# The Developmental Dimensions of the Egyptian Media Role in the Peace Process

(A content analysis study with a future perspective)

# Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy At the University of Leicester

By

Khayrat Moawed M. Adlan-Ayad

Centre for Mass Communication Research

University of Leicester

UMI Number: U148046

#### All rights reserved

#### INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



#### UMI U148046

Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.

Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

#### **ABSTRACT**

# The Developmental Dimensions of the Egyptian Media Role in the Peace Process

(A content analysis study with a future perspective)

This study aims at investigating the role of the Egyptian press in the developmental dimension of the peace process. In exploring this role, the study answers two questions. How did the Egyptian press connect the peace process to the economic, political, and social dimensions of development? How did the press construct the meaning of peace in terms of a social context in Egypt? The study addresses five main objectives. These objectives are: exploring differences between national and opposition newspapers in dealing with the developmental dimensions of the peace process; examining how the economic dimensions were framed; examining how the political dimensions were presented; exploring how the social/cultural dimensions were portrayed; and how the Egyptian journalists consider the role of the press within its relationship with political institution.

The study adopts two main theoretical approaches: the political economy approach and the construction of meaning approach. The political economy approach is used in the study to explore two main points: the relationship between the media institutions and the political institutions in Egypt, and the extent to which this relationship influenced press coverage of the developmental dimensions of the peace process. The construction of meaning approach is used to analyse how the Egyptian press framed and constructed the meaning of peace in terms of Egypt's economic, political and social context. The study uses two methods: content analysis and interviews. The content analysis is carried out on two Egyptian newspapers. The analysis is conducted over period of thirteen years from January 1977 to March 1989. The analyzed content is selected according to main events that took place in this period. Twenty-one weeks were selected in which 617 articles were analyzed. For the second method, interviews were carried out with a number of the Egyptian journalists from the two selected newspapers. Ten journalists were interviewed during the early 1998, five from each newspaper.

Following the political economy approach, interviews with Egyptian journalists from both the national and the opposition paper under analysis considered the relationship between the press and the government to have been very close all along. The criteria of selecting news in the national newspapers were far from professional news values. Results of the content analysis reinforce the views of these journalists about the relationship between the government and the press and how it influences content. Following the construction of meaning approach, the analysis indicates that the Egyptian press constructed the meaning of peace within the social context. The press considered that peace would lead to the solving of critical economic and political issues facing Egypt. Socially, that peace would secure enough funds to build houses, renew the infrastructure, decrease unemployment, and improve health care. Generally, that peace would help to solve economic, political, and social problems.

According to the results of the study, it can be argued that the mass media can play a significant role in promoting and reinforcing peace through constructing its meaning within the social context or through connecting it with the urgent needs of people. However more studies are required in different societies and times in order to develop the argument.

#### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

First of all, my most gratitude and thanks to my supervisor Olga Linne, the best and helpful tutor anyone could have. She was willing to accept the role as my analyst and her constructive guidance and criticism has helped me very much to refine and improve my work in every possible way. She did everything and spent endless time helping me to improve my reading, thinking and writing. Olga was always available when I needed her. She has my deepest gratitude.

My warmest and respectable thanks to Anders Hansen who helped me more than I had my right to expect. Anders was always willing to give me time to discuss coding schedule and analysis categories. His guidance when I was processing my data and using SPSS was very helpful. I remember that every time I asked him for thirty minutes, the meeting would extend to a longer time. He never asked me to finish the meeting.

My deepest thanks to my father and my mother for their concerns and prayers for me. Words are insufficient to thanks my father and my mother-in-law who spent time and money to come from Egypt and stay with us during very difficult times; the delivery of my two sons: Mostafa and Fares. No words can express my gratitude to my wife, Rehab, who made so many personal sacrifices and shared all the troubles I faced during the preparation and writing this study.

I wish to thank every one at the Centre for Mass Communication Research at the university of Leicester. All members of staff always have schedule time for Ph. D. student and practice open door policy. My deepest gratitude to David Middleton for his proofreading. I also wish to thanks every one at the office for their help. My great thanks to all colleges of Ph. D students for their rich discussion in different area.

I wish to thank Egypt's government for granting me this scholarship to study for a Ph. D, and all the staff at the Egyptian Educational & Cultural Bureau in London for their help and willingness to discuss any problem facing me. My respectful thanks to my Professors and colleagues in the Faculty of Mass Communication at the University of Cairo, especially to Dr Sami Tayie who helped me to study in the Centre, and to Dr Rassem Al-Gammal and Dr Ali Agwa who supported me from the very beginning and choose me for this Scholarship.

## **Table of Content**

| Part one: Theoretical Framework, Background and Methodology  |                |  |  |
|--|----------------|--|--|
| Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework   | 1              |  |  |
| 1.1. The political economy approach  | 7              |  |  |
| 1.2. The construction of meaning approach  | 12             |  |  |
| Chapter 2: The Mass Media, Development, and Peace  |                |  |  |
| 2.1. Development   | 19             |  |  |
| 2.2. The peace process   | 22             |  |  |
| 2.3. Peace and development   | 24             |  |  |
| 2.3.1. Re-identification 2.3.2. Re-legitimisation  | 27<br>28       |  |  |
| 2.3.3. Re-structuring 2.3.4. Re-orientation  | 28<br>28       |  |  |
| 2.4. The mass media, development and peace   | 29             |  |  |
| 2.4.1. The mass media and development 2.4.2. The mass media and peace 2.4.2. The mass media, peace and development | 29<br>30<br>32 |  |  |
| Chapter 3: The Economic, Political and Cultural Environment  | 35             |  |  |
| 3.1. The economic situation  | 36             |  |  |
| 3.1.1. Open-door policy  | 37             |  |  |
| 3.1.2. Gains and losses of the open-door policy  | 39             |  |  |
| 3.1.3. Economic liberalization in 1980s  | 40             |  |  |
| 3.2. The political situation   | 42             |  |  |
| 3.3. The cultural situation  | 47             |  |  |
| Chapter 4: The Egyptian Media Institutions   |                |  |  |
| 4.1. The Egyptian press  | 54             |  |  |
| 4.2. The Egyptian Radio & Television   | 59             |  |  |
| 4.2.1. The Egyptian Radio 4.2.1. The Egyptian Television   | 58<br>60       |  |  |
| 4.3. The Middle East News Agency   | 64             |  |  |
| 4.4. Control and finance of media  | 65             |  |  |

## Chapter 5: Methodology of the Study

| Objectives of                              | of the study   | 68             |
|--|--|----------------|
| Methods of the study 5.1. Content analysis |  | 70             |
|  |  | 71             |
| 5.1.1                                      | l. Definitions of content analysis   | 71             |
| 5.1.2                                      | 2. Advantages of content analysis  | 72             |
| <b>5.1.</b> 3                              | 3. Disadvantages of content analysis   | 73             |
| 5.1.4                                      | 1. Steps in content analysis   | 74             |
|  | 5.1.4.1. Media sample and period of the study  | 74             |
|  | <ul><li>(1) Selection of media</li><li>(2) Period of the study – Time frame</li><li>(3) Unit of analysis</li></ul> | 75<br>77<br>79 |
|  | 5.1.4.2. Defining analytical categories  | 80             |
|  | 5.1.4.3. Constructing the coding schedule  | 81             |
|  | 5.1.4.4 Piloting the coding schedule   | 82             |
|  | 5.1.4.5 Data-preparation and analysis  | 83             |
| 5.2. Intervi                               | ews  | 83             |
| Part two: Re                               | sults of the Study   |                |
| <b>Introduction</b>                        |  | 87             |
| Int.1. Frequ                               | uency of news articles   | 89             |
| Int.2. Frequ                               | uency of coverage's characteristics  | 91             |
| Int.3. Amou                                | unt of coverage  | 93             |
| Int.4. Frequ                               | uency of main and sub-themes   | 94             |
| Int.5. Frequ                               | uency of actors  | 96             |
| Int.6. Frequ                               | uency of sources of coverage   | 97             |
| Int.7. Frequ                               | uency of orientation of coverage   | 99             |
| Chapter 6: Diffe                           | erences between Both Newspapers  |                |
| 6.1. Charac                                | cteristics of coverage   | 104            |
| 6.2. Differe                               | ences in dealing with various dimensions   | 107            |
| 6.3. Nationa                               | al actors in each newspaper  | 113            |

| 6.4. Sources of coverage in each newspapers                  | 115 |
|--|-----|
| 6.5. Stance of coverage in each newspapers                   | 116 |
| 6.6. Difference of coverage over time                        | 120 |
| 6.7. Conclusion  | 122 |
| Chapter 7: Framing of the Economic Dimension                 |     |
| 7.1. Main and sub-economic subjects                          | 126 |
| 7.2. Amount of coverage devoted to economic dimension        | 128 |
| 7.3. Characteristics of coverage                             | 130 |
| 7.4. National actors involved in economic dimension          | 133 |
| 7.5. Sources of coverage devoted to economic dimension       | 136 |
| 7.6. Coverage of economic dimension over time                | 137 |
| 7.7. Stance of coverage devoted to economic dimension        | 142 |
| 7.8. Conclusion  | 144 |
| Chapter 8: Framing of the Political Dimension                |     |
| 8.1. Main and sub-economic subjects                          | 148 |
| 8.2. Amount of coverage devoted to political dimension       | 150 |
| 8.3. Characteristics of coverage                             | 151 |
| 8.4. National actors involved in political dimension         | 155 |
| 8.5. Sources of coverage devoted to political dimension      | 157 |
| 8.6. Coverage of economic dimension over time                | 159 |
| 8.7. Stance of coverage devoted to political dimension       | 163 |
| 8.8. Conclusion  | 170 |
| Chapter 9: Framing of the Socio/Cultural Dimension           |     |
| 9.1. Main and sub-economic subjects                          | 175 |
| 9.2. Amount of coverage devoted to socio/cultural dimension  | 178 |
| 9.3. Characteristics of coverage                             | 181 |
| 9.4. National actors involved in socio/cultural dimension    | 188 |
| 9.5. Sources of coverage devoted to socio/cultural dimension | 191 |
| 9.6. Coverage of economic dimension over time                | 195 |
| 9.7. Stance of coverage devoted to socio/cultural dimension  | 201 |
| 9.8. Conclusion  | 205 |

| Chapter 10: How Journalists Consider the Egyptian Press Situation     |            |  |
|---|------------|--|
| 10.1. The relation between the press and government                   | 210        |  |
| 10.2. The press and development                                       | 217        |  |
| 10.3. Restrictions facing journalists and press                       | 220        |  |
| 10.4. Conclusion  | 223        |  |
| Chapter 11: Main Conclusion and Future Perspective                    |            |  |
| 11.1. Main conclusion in terms of the study's objectives              | 225        |  |
| 11.1.1. Difference between the selected newspapers                    | 225        |  |
| 11.1.2. The economic dimension  | 226<br>228 |  |
| 11.1.2. The political dimension 11.1.3. The social/cultural dimension | 228<br>229 |  |
| 11.2. Main conclusion in terms of theoretical framework               | 230        |  |
| 11.2.1. The political economy approach                                | 230        |  |
| 11.2.2. The construction of meaning approach                          | 232        |  |
| 11.3. Future perspective  | 234        |  |
| Appendices of the study   | 237        |  |
| Appendix A: Analytical categories                                     | 238        |  |
| Appendix B: Coding schedule   | 241        |  |
| Appendix C: Appendices of chapter 6                                   | 248        |  |
| Appendix D: Appendices of chapter 7                                   | 249        |  |
| Appendix E: Appendices of chapter 8                                   | 252        |  |
| Appendix F: Appendices of chapter 9                                   | 258        |  |
| Bibliography  | 268        |  |

### PART ONE

Theoretical Framework, Background, and Methodology

#### **Chapter One**

#### Theoretical Framework of The Study

The links between the mass media and society have been approached in several different ways. The mass media are both a product and also a reflection of the history of their own society. Despite the similarities of mass media institutions across societies, the media are by origin, practice and convention national institutions which respond to domestic, political and social pressures and to the expectations of their audiences. They reflect, express and sometimes actively serve the national interest as determined by other more powerful actors and institutions (McQuail, 1994).

Since the mass media are considered to be institutions having effective relationships with other institutions in a given society, studying this relationship constitutes a significant aspect in the field of mass communication. In identifying studies in the field, researchers have taken different departure points of view. Some have concentrated on historical developments. Others have dealt with mass communication research as various traditions each captured the attention of specific scholars. Many researchers have differentiated between two schools: the American and European, or social psychology and sociology. In this respect, this chapter discusses briefly developments in media research in the last few decades and deals with a suitable theoretical framework for the present study including the political economy and the construction of meaning approach (Halloran, 1998).

Halloran (1981) described research in mass communications as unbalanced and inadequate. He pointed out that we know far more about some parts of the world than others. We know far more about some aspects of the communication process than about others; and we have been presented with more analyses and interpretations from certain value positions than from others. The mass communication research field is dominated by research from western, industrialized nations. In this respect, as Halloran (1981) argued, two main domains may be identified; the American and the European. The first can be described as 'conventional research' and refers to research having a mainly value-free positivistic, empiricist, behaviouristic, psychological emphasis. In this domain, research was carried out with a view to improving the effectiveness of the media and improving methods to achieve specific goals rather than on refining concepts, developing theories, or achieving social change. In such an approach, which is centred on the media

rather than on society, theory was neglected and the media were not seen in relation to other institutions. Therefore, mass communication research in the US was more closely linked to social psychology and to professional and commercial interests than to sociology.

Halloran (Ibid) summarized the main characteristics of the European thought, or the so-called 'critical approach'. First and foremost, it deals with communication as a social process; second, it studies media institutions not in isolation but with, and in terms of, other institutions, and within the wider social context; and third, it conceptualises research in terms of structure, organization, professionalization, socialization, participation, and so on. This approach emphasises the importance of studying all aspects of the communication process and includes factors that affect what is produced (such as historical, economic, political, organizational, technological, professional and personal factors), and factors that influence how what is produced is used. In the past the emphasis in research was on use, reaction, effect, influence, not on relationships involving ownership, control, structure, organization and production.

Apart from these two different schools of studying mass communication, Bennett (1982) pointed out that media researchers distinguish among four traditions of media theory: the mass society tradition; the liberal-pluralist schools; the Frankfurt schools; and the neo-Marxist approach. The following section discusses briefly these four traditions.

The *mass society* tradition focuses on culture and on conditions, which prepare the way for the production and mass distribution of cultural commodities. Primary among these conditions are the process of industrialization and consequent urbanization, and the distribution to the traditional extended family structure and community ways of life found on their authentic and historically rooted cultures. This tradition has viewed the development of the media pessimistically as constituting a threat to either the integrity of elite cultural values or the viability of the political institutions of democracy, or both (Boyd-Barrett, 1995a; Bennett, 1982)

Liberal-pluralist schools of thought consider the media function as the "fourth estate" in which journalism acts as an independence watchdog of liberal freedom in the parliamentary democracy, its independence guaranteed constitutionally. The media play an important part in the democratic process in constituting a source of information that is independent of government. They are also viewed as adding to the series of

countervailing sources of power, which, in liberal democracies, are said to prevent a disproportionate degree of power from being concentrated in any one section of the population or organ of government (Golding & Elliott, 1979; Bennett, 1982). Liberals consider press freedom as a right exercised on behalf of society by publishers who take the public interest into consideration and whose actions are regulated by market processes. These processes ensure that the press is free, diverse, and representative (Curran & Seaton, 1997).

The *critical theory* of the Frankfurt school is an instance of an attempt to incorporate a mass society critique and put it to use from within a Marxist framework (Bennett, 1982). This school criticizes mass society, liberal theory, and a limited effect tradition emerging from quantitative research in the United States during the 1960s. Curran & Seaton (1997) clarified that the Frankfurt School writers shared with many other European social and literary critics a revulsion against American culture. Much of the media work of writers like Marcuse and Adorno was based on a rejection of that which was modern, mass and American. According to Curran et al (1982), critical theory argued that the mass media play a strategic role in reinforcing dominant social norms and values that legitimize the social system.

The attempt to develop a Marxist approach (neo-Marxist) to the media is part of a more general theory of ideology concerned with the role played by ideological institutions in the process whereby existing relationships of class domination are reproduced and perpetuated or, on the contrary, challenged and overthrown (Bennett, 1982). This approach (based on Marxist theories of ideology, theories about the strategic circulation of forms of 'common sense' which work to the benefit of dominant economic groups) had a formative effect on European cultural studies in the 1970s and 1980s. Among the pioneer scholars in this approach were L. Althusser and Stuart Hall. Neo-Marxists concentrate more on ideas than on material structures and emphasizes the ideological effect of media in the interest of a ruling class, and in legitimizing the dominance of capitalism and the subordination of the working class (McQuail, 1994, Corner, 2000).

Shoemaker and Reese (1991) argued that domains of mass communication research could be discussed through five general groups of variables that have been used in mass communication research. These variables are characteristics of media content, media effects on the audience, audience use and evaluation of media content, characteristics of audience and its environment, and media organizations.

The question of the power of the mass media is central in media research. In the early days of communication studies during 1920s and 1930s, the mass media were viewed as a major power and had an enormous impact on ideas, values and behaviours. A reassessment of the impact of the mass media during the late 1940s, 1950s and 1960s gave rise to a new academic orthodoxy that the mass media have only a very limited influence (Curran et al, 1982). According to Klapper (1960), the new orientation can perhaps be described as a shift away from the concept of a "hypodermic effect" toward an approach, which might be called "situational" or "functional". It is a shift away from the tendency to regard mass communication as a necessary and sufficient cause of effects towards a view that the media function among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influences.

Scholars in the Marxist and neo-Marxist critical tradition exercised a growing influence on mass media research during 1970s and attacked the limited model of media influence. The initial response of the critical tradition was to dismiss out-of-hand empirical communication research as being uniformly uninteresting. They argued that the classical empirical studies did not demonstrate that the mass media had very little effect. On the contrary, they revealed the central role of the media in consolidating the values and attitudes of audiences (Curran et al, 1982). The renewal of media research, according to McQuail (1994), was marked by a shift of attention towards long-term change, cognition rather than attitude and affect, intervening variables of context, disposition and motivation, and collective phenomena such as climates of opinion, structures of belief, ideologies, cultural patterns and institutional forms of media.

Aside from the traditional view of the effect of the media which has had a great deal of debate in mass communication research about the kinds and levels of effect the media have, many researchers emphasize the cultural and social environment in which the mass media work and the way content is constructed. McQuail (1994) focuses on what is called the alternative perspective, which emerges from a different view of society and of the media. Its main points are to engage critically with the political and economic activities of the media; to better understand the language of the media and the ways of its culture; to discover how groups differently situated socially and culturally construct meaning; and to explore the diverse meanings of the practices of using mass media. The interaction and engagement between media experience and social cultural experiences are central to all these points.

Thompson (1988) analyses the study of mass communication as a cultural phenomenon, in which symbolic forms are produced, transmitted and received. In this respect, he distinguishes between three main aspects of mass communication. The first is the process of production and diffusion of mass communication material, which occurs within specific social-historical circumstances and, generally, involves particular institutional arrangements. The second aspect is the construction of the media message. The material transmitted by mass communication is a product which is structured in various ways and mainly displays an articulated structure. The third aspect is the reception and appropriation of the media's messages. These messages are received within a social and cultural context by individuals who employ the resources available to them in their everyday lives.

Concerning the studying of media organizations, Blumler and Gurevitch (1986) argued that some communication scholars have operated within the economic power domain, examining, for example, how ownership structures, dependence on capitalist markets and competition for advertising and audience, may constrain the production of media content. Others have operated within the political power domain tracing variations of media roles to their different relationships with the state apparatus, government institutions and the political parties. Various individual case studies also focused on media relationships with members of specific pressure groups, such as trade unions and women's movements.

Gallagher (1982) points out that media organization and occupations lie at the heart of any study of mass communication, for they affect the processes through which the output of the media comes into being. The assumption that media messages and images constitute a powerful, social, cultural and political force dominates both public debate and perspectives of research in the field of mass communication, whether expressed in terms of a search for "measurable effects" or formulated as a more macro-analysis of "agenda-setting" or a "reality-defining" function of the media. This assumption underlines particularly all questions concerned with the link between media output and social consciousness.

The most visible and accessible evidence, according to McQuail (1994), of how mass communication works is the vast variation of messages and meanings which are continuously being transmitted and received from all kinds of different media. Shoemaker and Reese (1991) add that the media content takes elements of culture,

magnifies them, frames them and feeds them back to the audience. The media impose their own logic in creating a symbolic environment.

The above discussion illustrates that studying the mass media as an institution in relationship with other institutions in a society and studying media content and how it is constructed is a central domain in mass communication research. It relates to the social, political and institutional context which includes, as Thompson (1988) pointed out, the institutional organization of producers and transmission networks; patterns of ownership and control; the relationship between media institutions and state organizations responsible for monitoring outputs; the routine and practical procedures of media workers; the techniques and technologies employed in production and transmission; and the aims of producers and programmers and their expectations of audience response.

As the present study aims at investigating how the Egyptian press presented and portrayed the peace process between Egypt and Israel within the social context, it can be argued that it is located in that domain. Many aspects are to be discussed in the study: the relationship between the mass media institutions and the state in Egypt and the extent to which this relationship influences media content; the economic, political and cultural environment in which the media work: the content of the Egyptian press concerning the peace process and the way in which this content was constructed in terms of the above economic, political and cultural context. In this respect, and in terms of the main aim of the study, two main approaches will be discussed and adopted: the political economy approach and the construction of meaning approach.

#### **I-1- The Political Economy Approach**

Mosco (1996) defines political economy as the study of the social relationships, particularly the power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution and consumption of resources, including communication resources. He points out that there are three features of political economy: it analyses the study of social change and historical transformation; it focuses on examining the social whole of social relations that constitute the economic, political, social and cultural field; and it is also interested in social values and moral principles. Golding and Murdock (2000) defined what they called 'critical' political economy which always goes beyond simulated action to show how particular micro-contexts are shaped by general economic dynamics and the wider

structures they sustain. It is especially interested in the ways that communicative activity is structured by the unequal distribution of material and symbolic resources.

The term political economy in media research, according to Boyd-Barrett (1995b, 186) also has a broadly 'critical' significance, often associated with macro-questions of media ownership and control, factors that bring together media industries with other industries, and with political economic and social elites. It commonly looks at the processes of consolidation, diversification, commercialisation, internationalisation, the working of the profit motive in the hunt for audiences and/or advertising, and its consequences for media practices and content.

Political economy was one response to the prevailing directions of earlier media effect studies, which concentrated on the psychological effects of the media on individual level. Political economy theorists argued that the significance of the media went much further than the question of individual effects, uses and gratifications. It was also concerned with the relationship of the media to other social institutions, to the economy, and to the formation of social ideology. In this respect, many researchers argued that the strength of Marxism has been to suggest there is indeed a link between questions of ownership and the cultural content of media production (Stevenson 1995; Boyd-Barrett, 1995b).

Mosco (1996) argued that there are numerous thematic interests that link political economists within and across regions. These include the business of communication, the role of the state, the connections between the corporate and state sectors, and the linkages between the political economy of communication and the wider global and national political economies. These concerns are often framed in the language of power, for some as institutional power, for others as class power. As for mass communication, the tendency concentrates on how communication is socially constructed, on the social forces that contribute to the formation of channels of communication, and on the range of messages transmitted through these channels.

Political economy, according to Curran et al. (1982), questions the power of the media by analysing their structures of ownership and control. Adopting a fundamentalist-Marxist approach, studies conducted in this vein have been based on the assumption that the dynamics of the "culture-producing industries" can be understood primarily in terms of their economic determination. Thus, the content of the media and the meanings

carried by their messages are, according to this view, primarily determined by the economic base of the organizations in which they are produced.

In a study of control mechanisms of national news making in four countries [United States, Britain, Canada and Mexico], Schulman (1990) concludes that the national news systems, for all their diversity and complexity, share two salient characteristics: [a] their economic structures are built on highly concentrated patterns of ownerships, and [b] these patterns of ownership and the journalists they employ have close personal and professional relationships with the political elite of their respective nations. The interaction of these two factors has created national news production processes intent on safeguarding privilege and status. Golding and Murdock (2000) argue that the history of the communication systems is not only an economic history, but also a political history of their centrality to the exercise of full citizenship conditions that allow people to become full members of society at every level. Media systems would contribute to these conditions in two ways. First, they would provide people with access to information and advice that would enable them to be active participants in society. Second, they would provide the broadest possible range of information, interpretation and debate on areas that involve political choices.

McQuail (1994) argues that the relevance of the political economy approach has been greatly increased by several prominent trends in media business and technology. There has been a growth in media concentration worldwide, with more and more power of ownership being concentrated in fewer hands. There has been a growing global "information economy", involving an increasing convergence between broadcasting and telecommunications. There has been a decline in the public sector of mass media and indirect control of telecommunications under the banner of "deregulation", "privatisation" or "liberalization". The essential propositions of the political economy approach have not changed since earlier times, but the scope for application is much wider. Mosco (1996) emphasizes the same idea as McQuail and adds that new themes have emerged: the connections between production, discourse and reception; the relationship of class power to gender and race; the significance of structural change within and across the communication industries; and the relationship between private, state and public communication.

Researchers, therefore, have considered the political conditions as a central point in political economy studies. There is an agreement among researchers (Curran et al. 1982;

Murdock & Golding 1977; Mosco 1996; Shoemaker & Reese 1991) that the examination of the relationship between the media and their institutional structures and interests in their environment is the domain of the political economy approach. This approach focuses on the relationship between media institutions and the political and economic institutions of society. Media organizations exist in a symbolic relationship with their environment, drawing on it for the raw material of their contents. The generation and shaping of these materials through interaction between media professionals and their sources of information, inspiration and support outside their own institutions take place at the interface between the media and these institutions.

Concerning the relationship between the media and political institutions, Blumler and Gurevitch (1982) determine some constraints subordinating the media to political institutions: legal constraints which include all those rules and regulations defining the rights and obligations of media institutions that are ultimately enforceable by the executive and judicial arms of the state; normative constraints which refer to expectations of political and public by media organizations, for which they may be held socially accountable without falling under the direct control of either state or party machinery; structural constraints, which concern the degree to which formal or semi-formal linkages may be forged between media institutions and political bodies; and economic constraints, which apply not only to commercial media organizations, but also to non-commercial media institutions. Commercial media organizations meet the needs of advertisers and produce audience-maximizing products, while those media institutions whose revenues are controlled by the dominant political institutions or by the state gravitate towards the heartland of the prevailing consensus.

The discussion of the political economy approach in the United States, as Herman (1990) clarifies, began with Dallas Smythe and Herbert Schiller. The study of mass media in the US, according to this approach, is determined by communication gatekeepers who are not media professionals so much as large profit-marketing organizations with close ties to government and business. The central goal of the political economy tradition in the US is to understand the relationship of government or the state with the communications business. The sustained development of a political economy approach in Europe, according to Mosco (1996), emerged with the appearance between 1974 and 1982 of a set of theoretical and programmatic pieces that contributed substantially to placing the field on Europe. There are numerous parallels in themes and methods between US and

European political economic research. Their differences, though important, are largely a matter of emphasis, not points of fundamental departure.

Golding and Murdock (2000) point out that three areas of analysis can be identified in the political economy of communication: the production of meaning as the exercise of power; the political economy of text; and the political economy of cultural consumption. As the present study is concerned with an examination of how the Egyptian press presented the peace process in terms of political, economic and cultural situations, it is more related to the first two areas of analysis. The production of meaning as an exercise of power, as Golding and Murdock (Ibid) illustrated, includes two key issues. The first is pattern of ownership of media institutions and the consequences of this pattern for control over their activities. The second is the relationship between state regulation and the media institutions.

The political economy, according to Boyd-Barrett (1995b), has identified the link between state and public media and the opportunities for indirect state intervention in the control and operation of public media. Golding and Murdock (2000) argue that the state is not only a regulator of communications institutions. It is itself a communicator of enormous power. How this power is exercised is of major interest to a political economy of culture. Inevitably, governments are anxious to promote their own views of the development of policy, and to ensure that legislative initiatives are properly understood and supported. Curran (1990) clarified the above point. He pointed out that the news media are shaped more by the patterns of thought and power relationships outside the media to which journalists respond than by direct controls exerted within media organizations. Altscull (1995) went further and concluded that the news media are agents of those who exercise political and economic power and that the content of the media always reflect the interests of those who finance them.

After the above discussion about the political economy approach which focuses on the economic, political and structural environment of mass media institutions and their relationship with other institutions in society, it is important to identify how this approach will be applied in this study. Two main points will be adopted from the political economy approach: the relationship between media institutions and political institutions, and the extent to which this relationship influenced media content.

The level of political control, according to Wolfsfeld (1997), refers to the extent of the power by which the authorities have officially regulated news media. In the non-democratic world such control is quite blatant. The government usually own a good part of the broadcasting systems and newspaper editors understand what kinds of stories can be in trouble. Professional criteria such as news values become less important or secondary factors in identifying what is eligible to screen or publish.

The Egyptian media as a whole and broadcasting in particular are not only in state ownership, but also state operated. Merrill (1988) conducted a study about the inclination of national governments to control the press and the relationship between them and the mass media in fifty-eight countries around the world. Merrill grouped countries into geographic regions and ranked them according to their inclination to control the press as follows: the Middle East, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, Western Europe and North America. Dabbous (1994) points out that the Egyptian media in general, and the press in particular, have undoubtedly had a long history of struggling to maintain its power and influence on policy-making. Although, according to the existing rules, political parties as well as religions and private persons are free to publish newspapers in Egypt, the press still faces major problems such as state ownership or control of a large number of the national newspapers, including the broadcast media. There is also the problem of different interpretations of the laws and regulations concerning the media (more details about the Egyptian media will be discussed in chapters four and ten).

In this respect, the political economy approach will be used to discuss how the Egyptian media presented the developmental dimensions of the peace process to discuss their relationship with government though a number of interviews with a sample of Egyptian journalists, and the extent to which this relationship influenced content in the media regarding the peace process in terms of studying one national newspaper (owned by the government) and one opposition newspaper (owned by an opposition party).

#### **I-2- The Construction of Meaning Approach**

According to Golding and Murdock (2000), the construction of meaning approach is centred on studying communications from within a cultural studies perspective. DeFleur & Rokeach (1989) pointed out that the construction of meaning approach is closely linked to the symbolic interactions paradigm. Such a construction approach attributes more power to the media than does the selective influence theory, although that power is

said to be long range and indirect. Shoemaker and Reese (1991) stated that one of the most obvious ways media content structures a symbolic environment is simply by giving greater attention (in the form of more time or space, greater prominence, and so on) to certain events, people, groups, and places than to others.

