously problematic. We cannot readily transpose the 'instructions' given here onto reality, given that the book offers a poetic idealization in the style of Virgil's *Georgics*. Nevertheless, as a piece of élite literature it surely reflects élite tastes, since, for all its lauding of the simple rustic farmer, the range of vegetables listed in the text probably far exceeded that grown in reality by ordinary smallholders in both its variety and its luxury.³

² The Loeb text translates *porrum* as 'leeks'. But in contrast to carrots and lettuce, leeks are a winter crop; Columella appears to have confused the seasons here or may be exercising poetic licence. Alternatively, *porrum* may be an erroneous translation: spring onions may be what Columella had in mind.

³ Cf. Evans (1980: 137-41), who takes Columella and other literary sources as evidence for the peasants' diet. His argument

Columella is, of course, flattering his élite readership by directly alluding to the ideals of Rome's past, in which the Roman farmer was seen to be honest and hard-working, and to be the foundation of Rome's military success.

Despite the poetic and moralizing structure of Book 10, many of the vegetables that appear in it are duplicated in the non-poetic Book 11 (and elsewhere in the *De re rustica*).⁴ Where Book 10 is particularly problematic, however, is in its guide to seasonal cultivation. For example, asparagus is apparently to be cut at harvest-time; but asparagus is in season earlier in the spring. It may be that we should not view this section of Columella too literally, but should regard his apparent confusion of the seasons as poetic licence. In Book 11, Columella clearly implies that asparagus is in season in the spring, which rather confirms his use of poetic licence in Book 10. In addition, since Book 11 conforms to the treatise style of the remainder of the *De re rustica*, we should perhaps take it as a more reliable guide to the vegetables that an estate owner might anticipate growing. But the fact that many of the fruits, vegetables, and herbs appearing in Book 10 are duplicated in Book 11 suggests that the former should not be too hastily dismissed as a guide to the crops

that this is confirmed by the listing of some of these herbs, fruits, and vegetables in Diocletian's maximum price edict seems highly questionable.

⁴ See esp. RR 11. 2. 96; 11. 3. 14-17, 23; 12. 47. 1.

that an estate might cultivate in a garden, if not as a guide to methods of cultivation.

Neither Cato nor Varro refers to cultivating such a wide variety of crops as Columella does, nor are their instructions for fruit- and vegetable-growing as systematic as his. Nevertheless, both favour the same kinds of fruits and vegetables, most notably figs (Cato, RR 8. 1; e.g. Varro, RR 1. 41. 4), plums (Cato, RR 133) pomegranates (Cato, RR 7. 3; e.g. Varro, 1. 41. 4), apples (e.g. Cato, RR 40), pears (Cato, RR 7. 4), nuts (Cato, RR 8. 2), quinces (Cato, RR 7. 3), wild asparagus (*asparagi corruda*: Cato, RR 6. 4), and (domesticated?) asparagus (*asparagus*: Cato, RR 161). Further evidence for garden cultivation comes from the elder Pliny, who suggests that it is proper to have gardens (*horti*) adjoining the farmhouse (*villa*: *HN* 19. 52), and devotes much of *HN* 19 to the specialized cultivation of vegetables, fruits, and herbs in a similar manner to Columella's eleventh book.

The agronomists give just as much consideration to preserving and storing fruit, particularly top and soft fruit; this is particularly so in Columella's twelfth book. André (1981: 86-7) argues that the total harvest of soft fruit probably far exceeded the amount that could be consumed immediately, and that, for this reason the time of the harvest was also a vital time for preparing and organizing reserves for winter; Columella describes this task as being the job of the bailiff's wife (*vilica*). Provision, Columella says, should be made for preserving

cornel berries (12. 10. 3) and several varieties of pears (12. 10. 4), and for drying apples and pears (12. 14. 1), which, together with figs (12. 15. 1-5), provide a good source of nourishment for 'country folk' (*rustici*) in winter (12. 14. 1).⁵ Grapes could be dried and stored as raisins (12. 16. 1-3); service-apples (*sorba*, normally known in English as sorbs), too, could be stored, by using a similar method to that for grapes (12. 16. 4-5). Pomegranates ought also to be dried and preserved while the weather is still fine (12. 46. 2-7), along with quinces (12. 47. 1-4). Columella goes on to inform his readers that the quince, when submerged in honey, produces its own liquor (12. 47. 3); this, in turn, can be used to preserve various kinds of apples (12. 47. 5).

Storing and preserving fruit is deemed equally important by Cato, who also assigns the bailiff's wife (*vilica*) to this job. This was a considerable task, if we are to judge by Cato's instructions, as it involved keeping a large store of dried pears, sorbs, figs, raisins, sorbs in must, preserved pears, grapes, and quinces (148. 2-3). In addition, he says, the *vilica* should keep grapes preserved in grape-pulp, as well as Praenestine nuts (possibly walnuts), Scantian quinces, *et alia quae condi solent et silvatica* (148. 2-3). Varro also offers guidance for storing a number of different crops, including quinces, pomegranates, pears, and sorbs (1. 59. 1-3). All the

⁵ Figs could also be treated to produce vinegar, 12. 17. 1-2.

agronomists make provision for storing olives and olive oil (e.g. Cato, RR 64-5; 100), grapes and grape products including wine (e.g. Cato, RR 25; 107), cereals (e.g. Cato, RR 92; Varro, RR 57), and some legumes and pulses (e.g. Cato, RR 116). In addition, Cato instructs his readers on methods for curing ham and pork (RR 162. 1-3).

The agronomists also devote space to discussing animal-, fish-, and bird-rearing. It seems to be their expectation that the estate owner will keep cattle (Varro, RR 3. 2. 13), as well as sheep, goats, and pigs (2. 1. 12 ff.), and perhaps also aviaries (3. 2. 2; 3. 3. 1; 3. 5) which may house songbirds (3. 5. 14), ducks (3. 5. 14; 3. 11), peafowl (3. 6), doves and pigeons (3. 7; turtle-doves at 3. 8), or other domestic and wild fowl (3. 9). Geese can also be kept (3. 10), along with other similar species (teal, coot, and partridge: 3. 11. 4). Keeping fishponds is an aspect of villa husbandry mentioned more than once (e.g. 3. 3. 1 and 3. 16), which suggests that it was considered relatively important. This is supported by Columella, who devotes a section of his Book 8 to managing fish and fishponds (RR 8. 15 ff.), which according to Varro may be both freshwater and saltwater (Varro, RR 3. 3. 4; 3. 3. 5). Game seems also to have merited serious consideration; keeping a hare-warren is discussed (with fishponds, Varro, RR 3. 3. 1; also 3. 12), which may also include boars (3. 13). In addition, an enclosure near the villa may be kept for hunting purposes (3. 3. 5); this, too, can stock not only wild boars but also roe deer (3. 3. 8). Columella's

instructions for a game enclosure mention oryx and fallow deer (9. 1. 1) in addition to the wild boars and roes mentioned by Varro.

Finally, an estate might raise various species that are 'outside' the villa: bees, snails, and dormice (Varro, *RR* 3. 3. 3). Beehives were to be put next to the hunting enclosure (3. 3. 5), or even in it (3. 12. 2). While he does not specifically talk of putting the apiary next to a hunting enclosure, Columella devotes considerable space to discussing the best location for beehives (*RR* 9. 5. 1-6), as well as giving other extensive instructions (occupying most of Book 9) for their care. The raising of snails is also discussed by Varro (*RR* 3. 14), and the suggestion that they may have been kept on large estates is supported by references in both Varro and the elder Pliny to a certain Quintus Fulvius Lippinus, who raised snails in Tarquinii before the Social War (Varro, *RR* 3. 12. 1; Pliny, *HN* 9. 173). Dormice are considered in the same discussion about snails (Varro, *RR* 3. 15); the latter might even be kept inside the villa (3. 15. 2). Neither snails nor dormice, however, are discussed by Cato or Columella.

All the agronomists comment on flowers, typically in the context of how to plant a garden (*hortus*). Cato (*RR* 8. 2) talks of planting 'all manner of flowers for garlands', including myrtle and laurel. Elsewhere, without specific reference to garden cultivation, he gives instructions for planting poppies. Varro is more specific, highlighting lilies and crocuses (*RR* 1. 35. 1), violets (e.g. 1. 23. 5),

and roses as flowers suitable for cultivation on the estate (RR 1. 16. 3; although cf. 1. 35, which suggests that violets were not best suited for cultivation on a farm, *fundus*). In addition to featuring Paestum's rose-beds in his ideal garden (RR 10. 38; see also 10. 96-108; 11. 2. 19), Columella, like Varro, gives practical instructions for growing violets (RR 12. 30. 1) and roses (11. 2. 19; 12. 30. 2).

RURAL PRODUCTION (1): SUSTAINING THE HOUSEHOLD

The agricultural writers concern themselves, as we have already seen, with instructions on how to grow fruit, vegetables, and herbs. In doing so, they frequently distinguish - not always explicitly, but sometimes via discussion of economic rationale - between produce to be consumed directly by the estate (or by the urban *familia*) and produce to be sold. Self-sufficiency was not, of course, a direct means of generating profits; indirectly, however, it helped to achieve this general aim. The less the estate owner had to buy in from external sources, and the more he could produce from his own land, then the less he would have to rely on others for food.

Self-sufficiency and the rural household

Thus one of the priorities for the landowner must have been to feed his own household. This meant, above all, feeding the rural household, since the productivity of the rural

estate was wholly dependent on the general well-being of the *familia rustica*.

While cash crop production is not the main focus of this chapter, it is highly relevant to discussing the self-sufficiency of the household. We have already seen (Chapter 4) that olive and olive oil production was important for domestic consumption on ancient Greek farms. The same should be valid for many Roman farms (Foxhall 1990a). Indeed, the evidence of the Roman agronomists, together with archaeological evidence for olive production, especially from North Africa, points very strongly towards the olive's continuing practical and prestige value during the Roman period (Mattingly 1988b; 1988c). On a practical level, olive oil could be used for lighting and heat, as well as for nutritional and cleansing purposes (cf. Foxhall 1990a: 79).

In terms of estate consumers, Cato assigns estate-produced food rations to the estate's slave workers; these comprise wheat (or bread), wine, olives, fish-pickle, vinegar (made from wine: RR 104. 2), oil, and salt (56. 1-58. 1). Wine was unlikely to be the same as that which was sold or used by the urban *familia*: Cato says that 'after-wine' should be used for sustaining the farm hands (RR 25 and 57), and also gives a recipe for 'wine' for the *familia rustica* to drink through the winter, made from must, vinegar, and water (RR 104). While Varro gives no instructions for rations, Columella gives only basic guidance for the feeding of estate slaves, leaving them in

the care of the overseer (1. 8. 18). Columella does, however, list a number of pulses and legumes that he regards as being 'most pleasing and useful to man' (*maxime grata et in usu hominum*: 2. 7. 1); again, all the crops that he lists are crops for which instructions for cultivation on the estate are also given. These include beans (*fabae*), lentils, peas, cow-peas, chickpeas, hemp, millet, panic grass, sesame, lupines, flax, and barley. Turnips, though, are to be considered more useful (*utilia*)⁶ since they can be used both as food for humans and as fodder for cattle. It can be reasonably inferred, then, that such estate-grown vegetables supplemented the slave's basic rations, especially when there was a surplus. Most types are recommended on the basis of their relative hardiness, their ability to grow in more than one kind of environmental situation, their relative cheapness (at seed), and their generally good yield (2. 10. 1-24). So, for example, barley is thought by Columella to be more wholesome than bad wheat, and is particularly good for fending off want in times of shortage (2. 9. 14). Panic and millet are recommended on the basis that peasants are sustained on food made from them (2. 9. 17): bread made from millet,⁷ and porridge made from panic grass (2. 9. 19; Pliny, *HN* 18. 101).⁸

⁶ The Loeb translation slightly skews the meaning of *utilia*, translating it as 'profitable'.

⁷ See also Pliny, *HN* 18. 100.

⁸ On the use of millet and panic grass as food, see esp. Spurr (1986).

Since hardly any of these staples that formed the basis of the rural *familia*'s diet are mentioned in other contexts, we can assume that they are unlikely to have been grown with any other specific destination in mind. That is not to say that some staples grown on the rural estate were never sold, simply that their main purpose was probably to feed the household.

A cultivated garden could also make the rural household self-sufficient in fruit, vegetables, and herbs, although members of the *familia*, with the possible exception of the *vilicus*, may not have seen too many of these, since the expectation of the agronomists is clearly that they will be fed mainly on staples.

As well as catering for the slave workers on the estate, the estate owner also had to ensure that his livestock were adequately fed. Thus Cato assigns rations of lupines (or mast), hay, clover, beans, and vetch for a yoke of steers (RR 60). We have seen that the agronomists make ample provision for these and other fodder crops; the estate undoubtedly expected to be self-sufficient in this type of produce.

Varro, however, implies that many estates that were able to generate surpluses of grain and wine ('and the like': Varro, RR 1. 16. 3) were not self-sufficient in these other products, which implies that many estates had to import these crops from time to time. Although Cato does not mention buying in grain, it is clear that he considers it necessary to buy fodder from time to time (RR 2. 5; cf.

Foxhall 1990a: 346). Perhaps this is what Varro intends by his vague words 'and the like'. Cato also suggests that the *vilicus* should not lend seed-grain, fodder, spelt, wine, or oil (RR 5. 3); this may be because they were critical to the self-sufficiency of the rural household. Among the other goods that the estate sometimes needed to buy in from outside may have been clothing, blankets, and so forth; Cato tells his readers that these kinds of items should be bought at Rome (RR 135).

Crops and other products that were not consumed directly by the *familia rustica* might be used in other ways on the estate. Cato, for example, gives instructions as to how to perform religious rituals for the well-being of the estate. One instance of this involves procedures for making a vow for the health of cattle (RR 83); the ritual uses meal, bacon, meat, and wine. Another, an offering to Jupiter Dapalis, made use of roast meat and an urn of wine (RR 132). Private rituals of this kind must, from time to time, have made demands on the estate's more valuable produce. The owner was also obliged to provide the *familia rustica* with certain items at times of public festivals; Cato

recommends rations of wine⁹ for each person at the Saturnalia and Compitalia (RR 57).

Self-sufficiency and beyond in the urban household

In addition to serving the immediate needs of the rural household, it can be assumed that the produce from an estate owner's rural land was used to supply his urban household too. At a basic level - that of simply feeding the household and keeping the *domus* lit (and heated when necessary) - the urban household's consumption needs must have been considerable (cf. Whittaker 1985: 58).¹⁰ But particularly for a wealthy Roman, especially if he was

⁹ It is not entirely clear whether Cato means that each individual is to receive 3.5 *congi* per festival, or that this amount should cover both festivals. According to Cato, in the same passage, the total of wine for each person per year - including this festival provision - should be 7 quadrants, or 56 *congi* (1 quadrant = 8 *congi* = 1 amphora). Using Cato's scheme for wine provisions (i.e. 2.5 *congi* for 1 month, 5 *congi* for 4 months, and 8 *congi* for a further 4 months), I calculate a total of 54.5 *congi*, without the additional festival ration. If we add 7 *congi* (3.5 per festival), the total is 61 *congi*, or just under 8 quadrants. If we assume that 3.5 *congi* covered both festivals, then the total is 58 *congi*, or just over 7 quadrants. We might therefore infer that Cato meant the latter provisioning - 3.5 *congi* to cover both festivals - since this makes a total nearer to 7 quadrants than if 3.5 *congi* were provided for each festival. (To calculate modern equivalents, 1 amphora or 8 *congi* = 25.79 litres).

¹⁰ For comparative figures for a wealthy Greek household, Foxhall (1990a: ch. 4) estimates the following figures for consumption: food, c.25-35 kg of oil per person per year (= 100-200 kg per household per year) 'is probably not excessive'; cleansing, c.10-20 kg per year per family; lighting, c.90-110 kg of oil per year per family. Wealthy Roman households, however, were on average several times larger than the largest Greek equivalent, so estimates of consumption need to be multiplied accordingly.

politically successful (or hoping to be so), the need for his estate's produce was driven primarily by the demands of social competition.

A member of the social and political élite was obliged to entertain, and competition from his peers compelled him to do so on a lavish scale. The conspicuous use of olive oil for lighting at dinner parties was undoubtedly one way of impressing one's status on visitors. Perhaps more important still as regards conspicuous display was the use of olive oil in perfume and for more general personal grooming. To be well groomed, and especially to smell sweetly (e.g. Ovid, *Ars amatoria*, 1. 505-24), was a distinguishing feature of the wealthy man; it represents 'the difference between cultured and brutish, and between city and country. To be physically groomed is to be urbane' (Wyke 1994: 135). The identification of a probable specialist oil press for perfume production in Pompeii (Mattingly 1990) points to the significance of this kind of use; and Varro's insistence on the value of producing flowers near to an urban centre (see below, p. 256) may support this suggestion. Similarly, the availability of olive oil as a basis for most cosmetics must also have been important to the women of wealthy households; their widespread, even extravagant, use by women in the late Republic made cosmetics a symbol of moral decline for writers of the period (Wyke 1994).

Wine, although obviously not used so diversely as olive oil,¹¹ must have played an almost equally important role in the wealthy Roman household. It was widely used in conspicuous consumption; broadly speaking, the greater one's consumption of highly regarded wines, the greater one's status. Setine, Caecuban, Falernian, and Alban wines were among those most sought after (Pliny, *HN* 14. 20 ff.; 14. 59 ff.); but producing good wines from one's own estate conferred similar prestige. Trimalchio's feast again provides an extreme example of this aspect of consumption. He offers to change the wine if his guests do not like it, since he does not have to buy it: it all comes from his own estates (Petr. *Satyricon*, 48).

The urban household undoubtedly used some of the more specialist goods cultivated on the villa estate. Just as wine and olive oil could be used to show off and reflect one's status, so too could other items of food. Once again, dinner-parties provided the setting for this kind of competition in social one-upmanship (cf. Hudson 1989: 82). It is not difficult to imagine that some of the more exotic fruit and vegetables grown on an estate's gardens were used to supply the urban household's dinner-parties. Being able to pander to the exclusive tastes of one's social peers was an important aspect of this kind of occasion; but being

¹¹ However, a recipe for laxative wine is given by Cato, *RR* 113-14; wine might also be used in remedies for urine retention (*RR* 122), gout (*RR* 123), dyspepsia and strangury (*RR* 127), and various stomach and bowel complaints (*RR* 125-6).

able to do so using the products from a cultivated garden on one's estate had added social cachet, since it conformed to the ideal of honest peasant-type farming that the Roman élite (and our sources) held dear.¹² That the owner ensured that certain stock were raised to satisfy his own need for conspicuous consumer goods is implied by Varro (RR 3. 3. 7), who suggests that the provision made for fieldfares and peafowl has become greater than in the past in order to cater for the *palatum suave domini*. He also mentions the senator L. Volumnius as receiving salt pork that probably came from his own estates in Lusitania (RR 2. 4. 11), although there is no particular indication as to how it was used.

