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Community

Key words: value, belonging, borders, labour, self-ownership

This chapter on community explores some of the different meanings of community as belonging. It follows Gerard Delanty's argument (2009) that community has an inescapable normative dimension, that belonging is never finite, and the longing for community can never be fulfilled. As he argues, the search for belonging takes place in an insecure world, structured by the boundaries of community and by exclusion so that belonging itself is insecure. What does it mean not to belong, not only on a local, regional or national level, but also to the international? People argue not only about the authenticity of the community, but about the status and the value of its members, and there is a broad range of critical literature on the idea of 'community' that relates to questions of identity and difference, and to the social relations of power embedded in structures of class, race, gender and nation. Drawing on my own research in addition to that of others, I will focus on a particular, liberal notion of community and in particular its relationship to property and ownership. I will then go on to consider how these constructions of community play out in international politics, in particular at the borders of the nation state and in the social and political relations of colonialism. This focus draws out the normative dimensions of community and its connection to the value of power relations, expressed through notions of honour and dishonour, distinction and degradation.

These liberal meanings of community are inseparable from what it means to be independent and autonomous, and what it takes to secure the individual to the community. In Locke's seventeenth-century theory of the social contract, for example, belonging to the community is intimately connected to a set of rights and credentials that determine personhood. Lockean individuals, in order to count as individuals, are expected to lead their own lives, without being dependent on anyone else, taking responsibility for themselves, their conscience, their labour and their reason. Property theory often rests on the assumption of rational, independent agents who are able to perceive their own self-interest and respect the equally rational and justifiable claims of others. From there, they are understood to be capable of building their own communities based on reasonableness and consent. This raises the question of who counts as a member of this community, defined by their enterprise and self-ownership, according to Macpherson (Macpherson 1962: 157). These solid individuals with secure roots in their own property holding form a 'virtual community of people linked by their citizenship in Europe at home and abroad…and constituted in opposition to their indigenous subjects' (Mills 1997: 29). The answer to the question of who belongs comes out of a tangle of norms, assumptions, power relations and inequalities that are attached to race, class and gender and to ideas about labour and freedom as well as belonging. Property relations are forged at the intersection of the natural and the social, where the boundary between self and other is expected to be fixed in nature, but where what counts as natural and real is constantly shifting. This is the contested moral and political space of community. Property functions as a set of legal relations, making it contingent and constantly in flux. At the same time, the volatility of property is offset by its 'strong connection with the essential, the authentic, the permanent, the territorial and the individual' (Davies 1999: 342). This tension between the fragility and the permanence of property is reflected in conceptions of community as vulnerable and constantly threatened by loss, and at the same time as natural and permanent.

The first section of this chapter explores how community is imagined out of self-ownership, and the particular view of freedom that emerges from liberal thinking based on possessive individualism, where being free and autonomous means having the capacity to exclude others from an impregnable internal fortress. In this particular world view, individuals are by nature equal, rational, self-interested and competitive. In pursuing their individual appetites and aversions, they can expect to find themselves in conflict with one another, and one person's absolute autonomy will come to rely on extinguishing the autonomy of another individual. The only way to prevent these conflicts from escalating out of control is for each individual to recognise every other individual as equally rational and self-interested, and as ultimately separate from them. Property in this discourse acts as a means of separation between individuals, and the basis for cooperation and a minimalist version of community. It is linked to a vision of separate, radically abstracted selves able to relate to each other through competition and exchange, with fixed boundaries around the individual who can then choose his or her degree of belonging to any given community.

This chapter explores the construction of what Bridget Anderson has called 'the community of value', made up of citizens who are understood fully to own themselves and to be ethically incorporated into a particular moral, economic and social space that is then imagined as a community. The chapter looks at some of the dimensions of outsiderness that are generated by the search for belonging to this community of value in an insecure world. Establishing the criteria of social belonging tells us who is included and who is excluded from 'the circle of those entitled to a just distribution and reciprocal recognition' (Fraser 2009: 17), in other words who is entitled to be a member of the community of value. Using this core idea, the chapter looks at how liberal ideas of community are inflected by property thinking, and at how that affects our notions of the public good, our connections to one another and how we deal with people beyond our borders. Its critical potential lies in thinking about what it means to use the idea of community to draw barriers around ourselves to protect us from potentially harmful intrusions. In considering the 'coziness' of certain forms of community, the challenges of not taking personhood for granted and the role of labour in understanding membership, this chapter connects with the ideas of Rawls, Hegel, Hobbes and Locke as well as with critics of liberal property thinking such as Waldron, Penner and Mills.