Some researchers concentrate on two main aspects of this approach: the first is related to the messages and meanings and how they are constructed. The second aspect concerns audiences and how they interpret these meanings. The first, and by far the largest, as Golding and Murdock (2000), pointed out, concentrates on the analysis of cultural texts, including those produced by the media industry. Within this context, according to McQuail (1994), the media construct social formations and history itself by framing images or reality in predictable and patterned ways. The second aspect concerns the way that audience members interpret media content and construct their own view of a social reality lifestyle and their place in it; in other words, how the audience members make sense out of what the mass media present (Ryan, 1991)

Negrine (1996) concentrated on the second aspect of the construction approach, which addresses how audiences come to understand, and make interpretations of, political communication. In this respect, he summarized four features of studies carried out according to that approach: first, studies which focus on individuals (children, teenagers) rather than collectivists. They concentrate on what these individuals think and how they structure their ideas, feelings and beliefs about political issues. Accordingly, the aim of this approach is to find out what the individuals think and how they think about issues in the public domain; second, that features which adopt the construction of meaning approach and can be linked to the 'cognitive revolution' of the 1960s where television viewers were seen as having an active role in constructing meaning from television through processing, interpreting and evaluating what they watched; third, features in which individuals come to make sense of what has been discussed in methodologies such as in-depth interviews and focus groups; fourth, features where individuals depend on frames to convey, interpret and evaluate information.

As the second aspect of the construction of meaning approach, which is related to interpretations of content by audience members, is beyond scope of this study, discussion will concentrate on the first aspect, how the media construct the meaning. This leads us to such issues as the framing of media content, the construction of social reality, and

factors that influence selection of media frames. The following section deals with these issues.

Many researchers argue that the media frame is concerned with the construction of social reality. It makes the world beyond the direct experience of people look natural. In everyday life people frame reality in order to negotiate it, comprehend it, and choose relevant repertoires of cognition and action (Wolfsfeld, 1993, Gitlin, 1980). Gitlin (1980) defined the frame from the journalist's point of view. He pointed out that 'media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation and presentation, of selection and of emphasis, whether verbal or visual' (p. 7). This definition illustrates the importance of specific rules on which journalists rely to construct meanings.

Gamson (1992) investigates what he called the 'collective media frame'. He explored how issues are framed in the mass media and how people talk about them. The collective media frame has three main components: injustice, which requires a consciousness of motivated actors who can portray harm and suffering; agency, which relates to ability of actors to change conditions in a collective action; and identity, which refers to 'we' can change as opposed to 'they' may be changed. Gamson focuses on four issues: affirmative action, nuclear power, troubled industry, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He concluded that the social context not only influences the media's construction of meaning but also affects people's interpretations of that meaning.

Cohen & Wolfsfeld (1993) edited a volume containing eleven studies about how the media framed the Palestinian uprising (Intifada), which took place in the late 1980s. In the introduction of their analytical framework, Cohen & Wolfsfeld adopted the classic question on communication research introduced by Lasswell in 1957: who interacts with whom, within what context, through what channel and with what outcomes. The first issue relating to 'who interacts' includes some possible interactions: between Palestinians and Israelis; between both Palestinians and Israelis on one hand and the news media on the other; and between the news media and outside audiences in the world. The second issue, which relates to 'about what' is the most important because it refers directly to media content and frames. Frames provide meaning, and the struggle over media frames is central to every political conflict.

The social and political contexts in which interactions between who can influence the media, and in which meanings are constructed, has an important effect not only on these

interactions but also on their outcomes. The frames which the influencing actors or the antagonists develop about conflicts include a range of definitions where all attempt to answer the question of 'what is going on'. The aim is to examine the competing frames offered by antagonists, in order to understand better the essence of the conflict.

Gamson and Modigliani (1989) used the constructionist approach in a study concerning nuclear power by analysing the discourse on nuclear power in four news media. They maintain that media discourse and public opinion are two parallel systems for constructing meaning. Media discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct meaning, and public opinion is part of the process by which journalists and other cultural entrepreneurs develop and crystallize meaning in public discourse.

The concept of media frames, according to Wolfsfeld (1997), is best understood within the context of the social construction approach to the news media. Does the meaning of the mass media's content reflect reality? In dealing with this question, communication researchers agree that the meanings of the mass media's messages reflect the interests of their owners more than objective reality. DeFleur and Rokeach (1989) pointed out that the mass media provide a constant flow of information that can shape meanings. Those who own or control the economic means of production would also be strongly motivated to control the nature and dissemination of messages as a means of preserving their interests and maintaining their positions of dominance. However, Wolfsfeld (1993) argues that, despite the large number of cultural, ideological, and professional filters through which a frame must pass, it reflects a portion of reality.

According to Davis (1990, cited in Wolfsfeld, 1997), the departure point of the social construction of reality approach assumes that we live in a fundamentally ambiguous social world, a world in which persons, objects and actions have no essential meaning. Consequently meaning may be created, or imposed, on action, events, or things by human action at specific places and time. The meaning imposed is limited by, and relevant to, the context in which the meaning is created. Moreover, because action in situations is inevitably structured by groups who dominate those situations, those groups enjoy an inherent advantage in determining the meaning derived from that. Thus the meaning constructed by the media is influenced by both external actors (as ownership) and internal ones (as professional considerations).

Gamson et al (1992) pointed out that the mass media generate images around the world and use them to construct meaning about political and social issues. This meaning is not neutral, but reflects the power and point of view of the political and economic elites who operate and focus it. And the special genius of this system is to make the whole process seem so normal and natural that the very art of social construction is invisible. As external factors represented by political and economic factors were discussed earlier when the political economy approach was dealt with, the following section explores internal professional factors that influence the construction of media meaning.

Many studies in the area of cultural production and news making (e.g. Epstein, 1973; Golding & Elliott, 1979; and Fishman, 1980) concluded that news production is shaped by organizational considerations. It is also influenced by the values and ideology of the journalists or what Wolfsfeld (1997) called 'professional culture. The professional culture of the news media refers to the system of values, norms, beliefs and practices held in common by journalists who use certain routine frames for covering political conflicts based on their definition of what makes a good news story.

Researchers consider news values as the central point in studying news production and the construction of meaning (Negrine, 1994). Golding and Elliott (1979) stated that news values might be used in two ways; first, as determinants of what is newsworthy. Journalists rely on news values to select from the material available to them; second, as guidelines for the presentation of a news story, determining what to focus on and what to ignore, and suggesting priority in the preparation of the items for presentation to the audience. News values derive from assumptions or judgements about three things: the audiences and what is important for them; accessibility (prominence and ease to capture); and the extent to which an item fits into production routine and organization techniques. In this respect journalists try to agree on what are the minimum criteria of news values. Some of the more important are drama, visual attractiveness, importance, size, proximity, negativity, recency, elite, and personalities (Golding & Elliott, 1979; Galtung & Ruge, 1965). More about these criteria will be discussed in chapter ten.

The above discussion illustrates that the construction of meaning approach includes two main aspects. The first relates to how the mass media construct meanings. Media content constructs a symbolic environment about events, persons, policies, etc., by framing them, magnifying them and feeding them back to the people (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). The second aspect relates to the audience and how it interprets the constructed meaning.

People construct their own views about events, persons or policies. These may or may not be similar to those framed and magnified in the media content (Ibid).

The first aspect (how the mass media construct meanings) is the main scope of the construction of meaning approach in the present study. Furthermore, and to be more specific, not all aspects of the construction of meaning will be studied. For example, studying the production of news in the mass media is beyond the scope of this study. How, then, will the construction of meaning be applied? The simple and direct answer is that this approach is used to explore how the Egyptian press framed the peace process, and how the meaning related to this process was constructed in terms of social context.

Concerning the peace process, a number of public opinion surveys made it clear that the attitudes of Egyptians had changed toward the peace process with Israel. In 1974 as many as 55 percent of one Egyptian sample solidly supported the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) strategy of continuing the struggle until a secular democratic state could be created in Palestine; and 43 percent opted for a solution along the lines of Security Council Resolution 242. By 1978 only 18 percent of a similar Egyptian sample still supported the PLO strategy, while as many as 77 percent supported President Sadat's peace initiatives and the peace process with Israel (Ibrahim, 1980). These results mean that the symbolic environment of the peace process had changed.

This also means that the Egyptian media played an important role in changing that symbolic environment in favour of an accepted consolidation with Israel after more than three decades of conflict. It is not being argued that the Egyptian media had a direct effect on Egyptian attitudes regarding the peace process since that direct effect has been criticized and revisited. The new explanation here is how this effect is mediated by the social context (the economic, political, and cultural situation) in Egypt. This is what the study explores in chapters seven to nine. It is important to give a background about the relationship between the mass media and the various developments in the economic, political and cultural environment in Egypt during the peace process with Israel.

Accordingly, the thesis includes two parts plus the appendices and references. <u>Part one</u> includes, in addition to this chapter, four chapters. <u>Chapter two</u> discusses the relationship between mass media development and peace; <u>chapter three</u> explores the political, economic and social environment in Egypt; <u>chapter four</u> discusses the Egyptian mass media institutions; <u>chapter five</u> deals with the methodology of the study. <u>Part two</u>

includes six chapters with an introduction. Chapter six compares the differences between a national and an opposition newspaper in framing the developmental dimensions of the peace process; chapter seven discusses the economic dimension; chapter eight deals with the political dimension; chapter nine discusses the social/cultural dimension; chapter ten presents results of the interviews with the Egyptian journalists; and chapter eleven presents the main conclusion and tries to draw future perspectives.

#### Chapter two

# <u>Development, The Peace Process</u> And The Mass Media

The aim of this study is to investigate the developmental dimensions of the peace process as reflected in the Egyptian mass media. This chapter discusses the following points: the development, the peace process, and the relationship between the mass media, the development and the peace process.

#### 2.1 Development

In the past four decades the communication literature discussed three principal zones: (a) modernization, (b) dependency dissociation, and (c) multiplicity or another development. The first, prevalent from the end of the world war II to the mid-1960s, pictured "traditional" societies to which the dream world of the west (technology-based democracy and accompanying culture) would be transplanted. Voices of the New International Economic Order began to be vaguely heard towards the late 1960s and were fully articulated during the 1970s. They came under the rubric of a dependency paradigm. Following this, the 1980s witnessed the emerging multiplicity (another development) pattern. Its focus was on grassroots movements for decentralization and democratization (Eapen, 1994).

Researchers differentiated between two paradigms of development: the first one was dominant in the late 1950s and 1960s but by the end of 1970s a new one had emerged. According to Rogers (1976b), the dominant paradigm ruled intellectual definitions and discussions of development and guided national development programs through the late 1960s. This paradigm grew out of certain historical events such as the industrial revolution in Europe and the United States; the colonial experience in Latin America, Africa and Asia; the quantitative empiricism of North American social science; and capitalistic economic-political philosophy.

The old paradigm represents the model proposed in the 1950s and 1960s, which was designed to solve the social and economic problems in the developing countries by bringing in Western economic and political theories and practices. Schramm (1979) pointed this out and showed that the old paradigm of development conceived of industry

as the engine of developing society. The strategy was to save capital and invest it in machines, raw material and training.

The old paradigm also concentrated on quantitative variables such as the rate of growth of outputs. Melkote (1991) argued that the theory of development in this orthodox economic approach was simple. There were two important factors: the productive resources which a society had and the economic institutions to utilize and guide the use of these resources. The definitions of development in the sixties reflected this quantitative approach. Rogers (1969, p.72) defined development as "a type of social change in which new ideas are introduced into a social system in order to produce higher per-capita incomes and levels of living through better production methods and improved social organization".

According to Melkote (1991), this paradigm started to break down in the late sixties and early seventies. The development of the Third World notions simply did not fit the assumptions implicit in the paradigm. At its very best the paradigm worked better as a description of what had happened in West Europe and North America than as a predictor for the Third World. Schramm (1979) emphasized this point and added that Europe and North America took 300 years to progress from agricultural to industrial civilizations. Asia, Africa and Latin America had thought of doing it in twenty-five to fifty years.

With the failure of the old paradigm, other approaches to development emerged. Rogers (1976b) clarified that several world events in combination with the intellectual critiques led to a new approach to development. First, the ecological disgust with environmental pollution in the developed nations questioned whether such approaches offered an ideal platform for development. Second, the world oil crisis demonstrated that certain developing countries could make their own rules for the international game and produced some suddenly rich developing nations. Third, the sudden opening of international relations with China allowed the rest of the world to learn details of her pathway to development and the discouraging realization that development was going very well in the developing countries that had closely followed the old paradigm.

The concept of development in the seventies, according to Rogers (Ibid), became more qualitative. It had been expanded and made much more flexible while, at the same time,

becoming more humanitarian in its implications. Melkote (1991) states that researchers stressed: (1) equity in distribution of information and other benefits of development; (2) active participation of people at the grassroots; (3) independence of local communities to tailor development projects to their own objective; (4) integration of the old and new ideas, the traditional and modern system constitute a unique blend suited to the needs of a particular community. In other words communities are expected to set their own priorities and standards which may be unique to their own situations. Therefore, greater emphasis is given to the basic needs of people and the participation of beneficiaries in development programs set up for their benefit.

There can be no uniform development path applicable to all countries, and there can be no final definition of what development is. Only indications of what development should imply. The notion of development contains a universal dimension linked to the material and non-material needs of man. Development, then, may be said to imply the satisfaction of these needs for individuals and groups in a way that is unharmful to other people and to nature. This satisfaction requires a democratic structure of speech and organization and respects all human rights (Harris 1997, Sorensen 1985).

Four groups of needs have been identified: survival (as opposed to destruction); welfare (material needs); freedom/rights (as opposed to repression); and identity (as opposed to alienation). The notion of security may be said to involve the defence of survival, welfare, freedom, and identity: in other words, the precondition for the satisfaction of material and non-material needs. In this way peace, like development, becomes a permanent social process aiming at developing security and securing development for the individual and for all human beings (Sorensen, 1985).

In the light of dramatic developments in the 1980s, (the rise of the newly industrializing countries, the debt crises in some and revolutionary upheavals in others) the importance of cultural and structural factors has become better known and appreciated. The more recent perspective attempts to analyze the influence of both internal and external forces in the developmental process while emphasizing cultural and historical specificity. In the meantime, development indicators have broadened in scope to include economic as well as social and cultural [communication] variables (Tehranian, 1990).

The eighties have witnessed an increasing recognition within national governments, multinational agencies and non-governmental organizations of the importance of the social aspects of development. Areas of greater interest have been the issue of participation of intended beneficiaries in the planning and implementation of projects, the inclusion of social analysis into development planning and the consideration of gender issues in development project planning and policies (Melkote, 1991).

It can be seen that development as a process has several dimensions: economic (growth, GNP); political (political participation, participatory decision making, political access); social (access to material resources like good health, education, housing and food); and cultural (right to communicate, co-equal basis of communication, human rights, personal self-respect).

In the third world, where the process of development has taken place piecemeal and unevenly, the social system is often torn between a modernizing elite and a traditionalist mass. Frequently, the two sectors of the population live in separate quarters, sometimes as if in separate countries and centuries. What goes under the rubric of development often includes the process of growth in physical output, and increasing dualism and alienation. In the meantime, the increasing level of division and alienation of labor in the economic sphere, the bureaucratization and professionalization of power and authority in the political sphere, the functionalization and atomization of human relations in the social sphere, and the secularization and homogenization in the cultural sphere undermine the general sense of national and community solidarity (Tehranian 1990).

#### 2.2 The peace process

Galtung (1992) defines peace as a process aimed at the reduction of human violence to human beings and to nature by peaceful means. One important source of violence is unresolved conflict. Peace scholars, according to Tehranian (1992), often make a useful distinction between negative and positive peace. Negative peace is simply the absence of war; positive peace is also viewed as the absence of war, but with the presence of genuine human harmony and cooperation to achieve security and justice in human affairs. The former focuses on the use of force to pursue power; the latter emphasizes the pursuit of peace and justice with peaceful means.

The peace process at its best was a series of negotiations embedded in a large political process that lowered obstacles to agreement and made negotiation possible. Peacemakers set out to change the political environment through specific acts that enabled parties to negotiate alternatives not previously considered negotiable. To make progress, the peacemakers had to build political support for changes in the environment. They had to take concrete steps to erode serious psychological and technical obstacles. Then they had to shape negotiations to consolidate those changes that were achievable at a particular time in the political arena. Experience in the peace process demonstrates that it is more than a negotiation. It is a political process, formal negotiation is essential, but it is not always the most important instrument. Leaders must constantly move back and forth between the political and negotiating arenas; they don't move in linear fashion from politics and pre-negotiation to negotiations (Saunders 1988).

The politics of Arab-Israeli peacemaking include popular demonstrations and parliamentary decisions and intergovernmental confrontation, press leaks and television interviews, dramatic summits and secret talks, gruelling negotiations and triumphant celebrations. The peacemaking effort produced five Arab-Israeli agreements that changed boundaries, redeployed troops and led to an exchange of ambassadors.

According to Saunders (1988), the peace process between Egypt and Israel involved one or more significant acts. President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem, President Jimmy Carter's invitation to Camp David, and President Sadat's and Israeli Prime Minister Begin's acceptance of that invitation were political acts that changed the political environment for the negotiations that followed. When the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty negotiations were foundering five months after Camp David, Carter's trip to the Middle East brought the final pieces of the treaty together partly because, as one key Israeli said, it was unwise to sent the president of the United States home with failure.

In November 1977, President Sadat told his Egyptian parliament that he was prepared to go to the Knesset itself to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel (Ovendale, 1999). He surprised the world by his unexpected decision to visit Jerusalem, which was considered as a breakthrough of the 'psychological wall' with Israelis (Sadat, 1981). That visit was an event that has had prolonged psychological and political repercussions. It was certainly designed to force a change in traditional attitudes, which would allow further

communication between Egypt and Israel to proceed unhampered by the old refusal Arab positions. It wrecked the plans to reconvene the Geneva conference at an early date, on which the Carter administration had set its heart, but it led, in ten months, to the Camp David agreements and the subsequent peace treaty between Egypt and Israel (Waldheim, 1980; Peled, 1979; Baily, 1990).

The two Camp David agreements' framework, which was signed on 17 September 1978 in the White House, was an important advance and led to the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel six months later. Israel agreed to complete the withdrawal from Sinai to the internationally agreed border within a maximum period of three years.

In the event, the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel took six months, not the three months stipulated at Camp David. It was a period of intensive negotiation and short tempers, and of bilateral conversations and trilateral meetings of ministers from the three countries (Egypt, Israel, and United States). Meetings were at or near Blair House in Washington from 12 October, with interruptions, to 12 November 1978, in Brussels (23-24 December 1978), and at Camp David (21-22 February 1979). It includes also numerous ministerial visits to and from Middle East, and to the Middle East by Carter and Vance from 7 to 13 March 1979 (Baily, 1990).

#### 2.3 Peace and development

In December 1977, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a study of the relationship between disarmament and development. This study based upon a large number of specialized investigations. These investigations suggest that the world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigor or move consciously within a balanced social and economic development to a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both. It must be acknowledged that the arms race and development are in a competitive relationship, particularly in terms of resources, but also in the vital dimension of attitudes and perceptions. The main conclusion of the report is that an effective relationship between disarmament and development can, and must, be established (Hettne, 1983).

The economic impact of military expenditure on the development process is much debated. It is sometimes asserted that military expenditure in underdeveloped countries

has a positive development effect and, for obvious reasons, this has raised an ongoing controversy both as regards the data problem involved and the normative question of what is meant by development in this context. On the whole this thesis now seems to be refuted. Military expenditure is considered harmful to development (Ibid)

The peace process in the Middle East has a developmental dimension on both national and international levels. Quandt (1986) stated that by 1977 the price of oil had stabilized somewhat. But the widespread belief was that further turmoil in the Middle East could renew the price spiral. Stable oil prices required Middle East stability and that meant progress toward defusing the explosive Arab-Israel conflict. High on Carter's domestic agenda was the development of a comprehensive energy policy, and his concern to keep the price of petrol cheep for US citizens reinforced his belief that progress must be made in the Middle East.

On the national level Quandt (1986) clarified that in January 1977 two important developments took place in the Middle East that influenced the new American administration's perceptions of the timing and urgency of any new initiative. First, the Israeli government decided to hold early elections in May. This meant that a strong Israeli government could not be in place until much later in the year. Second, and more important the riots broke out in Cairo in reaction to sudden food price increases. The Sadat regime, on which the Americans were counting so heavily seemed to be in serious trouble. Lack of progress on the peace front would further weaken Sadat's position.

Heikal (1996a) argued that the Egyptian demonstrations in January 1977 was the vital reason which led Sadat to the conclusion by mid-1977 that Egypt would have to negotiate a new relationship with Israel. Sadat thought that peace with Israel was the right key to unlock Washington's generosity and aid. As a result, favorable necessary economic conditions for Egypt might be created. According to Fahmy (1983), Sadat had raised expectations greatly, repeatedly telling Egyptians that peace would usher in an area of prosperity. There would be, as he put it, a "peace dividend" (Lesch & Tessler (1989). The peace, as Sadat constantly proclaimed, was the key to a better future for Egypt. Peace would be more than the end of warfare, of suffering and the death of thousands of Egypt's sons still in their prime. It would also be the beginning of a period of economic

renaissance for Egypt, because the country would be able to devote all its resources to development.

Waldheim (1980) clarified that Sadat recognized that a peaceful solution of the Middle East conflict would benefit Egypt, which would never overcome its economic and social problems until it could stop allocating so much of its budget to defence expenditure. Sadat tried to convince the Arab world that the path of compromise he had elected to pursue would lead eventually to peace and development. He followed that line of reasoning with his dramatic visit to Jerusalem the subsequent negotiations from which led to the conclusion of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty

As a result of the signing peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has become one of the largest recipients of American aid and assistance, second only to Israel on the American list of priorities. This was part of process started in 1974 when President R. Nixson appropriated \$250 million in economic aid to Egypt. In 1977, after signing the Camp David agreements, American aid to Egypt reached \$1 billion. By 1984 it had reached \$2.3 billion a year. The political underpinning of the aid was articulated in a 1981 document issued by the Agency for International Development. It stated that the high level of aid to Egypt is premised on the belief that President Sadat's peace initiatives are crucial to that objective [stability] and that these efforts will be supported and enhanced by a vigorous and growing economy (Dossouki, 1988).

As a result of the peace treaty, according to Lesch and Tessler (1989), the Egyptian economic situation was improving rapidly, with a projected growth rate of 10 percent for 1980 and increased investment and aid from abroad. Revenues from oil, the Suez canal and tourism contributed measurably to this boom, and all were due, at least in part, to the peace with Israel. The country was experiencing more economic growth than it had seen in two decades.

The peace process between Egypt and Israel affected Egyptian politics in the development process. During the decade after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, a steady transformation in Egypt policies took four interrelated forms: re-identification, relegitimization, restructuring and reorientation. The following section discusses these

forms briefly. (More details about political, economic, social and cultural developments in Egypt will be dealt with in the next chapter).

#### 2.3.1 Re-identification

According to Heikal (1996a), before going to Israel in November 1977, Sadat flew to Iran to ask for the Shah's view and received encouragement to negotiate with Israel. The Shah had been pressing Sadat for some time to turn his back on the Arab world and establish a separate Egypt identity. That advice had not entirely been ignored for Cairo had begun to emphasize Egypt's Pharaonic past and its superiority over other Arab countries.

As soon as Sadat returned from Jerusalem on November 21, 1977, a great debate arose in Egyptian intellectual circles about the Arab identity of Egypt. The majority of Egyptian intellectuals and writers varied in their analyses and points of departure. But they agreed on the following themes: Egypt had an older civilization than the Arab one. Its civilization is part of the Mediterranean culture; hence, it is more attached to the Greaco-Roman traditions than Arab-Islamic values. In short, Egypt is part of European and western civilization. Egypt, therefore, should conclude peace with Israel and be neutral, like Switzerland, in the world politics in general and in Arab-Israel politics in particular. Egypt should reduce its defence spending and pursue a foreign policy based on peaceful aims and concentrate on economic and social development. However, other Egyptian intellectuals and writers attacked these ideas and used all the arguments of Arabism: the common culture, language, and values; the economic advantages of large international unite; and the Israeli threat to Egyptian national security with or without the other Arab support (Ali, 1988).

This intensive debate seriously affected the Egyptian public. Public surveys seemed to indicate a great change in Egyptian attitudes toward Arabism and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In early 1977, Saad Ibrahim conducted a survey of Arab attitudes toward Arab unity in ten Arab countries. In his Egyptian sample he found that 72.6 percent wanted to have a single federated state (Ibrahim 1980). By 1978, after Sadat's initiative, it seemed that the trend had reversed. In a survey conducted by R. Hinnebuch in late 1977 and early 1978, only 34.4 percent considered Egypt part of an Arab nationhood, while 53.9 percent considered Egypt the Land of Pharaohs and the oldest nation in the world (Ali, 1988).

#### 2.3.2 Re-legitimization

One of the main legitimacy's sources for the Egyptian regime of July 1952 was its anti-West, defined as anti-imperialist and anti-Israeli, stance. The centralization of authority was always justified on the basis of resisting outside enemies forces. The defeat of 1967 put this source of legitimacy into question. The peace with Israel and the relocation of Egypt to the Western camp made it irrelevant. After the demonstrations and riots in January 1977, Sadat began to lose his legitimacy among Egyptians. The Hero of the Crossing was no longer the Hero of the People. The decentralization of authority and the democratization of Egypt became imperative. Sadat understood this. Parallel with his steps toward peace with Israel and an alliance with United States, he embarked on a process of pluralising Egyptian politics. When this process suffered a setback in 1981, Sadat was assassinated and Mubarak continued the process (Ali, 1988; Heikal, 1996a).

#### 2.3.3 Restructuring

According to Ali (1988), the Camp David accords and the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty have allowed Egypt to live under a new promise of peace. Political and socio-economic restructuring of the country, formerly suppressed for the sake of unity and the need to combat the external threat, was given a chance to evolve. Consequently, as noted, re-legitimization and democratization have been the outcome of the political sphere. In the socio-economic field three processes have taken place: the growth of civil society (the trend has been toward privatization since 1978), the rise of Islam, and the intensification of Egyptian-Arab interdependence.

#### 2.3.4 Reorientation

Sadat's peace with Israel and his de facto alliance with the United States represented a new strategy in Egyptian foreign affairs. In general, states pursue one of three strategies: joining or bandwagoning, balancing, or self-reliance (Dessouki, 1988). Egypt, with its meagre economic resources, could not follow the strategy of self-reliance, although some attempts were made. Nasser's strategy was basically one of striking the balance with Israeli by trying to build an Arab alliance and of balancing the Israeli-American de facto alliance with an Egyptian-Soviet one. Sadat's strategy between 1970 and 1973 was virtually the same. Immediately after the 1973 war, Sadat changed his strategy to one of joining the Israeli-American alliance to appease and contain Israel and to compete with it

for American favors and assistance. Ten years after Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, Mubarak realized the dark side of this strategy for Egypt. As a result, he has begun to add to it some elements of a balancing strategy in order to increase his options.

#### 2.4 The mass media, peace and development

The following section will discuss briefly the relationship between the mass media and peace, the mass media and development, and the mass media, peace and development.

#### 2.4.1 The mass media and development

Boern (1992) stated that, over the past few decades, the planned and deliberate use of communication has taken an increasingly prominent place in development strategies. It was realized that no change in the lives of people would take place without the development of appropriate values, attitudes and stock of knowledge in the minds of the people. This notion put due emphasis on communication as an important instrument for investment for development.

In the sixties, under the dominant paradigm of development, there were three areas which reflected the role of the mass media in development theory and practice: (a) the modernization approach which considered the mass media as agents and indices of modernization in developing countries; (b) the communication effect approach which considered the mass media as magic multipliers of development benefits. According to this approach the mass media have a powerful, direct and uniform impact on people; (c) the diffusion of innovations approach which emphasized the ability of media messages and opinion leaders to create knowledge of new practices and ideas among the target audience and to persuade them to adopt the exogenously conceived and introduced innovations (Melkote, 1991).

During the seventies with the new concept of development which emphasized self-development efforts, grassroots participation and two-way communication, the role of the mass media in development was re-examined. Rogers (1976a) summarized the chief roles of the mass media in self-development as: (a) providing technical information about development problems and possibilities, and about appropriate innovations, in answer to local requests; and (b) circulating information about the self-development

accomplishments of local groups so that other such groups may profit from others, experience and perhaps be challenged to achieve a similar performance.

Mody (1991) described the role of communication in developing countries as top-down. He added that mass media systems in Africa and South Asia are presently organized to send development messages from supposedly know-it-all development experts in capital cities to supposedly ignorant peasants and slum dwellers who are perceived as needing development. This top-down structure of development initiative and its paralleled centralized media system reflect the power structure.

As the concept of development in the eighties emphasized the participatory approach, and the cultural dimension in development is more appreciated (Tehranian 1990), the role of communication becomes more complex and variable. Melkote (1991) cited some of the new functions for mass media that may contribute significantly to a participative society: (a) to help in the development of a community's cultural identity; (b) to act as a vehicle for citizen self-expression; (c) to facilitate problem articulation; and (d) to serve as tools for a diagnosis of community problems.

Tehranian (1990) differentiates the goals of communication and development as viewed from both the top and the bottom. He states that the process of social communication and development are complex processes that appear radically different from the perspectives of the top and bottom, or center and periphery, of a social system. According to him, goals of communication and development as viewed from the top/center concentrate mainly on national security, political mobilization, national unity and economic growth. On the other hand, these goals concentrate basically, as viewed from the bottom, on individual choice and freedom, political access, political participation, sub-national unity and distributive justice.

#### 2.4.2 The mass media and peace

The mass media, in effect, provide their audience with a map of the social and political world beyond their own immediate experience. News helps to construct understanding of what exists, what is important, what is good and valuable, and what is bad and threatening. The news media affect political life not only by consciously championing political causes in the editorial pages or elsewhere, they also exert political influence,

however unwittingly, by virtue of their news gathering routines, their access to mass audiences, their capacity to act as a channel for other political actors, and their ability to ignore, select and interpret policy relevant events (Hackett, 1991)

Becker (1982) suggested that the supposed peace-inducing properties ascribed to the mass media are generally assumed to exist in the realm of international relations, but they also appear in the fundamental premises of many psychological, educational and sociological theories. The communication act per se is frequently said to possess the function of awakening mutual understanding, of helping to reduce conflicts, of stimulating social action and even of helping to bring a state of harmony where previously there were harsh conflicts of interaction at play.

Bruck and Roach (1993) argued that creating a peace culture is clearly a process that can be started in many ways and many places. Yet it cannot be achieved without the progressive demilitarization of all sectors of society and state. The mass media, as Hackett (1991) stated, through their news coverage, their institutional dynamics and their interaction with other social forces can help to make or break movements of anti-war dissent and create peace culture.

In 1978, UNESCO issued a declaration on the mass media, which emphasized its role in peace. According to this declaration, the mass media have an important contribution to make in the strengthening of peace and countering incitement to war. By disseminating information on the aims, aspirations, cultures and needs of all peoples, the media contribute to eliminating ignorance and misunderstanding between peoples, thereby promoting the formulation by states of the policies best able to promote the reduction of international tension and the peaceful and equitable settlement of international disputes (Becker 1982).

Peace activists know that the mass media are in many ways crucial to their work. The daily reports in the press, on radio, and on television produces the information environment in which they work and on which they have to depend. Moreover, the if and how of reporting is quite decisive for their political effectiveness as well as for the public perception of the relevance of peace issues to the political agenda and other key events of the day (Bruck and Roach 1993).