Other aspects of social competition might also place considerable demands upon the wealthy Roman's resources. Foremost among these were 'private euergetism, gift exchange, and patronage' (Whittaker 1985: 59). The kinds of products that might be distributed in pursuit of influence included 'wine, flour, barley, vegetables, wood, olive oil, cheese, garum and pork' (Whittaker 1985: 59), all of which, as we have seen, the agronomists encourage their readers to produce. So great were these demands on élite resources that Whittaker views the evidence for wine production on the estate of the Volusii at Lucus Feroniae - namely amphorae found in Rome, together with the *horrea Volusiana* - not as evidence for a personal trading empire, but as

¹² e.g. Cato, RR 1. 4.

'the necessary equipment for the conduct of Roman aristocratic patronage and politics' (1985: 60).

Like the rural household, the urban household may also have made use of the rural estate's products for private religious rituals. These might involve not only edible produce - meat, wine, fruit, and so forth - but also flowers grown on the estate's garden(s) (see e.g. Veyne 1987: 197).

RURAL PRODUCTION (2): MARKETING AND MARKETS

It has recently been argued that there were three main options open to the landowner wanting to sell his surplus produce. He could take his goods to the market and sell them through his dependants; he could take them to the market but sell them to middlemen; or he could sell them 'at the farm gate' (Morley 1994: 173-5).

There were two principal types of market in the Roman world, *nundinae*, or periodic markets, and the *macellum*. The sources suggest that *nundinae* performed a different function from the *macellum*, since the *nundinae* continue to exist after towns start to possess permanent buildings - including *macella* - for marketing (Morley 1994). In addition, the sources strongly indicate that *nundinae* were used primarily by the peasant or smallholder population (MacMullen 1970; Evans 1980: 143-4; de Ligt 1990; 1991; 1993; Morley 1994), and that these *nundinae* were essentially small-scale markets for small-scale producers. More significantly, it seems that, for the most part,

nundinae had little to do with the main products of large rural estates, though this is not to deny that *nundinae* were in some way important to the circulation of goods in the rural community,¹³ and possibly also to the exchange of goods between urban centre and rural hinterland. Indeed, while the exact connection between the different market cycles suggested by the *nundinae* calendars of Campania is still uncertain,¹⁴ it is clear that they mention the main towns in Campania - some even include Rome - which has led to the proposal that one function of the *nundinae* was to 'funnel produce towards the city, with the secondary effect that certain luxuries and other goods travelled back along the same lines of communication' (Morley 1994: 190). What we do not have, however, is any indication from the sources either that luxury or specialized goods were sold at *nundinae*, or that the products of large rural estates were involved. It seems that we must look elsewhere for an outlet for these kinds of goods.

In contrast, a great deal more evidence exists for the *macellum*. It is noticeable, above all, that a large number of Italian towns possessed *macella*, and that the possession of this kind of market-building was a recognizable physical feature of 'romanization' (cf. De Ruyt (1983), who

¹³ *Nundinae* may have been the context in which a large estate might off-load a small or second-rate surplus of subsidiary products.

¹⁴ For recent attempts to shed light on the Campanian market cycles, see MacMullen 1970; Andreau 1976; Shaw 1980; de Ligt 1990; 1991; 1993; Morley 1994.

catalogues seventy-eight examples, not all of them Italian). The specific location of the *macellum* within the town is significant: most are situated either in or alongside the forum. The forum, as previously noted (Chapter 2), was the area most conspicuously associated with the local *élite* and with their competition for status through public benefactions. This in itself strongly suggests that the *macellum* had more to do with the *élite* than with the peasant population. However, the strongest evidence for connecting the *macellum* to the production on *élite* estates comes from literary and archaeological sources.

The few literary references to what was actually sold at the *macellum* are problematic, since most pertain specifically to Rome and its specialist markets.¹⁵ Nevertheless it is possible, with caution, to use these examples in conjunction with other types of evidence to suggest commodities that may have been sold at other urban *macella*.

Evidence for produce sold at the macellum

The early excavations of the *macellum* at Pompeii (FIG. 8) found remains of figs, plums, grapes, and lentils (Mau-Kelsey 1902: 96; de Ruyt 1983: 148-9). It is virtually impossible to detail other fruits and vegetables that may have been sold, since comparable archaeological evidence is

¹⁵ Robinson (1992: 131-2, esp. n. 5) lists the references for the specialist markets. See also Frayn (1993: ch. 2).




FIG. 8. Pompeii: plan of the imperial *macellum* (after Maiuri; taken from de Ruyt 1983: 142 fig. 53).

lacking.¹⁶ The literary sources do at least give some clue as to the general types of vegetable sold at the *macellum*. Varro, for instance, refers not only to markets at Rome, but also to the antique (i.e. pre-imperial) Forum Holitorium, where there were plenty of vegetables (*ubi olerum copia*: *LL* 5. 146). Similarly, Pliny refers not to the markets of his own day, but to the market-place of the past, in order to evoke a bygone age of innocence (*HN* 19. 52 and 57). In this golden age, he says, farmers (*agricolae*) grew in their own gardens the basic vegetables needed for subsistence; if the garden was neglected it was a sign that there was a bad mistress of the house, and then one was forced to get supplies from the *macellum* (19. 57). The *macellum*, by implication, was a place where the peasant went only exceptionally. It seems also, in this account, to be bound up with moral disrepute. On the one hand the passage could be taken to imply that basic vegetables were sold at the *macellum*; on the other hand, the fact that the peasant went there only in desperation and exceptionally, could imply that it did not offer the kinds of goods he would usually buy. Ultimately the interpretation remains uncertain, but the moral associations are interesting; perhaps these were bound up, too, with the types of produce on sale at the *macellum*. If the *macellum* is exceptional,

¹⁶ De Ruyt (348 n. 20), following Mau (1902: 91-2), suggests that fruit and vegetables were sold in a group of buildings opposite the *macellum*. Mau's original suggestion, however, is not supported by any other evidence.

then it points to the sale there of exceptional goods, or luxurious exotica (including, in Pliny's day, kale and cultivated asparagus), that were themselves symptomatic of moral disrepute. Whether figs, grapes, and plums fall into the category of exotica is debatable;¹⁷ lentils are more doubtful still. Possibly the *macellum* dealt in special varieties of these fruits and pulses.

Bread is attested in Pompeii's *macellum* by the finds of charred loaves and cakes. Whether these were specialities of some kind can only be the subject of speculation. Mayeske (1972) suggests¹⁸ that the *macellum* may have provided bread for the residential quarter around the forum, an area in which, according to her, there was no other bakery. This might seem to support the idea that if there was a bakery, or baker's shop in the *macellum*, it was not necessarily a specialist producer. De Ruyt (1983: 349), on the other hand, notes Mau's reference to remains of loaves and grain found in shops along the street onto which the north side of the *macellum* opened (see FIG. 8), in order to refute Mayeske's hypothesis. But it is not clear whether the excavators were referring to the shops belonging to the *macellum*, or (as de Ruyt argues) to the shops on the other side of the street. Either way, this evidence does not preclude the possibility that there was

¹⁷ In ancient Greece, figs were regarded as a staple (Foxhall 1990a: 71).

¹⁸ On the basis of a painting from the *macellum* depicting Cupids celebrating the festival of Vesta, dancing round a mill.

a baker's outlet in the *macellum*, any more than it proves, alternatively, the existence of a bakery on the road bordering the *macellum*'s north side. Attempting to establish on the basis of such slight evidence whether, if bread was sold there, it was of a special or 'fancy' type, therefore appears futile. However, Pliny (*HN* 19. 53) comments on bakers' shops producing one kind of bread for the rich, and another for the poor (*alio pane procerum, alio volgi*), which, given that the comment is made in the context of luxury and *macella*, could be taken to mean that in Rome, at least, special types of bread could be bought from the *macellum*.

Rather more source material can be drawn upon in order to gain some idea as to the kinds of fish that were sold at Pompeii. There can be little doubt that fish of some kind were sold in the *macellum*, since the archaeological evidence is relatively plentiful. A distinctive type of counter was found there, designed so that water could drain off one side (Mau 1902: 96).¹⁹ In addition, fish-scales, shellfish, and a fish-hook were found in the gutter (de Ruyt 1983: 345). A number of references in Plautus's plays confirm that for Rome, at least, fish-selling was common in the *macellum*,²⁰ even though by the later Republic there was

¹⁹ Equivalent counters have also been found at Ostia, Hippo Regius, and Leptis Magna (de Ruyt 1983: 345). See also Eschebach (1970), who, on the basis of the fish counter in Pompeii's *macellum*, refers to the entire building as a fish-market.

²⁰ Plaut. *Rudens*, 974, 979-80; *Aul.* 5. 373; *Pseud.* 5. 169; *Capt.* 5. 813; 815. See also Apul. *Met.* 1. 24.

no specialist fish-market there (de Ruyt 1983: 342; Robinson 1992: 131; Frayn 1993: 65). We hear that two distinct categories of salt-water fish were available: large fish caught on the high seas (*ceti*),²¹ and smaller fish caught nearer to the shoreline. The latter type are better documented in the literary sources. Mullet, for example, may have been an option only for the rich (Juv. *Satires*, 5. 92-3; 6. 36-40), and paintings in Pompeii's *macellum* suggest that mullet featured among the fish sold there, too. In Rome's market one might also have found eels, murenas, oysters, and *coracini*;²² at Pompeii sea-bream and dentex have been identified in the *macellum* paintings (de Ruyt 1983: 345).

Freshwater fish, perhaps smaller on the whole than their salt-water counterparts,²³ were caught in the Tiber, and could also be bought at the *macellum*. These seem to have been cheaper,²⁴ and presumably were therefore less desirable, possibly due to pollution in the river.

From the literary sources we can also obtain some idea of the fish-sellers' clientele. The satirists frequently use fish as a motif for luxury and extravagance (see e.g. Hudson 1991), a symbol of moral depravity, and this is

²¹ Possibly more frequently used in making *garum* than for eating fresh (de Ruyt 1983: 343). On types of salt-water fish used in the manufacture of *garum*, and on the organization of the *garum* industry more generally, see now Curtis (1991).

²² Eel, murena: Plaut. *Aul.* 5. 399. Oysters: Pliny, *HN* 19. 4. 52. *Coracinus*: Mart. *Epig.* 8. 85.

²³ Varro, *RR* 3. 17. 6-7.

²⁴ See Juv. *Satires*, 11. 35-8.

equally the case in the few instances in which fish are specifically mentioned in the context of the *macellum*. In such examples, it is important to the satirical intent, as when Horace says:

It's a dreadful mistake to pay three thousand
[sesterces] for fish at the market [*macellum*]
and then to squeeze the sprawling creatures in a
narrow dish

(Hor. Sat. 2. 4. 76-7)²⁵

or when Juvenal's persona rails against the revolting Crispinus, who

bought a red
mullet for sixty gold pieces [6,000 sesterces] - ten
to each pound weight
to make it sound more impressive

(Satires, 4. 15-17)²⁶

Whether the prices are accurate or exaggerated hardly matters; the satirists are drawing attention to the fact that this is extraordinary fish for extraordinary consumption. The fish are symbolic of the ridiculous extravagance of the élite. Mulletts seem to be a particular target: according to Suetonius, Tiberius, on hearing that Corinthian bronzes had risen to an immense price and that

²⁵ 'Immane est vitium dare milia terna macello / angustoque vagos picis urgere catino.'

²⁶ 'mullum sex milibus emit / aequantem sane paribus sestertia libris / ut perhibent qui de magnis maiora loquuntur'.

three mullets had sold for thirty thousand sesterces, ordered that the senate regulate the prices at the *macellum* (Suet. *Tib.* 34. 1). By implication, this was not the everyday fare of the 'average' Roman. Thus we have an indication that the *macellum* may have been geared especially to meeting the demands of the élite. Poorer-quality or less spectacular fish, by comparison, might be bought in less salubrious surroundings.²⁷

Evidence for the sale of meat and poultry at Pompeii is limited. There are a number of paintings depicting birds (including some killed, some dressed, and some on plates). In addition, a counter, identified by Mau as a possible meat counter, was found in the *macellum* (Mau-Kelsey 1902: 96). Sheep skeletons were also found in one of the rooms on the eastern side of the *macellum*; their significance is unclear, although Mau suggests that they were slaughtered there for sacrificial purposes as a prelude to their sale. In short, only the sheep skeletons provide any real evidence that red meat may have been sold there. Mau supposes that the room at the south-east corner of the *macellum* was a 'market room for meat and fish', but there is little to confirm this idea; even the sheep skeletons were found in a different area of the *macellum* (on the north-east side). Frayn argues that meat was more likely to

²⁷ See, for example, Juv. *Satires*, 4. 32-3, again on the subject of Crispinus, 'now Chief of the Equites, who used to hawk at the top of his voice from a broken job-lot his fellow-countrymen the sprats' (Loeb trans., adapted: *iam princeps equitum magna qui voce solebat / vendere municipes fracta de merce siluros*).

be sold (and slaughtered) at a *laniena* (butcher's shop) outside the *macellum*, on the grounds that there is 'no provision for the slaughter of animals within the precincts of the *macella*', nor for 'keeping animals prior to slaughter' (1993: 70).

If sheep were sold (and perhaps also slaughtered) in Pompeii's *macellum*, as Mau suggests, then this may have been the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, *contra* Frayn, there does seem to have been a precedent for butchers in the *macellum* at Rome: Plautus refers to *lanii* (*Capt.* 5. 818), as does Terence (*Eun.* 5. 257).²⁸ Further evidence to support Mau's theory comes from Gaul, where the large quantity of cow and sheep bones found in a room in the south-west corner of the *macellum* at Genava (modern Geneva) has been interpreted as a butcher's shop (de Ruyt 1983: 75). At Rome, meat-sellers (together with fishmongers) certainly characterized the *macellum* by the third century BC, as indicated by Plautus, in whose plays it is the place where indeed lamb (*Aul.* 5. 374-5) and mutton (*Capt.* 5. 818-20) could be bought, but also beef, pork, and veal (*Aul.* 5. 374-5).

In addition, de Ruyt suggests, the Romans quickly developed a taste for certain delicacies, such as sweetbreads,²⁹ which again could be bought at the

²⁸ In Terence, *lanii* are differentiated from *fartores*, who make forcemeat (de Ruyt 1983: 346).

²⁹ De Ruyt's suggestion is made on the basis of Plaut. *Men.* 5. 210-11.

marketplace (from *fartores*: see n. 28). If there were meat markets in Rome, as suggested by the literary sources, then it would not be unreasonable to assume that sweetbreads and offal were sold. If Mau is right to suppose that sheep were sold in the *macellum* at Pompeii, we may also imagine that sweetmeats were sold here. Again, the lack of conclusive evidence means that this argument is largely conjectural.

For poultry and other birds, however, it is again possible to suggest types sold at Pompeii. Although no bones of any kind of bird have been found at the *macellum* there, or at *macella* elsewhere, the literary sources, together with the paintings at Pompeii, are nevertheless strongly indicative of bird-selling. The colonnade at the entrance to the *macellum* (opening directly on to the forum) had walls and panels decorated with paintings featuring representations of birds, fish, and 'vessels in which wine and other liquids could be kept'. Since these particular paintings differed substantially in content from others of what Mau termed the Fourth Style (which he shows to be the predominant style used on the panels), he believes that they were intended to refer directly to the items for sale in the *macellum* (1902: 97). De Ruyt (1983: 347) also notes Mazois's reference to the painting of a boar's head, possibly located on the same walls of the colonnade, as well as paintings of geese and other unspecified birds in the market-stalls in the southern corner of the *macellum* (1983: 148 n. 123).

Of specific types of birds, thrushes (*turdi*)³⁰ are attested by Varro as being destined for trade and to be sold at the *macellum* (RR 3. 4. 2). The same passage refers to people who keep an *ornithon*, an enclosure for birds sold at the *macellum*. Although *turdi* are mentioned in the context of the *ornithon*, there is no further suggestion as to the birds that may also have been kept there, ready for the market. Of other small birds, Frayn (1993: 72) claims that '*ficedulae* (fig-peckers, *beccafichi*) would in many localities have been available in markets', but, as with many other types of commodity that might be considered likely contenders for sale at the market, we have no evidence that links fig-peckers *specifically* to *macella*. A fat pigeon (*turtur magnus*), however, is listed among the pickings to be had from the market (Juv. *Satires*, 6. 39). Similarly, Varro (RR 3. 7. 10) gives prices for pigeons sold at Rome: a good pair will sell for 200 HS, but 'unusually fine ones' might fetch as much as 1,000 HS. Pheasants were included among the slightly more exotic birds to be found at the *macellum* (de Ruyt 1983: 347). It is these kinds of birds, says Pliny, that are all the more prized because of the difficulty involved in catching them (*HN* 19. 19. 52).

³⁰ The Loeb text translates *turdi* as 'fieldfares', meaning a specific type of thrush. Frayn (1993: 72) prevaricates, referring to '*turdi* (thrushes or fieldfares)'. Fieldfares are an entirely different species to thrushes (the former are now winter migrants to Britain).

Animal game was similarly valued: its price reflected the skill needed, or the risks run, to capture the animal. Its size and relative rarity probably added still more to its value. The attraction (and added value) of a truly wild animal, rather than of a wild species raised 'domestically', is illustrated by a passage in Varro, which at the same time links the game (in this case, wild boar) to the *macellum*. The context is a rhetorical debate as to what constitutes a villa, and whether the type of husbandry practised on the villa makes any difference to its nomenclature. In this fictional scene, Appius asks Axius:

And do you get more from the butcher [*lanius*] for the boars born on your place there than Seius does from the market-man [*macellarius*] for the wild boars from his place?