Territories of the Self

A territorial understanding of the self encourages an identity based on a fixed and unbreachable boundary between self and other. It creates particular relations of honour and status between individuals. People tend to see all others as external to their identity, and as possible threats to their own integrity. This approach to thinking about the self as contained and enclosed, and protected by private property, rather than as constituted by the common and forged in relation to others, links it to a particular way of imagining community (Brace 1997, 2004). The atmosphere of mutual fear, distrust and diffidence creates a sense of a self constantly on its guard, alert to the possibility of danger and invasion, inevitably taking up the stance of distrust and self-defence. This is a vision of non-community closely associated with Hobbes' conception of the state of nature, that also finds its echoes in Kant's 'unsocial sociability of men', where man has an inclination to associate with others, but also a strong propensity to isolate himself from others. Any relationships between people are

bound to be based on suspicion, as Kant says each seeks to 'achieve a rank among his fellows whom he cannot tolerate but from whom he cannot withdraw' (Kant 1963). People meet to trade with one another, for example, and 'a certain Market-friendship is begotten' which is based more on jealousy than on true love (Warrender, 1983: 42). They meet for pleasure and recreation in order to satisfy their own vain glory by making comparisons with the defects and infirmities of others. They 'wound the absent' by condemning and judging them (Warrender, 1983: 42). At the same time, as both Hobbes and Rousseau recognised, they are afflicted by the unremitting rage to distinguish themselves from others and to pursue glory through self-aggrandisement and the potential to exercise power over others. Property relations that arise from this territorial understanding of the self, coupled with the rage to distinguish the self from others, are centrally concerned with the capacity to exclude. In this discourse, it is the capacity to exclude others, to refuse to acknowledge them as members of the community, that according to Macpherson 'makes a man human' (1962: 142). The individual subject is understood to be defined by independent labour, appropriation and acts on the outside material world (Coleman 2005). Such individuals are able to define their own terms of possession, and to treat others as external threats to their own identity and integrity. They are understood to have the capacity to enclose and husband themselves. This particular conception of property in the person grounds a claim for integration into a normative order of rights and duties, into the welfare of the collective, and so membership of the community. Charles Mills points out that this concept of personhood has to include the concept of a 'subperson' – not an inanimate object, and not entirely outside the imagined moral community, but not fully a person. Subpersons are defined in contrast to those who own themselves, and it is generally understood that they 'can be encroached upon with impunity' (Mills 1997: 7).

James Penner argues that the 'hold of property on our imaginations' (Penner 2009, 195) means that we apply the concept of property beyond the realm of genuine property rights to other very different sorts of social relations. For him, the concept of distributive justice only makes sense where individuals view the law as 'an alien body of norms which confine and restrain them by threats of sanction' (Penner 2009, 198), and where members of the community, such as hedge fund managers who resist regulation, treat their relations with others as a series of extractions. While more modern liberalism has dissipated the strength of suspicion and distrust, the residue of exclusion, drawing the boundaries around the self, encroaching on others with impunity and 'wounding the absent' remains. As Nick Blomley argues, a distributive model of justice and social interaction presupposes what he calls a 'propertied' view of social life where subjects are constituted as individualised bearers of resources engaged in market-like transactions (1997, 211-12). In this account, Rawls' basic liberties – liberty of conscience, freedom of association, freedom of speech and liberty, the right to vote, hold public office and so on - are essentially freedoms from the interference of others, and the difference principle, which ensures that any social and economic inequalities are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society, is a 'defensive stance' (Penner 2009, 199) designed to draw barriers to protect us from the potentially harmful intrusions of others.