President Sadat recognized the importance of mass media in the peace process. He not only concentrated on the Egyptian media, but also on American public opinion through the American media. He spent endless hours with media people, senators and representatives, and leaders of the American Jewish community. One is tempted to argue that the target of his visit to Jerusalem was not only the Israeli but also, equally, the American people (Dessouki 1988). According to Dayan and Katz (1992), Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, among other events such as the royal wedding of Charles and Diana and the debates of 1960 between John Kennedy and Richard Nixon, were media events. Sadat's visit was an exercise in television diplomacy and he captured the imagination of millions in the world. He made the visit in front of television cameras and well-established news celebrities such as Walter Cronkite, John Chancellor and Barbara Walters, accompanied him on his visit.

#### 2.4.3 The Mass Media, Peace, and Development

Theories of communication, peace and development according to Tehranian (1990), have been dominated by a postwar debate between two dominant perspectives: modernization (Liberal) and dependency (Marxist). The liberal theorists have argued for a modernization paradigm that uses the nation-state as its chief unit of analysis and drawn the conclusion that is partial to market solutions and the trans-national corporate penetration of third world economics. The Marxist theorists, by contrast, have largely operated on a dependency paradigm in which the world capitalist system is the chief unit of analysis, focused on the center-periphery dynamics of development, and in favor of social revolution and developmental policies that aim at industrialization with the aid of the socialist, rather than the capitalist, camp.

The mark of Egyptian history is the dominance of the state over society. Geography and demography have made centralism and authoritarianism an Egyptian tradition. Modern times, however, have modified and moderated this tendency from the middle of the nineteenth century and certainly during the 1923-52 liberal era in Egyptian politics. Gamal Abd al-Nasser's July revolution 1952 reversed the trend toward declining state power. After the October 1973 war, and since Camp David, the development of the Egyptian civil society under Sadat has been resumed. The legacy of the 1960s has lost some of its lustre and logic; the firm grip of the state has loosened in politics as well as in

economics. Egypt has been transformed from a one-party system into a multiparty system. In economics, different indicators show the emergence of state dominance and the Emergence of independent or private sectors.

At the information level, some opposition newspapers have started up and established themselves. However, the national-press, radio and television are still highly centralized, monopolized, controlled, and used as an instrument for mobilization and political legitimisation. After Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Egyptian public opinion was to undergo an intensive and sustained media campaign to prepare it for the change in the peace politics. According to Ibrahim (1988), Egyptians were told that their sacrifices in war amounted to 100,000 war casualties and \$30 billion of debt. No other Arabic country matched this sacrifice. The US will never allow Israel to be defeated and the Soviets will never give Egypt arms to win the war decisively. Egypt's severe economic problems are due to the state of war with Israel. Egypt is heavily indebted while other rich Arab nations and individuals are depositing billions of dollars in foreign banks. The Syrians and the Palestinians are not interested in resolving the Arab-Israel conflict because they are benefiting from it along with their Soviet patron. The state-controlled media hailed President Sadat as "The Hero of War and Peace". He fuelled the Egyptian people's sense of patriotism and depressed their sense of Arab nationalism. A new spirit of "Egypt first" was drummed up, and expectations of instant prosperity skyrocketed.

Opinion surveys demonstrated the effect of the mass media on the Egyptian attitudes to the peace process. In 1974 as many as 55 percent of one Egyptian sample solidly supported the Palestinian Liberal Organization (PLO) strategy of continuing the struggle until the creation of a secular democratic state in Palestine was acheived; and 43 percent opted for a solution along the line of Security Council Resolution 242. By 1978 only 18 percent of a similar Egyptian sample still supported the PLO strategy, while as many as 77 percent supported Sadat's peace initiative, which was even more accommodating toward Israel than Resolution 242. This dramatic swing was reinforced by the promise that peace with Israel would bring prosperity to Egyptians and justice to the Palestinians (Ibrahim, 1980).

It can be seen that the value which connects development to peace is security. The notion of security, as Sorensen (1985) put it, involves the defense of survival, welfare, freedom

and identity. In other words, security involves the main dimensions of development. Positive peace, as Tehranian (1992) put it, is the absence of war with the presence of genuine human harmony and cooperation to achieve security and justice. It is seem that the main goal of peace is development.

The Egyptian mass media, according to some studies which have been conducted in the late seventies (Ibrahim 1980, 1988; Ali, 1988), tried to connect the peace process to development. They considered the peace as the beginning of a period of economic renaissance and the key to better future for Egypt.

The above chapter discussed, in general, the relationship between the development process, the peace process and the mass media. What about the relationship between the peace process between Egypt and Israel and the developmental dimensions in Egypt during the late seventies and eighties? How has the peace process affected political, cultural and economic environment in Egypt since 1977? The answers to these sorts of questions will be dealt with in the next chapter

# Chapter three

# The Economic, Political and Cultural Environment in Egypt During the 1970s and 1980s

For most of its modern history, the development of Egypt has been formed by two main factors: the national and the international. Nationally, the mark of Egyptian history is the dominance of the state over society. After the 1952 revolution, Gamal Abd Al-Nasser's brought the political system, banking, most of industry, much of commercial activities, most education, professional and labour unions and even the religion institution under state control. When Sadat came to power in 1970, an open door policy controlled democratisation, alliance with the West and reconciliation with Israel were the four cornerstones of Sadatism (Ali, 1988; Ibrahim, 1988)

Internationally the development of Egypt has occurred under the shadow of conflict with external powers. First there was Mohammed Ali's conflict with Turkey to gain independence for Egypt from the Ottoman Empire in early nineteenth century. Then came the protracted conflict for independence from Great Britain that continued from 1881 to 1952. The conflict with Great Britain overlapped the Arab-Israeli one that started in 1948, accelerated in the mid-1950s, and became particularly significant for Egypt in 1967 when Egyptian territories came under direct Israeli occupation. The question of national identity has thus dominated the evolution of Egyptian society and politics (Bowen-Jones, 1988; Ali, 1988).

As this study aims at investigating the developmental dimensions of the Egyptian mass media role in the peace process, it is important to discuss the political, economic and social environment in which the Egyptian media work. The mass media, as institutions, are affected by the political and economic environment in a given society. As the nature of the relation between media and society, according to McQuail (1994), depends on circumstances of time and place, this chapter deals with the economic, political and social situation in Egypt during 1970s and 1980s.

# 3.1 The Economic Situation

The element of national power influences the process of policy-making in a number of ways. An economy which is vulnerable to externally generated forces, can severely limit

the decision-makers' freedom of manoeuvrability. Thus, heavy dependence on imported raw materials, external trade and foreign aid will adversely affect the conduct of foreign policy (Dawisha, 1976). From the late 1960s to the late 1980s, Egypt's economy faced sharp problems because of the increasing population, the lack of resources and raw materials and dependence on Arab and foreign aid. Ibrahim (1988) stated that Egypt's rate of economic growth dropped from 6.9 percent in 1963 to only 2.9 in 1974.

There are certain basic demographic facts about Egypt that must be borne in mind. The country has a very young population: 40 percent of its 44.7 million of population (mid-1982 estimate) are less than 15 years of age. Yet the working population is about 10 million, or under 25 percent of the total population of the country. Nearly half of this working population is still engaged on the land, 39 percent in services and only 19 percent in industry. In other words, the industrial labour force stands at just 1.5 million of total population of 44 million (Vatikiotis, 1991). Thus, it can be argued that size and the distribution of the population, in terms of limited resources, were a harmful factor in the economic development in Egypt.

The poor state of the Egyptian economy in 1977 was obvious. The great burden of defence expenditure together with the pressure of population on the economy and the breakdown of services in urban areas were sources of general disquiet and insecurity. Egypt, then, needed a peace settlement. According to Vatikiotis (1991), there were those who argued that the domestic troubles of autumn 1973 and the food riots of January 1977 underlined the urgency of resolving the burdensome external conflict if Egypt was to concentrate on tackling its pressing economic and social problems at home.

Dessouki (1988) stated that the Egyptian notion of peace is a pragmatic solution to fundamental problems faced by the Egyptian society and economy and compounded by a population explosion that increases the population by more than one million every ten months. Peace was a means to divert resources to developmental objectives and to create an atmosphere of stability.

Egypt's spending on her armed forces aggravated its economic situation. Egypt's defence expenditure as a percentage of her Gross National Products has rose from 13.5% in 1967 to a crippling 34.1% in 1974. Military spending on this scale necessitated corresponding sacrifices in other sectors of domestic consideration and especially on the

primary Egyptian objective of eradicating the traces of Israeli aggression (Dawisha, 1976). The economic dimension, therefore, can be posited as a primary determinant of Egypt's decision to accept American mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace settlement in the Middle East.

#### 3.1.1- Open door policy

Less than six months after the October war, Law 43 of 1974 introduced the open door policy. It aimed at liberalising the Egyptian economy by ending the near monopoly of the public sector and encouraging the private sector (Ibrahim, 1988). The Egyptian leadership has increasingly liberalised the Nasserite economic structure in order to rectify the deteriorating economic situation. In July 1975, the national assembly (parliament) effectively reversed Nasser's nationalisation measures of 1960-62 by allowing foreign banks to resume operations in Egypt, by easing import and export restrictions, and by decentralising the public sector (Dawisha, 1976).

The mid-1970s marked a turning point in Egypt's internal development and foreign relations as dramatic as any that has occurred since the 1952 revolution. Egypt has cast its economic, diplomatic, and to some extent military, lot with the West and, more specially, with the United States. It was suspected that only the United States with its great leverage over the Israeli economy and the state of military preparedness could convince the Israelis of the desirability of concluding a settlement acceptable to the Arab world and of promoting economic support for Egypt. It was argued that without peace settlement, foreign investors would remain wary of investing money in Egypt (Waterbury, 1978; Eilts, 1988b).

The US response came quickly. According to Weinbaum (1985), US officials appreciated Sadat's dire economic predicament and his political vulnerability at home. Egypt would require immediate, tangible evidence of US support, enough to enable him to improve domestic economic conditions sufficiently to allow him to accept political risks in the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces and participate in a more comprehensive regional peace. After signing the January 1974 separation of forces accord between Egypt and Israel, the US announced the commitment of \$85 million to an initial program to help clear the Suez Canal of war debris and to begin the reconstruction of the canal cities. Eilts (1988a) stated that, at the time of Camp David, Egypt was already receiving roughly the equivalent of \$1 billion in economic aid each

year, partly through appropriated funds and partly from the provision of Public Law 480 concerning wheat and wheat flour.

Vatikiotis (1991) concluded that the most basic choices in political economy made by the Sadat regime were (a) a shift to a free market economy in the hope of attracting foreign capital investment; (b) a greater determination to strike a more reasonable and credible balance between industrial and agricultural development; (c) a decision to revitalize the existing private sector; and (d) a conscious effort to provide for a manageable handling of the social and economic problems looming on the horizon until the end of the century.

Roy and Irelan (1989) differentiated among three phases in the implementation of the economic liberalisation policy in Egypt: 1974-77, 1977-79 and 1980-81. The initial period began with the open door policy in 1974 and ended with the riots over price increases of subsidized consumer goods in January 1977. It was perhaps the only period that witnessed the emergence of strong government sentiment for decisive economic change and sufficient political licence to pursue it actively. It was also the period when the sharp disparity between domestic and foreign perceptions of the liberalisation policy became apparent. During this period, the government demonstrated an increasing willingness, if not ability, to come to grips with the problems of implementation. Simultaneously, it was made more aware of the probable political and social costs of pressing for liberalisation, costs that it was not willing to incur.

The government – possibly as a means of gaining popular support for its controversial policy – undertook, according to Roy and Irelan (1989), an extensive campaign to create an atmosphere of growth, change and progress. Projects by the score were reported in the press, although investments were only coming in at trickle – nothing approximating the figures carried in the press. This led to criticism, and increasingly the question of where the benefits of the liberalisation was asked? Ibrahim (1988) argued that Sadat's liberalisation policy, or open door policy, generated an ideological polarization in Egypt. Supporters of the new policy were from the upper strata of society – for example, the wealthy returnees from the oil-rich Arab countries, contractors, and the like. Detractors of the open policy were public sector workers and the lower middle classes. Thus, by January, three years after the introduction of the new policy, there were massive urban

food riots. Sadat's reaction was massive arrests of opposition elements who were blamed for instigating the riots and a continuation of the same open door approach.

When foreign investment had not developed in the manner anticipated during the initial period of economic liberalisation, the government attempted to stimulate it further by amending the Foreign Investment Law of 1974 with Law No. 32 of 1977, which opened import substitution opportunities for investors. What had started as a policy to induce foreign investment to ease foreign exchange earnings now became a policy of opening domestic markets for foreign investor exploitation. In the aftermath of Camp David, the government sought during the period 1980-81, to frame new economic rules and regulations governing private sector activity. The instinct to return to greater control over the economy was reasserting itself (Roy and Irelan, 1989).

#### 3.1.2- Gains and Losses of Open door policy

According to Weinbaum (1985), the open door policy was impressive if measured by most gross indices. On average, annual GDP growth in constant prices after 1977 rose at more than 8 percent in comparison to 3 percent in 1973. The deficit in goods and services fell steadily to \$1.5 billion in 1979 from \$2.5 billion in 1975. Also, by 1979, Egypt was showing a small surplus of \$700 million in its balance of payments. In 1980, oil exports provided nearly \$3 billion, Suez Canal fees upwards of \$1 billion, remittances \$2.7 billion, and tourism and agriculture exports around \$600 million each. With the steep rise in foreign exchange earnings and a continued influx of foreign economic assistance, Egypt debt servicing was now more manageable.

Roy and Irelan (1989) argued that liberalisation had not produced the desired transformation. There had been little foreign investment, especially by the US companies. There had been only limited technological transfer; the Arabs had lost interest, both as a result of Camp David and because of the curbs placed on real estate speculation in 1978. A few joint ventures between Western and Egyptian public sector companies had been concluded and a new class of nouveaux riches had been created that posed serious socio-political problems.

The creation of the new rich class was the main negative effect of economic liberalisation and promoted class divisions and tensions in Egypt by the late 1970s. According to Weinbaum (1985), the gap between Egypt's rich and poor apparently

widened. While the lowest 20 percent of the population held 6.6 percent of national income in 1965, they dropped to 5.1 percent by the late 1970s. By comparison, the income of the highest 5 percent dipped slightly to 17.4 percent from 17.5 percent between 1960 and 1965 but increased markedly to 22 percent after several years of Sadat's policies.

According to Azzam (1998), economic liberalization (*infitah*) is generally viewed, on a public level, as responsible for the increased disparity between rich and poor, the increase in unemployment, and the spread of corruption. The government itself is viewed as corrupt, and it is widely acknowledged that corruption has permeated all levels of society. The government itself has attempted to win credibility by exposing cases of corruption in high places, but on the whole, this strategy has only further reinforced the public's belief that corruption exists at the highest level of state.

Opposition to Sadat's economic policies came particularly from managerial-level civil servants, intellectuals and the many employed in the traditional economic sectors who shared in very little of the economic expansion and whose real incomes were eroded in the accompanying inflation. The more educated opposition groups argued that the new economic program had strayed from ideals of equity at home and solidarity with the Arab world (Ibid).

#### 3.1.3- Liberalisation in 1980s

In the early 1980s, Egypt had become one of the world's most economically dependent countries. In 1961, only seven percent of its food supply was imported. The proportion stood at one-fifth a decade later, and, until 1974, the country ran a net favourable agricultural trade balance. By 1981, Egypt's food deficits were staggering. The value of imports exceeded exports by some \$3 billion, and Egypt relied on foreign suppliers for about one-half of its total food consumption. From all sources, the economic aid Egypt now receives totals about eight percent of GNP, with the US providing nearly half of the funds. American economic support runs to \$1.1 billion yearly (Amin, 1982).

The death of President Sadat came at a time when his economic liberalisation policy required reconsideration. As the negative economic and social results – ostentatious consumption, unregulated speculation and rising inflation – that attended liberalisation emerged, it became apparent that the potential disruption had reached serious

proportions. The people's assembly nominated Vice-President Mubarak for the presidency on October 1981. In his first presidential address to the People's Assembly, he emphasised the need for drastic economic reform and called for greater productivity (Roy and Irelan; 1989, Vatikiotis, 1991).

As an expression of dissatisfaction with the open door policy, Mubarak dropped the economic czar responsible for guiding the liberalisation and acted to curb imports of many foreign luxury goods. He assured the country that he would resist investments, foreign or domestic, not directed towards expanding Egypt's productive capacity. Mubarak instructed his economic advisors, moreover, to explore ways of reducing the heavy burden on the national budget of consumer subsidies. On aid relations with the US, Mubarak hoped to receive treatment for Egypt comparable with the largely unfettered economic assistance given to Israel (Weinbaum, 1985).

Indigenous private sector initiatives were on the rise, and the government took steps to regulate private sector activities and stimulate domestic and foreign capital formation. According to Ali (1988), actual percentages of gross fixed investment in the public sector were reduced from 79 percent in fiscal year 1983 to 70 percent in fiscal year 1986. The relative share of private investment, especially in industry and manufacturing as well as the more conventional commercial trade area, continued to increase.

By the end of 1984, under Mubarak's presidency, Egypt still faced massive economic and social problems, ranging from inflation, unemployment and the structural reforms of the economy to managing her relations with the Arab states and the superpowers, as well as with Israel (Vatikiotis, 1991). More than other Egyptian employers, Egyptian bureaucracies have been interested in Arab jobs and money. Workers in such government organizations were the hardest hit by inflation and the deterioration in Egypt's economic fortunes. They had been looking foreword to living and working in one of the oil-producing states as the way to secure the future for their children. This opportunity would not exist without the consolidation of Egyptian-Arab relations and a cooling of Egyptian-Israeli relations. Consequently, the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel was doomed (Ali, 1988).

Vatikiotis (1991) argued that despite the thorny and ever more complicated economic difficulties facing President Mubarak in his second term of office, he could claim several

accomplishments in the improvement of the country's infrastructure (power, water, telecommunications, public health, urban transport) and regional and international diplomacy. The private sector was encouraged and expanded under new legislation and measures of foreign currency and interest rate reform. Between the 1982-87 five-year Plans and the 1987-92 Plan, the percentage of investment of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the public sector dropped from 77 percent to 50 percent.

The last two years of the 1980s witnessed a diligent spate of legislation aimed at economic growth and development as well as at social reform. All legislation went hand-in-hand with reforms to regulate financial investment aimed at protecting investors and encouraging indigenous investment in private enterprise and attracting Arab funds; especially as diplomatic trade and political relations with Arab countries had been restored. There was to be investment in land reclamation, in exploration of energy sources in the Western Desert and natural gas field in the Delta, and in the further development of the petrochemical industry and the steel and aluminium industries (Ibid).

# 3.2- The Political Situation

After the October 1973 war, and certainly since Camp David, the legacy of the 1960s has lost some of its logic. The firm grip of the state has loosened in politics as well as economics. The Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal and the political outcome of the October War provided the new basis for President Sadat's peace policy of a final accommodation with Israel. The dramatic steps that he took in the implementation of this new policy constituted perhaps the first serious act of policy taken by an Arab ruler in the thirty-year old conflict. These steps were his visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, the summit meeting in America in September 1978, and the Camp David accords leading to the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in March 1979. The new policy of Sadat influenced the political environment in Egypt during 1970s and 1980s on both domestic and foreign levels.

When Sadat came to office in 1970, he presented his case to the Egyptian public as a quest for democratization and as an end to an autocratic police state. Some measures were declared to substantiate his new policy, with the promise of such steps as soon as Egypt liberated its territories from Israeli occupation. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other political prisoners were released between 1971 and 1975.

Politicians and journalists in exile were given clemency and encouraged to come home (Ibrahim, 1988).

Sadat's leadership differed from Nasser's not only in substance but also in style. With the consolidation of his authority, Sadat exhibited a far greater tendency to delegate administrative duties to his chief lieutenants. Thus, cabinet members had participated in not only the execution of, but sometimes even in the formulation of, Egypt's politics. Under Sadat, the military continued to occupy the central position in the decision-making process which they had filled during Nasser era. The other institutional structures remained subordinate to the presidency, particularly in the foreign sector. The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) – Egypt's sole political party at that time – alone with the National Assembly, the parliament, continued to mirror and confirm presidential decisions (Dawisha, 1976).

Sadat's owns legitimacy derived from two events: his destruction of Nasserites who challenged his authority in May 1971 and his going to war against Israel in October 1973. Soon after this, he was emphasizing the importance for Egypt of moving from arbitrary power to the rule of law. With such an orientation went the lifting of censorship, the reform of the courts, and a less clumsy use of the security services. The nearest step was the introduction of a controlled multi-party system under which there were limitations on party activity imposed by the law of political parties. What was being introduced under this controlled change was not so much an element of pluralism in Egyptian political life as one of diversity. But it was the first of its kind since 1952 and it managed also to generate an atmosphere of security while at the same time further improving Sadat's political standing in the country (Vatikiotis, 1991).

The multi-party system was officially introduced in 1976. President Sadat decided to restrict the number of parties to three: a centrist party [Egypt's Arab Socialist Party], one to its right [the Liberal Party], and one to its left [the Unionist Progressive Party]. The two chairmen of the opposition parties were former Free Officers – Mustafa Murad and Khalid Mohieddin. Requests to form additional parties were denied (Ibrahim, 1988).

By the end of the 1980s, Egypt had six legal political parties in addition to the semi-legal Muslim Brotherhood. The National Democratic Party (NDP), which replaced the ASU, was the ruling party in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. It is still in power now. The

opposition were the Wafd, Socialist Labour, Progressive Unionist, Liberal and Umma parties. On an ideological spectrum, the Wafd, the Liberal and the Umma are to the right of centre. They are committed to the private sector, would scale down or liquidate the public sector and are generally in favour of less state-subsidized food and fewer government services. The Socialist Labour and Progressive Unionist parties are to the left of centre and favour a more streamlined and better-managed public sector, state subsidy of basic commodities and services, and greater equity in taxation and income distribution than existed under the NDP. All opposition parties favour greater democratization, amending the constitution and abolishing the emergency laws in existences since 1981.

The Socialist Labour Party (SLP) was the major opposition party in Egypt's People's Assembly (the parliament), when the Camp David Accords were ratified. According to Ibrahim (1988), because President Sadat felt that the other opposition parties in the assembly were going to vote against the Accords, he encouraged a few independent members of the Assembly from the pre-Revolutionary Young Egypt's Socialist party to revive their old party under the new name, SLP. The law at the time required that a minimum of twenty Assembly members were required before a party could be founded. President Sadat persuaded several of his own NDP members to switch to the newly proposed SLP to fulfil the required minimum.

On regional issues, opposition parties express more vocal pro-Arab and anti-Israel polices than those generally expressed by the NDP. The SLP, which had accepted the Camp David accords with some reservations, announced in February 1981 its total opposition. Since its return to politics in 1984, the New Wafd Party has declared the non-existence of the accords because of Israeli violations. The Progressive Unionist Party opposed the accords from the beginning. The Muslim Brotherhood, which has reservations about the idea of pan-Arab nationalism, preferring instead a pan-Islamic nationalism, has, in practice, supported opposition to Camp David and the call for Egypt to shoulder its Arab responsibilities. The NDP, the majority ruling party, was not to be outbid by the opposition parties. Although it continued to support the accords, it increasingly adopted pan-Arab stands in the People's Assembly (Ali, 1988).

The multi-party system step was welcomed by most Egyptian intellectuals and professionals. After the Camp David accords and the negative outcomes of the economic

open door policy, criticism of President Sadat began to increase and freedoms to narrow. By 1981, Sadat's position had become increasingly isolated. There was growing criticism at home of his domestic and foreign policies and corruption was widely alleged. He had grown impatient with rising criticism. Opposition newspapers were frequently confiscated and many of them banned. In September 1981, more than 1500 opposition activists were arrested, including some prominent and highly respected figures such as Mohammed Heikal, Hilmi Murad, and Fatehy Radwan. The Coptic pope was removed from his office, something that had not been done in fourteen centuries of Islam and the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood was also jailed. A month later President Sadat was assassinated (Eilts, 1988b; Ibrahim, 1988).

After the assassination, there was a national consensus to support Mubarak and to give him ample time to deal with the regime's crisis. President Mubarak's freedom of action has been constrained by domestic and foreign factors. On the domestic level there were the massive problems with economic and social issue, democratisation and Islamic militancy, which continued to receive outside support. On the foreign level there was the peace process with Israel, particularly completing troop withdrawals from Sinai as well as that of relationships with other Arab countries.

During the first six months of his presidency, Mubarak tried to convince Egyptians, Arabs and Israelis that peace did not depend on the life of one man. He asserted that the peace treaty with Israel was not only vital to Egypt's interests but also remained the main hope for a wider peace in the region. The Camp David peace process was upheld, and close relations with the US maintained. At the same time, President Mubarak indicated the first change in style as far as the conduct of foreign policy was concerned: he did not attack any Arab state, nor publicly insult any Arab head of state.

The rapprochement with Arab countries began to pay off in early 1984, when Jordan called for Egypt's readmission to membership of the Islamic Conference and the Arab League. In December, full diplomatic relations with Jordan were restored, and speculation was rife about the possibility of other Arab states such as Iraq and Morocco following suit. By early 1988, Egypt had restored relations with seventeen of the twenty-one Arab League members. The remaining four – Syria, Libya, Lebanon, and Algeria – still boycott Egypt diplomatically (Vatikiotis, 1991; Ali, 1988).

Concerning the peace process and normalization with Israel, three critical moments have occurred and influenced the Egypt-Israel relation. These events were the invasion of Lebanon 1982, the bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunisia in 1985, and the 1987-88 uprising in the occupied territories which coincided with Egypt's return to the Arab League after the Amman summit in November 1987. The invasion of Lebanon was the most serious development. According to Eilts (1988b), it created serious problems for Mubarak at home and in the Arab world because it was seen as evidence that the peace treaty had given Israel a free hand to act aggressively against other Arab states.

According to Shamir (1988), Egypt saw the Israeli invasion of Lebanon as a flagrant violation of at least the spirit of the peace agreement. It also regarded the invasion as a heavy blow to the credibility of Egypt's arguments in domestic and inter-Arab debates, which had maintained that Egypt's position with Israel was neither a betrayal of Arab solidarity nor did it expose Israel's neighbours to military attack. Cairo reacted to the war by suspending the implementation of almost all the normalization projects that were in the pipeline, by sharply reducing trade relation and by intensifying the attacks on Israel in the media. Otherwise the Egyptian government resisted external and domestic pressures to withdraw from the basic commitments to the peace treaty; only the uproar produced by the massacres at Sabra and Shatila induced Egypt to add to the sanctions against Israel and recall its ambassador from Tel Aviv.

The Israeli bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunisia in October 1985 eroded the faith of the Egyptian public in the peace process. The Egyptian government could not prevent anti-Israel demonstrations protesting against the air raid. Within the three months following the raid, a chain of events promoted domestic protests; the hijacking by four Palestinians of an Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, with American tourists on board, and mediation by the Egyptian government to free the hostages; the discovery that an American passenger had been killed and thrown overboard by the hijackers; and the interception of the Palestinians gunmen [hijackers] on their way to Tunisia by US Navy F-15 fighters over the Mediterranean sea which forced an Egyptian plane to land at a NATO base in Italy. Meanwhile, as these events were continued, an Egyptian border guard stationed in Sinai, S. Khater, opened fire on an Israeli tourist group visiting Egypt killing seven tourists. His action was perceived as a fair revenge for the raid on the PLO in Tunisia. When the government announced that Khater had committed suicide in his

prison cell, many Egyptians cast doubt on the government's version of the death (Ibrahim, 1988).

Concerning the political liberalization process at home, two general elections held in 1984 and 1987 led to one of the largest representations of the opposition in the People's Assembly in the history of Egypt. The opposition share of the elected seats in the People Assembly rose from 8.6 percent in the 1979 election and 15.0 percent in 1984 election to 22.3 percent in 1987 (Ali, 1988). According to Vatikiotis (1991), the development of a plural political system in Egypt was not rejected or overthrown, despite robust criticism by opposition groups. It is still based on the relatively limited political participation usually associates with mature democracies. Ayad (1992) concluded that one of the most important reasons for Egyptians ignoring general elections is their lack of confidence in the voting and counting process.

The democratisation process has led to a proliferation of, and an increase in the assertiveness of, social, intellectual, professional and business syndicates and associations. These groups usually followed the government line under President Sadat; they were split between those who supported the president such as business associations and the medical profession syndicates, and those who opposed him such as the press and lawyer syndicates. The democratization under Mubarak has made the government less influential in these associations.

Mubarak has consistently followed a hands-off policy towards them. The members of these associations now have the opportunity to promote their economic interests. In regard to work opportunities and income, these interests are largely connected with the Arab world. They have become vocal in supporting Arab causes, particularly, that of the Palestinian cause and in pressuring the government to take the same position. They did their best to disrupt the normalization process with Israel.

### 3.3- The Cultural Situation

Demographically, Egypt has remained the most densely populated state in the Arab world. Apart from its obvious utility for the industrial and military potential of the country, the sheer size of the population in comparison with other Arab countries has significantly contributed to Egypt's persisting centrality in the Arab world. Egypt's large population contains a large and well-qualified middle-class sector.

The enormous efforts by the Nasserite leadership to expand education at the secondary and university level tended to produce a large number of educated personnel who could not be absorbed by the country's economic, social and educational institutions. Consequently, many of these graduates were dispatched to teach and work in the educational institutions of Arab and other developing countries. This trend has continued in the 1970s and 1980s. Almost all of those concerned with education planning agreed that there were far too many university graduates for the country's needs. It can be argued that the huge number of graduates, in terms of the country's needs, represented an active soil for Muslim extremists in the 1970s and 1980s.

Egyptians believe historically, and feel nationally, that their country represents one of the oldest civilizations in the world; that their state is the oldest and most experienced in the region. To this extent they have a secular perception of – and an instinct for – survival. After 1973, they came to view their quarrel with Israel as being one over territory: they wanted Sinai back. They did not, however, ignore the political rivalry with Israel in the region. At the same time they argued that other Arabs, despite their opposition for the moment, could do very little about Israel without Egypt's leadership and support. They could not deny Egypt a role in the Arab World, by virtue of its sheer size, the dynamism of its experience and the momentum of its human resources (Vatikiotis, 1991). Sullivan (1994) asserts this point and argues that Egypt has a greater sense of self-worth, self-respect, and thus a greater appreciation of its own way of doing things, whether that be Islamic, Egyptian or Arab.

As his domestic power base grew stronger, President Sadat began, gradually, to shift Egypt attitudinal position regarding the Arab world towards an increasing emphasis on Egyptian affairs. Egypt's ideological orientation became progressively more national. After the enormous human and material cost of the October War, the Egyptians felt that they had made enough sacrifices for the Arab cause and that the time had come for them to turn their attention towards domestic reconstruction.