(Varro, RR 3. 2. 11)

That game was regarded as something of a luxury - particularly for city-dwellers - is reflected by Horace's *Satire* 2. 3, in which Damasippus repeats a lesson he learnt from Stertinius, and retells a story designed to show that spendthrifts are fools and madmen. In this story, a man who inherits a legacy of a thousand talents orders the market (*macellum*) to come to him. It is made clear that if he so chooses, he can be supplied with, among other things, a boar from Lucania (2. 3. 234-5).³¹

³¹ That Pompeii's *macellum* was decorated with a painting of a boar's head (see above, p. 244), may reflect the sale of game

Archaeological and literary evidence for produce sold specifically at the *macellum* is admittedly sketchy. yet they seem strongly to suggest that it was a select marketplace that sold specialist, luxury foods primarily to a wealthy élite. If this suggestion is largely correct, then we can begin to see that the types of crops, fish, birds, and game that the agronomists recommend for raising on the estate correspond very closely to the kinds of specialist produce apparently sold at the *macellum*. In other words, it seems highly likely that some estate production was intended specifically for sale at the *macellum*.

Thus, in addition to the specific goods attested in the sources to have been sold at the *macellum*, we may reasonably infer that the more exotic produce discussed in the agronomists not mentioned with reference to feeding the estate are precisely those that were likely to have been sold at the *macellum*, or at least in the urban centre. In addition, other passages in the agronomic and other literary texts strongly imply that certain goods were destined for the urban centre. The fact that most of these goods are also slightly exclusive, requiring specialist or intensive cultivation, further implies that they may have been destined for the *macellum*.

For example, implicit in Columella's instructions for growing gourds (*cucurbitae*)³² is the suggestion that they

there.

³² Most gourds are New World species; it is not clear exactly what the Roman *cucurbitae* were, but Columella's description

were particularly worth growing for consumption elsewhere than on the estate. A gourd grown in such a way so as to make it grow longer and narrower, he says, will fetch a better price than others (11. 3. 50).

Asparagus is a good example of a vegetable that was probably cultivated by larger landholders for a specialized market. Cato, for example, describes in some detail one method for planting asparagus (RR 161), and also suggests that wild asparagus should be grown on any part of the estate where there is wet ground (6. 3-4). Similarly, Varro recommends that wild asparagus should be grown in shady spots (1. 23. 5), while Columella includes wild asparagus in his list of what must be cultivated (11. 3. 16). What is interesting about the fact that the agronomic texts give preference to growing the wild variety is that, on the basis of Diocletian's price edict, André (1981: 23) believes that cultivated asparagus was three times more expensive than wild (or mountain) asparagus. This was probably because cultivated asparagus required considerable attention; Pliny (HN 19. 145) claims that of all cultivated vegetables, asparagus requires *lautissima cura*. Furthermore, two poems from Martial (13. 21) and Juvenal (11. 68-9) complete an apparent paradox, suggesting as they do that it was in fact the cheaper wild asparagus that was more greatly appreciated (1981: 83). André suggests that we may have here a satirical affectation, since a comment from

suggests a vegetable similar to a gourd.

the elder Pliny (*HN* 19. 54) indicates that wild asparagus was more likely to appear on the tables of the (rustic) poor. However, there is no reason to regard this apparent preference for wild asparagus simply as a satirical affectation: it is more usual that the satirists broadly reflect the ideals and attitudes of the Roman élite as a whole. I would suggest, therefore, that in this particular instance, the satirists are reflecting the affectations of their own social milieu.

We can now understand better why Cato and Varro are in favour of growing what is - in André's argument - an unprofitable crop. Quite simply, there must have been a demand for wild asparagus, or it would not have been worth growing (equally, it would not have been worthy of mention for the agronomic writers). That demand, judging from the satirists, most probably arose from the urban centres, and especially from the wealthier households for whom wild asparagus represented one of the elements of social competition. So, for example, the context in which Juvenal's persona talks of providing mountain asparagus in a meal for a friend is one of social one-upmanship. The asparagus has added status value because it is to be picked by his bailiff's wife from his own estate. What is so important about wild asparagus for the élite, then, is not its taste or its possibly higher price, but its overtones of the countryside and of the rustic style of living that they held so dear. Evans's belief (1980: 138) that *asparagi corruda* 'seems to have been a vital food resource for the

rustici throughout the classical period'³³ does not, therefore, necessarily invalidate this argument.³⁴

It is also important to note that it was not exclusively fresh produce that was sold at the *macellum*. Indeed, there is direct evidence in Varro's treatise for shrewd economic management relating to eventual sale of the stored foods. Storing is regarded as a direct prerequisite to marketing: *omnis fere fructus quinto denique gradu pervenit ad perfectum ac videt in villa dolium ac modium, unde sexto prodit ad usum. Primo praeeparandum, secundo serendum, tertio nutricandum, quarto legendum, quinto condendum, sexto promendum*³⁵ (RR 1. 37. 4). Preserved foodstuffs, he says, are taken out of storage for three reasons only: because they are to be protected, consumed (*utenda*), or sold (RR 1. 62). Given their different purposes (*ea quod dissimilia inter se*), protecting and consuming are done at different times. These two operations were vital to the

³³ Evans argues for the importance of asparagus in the peasants' diet on the basis of the same literary sources considered here, and from the fact that asparagus is a good source of vitamin C. However, he overlooks the instructions in the agronomists for planting wild asparagus, and thus misses the status significance of the vegetable to the élite.

³⁴ Another possibility is that *asparagi corruda* was in fact no different to the 'domestic' variety. This is implied by Columella, who writes (11. 3. 43): '*Sativi asparagi, et quam corrudam rustici vocant, semina fere biennio praeeparantur*', and also by Pliny, *HN* 16. 173.

³⁵ '... almost every product comes to perfection in five stages and reaches jar and basket in the farmstead, and from these is brought forth for use in the sixth. The first stage is the preparation, the second the planting, the third the cultivation, the fourth the harvesting, the fifth the storing, and the sixth the marketing.'

estate's production: the time at which preserved foods were consumed (relative to the time of their harvesting and preserving) depended on the keeping qualities of each particular fruit. Protection, of course, was carried out with a view to future consumption, but perhaps more importantly, with a view to future sale.³⁶ Organizing the sale of produce, however, may have presented the bailiff's wife with more problems, since timing was all-important, and it required careful (and, if necessary, immediate) response to demand in order to maximize profits. Thus, Varro says, you should first sell those crops that do not keep well, and sell those which keep better once the price is high. The longer-stored products may even double the profit if sold at the right time (RR 1. 69. 1). So great is the emphasis placed by Cato, Varro, and Columella on storing and preserving certain crops that it seems highly probable that a fair proportion eventually found its way to the urban centre.

That the élite may have kept fish to sell at the *macellum* is suggested by Varro (RR 2. introd. 5); fishponds are regarded as a form of husbandry from which 'no little revenue (*fructus*) can be derived'. In Varro's dialogue on villa husbandry, Seius is acclaimed for keeping fish to sell at a profit (3. 2. 14). Fish are also included among the products that were born and reared in *macellum ut perveniant* (Varro, RR 3. 3. 4). Columella, too, regards

³⁶ That the management of these tasks was vital to the overall self-sufficiency of the estate, see Columella, RR 12. 1. 5.

rearing fish as a profitable activity (8. 16. 1; 8. 16. 6, with the added implication that these were sold to members of the *élite*). In moralizing fashion, Columella affects to despise fish-rearing because it is 'quite unsuitable for farmers' (*quorum redditum . . . alienissimum agricultoribus putem*: 8. 16. 1), but he is nevertheless well informed as to the most profitable species, and as to the best ways of breeding them. He, like Varro, has the market in mind as a destination for reared fish (albeit a specialist fish-market, *piscatorium*, rather than a *macellum*: 8. 17. 15). Additionally, some of the types of fish for which he discusses methods of rearing correspond to those highlighted by other sources as being sold at the *macellum*: turbot (8. 16. 7), dentex (8. 16. 8), shellfish (8. 16. 7-8), and perhaps grey mullet (8. 17. 8).³⁷ Other evidence also suggests specialist fish-rearing. A Campanian from before the Social War, C. Sergius Orata, is said by the elder Pliny to have bred and supplied oysters (*HN* 9. 168); the inference both from Pliny and from another reference to Orata in Valerius Maximus is that Orata bred fish for profit especially to cater for the local *élite* (D'Arms 1970: 19). Sulla's estate near Cumae also incorporated fisheries (App. BC 1. 104). L. Licinius Murena may have been the first to have all sorts of fish-ponds (*HN* 9. 170;

³⁷ However, Columella also considers that another fish attested by other sources for sale at the *macellum*, the red mullet, is unsuitable for rearing since it is 'intolerant' of captivity (8. 17. 7).

cf. Columella RR 8. 11), and L. Licinius Lucullus had fish-ponds at Neapolis and Misenum (3. 17. 9), although whether either Murena or Lucullus bred fish for profit is uncertain. Hirrus (C. Licilius Hirrus) is implied to have profit-making fish-ponds, for the fish added to the huge value of the estate (Varro, RR 3. 17. 3). Fish-farming - including the farming of shellfish - is also widely attested archaeologically on the Mediterranean coast (Greene 1986: 79). Some fish may have been taken straight to the market, while others may have been used for making fish sauce (*garum*) (Curtis 1991), itself a delicacy. Members of the élite clearly could not afford to stand by moral sentiments when there were profits to be made that might help subsidize their conspicuous expenditure.

Of birds raised on large estates, there were perhaps three main categories: domestic fowl (such as geese, chickens, and guinea-fowl); 'utilitarian' but essentially non-domestic birds; and exotic birds, such as peacocks. The last two types could also, of course, be reared intensively, apparently in the hope of selling them for a good price. Varro (RR 2, introd. 5) mentions keeping poultry-yards as a means of raising revenue. In addition, he implies (RR 3. 6. 1) that estate owners had a keen awareness of current, perhaps *macellum* prices: in a discussion on raising birds he mentions that a certain Marcus Aufidius Lurco raises 60,000 sesterces by rearing peafowl, and that a flock of 100 brings in 40,000 HS (RR 3. 6. 6). In the same passage in which Lurco's peafowl are

mentioned, it is perhaps implied that Marcus Piso (cos. 61) kept peacocks for profit on the island of Planasia (near Elba). Similarly, Seius is admired for the revenue he generates from raising several kinds of poultry (RR 3. 2. 13-14), including geese, chickens, pigeons, cranes, and peafowl. In a discussion of Seius's geese-rearing techniques, Scipio Metellus (cos. 52 BC) is also mentioned as keeping flocks of geese (RR 3. 10. 1). According to Varro, too, one L. Abuccius raised 20,000 HS from his aviaries, which housed poultry and peacocks (RR 3. 2. 17), while L. Licinius Lucullus had aviaries in which were kept birds for both pleasure and profit (RR 3. 4. 2). That birds were raised in this way to satisfy élite demand is clear from another discussion in Varro (RR 3. 2. 15), where aviaries are suggested as a means of raising substantial sums of money - the example given by the speaker is of 60,000 HS raised from 5,000 fieldfares - but only if that demand can be wholly relied upon. Demand of this kind is envisaged as being for the celebration of public banquets, somebody's triumph, *aut collegiorum cenae quae nunc innumerabiles excandefaciunt annonam macelli* (RR 3. 2. 1).

That the élite were buying these kinds of specialist goods thus seems certain; moreover, it is their own social competition that inflates the prices at the markets. For all that the élite were spending their money on expensive goods for expensive dinners, it seems that some of them were also profiting from the same operation by supplying the market with the goods in demand. Perhaps they made

substantial profits; alternatively, perhaps they invested in this kind of husbandry simply in order to balance their expenditure. The problems (but also the profits) involved in catering for élite tastes are mentioned again in another reference to keeping birds. In a discussion of fowls (RR 3. 9. 18), we are reminded of the constant social pressure that provoked the élite into trying to keep ahead of their peers. This competition created a constant demand for specialist and novel goods that suppliers must have found difficult to keep up with, but for which the buyers had to be prepared to pay substantial sums. Varro seems to be well aware of this problem, and yet the implication is that there were substantial profits to be made if one could afford to invest in this kind of husbandry; of African hens, Merula claims that *haec novissimae in triclinium cenantium introierunt e culina propter fastidium hominum. Veneunt propter penuriam magno*.³⁸

We have seen in Varro the implication that the genuinely wild boars fetch a higher price at the market than those raised for the purpose on Seius' farm.³⁹ Nevertheless, it

³⁸ 'These are the latest fowls to come from the kitchen to the dining-room because of peoples' pampered tastes. On account of their scarcity they fetch a high price'. Birds might also be sold for public and private ritual ceremonies (Varro, RR 3. 3. 5).

³⁹ The passage from Varro is particularly interesting for the emphatic distinction made between the *lanius* and the *macellarius*: *et num pluris tu e villa illic natos verres lanio vendis, quam hinc apros macellario Seius*. There would be little point in Varro making this distinction unless he meant something by it; I believe it is, once again, suggestive of the exclusiveness of the *macellum* - the genuinely wild boar, by implication, goes to the *macellum*, whereas the home-born animals simply go to the butcher

seems as though game was raised for the market; Seius is in fact praised for his ability to generate income from raising boars and unspecified other game (RR 3. 2. 14). In addition, Varro (2. introd. 5; 3. 3. 1) includes rabbit-hutches in his discussion of forms of profitable husbandry (he uses the word *fructus*). Sulla's estate near Cumae supposedly included hunting enclosures (App. BC 1. 104).

It may also be the case that flowers were sold at the *macellum*; they were certainly intended for the urban centre. Cato specifically mentions this possibility, and although he does not explicitly talk of selling the produce of the garden, this is clearly implied: *sub urbe hortum omne genus, coronamenta omne genus* (8. 2).⁴⁰ Varro, too, suggests that it is profitable to have gardens on a large scale (late) if you have an estate near a city (1. 16. 3), and mentions violets and roses specifically because of urban demand for these products.⁴¹ Demand for flowers should not be underestimated; garlands of flowers were used decoratively, particularly at dinner-parties, but also for frequent public and private religious ceremonies.⁴² Roman

(which may or may not be attached to the *macellum*, cf. Frayn 1993: 70).

⁴⁰ The Loeb translation of this passage is misleading: Cato is not in fact saying 'have a garden planted with . . .'. *Hortum* here does not mean 'garden', but according to Lewis and Short should be read with *omne genus* to mean 'garden stuff' or 'garden vegetables'.

⁴¹ Literally, 'likewise the many things that the city takes', *item multa quae urps recipit* (RR 1. 16. 3).

⁴² Garlands for weddings are perhaps suggested by Cato's reference to growing *murtum coniugulum* ('conjugulan' myrtle: RR 8. 2).

fondness for flowers is reflected in the wreaths and garlands of flowers that feature in many of the wall-paintings in Pompeii; no doubt their decorative value was added to by the fact that they represented 'a little bit of country in town'. In addition, and perhaps more important still, flowers were sought after for their fragrance, and some were used to make perfume; evidence of specialized perfume manufacture at Pompeii has recently been argued for by Mattingly (1990), and the use of perfume by the élite was an aspect of conspicuous consumption. Although we have no direct evidence that flowers were sold at the *macellum*, they would fit well in the context of its specialist products.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MACELLUM AND LOCAL FARMS

Local smallholdings and specialist production

It is evident from both non-agronomic literature and archaeology that the *macellum* dealt in specialized, sometimes luxury, produce and served a largely élite clientele. That it was specifically the élite who purchased goods there is strongly implied by Suetonius's account of Tiberius ordering prices at the *macellum* to be monitored (Suet. *Tib.* 34. 1). This seems to be another instance of concern over status competition, played out - in this example - in the *macellum*. The picture we get of the kind of produce sold there tallies very closely with the kind of produce the agronomists envisage as being grown on the large estate. That is not to say that every crop mentioned

in the agronomists can be attested at the *macellum*, or vice versa, but simply that both are concerned with broadly the same specialized types of goods. It is therefore difficult not to imagine a connection between the two.

While it is possible that some market produce came from outside the town, or even abroad, I suspect that on a regular basis most produce sold at the *macellum* came from nearby rural estates. What is, I think, unlikely is that much - if any - produce was regularly supplied by local smallholders (contra Frayn 1993). A number of arguments can be made to support this hypothesis.

In her discussion of *macella* and their suppliers, Frayn (1993), suggests that the peasant farmer was able to produce a wide range of vegetables to sell at the market. Her argument rests largely on the evidence provided by the Virgilian *Moretum*, in which the countryman takes to the market a number of herbs and vegetables, the produce of his own garden. But as evidence for the success of the peasant farmer this passage is far from convincing. The lines that Frayn cites (lines 78-81), taken from an earlier part of the poem, are perhaps more indicative of the poem's genre and of its usefulness for our purposes:

inde domum cervice levis, gravis aere redibat
vix umquam urbani comitatus merce macelli.

That the countryman brought home scarcely any merchandise from the *macellum* seems to echo the same moral sentiments

as are expressed later by the elder Pliny (*HN* 19. 52 and 57). Rather than regarding the poem as positive evidence for the variety (and surplus) of vegetables grown by the peasant farmer,⁴³ I suggest that it should be seen as part of the same rustic idealization as is expressed by Pliny. To read it as literal evidence for the rustic life ignores, above all, the pastoral literary tradition in which it is written.

Similarly, we should treat with caution the next source used by Frayn as evidence for the peasant farmer selling his produce at the market. The passage in question is taken from Columella's *De re rustica*, Book 10, lines 310-13. Frayn sees these lines as being Columella's instructions to the smallholder to take his garden produce to the market.⁴⁴ Problems exist with this interpretation: first, 'market' is not actually mentioned in the text; second, *deferre* simply translates as 'carry down' and need not necessarily mean 'carry down to the market' (or 'to market bring', as in the Loeb translation); third, this particular book of Columella is written after the style of Virgil's *Georgics*.⁴⁵ Lines 304-10, which are not addressed, it appears, to the large estate owner as such, but instead to 'you rustics' (*vos agrestes*), show similarities to the description of the countryman in the *Moretum*:

⁴³ Frayn refers to the 'poor farmer' (1993: 62).

⁴⁴ Although onions, garlic, dill, and corn-poppies can hardly be said to add up to the 'variety' that Frayn refers to.

⁴⁵ Col. *RR* 10, preface, 3-5.

et titubante gradu multo madefactus Iaccho
aere sinus gerulus plenos gravis urbe reportet.

(1. 308-10)

Both take their produce to town; both return home with their pockets full of bronze. What we have here is not circumstantial evidence for the smallholder's market produce, but rather a literary *topos* serving to re-establish the ideal of the honest toil and simple pleasures of the countryman.