Such a defensive, distributive approach to community means that justifications of private property start from the perspective of the rights and interest of the potential proprietor, and only then take into account the perspective of society as a whole (Waldron 2009). This model of property and community tends to set it up so that the hard cases for private property are phrased in social terms around issues of pollution, for example, and patterns of inequality and poverty. Waldron argues that this takes us to an aggregative approach to the general good, to a vision of the communal within

which 'the particularity of individual predicaments disappears from view' (Waldron 2009: 171). In this airbrushing out of particularity, it comes to look as though only the interests of individual owners are at stake in justifications of private property. Those without property are rendered absent. We need, as Waldron argues, to think about those who have no property at all, who bear all the restraints but enjoy none of the benefits of private property. It is their interests 'to whom, *above all*, a justification of property is owed' (Waldron 2009: 172). For Waldron, there are grave dangers for the poor in having their poverty categorised as a social problem to be fixed. In the process, they will be treated like an oil slick or a component of a decaying infrastructure, as 'broken'[1](Cameron 2011). Each poor man, woman and child, he argues, has a 'human status as an individual, an agent, a proper subject of freedom, and a potential bearer of obligations' (Waldron 2009: 172-3). This is almost exactly what is denied to those identified by Mills as subpersons, who can be encroached upon with impunity. It is one of the functions of 'community' to police who is afforded this human status. Traditional property theory takes personhood for granted 'and thus excludes the differential experience of those who have ceaselessly had to fight to have their personhood recognized in the first place' (Mills 1998: 9).

Homelessness, Community and Gentrification

Those who qualify as subjects of freedom and bearers of obligation are often those who are allowed to count as citizens, to participate in the social contract, and it is from them that our states and institutions claim allegiance. Waldron's argument is that justifications of private property concentrate on this group of people, defined as potential property owners, and any regulatory scheme considers the advantages that might accrue to them, as its likely beneficiaries. He uses the example of the regulation of public spaces, and campaigns to clean up urban parks so that they are not filled with litter, human waste, needles, bed rolls and condoms, and people can use them without feeling harassed or intimidated by other users. Such campaigns set rules so that people feel welcome in public spaces, but the rules are made in a society where there are large numbers of homeless people who have no private space and so no alternative but to live all their lives in public. The background conditions of homelessness make the proposals to regulate the parks unfair because of the disparities the beneficiaries and the homeless people will experience in bringing their behaviour into line with the rules (Waldron 2009: 178). There is a real, palpable difference between the impact of the regulation on a person who has a home in contrast to someone who is homeless, and this affects their 'human status' within the community.

Prohibiting people from sleeping is stopping them from doing something that they need to do. Being prevented from sleeping is not only uncomfortable and degrading, but painful, dangerous and impossible, almost literally unbearable, as Waldron points out. For Waldron this example poses fundamental questions about who counts as a member of the community. In a situation where those without a private place to live are stopped from sleeping and urinating, they are being treated like an alien group, and not as the proper subjects of freedom or the potential bearers of obligations. Instead, they are coded as intruders into public space 'in a way that makes public places uncomfortable for members of the community' (Waldron 2009: 185). They are 'space invaders'

[1] In the wake of the riots in London and other English cities in 2011, David Cameron declared that the 'slow motion moral collapse' that had led to a 'broken society' was back at the top of his political agenda. He pledged to tackle children without fathers, schools without discipline and communities without control (Cameron, 2011). http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14524834, accessed 21/8/14.

(Puwar 2004), and strangers. This fits with Zygmunt Bauman's analysis of the boundaries of new communities that are constructed to exclude strangers. The homeless people in Waldron's account both enforce and problematise social and cultural boundaries, and the boundary between self and other. They are especially troubling strangers because they share 'common citizenship' and a common place of residence with the other members of the community (2009: 186). Their membership is not about civic or national belonging, but about the moral boundaries of property and the performance of self-ownership. Homeless people are marked as mobile, rootless, antisocial and threatening, and treated as needing to be removed from sight. They are the social other of the residents, cast as both flawed consumers and vagabonds (Marotta 2002: 44), rather than strongly associated with permanence and authenticity. They represent the contingency and volatility of specific ways of understanding private property as the basis of community, and show how this constellation distributes subpersonhood and insecurity. Their treatment is conflated with measures to deal with anti-social behaviour. In the controversy over the use of 'homeless spikes' in London, Tesco defended their use as deterrents to anti-social behaviour such as smoking and drinking, which they interpreted as intimidating for their customers (before removing the spikes in response to protests). Campaigners against the spikes outside luxury apartments in central London declared that: 'We don't want to live in a society where public space is covered in spikes. Homeless people are not pigeons' (*Guardian* 12/6/14).