The impact of the October 1973 war found Egyptians reverting to an earlier sense of national identity, that of Egyptianism. Egypt became their foremost consideration reflection in contrast to the earlier one, preferred by the Nasser regime, of Egypt's role and primacy in the Arab world. In general, according to Vatikiotis (1991), there was a perceptible determination on the part of the Egyptians for a partial disengagement from

the Middle East conflict and a re-adoption of the old slogans; "Egypt for the Egyptian" and "Egypt first above all else". By the beginning of 1978, after Sadat's visit to Israel, a great debate about Egypt's identity dominated intellectual circles and received intensive publications in the media. The debate was led by Tawfiq al-Hakim who in the 1920s and 1930s was a member of a Pharaonist movement. The debate pushed to the surface the tension between old-style secular Egyptian nationalists and those still clinging to a partly Islamic based orientation (Ibrahim, 1988).

This intense debate seriously affected the Egyptian public. Its results were evident in roughly two periods. In the first period, from 1977 until mid-1982, Egypt's rejection of identification with the Arab world triumphed. In the second period, from mid-1982 until the present, an emphasis on the commonality of Egypt's interest with the Arab world prevailed. During the first period, Egypt witnessed, for the first time in its history, anti-Palestinian demonstrations after the events in Cyprus in February 1978 in which a group of Palestinians hijacked an Egyptian plane on its way to Larnaka. Fifteen Egyptian were killed. Among them was Yussuf al-Sibai, Egypt's Minister of culture and a well-known writer (Ali, 1988)

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 was a watershed in the process of Egyptian re-identification with the Arab world and Arab issues. Previous Israeli actions such as the invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 had frustrated some Egyptians. However, they continued to hope for the best. Some in the media even hinted at Arab intransigence. The invasion of 1982 was different. As the events unfolded that led to the lonely stand of the PLO in Beirut, Egyptian began to feel guilt. Suddenly all the claims of Tawfik al-Hakim and others disappeared from the Egyptian media. Many even reversed their position. Egyptian demonstrations in this period were different. They were not anti-Arab or anti-Palestinian, but anti-Israeli and anti-American (Ali, 1988, Ibrahim, 1988).

Another issue dominated Egyptian culture environment in 1970s and 1980s: Islamic fundamentalism. The late 1970s witnessed a violent clash between Coptics and Muslims in Cairo, Alexandria and parts of Upper Egypt. In 1980s, there were attacks against politicians and intellectuals. Negative results of an economic open door policy, controlled democratisation, limited participation and re-orientation of Egypt's foreign policy towards Israel and the United States were among the reasons which led to the

increasing violence in Egypt. A full discussion of the Islamic environment is not to be in this study. However, it is important to deal briefly with the Islamic phenomenon in 1970s and 1980s because Islam constitutes the main cultural dimension of Egyptian society.

According to Ali (1988), the Egyptian people as a whole, both Muslim and Christian, have become more religious and conservative. The Western dominance, which continued from the beginning of the century until the mid-1970s, has begun to decline. Egyptians have become more observant of religious rituals such as praying, fasting and pilgrimage to Mecca. All Egyptian institutions organize religious events and encourage religious behaviour. Kepel (1985) confirms the point and states that, though having many of the institutional forms of a Westernised secular state, Egypt remains an Islamic state in form and essence, just as its society remains faithful to traditional religious beliefs and practices despite more than a century of evolution towards secularism. Surveys show that the Egyptians are in favour of the application of Islamic law [sharia]. In a survey, conducted by National Centre for Social and Criminological Research (1985), on 3,425 Egyptian, it was found that 98 percent of Muslims and 63 percent of Christians agreed with the application of Islamic law.

The traditional Al-Azhar religious institution is gaining strength within the society. The mass media have resurrected the traditional role of Al-Azhar. The government is using this prestigious religious institution to promote the more moderate Islamic ideas on the one hand and to fight the more violent religious groups on the other. According to Kepel (1985), the modern Egyptian state has regained control of religious institutions and religion in the manner of some of the classical Islamic states. It assumes responsibility for religious interpretation, determines what role Islam will play in political life, and organizes the religious life of the nation. Olsen (1988) argues that Islam in Egypt has been used to legitimise the different policies of the changing governments over the past three decades. From its founding in 972, according to Ajami (1983), Al-Azhar has been willing to repeat the utterances of the state and give the deeds of rulers' religious sanction and cover. The manner in which Al-Azhar gave its approval to Sadat's journey to Jerusalem is illustrative. In a statement (fatwa) issued in May of 1979, Al-Azhar said 'We believe that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty is in harmony with Islamic law. It was concluded from a position of strength after the battle of the holy struggle (jihad) and the victory realized by Egypt on the tenth of Ramadan of 1393 (October 1973)'.

Apart from the traditional and official Islamic institutions, which include Al-Azhar and the Ministry of Religious Endowments, there are other organizations and groups. The most famous is the Muslim brotherhood\* (the Ikhwan), which is described as 'moderate', and radical groups such as Al-Jihad (Holy War) and Jamaat Al-Islamia (a young Muslim group). The main difference between The Ikhwan and the radical groups is their orientation toward the political regime. While the first participated in the political process through gradual change, the latter viewed the existing system of government as illegitimate and rejected the idea of compromise and participation (Azzam, 1998; Yassin, 1987).

The Muslim brotherhood, the main Islamic movement in Egypt since the 1920s, has achieved a prominent standing in Egypt's politics. Although it has no officially recognized status as a party, it has tried to work within the legal political system of the country and has enjoyed de facto recognition since entering into coalition politics under Mubarak. In the 1984 general elections, the Muslim Brotherhood allied with the Wafd Party and gained eight of fifty-eight seats. In the 1987 elections, it allied itself with the SLP and Liberal Party and gained forty of the sixty seats won by the alliance, representing the largest single opposition group in the People's Assembly.

Furthermore, members of the Muslim Brotherhood dominated the membership of professional organizations such as the medical profession (Yassin, 1987; Shaikh, 1992). It is seen as the most influential Islamic movement in Egypt during the last century. According to Faksh (1997), the Ikhwan found its strongest support among the middle and lower-middle classes who saw Islam as Egypt's salvation. Indeed, the Ikhwan spoke to the masses in their own language, the simple language of Islam, affirming the belief that Islam provides thorough and sound solutions to all problems.

<sup>\*</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan) was founded in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna. It became the major mainstream Islamic fundamentalist movement, with its adherents and branches in the other Arab countries. Starting as a reform movement concerned mainly with religious activities and individual and social morality, the Ikhwan grew in 1940s into a populist Islamic movement with an activist political bent, advocating an Islamic polity based on Islamic norms and laws (Shari'a). In 1954, the Ikhwan was banned following an assassination attempt on Nasser; thousands of its members were arrested and its leading figures executed. Under Sadat, despite its opposition to many internal and foreign policies, the Ikhwan continue to work within the framework of the political system. This strategy continued under Mubarak with more participation in the open economic, social and political environment. (more details about the active role of the Ikhwan in Egypt can be found in Faksh, 1997; Shaikh, 1992; & Kepel, 1985)

In the last three decades, the Ikhwan has kept a working relationship with the political regime. It did so despite its opposition to Sadat's peace initiative with Israel and his general alliance with the United States which it saw as betraying the Islamic struggle. It also opposed aspects of his economic and political liberalization because they led to neither improved welfare in society nor to a wider enfranchisement and freedom (Faksh, 1997). Ali (1988) stated that the Muslim Brotherhood is increasingly distancing itself from the radical and violent Islamic groups. In the 1987 elections campaign, the radical groups distributed leaflets denouncing the Muslim Brotherhood for participation in the elections, accusing it of selling out the Islamic cause. The Muslim Brotherhood denounced the acts of violence and terrorism committed by these groups.

The radical and more violent Islamic groups have appeared in Egypt since the mid-1970s. They made a mark on Egyptian history when members of one of these groups, *Al-Jihad* (Holy war), assassinated President Sadat. Since then, they have continued to attract members, especially among students where they found a loyal following. Hammoud (1996) concluded that there two main domestic factors behind the increasing appearance and plurality of the radical Islamic groups in Egypt during the seventies and the eighties: First, there had been a withdrawal of the state from its 'welfare' role, a move that benefited the Islamic fundamentalists who enhanced their social role and appeal. Second, the political climate, characterised by the repression of dissent and by a lack of freedom, helped to radicalise and alienate people who had been subjected to oppression and coercion by the government.

These groups rejected any compromise with the state and refused to participate in any legal political activity. In contrast to the main stream *Ikhwan* movement, they turned to violent means against political figures at all levels. One of these groups (*Al-Jihad*) claimed responsibility for the assassination of President Sadat in October 1981 as retaliation against his internal economic and political policies and external peace initiatives. They have continued to carry out violent acts not only against politicians but also against the society as a whole. In 1987 they tried to assassinate the former interior ministers, H. Abu Basha and M. N. Ismail. They also attack everything that they consider immoral in music and art (Shaikh, 1992). Ali (1988) argued that although an element of violence appeared in late 1970s and 1980s, it could be seen that a moderate

Islam was what the Egyptian people wanted. In contrast, nationalism was predominant in the 1950s and 1960s and liberalization in the 1970s.

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that Egyptian society in the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a significant change in its economic, political and cultural dimensions. In economics, there was a shifting from an economic state-monopoly to an open door economic policy. Politically, Egypt moved from a one-party to a multi-party system and from an autocratic regime to controlled democratisation. Culturally, Egyptians fluctuated between a national, Arabic and Islamic identity.

The Egyptian media institutions and the extent to which they are connected to the economic, political and cultural situation in Egypt are discussed in the next chapter. The following chapters deal with the economic, political and socio/cultural situation as presented in the press.

# Chapter four

# Egyptian Mass Media Institutions

The mass media of any country contains ingredients that are endemic to their local setting, characteristics that make them special products of the social milieu from which they originate. The press and mass media in the Middle East have developed certain traits that are peculiar to the region's social and psychological framework (Mowlana, 1988). In analysing the mass media in the Arab world, some factors should be taken into account: government power and control over the media, western influence, interrelationships between countries of the region, cultural environment and economic factors (Boyd-Barrett, 2000)

The mass media in Egypt has been influenced by political, economic and social changes that have taken place in the last few decades. This chapter discusses developments in the Egyptian press and broadcasting (radio and television). Control, ownership and financing of the Egyptian media will be dealt with. First let us consider the Egyptian press.

# 4.1-The Egyptian press:

Some scholars stated that the publication of newspapers in Egypt has been organized over time by a series of laws (Tayie, 1989). However, others argue that press laws in Egypt do not reveal all the details of who decides editorial content and why. According to Rugh (1979), the press laws tend to imply that the media are freer than they really are. However, they do not mention some essential extra-legal influences.

The press, in its modern sense, was introduced in Egypt in the late eighteen century. In August 1798 Napoleon Bonaparte published the first newspaper ever to appear in Egypt, Le Courier d' Egypte. It mainly dealt with political news and appeared in editions of four pages once every four days. The aim was to print and distribute decrees and daily orders. Two months later, Bonaparte founded a second journal, Le Decade Egyptian, for scholars and administrators interested in the archaeological study and literary developments of the Nile Valley. Because combined attacks by the Turks, British and native rebel forces compelled the French to evacuate the country, these publications soon disappeared (Mowlana, 1988; Aboubakr, 1980)

A new press era started in 1881, when the first press law was enacted. While this law stated that the publication of newspapers was a right for any individual on condition of having permission from the government (Tayie, 1989), it gave the government the right to close down or confiscate any newspaper violating public order, religion or morals. With the beginning of the British Occupation in 1882, the Egyptian press developed and flourished until 1914, when World War I began and brought along restrictions in the form of martial law. Many newspapers had to close down and others lost their national spirit.

From 1923, the time of Egypt's first constitution and the beginning of its parliamentary democracy, the Egyptian press largely enjoyed freedom. There were, however, many different points of view about the terms reached with Britain in drafting the constitution. The press participated fully in the discussions. Each party took its own line. Each had newspapers publishing its news and views. With the beginning of World War II, martial law was re-imposed. This led to the disappearance of several newspapers. The abolition of martial law and the lifting of censorship in 1950 led to a rapid growth of the radical press in the following two years. The press openly called for a revolution (Janokouwski, 1975).

When Nasser came to the office after the 1952 revolution, several measures were taken by the government to integrate the press with the regime. The Office of Censorship of Publications was established in 1957. In 1960, the press was nationalized under the Press Organization Law (Law 156, 1960). According to this law, the publication of a newspaper was subject to permission from the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which was the sole political party in existence. ASU became the owner of the national newspapers. Each newspaper had a board of directors, half of whom were elected and half appointed by the ASU (Law 156, 1960). The role of the press in the 1960s was to mobilize public opinion strongly towards the ideology of the government. The final breakdown in press credibility occurred in 1967; the Egyptian press overestimated the power of the Egyptian army and its ability to defeat Israel (Dabbous, 1994).

In the 1970s, under President Sadat, Egypt witnessed a series of political, economic and social changes (as explained in chapter three). While the press under Sadat started to enjoy a certain degree of freedom, it continued to propagate the official policy of the new regime which was being adopted as the national policy (Ibrahim, 1991). The 1971

constitution gave freedom to the press and lifted newspaper censorship. Journalists became free to write what they wanted as long as they followed the official policy. When Mohammed Heikal, the former confident of Nasser and editor of Al-Ahram, expressed fundamental opposition to the way Sadat had conducted the October war and to Sadat's direct appeal to the United States to solve the Arab-Israeli problem, he was removed (Ibid)

The most outspoken criticism during the Sadat period continued to come from the non-dailies. The monthly Al-Tali'ah remained a Marxist organ, and the weekly Rose Al-Yousif, which became very popular with intellectuals, was also to the left of the mainstream. When Al-Tali'ah and Rose Al-Yousif said that the January riots in 1977 were an expression of mass disaffection, this was out of line with the government's view that the riots were inspired by radical elements. Shortly thereafter, Al-Tali'ah was closed and was replaced by a science magazine, and the editor of Rose Al-Yousif was replaced by a man more supportive of government policies. In 1979, other editors were removed as a result of their criticism and opposition to the peace treaty with Israel (Rugh, 1979)

In 1980, new legislation was passed dealing with the authority of the press and the rights and responsibilities of journalists (Law 148, 1980). According to this legislation, the Supreme Press Council, which was founded in 1975, had the right to organize and control the press. The president of the Supreme Press Council is the president of the Council of Advice. Ownership of the national newspapers and the Middle East Agency was by the state. Right of this ownership lay with the Council of Advice which has the right to nominate the heads of the boards of directors and the editors of all national newspapers. The new law also allowed the political parties to publish their own newspapers. By September 1981, all the opposition newspapers were closed as a result of open criticism of Sadat's domestic and foreign policy, especially towards relations with the West and Israel. Many leaders of the opposing parties were jailed. The press in this period lost the degree of freedom it had enjoyed in the late 1970s, and turned instead to a state-controlled instrument for managing public opinion. When Mubarak came to office in 1981, he set free all the imprisoned leaders and gave the opposition parties the freedom to operate again and to publish their own newspapers.

Law 148 lasted until 1996 when new legislation, Law no. 96, 1996, on the organization of the Egyptian press was passed. The new law consists of 81 articles and contains all the

previous law's articles. The most important articles in Law 96 are articles 21 and 22. They state that any journalist is to be jailed for abusing public officials, insulting the parliament, army courts, authorities or public agencies. Some opposition newspaper journalists were punished in line with those two articles.

At present there are five major national daily newspapers: three morning newspapers: Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar and Al-Gomhuria, and two evening newspapers: Al-Messa and Al-Ahram Al-Messa'e. These papers are distributed all over Egypt and most Arab countries. Al-Ahram is the only national daily printing an international edition in the United States and Europe. The international edition of Al-Ahram is reprinted through satellite. In addition to these five papers, there are other daily newspapers: the Egyptian Gazette, Le Progres Egyptien and Le Journal d'Egypt. The Egyptian Gazette is printed in English and the last two in French. The circulation of these newspapers does not exceed a few thousand copies per day which are circulated in Cairo, Alexandria and other big cities in Egypt. Table (4.1) shows the main national daily newspapers and their circulation.

Table (4.1): Circulation of national daily newspapers

| Newspaper                                  | Circulation (by thousand) |      |      |  |
|--|---------------------------|------|------|--|
|  | 1977                      | 1987 | 1998 |  |
| Al-Ahram (The Pyramids)                    | 650                       | 800  | 980  |  |
| Al-Akhbar (The News)                       | 530                       | 750  | 900  |  |
| Al-Gomhuria (The Republic)                 | 120                       | 450  | 550  |  |
| Al-Ahram Al-Messae (The Evening Pyramids)* | -                         | -    | 240  |  |
| Al-Messa (The Evening)                     | 60                        | 180  | 220  |  |
| The Egyptian Gazette                       | 35                        | 40   | 42   |  |
| Le Progres Egyptien                        | 10                        | 10   | 11   |  |
| Le Journal d'Egypte                        | 3                         | 3    | 3    |  |

<sup>\*</sup> Al-Ahram Al-Messae has published in 1994

Sources; Egyptian Newspaper Statistics (1977, 1987); Europa Yearbook (1998), London: Martins Printing Group; Al-Ahram advertising prices list (1998); Eilts (1988).

Newspaper circulation has witnessed changes during the 1990s if compared with the figures of the 1980s and 1970s. It can be seen from table (4.1) that circulation increased in the 1990s compared with that of the 1980s and 1970s respectively. This is particularly so for the major five newspapers. It can be explained by the increase in the population as

it increased rapidly from 38 million in 1976 to 50 million in 1986 and reached 58 million in 1996. Percentages of illiteracy decreased from 55% in 1970s to about 46% in 1990s. It can be seen that while the population increased by 52% from 1970s to mid 1990s, however, illiteracy decreased by only 9% in the same period.

Apart from the dailies, there are various types of non-daily publications. The most famous are the weekly periodical magazines, *Akher Saa, Al-Mussawar, Rose Al-Yousf, October, Sabah Al-Khair, Al-Izaa wal-Television* and *Hawa*. Circulation of these weekly magazines ranges from 35 thousand to 135 thousand. Some of the weekly magazines are distributed in many Arab countries (Eilts, 1988). There is also a large number of political, technical, religious and social periodicals. In the last two years (from 1998), new private newspapers such as the dailies AL-Isbo'a (The Week) and Al-Dostour (The Constitution) as well as a daily business newspaper A'lam AlYoum (The World Today) entered the Egyptian market. The newly introduced private newspapers are very small in terms of circulation and influence in comparison with the main national daily (Amin & Napoli, 2000).

At the present time, there are five major opposing political parties in Egypt, each publishing its own weekly newspaper and representing views on domestic and foreign issues. The most wide spread opposing newspapers are Al-Shaab, which belongs to Socialist Labor Party, Al-Ahally that belongs to the Progressive Unionist Party, Al-Ahrar, which is published by the Liberal party and Al-Wafd that belongs to the New Wafd Party. Al-Wafd has been a daily since April 1994. There are also many periodicals which are published by professional societies, provincial governments, social clubs, government organs, universities, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and news agencies and embassies in Cairo.

# 4.2 The Egyptian Radio and Television

#### 4.2.1- The Egyptian Radio

Radio broadcasting in Egypt started at the beginning of 1920s with several private commercial stations, mostly located in Cairo. These stations stopped operating by the end of the 1920s because of a lack of financial resources. At the beginning of the 1930s, the Egyptian government signed a ten-year contract with the Marconi Company of the United Kingdom to provide a broadcasting service for Egypt. The official opening date

of the Marconi-operated Egyptian radio service was 31 May 1934. The system was initially financed by a licence fee on receivers; 60% was for Marconi and 40% for the government for the costs of construction and operation of transmitters (Dabbous, 1994)

Though Marconi contract was renewed in 1943 with a stipulated expiry date of 31 January 1949, it did not last until the end of the period. On 4th March 1947, the Egyptian government terminated the contract and the radio service became Egyptian owned and operated. "National consideration" was given as the reason for terminating the contract during the second term. A more specific explanation for cancellation, according to Boyd (1982), was increasing Egyptian resistance to British policy, particularly in something as sensitive as radio broadcasting, and the general weakness of British influence in the Arab World following World War II. After the termination of the second Marconi contract, and until 1952, control of Egyptian radio was moved between the Ministries of Social Affairs and Internal Affairs. Finally, when the Ministry of Information was established after the 1952 revolution, it became the ministry concerned (Tayie, 1989). It is still the Ministry that controls and operates both Egyptian radio and television.

After the 1952 revolution, broadcasting developed greatly. The Revolutionary Command Council realized the importance of radio as a communication medium, particularly with a high level of illiteracy among the population. Before the revolution, Egyptian radio used to transmit on only two national services with a daily transmission of 18 hours. By 1960, the number of services had increased from two to seven and the hours of transmission reached 72 hours per day (Ibrahim, 1991)

In 1959, a Presidential decree gave the broadcasting organization "economic character". It allowed broadcast services to accept commercial advertising and to utilize the hard currency that might result from such advertising. Radio advertising was first allowed on "The People Programme" in April 1959 and later in the same year on "The Alexandria Local Service". The Middle East Programme, which began on 31 May 1964, was the first commercial service in Egypt. It was a night-time and early morning service (Boyd, 1982) In April 1981, the Egyptian government started a new specialized system called the Broadcasting Network System. With this system, Egyptian radio consists of six national networks and the overseas network. Since January 1995, the number of national networks increased to seven. Table (4.2) shows the seven national networks and the number of daily transmission hours for each network.

Table (4.2) Transmission hours of radio' networks

|                           | Hours of Transmission |         |       |           |         |       |  |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|---------|-------|-----------|---------|-------|--|
| Network                   | 1985/1986             |         |       | 1994/1995 |         |       |  |
|                           | Hours                 | Minutes | %     | Hours     | Minutes | %     |  |
| The Principle Network     | 24                    |         | 15.0  | 24        |         | 8.9   |  |
| The Commercial Network    | 13                    | 45      | 8.6   | 17        | 02      | 6.3   |  |
| The Voice of Arab Network | 27                    | 30      | 17.2  | 33        | 10      | 12.3  |  |
| The Local Network         | 43                    | 25      | 27.2  | 108       | 25      | 40.1  |  |
| The Sport Network*        |                       |         |       | 16        | 29      | 6.1   |  |
| The Religion Network      | 19                    |         | 12.0  | 24        |         | 8.9   |  |
| The Cultural Network      | 32                    | 02      | 20.0  | 47        | 12      | 17.4  |  |
| Total                     | 159                   | 42      | 100.0 | 270       | 18      | 100.0 |  |

<sup>\*</sup> The sport network has become a separate network in the first of January 1995

Source: Egyptian Radio and Television Union Yearbook, 1986, 1995

In total, the seven national networks' number of transmission hours was 60,680 hours during 1985-1986, with a daily average of 159 hours and 42 minutes (Egyptian Radio and Television Union Yearbook, 1986). This increased to 99,645 with a daily average of 270 hours and 18 minutes during 1994-1995 (Egyptian Radio and Television Union Yearbook, 1995). It can be seen from table (4.2) that the number of transmission hours increased noticeably during the 1990s. This may be explained by the new local services starting in the early 1990s. The total daily hours of transmission of local service was 43 hours and 25 minutes in 1985. This number increased to 124 hours and 54 minutes in 1996, including the Sports Network that became a separate network in 1995.

Egypt has had one of the largest overseas' programnes in the world. It started in July 1953 with a broadcast to Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan. By 1973, 20 years of expansion in international radio broadcasting had made Egypt the sixth largest international broadcaster in the world (Egyptian Radio & Television Union Yearbook, 1976). One of the earliest foreign language programs was the Hebrew service. As Israel was the intended target, the majority of the broadcasts was on medium wave. During the 1960s and until 1978, the Hebrew program ranged from 12 to 15 hours per day, operating mostly in the afternoon and evening.

After 1978, Egypt decreased the service's hours for two reasons. First, the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel implied a normalizing of relations that almost mandated some changes in the service. Second, since the peace agreement, Egypt had to strive to explain its actions to the other Arab countries, many of which had attempted to isolate Sadat as a political leader. Part of the transmission time devoted to Hebrew prior to 1978 was later used to broadcast to other Arab countries in Arabic (Boyd, 1982). In 1995, the total number of transmission' hours of the Hebrew service was 2,190 hours with a daily transmission of only 6 hours (General Institution of Information Yearbook, 1995).

During the 1980s, the total number of transmission of the overseas network reached 19,162 hours and 30 minutes with a daily average of 52 hours and 30 minutes. This increased during the 1990s to 23,241 hours and 30 minutes with a daily average of 64 hours and 20 minutes (Egyptian Radio & Television Union Yearbook, 1986, 1995). The overseas network includes 45 services in 33 languages and covers almost all regions of the world in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Europe and North and South Americas.

#### 4.2.2- The Egyptian Television

Television was officially introduced in Egypt on 21st July 1960. In 1959, the Egyptian government signed a contract with the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) to provide a complete television service for Egypt. Three separate channels were provided under the contract. The first channel was to provide a mixture of popular programming, news and programmes concerned with developmental and educational goals. The second channel was designed initially to be for urban areas and better educated audiences. Channel three provided programmes to the foreign community, featuring Egyptian-made programs in French and English. The third channel was closed after the 1967 war between Egypt and Israel for financial reasons (Dabbous, 1994).

During earlier years, television broadcast a great deal of foreign programs, mostly American and British. Immediately after the 1967 war, there was a decrease in the amount of foreign programming that was shown on television. British and American programs became unacceptable due to the break in diplomatic relations with Great Britain and the United States. After 1974, the year when the door was formally opened to the West, the number of Western programs on Egyptian television increased again

(Boyd, 1982). Colour television was introduced in Egypt in August 1974. The French government had been successful in persuading Egypt to adopt the SECAM system and had installed colour equipment in one of the Egyptian studios before the 1973 war. After the war, the decision was made to convert both production and transmission facilities to colour. In the early 1980s, television had a great expansion in Egypt. For a population of 45 million in 1980, there were about 3 million TV sets. This number increased to 4,253,000 sets in 1983 (Ibid).

At the present time, Egyptian television has seven channels: two national and five regional channels. The national channels, first and second channels, cover all the country. While programs on channel one concentrate on informational and social activities, a great deal of channel two broadcasts cultural programs and foreign art. The regional channels cover specific regions in Egypt and broadcast informational and instructional programs addressing local problems and issues. Table (4.3) shows the Egyptian television channels, daily transmission hours in 1995 of each channel and their respective dates.

Table (4.3): Transmission hours of television channels

| Television Channels & Starting Date |                | Transmission Hours (1995) |      |       |  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|------|-------|--|
| Channel                             | Starting Date  | Hou.                      | Min. | %     |  |
| Channel 1 (national)                | July, 1960     | 19                        | 59   | 20,5  |  |
| Channel 2 (national)                | July, 1961     | 17                        | 54   | 18.4  |  |
| Channel 3 (regional)                | October, 1984  | 13                        | 36   | 14.0  |  |
| Channel 4 (regional)                | October, 1988  | 11                        | 27   | 11.8  |  |
| Channel 5 (regional)                | December, 1990 | 12                        | 37   | 13.0  |  |
| Channel 6 (regional)                | May, 1994      | 12                        | 35   | 13.0  |  |
| Channel 7 (regional)                | May, 1994      | 9                         | 04   | 9.3   |  |
| Total                               |                | 97                        | 12   | 100.0 |  |

Source: Egyptian Radio & Television Yearbook, 1995

Apart from the regional channels, the total number of transmission hours of the two national channels amounted to 8,743 hours and 57 minutes during 1984/1985, with a daily average of 23 hours and 57 minutes. This number increased during 1994/1995 to

13,830 hours and 16 minutes, with a daily average of 37 hours and 53 minutes (Egyptian Radio & TV Union Yearbook, 1985, 1995). Egyptian television has 12 studios: five mainly for drama production, three for programmes production, three announcer studios and one for the news. In 1997, the Egyptian government opened a new and huge production centre for television programs, *Informative Production City*. It has the facilities to produce more than 3,500 hours of television programmes every day. It contains thirteen closed studios, ten big open studios and many other facilities concerned with TV production (Ibid)

Concerning new technologies, Egypt has sought actively to develop its terrestrial radio and television broadcasting through modern telecommunication facilities. The establishment of the Arab Telecommunication Satellite Organization (ARABSAT) was an attempt to provide a general and specialized telecommunication service for Egypt. The Egyptian Satellite Channel (ESC) went into operation for the first time in December 1990, covering Africa, the Arab World and the Mediterranean (General Institution of Information Yearbook, 1995)

ESC transmission hours reached 24 hours daily in 1995. It aims at connecting Arab people around the world to Egyptian culture. However, one of its main goals was to reach the remote areas within Egypt such as the army and petroleum sites. Its programs concentrate on culture [33.6%] and entertainment [25.4%]. ESC also rebroadcasts the programs of the first channel, including selected programs of the other regional channels. In May 1994, a second satellite channel, Nile TV, went on the air. The Nile TV broadcasts programs in two foreign languages, English and French. It reflects Egyptian views on regional and international issues (Ibid)

In October 1995, Egyptian Radio and Television Union agreed with the Marta Marconi Company, a French company, to establish an Egyptian satellite, NileSat 101. It was launched in April 1998. It has the facility to broadcast 72 television services for 24 hours daily. Transmitting across North Africa and Arabian Peninsula, NileSat beams down more than 100 digital television channels. At present, Egyptian satellite channels and more than 12 specialized channels for educational, developmental and informational purposes are broadcasting through NileSat (Amin & Naboli, 2000; General Institution of Information Yearbook, 1995)

# 4.3 The Middle East News Agency (MENA)

After the 1952 revolution, Egypt developed the practice of having the state news agency provide guidance on the order of news items for both radio and television. This guideline, according to Boyd (1982), stipulates that stories about heads of state come first, generally to be followed by stories on those Arab countries with which the country has close relations. After this come stories on the rest of the Arab World and other foreign countries.

The Middle East News Agency (MENA) is the major news provider in Egypt. MENA began as a private venture on 28 February 1956 with the objective of serving as a regional news agency. In 1962 the Egyptian government nationalized it. After the 1980 law, ownership of MENA was moved to the Council of Advice. Like other news organizations, property rights belong to the Supreme Press Council, which also has the right to nominate a board of directors to run the organization (Aboubakr, 1980; Tayie, 1989). Regarding its relationship with other international news agencies, MENA exchanges news with approximately 25 agencies. It relays 40,000 words on its local Arabic report, 35,000 words on its overseas Arabic report, 25,000 words on its English report, 15,000 words on its French report and 44,000 words on its economic report (Dabbous, 1994)

MENA started publishing the *Cairo Press Review* on 9 April 1956. This review provided a daily English translation of the most important editorials and articles appearing in the Egyptian press in order to make it possible for diplomats and foreign correspondents in Egypt to be up-to-date with the news published in the press. MENA also published the *Party Press Review*, which translates into English the news and editorials published by the opposition party's papers. MENA is supposed to receive an annual budgetary allocation from the Ministry of Information, but the agency tends to rely more on, and maintains itself through, contracts with Reuters and Agance France-Press in addition to its television services (Tayie, 1989).

# 4.4 The Egyptian Media Control and Finance

The structure of ownership and control of the mass media have gone through considerable transformations since the World War 2 owing to technological advance, concentration of production and marketing, and the capacity for a global reach of communications throughout the world. In the developing countries, several factors influence the pattern of media ownership. Some of these factors are, initially, colonial or investment spheres of influence, government structure [whether democratic, autocratic, or modelled on a single governing party], the size of the local investment, and cultural factors.