None of this need preclude the smallholder from having sold his produce in the *macellum*; but the nature of our evidence clearly makes such an assumption questionable. It is not, of course, unlikely that smallholders grew vegetables, but the scale and nature of the operation probably precluded the smallholder from selling those vegetables at the *macellum*. While some smallholdings were no doubt bigger than others, the 'typical' holding is believed to have been around 1.77 hectares (Foxhall 1990a: 206),⁴⁶ which, it is argued, was barely sufficient to provide for a single household, let alone provide a surplus for the benefit of other households. Whatever the size of the 'average' smallholding, surpluses of produce like fresh vegetables were probably sporadic and 'accidental'. A windfall surplus might be sold, but this is only one

⁴⁶ Foxhall cites Evans (1980: 159, 161). However, Foxhall (1990a: 205) also notes White (1970) who, on the evidence of the sources, gives 10 iugera (2.4 ha) as the starting size of a smallholding; slightly larger than the area suggested by Evans, but still insufficient to support a household.

possible way of disposing of it; it might be given away, for example, in the hope of future return, or fed to animals. Thus, the smallholder's first priority was therefore to feed himself and his family (Wolf 1966: ch. 1), not to produce a surplus to sell; his agricultural strategies were characterized by security rather than by diversification and risk-taking (Foxhall 1990a: 25). By comparison, the range and quantity of crops suggested by the agronomists is impressive. This scale and breadth of production reflects, above all, the diversification of productive aims; it was the ability to diversify that particularly set the rural estate owner apart from the smallholder. It is thus improbable that the smallholder could have diversified in order to grow the more exotic vegetables to be found at the *macellum*, or to grow enough of them to have a saleable surplus. For the same reasons, it is unlikely that he ever contributed to the *macellum* on a regular basis what Frayn refers to as a 'wide variety' of semi-exotic vegetables and herbs. Fruit and vegetables are the only products that are mentioned in the sources as being taken to the *macellum* by farmers. It appears unlikely that the sources reflect reality in this respect, and, when considered in conjunction with the argument put forward above, the ability of the smallholder to supply any other kind of produce to the *macellum* must therefore be deemed to be less probable still.

A possible exception is game, which Evans (1980: 137) argues may have been supplied by the local peasantry.

Peasants, he suggests, may have spent their spare time hunting and poaching, and thus may have taken their catches to sell at the market. However, the evidence is, as Evans admits, 'terribly nebulous' - although he still argues that it is 'obvious' that game was not being marketed by the aristocracy. This raises an equally obvious objection: if peasants were not supplying the market (and it is surely inconceivable that they could have done so on a regular basis), who was? The fact that 'wild game was in sufficient demand throughout Roman world for its price to be regulated in Diocletian's edict' (Evans 1980: 137) suggests that it was being consumed by the élite, but also (*contra* Evans) that it was, at the same time, being marketed by them.

Only large estates could afford to specialize and diversify in the way suggested by the agronomists. For example, the agronomists' interest in 'market' gardens is a long way removed from the economic strategies and concerns of the typical smallholder, whose limited land simply did not give him the option of deciding whether or not to devote certain plots of land to market gardening. (Smallholders with irrigable land may have devoted some space to market gardening,⁴⁷ but I suspect they were the exception rather than the norm.) As we have seen, flowers,

⁴⁷ Cf. Marcel Pagnol's rural novels set in early twentieth-century Provence, *Jean de Florette* and *Manon des sources* (Pagnol 1988). The plot centres around the struggle for control of a hillside spring: it is the ambition of the chief malefactors, César Soubeyran (Papet) and his nephew Ugolin, to make their fortune by using the copious water-supply to grow carnations, which will be sold in Marseille, some 10 km distant.

exotic fruits, and vegetables were almost certainly sold at the *macellum*,⁴⁸ and it seems unlikely that they featured among the crops grown on most smallholdings. It is noticeable that staples do not feature in literary accounts of products sold at the *macellum*, and they are not included by the agronomists among those crops that one might sell at the urban centre; it is made clear that staples were regarded as being for estate consumption only. Staples are, however, precisely the principal crops likely to have been grown by smallholders, for this reason alone it is unlikely that these smallholders could regularly supply the *macellum*.

Similarly, responsiveness to demand was an option open only to the owners of larger estates: smallholders had first to feed themselves and their families from a relatively limited landholding (limited in terms of size and variety of soil types). Practical constraints on production simply may not have allowed much diversity in the first place in areas such as fruit- and vegetable-growing. Even if smallholders were fortunate enough to grow fruit, and to grow sufficient quantities so as to put a proportion aside for preserving, the primary aim must have been to preserve and store enough to feed the family unit through the winter months; it is unlikely that they were

⁴⁸ Although de Ruyt, following Mau, suggests that at Pompeii, fruit-selling probably took place in another building, across the forum from the *macellum* (1983: 348 n. 20). See also Frayn (1993: 160-1).

able to produce enough to have a regular surplus to sell.⁴⁹ So, again, it seems unlikely that the dried fruit and nuts sold at the *macellum* came from the stored surplus of the peasant farmer. Frayn's assumption that the peasant farmer contributed substantially to the produce sold at the *macellum* must surely, therefore, be discarded.

If we accept that the evidence discussed so far is suggestive of a close association between the *macellum* and the large rural estate, it follows that rural estates supplying the *macellum* needed to be located within reasonable travelling distance of the urban centre. Since overland transport was slow and expensive (Greene 1986: 39-40), buying an estate near a town (or near a waterway)⁵⁰ helped to cut the estate owner's costs and allowed him to produce in particular the fresh products for which there was greatest demand, and for which the highest prices were paid. We have already seen that Varro highlights violets and roses as flowers for which there was particular urban demand,⁵¹ but he also says it would not be profitable to grow the same products at a remote farm where there is no

⁴⁹ Contrast this to Cato, *RR* 25. 1, who specifically stipulates that some of the harvested grapes should be set aside for household use.

⁵⁰ The younger Pliny's letters show that he was fully alert to the possibilities offered by the estate he was thinking of buying (next to his existing estate at Tifernum Tiberinum); its location next to the Tiber would allow him to transport his crops - although he does not say which particular crops he has in mind - to sell in Rome (*Ep.* 5. 6. 12).

⁵¹ See above, n. 41.




FIG. 9. Schematic representation of trade zones around an urban centre (Frayn 1993: 77, fig. 7).

market to which to take your produce.⁵² Frayn (1993: 76) rightly suggests that considerations of product freshness effectively limited the distance from a town at which a farm could be financially viable, and estimates that flowers must have come from farms and market-gardens within the range of 5-10 km from the market. If we are correct to assume that it was largely cut or picked flowers (as opposed to potted ones) that were sold - and this is strongly implied in the case of garlands (Cato, RR 8. 2), and must have been the case for roses - then 5-10 km seems a reasonable guess, bearing in mind, of course, the emphasis Cato and Varro specifically place on this kind of farm's being near an urban centre. Flowers, then, could be profitable, but only if you owned a garden within easy reach of a town. In essence, the closer the farm to the urban centre, the greater the profit will be. The desirability of rural land close to the town for marketing reasons must have made land of this kind correspondingly expensive (cf. De Neeve 1985: 79-80). Similar considerations must also have applied to other crops: Frayn's diagram (1993: 77; FIG. 9), representing the range of particular goods, places all the types of produce attested for the *macellum* - flowers, vegetables, soft

⁵² Varro, RR 1. 16. 3: *cum eadem in longinquo praedio, ubi non sit quo deferri possit venale, non expediat colere* ('while it would not be possible to raise the same products on a distant farm where there is no market to which its products can be taken'). Varro does not specifically mention the *macellum* in this context, although it seems reasonable to assume that he had the *macellum* in mind.

fruit, curd cheese, poultry, suckling pig, and spring lamb - within a 15 km radius of the town. *Villatica pastio* seems particularly associated with suburban farms for this reason, but any estate with good access to transport routes could also produce these kinds of specialized goods for sale. In short, an estate producing crops to sell at the *macellum* almost certainly needed to be near the town, or else near a waterway. The arguments put forward so far as to the ability of the estate-owner to grow market-oriented crops, whether for immediate sale or for initial storage, are heavily dependent on a rather literal reading of the agronomic texts. Nevertheless, the productivity of the rural estate closely matches the products attested in the literature and archaeology for the *macellum*. The types of products sold there seem in particular to have been those that needed to be produced relatively close to the town centre because they spoiled easily. That the large rural estate ideally tried to fit the bill is indicated throughout the agronomists, but the final test for rural estates producing for *macella* should therefore come from estates within an approximate fifteen kilometre or so radius of the urban centre.

Villa production and local markets: the evidence of archaeology

The major difficulty when trying to identify types of villa production, let alone link villa production to specific destinations, is simply that there is insufficient

evidence. Field survey can usually only show possible villa sites. Although there have been a number of villa excavations in recent years, some following on from field surveys, the range of evidence from these sites that could serve the purpose of piecing together villa production is limited. Occasional remains of presses mean that olive oil and/or wine production is highly visible, but other kinds of production are less well attested. Seed and bone analysis, for example, is a relatively recent development, and consequently the number of published site reports that include archaeobotanical and faunal analyses is still insufficient to allow us to draw general inferences as to villa production. The minor exceptions are some of the villas in the area around Pompeii; here the work of Jashemski (e.g. 1979; 1987) has been instrumental in demonstrating the extent to which seed and bone analysis can illuminate villa production.

Much of this chapter has relied on the evidence of the *macellum* at Pompeii, simply because, unlike other *macella*, evidence for the produce sold there was buried along with the rest of the town in AD 79. Given that the evidence for possible villa production in the area around the town is also unusually good, it provides a convenient test for the relationship between villa production and the *macellum*. But evidence for villa estates in the immediate vicinity of Pompeii is limited. The excavations of these 'villas' were carried out for the most part by private landowners more interested in buried treasure than in archaeological

recording or systematic publication. Given their poor publication, identifying the 'villas', let alone reconstructing their functions, is now thought to be extremely hazardous. Indeed, in his recent reassessment of all the available evidence Jongman concludes that 'even the location of many villas is far less secure than the texts of the publications suggest' (1988: 113).

There are two concentrations of 'villas' outside Pompeii (FIG. 10): one immediately north of the town, the second to the south and east. Of the latter, more than half (seven out of thirteen) do not, in Jongman's analysis, warrant being classified as villas. Those nearer and to the north of the town fare a little better under scrutiny, although over a third (seven out of eighteen) cannot be securely identified.⁵³ However, none of these 'villas' has been the subject of detailed botanical and zoological analysis, so that even when the published accounts of their structures and findings are relatively good, information regarding their agricultural output is restricted to assumptions

⁵³ Jongman does not decide what, to his mind, constitutes a villa. It seems to be his implicit assumption, nevertheless, that it amounts to evidence of a farm that supported more than just subsistence agriculture. In practice, his methodology in this particular section (1988: 112-20) is weak. His description of villa 22, for instance, reports nothing more than 'agricultural implements', two rooms with wall-paintings and a bath; yet he concludes that 'all in all it is a fairly rustic building', and includes it in his list of villas.




FIG. 10. Map showing distribution of alleged Pompeian villas (Jongman 1991: 114, fig. 5).

based on the dubious equation that 'pots equal production'.⁵⁴ In short, the evidence of these 'villas' is so beset with difficulties that they are probably best discounted from discussion.

Surprisingly, in the light of the problems with the 'Pompeian villas', Jongman mentions only in passing the recently excavated villas at neighbouring Oplontis and Boscoreale - well within what he calls the 'economic' territory of Pompeii⁵⁵ - perhaps because their findings were not sufficiently well published at the time when he was writing. These are now the subject of an extensive article by Jashemski (1987), and provide arguably the best evidence yet for agricultural production on villa estates. The material from Boscoreale and Oplontis gives us a good indication of the production capabilities of the villas in the region. It is, of course, impossible to be certain whether or not their produce was destined for the *macellum*; but the extent to which they conform to what the agronomic

⁵⁴ Jongman rightly eschews the 'pots equal production' line of approach for his quantitative analysis of Pompeii's agricultural production, although his own calculations are grounded in figures so hypothetical that his margin of error increases the further he proceeds (1988: 131-6).

⁵⁵ Jongman (1988: 106-12), estimates an area of 200 sq km which he justifies on the basis of demographic arguments. Purcell (1990: 112), on the other hand, opts for Thiessen polygons to determine Pompeii's theoretical territory. The polygon drawn by Purcell suggests that Pompeii's sphere of economic influence may have been much less than Jongman estimates - about 130 sq km, although it still incorporates Boscoreale and Oplontis. Cf. also Eschebach (1970: 9, 11, and map 1) who draws a hypothetical territorial boundary for Pompeii based largely on natural boundaries and trade routes.

texts specifically refer to as market production gives some indication as to whether they might have been engaged in this style of production. It should be noted though, that the findings concerning agricultural production at the Boscoreale and Oplontis villas cannot be taken as a guide to production at villas elsewhere in Italy, for the territory of southern Campania benefited from the famed fertility of its volcanic soil. Boscoreale, in particular, may have been exceptionally privileged in this respect, situated as it is directly on the lower slopes of Vesuvius.

At the so-called villa of L. Crassius Tertius at Oplontis, much carbonized plant material was found in storage. These crops included vines and olives, as well as a number of legumes and grasses (probably used as fodder) and even wild poppies and violet blossoms (Jashemski 1987: 34), which appear to bear out Varro's recommendation to grow violets near market centres.⁵⁶ Filberts and pomegranates were found, too, although the purpose of the latter is unclear as they seem to have been picked before ripening.⁵⁷ Both the nuts and the pomegranates were found in storage contexts, which once again demonstrates the essential reliability of the agronomic texts since Cato,

⁵⁶ Cf. also Cotton (1979: 69), who, on the basis of modern comparative evidence of a neighbouring village, suggests that the late Republican villa at Posto (Francolise) may have supplied flowers to Capua or Naples.

⁵⁷ Which, as Jashemski puts it, 'raises the interesting question as to the intended use of a ton of green pomegranates' (1987: 64, with further discussion, arguing for their use as flavouring for must in wine-making, in nn. 11-12).

Varro, and Columella all discuss methods of storing these two crops (see above, p. 221).

At Boscoreale (FIG. 11) it was possible to excavate the actual farmland attached to the villa. Vine-growing was much evidenced by way of wine presses, and carbonized grape seeds and stems (Jashemski 1987: 67); the study of tree roots identified fig, possibly walnut or cherry, apricot, and peach trees (1987: 69). It is possible that vines were grown on the larger trees such as fig, walnut, and cherry (apricot, almond, and peach trees are not so large or sturdy). That these trees seem to have been interspersed among the vines not only supports the earlier suggestion that 'cash' crops were probably never grown in isolation, but also finds confirmation in modern-day smallholders' vine-growing practice. To these can also be added almonds, of which carbonized remains were found in the vineyard. At the villa entrance were found a few finds of bird bones, including those of chickens and of a rail (a water-bird). Dormouse bones were also found in amongst the bird bones (1987: 70). Bigger skeletons included those of a pig, and those of either sheep or goats. These, however, are likely to indicate the food consumed on the premises rather than the type of stock raised there (Greene 1986: 79). Amphorae discovered in the villa yielded evidence of wine, olive oil, and garum, and are perhaps more likely to relate to the estate's crop production since we have already seen that vines were cultivated on the site.




FIG. 11. Plan of the villa rustica at Boscoreale (Jashemski 1987, fig. 32).

The variety of fruit trees at Boscoreale is suggestive (though far from being conclusive proof) of crop production that went beyond simply providing for the villa. On the assumption that fresh fruit more readily fits the bill of exclusiveness that seems to have characterized the *macellum*, apricots and peaches (and the possible cherries) are perhaps most likely to have been destined for sale there, although the evidence of figs found at the Pompeian *macellum* means that those at Boscoreale may also have been sold, either fresh or dried.⁵⁸

Examination of the pig bones led Jashemski (1987: 69) to state that 'there is no doubt that pigs were raised on the villa'. If so, it is impossible to know the scale of such stock-raising. The bird and dormouse bones, found in a pile of *débris* just outside the villa entrance, are more problematic still. There is no way of telling whether they were reared on the estate or simply bought in for a meal. As evidence for production for the *macellum* these bones are clearly inadequate.

For non-Pompeian villa estates, little can be added to confirm production specifically for the *macellum*, although

⁵⁸ It is possible that the villa at Posto (Francolise) may have grown surpluses of fruit. Although it is not possible to know what land, or how much, came under its control (Cotton 1979: 68), the surrounding area is still very fertile and supports 'extensive peach orchards' and the 'occasional fig tree' (as well as grain, hay, beans, peas, tomatoes, gourds, peppers, and maize). Tomatoes, peppers, maize, and some modern bean varieties are, of course, New World imports (thus post-fifteenth century AD); the point is simply that the soil is even now sufficiently fertile to support a number of crops.




FIG. 12. Settlement in the Biferno valley (Greene 1986: 106, fig. 44).

some survey evidence is suggestive of this possibility. For example, there is a high density of villa sites near Rome (most within 20 km) found by the South Etruria survey (Potter 1979; FIG. 6), and the proximity of villa sites to the Biferno river (of which the majority are within 3 km of the river) in the Molise survey (Lloyd and Barker 1981; FIG. 12).⁵⁹ However, since by far the majority of these villa sites have not subsequently been excavated, we cannot link their production to local markets. It has been argued that Settefinestre and the other *villae rusticae* in the area produced vegetables 'to meet the demand of the town' (Carlsen 1984: 52), but this is little more than conjecture.

Indeed, the evidence from a select handful of villas is itself problematic, and can hardly be regarded as conclusive proof of market-oriented production. A more systematic study based on equally systematic excavation of a larger sample of villas would clearly be more revealing of local villa production. However, until such time as a study of this kind is undertaken, it is sufficient to note that the villas discussed here do not rule out specialist production for the local market.

⁵⁹ Proximity to an urban centre, particularly Rome, was obviously important, too, for those estates needing to sell their surpluses of cash crops. The villa sites surrounding Cosa were probably not concerned principally with supplying a market there, but with shipping their products elsewhere (as is suggested primarily by the finds of wine amphorae, arguably from the Settefinestre villa, as far afield as France: Manacorda 1978; 1981).

CONCLUSIONS

There is no doubt that, for reasons of social status, investment in agriculture was highly desirable. But the evidence, even from the sometimes moralizing agronomists, suggests that the *élite* took a very active interest in their landholdings. Part of that interest had a social as well as an economic motive. Self-sufficiency played an important part in estate rationale, since it alluded to the self-sufficient peasant farming of Rome's idealized past, and thus conformed to the moral tradition of the *mos maiorum*. At the same time, self-sufficiency made sound economic sense: the less the estate relied on outside produce, the greater - potentially - the owner's profits might be.