The online protests on change.org and on twitter against the use of the spikes to deter people from sleeping in doorways can be read as using the new technologies of communication to create a communicative space 'where a kind of proximity is to be found' (Delanty 2009: 157), a flexible community within which belonging is generated through participation in communication .This expresses the idea that communities can be untethered from the insecurities of the world and exist without being grounded in a collective identity. These virtual spaces are often idealised as universally accessible public domains, outside the institutions of the state and offering the possibility of a public sphere that permits a 'rational, well-informed conversation between equals capable of resolving their differences by non-coercive means' (Schlesinger and Kevin 2000: 207).Questions remain about what kind of proximity and conversation these spaces offer, when some of the protestors were arguing that flower pots would have been a better and more aesthetically pleasing solution than the unsightly spikes. As Waldron argues, responses to the diverse demands on public spaces are often about keeping poverty out of sight, and relieving the distress of the rich by sheltering them from the disturbing spectacle of the 'strangers' who live among them (Waldron 2009: 187).

Nick Blomley's description of the 'geographies of property' at the 'gentrification frontier' in Vancouver in the late 1990s (Blomley 1997: 194) reflect some of the same cosmetics of community, covering over the wound of absence. The Downtown Eastside in Vancouver was a densely populated inner city neighbourhood of several thousand people, but was described as 'empty' by developers. The people who lived there were a mobile, socially marginal and criminalised population who were easily characterised as outsiders with little stake in the neighbourhood. They were regarded as unstable, contingent and in flux, divorced from the authentic, the permanent and the territorial. Once they had been characterised as outsiders and strangers, they were understood to have no real identification with the place. Improvement and revitalisation of the neighbourhood was only possible if property owners moved in and 'the marginal and dangerous move out' (Blomley 1997: 196). Those who resisted gentrification responded by emphasising the stability of the displaced

population, characterising the neighbourhood as a settled community of residents and stressing the loyalty of many elderly men to it as their home. They insisted on the entitlement of long-term working-class residents to the neighbourhood by invoking the dignity of masculine labour, and the 'implicit Lockean landscape that the resource worker created in his prime' (Blomley 1997: 209). Blomley quotes the words of one of the residents campaigning against the developers: 'They think that everybody down here is just a transient. But this is a community. It is a neighbourhood. There are actual people living down here' (1997: 201 n.41). The developers and the realtors co-opted the narrative of community and property to 'configure the neighbourhood as an empty, speculative site, rather than a viable community space' (1997: 203). In response, the protestors imbued the neighbourhood with local meanings, presenting it as a place of 'shared sentiment and symbols' (1997: 205), collective memories and the creation of an imagined community. The symbolic effect of the different readings of property at work here was to 'map a border – both real and metaphorical – between an inside and an outside' (1997: 206). In the process, oppositional property narratives emerged between the 'good property' of the poor and marginalised and the 'bad property' of prevailing capitalist relations (1997: 205).

Blomley's analysis of gentrification echoes the colonial discourse of property relations where the Lockean landscape of ordered and disciplined improvement and productivity was created against a backdrop of the myth of vast tracts of vacant land, awaiting development and improvement. Under colonialism, the formation of identities and communities was played out in 'the definition of entitlement to welfare and to property rights, both within the metropole and on the periphery' (Daunton and Halpern 1999: 6). Endowment, anchorage and membership were all mediated through property rights in land, persons and labour. The volatility and flux of property meant that these rights were constantly renegotiated and contested. As Delanty (2009) argues about belonging, it is never established as final: there is always contestation over claims to community. The English colonists used their own ideas about proper land use and ownership to displace the indigenous people of America, marking them as wandering, transient and potentially troublesome. Their mobility was coded as resistance to the 'English colonial agenda of fixity and social place' (O'Brien 1999: 206), and their capacity to define the terms for possessing the land was crowded out by enclosures and the conception of private property in land, structured by the right to exclude. Their version of ownership was stigmatised as non-improving, wasteful and linked only to subsistence rather than fully integrated into the market relations that underpinned the currents of world trade and the meanings of citizenship and belonging. They had failed to fulfil God's injunction to subdue the earth. As a result, they were regarded as fugitives and exiles in their own land, unable to define their own terms of possession and community.