In Africa, where the press is of limited importance as a mass medium because of low rates of literacy, four types of ownership and control may be detected: religious, political party, private and government. The latter is obviously by far the most important (O'Brien, undated). According to Mytton (1983), ownership of the daily newspapers in Africa is concentrated in the hands of either the governments or the ruling parties. Mowlana (1988) pointed out that government control of the mass media is common in the Middle East. Most of the countries in the region consider mass media as instruments of national policy, devices by which the goals of the national government in power can be furthered. Such a theory of the role of the mass media demands control over its content.

As for the Egyptian media, they have always been closely tied to politics. The first newspaper to appear in Egypt was an official publication, *Courier de' Egypte*. It was intended to inform and instruct the French expeditionary forces and improve their morale. The first indigenous Egyptian papers, *Journal Al-Khadyu* and *Al-Waqa'I Al-Masriyh*, were published by the government in 1827 and 1828. They contained official government guidance and authorized editorials. Almost all the publication laws regarding press matters in Egypt reinforced state control over the newspapers. The first law, which passed in 1881, stated that the publication of newspapers was a right for any individual on condition of obtaining permission from the government and gave the government the right to close or confiscate any paper. Law 20, in 1936, also stated that publishing a newspaper was subject to government permission.

After the 1952 revolution, as explained above, government control over the press increased. In 1960, all Egyptian newspapers were nationalized and became state owned. In the 1960s and 1970s, the National Union and Arab Socialist Union exercised this authority. When Law 148 was passed in 1980, it gave the Supreme Press Council (SPC) the right to control and manage the Egyptian press. The new and latest legislation on

press matters issued in 1996 and stated that the big national papers are state owned (Law 96, 1996). Accordingly, publishing a newspaper is subject to obtaining a licence from the SPC (the President of the Council of Advice is the head of the SPC). The Council of Advice includes members from many fields, half being nominated by the government. The Council of Advice also nominates editors and heads the board of directors of national newspapers after government approval.

Broadcasting, according to Katz (1978), is subject to state legislation in almost all the countries in the world. The original justification for this control was technical. Available frequencies are a limited resource and governments take the view that its utilization must be controlled in order to enable their countries to make the most effective use of the frequencies allocated to them by international agreement. However, in developing countries, government control of broadcasting usually involves much more than the allocation of frequencies. Political considerations have progressively caused control to extend to the content of services. Egyptian radio became government owned and operated in 1947. The Ministry of Social Affairs performed this ownership. In 1963, a presidential decree was issued, putting the Egyptian Broadcasting Organization, radio and television under the control of the Ministry of National Guidance. This was followed by three laws that transferred the EBO to the Radio and Television Union, body theoretically independent of the government (Dabbous, 1994).

The Egyptian Radio and Television Union is run by three main bodies: the Board of Trustees, General Assembly and the Board of Delegate Members. The president of the Egyptian Radio and Television Union is the head of the above three bodies. In turn, the Cabinet nominates him. Although the Ministry of Information does not supervise the Radio and Television Union directly, it is still in control indirectly. The Minister of Information attends the meetings of the Board of Trustees and participates in discussions. The government also appoints the head of the Board of Trustees who has to inform the Minister of Information of Board decisions and solicit his approval on them. The Board of Trustees also has to make annual recommendations to the Minister of Information (Tayie, 1989). In general, it can be seen that the Egyptian broadcasting system is not only government-controlled, but also government-operated.

Sources of income for the Egyptian radio and television include advertising revenue, program sales and funds from the state budget. The radio license fee which was the

original means of financing the Egyptian radio, has been eliminated. Instead of a license fee, an amount of money was added monthly to electricity bills. After 1974, the revenue that television derived from advertising and from program sales to other Arab countries increased significantly. Before 1974, according to Boyd (1982), most advertising had been restricted to Egyptian state industries. With the open door policy in 1974, as explained in chapter three, the volume of foreign goods in Egyptian shops increased. Consequently, there was a large number of commercials on television for American and European products.

Advertising is considered the main source of finance for most of the Egyptian mass media. Advertising revenue from radio and television increased from \$709,932 in 1973 to \$5,235,300 in 1978 (Ibid). Commercial radio time amounted to 257 hours in 1978, which represented 3% of the total number of transmission hours on the Commercial Radio Network (Tayie, 1989). This number increased to 205 hours in 1994 representing 2.7% of the total transmission hours (Egyptian Radio & Television Yearbook, 1994). On television, where advertising is screened over all channels, commercials amounted to 164 hours in 1978, which represented 2% of the total number of transmission hours. This number reached 616 hours and 41 minutes in 1994 representing 2.3% of the total number of transmission hours (Ibid). Concerning the Egyptian press, advertisements in national dailies cover 39.9% of the total space (though this may vary slightly from one paper to another) (Tayie, 1989)

Briefly, it can be concluded that the development and control of the Egyptian mass media must be related to the political, economic and social environment in Egypt. The political sphere has influenced the development and regulation of the Egyptian media in the last few decades. Content of the electronic media, always reflects the view of political elite and follows national policy.

# **Chapter Five**

# Methodology of the study

As the study mainly investigates the developmental dimensions of the Egyptian mass media role in the peace process, it analyses these dimensions as reflected in the Egyptian media. This chapter discusses methods used in carrying out the fieldwork. Before discussing the methods, the objectives of the study will be considered.

# Objectives of the study

The basic objective of the study is to examine how the Egyptian newspapers dealt with the dimensions of the peace process between Egypt and Israel and five issues or dimensions are taken into consideration. Firstly, difference between national (governmental) and opposition newspapers in covering and presenting various dimensions of the peace process. Secondly, the economic dimension of the peace process as reflected in the Egyptian newspapers. Thirdly, how the Egyptian papers portrayed the political dimension of the peace process. Fourthly, the social/cultural dimension of the peace process as presented in the Egyptian press. Finally, the kind of environment, in which the Egyptian newspapers carried out their coverage of the peace process dimensions.

Regarding the first issue, the study analysis covers differences between Egyptian national and oppositional newspapers in dealing with dimensions of the peace process. Some questions are to be addressed:

- What were the characteristics of the coverage devoted to the dimensions of the peace process in each newspaper?
- How did each newspaper cover every dimension of the peace process?
- What kinds of national actors did each newspaper concentrate on in dealing with the dimensions of the peace process?
- Did the sources of the coverage devoted to the dimensions of the peace process differ from a national newspaper to an opposition one?
- Did the coverage stance differ from one newspaper to another?

To what extent did the coverage in each newspaper differ over time?

In dealing with the second dimension, the study investigates how the economic dimension of development was connected to the peace process between Egypt and Israel. In this respect, the following questions are dealt with:

- What were the most important economic aspects the Egyptian newspapers concentrated on in their coverage of the peace process and to what extent were some specific aspects such as equality of income, satisfaction of material needs and independence of local community connected to the peace?
- What were the characteristics of the Egyptian press coverage of the economic dimension of the peace process? Characteristics of coverage refer to the amount and kind of coverage.
- Who were the main actors involved in the economic dimension of the peace process as presented by the Egyptian press?
- In its coverage of the economic dimension of the peace process, upon what sources did the Egyptian press depend?
- What was the stance of the coverage devoted to the economic dimension of the peace process?

On the political dimension of development as portrayed in the Egyptian media, the study aims at answering the following questions:

- What were the most important political aspects the Egyptian press concentrated on in its coverage of the peace process between Egypt and Israel and to what extent were some specific aspects such as political participation, plurality and stability of political institutions connected to the peace?
- What were the characteristics of the Egyptian press coverage of the political dimension of the peace process?
- Who were the main actors involved in the political dimension of the peace process as presented by the Egyptian press?
- In its coverage of the political dimension of the peace process, on what sources did the Egyptian press depend?
- What was the orientation of the coverage devoted to the political dimension of the peace process?

In dealing with the fourth aspect, the study investigates the cultural/social dimension of development connected with the peace process. In this respect, the following questions were investigated:

- What were the cultural/social aspects the Egyptian press concentrated most on in its coverage of the peace process between Egypt and Israel and to what extent specific aspects such as decreasing unemployment, increasing educational opportunities and national integration connected with the peace settlement?
- In its coverage of the peace process, what aspects of Egypt's identity did the Egyptian press concentrate?
- What the characteristics of the coverage were devoted to the cultural/social dimension of the peace process?
- Who were the main actors involved in the cultural/social dimension of the peace process as presented by the Egyptian press?
- In its coverage of the cultural/social dimension of the peace process, upon what sources did the Egyptian press depend?
- What was the stance of the coverage devoted to the socio/cultural dimension of the peace process?

Concerning the fifth issue, the investigation of the political and economic environment of the Egyptian media, the study considered the following questions:

- What was the relationship between the government and the mass media in Egypt during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s?
- What economic restrictions were placed on the Egyptian press, and how did they influence content? Did the national and opposition newspapers face the same restrictions?
- How free was access to information for journalist and reporter? Was this freedom available to reporters in both national and opposition newspapers?
- How did editors see the role of the Egyptian press develop during the 1970s and 1980s and to what extent was this role connected to the peace process between Egypt and Israel?

# Methods of the study

To achieve the above objectives, the study was carried out in two phases. In the first phase, a content analysis was carried out on a sample of Egyptian newspapers output. The analysis aims at dealing with the first four dimensions of the above objectives. The developmental dimensions (economic, political and cultural/social dimensions) of the peace process between Egypt and Israel as presented by the Egyptian press were investigated through content analysis. In the second phase, interviews were carried out with a number of Egyptian journalists from both national and opposition newspapers. The aim of this was to deal with the fifth dimension of the above objectives, the economic and political environment of the Egyptian press. The following section discusses the two phases of the study.

# **5.1 Content analysis**

## **5.1.1. Definitions of content analysis**

Content analysis has been defined in a variety of ways and used for diverse purposes. Its techniques have been associated with the generation of indicators from virtually every element in the communication process (Hofstetter, 1981). The first attempt to define content analysis as a research technique was made by Berelson (1952). He pointed out that content analysis is a 'research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication' (p. 18). Following this definition, content analysis received many critics for a number of reasons: it is restricted to purely quantitative analysis, concerned with manifest content only, and is more descriptive to the extent that inferences of the effect of media content on audience perceptions of social reality may not be possible (Gunter, 2000). Much of the controversy over definition of content analysis, according to Hansen et al (1998: 94-95), has focused on the notion that it must be objective. Objectivity in content analysis as in any other kind of scientific research is an impossible ideal serving only to provide cosmetic cover and mystify the values, interests and means of knowledge production which underpin such research.

Therefore later definitions of content analysis have omitted references to objectivity. It is a method for the systematic analysis of communication content (Ibid). Krippendorff (1980:21) defined content analysis as "a research technique for making replicable and

valid inferences from data to their context." He also states that content analysis is a tool which provides knowledge, new insights, a representation of facts, and a practical guide to action. The purpose of content analysis is not only to quantify salient and manifest features of a large number of texts, but also to make broader inferences about the processes and politics of representation. Its aim is to examine how news, drama, advertising, and entertainment output reflect social, political and cultural issues and values (Deacon et al, 1999, Hansen et al, 1998).

Since most social processes are transacted through symbols the widest use of content analysis is found in the social sciences and humanities" (Hansen, et al, 1998: 33). Therefore, "several of this century's most prominent sociologists have been attracted to the idea of using content analysis for monitoring the 'cultural temperature' of society, for establishing long-term cultural indicators comparable to the indicators used by economists and politicians in the monitoring of the economy" (p. 92). According to Wimmer and Dominik, (1994), content analysis technique can be used in describing communication content, testing hypotheses of messages characteristics and aims of media producers, comparing media content to the "real world", assessing the image or representation of particular groups in society, and drawing inferences about media effects or establishing a starting point for studies of media effects.

# 5.1.2. Advantages of content analysis

Krippendorff (1980) pointed out some important factors that have differentiated content analysis from other research methods. One of these is the unobtrusiveness of content analysis. He highlights the fact that content analysis is able to accept unstructured material and process symbolic forms. Thus, content analysis has an important place in the mythology of investigative tools. It is capable, first, of accepting relatively unstructured symbolic communications as data and, second, of analyzing unobserved phenomena through the medium of data connected with the phenomena, regardless of whether language is involved.

Content analysis also, according to Berger (1998), allows researchers to deal with subjects that are current. This means that researchers can study phenomena as they develop. It also allows researchers to study past issues with considerable ease, particularly

print media, books, newspapers and magazines. One of the important advantages of content analysis, according to Krippendorff (1980: 31), is that it can cope with large volumes of data that help social scientists in the major phases of their research. This is inherent in the method and is usually one of its advantages, but it has been made easier still with the developing use of computers. As Holsti (1969) indicated, the more laborious chores associated with content analysis will become their domain.

Content analysis provides numbers. The technique, according to Berger (1998), is based on counting and/or measuring, and the findings are given in numerical form. This enables others to replicate the research and see whether or not they obtain the same numbers. But this is only part of the story because once you have data you have the problem of interpretation.

## 5.1.3. Disadvantages of content analysis

As in any other method, the use of content analysis has difficulties. According to Wimmer and Dominik (2000: 138), it alone cannot serve as a basis for making statements about the effect of content on the audience. A study of cartoon programs on television might reveal that 80% of these programs contain commercials for sugared cereal, but this finding alone does not allow researchers to claim that children who watch these programs will want to purchase sugared cereals. An audience research is needed to make this statement.

Another difficulty associated with content analysis, as Berger (1998: 27) pointed out, is with the sampling: how representative is the material someone studies relative to all the material that could be studies? What is the right amount of material to study, and how can a reasonable way of sampling this material be determined? Also, the findings of a particular content analysis, according to Wimmer and Dominik (2000: 138), are limited to the framework of the categories and the definitions used in that analysis. Different researchers may use varying definitions and categories systems to measure a single concept such as televised violence. For that, researchers asserted the importance of defining categories and pointed out that the categories of content analysis must be pertinent to the objective of the study, should be functional, and must be manageable (Stempel III (1989). Another potential limitation is that content analysis is frequently

time-consuming and expensive. The task of examining and categorizing large volumes of content is often laborious (Wimmer and Dominik (2000: 139).

Despite the above critics, content analysis is considered as a very useful research method when used and designed correctly. As Hansen et al (1998) argued, much of the criticism which has been directed at content analysis touches on problems more to do with potential and actual misuses and abuses of the method, than to do with any inherent weaknesses of this method as a means of data-collection (p. 98). Therefore, the following section discusses procedure and steps of content analysis and how they are used in this study.

## 5.1.4. Steps in content analysis

In the present study, content analysis was used in two ways: (a) to make a quantitative description of the developmental dimension of the peace process as portrayed in the Egyptian press; (b) to make inferences about the developmental dimension of the peace process in respect to the political, economic, and cultural/social context in Egypt. Hansen et al (1998) proposed that carrying out content analysis consisted of six related steps: defining the research problem, selecting the media and sample, defining the analytical categories, constructing a coding schedule, piloting the coding schedule and checking reliability and, finally, data-preparation and analysis. As the research problem and objective of the study were discussed above, the next section is concerned with the other five steps of doing and designing content analysis in the present study.

#### 5.1.4.1- Selection of Media and Sample

Holsti (1969) argued that it is too difficult for an analyst involved in media outputs to examine all relevant data or all media coverage. The media produce huge volumes of text and images. For practical reasons, therefore, content analysis must start with selecting a relevant output of media content to be analyzed (Hansen et al, 1998). The selected sample can be employed and findings can be used to make inferences about the whole media content from which they are selected. According to Gunter (2000), sampling in content analysis usually includes more than one step. A first step might be to specify which content sources (media) are to be sampled. Then a decision must be taken about

which editions of each newspaper (in cases where newspapers are the medium) are to be analyzed and over what period of time. At this level, one has to consider how many stories and what types of stories should be identified and analyzed.

Selection of media and sample procedure in the present study consisted of three steps: selecting which media was to be analyzed, clearly, defining periods and dates in which the study was to be conducted and choosing units of analysis or relevant content. All these three steps were selected and considered according to objectives of this study.

### (1) Selection of media

Any content analysis of media coverage should start by selecting which media [radio, television, press and so on] (Hansen et al, 1998), and which channels or specific newspapers within these media, are to be analyzed. Choosing a sample representing the media in a given society is not an easy task, particularly in a country where most of the media are a state controlled such as Egypt (see chapter 4).

In the present study, the Egyptian newspapers were selected within the Egyptian mass media to be the media' sample for the following reasons:

- What is presented in the Egyptian radio and television is similar to what is
  portrayed in the Egyptian newspapers (Al-Gammal, 1991). Consequently, news
  in the Egyptian papers is enough to reflect the content of Egyptian radio and
  television.
- The ease of accessing news and opinion materials on the Egyptian newspapers in the period of the study.
- The study uses news and opinion materials as the units of analysis. Opinion materials are rarely presented in Egyptian radio and television.

According to the above reasons, a sample of daily-national and weekly-opposition newspapers was selected for the analysis. The reason for comparing a daily-national newspaper with a weekly-opposition newspaper is non-existence of a daily-opposition paper in Egypt during the study periods. The first appearance of daily issues was in 1994 when *Al-Wafd* newspaper [The Delegate] became daily.

As the following section discusses the two chosen newspapers for the analysis, the researcher understands the difficulties in defining two newspapers to represent the entire Egyptian press. It can be argued that there are other national newspapers that have different views from those of the selected one (Al-Ahram) and those of the selected opposition newspaper (Al-Shaab) which represents the views of an opposition party (SLP). However, the Egyptian press is homogeneous as discussed in chapter four. The nature of the Egyptian press and the political environment in Egypt concerning the peace process were also taken into consideration in the selection process (as the following section illustrates). It can, therefore, be argued that the newspapers analyzed represent the entire Egyptian press in relation to the developmental dimensions of the peace process

#### - Daily - national newspaper

There are eight national daily-newspapers in Egypt: Al-Ahram [The Pyramids], Al-Akhbar [The News], Al-Gumhuryah [The Republic], Al-Ahram Al-Messai [The Evening pyramids], Al-Messa [The Evening], The Egyptian Gazette, Le Progres Egyptian, and Le Journal d'Egypt. Al-Ahram was selected as the daily-national newspaper for the analysis because it has the highest circulation (as explained in chapter four). It also devotes more space to expressing opinions, which are an important unit of analysis in the present study. Al-Ahram is also described as a conservative and official newspaper and reflects views of the Egyptian government (Dabbous, 1994, Rugh, 1979).

Al-Ahram, according to Merrill (1968, 137), is very important in Egypt and the Middle East generally because it is the closest of all the country's papers to the government. Al-Ahram would have a rightful claim to Egyptian press leadership and even perhaps on press ownership in the entire Arab world. Without a doubt, its range of news coverage and discussion is outstanding, as is its production quality. Al-Ahram, which has sometimes been called by Americans 'The New York Times of the Arab World', was founded in 1876. Pioneering among Egyptian newspapers in the building up of international news, it very early stationed its own correspondents abroad. It still portrays many good journalistic characteristics: an excellent variety of news and features, notable cartoons, outstanding special articles on international subjects, and gives notable spaces to Arab and foreign news. It subscribes to the services of the main international news

agencies such as Reuters and United Press International (p. 138-40). Merrill et al (1970, 236) pointed out that Al-Ahram is the most influential paper in Egypt and the Middle East. It has gained its position since 1950s when Mohammed Heikal became its editor. He was a close friend of President Nasser. In a nation of 'semi-official' newspapers, Al-Ahram is more 'semi-official' than the rest. For its remarkable amount of coverage of foreign and Arab news, Al-Ahram, according to Eilts, (1998) is considered to be an 'elite' newspaper. It also has the highest daily circulation among the Egyptian newspapers. Its daily circulation is around 980.000 and its Friday circulation exceeds one million.

#### - Weekly - opposition newspaper

There are six regular weekly-opposition newspapers in Egypt (as explained in chapter four); Al-Shaab [The People], Al-Wafd [The Delegate], was issued daily from 1994, Al-Ahaly [The Masses], Al-Ahrar [The Freer], Al-Arabi [the Arabic and Al-Umma [The Nation]. Al-Shaab [The People] was selected as the weekly-opposition newspaper for analysis in the present study. Al-Shaab belongs to the Socialist Labor Party which was the major opposition party in Egyptian People's Assembly (the parliament) when the Camp David Accords were ratified in 1978 (as explained in chapter three). It also has the highest rate of circulation amongst the weekly-opposition newspapers.

#### (2) Period of the study

After selecting newspaper as the medium, the next step was to define the periods in which the study was to be carried on. According to Hansen et al (Ibid), this step depends mainly on whether the subject of analysis concerns the mapping of some general dimensions of coverage or relates to a specific event. As the present study aims mainly at investigating developmental dimensions of the peace process between Egypt and Israel as presented by the Egyptian papers, the period of analysis was selected in the light of the main peace events that took place between Egypt and Israel during the 1970s & 1980s.

Table (5.1): period of the study

| Year | Week, Month          | Events related to the peace process                          |
|------|----------------------|--|
| 1977 | Week 1, Jan., 19-22* | Riots broke out in Cairo in reaction to food price increase. |
|      | Week 2, Nov., 19-25  | President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.                        |
| 1978 | Week 3, Sep., 19-25  | Signing the Camp David Accords.                              |
|      | Week 4, Oct., 1-7    | After the signing of Camp David Accords.                     |
|      | Week 5, Nov., 8-14   | Negotiations about the peace treaty.                         |
| 1979 | Week 6, Mar., 25-31  | Signing the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.                   |
|      | Week 7, Apr., 1-7    | After the signing of the Peace Treaty.                       |
|      | Week 8, May, 24-30   | Initial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.                       |
| 1980 | Week 9, May, 2-8     | Negotiations about Palestinian self-autonomy.                |
| 1981 | Week 10, Oct., 7-14  | Assassination of President Sadat.                            |
|      | Week 11, Dec., 16-22 | Israel annexation of Syrian Golan Hights                     |
| 1982 | Week 12, Apr., 22-28 | Final Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, except for Taba.        |
|      | Week 13, Jun., 7-13  | Israeli invasion of Lebanon.                                 |
| 1983 | Week 14, Mar., 20-26 | Egyptian-Israeli negotiations about Taba.                    |
| 1984 | Week 15, Apr., 20-26 | Celebration of returning Sinai, Return of the Wafd Party     |
|      | Week 16, Sep., 24-30 | Resumption of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Jordan  |
| 1985 | Week 17, Oct., 2-8   | The Israeli attack on the Headquarters of the PLO in Tunisi  |
| 1986 | Week 18, Sep., 10-16 | Egyptian-Israeli principles of agreement about Taba.         |
| 1987 | Week 19, Dec., 16-22 | Palestinians uprising in the occupied territories.           |
| 1988 | Week 20, Sep., 25-30 | International arbitration for Egypt about Taba.              |
| 1989 | Week 21, Mar., 20-27 | Israel's withdrawal from Taba.                               |

<sup>\*</sup> Although the peace process between Egypt and Israel began in November 1977, the first week in the period of analysis was selected because the riots that broke out in Cairo in January 1977 (as explained in chapter two) were seen as the vital reason of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

Therefore, the overall period of interest in the present study was from 1977 to 1989, thirteen years of negotiations, with interruptions, about the peace process between Egypt

and Israel. The study was carried out on twenty-one weeks from 1977 to 1989. As the scope of the present study is not to investigate the peace process itself, but to investigate basically the developmental dimensions of the peace process as presented in the Egyptian press, these weeks were selected according to major changes and events related to the peace process. The above table (5.1) shows the weeks of the study and the main events concerned.

#### (3) Units of analysis

In this step several factors arise when considering relevant content. Sampling of relevant content should be considered from the articulation of the research problem, the theoretical framework and how to limit the amount of material selected without affecting the principal of being representative (Hansen et al, 1998, 104). Gunter (2000) points out that the unit of analysis is the entity that is counted in a content analysis. Though it is the smallest element of such analysis, it is one of the most important. In written content, the unit of analysis, according to Wimmer & Dominick (2000), might be a single word, a theme or an entire article or story. In television and film analysis, units of analysis might be characters, behavior actions or an entire programme. Specific rules and definitions are required for determining the units of analysis. For the present study in which the analysis is carried out on two of the Egyptian newspapers, the unit of analysis is the entire *news article*. In this respect, the following criteria and definitions are taken into consideration:

- 1. The unit of analysis (news article) includes two elements: first news stories printed on the front pages of the two analyzed newspapers. Second; opinion materials published in the whole of the two newspapers Al-Ahram & Al-Shaab.
- 2. The opinion materials in Egyptian newspapers include three types of articles. They usually consist of not only news of events but also analyses and comments about such events with connections to other related affairs. For this reason, opinion materials can increasingly influence Egyptian thinking regarding an issue. The three main avenues of expressing opinion in the Egyptian press are:

  (1) the main editorial that reflects views of the newspaper [Al-Ahram's opinion, Al-Shaab's opinion]; (2) daily columns which represent views of 'well-known

journalists'<sup>1</sup>; and (3) analytical editorials that reflect opinion of key specialists or intellectuals<sup>2</sup>.

3. The analysis is carried out on a news article (unit of analysis) that discusses any aspects of the peace process in connection with other aspects of the dimensions of development. In other words, for a news article to be taken into consideration it should contain a peace aspect, whether it is the main or subsidiary. For example, if an article discusses foreign economic aid as the main subject and talks about the peace agreement as a subsidiary, it is counted. On the other hand, if an article includes aspects of all dimensions of development but does not mention any aspect of peace, it is ignored.

#### **5.1.4.2- Defining Analytical Categories**

One of the most problematic points of any content analysis is the categorization; that is, how to classify and define the units to be counted. The definition of analytical categories refers mainly to the dimensions and the characteristics of the text to be analyzed (Hansen et al, 1998). Many researches agree that the definition of analytical categories should follow basically from, and relate directly to, the research problem and the study objectives (Holsti, 1969; Stempel III, 1989; Hansen et al, 1998).

Concerning the analytical categories of the study, three factors were taken into consideration: the research problem, the study objectives and the theoretical background. As the study aims mainly to investigate the developmental dimensions of the peace process, subjects or themes, categories were designed to meet the dimensions of development- economic, political and social/cultural. Each category contains many subcategories. For example, the political category consists of such sub-categories as political participation, political stability, and the activities of opposition and so on. The purpose is to know which subject received the most coverage and the type of coverage received.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The well-known journalist is someone with an established position in a newspaper who hold a previous or current executive position. He writes a daily column that in most cases the editor does not change.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The specialist is also someone with an established position in a newspaper who hold a previous executive position but he concerned with specific issues such as economic, political or social issues. He writes a weekly editorial analysing a specific issue on local, regional or international levels.

Defining the analytical categories is designed also to meet objectives of the study. For example, the second main objective concerning the economic dimension of the peace process (as explained above) refers to the relationship between different aspects of economic development and the peace process and the type of coverage devoted to these aspects. Some economic sub-categories were defined: such as increasing incomes, obtaining economic aid and solving economic problems. Other categories were defined as newspaper type of article, location of article, and amount of coverage.

The theoretical framework of the study was taken into consideration in defining the analytical categories. Concerning the political economy approach, explained in chapter one, newspapers were categorized to show how extent ownership and control of the newspaper might affect content towards different dimensions of the peace process. Such a categorization enabled the researcher to explore the differences between a newspaper owned by the Egyptian government (Al-Ahram) and a newspaper owned by an opposition party (Al-Shaab) in dealing with the developmental dimensions of the peace process.

Following the construction of meaning approach that connects media content to the construction of a symbolic environment about events and policies (as explained in chapter one), various analytical categories were defined. Examining actors and sources as analytical categories was important in order to discover how the meaning of peace was built and connected to economic, political and social development in Egypt. According to Hansen et al (1998, p.108) "... the analysis of who is portrayed as saying and doing what to whom, and with what key attributes, is essential to an understanding of media roles in social representation and power relationships in society...and to see who successfully makes claims about social problems and thus helps "construct" and elevate new profile issues onto centre stage". Another category classified in this regard was orientation or the stance of the coverage. An article was coded in terms of whether it was positive, negative or neutral. Positive orientation was defined according to such words as peaceful, stable and cooperative. A negative attitude was classified in terms of words like aggressive, terrorist and threatening. Such categories enable the researcher to evaluate the stance of the coverage devoted to the developmental dimensions of the peace process. In other words how the Egyptian press constructs the meaning of peace in terms of economic, political and social development. (Full details of definitions of analytical categories was explained in Appendix A)

#### **5.1.4.3- Constructing the Coding Schedule**

After defining the analytical categories or selecting the dimensions or variables to be analyzed, the next step was to set out these categories in a coding schedule. The schedule should establish clear guidelines and definitions for the coding practice (Hansen et al, 1998). Failure to attain clear coding schedule could mislead the researcher when making conclusions from the findings (Holsti, 1969). According to Hansen et al (1998, 116), the coding schedule is similar to a survey questionnaire. It contains a number of variables which are to be coded for each unit of analysis – the newspaper article in the present study. For each variable, the coding schedule defines the values of coding possibilities associated to that variable.

The construction of the coding schedule in the present study was based on the objectives of the study and the analytical categories. It contains all the variables that met the requirements of the study objectives and answered its questions. Each variable, which represented an analytical category, contained many values or sub-categories defining that variable For example, the title of the newspaper variable contained two values: (1) Al-Ahram and (2) Al-Shaab. A specific 'sheet', one per unit of analysis, was designed to collect the data. Data was coded in these sheets according to categories and sub-categories defined in the coding schedule (See appendix B for full details of the coding schedule and coding sheet).

#### 5.1.4.4- Piloting the Coding Schedule

Constructing a coding schedule is important for the fine-tuning of the coding schedule. It is also provides an opportunity for inspection of its reliability (Bernstein, 1997). Test coding of a small sub-sample of the articles to be analyzed is important to reveal inadequacies or inconsistencies in the categories system of the coding schedule (Hansen et al, 1998). According to Deacon et al (1999), after designing coding schedules, it is important to test them on selected content samples to assess how easy the variables and values are to use and understand.

Through constructing a pilot study, the analyst can define accuracy and reliability of the coding schedule. Accuracy of the coding schedule relates to whether the categories and sub-categories are sufficient to meet and answer questions raised in the study. Reliability in content analysis, according to Hansen et al (1998), relates to consistency in the schedule; consistency between different coders and their validity over time.

In the present study, the pilot study was carried out on both selected newspapers in week 6 and week 12 of the study period (see table 5.1 concerning period of the study). Fifty-four articles were analyzed according to the initial coding schedule. Following the pilot study, changes were made. The position of some categories was changed, some subcategories were deleted and some variables' values were added.

#### 5.1.4.5- Data-preparation and analysis

After piloting the coding schedule, the final stage for a content analysis is preparation of the data and its analysis. In this stage two steps were carried out in the present study. First, the data collected through the coding of articles under analysis was entered into a computer data file for application to a statistical analysis package (the Statistical Package for the Social Science; SPSS) to organize and prepare the data for analysis. SPSS is seen as "a powerful package, which has traditionally been, and continues to be, popular with social scientists for content analysis purposes" (Hansen et al, 1998, p. 122). Second, the analysis of data was carried out in accordance with the main purpose of the study and its objectives. Results of the analysis follow in chapters six through nine.