There can be little doubt that the major interest on the part of the larger estate owner was in generating profits. Some of these came from rents (Chapter 4), and that part - perhaps the largest part - of the wealth of the landed *élite* came from rents is not seriously disputed; but profit-making in other ways was no less important. Large landowners grew 'cash crops' - olives, and more particularly vines, that would generate especially high returns - but the large estate was characterized no less strongly by the diversity of its production. Hence the agronomists show a level of interest in the productivity of the rural estate that goes far beyond growing only cash crops, and in this respect we are reminded of the diversity of urban property holdings brought about, as I have argued,

by the need to get ahead of one's social peers. The agronomists strongly suggest that there was money to be made from producing specialized goods - such as flowers and some fruits and vegetables - to sell in the town, at the market. Not only does this appear to be supported by the limited archaeological evidence, but it corresponds also to the evidence of the literary sources, which suggest that the *macellum* sold specialized, semi-luxury goods to an urban élite who could afford to pay extravagant prices. Admittedly, some of the evidence used to argue that certain products were sold at the *macellum* is contentious: it is by no means always certain that some of the specialist crops discussed were destined for the *macellum*, even if it is reasonably clear that they were destined for élite consumption via the urban centre. Nevertheless, where the sale of particular goods specifically at the *macellum* cannot be attested with certainty, the main argument - that large estates were producing specialist, profitable products for élite consumers - still stands.

The idea that élite landowners invested in land simply for the social and moral prestige that it conferred largely ignores the available evidence for the level and diversity of rural estate production. The arguments in favour of 'cash crop' production, while crediting the élite with an active interest in profit-making, nevertheless play down the extent of that interest. Even where it has been asserted that the élite's main concern was to produce marketable surpluses, the emphasis is very squarely on

'cash crops' (see e.g. Whittaker 1985). But it seems clear that estate owners were intent on making as much from their estates as possible - which meant cultivating as many crops as possible - and on using every spare inch of land to do so. Moreover, there is nothing in the agronomic texts that suggests otherwise: in the words of Varro (*RR* 1. 4. 1-2),⁶⁰ a prospective farmer should have some relevant knowledge, and then, 'equipped with this knowledge, the farmer should aim at two goals, profit and pleasure; the object of the first is material return, and of the second enjoyment. The profitable plays a more important role than the pleasurable'.⁶¹

⁶⁰ 'Hinc profecti agricolae ad duas metas dirigere debent, ad utilitatem et voluptatem. Utilitas quaerit fructum, voluptas delectationem; priores partes agit quod utile est, quam quod delectat.'

⁶¹ Cf. also Whittaker (1985: 49), on Cato, *RR* 2. 7.

Chapter 6

The Vilicus, Patronage, and Household Management

We have seen that the rural estate made an important contribution to the financial - and consequently the social and political - success of its owner. It is therefore surprising that few studies of Roman agriculture, or more precisely of villa estates, have considered exactly how it was that the agricultural estate was managed in order that it could provide for the household, supply the urban centre with saleable goods, and derive rents. Previous work on the rural *familia* (e.g. White 1970; Martin 1971; 1974; Carlsen 1992; 1993) has instead concentrated on the internal hierarchies within the *familia* and on the minutiae of individuals' tasks. Alternatively, the use of the *familia rustica* by the estate owner (sometimes referred to in this context as the 'vilicus system') has been studied for its profitability or feasibility compared with other forms of labour, namely tenants, sharecroppers, and neighbouring free farmers (e.g. Maróti 1976; de Neeve 1984; Kehoe 1988a). Whether intentional or not, the effect has sometimes been to separate out the *familia rustica* (or tenancy, sharecropping, and so forth) rather than to view

it as an integral part of a wider 'system'. It has already emerged (Chapter 4) that in a number of ways the large estate seems to have been dependent on other and neighbouring forms of labour, and that a close relationship between the estate and other farms appears to be confirmed by archaeological survey; it should therefore be clear that rural estate rationales must be explained in this broader context. Indeed, this approach is implicitly suggested by the agronomists, none of whom specifically advocates an 'either-or' approach to different forms of labour.

That having been said, all the agronomic texts discuss the *familia rustica*, and in particular the *vilicus* and the *vilica*, at some length. Thus it is necessary to reconcile the use of the *familia rustica* with that of 'outsiders' - tenants, free farmers, and others - in such a way as to make sense of both in the context of large estate rationales.

This chapter will look first at how the activities of the *familia rustica*, and specifically those of the *vilicus*, contributed to the success of the estate, and second at how the *vilicus* sheds light on the management of the *paterfamilias*'s whole household.

THE SOURCES AND THE FAMILIA RUSTICA

The main sources for evidence of the rural *familia* are the agronomic texts, all of which cover, to differing extents, the organization of the rural household. Each of the agronomic works contains sections on household management,

which centre upon the role and duties of the head of the rural *familia* - the bailiff (*vilicus*) - and his wife. The nature of the instructions laid down for the *vilicus* are indicative of a general problem in the agronomic texts. It should be remembered that none of the agronomists - with the possible exception sometimes of Cato - seems to be writing with a 'real' estate in mind. Thus the agronomists have in mind an ideal or idealized bailiff: we are told what the *vilicus* should do, not what he actually did. We should accordingly view the duties of the other members of the rural *familia*, as discussed in the treatises, in the same way: that is, their tasks are those that would be ideal in an ideal estate. Similarly, it is probably reasonable to assume that the actual composition of the *familia* as described in the agronomic texts is idealized, rather than a reflection of a 'typical' rural estate, if indeed any such estate ever existed.

Our 'controls' for the accuracy of the agronomists include in particular Cicero and Pliny the Younger, whose letters, as we have seen, are from time to time concerned with the activities of their rural *familia*. The *Digest* also provides some interesting insights, notably for larger-scale farms that were likely to have a *vilicus* and a significant number of slaves. Archaeology, however, while illuminating some aspects of estate organization, is virtually of no help when it comes to finding evidence for the organization of the *familia rustica*. Thus, although excavations such as those at the villa at Settefinestre

have revealed sizeable 'slave quarters', this evidence alone cannot tell us how members of the slave *familia* worked in relation to one another, what the chain of command was, or what the relation was between the *familia* and those outside the household.

THE RURAL FAMILIA AND HOUSEHOLD MANAGEMENT (1)

The familia rustica

Very few individual members of the *familia rustica* are mentioned in the agronomic texts, or in other extant sources.¹ In Varro (RR 1. 2. 14), the rural household is effectively divided into two parts: staff whose job it was to look after livestock under the supervision of the *magister pecoris*, and staff who did everything else except look after livestock, under the supervision of the *vilicus* (cf. Aubert 1994: 177). Below the *magister pecoris* and *vilicus* in terms of status were the foremen² (Cato, RR 56) and their squads of unskilled (slave) workers or *operarii* (Columella, RR 1. 9. 7). These formed the basis for the

¹ This surely underlines the suggestion (Chapter 3) that, for the urban household, job specialization was effected primarily with a view to conspicuous consumption. The *familia rustica*, by comparison, was primarily a productive unit. Since its activities were carried on largely away from public view, the owner had no need of the kind of minute job specializations necessary for the *familia urbana*.

² The *praeфекtus* was important to the estate in that he was required to 'drive' teams of slave workers; thus the estate owner should give him an added incentive to carry out his tasks conscientiously: *praeфекtos alacriores faciendum praemiis dandaque opera ut habeant peculium et coniunctas conservas, e quibus habeant filias* (Varro, RR 1. 17. 5).

basic olive grove of 240 *iugera* (Cato, RR 10. 1), which required thirteen staff; a small vineyard of 100 *iugera* required sixteen staff, ten of whom were *operarii* (RR 11. 1). Larger farms were clearly expected to have an proportionately larger *familia*. In addition to key members of the *familia* there might be skilled workers or artisans, who could be slave or free but who still came under the control of the *vilicus*. Varro cites physicians, fullers, and other artisans (*medici, fullones, fabri*: RR 1. 16. 4) in this category, and adds that these, if in the neighbourhood, should be hired on yearly contracts (expressed by *anniversarios vicinos quibus imperent*). At the same time, Varro says, owners of large estates (*lati fundi*) usually employ the staff of the household (*domestica copia*) to do these jobs, especially if the estate is some way from a town and therefore from a supply of labour (RR 1. 16. 5). Individual farms would, in reality, have differed in the exact composition of the *familia rustica*, but that the agronomists mention virtually the same staff in their respective discussions of essential workers for the estate must imply, to some degree, that these workers were regarded by the élite in general as vital to a large estate.

The vilicus

The agronomists apparently attached most importance of all to the *vilicus*: the duties of the *vilicus* occupy part of two books of Columella (RR 1. 8 and 11. 1), part of the

first book of Varro (RR 1. 17. 4-7), and part of the fifth book of Cato (RR 5. 1-5). It is notable that they are consistent in their expectations of their ideal bailiff: his role, if not his actual individual tasks, remains more or less the same from Cato through to Columella. This most probably indicates that he remained crucial to the Roman way of thinking (if not necessarily the practice) of how an estate should be run, and that his role, or function, was an especially important one in the organization of the *familia*.

This is a point worth emphasizing, for in one sense it demonstrates a certain self-sufficiency within the household, though not in the way that Finley meant. For most of the time the household was more or less self-sufficient in terms of its own human resources; the bulk of the household's activities were carried on by its own members, with little recourse to outsiders, even to relatives of the *paterfamilias*. This is demonstrated by the extraordinary level of trust that a *paterfamilias* was willing to place in his *familia*, despite the rhetoric concerning the unreliability of slaves and freedmen. This is true even of Cicero, whose *De officiis* contains perhaps the most well-known passage (1. 150-1) on the untrustworthiness of slaves and of those who are associated with slave-type jobs, but who himself owned a number of estates run by *familiae rusticae*.

The *vilicus* is regarded by Columella as a direct, if not wholly satisfactory substitute for the *dominus*:

Ceterum cum mediocris adest et salubritas et terrae bonitas, numquam non ex agro plus sua cuique cura reddidit quam coloni, numquam non etiam vilici, nisi si maxima vel neglegentia servi vel rapacitas intervenit . . .

(Columella, RR 1. 7. 5)³

In this respect the bailiff was surely the most important member of the *familia*; even though he was 'only' a slave or freedman, his was a privileged position, for in terms of authority he was second only to the *dominus*, who was often likely to be absent. However, while enjoying a position of considerable status in the *familia*, he is not to overreach his authority, for *ne plus censeat sapere se quam dominum* (Cato, RR 5. 2; cf. Columella, RR 1. 8. 13).

His privileges could include more clothes, food, exemption from work, or grazing for his cattle (Varro, RR 1. 17. 7), so as to encourage loyalty.

The *vilicus* should be distinguished from the other slaves and freedmen of the rural *familia* (and perhaps allied to a limited extent with the master) by virtue of being educated, if only to a small degree (Varro, RR 1. 17. 4); he is supposed to be at least capable of making up the accounts with the master (Cato, RR 5. 3). Columella differs slightly; education is not so important as a 'retentive

³ 'But when there is only a modest degree of healthfulness and a modest goodness in the land, it is invariably the case that a man gets a better return from his land by looking after it himself than by getting a *colonus* to do so, or even a bailiff, unless extreme carelessness or greed on the part of a slave gets in the way.'

mind' (*tenacissimae memoriae*), for this kind of *vilicus*, if he has no real education, will be less able to falsify accounts or will be afraid to do so through another for fear of being found out (RR 1. 8. 4). Above all, however, it was ideally important for a *paterfamilias* that his *vilicus* was a credit to the household; if the *vilicus* hung around the town, then he might come into contact with *popinae*, *ganeae*, and so forth, and thus bring corrupt morals to the estate. Thus the worst type of *vilici*, according to Columella, are those accustomed to *otiiis*, *campo*, *circo*, *theatris*, *aleae*, *popinae*, *lupanaribus*; for they carry their dreams of these activities over into their farming, so that the master loses not just the value of the slave, but of his whole estate (*non tantum in ipso servo quantum in universa re detrimenti dominus capit*, Columella, RR 1. 8. 2).

The *vilicus* is responsible for the well-being of the *familia* as far as their needs (food, water, clothing, shelter) are concerned (Columella, RR 1. 8. 9, and 11. 1. 18-19, 21; Cato, RR 5. 2, *familiae male ne sit, ne algeat, ne esuriant*). More importantly, he is charged with overseeing the productivity of the estate. He must keep the *familia* busy (*opere bene exerceat*, Cato, RR 5. 2; Columella, RR 11. 1. 17) and ensure the master's orders are carried out.

The vilica

If the *vilicus* was central to the success of the estate, then so too was the *vilica*. Like the *vilicus*, she is differentiated from the rest of the *familia* by virtue of the space given over to her duties in the agronomic texts. She was regarded as subordinate to the *vilicus* (Cato, RR 142. 1), and her activities were regarded as a kind of subsection of his (Columella, RR 12. 1. 4). But while the *vilicus* is supposed to spend the larger part of his time outdoors, the *vilica* is confined indoors. Traditionally, she was assigned domestic labour, to carry out the duties formerly carried out by the *domina* (Columella, RR 12 pref. 7-10). Nevertheless, the *vilicus* is not supposed to ignore the domestic domain altogether - the *vilica* is perceived simply as lightening his load in this respect (Columella, RR 12. 1. 4) - for he should constantly keep an eye on the *vilica* to encourage her to be prepared to bring herself to account. Ideally, she is to spend as much time indoors as possible, not least so as to ensure that the bailiff has as little to do there as possible (Columella, RR 12. 1. 3), although she may need some convincing to do so (12. 1. 5). However, within her indoor domain, she is to be kept busy at all times: she should remain as little as possible in one place (Columella, RR 12. 3. 8), for she needs to oversee all the activities in the house, from visiting the loom to counting sheep fleeces to making sure the utensils are properly polished (12. 3. 8-9). She is expected to keep watch on the *familia*, and look out for anyone who is hiding

from work and make sure he is not lazy, though what she is supposed to do if he is indeed lazy and not ill, Columella does not make clear (12. 1. 6). She was not a mere appendage to the *vilicus* (Varro mentions only that the *vilicus* should take a mate - maybe not necessarily the *vilica* - though only for the purpose of procuring children so that the *vilicus* will have greater attachment to his place of work), but someone on whom the economic fortunes of the rural estate fully depended.

While the emphasis in the bailiff's job was to maximize (or optimize) productivity, the emphasis for the *vilica* lay in following up that productivity via careful storage of the farm's produce. Her importance in this regard is further underlined by comparative work on the role of storage. As has recently been shown for the Greek family, through a study of ancient and modern practice (Foxhall and Forbes 1995), the significance of storage in household economic strategies should not be underestimated; it can be an essential economic strategy in the organization of the household. The products of storage on the Roman estate could be translated into self-sufficiency (supplying the *familia*). Alternatively, storage sometimes formed a necessary stage in the process of production of marketable surpluses; grapes, for example, could be dried and subsequently sold as raisins. In addition, the storage of some goods allowed the estate owner to wait before releasing the goods for sale at a suitably high price; in other words, he could afford to wait until demand effected

an increase in the market price.⁴ The *vilica's* role was thus essential, and influenced to a large extent the activities of the *vilicus*. Thus for Cato, although he does not enlarge on her duties (and for Varro, who cites Cato in this respect), a *vilica* is no less essential to a vineyard of 100 *iugera* than she is to an olive grove of 240 *iugera* (Cato, RR 10. 1 and 11. 1; cited also by Varro, RR 1. 18. 1).

Columella devotes an entire book to her responsibilities (Book 12). The minutiae of her tasks run from keeping a supply of cooked food ready for the *vilicus* and the rest of the *familia*, to having a supply of dried and preserved fruit, to knowing how to make good flour and spelt (Cato, RR 143. 3). According to Columella, the *vilica* was also to be responsible for the storage of cheese, wine, and olive oil. Her major tasks include making all the practical arrangements for the wine vintage, and later in the year (in the winter) the olive harvest - a most important task (cf. Columella, RR 12. 55. 1, where Columella contrasts the lesser task of salting pork: *nunc ad minora redeamus*). In addition, she is to be responsible for the 'putting up' (*compositiones*) of the autumn harvest, a job that Columella regards as one of her most arduous (RR 12. 46. 1).

⁴ A good example of this strategy comes from the late Republic, when the storage of grain in this way - to create enhanced demand, and therefore enhanced prices - proved a major social and political headache (Garnsey 1988: ch. 13).

Almost the entire remainder of Columella's Book 12 is then given over to recipes (most of them cited from earlier Greek and Roman writers) - by implication, they are for the *vilica's* use - for preserving, pickling, storing and drying of vegetables, fruits and herbs, along with recipes for other products necessary for the maintenance of the farm, such as sour milk, cheese, and so forth. Not the least among these are instructions for making and preserving wine and olive oil, which probably take up the larger part of this section.

Perhaps the most important of the *vilica's* duties is to act as a kind of quality controller. The emphasis that Columella places on the immediate inspection of goods coming into the estate (RR 12. 1. 5), and on their regular monitoring thereafter (12. 2. 1, and 12. 3. 5), only makes sense if we recognize that storage had an important part to play in the economic strategies of the rural estate. The *vilica* was also responsible for the daily 'accounting', for after checking the quality of produce brought into the estate,

tum separare, quae consumenda sunt, et quae superfieri
possunt, custodire, ne sumptus annuus menstruus fiat.
(Columella, RR 12. 1. 5.)⁵

⁵ 'Then (she must) separate the things that are to be consumed, and take care of the things that can be a surplus, so that a year's provision does not become a month's.'

Her role was therefore much more than just that of a 'housekeeper' (as most translations would have it), for her decisions directly affected those of the *vilicus*. The decision of the *vilicus* to sell in response to (urban) demand depended heavily on the *vilica*'s ability to have first stored the produce correctly and set aside sufficient for sale. This must have been particularly crucial for those crops grown on a large scale, such as wine and olive oil. As we have already seen, it was her task to make all the preparations for the storing of these products; any error on her part must therefore have had the potential to endanger the estate's profitability (or even viability). In practice the *vilicus* could not do much without the *vilica*. In turn, she no doubt required the help of other slaves, particularly women, when seeing to indoor tasks. Buck (1983: 22) notes that in the jurist Palladius one-third of the jobs listed are exclusively for women, perhaps the majority of them for wool-working, a process that involved an enormous amount of labour at a number of separate stages.