The Theme of Loss

These oppositional narratives of 'good' and 'bad' property fluctuate and change their meanings in response to the volatility and flux of property, and to the social relations of power involved in defining its meaning . The 'good', improving property of enclosure was contrasted to the 'bad' stewardship of the indigenous peoples, but also to the 'bad' corporate greed of the developers. This is related to the ways in which 'community' is positioned as the defining other of capitalist modernity, contrasting direct, local relationships with more abstract relations. Community is understood to emerge from face-to-face encounters and to be sustained by naturalised boundaries that exist 'through reference to place or race or culture or identity' (Joseph 2007: 58). Miranda

Joseph identifies a romantic narrative of community that places it prior to 'society', and then sees it as destroyed by capitalism and modernity as economic values became predominant. The modern discourse of community 'has been dominated by a theme of loss' (Delanty 2009: 7). This has the effect of cutting community off from capital by sealing it in the past. This sealing-off neatens the edges of community and allows us not to think about the social relations of power involved, and to ignore the question of who belongs and on what terms. In her critique of Robert Putnam and his analysis of social capital, Joseph argues that he gives to 'community' the values of trust, norms and networks that can sustain economic co-operation, and divorces them from the background conditions of exploitation and subordination (Joseph 2002: 12). This romantic narrative of community, Joseph argues, is then complicit with capital and deployed to maintain or elaborate domination and exploitation (2002: 19-21).

Waldron uses the homelessness example to express his doubts about 'community' as an adequate response to being 'poor, deprived and displaced' (2009: 189) when the problem is one of exclusion or expulsion from the community. His article is a critique of 'cozy forms of community' where those who are privileged as members enjoy one another's company, take responsibility for their neighbourhood and celebrate their loyalty, shared values and communal solidarity (2009: 190). As part of the construction and maintenance of such cozy communities, their members recoil from the homeless people who live amongst them, and try to ensure that they 'come nowhere near their gates, nowhere near the public places where they walk their prams or hold their barbecues' (2009: 190). They demonstrate and act upon an impulse to protect their given form of community, but also to prevent the formation of an alternative form of community by the disadvantaged. This is part of the same process that crowded out indigenous meanings of property and alternative forms of ownership. Those who count as the proper subjects of freedom and the potential bearers of obligation are also in control of the narratives of possession and community and able to define the terms of membership. As Waldron argues, the small-scale example that he uses applies on a much wider scale to people who band together to defend their jobs and industries, their own property in skill and membership, 'no matter what the cost to poor people beyond their borders' (2009: 191) who are figured as outsiders, refugees and migrants and treated with suspicion.

This exclusion of poor people beyond borders is inextricably linked to the insecurity of the world and of belonging, and to the role of labour in determining membership and the meaning of community. The prosperous market economy of Waldron's account is a moral and political as well as an economic space, and the borders are drawn around individuals as well as around states. The territorial self claims a monopoly, a right to exclude competitors and contestants as potential invaders, and at the same time has to legitimate itself in relation to others through notions of honour and degradation which consist in comparison. The liberal subject defined by Hobbes as a fortress, by Locke as an enterprising owner and by Rawls as the self-authenticating source of valid claims, owns his or her labour, and not only finds his or her work developing and liberating, righteous, industrious and creative, but constitutive of his or her membership of a civil society and of her citizenship. It can ground their collective responsibility, their sense of identity and honour, and their assurance of economic security. In the process, they are defined in relation to what others lack (Hall 2000: 230). Some people's labour is stigmatised as inefficient, as unskilled and unimproving, as drudgery that bears no relation to the welfare of the collective. As I have argued elsewhere, this is particularly the case for poor women who work in the economy of makeshifts, outside the protection of the guilds and other mechanisms of ethical incorporation into civil society (Brace 2002,

2013). Those who labour without honour and recognition become freelance hustlers with nothing to sell except themselves, and find themselves on the outside of the 'community of value' (Anderson 2013), marked by race and by gender, and denied the 'human status' that can ground their belonging.