# 5.2. Interviews

Murdock and Golding (1977) argued that the sociological study of mass communications should not be seen as a self-contained professional specialism, still less as one element in a general multi-disciplinary approach to communications, but as part of the overall study of social and cultural reproduction which has traditionally occupied the heartland of sociological analysis. Halloran (1998) emphasizes this point and points out that the media should be seen not in isolation, but as one of a set of social institutions, interacting with other institutions within the wider social system. In this respect and in order to meet the fifth main objective of the study that concerns the political and the economic

environment in which the Egyptian press works, some interviews were carried out on a sample of editors and well-known journalists of the two newspapers under analysis.

The interview may technically take several forms such as focused, structured, semistructured and open-ended. Gunter (2000) differentiates between two basic types of interview: structured and unstructured. In the structured interview, the interviewer mainly asks questions in a predetermined order most of which supply respondents with a range of possible answers. In an unstructured interview, broader and open-ended questions are asked to which respondents provide answers in their own words. These are either written down verbatim or audio-recorded for later transcription and interpretation. There is also a degree of freedom accorded to the interviewer to ask new questions (previously unscheduled) to follow up on specific remarks made by respondent. In this study the interviews were the semi-structured one. Some main questions and issues were previously determined according to the objectives of the study. These questions and issues were used guidelines during the interviews. Lindlof (1995) differentiated between types of interviews that might be used in a given research: ethnographic, informant, respondent, narrative and focus group. Deciding the type of interview to be used depends mainly on the aims and objectives of the study but it must be functional for the purposes of the research.

The main aims of these interviews were: (1) to discover the relationship between the political institutions and the press; (2) to discover to what extent these relationships influence content; (3) to show the economic restrictions facing the Egyptian press, particularly the opposition newspapers; and (4) to indicate the rules that govern the selection of news in the Egyptian press. Findings of the content analysis were dealt with in integration with how journalists responded in their interviews and, especially, assessing the effect their work had on the relationship between the political institution and the press in Egypt during the 1970s and 1980s. to this end, open-ended or informative interview was used.

Ten interviews were carried out with ten journalists; five from the daily-national newspaper (Al-Ahram) and five from the weekly-opposition newspaper (Al-Shaab). These journalists were chosen in relation to the units of analysis in the first phase.

Because the units of analysis were concerned with news material on the first pages and opinion materials (main editorials, daily columns and analytical editorials), interviews were carried out with the deputy editors-in-chief concerned with news production and main editorials, well-known journalist who write the daily columns and specialists who analyze specific issues through analytical editorials.

The selection of those interviewed was not only according to the unit of analysis which includes news stories of the front pages and opinion materials, but also according to the objectives of the study. These journalists were practising their profession and were involved in the production of news in both newspapers under analysis during the period of the study. For example, the well-known journalists interviewed in Al-Ahram were the editors-in-chief of two of the main national weekly magazines during the late seventies and eighties (October & Akher Sa'a). Deputy editor-in-chief of Al-Ahram had at least 20 years as a professional journalist before taking his position. For the opposition newspapers (Al-Shaab), like other opposition newspapers in Egypt, the editor-in-chief and the well-known journalist had previously held executive positions in the national newspapers. Accordingly, all the interviewees were in fact practising media profession at the time of the study.

All the interviews took place in Cairo between 5 February and 18 March 1998. Each interview lasted between 30 and 50 minutes. Four main issues were dealt with:

- The relationship between the political institutions and mass media in Egypt, especially the press and the extent to which this relationship affected content.
- Economic restrictions placed upon the Egyptian Press.
- The role played by the Egyptian Press in development, and the extent to which it connected development to the peace settlement.
- Rules, which govern the selection of news in the Egyptian press.

It was difficult to arrange times for interviews with Al-Ahram's interviewees. When they were interviewed, their answers were more political than professional, particularly concerning issues such as the freedom of journalists to access information, criteria for selecting news and the relationship between the government and the press. This may be understood in terms of the close relationship between Al-Ahram and the government.

This may also explain the differences between the answers of the two newspapers' journalists which will be discussed in chapter ten.

The next part contains six chapters and deals with the results of the fieldwork carried out in the content analysis and the interviews. Chapter six discusses the differences between daily national and weekly opposition newspapers regarding different dimensions of the peace process. Chapters seven, eight and nine deal with the three dimensions of the peace process. Each chapter discusses a developmental dimension (economic, political and cultural/social). Chapter ten deals with the results of the interviews. From the findings and discussion in chapters six to ten, the main conclusion tries to give a future prospective of the relationship among mass media, development and peace.

# Part Two Results of the study

# **Introduction**

This part presents the results of content analysis and interviews carried out in the present study. The content analysis and interviews were carried out to investigate how the Egyptian press connected the peace process between Egypt and Israel to economic, political and social/cultural dimensions of development and how the political and economic environment of the Egyptian press affected its content.

The analysis was carried out on a sample of the Egyptian national-daily newspaper, Al-Ahram, and the opposition-weekly newspaper, Al-Shaab. The sample period was from January 1977 to March 1989. Twenty-one weeks were selected from this period which witnessed major events related to the peace process (as explained in chapter five). 147 issues from Al-Ahram and 21 issues from Al-Shaab were examined. The analysis was performed on news stories on the front page and opinion materials in both newspapers. The analysis concentrated only on those news articles that featured the peace process. In all, 617 news articles were analyzed 541 from Al-Ahram and 76 from Al-Shaab. The interviews were carried out with ten journalists from the two newspapers, five from each (see chapter five). All interviews took place in Cairo from 5 February to 18 March 1998. The aim of these interviews was to define the political and economic environment of the Egyptian press.

Before discussing the detailed results, it is important to explore the frequencies of the main analytical categories. According to Hansen et al (1998, p. 122), "a good starting point for any content analysis is to begin by establishing simply the distribution or frequencies for each of the main categories analyzed before moving on to conducting more complex analyses comparing two or more dimensions with each other".

This introduction presents the main findings of the analysis without concentrating on the political, economic or social/cultural dimension of the peace process. These findings include the following categories: the distribution of news articles (news and opinion materials) in the study period, the characteristics of news articles, main and subsidiary subjects, the actors, and the sources of the news articles.

# Int. 1- Frequency of news articles in the study period

As explained above, the analysis was carried out in 21 weeks from January 1977 to March 1989. These weeks were selected according to the main events and changes that related to the peace process between Egypt and Israel. Table (int. 1) shows the distribution of news and opinion materials.

From Table (int.1), it can be seen that the most extensive coverage of the peace process between Egypt and Israel was in weeks 12, 6, 7, 10, 4 and 3. The coverage in these weeks represented 45.9% of the paper's coverage devoted to the peace process in the study period. This can be explained by the most important events related to the peace process that took place in these weeks. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from almost all of the Sinai' region that took place in April 1982 received the most coverage (week 12, 9.8%). Signing the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979 and the celebrations that follow in April of the same year came second position of coverage (week 6 and 7, 8.1% each). Because President Sadat was seen as the peace hero, his assassination in October 1981 was connected to the peace process and occupied third position in comparison (week 10, 7.6%). Signing the Camp David Accords in September and October 1978 received significant coverage but slightly less than the above events (week 3 & 4, 6.3% and 7.3%). The Israeli invasion to Lebanon in June 1982 which was considered as a main threaten to the peace process (as explained in chapter three), also received significant coverage (week13, 6.0%).

Table (int. 1) Weeks of analysis

| Week of analysis         | Frequency | Percent     |
|--------------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Week 1, 19-22 Jan. 1977  | 6         | 1.0         |
| Week 2, 19-25 Nov. 1977  | 31        | 5.0         |
| Week 3, 19-25 Sep. 1978  | 42        | 6.8         |
| Week 4, 1-7 Oct. 1978    | 45        | 7.3         |
| Week 5, 8-14 Nov. 1978   | 27        | 4.4         |
| Week 6, 25-31 Mar. 1979  | 50        | 8. <i>1</i> |
| Week 7, 1-7 Apr. 1979    | 50        | 8.1         |
| Week 8, 24-30 May 1979   | 21        | 3.4         |
| Week 9, 2-8 May 1980     | 30        | 4.9         |
| Week 10, 7-14 Oct. 1981  | 47        | 7.6         |
| Week 11, 16-22 Dec. 1981 | 26        | 4.2         |
| Week 12, 22-28 Apr. 1982 | 55        | 8.9         |
| Week 13, 7-13 Jun. 1982  | 37        | 6.0         |
| Week 14, 20-26 Mar. 1983 | 10        | 1.6         |
| Week 15, 20-26 Apr. 1984 | 13        | 2.1         |
| Week 16, 24-30 Sep. 1984 | 15        | 2.4         |
| Week 17, 2-8 Oct. 1985   | 25        | 4.1         |
| Week 18, 10-16 Sep. 1986 | 20        | 3.2         |
| Week 19, 16-22 Dec. 1987 | 27        | 4.4         |
| Week 20, 25-30 Sep. 1988 | 14        | 2.3         |
| Week 21, 20-27 Mar. 1989 | 26        | 4.2         |
| Total                    | 617       | 100.0       |

As the fieldwork was carried out from 1977 to 1989, it took place under the two presidencies of Sadat and Mubarak. The following table (int. 2) shows the percentages of the Egyptian press coverage of the developmental dimensions of the peace process in these two presidencies. Figures of Table (int. 2) shows that while the amount of coverage devoted to the peace process under President Sadat was 349 news articles representing 56.6% in ten weeks from January 1977 to October 1981, under President Mubarak, it amounted to only 268 news articles representing 43.4% in eleven weeks from December 1981 to March 1989. The difference in coverage was due to the importance of events related to the peace process. The most significant events took place under President Sadat: his historical visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, the signing of the Camp David Accords in September 1978 and the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in March

1979. Generally, it can be concluded from Tables (int. 1 & 2) that the more important the event concerning the peace process, the larger the amount of coverage or higher frequency of news articles it received in the Egyptian press.

Table (int.2), frequency of news articles in two presidencies

| Two periods                                      | Frequenc | Percent |
|--|----------|---------|
| Under President Sadat (from Jan. 77 to Oct. 81)  | 349      | 56.6%   |
| Under President Mubarak (from Dec.81 to Mar. 89) | 268      | 43.4%   |
| Total  | 617      | 100%    |

#### Int. 2- Characteristics of the Coverage:

The characteristics of coverage include two categories: location of news articles in the newspapers and type of news articles. Analysis of these categories is essential to identify not only the location of the coverage that devoted to the news articles but also the kind of coverage they received. The characteristics of coverage of the various articles have been used to categorize according them by their subject matter.

#### Int. 2-1- Location of News articles

The first of these characteristics was the location of the news articles in the newspapers. The location was coded according to three positions: front page, back page and inside page. News articles that were published on the front page and had a supplement on an inside page were considered as front page. As this category indicates prominence of coverage, news articles printed on the front page were perceived as more prominent than those printed on the back page and so on. The following table (table int. 3) shows the location of news articles.

Table (int. 3) Location of news articles

| Location    | Frequency | Percent |  |
|-------------|-----------|---------|--|
| Front page  | 348       | 56.4%   |  |
| Back page   | 46        | 7.5%    |  |
| Inside page | 223       | 36.1%   |  |
| Total       | 617       | 100%    |  |

From Table (int. 2), it can be noted that 56.4% of the news articles were printed on the front page; 19.3% out of the total number was considered as the main front-page topic. This indicated that the peace process was considered as a prominent subject for Egyptian newspaper coverage. There was a significant number of news articles concerning the peace process published on the inside page (36.1%). This can be explained by the units of analysis of the present study and the characteristics of Egyptian newspapers themselves. Almost all analytical editorials and main editorials, which were among the units of analysis of the study, were published in the inside pages. The relatively few news articles printed on the back pages (7.5%) is also due to the characteristics of Egyptian newspapers. while two daily columns were published every day In the back page of Al-Ahram, the rest of the page consists of advertisements and light news. In Al-Shaab, an analytical editorial and a weekly column were published in the back page. Therefore, it may be concluded that the coverage devoted to the peace process between Egypt and Israel was perceived as worthy of prominent coverage.

#### Int. 2-2- Type of the Coverage

In this category, news articles were coded according to the units of analysis. As the analysis was carried out on news stories on the front page and opinion materials in the whole newspaper, this category was coded into four types or formats; news story, main editorial, analytical editorial and daily/weekly column. News story refers to news reports that were printed in the front page. Main editorial, daily/weekly column and analytical editorial reflect coding editorial views, well-known journalist opinion and specialist views on current affairs (see chapter five). The following Table (table int. 4) shows the types or formats of the news articles.

Table (int. 4), Types or Formats of News articles

| Type of news article | Frequency | Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|
| News story           | 348       | 56.4%   |
| Main editorial       | 71        | 11.5%   |
| Daily column         | 112       | 18.2%   |
| Analytical editorial | 86        | 13.9%   |
| Total                | 617       | 100.0%  |

It can be seen from the above table that the majority of news articles related to the developmental dimensions of the peace process were *news stories*. They represented 56.4% out of the total number of news articles (348 out of 617). As news stories were printed on the front page, it can be seen that the number of news stories in the above table (348 news articles) matched the number of news articles on the front page (table int. 3). Coverage of opinion materials represented 43.6% out of all news articles. The *daily column* came in first position (18.2%) because more than five daily columns were published in the same issue. Analytical editorial, which reflects views of 'specialists' came second with a percentage of nearly 14.0%. Because the *main editorial* was printed once every issue, it took third position (11.5%).

## Int.-3 Amount of Coverage Devoted to Main Subjects of News articles

The amount of coverage was calculated in column/centimeters. The standard space of a page of the two newspapers under analysis is eight columns wide and 54 cm long. If a news article, for example, was published on three columns wide by 20 cm long, it was calculated as a 60 cm/column and if a news article occupied the whole page, it was calculated as 432cm/column. The total amount of coverage devoted to all subjects amounted to 54,726 cm/column. If multiplied by 432 cm/column, the standard space of a page, the total amount of coverage was 126.6 pages. The following table shows amount of the coverage devoted to each main subject related to the peace process.

Table (int. 5) shows that the Egyptian press, in its coverage of the peace process between Egypt and Israel concentrated mainly on economic and political issues. Economic issues alone occupied 25.8% of all coverage devoted to the developmental dimension of the peace process. Political issues came second with 21.8% coverage. Because the peace process included the withdrawal of military troops and numerous military negotiations, the amount of coverage devoted to military issues represented 14.1%. Social and cultural issues received nearly the same amount of coverage, 11.3% for the first and 11.0% for the second.

It can be noted from Table (int. 5) that the amount of coverage devoted to economic, political and social/cultural issues altogether, which are the scope of the present study, represented about 70.0% of the total amount of coverage devoted to the developmental dimension of the peace process. This may be explained by the economic, political and

social/cultural situation in Egypt during this time (see chapter three). It seems that the Egyptian press considered peace as a key solution to the economic and social problems and as a tool for political stability. More details about this statement will be discussed in the following chapters.

Table (int. 5) amount of coverage devoted to main subjects

| Main subject | Amount of coverage |         |         |  |
|--------------|--------------------|---------|---------|--|
| •            | By cm/column       | By page | Percent |  |
| Peace        | 5,174              | 12.0    | 9.5%    |  |
| Economic     | 14,136             | 32.7    | 25.8%   |  |
| Political    | 11,946             | 27.6    | 21.8%   |  |
| Cultural     | 6,012              | 13.9    | 11.0%   |  |
| Military     | 7,670              | 17.8    | 14.1%   |  |
| Terrorism    | 3,454              | 8.0     | 6.3%    |  |
| Social       | 6,186              | 14.3    | 11.3%   |  |
| Other        | 148                | 0.3     | 0.2%    |  |
| Total        | 54,726             | 126.6   | 100.0%  |  |

## Int. 4- Subject of News articles

This category was coded according to the objectives of the study. It included all subjects related to the economic, political and social/cultural dimensions of development. One main subject and up to two subsidiaries were coded for each news article. While the study concentrates on three main developmental dimensions of development (economic, political, and socio-economic dimensions), all possible subjects were listed in the coding schedule. The reason is that an article may focus on a military or peace aspect as the main subject, while the subsidiary in respect of the article might be economic, political, or cultural. The following table summarizes the subjects of the developmental dimensions of the peace process. Details of each dimension are explained in the following chapters.

Concerning the main subject, this refers to the main topic of the news article. It can be seen from Table (int. 6) that *economics* was the most frequent subject for the main news article with a percentage of 26.7% out of all cases. The *Political* followed the economic

in 20.4% out of all cases. *Defense* as a main topic came third with a percentage of 12.8% followed by *cultural and social subjects* with nearly the same percent; 11.8% and 11.7%.

Table (int. 6) Main and sub-subjects of all developmental dimensions

| Subject        | As a main subject |         | As a subsidiary 1 |         | As a subsidiary 2 |         |
|----------------|-------------------|---------|-------------------|---------|-------------------|---------|
|                | Frequenc          | Percent | Frequency         | Percent | Frequency         | percent |
| Peace          | 60                | 9.7     | 168               | 27.2    | 213               | 34.5    |
| Economic       | 165               | 26.7    | 122               | 19.8    | 96                | 15.6    |
| Political      | 126               | 20.4    | 119               | 19.3    | 114               | 18.5    |
| Cultural       | 73                | 11.8    | 63                | 10.2    | 60                | 9.7     |
| Defense        | 79                | 12.8    | 79                | 12.8    | 72                | 11.7    |
| Terrorism      | 38                | 6.2     | 25                | 4.1     | 22                | 3.6     |
| Social         | 72                | 11.7    | 34                | 5.5     | 21                | 3.4     |
| Other          | 4                 | 0.6     | 6                 | 1.0     | 9                 | 1.5     |
| No sub-subject |                   |         | 11                | 0.2     | 10                | 1.6     |
| Total          | 617               | 100.0   | 617               | 100.0   | 617               | 100.0   |

Regarding a subsidiary one seen as the second subject in importance in news stories, it can be noted that *peace subjects* were the most frequent subsidiaries with 27.2% followed by *economics and the political* with relatively similar percentages; 19.8% and 19.3%. *Defense subjects* came fourth representing 12.8% of all cases followed by *cultural subjects*, which appeared in 10.2% of all cases. *Peace subjects* were overwhelming as a subsidiary two with 34.5%. *Political subjects* came second represented 18.5% followed by *economics* in 15.6% all cases. *Defence subjects* also came fourth as a subsidiary two with 11.7%.

As the study was carried out on news stories and opinion materials involving the peace subject, whether it was the main subject or the subsidiary subject, it can be noted from the above table that economic and political dimensions were the most important ones for the Egyptian press coverage of the peace process. *Social/cultural subjects* came third representing 17.4% on average. While Defense subjects appeared in about 12.4%, terrorism subjects were relatively rare, only 4.6%.

#### Int. 5-Actors

According to Hansen et al (1998), an analysis of actors or who is portrayed is essential for understanding media roles and power relationships in society. Actors in a news story are usually the main subjects of the story or the key persons who present it. National actors refer to Egyptian actors in news stories. Two categories of actors were coded; "main actor" and "other actor". In a news story about a meeting between the Egyptian president and a minister or a local governor, for example, the "main actor" would be the Egyptian president and the minister or the local governor was considered to be the "other actor". Where the meaning of peace or results of the peace process were discussed without considering any human actor, no human actors were coded. Table (int. 7) shows the main and other actors involved in the developmental dimensions of the peace process.

Table (int. 7) main and other national actors

| Actor                        | Main |      | Oth | Other actor |  |
|------------------------------|------|------|-----|-------------|--|
|                              | N    | %    | N   | %           |  |
| No human actor               | 68   | 11   | 216 | 35          |  |
| President                    | 311  | 50.4 | 2   | 0.3         |  |
| Ministers                    | 98   | 15.9 | 140 | 22.7        |  |
| Local governors/ruling party | 38   | 6.2  | 84  | 13.6        |  |
| Political opposition         | 25   | 4.1  | 28  | 4.5         |  |
| Parliament                   | 17   | 2.8  | 36  | 5.8         |  |
| Social organization          | 17   | 2.8  | 30  | 4.9         |  |
| Military/police officers     | 12   | 1.9  | 35  | 5.7         |  |
| Egyptians                    | 30   | 4.9  | 40  | 6.5         |  |
| Other national actors        | 1    | 0.2  | 6   | 1           |  |
| Total                        | 617  | 100  | 617 | 100         |  |

From Table (int.7), it can be noted that the 'president/prime-minister' was the most frequent main actor. This actor alone, as a main actor, was involved in more than 50.0% of all news articles. This can be understood in terms of the superiority of the President over any other authority, according to the permanent Egyptian Constitution, which issued in 1971. The second most frequent main actor was the 'minister', who appeared in nearly 16.0%, followed by the 'ruling party/local governor' with only 6.2%. Other main actors did not exceed 5.0%. The actor labeled 'parliament' appeared in only 2.8%. This

is interesting because 'parliament' should have been an active actor in the developmental dimensions of the peace process. This raise questions about the reality of democracy in Egypt during the last three decades.

For "other actors", the above table shows that, apart from news articles that did not contain any actor (no human actor) 'minister' were the most frequent other actor. He appeared in nearly 23.0%. The ruling party/local governor came second with 13.6%. 'Egyptians' appeared in 6.5% followed by parliament and military/police officers' with nearly the same percent, 5.8%.

Figures of table (int. 7) show that the Egyptian press, in its coverage of the developmental dimension of the peace process, reflected power relationships within Egypt, in which the executive authority (president, ministers, ruling party and local governors) prevailed over other authorities, particularly the parliament. Apart from 'no human actor' Executive Authorities altogether were involved in slightly more than 83.0% as 'main actor' and in nearly 66.0% as 'other actor'. This reflects the close ties between political institutions and the Egyptian press.

## Int. 6- Sources of News articles

This category was coded according to the units of analysis of the present study. As the study was carried out on news and opinion materials, this category includes the most frequent sources appearing in the Egyptian press. A news story might originate from one source such as a single correspondent, or more than one source, such as a correspondent and a news agency. When the source of a story was not mentioned, it was dealt with as unidentified. Opinion materials in the Egyptian press usually originate from three sources; the newspaper itself (main editorial), a well-known journalist (daily column) and specialist (analytical editorial), see chapter five. Table (int. 8) shows the sources of news stories and opinion materials the peace process between Egypt and Israel.

Sources of news articles were defined according to the most frequent sources in the Egyptian press. Unites of analysis (opinion materials and news stories) were also taken

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Egyptian is considered the national actor when news articles did not mention a specific national actor, but focused on the Egyptian as the people who suffer of three decades of war status with Israel and who burden costs of four wars in the Middle East. They also been the national actor when news stories focus on the benefits, which the Egyptian would gain from the peace process.

into consideration. Accordingly, sources were coded in six categories in addition to 'other' or 'unidentified'. Sources of opinion materials include 'own writer' and 'specialist'. While the former refers to 'well-known' journalists, who write a daily column or the main editorial of newspapers, the latter refers to specialized journalists or intellectuals, who write weekly-analytical editorials. Sources of news stories include MENA (Middle East News Agency, the Egyptian news agency), the big 4 (the four biggest international news agencies; R, AP, UPI & AFP), own correspondent, and a combination of two sources.

Table (int. 8) sources of news articles

| Source                     | Frequency | Percent |
|----------------------------|-----------|---------|
| MENA                       | 39        | 6.3%    |
| Four big                   | 74        | 12%     |
| Own correspondent          | 104       | 16.9%   |
| Own writer                 | 183       | 29.7%   |
| Specialist                 | 86        | 13.9%   |
| Combination of two sources | 94        | 15.2%   |
| Unidentified               | 29        | 4.7%    |
| Other source               | 8         | 1.3%    |
| Total                      | 617       | 100%    |

From the above table, it can be noted that 'own writer' was the most frequent national source regarding the peace process. It represented 30.0% out of the total number of news articles (183 out of 617). This exemplifies the importance of 'writers' in the Egyptian press. In additional to writing main editorials in the newspapers, each well-known writer has a daily-column to write every day (every week in weekly newspapers). 'Writers' are also the main potential source to influence Egyptian public opinion since they write a daily-column, have more experiences, and have neither executive nor administrative responsibility. After more than three decades of conflict, the high percentage of 'writers' involvement as a source of the developmental dimension, in a sensitive issue like the peace process with Israel, can easily be understood.

The second most frequent source was 'own correspondent'. It represented a percentage of 16.9% (104 out of 617) and was followed by a 'combination of two sources' with 16.2%. The 'specialist' came fourth with 13.9% followed by the four big agencies with

12.0%. It can be noted from the above table that while sources of news stories altogether (own correspondent, four big, combination of two sources and MENA) represented slightly more than 50.0%, sources of opinion materials represented about 44.0%. The rest were 'other' or 'unidentified' sources. It can also be noted that MENA represented only 6.3% as a source of news articles. This may be worth nothing because in an issue such as the peace process, the Egyptian news agency was assumed to be the main source of news articles. However, this may simply reflected the superiority of the main international news agencies, particularly in the third world, and/or the lack of funds allocated to MENA.

## Int.7- Orientation of the Coverage

This category aims at determining the stance of coverage towards the developmental dimension of the peace process. Three orientations were coded in this respect: positive, neutral and negative. To discover or define what kind of orientation an article contained, values and words were counted. For example, the orientation of an article was considered to be positive if it contained such terminology as peaceful, friendly, normalization and so on. If the article included one or more negative values such as aggressive, apartheid, killer and so on, it was coded as negative. The following table shows the orientations of the coverage.

Table (int. 9) orientation of the coverage

| Orientation          | Frequency | Percent |  |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|--|
| Positive orientation | 248       | 40.2%   |  |
| Neutral orientation  | 231       | 37.4%   |  |
| Negative orientation | 138       | 22.4%   |  |
| Total                | 617       | 100.0%  |  |

The above table indicates that the whole stance of the Egyptian press coverage of the developmental dimension of the peace process was positive. The positive orientation represented slightly more than 40.0%. On the other hand the negative orientation represented only 22.4%. News articles, which were not clearly positive or negative, were coded as neutral. The neutral articles represented 37.4%. These figures indicate that the Egyptian press treated the peace process positively.

As explained above, positive and negative orientations were assessed by the appearance of positive and negative words and values. The following table summarizes the most frequent positive values. The table contains the appearance of positive values only. For example: the 'peaceful' positive value appeared 62 times out of the total number of news article, 617. The only number, which appears in the table, is 62. And so on..

Table (int. 10) positive values of the coverage

| Positive word or value | N  | Percent |
|------------------------|----|---------|
| Peaceful               | 62 | 10.0%   |
| Cooperation            | 32 | 5.2%    |
| Growth                 | 58 | 9.4%    |
| Developing             | 33 | 6.3%    |
| Stability              | 70 | 11.3%   |
| Homogeneity            | 34 | 5.5%    |
| Reform                 | 51 | 8.3%    |
| End of suffering       | 44 | 7.1%    |
| Renaissance            | 47 | 7.6%    |
| Successful             | 49 | 7.9%    |
| Praise                 | 42 | 6.8%    |
| Normalization          | 17 | 2.7%    |

From Table (int. 10) one can note that the most frequently used positive values or words, were stability, peaceful, growth and reform. Successful, renaissance, and end of suffering were also among the most frequent positive values. From the figures in Table (int. 10), one can notice that values related to the economic dimension of the peace process (such as reform, growth, cooperation and developing) featured more often in the news articles. This means that the Egyptian press mainly connected positively the peace process to improvement in the economic situation in Egypt during the late seventies and the eighties

For a negative coverage, the following table (int. 11) summarizes the most frequent negative values or words. From Table (int. 11), it can be noted that the most frequent

negative values were aggressive, refusal, threaten and opposition. War supporter and terrorists also achieved a significant frequency. These negative values appeared in the Egyptian press coverage of the developmental of the peace process as a reflection of the negative Israeli actions against other Arab countries. This means that these actions were seen as aggressive and threatening to the peace process, and the Egyptian leadership opposed and refused to respond to such actions.

Table (int. 11) most frequent negative values

| Negative values | N  | Percent |
|-----------------|----|---------|
| Aggressive      | 65 | 10.5%   |
| Terrorists      | 36 | 5.8%    |
| Violent         | 27 | 4.4%    |
| Isolation       | 15 | 2.4%    |
| Opposition      | 43 | 7.0%    |
| War supporters  | 38 | 6.1^    |
| Threaten        | 46 | 7.3%    |
| Illegal         | 28 | 4.5%    |
| Refusal         | 52 | 8.4%    |

The majority of these actions took place under President Mubarak (see chapter three). The most serious were the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, the bombardment of the PLO Headquarter in Tunisia in 1985, and the violent reaction to the Palestinian Uprising in the occupied land during the late eighties. To understand the stance of the Egyptian press coverage, the following table shows frequencies of the most regular negative values in the two presidencies.

From Table (int. 12), it can be noted that most of the negative coverage took place under Mubarak. Each negative value received two-third of its frequency under Mubarak. For example, aggressive and threatening as negative values received slightly more than three-quarters of their coverage under Mubarak (76.9% and 78.3% respectively). Each of the other most frequent negative values (opposition, war-supporter, refusal and terrorist) received, at least, 65.0% of the coverage under Mubarak presidency.

Table (int. 12) negative values in two presidencies

| Negative value | Main tv                  | Total |        |
|----------------|--------------------------|-------|--------|
|                | Under Sadat Under Mubara |       | iotai  |
| Aggressive     | 15                       | 50    | 65     |
|                | 23.1%                    | 76.9% | 100.0% |
| Terrorist      | 11                       | 25    | 36     |
|                | 30.6%                    | 69.4% | 100.0% |
| Opposition     | 15                       | 28    | 43     |
|                | 34.9%                    | 65.1% | 100.0% |
| War-supporter  | 10                       | 28    | 38     |
|                | 26.3%                    | 73.7% | 100.0% |
| Threatening    | 10                       | 36    | 46     |
|                | 21.7%                    | 78.3% | 100.0% |
| Refusal        | 18                       | 34    | 52     |
|                | 34.6%                    | 65.4% | 100.0% |

From the above introduction, some general points can be made. First, in its coverage of the peace process in late seventies and eighties, the Egyptian press concentrated on economic, political and cultural/social subjects. It seems that the economic and social situation in Egypt, as discussed in chapter three, influenced the content of the Egyptian newspapers regarding the peace process. In other words, the Egyptian papers connected the peace process to economic and social issues. More details about this connection will be discussed in the next chapters.

Second, the executive authority representatives; the president/prime minister ministers, and local governors dominated the press coverage of the peace process. This may be explained partly by the nature of the peace process, since it had mainly been a political process and partly about the power relationships within Egypt, in which executive authority prevailed over other authorities. Third, own writers, correspondent were the most frequent sources for news articles. Fourth, the orientation or stance of the coverage was positive. However, it differed from time to time according to the developments of the peace process and Israel's attitude towards Egypt and other Arab countries. In this respect, the majority of negative values appeared under President Mubarak. Since it was then that most negative Israeli actions took place.

The next four chapters discuss, in details, the results of the analysis. Chapter six explores differences between the national newspaper and the opposition newspaper in dealing with the developmental dimensions of the peace process. This chapter meets one of the

study's objectives and explores the use of the political economy approach in the study. Chapters' seven to nine focus on the coverage of the three dimensions of the peace process (economic, political and socio/cultural).