From a brief survey of the *vilicus*'s and *vilica*'s duties, a number of immediate observations can be made. Both were clearly crucial to the productivity of the estate, he by supervising the work of slaves on the estate, she by supporting him in his tasks and monitoring the storage of produce. The importance of the *vilicus* for managing an estate is underlined by the master's apparent need to favour him and elevate him above the rest of the *familia*.

The way in which he did so, to judge by Varro, was by giving him tangible and highly visual symbols of status: it is thought reasonable to allow the *vilicus* to have some property of his own, such as livestock, and maybe also some land. It is in this context of privileges that the agronomists also expect him to have a female partner (Columella, RR 1. 8. 5; Varro, RR 1. 17. 5), the *vilica*. Privileges such as these acted as prominent reminders to further members of the *familia* as to where, other than with the *dominus*, power and authority lay. There is no small measure of self-preservation for the *dominus* at work here, for the idea, as Varro goes on to explain, is that if some especially arduous task or punishment is meted out to the *vilicus*, such bonuses will ensure that *consolando eorum restituat voluntatem ac benevolentiam in dominum* (RR 1. 17. 7).

The vilicus and vilica, and the agronomists' prescriptions regarding their behaviour

On one level it is difficult to explain the agronomists' instructions as regards the *vilicus* and *vilica* as much more than pragmatism, designed to ensure the efficiency and productivity of the estate. Less readily explained are other instructions that relate not just to the internal workings of the estate, but to the *vilicus*'s dealings with outsiders. For example, while it was not, in theory, absolutely vital that the *vilicus* went to town to sell the estate's produce - it could quite simply be sold from the

farm gate - such a practice is clearly implied by the agronomists. It is difficult to imagine that the *vilicus* did not go into town; he was, after all, charged with carrying out his master's business, and even if he did not go to town to sell the produce of the estate it was highly probable that he had to visit the town for other purposes. For example, the farm may have needed new equipment: Cato's list of equipment for estates growing vines or olives (RR 10. 1-13. 3) reminds us of the scale of operation, and it is inconceivable that the estate did not need to buy additional pieces of equipment from time to time, or to have existing equipment repaired. De Neeve (1985: 95) goes further, saying that 'goods were regularly bought as a matter of course'. With regard to processing the estate's 'cash crops' (olives and vines), not all estates - particularly smaller ones - found it necessary or viable to own their own presses; pressing might either be carried out on a neighbouring, bigger estate, or possibly in the town (cf. Foxhall 1990a: ch. 4).

The town seems to be a source of concern in the agronomic texts: the *vilicus* is not allowed to become acquainted with the city or the market (*nundina*), except in the execution of his duties (Columella, RR 11. 1. 23; cf. Cato, RR 5. 4, where the *vilicus* is not allowed to make any purchases without the master's knowledge). So keen are the agronomists to restrict the bailiff's number of acquaintances that even contact with soothsayers and

witches is to be discouraged (Columella, RR 1. 8. 5-6 and 11. 1. 22; Cato, RR 5. 4).

Most of the agronomists' instructions seem to be concerned primarily with the *vilicus*'s activities rather closer to home. Neighbouring farms, not just the town, appear to pose a problem. He is, for the most part, not allowed to go out of bounds (*nec egredi terminos*; Columella, RR 1. 8. 7).⁶ He is to be encouraged to take good care of the farm tools so as not to have to borrow from neighbours (Columella, RR 1. 8. 8). Similar guidelines are laid down by Cato; the *vilicus* should not lend to anyone seed-grain, fodder, spelt, wine, or oil. He is not to extend credit to anyone without his master's knowledge, or have more than two or three households from which he borrows or to which he lends (Cato, RR 5. 3). All these instructions seem designed to keep the *vilicus* confined within the boundaries of the *fundus*. In addition, he is not allowed to entertain outsiders; the exception is a close friend or relation of his master (Columella, RR 1. 8. 7 and 11. 1. 23), although he is allowed, if he sees fit, and on a special occasion, to entertain a diligent member of the household 'as a mark of distinction' (Columella, RR 1. 8. 5; also 11. 1. 19). In addition, the *vilicus* should not be a 'gadabout' (*vilicus ne sit ambulator*; Cato, RR 5. 2, and

⁶ It is uncertain exactly what *terminos* refers to here; if we compare this section to Varro, RR 1. 16. 5, it seems that the boundaries of the farm are intended. Thus 'out of bounds' almost certainly means 'off the property' (even if that property was fragmented).

cited by Columella, RR 1. 8. 7), and should always be sober (Columella, RR 11. 1. 13). Cato says that he should not dine out (RR 5. 2), as does Columella (RR 1. 8. 12). And he must have no hanger-on (*parasitum nequem habeat*: Cato, RR 5. 4).

Similar instructions apply to the *vilica*: her movements, too, are to be restricted. Like the *vilicus*, she is not to be a 'gadabout', or to go out to meals (Cato, RR 143. 1). In addition, she is not to be allowed to cultivate neighbouring women by visiting them, or by bringing them to the house, even if she were only to admit them to her part of it (Cato, RR 143. 2).

The instructions for the *vilicus* clearly confirm the estate's relationship with both a nearby urban centre and neighbouring farms. But more significantly they highlight a problem with the *vilicus*, and to a lesser extent, the *vilica*, as far as the agronomists are concerned: in the agronomic texts the *vilicus* is as much defined by what he cannot do as by what he can. Part of the explanation for this may lie in the moral traditions in which the agronomic texts are written. Concern that the *vilicus* should not spend too much time in the town conforms to the stock moral rhetoric of the late Republic and early principate: the countryside is regarded as the honest seat of Rome's success while the town is seen as the corrupting seed of its downfall. In the agronomic texts these moralizing instructions are also designed to enhance the estate owner's own social and moral status: the implication is

that a farm run by a well-behaved *vilicus* will be a credit to the owner, which in turn will reflect the owner's own moral rectitude. Since the town could potentially compromise the morals of the *vilicus*, this in turn endangered the good management of the estate, which in turn jeopardized the social and moral credit accruing to the owner. This explanation also sheds light on the ideal characteristics of the *vilica*: like the *vilicus*, she is supposed to be of irreproachable morality (Columella, *RR* 12. 1. 1-3), since her behaviour also bears on the running of the estate.

Nevertheless, given that the *vilicus* appears to be crucial to the success of the estate, the restrictions on his activities still seem anomalous; while some of them can be explained in terms of moral rhetoric, most do not fit readily into this interpretation. Yet to judge from the agronomists' emphasis on the importance of these constraints, the success of the estate seems to hinge as much on the application of these restrictions as they do on the *vilicus*'s actual duties. An explanation of large estate rationales therefore needs both to take into account and to explain this apparent paradox.

THE RURAL FAMILIA AND HOUSEHOLD MANAGEMENT (2)

The relationship of the estate with outsiders

The Roman 'household' comprised several mini-households to cope with the diversity of the élite's property interests. This fragmentation has one overriding and direct

implication: the *paterfamilias* could not personally oversee more than one household at a time. It is therefore reasonable to assume that, in the case of rural estates, the *dominus/paterfamilias* was absent for the majority of the time. That the rural *familia* must often have worked away from the watchful eye of their master indicates not only a certain level of trust placed in the household's members, but a measure of necessity. The richer the landowner, the more likely he was to spend time in the urban centre - the focus for political activity - and the less time he would have for the rural estate. Cicero's rural estates, for example, were scattered about to the north and south of Rome, but it was in Rome itself that he spent the majority of his time. The sheer logistics of travelling around made it unlikely that he could ever oversee the activities of his estates to any significant degree. Thus the members of the rural *familia* were more likely than its urban counterpart to be away from the direct management of their *dominus*, and in this respect they were more or less autonomous.

It is this autonomy combined with the estate's inherent dependency (Chapter 4) on 'outsiders' - the town, tenants, sharecroppers, neighbouring free farmers - that seems to offer an explanation for the importance attached by the agronomists to restricting the *vilicus's* movements.

A recent comparative study (Foxhall 1990b) of Roman with modern Andalusian farm systems shows the role of the bailiff in a tenancy system, in particular, to be

suggestive of an explanation for curbing the *villicus*'s activities. In Andalusia the bailiff (who, like the agronomists' ideal bailiff, has a *parcela* of his own to cultivate) is empowered to deal with the tenants on the owner's behalf (Pitt-Rivers 1971: 40). Equally, he has the scope to develop his own socio-economic contacts. The Andalusian example of *latifundia* management thus sheds light on the Roman agronomists' paranoia about the bailiff's movements: the very fact that much of the master's business involved contact with neighbours, and that it had to be carried out by the bailiff in his master's absence, clearly put the bailiff in a position which potentially he could exploit to his own benefit (Foxhall 1990b: 103). In particular, he might have the opportunity to offer a kind of patronage: by virtue of his contact with these tenants, the bailiff could put himself in the position of patron to any tenants on the estate, negotiating with the master on their behalf.

In theory the patronage explanation seems attractive, not least because the inherent dependency of the estate on outsiders created the circumstances in which patronage could have a role to play. But if the *villicus* was to insert himself between the estate owner and his tenants, or other farmers, we first need to ascertain more precisely the conditions necessary for patronage to 'work' in a rural context.

A survey of patronage studies (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980) highlights a number of characteristics of patron-

client relationships. These include 'the simultaneous exchange of different types of resources' (with the sub-characteristic that these resources are inseparable, forming part of a 'package-deal'), and 'a strong element of unconditionality and of long-range credit'. In addition, 'patron-client relations are entered into voluntarily',⁷ and 'they seem to undermine the horizontal group organization and solidarity of both clients and patrons, but especially of clients'. Above all, however, 'patron-client relations are based on very strong elements of inequality and of differences in power' (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980: 49-50).

The tenant-landlord relationship, by definition, was one founded on differences in power. The estate owner derived material benefit from the tenancy arrangement in the form of rents; he also had the legal power to terminate the tenancy agreement and to evict the tenants from their farms. We have seen (Chapter 4) that, for the most part, farmers entering this kind of agreement were unlikely to be well off and that tenancy, despite the obligations it demanded of the tenant, was attractive to the small farmer primarily because of the moderate security it offered. The ability of the estate owner to deprive the tenant of that security at any time meant that the owner was clearly in

⁷ The major exception in Roman society was the patron-freedman relationship. This was not entered into voluntarily, and the obligations (*operae*) it engendered (especially on the part of the freedman) were enforceable in law. On the implications of *operae*, and on patron-freedman relationships generally, see Fabre (1981).

the position of superior power. This key prerequisite for patronage was therefore an intrinsic part of the Roman landlord-tenant arrangement. Thus Roman tenancy provided a 'fertile ground' for patronage (Garnsey and Woolf 1989: 160). That is not to say that a patron-client relationship necessarily followed from a landlord-tenant arrangement, simply that the latter incorporated the requisite constituents for such a relationship.

But what are the resources that might be exchanged between the estate owner and his tenant in a patron-client relationship? The main 'resources' - rent for the landlord, security for the tenant - were exchanged as part of a legal agreement that had nothing to do with patronage. However, simply by virtue of owning a large estate, the landlord was likely to have control over other resources of which the tenant might sometimes have need. Foremost among these, arguably, was farm equipment, which the tenant was unlikely to be able to afford either because it required a large initial outlay of capital or because it was expensive to maintain, or both (cf. Foxhall 1990b: 112). In addition, the landlord would help his tenant sell his goods at the market, provide occasional transport, or find a buyer for the tenant's own produce. The tenant himself might have no necessary or immediate access to these services, since they all might fall outside the normal tenancy agreement.

While there is little direct evidence to demonstrate this process at work in Roman rural society, comparative examples are highly suggestive. In early twentieth-century

Perugia most land was worked under the *mezzadria* system. As with Roman tenancy, the main agreement between the tenant and the landowner was contractual and involved stipulated obligations on both sides. The terms of the contract could be wide-ranging,⁸ even including the right of the landowner to disapprove of a marriage involving a member of the tenant's family. But the relationship could be assimilated to that of patron-client, and thus make available to both parties resources that were not included in the contractual agreement, for example monetary loans, supplementary employment (for the tenant), or legal help (Silverman 1977: 12). In this way, patronage represented

an alternative way of doing things because . . . it offers some advantage over the 'official system', over the 'normal' status quo. It is a gap filler, doing what the established order cannot do or does less efficiently.

(Garnsey and Woolf 1989: 154)

The Roman tenant, for his part, may not have had material resources to bring to a patron-client relationship, but he could offer other tangible benefits. He could contribute his own labour over and above the *opera rustica* that might be required of him as a condition of his tenancy (above, Chapter 4, p. 202). He could provide electoral, or even physical support: rural tenants fighting alongside their

⁸ See Silverman (1977: 12) for examples of what the terms of the contract might entail.

landlords, who were perhaps also their patrons, appear occasionally in literary sources (Plut. *Pompey* 6; Caesar, *BC* 1. 34 and 1. 56). Arguably, they comprise a literary *topos*; if so, then it is a *topos* apparently designed to point up the importance of the connection between the two parties, and may imply a patron-client relationship. Both the landlord and the tenant therefore had something to bring to a patron-client relationship of the 'unconditional' and 'long-range credit' kind envisaged by Eisenstadt and Roniger. None of these exchanges were immediately conditional on another, but were instead effected on the implicit understanding that at some time in the future each exchange would be reciprocated.

However, as has already been noted, the probable patron - the estate owner - was absent for the majority of the time. Since the *vilicus* was entrusted, in his place, to attend to the affairs of the farm, the *vilicus* consequently had effective control over those resources that might form the basis for offering patronage. The tenants were the farmers with whom the *vilicus* was bound to come into contact in the course of his duties, particularly if, as was the case with the younger Pliny, perhaps the larger parts of his *Comum* and *Tifernum* estates were let to tenants (de Neeve 1990: 373). In this way, the *vilicus* could act as a 'buffer' between the master and the tenants; such an arrangement relieved the landowner from direct involvement in supervising the estate and in dealing with his tenants and sharecroppers. At the same time, however, it again gave

the *vilicus* the chance to insert himself into the role of patron offering client-type benefits to the tenants - precisely the agronomists' fear. The instructions laid down in the agronomists are therefore aimed at restricting contact with tenants, and thus at restricting the bailiff's potential either to build up his own network of patronage or to take over the patronage claims of his master. The agronomists' lengthy instructions tend to suggest that this may in fact have been a genuine problem for the absentee landlord, and that, 'real-life bailiffs were prone to develop . . . low-level patronage networks' (Foxhall 1990b: 103). It should perhaps be remembered that it was not just the *vilicus* who may have been responsible for collecting the rents of tenant farmers. Indeed, the evidence for the *vilicus* collecting rents is limited, although bailiffs were certainly used to ensure that the terms of the tenancy contract were fulfilled (Kehoe 1988a: 21-2). Pliny, for example, never mentions his *vilicus* but does refer to running both his property at Tifernum Tiberinum and his potential new estate adjacent to it through *actores* (*Ep.* 3. 19. 2). However, the difference between *actores* and *vilici* is not entirely clear, and may not be significant.⁹ Whether

⁹ Kehoe (1988a: 16 n. 6) gives references for several texts that use both terms interchangeably. See also Aubert (1994: 186 ff.), who in a discussion of *actores* confirms that 'the difference between *actor* and *vilicus* is not always clearly established' (1994: 190), but nevertheless suggests that *actores* are a later development than *vilici* - c. first century AD - and may have taken over the rent-collecting aspects of the *vilicus*'s tasks during this period.

or not *actores* and *vilici* were effectively interchangeable is not, in one sense, important; what is significant is that any member of the landlord's *familia* who had the responsibility for collecting rents from tenants, or for visiting other types of neighbouring farmer, was potentially in a position to offer patronage. Most frequently, however, this was likely to be the *vilicus*.

Tenants must therefore have been uppermost in the agronomists' minds as the farmers most likely to pose a threat - via the *vilicus* - to the master's household. Since the *vilicus* was not absolutely bound to meet with neighbouring free farmers, this might go some way to explaining why the agronomists do not seem explicitly concerned with the threat they posed. Nevertheless, it must be supposed that the instructions concerning the *vilicus* were written partly with the free farmer in mind.

Indeed, the need of the neighbouring free smallholder for a patron may have been greater than that of the tenant. As well as providing basic necessities, such as clothes, food, and shelter, a patron might also provide security against violence (Garnsey and Woolf 1989: 154). The peasant farmer might usually expect to call first on kinsmen and neighbouring farmers for assistance during the occasional crisis.¹⁰ But the free farmer incurred perhaps even greater need during non-crisis periods, not all of which could be

¹⁰ See Garnsey and Woolf (1989: 155), especially for Egyptian examples; and Gallant (1991) for a comparative study of ancient and modern Greek peasant strategies.

met by kinsmen or neighbours. For example, from time to time the smallholder may have required various items of equipment to make his farm viable. While a landlord was supposed to make available to the tenant farmer most of the necessary equipment, the free farmer had no such automatic assistance, and any equipment that he needed to make his farm viable had to be provided from his own resources. Small farmers were unlikely to possess all the animals and equipment that they might need at any time; purchasing large farm equipment cannot have been a viable option for the small farmer, and maintaining traction animals was likely to involve expense beyond the means of most farmers operating at subsistence level (cf. Foxhall 1990b: 111-12). Added to this, as we have seen in Chapter 4, the free smallholder was also particularly vulnerable to hardship. Impoverishment brought about, for example, by crop failure might render a smallholder unable to feed his family. It might subsequently leave him less able than usual to afford to buy or maintain vital farm equipment.