In Mills' account of the racial contract, white people are defined as white on the basis that they have the capacity to exclude others and to exercise despotic dominion over themselves. This helps us to understand whiteness as a probationary and as a moral category, where whiteness is a status and a property in membership. It becomes inextricably linked to a set of expectations, privileges and benefits that are affirmed and legitimated by law and by the norms of belonging. Being white involves being able to protect yourself from subpersonhood and from strangerhood. Race in this account is a 'marker of entitlement or dispossession, civilization or barbarism, normative inclusion or normative exclusion, full or diminished personhood' (Mills 1996: 127). It is also deeply connected to labour, and the powerful myth that African slaves, in need of direction and compulsion, were only fitted for certain kinds of labour and needed to be disciplined (Brace 2004: 174). This was a myth that fixed slaves in their place, and broke the connection between labour and honour, rationality and autonomy. This dishonouring of labour was an important dimension of racialised dispossession and exclusion. At the same time, the link between industry and righteousness is also broken by mobility, and those whose labour is stigmatised as inefficient are also constructed as vagrant, marginal, wandering and transient. Their mobility is a sign that they are not keeping their place, and the problem of migration is perceived as being that people are seeking to work in the wrong place, undermining the livelihoods of settled members of the community, and refusing to accept their position (Anderson 2013: 27).

Migration and the Human Project

The sense of stability that underpins both communal and individual identity is thrown into disorder by the processes of migration. Endowment and entitlement are understood to require anchorage, so that membership rests on property rights in land, persons and labour that are supposed to be fixed, 'assuming, apparently, that people usually stay where they are supposed to be' (Pettman 1998, 394). Those who do not stay where they are supposed to be, like the original peoples of America or homeless people living in parks or sheltering in doorways, are marked as potentially troublesome, and then as lacking in self-control and the inclination to labour. Poor people who move and migrate have somehow not rooted themselves in improvement and ownership of a property in the person, or in their own communities; they are understood not to be masters of themselves, to lack the 'durable solidity' that forms the core of the liberal subject's identity (Brace 2010).

This durable solidity is inflected by gender. Women are supposed to find it in the family, in their domestic duties and responsibilities and their fixed loyalties to their culture and community. In the traditional migration story, it is assumed that they are left behind or attached to male migrants as dependants. Women from poorer South and Southeast Asian states who migrate to work in richer South and Southeast Asian and Gulf states in domestic labour and sex work inhabit 'a strange in-between space, between the public and the private, the domestic and the market' (Pettman 1998: 398). It is a space that is somehow outside of community, and the women are understood to be

suspended there, in a world of 'fraught commitments and fragmented loyalties' (Gardiner Barber 2006: 73).

Standing, as Judith Shklar and Charles Mills argue, was defined by citizens distinguishing themselves from noncitizens, and members of communities distinguishing themselves from strangers, through a dialogue between the liberal subject and its others within which 'people who are not granted [the] marks of civic dignity feel dishonored, not just powerless and poor' (Shklar 2001: 2). Somewhere in this complicated dialogue about social standing, inclusion and community, there is a story about migration and the processes that construct belonging. The figure of the 'high value' migrant will be an entrepreneur, an investor, a doctor, a research scientist, a software engineer or 'the privileged employee of a multinational company' (Agnew 2008: 184, UKBA 2010). They are able to rely on their own capacities, their grounding in self-ownership and improvement, to claim 'citizen-like entitlements' (Ong 2006: 501) on the basis of their respectable standing (Shklar 2001: 17). The link between their labour and righteousness, their enterprise, is unbroken by their mobility and they are able to continue to define their own terms of possession. In their negotiation of national and international spaces, their 'frequent flying' and 'net surfing' (Pettman 1998: 389) they are not constructed as vagrants. The terms of belonging are related to the 'somatic norm' of being white and male, but some others, including women, 'can pass as the universal human' if they are protected by their skills or their aspirations, or by the 'privilege of being racially unmarked' (Puwar 2004: 10-11). The 'property of membership' (Somers 1996: 67) is required to support the rights and duties that underpin human status and the community of enterprisers, and is embodied in notions of skilled and fair labour which are withheld from the poor (and in particular from poor women) who migrate for work.