In these three chapters the total number of articles analyzed is dealt with as a whole without drawing comparisons between the chosen newspapers. The reason is to show how the Egyptian press, as a whole, constructed the meaning of peace. Applying the construction of meaning approach is the focus of the analysis of these chapters. Some tables in these three chapters (7 to 9) contain a small numbers of cases. This may be explained by what these chapters particular address. Each chapter discusses one of the developmental dimensions and analyzes only the total number of cases related to that dimension. For example, chapter seven analyzes only 165 cases, which is the total of those in the economic dimension. Chapter eight deals with only 126 cases which represent the total number of the political dimension. These numbers of cases were all the available news articles relating to the objective of the study during the analyzed period. The researcher, however, is aware of the limitations of using such small a number of cases in the analysis. This explains why he concentrated on the largest number of cases in such tables and tried to be careful in his interpretations".

Apart from the results of the content analysis, chapter ten deals with the interview results. This chapter shows, with chapter six, how the political economy approach is applied in the study. Finally, will be the main conclusion and a future perspective, in respect of findings of the study, and of the relationship among mass media, peace and development.

### Chapter six

# <u>Different between National and Opposition</u> <u>Newspapers in dealing with the Developmental</u> <u>Dimensions of the Peace Process</u>

This chapter deals with the difference between the Egyptian national and opposition newspapers in covering the developmental dimensions of the peace process between Egypt and Israel. In this respect, the following questions were answered. What were the characteristics of coverage in both papers? What was the difference between the Egyptian daily-national newspaper [Al-Ahram] and weekly-opposition newspaper [Al-Shaab] in covering the economic, political and social/cultural dimensions of the peace process? Who were the main actors involved in both papers' coverage of the developmental dimensions of the peace process? What were the sources on which both newspapers depended? To what extent did the coverage's orientation or stance differ in both papers? Did the coverage of the developmental dimensions of the peace process differ over time during the negotiations?

As explained in the introduction to this part of the study, the analysis was carried out on 147 issues of Al-Ahram and 21 issues of Al-Shaab. The total coverage devoted to the developmental dimensions of the peace process was 45,524 cm/column (105.4 pages) in Al-Ahram and 9,198 cm/column (21.2 pages) in Al-Shaab. Having a division of issue, it shows that while the amount of coverage in Al-Ahram was 0.71 pages per issue, it was about one page per issue in Al-Shaab. This chapter discusses how the coverage of the developmental dimensions of the peace process differed in both newspapers.

## 6.1- Characteristics of Coverage in both Newspapers

The characteristics of coverage refer to the locations and types of news items. Analyzing these categories helps to indicate what kind of coverage the developmental dimensions of the peace process received in both newspapers.

#### 6.1.1- Location of Coverage in both Papers

Location of coverage is one of the categories that can enable assessment of the prominence of the coverage. The following table summarizes location of news articles in both newspapers

Table (6.1) location of items in both papers

| Location of item | Al-Al | ram   | Al-S | Shaab |
|------------------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| ·                | N %   |       | N    | %     |
| Front page       | 325   | 60.1  | 23   | 30.3  |
| Back page        | 38    | 7.0   | 8    | 10.5  |
| Inside page      | 178   | 32.9  | 45   | 59.2  |
| Total            | 541   | 100.0 | 76   | 100.0 |

From the above table, it can be noted that more than 60% of Al-Ahram's coverage of of the peace process was published on the front page, 32.8% in the inside pages and only 7.0% in the pack pages. The order of locations of coverage in Al-Shaab was quite different. The majority of the coverage devoted to developmental dimensions in Al-Shaab was printed in the inside pages, 59.2%. While 30.0% of AL-Shaab's coverage was published on the front pages, only 8.0% came on the back pages.

One can note from the above table and figures that locations of news articles dealing with the developmental dimensions of the peace process differed clearly in each newspaper. While the majority of coverage in Al-Ahram located in the front pages, the majority of coverage in Al-Shaab came on the inside pages. These differences can be understood in two ways. First, Al-Ahram belongs to and has very strong ties, with the government. As a result, it considered the developmental dimensions of the peace process very important as did the government. Consequently, the majority of its coverage was published on the front pages. Second, it can be argued that al-Shaab is a weekly opposition newspaper, which does not concentrate on news stories as it concentrates mainly on analytical stories that are usually printed in the inside pages (see next table). However, it is safe to say that coverage of the developmental dimensions of the peace process was more prominent in Al-Ahram than Al-Shaab.

#### 6.1.2- Type of Coverage in both Newspapers

As the study was carried out on news stories of the front pages and opinion materials, this category was coded according to four types of articles; news story, main editorial, daily column and analytical editorial.

Table (6.2) type of articles in both newspapers

| Type of articles     | Al-A | hram    | Al-Shaab |       |  |
|----------------------|------|---------|----------|-------|--|
|                      | N %  |         | N        | %     |  |
| News story           | 320  | 59.1    | 28       | 36.8  |  |
| Main editorial       | 68   | 12.6    | 3        | 3.9   |  |
| Daily/weekly column  | 99   | 18.3    | 13       | 17.1  |  |
| Analytical editorial | 54   | 10.0 32 |          | 42.1  |  |
| Total                | 541  | 100.0   | 76       | 100.0 |  |

From the above table, it can be seen that news stories were the most frequent articles covering the developmental dimensions of the peace process in Al-Ahram. They represented more than 59.0%. Opinion materials altogether appeared in only about 40.0%. In Al-Shaab, the type of coverage was quite different. While news stories represented less than 37.0%, opinion materials appeared in more than 63.0%. This difference between the two papers may refer to daily and weekly appearance. While Al-Ahram, the daily paper, was concerned mainly with daily news on the peace process and its developmental dimensions, it is evident that Al-Shaab, the weekly paper, concentrated basically on analytical views regarding the peace process, not just news stories.

Apart from the news stories, the above figures show, regarding opinion materials, that while analytical editorial was the most frequent type of coverage in Al-Shaab (more than 42.0%), it was the least in Al-Ahram (only 10.0%). It may be seen that Al-Shaab concentrated on analytical editorials rather than news stories to represent and deal with the developmental dimensions of the peace process. There was also another big difference between the papers. While main editorial, which reflects views of the newspaper itself, appeared in more than 12.0% in Al-Ahram, it represented only less than 4.0% in Al-Shaab. This indicates that the relationship between political institutions and the press affected coverage of the developmental dimensions of the peace process. As Al-Ahram was, and still is, owned by the government, it concentrated more clearly, through its main, than Al-Shaab, editorials on those dimensions.

# 6.2- Difference between both Newspapers in dealing with different Dimensions of the Peace Process

This section deals with the main questions. What was the difference between the national and opposition newspapers in their coverage of the developmental dimensions of the peace process? What was the main dimension upon which each paper concentrated? And what were the most frequent economic, political, and social/cultural subjects that appeared in each newspaper? The following table shows how both newspapers presented the dimensions of the peace process as a whole.

Table (6.3) Dimensions of the peace process in both newspapers

| Main subject | Al-Ahram |       | Al-S | haab  |
|--------------|----------|-------|------|-------|
|              | N        | %     | N    | %     |
| Peace        | 53       | 9.8   | 7    | 9.2   |
| Economic     | 154      | 28.5  | 11   | 14.5  |
| Political    | 101      | 18.7  | 25   | 32.9  |
| Cultural     | 63       | 11.6  | 10   | 13.2  |
| Military     | 69       | 12.8  | 10   | 13.2  |
| Terrorism    | 34       | 6.3   | 4    | 5.3   |
| Social       | 64       | 11.8  | 8    | 10.5  |
| Other        | 3        | 0.6   | 1    | 1.3   |
| Total        | 541      | 100.0 | 76   | 100.0 |

The above table and figures show that, except for economic and political dimensions, there was little difference between national and opposition newspapers in dealing with the different dimensions of the peace process. Regarding the economic and political dimensions, it can be noted that there is a significant and clear difference between both newspapers. While the economic dimension was the most frequent and the main developmental dimension in Al-Ahram, the political dimension was the most frequent one in Al-Shaab. The economic dimension represented more than 28.0% in Al-Ahram and only 14.5% in Al-Shaab. The political dimension alone appeared in about one/third out of all the various dimensions of the peace process in Al-Shaab, 32.9%. In Al-Ahram, it was only 18.7%.

These differences between the two newspapers can be understood in terms of ownership of the press and its relationship with the political institutions in Egypt. Al-Ahram, which belongs to the government, usually reflects the views of the political institutions. Regarding the peace process, the Egyptian president and government concentrated on the economic outcomes of peace (see chapter two). As a consequence, Al-Ahram considered the economic dimension the most important aspect of the peace process. For Al-Shaab, which belongs to the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), priorities were quite different. The most important of which for SLP, as a result of peace, was the reducing of political normalization, canceling Martial Law and promoting democratization. So the political dimension of the peace process with Israel was seen by Al-Shaab as the most important. The following subtitles discuss the kinds of economic, political and social/cultural aspects on which each newspaper concentrated on.

#### 6.2.1- Difference between both Newspapers in Covering the Economic Dimension

As explained in Table 6.3, Al-Ahram concentrated mainly on the economic dimension of the peace process. While this dimension represented about 28.5% in Al-Ahram, it amounted to only 14.5% in Al-Shaab. On what kind of economic aspects did each newspaper concentrate? The following table explains.

Table (6.4) economic subjects in both papers

| <b>Economic subjects</b>              | Al-Ahram |       | Al-Shaab |          |
|---------------------------------------|----------|-------|----------|----------|
|                                       | N        | %     | N        | %        |
| Solving of economic problems          | 39       | 25.3  | -        | -        |
| Satisfaction of material needs        | 17       | 11.0  | -        | -        |
| Economic projects/investment          | 28       | 18.2  | -        | -        |
| Economic aid/assistance               | 32       | 20.8  | 1        | 9.0      |
| Economic normalization/cooperation    | 20       | 13.0  | 5        | 45.5     |
| Decreasing of cooperation with Israel | 3        | 1.9   | 5        | 45.5     |
| Other economic subjects               | 15       | 9.7   | _        | <u>-</u> |
| Total                                 | 154      | 100.0 | 11       | 100.0    |

From Table (6.4), it can be noted that priority of economic aspects was completely different in both newspapers. Al-Ahram concentrated mainly on solving the economic problems facing the Egyptian economy. This economic aspect appeared in more than 25.0%. Economic aid and assistance came second with 20.8%, followed by economic projects or investment, which appeared in about 18.0%. Al-Shaab concentrated on only two economic aspects with the same percent, 45.5%. These were economic normalization and less economic cooperation with Israel.

It can be concluded that the economic dimension of the peace process was seen in different ways by both newspapers. Al-Ahram considered peace with Israel as the direct way of solving the Egypt's problematic economic situation. Peace would lead to unlimited economic aid and assistance and a great number of new economic projects and foreign investment. This Al-Ahram point of view was similar to what the political leadership considered peace would lead to. Al-Shaab, which reflects the SLP views, stated that peace should not lead to any kind of economic normalization or cooperation with Israel. Therefore it concentrated on the lessening economic cooperation with Israel.

#### 6.2.2- Difference between both Papers in Dealing with the political Dimension

As Table (6.3) shows, the political dimension was considered, by Al-Shaab, to be the most important dimension of the peace process newspaper in comparison with Al-Ahram. The following table summarizes the kinds of political aspects on which each newspaper concentrated.

From table (6.5) and figures, one can note that the most important political subject in Al-Ahram was the activities of the government and officials, who represented more than 38.0% coverage. Political participation came second with 25.7%, followed by stability in the Middle East with 15.8%. For Al-Shaab, reducing political links with Israel was considered the most important political aim. It appeared in about 44.0%. Returning to the Arab World took position with 20.0% followed by political participation and activities of the opposition with the same 12.0%.

Figures of Table (6.5) show that ownership of both newspapers influenced their coverage of the political dimension of the peace process. It is apparent that Al-Ahram reflected the government view regarding the peace process. It concentrated mainly on the activities of government and the trips of officials to Israel and the United States to implement the

peace agreements. It also linked peace with Israel to the stability of the Middle East for peace would put an end to war or the threat of war in the region.

Table (6.5) political subjects in both papers

| Political subject                        | Al-Ahram |       | Al-Shaab |       |
|--|----------|-------|----------|-------|
|  | N        | %     | _ N      | %     |
| Political participation/plurality        | 26       | 25.7  | 3        | 12.0  |
| Activities of government/officials       | 39       | 38.6  | -        | -     |
| Activities of parliament                 | 10       | 9.9   | 2        | 8.0   |
| Activities of opposition                 | 3        | 3.0   | 3        | 12.0  |
| Returning to Arab World                  | 5        | 5.0   | 5        | 20.0  |
| Stability in the Middle East             | 16       | 15.8  | 1        | 4.0   |
| Reducing of p. normalization with Israel | 1        | 1.0   | 11       | 44.0  |
| Other political subject                  | 1        | 1.0   |          |       |
| Total                                    | 101      | 100.0 | 25       | 100.0 |

For Al-Shaab newspaper, the political aspects of the peace process were quite different. According to Al-Shaab, peace should not lead to any kind of political normalization with Israel. Nearly half of Al-Shaab's coverage of the political dimension of the peace process concentrated on reducing normalization. Al-Shaab also stated that peace with Israel should not affect the relationship between Egypt and the Arab world, and that the Egyptian government should accelerate the resumption of political relationships with the other Arab countries and a reduction, at in the same time, of the political normalization with Israel. It can be concluded that Al-Shaab newspaper reflected the views of the SLP, which were pro-Arab and anti-Israeli policies regarding the peace process (see chapter three).

#### 6.2.3- Difference between both Papers in Dealing with Cultural Dimension

As explained in chapter three, the cultural dimension of the peace process was mainly concerned with Egypt's national identity, whether it is Arab, Pharaonic or Islamic. The following table summarizes how both national and opposition newspapers connected the national identity to the peace process between Egypt and Israel.

Table (6.6) cultural subjects in both papers

| Cultural subject                       | Al-Ahram |       | Al-Shaab |       |
|--|----------|-------|----------|-------|
|  | N        | %     | N        | %     |
| Arab identity of Egypt                 | 17       | 27.0  | 4        | 40.0  |
| Pharaonic identity of Egypt            | 17       | 27.0  | -        | -     |
| Islamic identity of Egypt              | 4        | 6.3   | 2        | 20.0  |
| National integration / harmonic values | 15       | 23.8  | 1        | 10.0  |
| Negative image about Israel            | 7        | 11.1  | 3        | 30.0  |
| Other cultural subjects                | 3        | 4.8   | -        | -     |
| Total                                  | 63       | 100.0 | 10       | 100.0 |

For Al-Ahram, it can be noted from the above table that the most frequent cultural subjects were the Arab and Pharaonic identity of Egypt. Each was represented in 27.0% (17 out of 63). Al-Ahram concentrated on both the Arab and the Pharaonic identities of Egypt during the peace process with Israel. In other words, because Al-Ahram considered Egypt as part of the Arab world, it also stressed notions such as "Egypt for Egyptians" and "Egypt above all". Beside these Arab and Pharaonic identities, Al-Ahram also concentrated on another cultural subject, national integration. This has a rating of 23.8%. It means that Al-Ahram stated that there was a harmonic value among Egyptians regarding the peace process with Israel.

For Al-Shaab, the cultural dimension of the peace process was clearly different from that on which Al-Ahram concentrated. Egypt's identity as an Arab nation was the most important aspect related to the peace process. This aspect appeared in 40.0% of AL-Shaab coverage of the cultural dimension of the peace process. Thus Al-Shaab confirmed the Egypt's responsibilities to other Arab nations and mentioned that it should not be isolated from them irrespective of any peace obligations. In its coverage of the cultural dimension of the peace process, Al-Shaab concentrated also on negative statements about Israelis (30.0%). Some of these statements were quoted from cultural subjects in Al-Shaab's coverage such as "they do not fulfill their obligations", "they thrive on annexing lands of others" and "they are against Islam and Christianity". Al-

Shaab considered "the Islamic identity of Egypt" as an important cultural aspect of the peace process. It appeared in 20.0%.

It can be concluded from the above table and figures that while Al-Ahram, the national paper, connected the peace process with various cultural aspects such as the Pharaonic and Arab identity of Egypt and on harmonic values/national integration, Al-Shaab concentrated mainly on Egypt's Arab identity and on negative images about the Israelis. Again, it may be seen that the ownership of the Egyptian press and its relationship with the political institutions influenced its coverage of the peace process.

In relation to the cultural dimensions of the peace process come the social aspects. The following table shows how both national and opposition newspapers connected the peace process to social aspects in Egypt.

Table (6.7) Social aspects in both papers

| Social subject       | Al-A | hram  | Al-Shaab |          |  |
|----------------------|------|-------|----------|----------|--|
|                      | N    | %     | N        | <b>%</b> |  |
| Housing services     | 17   | 26.6  | 3        | 37.5     |  |
| Infrastructures      | 19   | 29.7  | -        | -        |  |
| Health services      | 12   | 18.8  | 2        | 25.0     |  |
| Solving unemployment | 13   | 20.3  | 3        | 37.5     |  |
| Other social subject | 3    | 4.7   | -        | _        |  |
| Total                | 64   | 100.0 | 8        | 100.0    |  |

From Table (6.7) it can be seen that Al-Ahram concentrated mainly on two social aspects. The most frequent one was infrastructure, 29.7%, followed by housing services, 26.6%. Solving the unemployment problem came third with 20.3% followed by the health services with about 19.0%. This means that Al-Ahram considered that the peace process with Israel could lead to solving of Egypt's critical social problems since peace would mean less defense expenditure and considerably more foreign aid. There would be enough funds to reform the deteriorated infrastructure and the building of much needed new housing.

For Al-Shaab newspaper, the most frequent social subjects were housing services and solving unemployment. Each appeared with 37.5%. Health service came in the second position with a percentage of 25.0%. Al-Shaab concentrated on the possible effects of a

peace agreement with Israel on the unemployment problem. Its coverage on this matter as on others seemed to match the views of the SLP, its owner. These views favored better-managed public not private sector.

It can thus be concluded from Tables 6.4 to 6.7 that there was a significant difference between the national daily newspaper (Al-Ahram) and the opposition weekly newspaper (Al-Shaab). While Al-Ahram considered the economic dimension the most important one in connection with the peace process, the political dimension, was the most important one from Al-Shaab's point of view. Regarding the economic dimension, while Al-Ahram concentrated on solving the economic problems and improving income, Al-Shaab considered decreasing economic normalization and cooperation with Israel the most important economic subjects. Concerning the political dimension, there was also a quite difference between both papers. While Al-Ahram concentrated mainly on the activities of the government, Al-Shaab stressed that the peace process should lead to an expansion of political participation. As for the social and cultural dimensions, while Al-Ahram considered Egypt's Pharaonic and Arab and rebuilding the infrastructures the most important cultural and social aspects, Al-Shaab concentrated basically on Egypt's Arab identity, negative images about Israelis and solving the notion's unemployment problem. It can also be concluded also that both papers reflected the views of their owners regarding all the developmental dimensions of the peace process.

#### 6.3- National and International Actors in both newspapers

Knowing the actors and sources is essential for understanding the role of the media and the power relationship in society. This category tries to clarify the main actors involved in the peace process as portrayed in both the national and the opposition newspapers. The following table (6.8) summarizes their actors.

From Table (6.8), it can be noted that the most frequent actor involved in the developmental dimensions of the peace process in both newspapers was the president. He came first in both papers but with different percentages. While representing more than all the other actors in Al-Ahram (52.9%), he came about third of all the other actors in Al-Shaab (32.9%). This means that both national and opposition newspapers in Egypt considered the president, vice-president or prime-minister the most important actors involved in the peace process. Despite the difference in the percentage in both national

and opposition papers, the president is the most important decision-maker not only in political issues but in economic and social issues as well.

Table (6.8), Main national actors in both papers

| National actors           | Al-Ahram |       | Al-Sl | haab  |
|---------------------------|----------|-------|-------|-------|
|                           | N        | %     | N     | %     |
| President, prime-minister | 286      | 52.9  | 25    | 32.9  |
| Ministers                 | 90       | 16.6  | 8     | 10.5  |
| Local governors           | 31       | 5.7   | 7     | 9.2   |
| Political opposition      | 6        | 1.1   | 19    | 25.0  |
| Parliament                | 14       | 2.6   | 3     | 3.9   |
| Social organizations      | 14       | 2.6   | 3     | 3.9   |
| Military/police officers  | 11       | 2.0   | 1     | 1.3   |
| Egyptian                  | 28       | 5.2   | 2     | 2.6   |
| Other actor               | 1        | 0.2   | -     | -     |
| No human actor            | 60       | 11.1  | 8     | 10.5  |
| Total                     | 541      | 100.0 | 76    | 100.0 |

Apart from the president, the main national actor in both papers, the importance of other national actors differs in Al-Ahram and Al-Shaab. In Al-Ahram, ministers came second with 16.6%, followed by local governors with 5.7%. The second actor in Al-Shaab was political opposition with 25.0%, followed by ministers with 10.5%. Consequently, it may be concluded that ownership of the Egyptian press affect its views regarding the most important actors involved in the developmental dimension of the peace process. While the national paper (Al-Ahram), considered the president, ministers and local governors the most prominent actors respectively, Al-Shaab (the opposition paper) considered the political opposition the most prominent actors, only after the President.

Concerning the international actors involved in the peace process, there was little difference between both the national and the opposition newspapers (see appendix C.1). Both newspapers concentrated on four international actors with the same order. These actors were president/prime-minister, ministers, parliament and military officers respectively. Because the main international actors in the peace process were the political leaders of the United States and Israel, there was no disagreement between both national and opposition newspapers regarding who was involved on the international level.

#### 6.4- Sources of News Articles in both Newspapers

As explained in the introduction to this part of the study, any news article may originate from one or more sources. Analyzing the sources of news articles may be useful in defining and understanding orientations of a newspaper regarding a particular issue. In a sensitive issue like the peace process between Egypt and Israel after more than thirty years of conflict, knowing the sources of the news articles in both the national and the opposition papers is essential to understand main purposes of each newspaper and the power relationships within society. The following table summarizes the sources of news articles concerning the developmental dimensions of the peace process in both the national and the opposition newspapers.

Table (6.9) Sources of news articles in both papers

| Source of news articles    | Al-A | Al-Ahram |    | Shaab |
|----------------------------|------|----------|----|-------|
|                            | N    | %        | N  | %     |
| MENA*                      | 39   | 7.2      | _  | -     |
| Four big                   | 71   | 13.1     | 3  | 3.9   |
| Own correspondent          | 94   | 17.4     | 10 | 13.2  |
| Own writer                 | 168  | 31.1     | 15 | 19.7  |
| Specialist                 | 52   | 9.6      | 34 | 44.7  |
| Combination of two sources | 85   | 15.7     | 9  | 11.8  |
| Unidentified               | 28   | 5.2      | 1  | 1.3   |
| Other sources              | 4    | 0.7      | 4  | 5.3   |
| Total                      | 541  | 100.0    | 76 | 100.0 |

<sup>\*</sup> MENA- Middle East News Agency; (the Egyptian news agency)

From Table (6.9), it may be seen that, for Al-Ahram, the most frequent source of news articles regarding the peace process was "own writer". This source appeared in about third of all sources, 31.1% (168 out of 541). "Own correspondent" came second position with 17.4%, followed by "combination of two sources" with 15.7%. It seems that Al-Ahram depended mainly on its own writers or on the most influential journalists to deal with the developmental dimension of the peace process and to convince Egyptians of its outcomes.

The above table and figures indicate that the "specialist" was the most frequent source in Al-Shaab newspaper. He represented more than 44.0% of all other sources (34 out of

76). As "specialists" are responsible for analytical editorials, it is clear that Al-Shaab depended heavily on these editorials to analyze the dimensions of the peace process. "Own writer" came second with 19.7%, followed by "own correspondent" and "combination of two sources" with almost the same percent, 13.2% and 11.8% respectively.

If sources of news stories such as correspondent or news agencies are compared with the sources of opinion materials such as the writers or specialists of both newspapers, it is clear that, while Al-Ahram depended mainly on the former one, Al-Shaab concentrated heavily on the latter. In Al-Ahram, the sources of the news stories represent altogether about 53.4% (285 out of 541). In Al-Shaab, while the sources of the opinion materials altogether represent more than 64.0%, they appear in only about 29.0% in Al-Ahram. That a source like MENA did not appear at all in Al-Shaab, may be because MENA belongs to the government. This indicates that Al-Ahram was mainly concerned with news stores regarding the peace process, while Al-Shaab was originally concerned with the analyzing all the dimensions and threats of the peace process to the national security of Egypt.

### 6.5- Orientation or Stance in both Newspapers

The orientation or stance of news articles is used to classify coverage in terms of value judgments (Hansen, 1998). Orientation was defined by three criteria: positive, negative and neutral orientation. The following table summarizes the orientation or stance of the coverage regarding the developmental dimension of the peace process in both national and opposition newspapers.

Table (6.10) orientation of coverage in both papers

| Orientation | Al-Ah | Al-Ahram |    | aab   |
|-------------|-------|----------|----|-------|
|             | N     | %        | N  | %     |
| Positive    | 235   | 43.4     | 13 | 17.1  |
| Neutral     | 214   | 39.6     | 17 | 22.4  |
| Negative    | 92    | 17.0     | 46 | 60.5  |
| Total       | 541   | 100.0    | 76 | 100.0 |

There was a significant difference in orientation between the national and the opposition papers regarding the peace process. As the figures of the above table show, while the positive orientation of Al-Ahram was 43.4%, the negative orientation represented only 17.0%. This finding indicates that Al-Ahram, the national paper, considered the peace process with Israel vital for a solution to the economic and social problems facing Egypt. Orientation of coverage in Al-Shaab, the opposition paper, was quite different. While the positive orientation of Al-Shaab's coverage was only 17.1%, the negative orientation represented more than 60.0%. This last finding shows that Al-Shaab considered peace with Israel would lead to negative rather than positive outcomes. These findings again show that ownership of newspapers in Egypt affected their content towards the peace process with Israel.

As explained above, these positive and negative orientations were assessed through the expression of positive and negative values and words. The following table summarizes the most frequent positive values in both newspapers. The table includes only how many times each value was mentioned. The number of each value is out of 541 in Al-Ahram and out of 76 in Al-Shaab. For example, if "stability" as a positive value mentioned 68 times in Al-Ahram's coverage, this means that it did not appeared in 472 articles of Al-Ahram. The following table gives only the first figure. This explains why there is no total number in the table.

From Table (6.11) one can note that the most frequent positive values of the peace process with Israel were mentioned in Al-Ahram, the national paper. Most of these positive values were rarely reported in Al-Shaab, the opposition paper. They were mentioned in Al-Shaab half the time they were reported in Al-Ahram. The only positive value that featured with nearly the same percent in both papers was "reform". This value, which means that the peace process should lead to the reclaiming of desert, appeared in about 8.3% in Al-Ahram and 7.9% in Al-Shaab. Because about 95.0% of the Egyptian live on only 6.0% of Egypt land, reclamation and development of the desert was, and still is, a critical economic issue. Its importance became clear after the beginning of the peace process with Israel. "Normalization" as an economic and political positive value did not appear at all in Al-Shaab. This indicates that whenever "normalization" featured in Al-Shaab, it did so as a negative value. Al-Shaab was against any kind of economic or political normalization with Israel until it withdrew from all occupied land. See analysis of tables 6.4 and 6.5 in this chapter.

Table (6.11) positive values in both papers

| Positive Value or word | Al-A | hram | Al-Shaab |     |  |
|------------------------|------|------|----------|-----|--|
|                        | N    | %    | N        | %   |  |
| Peaceful               | 58   | 10.7 | 4        | 5.3 |  |
| Cooperation            | 31   | 5.7  | 1        | 1.3 |  |
| Growth                 | 54   | 10.0 | 4        | 5.3 |  |
| Developing             | 30   | 5.5  | 3        | 3.9 |  |
| Stability              | 68   | 12.6 | 2        | 2.6 |  |
| Homogeneity            | 31   | 5.7  | 3        | 3.9 |  |
| Reform                 | 45   | 8.3  | 6        | 7.9 |  |
| End of suffering       | 43   | 7.9  | 1        | 1.3 |  |
| Renaissance            | 47   | 8.7  | -        | -   |  |
| Successful             | 49   | 9.1  | 4        | 5.3 |  |
| Praise                 | 42   | 7.8  | 2        | 2.6 |  |
| Normalization          | 17   | 3.1  | <u>.</u> | -   |  |

The figures in the above table indicate once more that the Egyptian press reflects its ownership in its responses to different issues. Peace, for Al-Ahram, which belongs to the government, means a peaceful and friendly relationship with Israel, economic cooperation and normalization, political stability and national integration or homogeneity of values among Egyptians about peace. Peace would also lead to economic growth, reform of the desert, an end to economic suffering and national renaissance. Al-Ahram also considered that most of peace efforts were successful and gave praise to the Egyptian leadership. Most of these positive outcomes or values of the peace were frequently repeated by the government officials during the peace negotiations.

For Al-Shaab, the only positive values of peace were reforming the desert and reclaiming new land for agriculture. It is clear that Al-Shaab concentrated on negative outcomes or values of the peace with Israel. The following table summarizes the most frequent negative values and words that appeared in the two national and opposition newspapers in their coverage of the developmental dimensions of the peace process.

From Table (6.12), it can be noted that the most frequent negative values appearing in the Egyptian press on the peace process, were represented in Al-Shaab. While most of the above negative values appeared in AL-Shaab with a percentage of more than 10.0%,

their percentage in Al-Ahram is less than 5.0%. Value such as aggressive amounted in Al-Shaab to 28.9%, but only 7.9% in Al-Ahram. Refusal as a negative value appeared in more than 30.0% of the time in Al-Shaab, but only about 5.0% in Al-Ahram.

Table (6.12) negative values in both papers

| Negative value or word | Al-Ahram |     | Al-S | Shaab |
|------------------------|----------|-----|------|-------|
|                        | N        | %   | N    | %     |
| Aggressive             | 43       | 7.9 | 22   | 28.9  |
| Terrorists             | 21       | 3.9 | 15   | 19.7  |
| Violent                | 23       | 4.3 | 4    | 5.3   |
| Isolation              | 8        | 1.5 | 7    | 9.2   |
| Opposition             | 24       | 4.4 | 19   | 25.0  |
| War supporters         | 24       | 4.4 | 14   | 18.4  |
| Threaten               | 36       | 6.7 | 10   | 13.2  |
| Illegal                | 20       | 3.7 | 8    | 10.5  |
| Refusal                | 28       | 5.2 | 24   | 31.6  |

The figures of the above table show that, according to Al-Shaab, the Israelis are aggressive and warmonger so the newspaper opposed and refused any kind of peace with them because this peace would isolate Egypt from the rest of the Arab world, threaten Egypt's national security and the security of the Middle East. This view of Al-Shaab newspaper matched the views of the SLP, its owner.