The chronic difficulties faced by the smallholder, together with the equally chronic threat of this kind of 'worst case' scenario, could make a patron particularly valuable, since a patron could offer means by which the smallholder could add to his income and thus avert complete ruin. The kind of long-term difficulties faced by the smallholder could lead him and his family to be dependent on the seasonal work provided by their larger neighbour in order to supplement their own meagre income, and also to

compensate for their own underemployment during certain periods of the year. The poor free labourer therefore needed the contact with someone who might offer him work to help ensure his survival (Garnsey and Woolf 1989). Here, then, was another fertile ground for patronage; the landowner, in return, might receive the labour of the smallholder, particularly at harvest time. Again, while a patron-client relationship did not necessarily follow, the possession of commodities and services that were needed by neighbouring smallholders, arguably to safeguard the latter's survival, must have helped the large estate owner's claims of patronage. Thus for the poor free farmer operating at subsistence level the chief concern - feeding his family - intrinsically overrode group interests; his concern to secure for his family the resources that would help ensure their survival was the fundamental reason for seeking a patron. In practice, though, the free farmer did not necessarily undermine the interests of his social group (cf. Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980: 50),¹¹ at least on a

¹¹ In a Roman context it is almost more likely to be the higher-status party who undermined the interests of his group. The estate owner was likely to be a member of the Roman élite, whose in-group competition for political office, as we have seen (esp. Chapter 1), caused its members to exploit any opportunity to advance their individual interests. Accumulating clients by holding out the promise of access to certain resources was one way of achieving this (cf. Wallace-Hadrill 1989b: 78). In this way, Roman patronage displays characteristics of other patronage systems, inasmuch as it 'tends to operate in a competitive and pluralistic system in which patrons are dependent on maintaining a high level of client support in a situation where clients are neither owned nor entirely controlled. That is to say, client choice is a significant dynamic in the system and clients

local level, since it must often have been kinsmen and neighbours who were the first port of call. Indeed, as far as the peasant farmer was concerned, creating both horizontal relationships (with kin and neighbours) and vertical ones (with the patron) represented the best survival strategy (Wolf 1966: 82-3; cf. Garnsey and Woolf 1989: 157). In any case, a particularly powerful or wealthy patron might be able to offer patronage to all his neighbouring farmers, either on an individual basis or by patronizing *municipia*, like Pliny.¹²

If the landowner himself was not in a position to offer patronage, then there was scope for others. In this context, it has been argued that the absentee estate owner, like Pliny the Younger, disqualified himself 'from being

constitute a major resource within it' (Johnson and Dandeker 1989: 223-4). Moreover, especially where political patronage was concerned, patron-client relationships were constantly played off against one another as patrons competed against each other for the same clients. In effect, the client is the major player since he is the resource for which patrons are competing. It was therefore particularly in the late Republic that patronage rested on 'networks of interconnection and cross-cutting ties, the outcome of which was continually shifting alliances of powerful patrons competing for resources including the resource inherent in client loyalty' (Johnson and Dandeker 1989: 227). It is because patronage was entered into voluntarily that it was an aspect of elite competition; this had the effect of constantly undermining a potentially hereditary order, and thus destabilizing it; that destabilization again led to the need to offer more patronage. Thus, undermining group interests was virtually an inherent characteristic of a member of the Roman elite, and that the estate owner should look to patronize local farmers should thus be regarded as another aspect of that elite competition.

¹² See Silverman (1977: 12-13) for examples of how members of the early twentieth-century Perugian élites might offer patronage to entire communities.

able to offer effective patronage to the countryfolk with whom he had economic dealings' (Garnsey and Woolf 1989: 160-1), and thus resident 'landlords' were better placed - by virtue of their residency - to engage in such relationships. If we substitute 'bailiff' for 'resident landlord' (for residency was the point of the *vilicus*), we can better imagine the potential of the bailiff to act as patron. In addition, there were perhaps other reasons why the bailiff might find himself in a position to offer patronage. Gilmore (1980) describes how the Andalusian field manager (*manijero*, a kind of second-in-command to the bailiff, responsible chiefly for hiring day labour) insulates the owner twice over, as it were, from the labourers. We can imagine how the Roman bailiff might use this reluctance on the part of the owner to deal directly with the labourers to his own advantage, with or without the help of a 'field manager'. Thus the estate owner's likely absence, compounded by a possible reluctance to deal with the business of hiring free labourers (an assumption perhaps supported by the fact that the agronomists make no reference to the estate owner being involved in hiring free labour), provided the *vilicus* with additional opportunities to offer patronage. This would help explain the instructions governing the bailiff's scope for hiring free labourers. In this respect, Cato warns that the *vilicus* is not to hire any extra staff for more than a day at a time (Cato, RR 5. 4). Thus, although neighbouring free labourers were ostensibly just that - free - they, like tenants,

might enter into a patron-client relationship with the owner of a large estate, or, in his absence, with the resident *vilicus*.

There were other 'outsiders' who came into contact with the estate. Traders might buy the estate's finished products, or in the case of vines or olives, for example, buy them at an earlier stage and make the end product themselves or sell the 'raw' crop onto others. Cato gives examples of how the sale of olives on the tree should proceed (RR 146), how grapes on the vine should be sold (RR 147), and how wine should be sold in jars (RR 148). He also describes terms for letting the gathering of olives (RR 144), and then for the olive-pressing (RR 145). Selling olives on the trees or grapes on the vine to dealers (particularly *negotiatores*) seems to have been normal practice (D. 18. 1. 39. 1; Pliny, *HN* 14. 50; Pliny, *Ep.* 8. 2). We have seen (Chapter 3) that while some urban households owned their own so-called 'middlemen', it seems as though the traders who dealt with rural estates did not belong to the households with whom they did business. More often than not, their business must have brought them into contact with the *vilicus*. Moreover, this contact could arise in both urban and rural contexts: *negotiatores* could deal with the estate's produce at the estate itself, as is implied at several points in the agronomic texts. The Veianii apparently waited for a *mercator* to come to their farm to buy their honey (*mercatoresmitterent*: Varro, RR 3. 16. 11); another passage from Varro implies that traders

bought produce from Brundisium and Apulia, probably from farms, and then packed it to send it elsewhere by sea (RR 2. 6. 5). The *macellarius* is mentioned in Varro in a context where it might possibly be inferred that he visited the farm to buy produce (Varro, RR 3. 2. 11). A passage in Columella suggests that the *vilicus* might go into town, or near to town in order to sell produce (RR 7. 9. 4); presumably the *vilicus* might sometimes take the produce to town and sell it to a dealer who might in turn sell it at the *macellum*, for example, or take it elsewhere to sell. In the case of contracting out the harvest of olives or vines, the contract went to the highest bidder at auction, and this seems to have directly involved the owner (Pliny, *Ep.* 8. 2), or perhaps his representative; the *vilicus* is not mentioned at all in this context.¹³ However, a contract for harvesting olives and vines obviously required that the *negotiatores* (or their sub-contractors) spend time on the estate, and they must have come into contact with the *vilicus*; the *vilicus* was therefore presented with ample opportunity to establish his own personal contacts. Other traders who visited the estate probably dealt with the *vilicus* directly, or else the *vilicus* directly sought out the trader in town (as Columella, RR 7. 9. 4). In either case, the *vilicus* had the potential to insert himself into

¹³ Cf. Aubert (1994: 171-2), who argues that the likely absence of the landlord meant that the *vilicus* was probably responsible for arranging contracts with *negotiatores*. See e.g. Cato, RR 144-8.

patron-client networks independently of his master. This possibility may also partly explain why Varro recommends that artisans needed by the estate should be employed from among the *paterfamilias*'s own people (above, p. 285), since the *vilicus*'s contacts with outsiders could then be limited.

Thus many of the agronomists' instructions concerning the *vilicus* - for example, that he is not to dine out,¹⁴ not to visit more than a couple of households, not to have a hanger-on,¹⁵ not to have more than a handful of households from whom he borrows or to whom he lends (above, p. 296), and so on - seem to pertain particularly to the *vilicus*'s potential relationship with neighbouring free farmers and tenants, but also with visitors to the estate.

If we accept that patronage offers an explanation for the agronomists' concern to restrict the *vilicus*'s movements with regard to tenants, neighbouring farmers, and other outsiders, then we can also explain the apparent threat of the town in the same context.¹⁶ We have seen (above, p. 295) that the estate was bound to be dependent on goods and

¹⁴ Dining with a social superior outside the *domus* or *familia* implies a degree of obligation and thus divided loyalties.

¹⁵ Again, if the *vilicus* is not permitted a hanger-on, then he is prevented from developing conflicting loyalties and his own patron-client links.

¹⁶ Added to the express instructions about not letting the *vilicus* spend too much time in town are similarly insistent warnings about the performance of religious rituals (Cato, *RR* 5. 3; 143. 1, and Columella, *RR* 1. 8. 5). Neither the *vilicus* or his wife should perform religious rites without permission from the *dominus*; 'the implications of expropriation of patronal privilege are clear' (Foxhall 1990a: 272).

services provided by the urban centre. But another reason also compelled the *vilicus* to frequent the town, and that was what the agronomists refer to as 'the execution of his duties' (above, p. 295). We are not told precisely what these duties comprised, but presumably they included taking produce from the rural estate to be consumed directly by the urban household, or taking produce to be sold either at the *macellum*, the *nundinae* - at both of which the *vilicus* might do business with *negotiatores* (above, p. 312) - or perhaps more simply, at the owner's *tabernae*. For these reasons, then, he probably visited the town occasionally, and it is in this respect that we can make sense of Varro's instructions that the *vilicus* can only go off the premises (*de fundo exeat*) with his master's permission, and even then only if he is going to return within the same day (*RR* 1. 16. 5). It is precisely because of his mediating role - cutting across both urban and rural spheres - that he was in a unique position to build up patron-client networks of his own. It seems that while, in practice, he may have been allowed to develop links with the urban and rural *hoi polloi* (particularly if they could prove useful to the owner), it was regarded as essential to prevent the *vilicus* from accumulating too much wealth and influence of his own since this would have the effect of damaging the prospects of the owner's household. The town undoubtedly provided plenty of opportunity for the bailiff to build up his connections and potentially to attend to some business of his own.

But perhaps as well as wanting to prevent the *vilicus* from offering patronage, the agronomists were also concerned that the bailiff should not fall into the clientage of others. If, for example, de Neeve is right to infer that Pliny's tenants were relatively wealthy, this may go some way to explaining why these tenants do not seem to have become Pliny's clients (Garnsey and Woolf 1989: 160-1).¹⁷ At the same time, and despite Pliny's obvious absenteeism, it would seem unlikely that a *vilicus* could offer patronage in these circumstances. For although it has been argued that resident landlords were literally better placed to offer patronage, 'it does not follow that they necessarily did so' (Garnsey and Woolf 1989: 161), and this is one set of circumstances in which it seems innocuous for a *vilicus* to be acting as patron. Instead, it is more probable that Pliny's bailiff might have become a client of one or more of his master's tenants. This possibility posed a threat to the well-being of the master's household: if the *vilicus* was looking after his own interests, the master's household stood to lose financially. In the longer term, if the *vilicus* was successful in finding other patrons, he might well be able to start establishing his own household, again to the detriment of that of his

¹⁷ Equally, however, it could be argued that wealthy tenants would make attractive clients, since their relative wealth and status would particularly enhance their patron's status. It should probably be assumed either that Pliny had no need of further clients or, as Garnsey and Woolf suggest, that he was effectively disqualified from offering patronage by virtue of his absenteeism.

master. Either possibility was damaging to the master's household; it is not, therefore, surprising that the agronomists deemed it necessary to recommend restrictions upon the *vilicus's* movements outside the estate.

By inserting himself - as either a patron or client - into the patron-client networks established by his master, the *vilicus* had the potential to topple a frail edifice of social and economic interdependence between the large estate and its surrounding farms. Simply by shifting the focus of patronage to one side, as it were, of the large estate, the *vilicus* could disrupt the interdependence of the estate and neighbouring farms. Instead of a mutual flow of goods and services between the two parties that were beneficial to both, the effect of a *vilicus* acting as patron or client in the system might be to divert some of those goods and services away from their 'normal' destination and into his own formative household. This might be disruptive to both the 'normal' patron and client. Most importantly, it could crucially undermine the viability of the large estate.¹⁸ We have already seen how the large estate depended on non-slave labour in order to remain financially viable. This was especially true of an estate that grew vines and olives, and more particularly

¹⁸ While the emphasis in this chapter is on the strategies of the large estate, it should be noted that the *vilicus's* insertion into the patron-client system might also affect the lower-status party, the tenant or free farmer. To a certain extent the tenant's economic security was protected by law. The same was not true of the free farmer, particularly if he was a smallholder owning a farm worked mainly or wholly by the familial unit.

the former, for the need of extra labour at times of harvest was considerable. A *vilicus* who came between the estate owner and the owner's tenants and any neighbouring free farmers might also jeopardize the owner's political security, since it seems that rural landlords expected to call upon their rural clients for electoral support.

The threat of a potentially disloyal *vilicus* - whether as a patron or client in relation to outsiders - must also go some way to explaining the privileges that the agronomists are prepared to confer on the bailiff. To allow the *vilicus* some land, livestock, and maybe even a slave or two, must have been intended not just to differentiate the *vilicus* from the other members of the *familia* for the sake of visually emphasizing his status and authority, or to give him incentives to work conscientiously, but to encourage his loyalty in the event of enticing offers being made by other potential patrons. On the other hand, this could be regarded as a risky tactic; giving the *vilicus* some property of his own might cause him to aspire to enlarging his formative household, and thus to forming the contacts that might help him achieve this aim.

It is worth noting that a problem in attributing so much importance to patronage is that our 'knowledge' of rural patronage in the late Republic and early principate is based largely on comparative evidence;¹⁹ but this may in

¹⁹ That rural patronage functioned in ways similar to those outlined above is furthermore suggested by the fourth-century AD author, Libanius who, in comparing contemporary with past

itself shed light on the role of the *vilicus*, and on systems of estate management. Garnsey and Woolf (1989: 167) suggest first that this may be due to the predominantly urban interests of the *élite*, and second that 'where the rural poor were actively patronized this was both a fact of life and not a proper subject for literature'. This may help explain the literary *topoi* in which rural clients appear. The need on the part of the estate owner for political support is unlikely to have been hugely significant; the *topoi* in this respect probably reflect the social and cultural acceptability of some forms of behaviour. Economic acquisitiveness, via patronage, is simply not one of those, particularly for prominent players in the political sphere, here represented by Pompey and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. It has also been recently argued that the *vilicus* needing to be kept under control is another literary *topos* (Aubert 1994: 190-1). I hope I have shown that this is not entirely the case, but this argument does draw attention to the fact that the need to keep him under control is not expressed directly in terms of the threat posed to the owner's patronage claims with regard to tenants and free farmers. Like the *topos* discussed above, it may simply be that it was socially unacceptable to refer to one's clients in this way. However, a related reason why

practice, gives a description of the kind of rural patronage offered in the late Republic and early principate (*Oration* 47. 19, 22). The ideal patron was one who provided protection from hardship and acted as a mediator between the client and the 'outside' world.

estate owners may not have chosen to mention their clients specifically is because they did not wish to draw attention to the fact that their clients represented sources of wealth and status. Exceptionally, clients may have contributed in a very direct manner to the wealth of the estate owner: Horace discusses how Philippus, a senator, managed a farm through a client (*Ep.* 1. 7. 75-80), but the context implies that this was unusual, rather than typical practice (see further, Garnsey and Woolf 1989: 159-60).

CONCLUSIONS

The vilicus, patronage, and continuity between urban and rural households

The importance assigned to the *vilicus*, and the concern over his potential ability to insert himself into key patron-client networks, clearly indicate that the *paterfamilias* expected to spend the majority of his time in town. They also indicate that, the *vilicus* notwithstanding, the *paterfamilias* expected to control the flow of goods and services - sometimes via patron-client networks - from rural to urban household, and vice versa, from his urban base. Above all, therefore, the agronomists' apparent concern that the *vilicus* should not appropriate his master's patronage networks highlights the fact that the *vilicus* was the mediator between the rural and urban parts of the master's household. The work required of him necessitated his movement in the locality of the estate,

but also allowed him to move between rural and urban spheres.

The urban residence of the *paterfamilias* should therefore be viewed as the 'nerve centre' for the management of all the mini-households that comprised the whole; the urban-based owner was, in effect, a spider at the centre of a web that spread outwards to cover both urban and rural contexts, and the channel of communication between the two was clearly the *vilicus*. With the cooperation of the *vilicus* the owner could extend his patron-client network to include tenants, neighbouring free farmers, and other 'outsiders', not just around the estate, but also in the urban centre, all of whom might bring certain resources and benefits to the estate which were otherwise unobtainable. All of these, in turn, could profit not just the estate, but the larger *familia* to which the estate belonged.

The *vilicus* was thus crucial to the household. On a practical and pragmatic level his actions affected the profitability of the farm. As well as doing his own tasks he had to organize farm work, using other slaves and perhaps freedmen and freedwomen (including the *vilica*). From time to time, particularly at harvest-time, he had to hire free labour; free craftsmen might also be needed to do jobs around the estate. All these came under the management of the *vilicus*, and his ability to provide effective management directly influenced the productivity of the estate. Added to his management of others, his jobs included making important decisions, such as when to store,

consume, and sell the estate's produce. These, too, were crucial to the estate's success.

But the financial well-being not just of the rural household, but also of the urban household, depended on the *vilicus's* relationship - formed on behalf of the absentee landlord - with 'outsiders', principally neighbouring farmers. Their importance to the success of the landlord is highlighted by the agronomists' instructions concerning the *vilicus*, who ideally helped his master keep a stranglehold on these human resources in both rural and urban contexts. The use of patronage in this respect can therefore be seen as an aspect of household management. More importantly, the *vilicus* points up the fact that we should view the Roman urban centre and its hinterland as a continuum: the social and political success of a member of the Roman élite depended on the financial prosperity of his household, which in turn depended on the success of *both* its rural and its urban components.

Conclusions

Due largely to the pressures of social and political competition, the élite household was geared towards exploiting every possible opportunity for financial gain. At the same time, socio-legal institutions - principally inheritances and dowries - created a need for the household to be organized where possible into discrete 'enterprises' that were readily separable. The combination of these requirements led the élite to invest in, and lease, urban property to an extent that is probably underplayed in modern scholarship. Moreover, the élite's relationship with traders may have been more intimate than has generally been thought, or than is indicated by the moral rhetoric of the period: the evidence of a small handful of socially prominent and wealthy families from this period suggests that traders and agents were often included in the *familia urbana* and contributed directly to the financial success of the owner.

The need to squeeze as much profit from one's resources as one could is also apparent in élite attitudes towards rural property. Again, socio-legal institutions played a part. Land fragmentation and the creation of marginal land were brought about by inheritance practices and dowries, and virtually forced diversification and specialization

upon the élite landowner. This he achieved largely by working marginal land and by using a variety of forms of labour in addition to his own *familia rustica*. It is clear, however, that specializing and diversifying were often made to work to the landowner's advantage: in addition to cultivating 'cash crops' and generating rents, rural estates seem often to have been partly given over to intensive, specialized production designed to raise particularly large profits.