As Waldron argues about the rules preventing homeless people from using the parks, in part this exclusion is a question about negative liberty, about asking 'why do we think we are justified in stopping them from acting in these ways?' (Waldron 2009, 180). When we think about community, citizenship and migration, in a context where migration is considered in terms of rates and targets, the abuse of free movement and the idea of 'pull factors' to particular countries (BBC 27 February 2014), the particularity of the individual predicaments of migrants disappears from view. It is not only the interests of 'the brightest and the best' migrants or of 'working families who work hard and do the right thing' (*Express*: 26/4/13) that need to be considered in justifying borders. Individual property rights require a collective context for their exercise and realization. Private property 'is held by virtue of communal relations' (Davies 1999: 341). Property, as Penner points out, is a normative achievement, a site where individuals are able to act communally. Property, he argues, serves as an indicator of the inadequacies of community – there is something wrong when significant numbers of people cannot make property rights their own (Penner 2009; 211). Collective concerns cannot be separated from issues of relative power, the realm of social relations and membership of the imagined community. By assuming that each individual is sovereign over herself and free to exclude others, we neglect 'the value people may place on the kind of power relations in which they stand to others' (Cohen 1995: 80). In other words, we cannot assume, with Rawls, that communities are unified systems of social cooperation without steadfastly ignoring the ways in which they are structured by property and power, to exclude -outsiders who do not belong.

Penner (2009) quotes from Rawls to make his point. 'Now obviously', Rawls says, 'no one can obtain everything he wants; the mere existence of other persons prevents this'. In this territorial world

view, others work to prevent my getting what I want, unless I can arrange it so that they serve my interests. Penner concludes that in Rawls' scheme, the only conceivable appreciation of others is 'as either impediments to or tools for the realization of my goals' (Penner 2009: 201). Against this, Penner draws on Hegel to stress the central importance of recognition by other rational wills, and the possibility of forming associations in which we act together rather than in conflict with each other. This raises the possibility of acting jointly, of treating everybody as subjects of freedom and potential bearers of obligation. It opens up the scope of community membership, and of human status: 'To be human is necessarily to value, and care about, not just our own lives but the way the whole human project is going' (2006: 204). This vision of community is about self-respect linked to participating with others in the human project, and for Penner this is only possible to imagine when property rights are kept in their place. As Davina Cooper's (2007)research on Summerhill school shows, in imagining community, we should be 'thinking about property as a set of networked relations in which the subject is embedded'. Mastery and dominion can be decentred by placing limits on what she terms 'propertization', dispersing rights and limiting power (Cooper 2007: 636). She argues for a broader conception of property and community 'organized around relations of belonging rather than control, where rights are fragmented and institutional authority dispersed' (Cooper 2007: 627). Rather than structuring communities around self-interest, the problem of fairness, and the fetishization of property in self-ownership, we need to think differently about the existence of other people. Our understanding of what it is to flourish and what it is for our lives to have meaning is 'ineluctably a matter of situating ourselves within the history of the human species' (Penner 2009: 216).

Conclusion

This chapter has explored some of the core ideas linked to community, and in particular to the idea of the community of value, structured by the state and the labour market, as well as by social relations of gender, race, nation and class. The critical potential of community as a concept is dependent on finding a way of detaching it from the distributive assumptions of property fetishism and of the territorial self. This involves thinking about international politics in a way that moves beyond 'border thinking' that takes it for granted that national citizenship is the ground on which rights and belonging ought to be organised. As other thinkers have argued about the social contract and about migration, we need to think about community through 'ordinary human relations' (Zerilli 2005: 77). We need an international politics that can understand how the nation state is implicated in reproducing the territorial understanding of the self and recognise that what happens at the borders of communities is about the production of power through relations of dependency, belonging and insecurity (Anderson et al 2010: 8).

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Suggestions for readers:

Anderson, B. (2013) *Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, B., Sharma, N. and Wright, C. (2010) 'Editorial: Why No Borders?' *Refuge* 26:2, 5-18.

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Walker, R. B. J. (1993) *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

For discussion of an alternative community, see:

http://www.transitionheathrow.com/grow-heathrow/

http://www.farmgarden.org.uk/home/local-food-project/growing-trends/631-community-orchards

On campaigns for migrant rights, see:

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