The role of the household, or *familia*, in all these aspects of economic activity is crucial. The *familia urbana* in particular contributed to the ostentation of the owner, thus helping him gain influence and, as a consequence, to increase his chances of receiving gifts, loans, and inheritances. In addition, the *familia* as a whole rendered the owner largely self-sufficient in terms of resources, removing the need for dependency on other households which might be engaged in the same political and social competitiveness. But perhaps most important of all, by being effectively split into lots of smaller *familiae urbanae* and *familiae rusticae*, the larger household could spread over and encompass, umbrella-like, both town and country. In this way, and through the use of his own mediators - principally the *vilicus* but perhaps also *actores* and *procuratores* - the owner was able to keep a stranglehold on both rural and urban economic resources. From the point of view of the élite *paterfamilias*, the role of the *familia* in this respect was crucial: he was able to

stay in the town - the arena for political and social competition - while his rural and urban *familiae* helped ensure he continued to accrue the financial profits needed for his success.

Appendix: Database

Given below is my database of *tabernae* in Pompeii. The basic structure of the tables and columns is described in Chapter 2. Some of the column headings are also given in full in that chapter; to help the reader, they are listed again here, together with others not previously given.

Key to columns

Reg	region
Ins1	insula
Door#	doorway number
G_ltr	Gassner letter (main type)
G_no	Gassner number (sub-type)
Atr_ho	atrium house
Dway	doorway
Oma	<i>ostium muratum ab antiquo</i>
Tr_typ	trade type
Prod	productive
Dte	date

Key to trade types (Tr_typ)

B	bakery
C	clay, stone, wood
Co	dye shop
G	garum
La	lampmaker
M	metal
Mu	<i>taberna musivaria</i>
P	provisions
Su	shoemaker
T	textiles
Th	<i>thermopolium</i>
U	perfumer
V	<i>taberna vasaria</i>
W	carpenter

Some of the trade types are uncertain; these are denoted with a question mark or by giving two possibilities (e.g. C/Mu). For the purpose of discussion in Chapter 2, where there are two possibilities the one mentioned first is counted, not the second.

DATABASE TABLE 1: Tabernae

Reg	Insl	Door#	G_ltr	G_no	Atr_ho	Dway	Oma	Tr_typ	Prod	Dte
I	ii	2	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
I	ii	4	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
I	ii	5	A	4	Y	N	-	-	-	-
I	ii	9	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
I	ii	11	A	2	Y	N	Y	Th	-	-
I	ii	23	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	ii	27	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	S
I	iii	4	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	S
I	iii	5-6	D	-	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	iii	7	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	iii	11	B	2	N	N	-	P/Th	-	-
I	iii	12	B	3	N	N	-	-	-	I-
I	iii	13	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	iii	14	B	4	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	iii	26	C	2	N	Y	Y	-	-	S?
I	iv	1	A	1	Y	Y	-	P?	-	-
I	iv	4	A	2	Y	N	-	-	-	-
I	iv	6	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
I	iv	8	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
I	iv	10	A	1	Y	N	Y	-	-	-
I	iv	18	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	iv	19	A	2	Y	N	-	-	-	-
I	iv	20	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
I	iv	23-24	A	6	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
I	v	1	B	3	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	vi	3	A	2	Y	?	-	M	-	-
I	vi	5	B	2	N	N	Y	-	-	-
I	vi	10	A	2	Y	N	Y	W?	-	-
I	vi	12	A	2	Y	N	-	M	-	-
I	vii	2	C	1	N	Y	-	Su?	-	-
I	vii	4	B?	2?	N	N	Y	V?	-	-
I	vii	6	B	1	N	N	Y	-	-	-
I	vii	15	C?	2?	N	Y	-	-	-	-
I	vii	17	C	4	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	vii	18	D	-	N	N	-	-	-	I-
I	viii	1	A	2	Y	Y	-	P	-	-
I	viii	3	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	S?
I	viii	4	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
I	viii	6	AII	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
I	viii	7	B	1	N	N	Y	B?	-	-
I	ix	2	A	1	Y	Y	-	M	-	-
I	ix	6	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
I	ix	7	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	ix	15	?	-	?	N	-	-	-	-
I	x	9	A	1	Y	N	Y	-	-	-
I	x	10	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	R
I	x	17	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
I	xi	3	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	xi	4	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
I	xi	7	C	2	N	Y	-	-	-	-
I	xii	4	B	1	N	N	Y	C/Mu	-	-
I	xii	8	D	-	N	Y	-	P/G	Y	I-
I	xii	10	C	2	N	Y	-	-	-	-
I	xii	12-13	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	xiii	6	B	3	N	N	Y	M	-	-
I	xiii	10	B	4	N	N	-	-	-	I-

I	xiv	6	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
I	xiv	11	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
I	xiv	13	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	xiv	14	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	xv	2	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	xvi	1A	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
I	xvii	3	C	2	N	Y	-	-	-	-
I	xx	2	C	3	N	Y	Y	C/La	Y	-
I	xx	5	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
II	i	4	C	2	N	Y	-	-	-	-
II	i	5	C	2	N	Y	-	-	-	I-
II	iii	5	C	2	N	Y	-	Th?	-	-
II	iv	1	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	i	6	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	I-
VI	i	8	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	I-
VI	i	9	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	S
VI	i	11-12	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	ii	2	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	ii	3	AII	1	Y	Y	-	P	-	-
VI	ii	7-8	D	-	N	?	-	P	-	-
VI	ii	23	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	iii	1-2	A	2	Y	N	-	M??	-	-
VI	iii	4	A	3	Y	?	-	-	-	-
VI	iii	5	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	iii	6	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	iii	8	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	iii	9	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	iii	10-11	B	5	N	?	-	M??	-	-
VI	iii	12-13, 22	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
VI	iii	14-15	B	5	N	?	-	M	Y	I-
VI	iii	16-17	B	3	N	?	-	-	-	-
VI	iv	5	B	2	N	?	-	-	-	-
VI	iv	6	B	1	N	?	-	-	-	-
VI	iv	7	B	2	N	?	-	-	-	-
VI	iv	12	C	1	N	?	-	-	-	-
VI	v	1-2	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
VI	v	6	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	vi	2	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	S
VI	vi	3	AII	2	Y	N	-	-	-	S
VI	vi	22	AII	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	S
VI	vi	23	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	S
VI	vii	4-5	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	vii	8	C	1	N	Y	-	U?	-	-
VI	vii	13-14	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	viii	4	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	viii	6	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	I-
VI	viii	11	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	viii	15	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	viii	16	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	viii	17	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	viii	18	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	viii	19	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	x	5	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	x	10	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	x	12	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	x	13	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	x	15	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xi	20	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	R
VI	xii	1, 8	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	xii	3	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-

VI	xii	4	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xii	6	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xiii	1	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	xiii	3-4	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	xiii	5	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	S
VI	xiii	7	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	xiii	11	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	xiii	14	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	xiii	15	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xiv	2	D	-	N	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	xiv	3	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xiv	4	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xiv	6	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	xiv	7	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xiv	8-9	B	6	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xiv	10	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xiv	11	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	S
VI	xiv	13	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	xiv	14	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xiv	15	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xiv	23-24	B	3	N	N	-	-	-	I+
VI	xiv	26	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I+
VI	xv	10	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xv	11	C	2	N	Y	-	-	-	I-
VI	xv	13	C	2	N	Y	-	-	-	I-
VI	xv	19	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xvi	5	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xvi	8-9	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	xvi	10	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	I-
VI	xvi	11	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xvi	13-14	B	3	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xvi	17	A	3	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	xvi	25	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	xvi	34	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	xvi	37	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	I+
VII	i	2	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	i	3	B	1	N	N	-	T	-	I-
VII	i	4	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	i	5	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	i	6	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	i	7	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	i	9	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	i	10	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	i	11	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	i	12-13	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	i	19	B	4	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	i	20	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	i	21	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
VII	i	24	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	i	26	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	i	27	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
VII	i	28-9	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	i	31	B	3	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	i	33,34,35	B	6	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	i	41,42	A	2	Y	Y	-	T	-	-
VII	i	49	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	i	52	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	i	53-57	B	6	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	i	60	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	i	61	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-

VII	ii	1	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ii	2	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ii	4	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	ii	5	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	ii	7	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ii	9	B	4	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	ii	13	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	ii	17	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ii	26	C	2	N	Y	-	-	-	R?
VII	ii	34	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ii	36	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ii	37	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VII	ii	39	AII	1	Y	?	-	-	-	-
VII	ii	40	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VII	ii	43	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	ii	46	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ii	49	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
VII	ii	50	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ii	52-53	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	3	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	5	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	7	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	8	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	I-
VII	iii	10	B	4	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	11-12	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	13	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	14,15	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	16	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	18	C	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	19	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	20	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	21	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	I-
VII	iii	22	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	I-
VII	iii	23	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	31	AII	1	Y	?	-	-	-	S
VII	iii	33,34,35	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iii	36-37	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	iv	3	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	iv	6	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	7	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	9	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	11	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	12-13	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	14	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	17	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	iv	18	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	19	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	21-22	D	-	N	?	-	P??	-	-
VII	iv	23	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	24-25	D	-	N	?	-	P??	Y	-
VII	iv	26-27	D	-	N	?	-	P	Y	-
VII	iv	28	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	30	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	34	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	35	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	36	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	38	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	45,46,47	A	6	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	49	A	2	Y	?	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	50	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-

VII	iv	52-53-54	B	6	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	55	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	iv	58	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	S
VII	iv	60-61	AII	6	Y	Y	-	M??	-	S
VII	iv	63	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	v	3	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	R
VII	v	4	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	R
VII	v	5	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	R
VII	v	6	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	R
VII	v	11	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	R
VII	v	13	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	R
VII	v	14	B	1	N	N	-	P	-	R
VII	v	15	B	2	N	N	-	M	-	R
VII	v	16	B	2	N	N	-	P?	-	R
VII	v	21-22	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	R
VII	v	23	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	R
VII	v	25	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	R
VII	v	26	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	R
VII	v	27	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	R
VII	v	28	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	v	29	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	R
VII	vi	4	A	2	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	vi	5-6	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	vi	8-9	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	vi	10	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	I-
VII	vi	12	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	vi	19	C	1	N	Y	-	Co?	-	-
VII	vi	21	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	S
VII	vi	27	A	2	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	vi	31-32	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	vi	33	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	vii	1	B?	2?	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	vii	4	A	1	Y	Y	-	M	-	-
VII	vii	6	A	1	Y	N	-	M	-	S?
VII	vii	7	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	vii	11	A	-	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	vii	24	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
VII	vii	25	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
VII	ix	2	B?	1?	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ix	4	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	ix	5	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	ix	6	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	ix	7-8	B	1	N	N	-	P	-	I-
VII	ix	9	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	ix	10	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	ix	11	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	ix	12	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	ix	14	B	1	N	N	-	P	-	I-
VII	ix	15	B	1	N	N	-	P	-	I-
VII	ix	16	B	1	N	N	-	P	-	I-
VII	ix	17-18	B	6	N	N	-	P	-	I+
VII	ix	22	B	1	N	N	-	P	-	I-
VII	ix	23	B	1	N	N	-	P	-	I-
VII	ix	24	B	1	N	N	-	P	-	I-
VII	ix	25	B	1	N	N	-	P	-	I-
VII	ix	26	B	1	N	N	-	P	-	I-
VII	ix	28	B	2	N	N	-	P	-	-
VII	ix	34	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	I-
VII	ix	35, 36, 37	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ix	45-46	A	1	Y	N	-	P	-	S

VII	ix	48	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	S
VII	ix	49	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	S
VII	ix	50	B	3	N	N	-	-	-	S?
VII	ix	51-52	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ix	57	B	3	N	N	-	-	-	S?
VII	ix	58	B	4	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ix	59	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ix	61,62	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	ix	68	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	x	2	AII	2	Y	?	-	-	-	-
VII	x	4	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
VII	x	6	A?	2?	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xi	15	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xi	16-17	B	6	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xii	4	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VII	xii	5	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xii	6	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xii	8-9	B	6	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xii	10	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xii	12	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xii	27	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	I-
VII	xiii	1,25	B	6	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xiii	2	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xiii	3	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VII	xiii	5	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xiii	6	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xiii	9,12	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	S
VII	xiii	10-11	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	S
VII	xiii	22	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	xiii	23	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xiv	1,20	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xiv	2	B	3	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xiv	3	AII	2	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xiv	6-7	A	2	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xiv	8	A	2	Y	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	xiv	10	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xiv	11	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	xiv	12	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xiv	13	B	4	N	N	-	-	-	-
VII	xiv	14	D	-	N	?	-	P	Y	-
VII	xv	14	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
VIII	ii	15	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	ii	31	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	ii	35	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iii	2	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iii	3	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iii	5	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	S
VIII	iii	6	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	S
VIII	iii	7	A	2	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iii	9	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iii	19	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iii	23	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iii	25	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iii	28	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VIII	iv	2-3	A	6	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	5-6	A	3	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	7	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	I-
VIII	iv	8	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	10	A	2	Y	N	-	Co??	-	-
VIII	iv	11	AII	1	Y	?	-	Co??	-	-

VIII	iv	14	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	R
VIII	iv	16	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	R
VIII	iv	19	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	R?
VIII	iv	20	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	21	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	31-32	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	I+
VIII	iv	35	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	35	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	36	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	38	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	39	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	40	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VIII	iv	43-44	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	46	B	4	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	47	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	48	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	iv	50	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VIII	iv	51-52	B	3	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VIII	v	1,40	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VIII	v	3	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	R
VIII	v	4	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	R
VIII	v	6	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	R
VIII	v	7	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	R
VIII	v	10	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VIII	v	11,12	A	3	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VIII	v	22-23	B	6	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	v	25-26	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	v	27	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	v	29	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VIII	v	30,31	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	v	32	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	v	33	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	v	34	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	v	35	B	3	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VIII	vii	3-4	B	6	N	N	-	-	-	-
VIII	vii	5	C	3	N	Y	-	M	-	-
VIII	vii	9-10-11	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
VIII	vii	12	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
VIII	vii	13	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
VIII	vii	14	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
VIII	vii	15	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
IX	i	1,34	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
IX	i	2	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
IX	i	4	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
IX	i	9	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
IX	i	10-11	A	6	Y	N	-	-	-	-
IX	i	13	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
IX	i	14	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
IX	i	17	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
IX	i	19	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
IX	i	21	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
IX	i	23	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
IX	i	24	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
IX	i	25	C	1	N	?	-	-	-	-
IX	i	27	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
IX	i	31	C	2	N	Y	-	-	-	I-
IX	ii	2	B	1	N	N	-	Co??	-	I-
IX	ii	3	B	1	N	N	-	Co??	-	I+
IX	ii	4	D	-	N	?	-	Co??	-	I-
IX	ii	5	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	I-

IX	ii	6	B	4	N	N	-	-	-	I-
IX	ii	9	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
IX	ii	11	B	2	N	N	-	Co??	-	-
IX	ii	12	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
IX	ii	20	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	I-
IX	ii	22	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
IX	ii	23	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
IX	iii	3	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
IX	iii	4	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
IX	iii	6	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
IX	iii	7	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
IX	iii	8	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
IX	iii	9	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
IX	iii	14	B	5	N	N	-	-	-	R?
IX	iii	18	B	3	N	N	-	-	-	-
IX	iv	1, 22	B	1	N	N	-	P	-	I-
IX	iv	2	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
IX	iv	3	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
IX	iv	4	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
IX	iv	6	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
IX	iv	7	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
IX	iv	8	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
IX	iv	9	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
IX	iv	19	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
IX	iv	20	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
IX	iv	21	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I+
IX	v	1	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
IX	v	3	A	1	N	Y	-	-	-	R
IX	v	5	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
IX	v	7	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
IX	v	8	A	4	Y	N	-	-	-	-
IX	v	10	A	2	Y	N	-	-	-	-
V	i	6	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
V	i	8	AII	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
V	i	17	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	R
V	i	19	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
V	i	22	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
V	i	24	A	3	Y	N	-	-	-	-
V	i	25	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
V	i	27	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
V	i	29	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I
V	i	30	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I
V	i	31	B	4	N	N	-	-	-	I
V	ii	2	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
V	ii	5	A	1	Y	N	-	-	-	-
V	ii	6	A	2	Y	N	-	-	-	-
V	ii	8	A	2	Y	N	-	-	-	-
V	ii	9	A	2	Y	N	-	-	-	-
V	ii	11	AII	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
V	ii	12	A	2	Y	N	-	-	-	-
V	ii	14	C	2	N	?	-	-	-	-
V	ii	16	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
V	iii	3	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
V	iii	5	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
V	iii	6	D	-	N	?	-	-	-	-
V	iv	4	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
V	iv	5	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
V	iv	12	C	3	N	Y	-	-	-	-
V	v	1	C	1	N	Y	-	-	-	-
V	v	4	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-

VI	occ	6	C	1	N	?	-	-	-	I+
VI	occ	7	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	occ	8	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	occ	15	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	occ	20	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	occ	21	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	occ	22	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VI	occ	24	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VI	occ	31	B	4	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	occ	34	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	-
VI	occ	38	B	1	N	N	-	-	-	I-
VII	occ	2	A	1	Y	?	-	-	-	-
VII	occ	4	A	2	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
VII	occ	11	A	1	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
IX	v	12	A	1	Y	?	-	-	-	-
IX	vi	c	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	I-
IX	vi	f	A	1	Y	?	-	-	-	-
IX	vii	18	C	2	N	?	-	-	-	-
IX	viii	1	B	2	N	N	-	-	-	-
IX	viii	4	AII	2	Y	?	-	M	-	-
IX	viii	5	A	1	Y	?	-	-	-	-
IX	ix	3	C	1	N	?	-	-	-	S?
IX	ix	5	C	1	N	?	-	-	-	S
IX	ix	7	C	2	N	?	-	P	-	-
IX	xii	1-2	B	3	N	N	-	T	-	S
III	iv	1	D	-	N	?	-	V	-	-
III	ix	c	C	1	N	?	-	-	-	-
III	ix	f	C	1	N	?	-	-	-	-

DATABASE TABLE 2: Fulleries

Reg	Insl	Door#	G_typ	Dway
VI	viii	20,2	-	-
VII	xiv	17	A	Y
VII	xii	17	A	Y
V	iii	1-2	-	-
VII	ii	11	-	-
I	vi	7	-	-

DATABASE TABLE 3: Brothels

Reg	Insl	Door#	G_typ	Dway
VII	xii	18,19,20	-	-
VII	iv	42	-	-
VII	xi	12	-	-
IX	vii	17	A?	N
VII	xiii	15	-	-
VII	xii	33	-	-
IX	vii	15	A?	Y
VII	xiii	19	-	-
VII	xiii	16	-	-

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