However in the most critical moments concerning the peace process with Israel, the negative values which appeared in both newspapers did show differences. These moments were the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the Israeli bombing of the PLO Headquarter in Tunisia in 1985. During the main critical moments related to the peace process, aggressive as a negative value, for example, appeared in Al-Ahram with 46.5% and Al-Shaab by 54.5% (see appendix C.2). Other negative values such as violent, threaten, refusal and opposition also appeared in the same period, from 1981 to 1985 (see also appendix C.2). The later finding shows that the Egyptian press concentrated on negative values or words in

connection with the developmental dimensions of the peace process when this process faced critical moments or events.

# 6.6- Difference between both Papers' Coverage under two Presidencies

As the peace process took place under both Sadat and Mubarak, this section analyzes differences between both the national and the opposition papers' coverage of the peace process over the period. Despite more than 56.0% of the Egyptian press coverage being devoted to the developmental dimensions of the peace process under President Sadat (see table 1 in the introduction to this part of the study), there were significant differences between the national and the opposition newspapers under the two presidencies. The following table summarizes this coverage.

Table (6.12) coverage of both papers under the two presidencies

| The two presidencies                     |     | hram  | Al-Shaab |       |  |
|--|-----|-------|----------|-------|--|
|  | N   | %     | N        | %     |  |
| Under Sadat, from Jan, 77 to Oct., 81    | 318 | 58.8  | 31       | 40.8  |  |
| Under Mubarak, from Dec., 81 to Mar., 89 | 223 | 41.2  | 45       | 59.2  |  |
| Total                                    | 541 | 100.0 | 75       | 100.0 |  |

The above table shows that there was quite a difference between Al-Ahram and Al-Shaab in dealing with the developmental dimensions of the peace process under the two presidencies. While the majority of Al-Ahram's coverage (58.8%) took place under President Sadat, nearly the same percent of Al-Shaab's coverage occurred under President Mubarak. These findings should be understood in terms of the political situation in Egypt during the late seventies and the eighties. In the late 1970s when the peace process with Israel began, the electronic media and the newspapers did their best to convince Egyptians that peace with Israel, a country which had been their primary enemy a few weeks earlier, was right and worth having. Al-Ahram was one of the main national papers used in this campaign. These findings can partly be understood by the main events of the peace process, such as the signing of the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty with Israel, which took place during the late seventies.

For Al-Shaab, the majority of such coverage occurred under President Mubarak. This can also be explained in terms of the political environment in Egypt. In the late seventies, and after signing the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt was isolated from the Arab countries. Criticism of President Sadat's policy began to increase in the opposition newspapers, especially during 1981. Many of these newspapers were confiscated and banned. AL-Shaab was among those, which was confiscated for about six months. Under Mubarak, no issue of any newspaper was confiscated. Under Mubarak, many members of the SLP, the owner of Al-Shaab, became members of the Parliament at the 1984 and 1987 elections and freedom was slightly increased. These political developments gave opposition newspapers the opportunity to criticize government policy towards peace. This may explain why the majority of Al-Shaab's coverage of the developmental dimension of the peace process took place under President Mubarak.

To have a clearer understanding of the differences between national and opposition coverage of the peace process over time, four periods can be differentiated; two under President Sadat and two under President Mubarak. These periods are listed under the following table.

Table (6.13) the two papers coverage over four periods

| Four periods* | Al-A | hram  | Al-Shaab |       |  |
|---------------|------|-------|----------|-------|--|
|               | N    | %     | N        | %     |  |
| Period 1      | 199  | 36.8  | 2        | 2.6   |  |
| Period 2      | 145  | 26.8  | 29       | 38.2  |  |
| Period 3      | 119  | 22.0  | 36       | 47.4  |  |
| Period 4      | 78   | 14.4  | 9        | 11.8  |  |
| Total         | 541  | 100.0 | 76       | 100.0 |  |

<sup>\*</sup> Period one lasted six weeks of analysis [weeks 1 to 6] and included main events of the peace process between Egypt and Israel as signing the Camp David and the peace treaty. Period two lasted five weeks [weeks 7 to 11] and included first Israel's withdrawal from Sinai until the assassination of Sadat. Period three lasted six weeks [weeks 12 to 17] and included the most critical moments of the peace process as Israel invasion to Lebanon. Period four lasted four weeks [weeks 18 to 21] and included final Israel's withdrawal from Sinai

From table (6.13), one can note that Al-Ahram concentrated the peace process in the first period (first six weeks of analysis). More than third of Al-Ahram coverage (36.8%) was

in this period. Al-Ahram belongs to the government and it is clear that it was used intensively in the beginning of the peace process, along with national media, to convince the Egyptians with the benefits of peace with Israel by connecting it with economic and social dimensions of development. Al-Ahram's coverage declined systematically through the other three periods. In the second its coverage was down to 26.8%, in the third to 22.0% and only 14.4% in the last. It is clear that Al-Ahram tried to concentrate on the positive outcomes of peace. When such critical moments of the peace took place in the second, third and fourth periods, coverage decreased.

For Al-Shaab, the coverage over the four periods was quite different. About half of Al-Shaab's coverage was in the third period, 47.4%. In this period, the most critical events, Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the bombing the Headquarter of the PLO in Tunisia, occurred. The SLP and its paper (Al-Shaab) considered these actions a direct violation of the peace treaty, which they already opposed. Consequently, Al-Shaab coverage concentrated, in the third period, on the negative outcomes of peace. After the third period, about 38.2% of Al-Shaab coverage came in the second period, in which President Sadat was assassinated. The assassination of Sadat was seen by Al-Shaab as a negative outcome of his peace policy towards Israel and of his internal political policies (see appendix C.2)

#### 6.7- Conclusion

Two main points were taken into consideration in the conclusion of this chapter; objectives and theoretical framework. Concerning the first, the conclusion tries to summarize how the results met the objectives and questions mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The second relates to how the results met the two main approaches of this study; political economy approach and construction of meaning approach.

Firstly, in terms of objectives and questions dealt with in this chapter, the following points can be made:

• The characteristics of the coverage in the national newspaper (Al-Ahram) and in the opposition newspaper (Al-Shaab) differed. In Al-Ahram more than 60.0% of coverage was located on the front page, while more than 59.0% of Al-Shaab coverage was printed on inside pages. This may be understood in terms of types of articles dealing with the developmental dimensions of the peace process in both newspapers. More than 59.0% of articles printed in Al-Ahram were news

stories, which are usually published on the front pages of Egyptian newspapers. In Al-Shaab, more than 40.0% of articles were analytical editorial, which are usually printed on the inside pages. So it can be concluded that while the majority of news articles were published on the front page of Al-Aharm and on the inside page of Al-Shaab, this did not mean that the developmental dimensions of the peace process were given greater prominence in Al-Ahram than in Al-Shaab.

- There was nevertheless, a difference between both papers in their dealing with different dimensions of the peace process. While Al-Ahram concentrated mainly on the economic dimension, Al-Shaab considered the political dimensions the most important. From an economic perspective, while Al-Ahram concentrated on dealing with the economic problems facing Egypt and economic aid as a direct outcome of the peace with Israel, Al-Shaab stated that peace should not lead to any kind of economic normalization and cooperation with Israel. From the political perspective of the peace process, Al-Ahram concentrated on "activities of the government" while Al-Shaab connected the peace to a brooder political participation and plurality. Both newspapers also differed significantly in dealing with the cultural/social dimensions of peace. While Al-Shaab concentrated basically on the Egypt's Arab identity, Al-Ahram gave Arab identity and Pharaonic identity the same degree of coverage. Infrastructure as a social aspect received greater coverage in Al-Ahram, while Al-Shaab devoted more to unemployment and housing problems. Consequently, it can be concluded that the priorities of economic, political and social/cultural aspects on peace with Israel differed from national to opposition newspapers.
- As for the national and international actors involved in the developmental dimensions of the peace process, there was little difference between both papers about the most frequent actor, the president/prime minister. However the two papers did give different priority to the other actors. While ministers took second in Al-Ahram priorities, political opposition was considered second in importance by Al-Shaab.
- The sources of news materials also differed. Al-Ahram depended mainly on its own writers, correspondents and a combination of two sources. Specialists and own writers were the most frequent sources in Al-Shaab. It clear that while Al-

Ahram depended basically on sources of news stories, Al-Shaab used mainly sources of opinion materials.

- Orientation or stance of coverage concerning the developmental dimensions of the peace process or how the Egyptian press connected peace to Egypt's economic, political and social development differed completely in both newspapers. In Al-Ahram, about 43.0% of coverage concentrated on positive outcomes of peace, with but 17.0% of negative orientation. For Al-Shaab orientation was quite different. While only 17.1% connected peace with positive values, more than 60.0% concentrated on negative outcomes of peace with Israel.
- The coverage in both newspapers changed over the period. Most of Al-Ahram's coverage of the developmental dimensions of the peace process was under President Sadat and especially in the first two years. Al-Shaab concentrated its coverage under President Mubarak and especially in the first half of the eighties, in which the most critical events faced the peace process with Israel took place.

Secondly, the theoretical framework of the study adopted two main approaches: the political economy approach and the construction of meaning approach. The construction of meaning approach will be discussed in the following three chapters (chapters seven through nine). The political economy approach includes two main aspects. Firstly: the relationship between ownership of the media and their output. Secondly: the relationship between the media and their structure and political environment. The second aspect will be dealt with in chapter ten, which examines the political and economic environment of the Egyptian press. In this chapter the conclusion analyzes how the results mainly met the political economy approach or what the extent to which ownership of the Egyptian newspapers influenced content regarding the different dimensions of the peace process.

• Following the political economy approach, it appears that ownership of the Egyptian press did influence content. Al-Ahram, which belongs to the government, concentrated mainly on the economic dimension of the peace process. This matched the views of the government, which considered peace would lead to a solving of the economic problems facing Egypt. As it is belongs to the government, Al-Ahram focused on the activities of the government for

most of its political material and on infrastructure for its social coverage. Egypt's Arab and Pharaonic identity received the same percentage of coverage as cultural aspects. This also matched the views of the government about identity of Egypt, especially after isolating Egypt from the Arab World in the late seventies. Al-Ahram also considered the president/prime minister and ministers the most important actors involved in the developmental dimensions of the peace process. Orientation of Al-Ahram's coverage was mainly positive concerning outcomes of peace with Israel.

- Al-Shaab, which belongs to the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), considered the political dimension the most important one in connection with the peace process. This matched the views of the SLP, which stated that the peace should lead to greater political participation and plurality in the Egyptian political system. Therefore, political participation was the most frequent political subject in Al-Shaab. It also reflected views of the SLP that the government must decrease economic cooperation and normalization with Israel. The SLP's pro-Arab and Islamic orientation made Egypt's Arab and Islamic identity and a negative image about Israel the most frequent cultural subjects. Like Al-Ahram, the president/prime minister was the most frequent actor in Al-Shaab. However, political opposition appeared in 25.0% of Al-Shaab coverage. As the SLP was against the peace treaty with Israel, more than 60.0% of Al-Shaab's coverage had a negative orientation towards different developmental dimensions of the peace process, especially in the first half of the eighties.
- It can be concluded that ownership of the Egyptian newspapers influenced their content regarding the peace process and its dimensions. While Al-Ahram reflected views of the government, Al-Shaab articulated the views and orientation of the SLP. Consequently, a political economy approach seems to be a useful approach to understanding the role of the Egyptian press in various issues. The construction of meaning approach and how the Egyptian press framed the meaning of peace with Israel will be discussed in the next three chapters, for they deal with the economic, political and social/cultural dimensions of the peace process. As explained in the introduction of this part, the total number of articles, in the following three chapters, will be dealt with as a whole without comparing between the two chosen newspapers.

# **Chapter Seven**

# The Economic Dimension of the Peace Process

This chapter discusses how the Egyptian press connected the economic dimension of development to the peace process. When the peace process began in the late seventies, Egypt was facing massive economic problems. There were researchers, who argued that peace with Israel was the main solution for the problematic economic situation in Egypt (Dossouki, 1988). Questions asked in this chapter are: How did the Egyptian press present the economic dimension of the peace process? What were the amount and kind of coverage devoted to different aspects of the economic dimension? Who were the main actors and sources involved in the dimension? What was the stance of the Egyptian press coverage regarding the economic dimension? Did the coverage differ over time? Results of the analysis are presented as follows:

- Main and sub-economic subjects connected to the peace process;
- Characteristics of the coverage devoted to the economic dimension;
- Main actors involved in the economic dimension;
- Main sources of the coverage devoted to the economic dimension;
- Coverage of this dimension under Sadat and Mubarak respectively; and
- Orientation or stance towards economic dimension.

# 7.1- Main and sub-economic subjects of the coverage

The Egyptian press considered the economic dimension of development the most important dimension of the peace process. Figures of Tables 6 and 7 in the introduction of the analysis indicate that the economic dimension was the most frequent one. It represented 26.7% of all cases, 165 out of 617. This dimension also received more than 25.0% of the coverage that was devoted to all developmental dimensions of the peace process (32.7 out of 126.6 pages). This means that the economic situation in Egypt during the seventies and eighties influenced the Egyptian press coverage of the different dimensions of the peace process. On what kind of economic subjects did the Egyptian press concentrate? The following table shows the main and sub-economic subjects of the peace process.

Table (7.1) main and sub-economic subjects

| Economic subject                       | Main subject |       | Subsidiary one |       | Subsidiary two |       |
|--|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|----------------|-------|
|  | N            | %     | N              | %     | N              | %     |
| Improvement of income / material needs | 28           | 17.0  | 23             | 18.9  | 16             | 16.7  |
| Solution of economic problems          | 32           | 19.4  | 33             | 27.0  | 27             | 28.1  |
| Economic projects / industries         | 28           | 17.0  | 30             | 24.6  | 19             | 19.8  |
| Economic aid / assistance              | 29           | 17.6  | 6              | 4.9   | 3              | 3.1   |
| Equality of income / local communities | 11           | 6.7   | 1              | 0.8   | 7              | 7.3   |
| Economic normalization/cooperation     | 25           | 15.2  | 24             | 19.7  | 12             | 12.5  |
| Reduction of normalization             | 8            | 4.8   | 2              | 1.6   | 5              | 5.2   |
| Others                                 | 4            | 2.4   | 3              | 2.5   | 7              | 7.3   |
| Total                                  | 165          | 100.0 | 122            | 100.0 | 96             | 100.0 |

From the above table, it can be noted that the most frequent economic subjects were the solution of economic problems, the establishment of new projects and improvements in income respectively. These three economic aspects represented altogether more than 53.0% out of all main economic subjects, 70.0% as a subsidiary one and 64.0% as a subsidiary two. Economic cooperation with western countries and normalization with Israel received a significant coverage on the Egyptian press. They appeared in 15.2% as a main economic subject, 19.7% as a subsidiary one and 12.5% as a subsidiary two. Economic aid also received a considerable amount of coverage as a main economic subject.

The above figures, therefore, show that the Egyptian press connected the peace process to the main economic needs and prevalent problems in Egypt during the seventies and the eighties. It thought the peace with Israel would help to solve the economic problems and to develop the desert. Egypt would receive an "unlimited" amount of foreign aid and assistance, which would lead to the establishment of new projects and factories. Consequently, the income of the Egyptians would be improved and their basic needs would be met. The peace would also increase economic cooperation with the western countries and normalization with Israel. It seems that the Egyptian press concentrated

mainly on the positive economic outcomes of the peace process, so an economic subject such as a "reduction of economic normalization with Israel" appeared in less than 5.0% as a main and subsidiaries.

The above table also shows that the Egyptian press concentrated mainly on quantitative indications of economic development such as higher incomes and more economic projects. Qualitative indications of economic development such as equality of income and the independence of local communities (see chapter two) were rare. These subjects appeared in only 6.7% as main economic aspects of the peace process and in about 4.0%, on average, as subsidiaries. This finding may be explained by two factors. Firstly, Egypt did not meet the quantitative requirements for economic development that prevailed in the development theories during the sixties and the early seventies. Therefore, the Egyptian press concentrated on these requirements, but only in the late seventies and the eighties. Secondly, the Egyptian press needed a concrete outcome of the peace negotiations in order to convince Egyptians of the benefits of the new peace policies with the Israelis.

#### 7.2- Amount of Coverage Devoted to the Economic Dimension

The total amount of coverage devoted to all dimensions of the peace process was 54,726 columns/cm (126.6 pages), of which 14,136 column/cm (32.7 pages) was devoted to the economic dimension. This appeared the largest amount of coverage, 25.8% (see table int. 6). Table (7.2) shows the amount of coverage that was devoted to each economic aspect.

From Table (7.2), it can be seen that solution economic problems and improving incomes received the largest amount of the Egyptian press coverage on the economic dimension of the peace process. These two issues received 47.0% out of the total coverage on the economic dimension (15.3 pages out of 32.7 pages). Two other economic issues received the same amount of coverage (5 pages): the establishment of new economic projects and economic cooperation/normalization. Foreign aid and assistance as an economic issue also occupied a significant amount of coverage, receiving about 11.6% (3.8 pages). Qualitative indications of economic development such as equality of income and independence of local communities received only 1.4 pages of coverage

Table (7.2) amount of coverage of economic subjects

| Economic subjects                      | Amount of coverage |         |       |  |  |
|--|--------------------|---------|-------|--|--|
|  | By col/cm          | By page | %     |  |  |
| Improvement of income / material needs | 3246               | 7.5     | 23.0  |  |  |
| Solution of economic problems          | 3388               | 7.8     | 24.0  |  |  |
| Economic projects / industries         | 2144               | 5.0     | 15.3  |  |  |
| Economic aid / assistance              | 1650               | 3.8     | 11.6  |  |  |
| Equality of income / local communities | 620                | 1.4     | 4.4   |  |  |
| Economic normalization/cooperation     | 2164               | 5.0     | 15.3  |  |  |
| Decreasing of normalization            | 810                | 1.9     | 5.7   |  |  |
| Others                                 | 114                | 0.3     | .07   |  |  |
| Total                                  | 14,136             | 32.7    | 100.0 |  |  |

From the above table, it can be seen that the Egyptian press coverage of the economic dimension of the peace process concentrated on the most urgent economic requirements during the late seventies and the eighties. In the late seventies, the Egyptian economy suffered from a massive economic problems ranging from inflation to structural reforms and unemployment. Negative outcomes of the economic open-door policy led to serious riots and demonstrations in January 1977. The gap between Egypt's rich and poor widened. By the late seventies, only 5.1% of the Egyptians held nearly 26.6 % of total national income (Weinbaum, 1985). It seems that the government, in order to gain popular support for its controversial political and economic policies, undertook an extensive campaign through the media to create an atmosphere of growth and stability. As the political leadership considered the peace with Israel the main solution of the problematic economic situation in Egypt, the press gave a great amount of coverage to the positive economic outcomes of the peace.

Consequently, peace would lead to the solution of serious economic problems, the improvement to income, the satisfaction of material needs and the establishment of new projects and factories. After the signing of the peace treaty in March 1979, Egypt has become one of the largest recipients of American aid. Economic aid was seen by the American administration as an important factor for the stability of Sadat's regime after his initiatives towards peace. As a result, foreign economic aid and assistance was

connected intensively with the peace process with Israel. In all, peace was introduced to the Egyptians as the beginning of economic renaissance.

# 7.3- Characteristics of Coverage Devoted to the Economic Dimension

Characteristics of coverage refer to location and the kinds of coverage devoted to the economic dimension. The following table shows location of coverage that devoted to each economic issue.

Table (7.3) location of coverage devoted to main economic aspects

| Economic subjects                      | Front page |        | Back page |          | Inside page |        |
|--|------------|--------|-----------|----------|-------------|--------|
|  | N          | %      | N         | %        | N           | %      |
| Improvement of income / material needs | 17         | 16.0   | 3         | 27.3     | 8           | 16.7   |
| Solution of economic problems          | 18         | 17.0   | 2         | 18.2     | 12          | 25.0   |
| Economic projects / industries         | 17         | 16.0   | 2         | 18.2     | 9           | 18.8   |
| Economic aid / assistance              | 25         | 23.6   | -         | -        | 4           | 8.3    |
| Equality of income / local communities | 5          | 4.7    | -         | -        | 6           | 12.5   |
| Economic normalization/cooperation     | 16         | 15.1   | 3         | 27.3     | 6           | 12.5   |
| Decreasing of normalization            | 5          | 4.7    | 1         | 9.1      | 2           | 4.2    |
| Others                                 | 3          | 2.8    | _         | <b>-</b> | 1           | 2.1    |
| Total                                  | 106        | 100.0% | 11        | 100.0%   | 48          | 100.0% |

As materials published on the front pages are considered to be more prominent, it can be noted from the above table that the Egyptian press regarded foreign aid as the most important economic issue for the peace process. This issue represented about quarter of all economic subjects printed on the front pages (23.6%). In the early eighties, Egypt had become one of the world's most economically dependent countries. Egypt's food deficits were staggering and it relied on foreign suppliers for about one-half of its total food consumption (for more, see chapter three). Consequently, foreign economic aid and assistance was considered the most important economic outcome of the peace process. Therefore, it was the most frequent subject printed in the front pages. Three other economic issues featured regularly on the front pages: solution of economic problems (17.0%), improvements of income and the establishment of new economic projects (each

16.0%). Because the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel included economic protocols, the Egyptian press published most of the materials related to economic normalization on the front pages.

On the back pages, two important economic issues dominated; improvements in income and economic normalization (each appeared in 27.3%). This may be explained by the importance of the back pages in the Egyptian newspapers because it is here that the daily-columns of the well-known journalists appear. Because of rising inflation during the late seventies and the eighties, connecting the peace process to the improvement of incomes, using the back pages to gain popular support for the peace policies seemed to be essential. Economic normalization was also a sensitive issue after more than thirty years of conflict with Israel and needed the contributions of experienced journalists to deal with. Most economic issues printed on the inside pages were about solving economic problems, new economic projects and improving incomes. One can note also from the above table that the qualitative indications of economic development were mainly printed on the inside pages.

Regarding economic subjects as subsidiaries, it can be noticed from Appendix (D.1) that three sub-economic subjects were basically published on the front and inside pages; solution of the economic problems, the establishment of new projects, and improvements to income/satisfaction of material needs. Table (7.3) and Appendix (D.1) show that the Egyptian press considered four economic subjects to be the most prominent issues. These were mainly published on the front pages. They represented the massive economic requirements of the Egyptians and, simultaneously, reflected the quantitative indications of economic development.

The second category of characteristics is the type of coverage. The Opinion materials published by well-known journalists and specialists are usually used to influence public opinion toward different issues. The following table summarizes the types of the coverage devoted to economic subjects.

Table (7.4) shows that, while news stories represented about 65% (107 out of 165) of all coverage devoted to the economic dimension, opinion materials (main editorial, daily column and analytical editorial) represented together 35% (58 out of 165). These figures show that the Egyptian press dealt with the economic dimension in an informative way. However, this varied from one economic issue to another. In total, and through

percentages within each economic subject, it can be noted from the above table that the Egyptian press relied mainly on opinion materials to deal with three economic issues; equality of income/independence of local communities and decreasing economic cooperation with Israel.

Table (7.4) types of coverage devoted to main economic subjects

| <b>Economic subjects</b>               | New | News story |    | Main editorial Da |    | Daily column |    | Analytical editorial |  |
|--|-----|------------|----|-------------------|----|--------------|----|----------------------|--|
|  | N   | %          | N  | %                 | N  | %            | N  | %                    |  |
| Improvement of income/material needs   | 19  | 17.8       | 1  | 6.3               | 3  | 11.1         | 5  | 33.3                 |  |
| Solution of economic problems          | 19  | 17.8       | 5  | 31.2              | 5  | 18.5         | 3  | 20.0                 |  |
| Economic projects / industries         | 20  | 18.7       | 4  | 25.0              | 4  | 14.8         | _  | <b>.</b>             |  |
| Economic aid / assistance              | 26  | 24.3       | 3  | 18.7              | -  | -            | -  | -                    |  |
| Equality of income / local communities | 2   | 1.8        | 2  | 12.5              | 5  | 18.5         | 2  | 13.3                 |  |
| Economic normalization<br>/cooperation | 15  | 14.0       | 1  | 6.3               | 8  | 29.6         | 1  | 6.7                  |  |
| Decreasing of normalization            | 3   | 2.8        | -  | -                 | 1  | 3.7          | 4  | 26.7                 |  |
| Others                                 | 3   | 2.8        | -  | <b> </b>          | 1  | 3.7          | -  | -                    |  |
| Total                                  | 107 | 100.0%     | 16 | 100.0%            | 27 | 100.0%       | 15 | 100.0%               |  |

For a news story, it can be noted that "economic aid" was the most frequent main subject presented in this type of coverage, 24.3%. Establishment of economic projects came second with 18.7% followed by two economic issues with the same percent: rasing income and solving economic problems, each appearing in 17.8%. This means that most of the news stories concentrated on quantitative indications of economic development. The main editorials which reflect the views of the newspapers also focused on two quantitative indications; solution of economic problems (31.2%) and new projects (25%). This can be understood in terms of the relationship between the Egypt's press government in that the papers' views always reflected the government's interests (except oppositional papers), see chapter five.

The priority of economic issues for "the daily column" and "analytical editorial" was quite different. Daily columns concentrated on two main economic issues, economic normalization with Israel (29.6%) and equality of income/independence of local

community (18.5%). It seems that the sensitivity of economic normalization and cooperation with Israel required the skills of famous or well-known journalists in their daily columns. Equality of income and independence of local community as qualitative indications of economic development were predictable issues in Egypt during the late seventies and the eighties. Well-known journalist considered these issues as future outcomes of the peace process.

As opinion material, which reflected the views of specialists or intellectuals, analytical editorials connected the peace process to two economic issues: improvement to income (33.3%) and a reduction of economic normalization with Israel (26.7%). Through analytical views and the deep knowledge of the writer, analytical editorials may influence public opinion towards various issues. It seems that concentrating on income improvement as a direct economic result of the peace was directed to gain popular support for the new policy. In the same direction, a lessening of economic normalization was connected to the threatening aspects of peace.

Concerning coverage of various types of economic subsidiary issues, it can be seen that the results of the analysis are comparable to main economic subject (see Appendix D.2). News stories as a type of coverage concentrated on three economic issues as subsidiaries: solution of economic problems, new economic projects and rising income. Opinion materials focused mainly on two of the above subjects (solution of economic problems, new projects) and economic normalization with Israel. From the above table and Appendix (D.2), it can be concluded that while news stories, as a type of coverage, concentrated basically on quantitative indications of development such as economic aid, problems and projects, the opinion materials dealt with qualitative indications of economic development and the more sensitive issues such as economic normalization with Israel.

# 7.4- National Actors Involved in the Economic Dimension

National actors refer to the Egyptian actors involved in the economic subjects. The main national actors who were involved in the total number of articles analyzed were mainly the executive authorities (table [int. 7]). It seems that this finding also applies to the economic dimension. The following table summarizes the most frequent national actors involved in the main economic subjects

Table (7.5) the national actors involved in the economic dimension

| Economic subjects                                 | Mos          | Most frequent national actors N=143* |                    |                     |              |  |  |  |  |
|---|--------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------|--|--|--|--|
| Economic subjects                                 | President    | Ministers                            | Local<br>governors | Social organization | Egyptians    |  |  |  |  |
| Improvement of income/<br>material of needs       | 17<br>20.0%  | 3<br>9.1%                            | 1<br>12.5%         | 1<br>14.3%          | 4<br>40.0%   |  |  |  |  |
| Solution of economic problems                     | 19<br>22.4%  | 5<br>15.2%                           | 1<br>12.5%         | 2<br>28.6%          | 2<br>20.0%   |  |  |  |  |
| Establishment of economic projects                | 16<br>18.8%  | 6<br>18.2%                           | 3<br>37.5%         |                     | 2<br>10.0%   |  |  |  |  |
| Economic aid                                      | 11<br>12.9%  | 12<br>36.3%                          | 2<br>25.0%         | •                   | 2<br>20.0%   |  |  |  |  |
| Equality of income/inde-<br>pendence of community | 7<br>8.2%    | 1<br>3.0%                            | -                  | •                   | -            |  |  |  |  |
| Economic normalization /cooperation               | 13<br>15.3%  | 4<br>12.1%                           | 1<br>12.5%         | 1<br>14.3%          | 1<br>10.0%   |  |  |  |  |
| Decreasing of normaliza-<br>tion                  | 2<br>2.4%    | -                                    | <u>-</u>           | 3<br>42.9%          | <u>-</u>     |  |  |  |  |
| Others  | -            | 2<br>6.1%                            | -                  | -                   | -            |  |  |  |  |
| Total   | 85<br>100.0% | 33<br>100.0%                         | 8<br>100.0%        | 7<br>100.0%         | 10<br>100.0% |  |  |  |  |

<sup>\*</sup> Other national actors were: No human actor [12], political opposition [2], parliament [4], military/police officers [3] and others [1]. The total number is 165.

The above table shows that the most frequent national actor involved in the economic dimension was the president/vice president. This actor alone appeared in more than 50.0% of all economic subjects (85 out of 165). Ministers came in the second position with a percent of 20.0% (33 out of 165). Other national actors were rare. None of them exceeded 6.0%. The above figures indicated to an overwhelming degree of executive authority in Egypt, not only in political issues but in economic issues as well. Executive authorities' actors (president/vice president, ministers and local governor) represented altogether more than 76.0% of the economic dimension.

To analyze the involvement of national actors in each economic issue, the above table shows that the "president" was the main national actor in four issues respectively; the solution of economic problems, improvements to income, new projects and economic normalization. This finding indicates that the president was involved in the most important aspects of the economic development in Egypt which could be direct outcomes of the peace process.

"Ministers" as a national actor were mainly concerned with economic aid (36.3%). This can be understood in terms of their responsibility for receiving and managing foreign aid and assistance. The most important economic issue that occupied the interests of "local governors" was the establishment of new economic projects. Egypt has 26 provinces, including the two of Sinai, which were returned to Egypt as a result of the peace treaty with Israel. It seems that each governor focused on the establishment of new projects in his province as part of the economic development.

"Egyptians" were basically concerned with their income as a result of the peace process. Improvement in income occupied 40.0% of the Egyptian's interests. This may be understood in terms of the economic situation in Egypt during the peace process. The level of Egyptian personal income during the late seventies and the eighties was one of the lowest in the world. A sudden small rise of food prices in January 1977 was directly met by violent riots and demonstrations all over Egypt.

One of the interesting findings was the involvement of "social organizations" in the economic dimension of the peace process. Social, or non-governmental, organizations were mainly involved in the reducing of economic normalization with Israel. It seems that social organizations were looking for jobs' opportunities for their members in one of the world's oil-producing countries, especially with the inflation and deterioration in Egypt's economic situation. These opportunities required the consolidation of Egyptian-Arab relations and, consequently, the decreased of normalization with Israel.

For the national actors involved in the economic issues as subsidiaries, the figures show that the president was mainly involved in solution of economic problems, establishing new projects and improving incomes respectively (appendices 7.3). The most important economic subsidiaries for ministers were economic cooperation and new projects. The Egyptians were concerned with the solution of economic problems and also their income, which was expected to improve as a result of the peace. While the percentage of military officers as national actors involved in economic subsidiaries did not exceed 3.0%, they were involved only in two economic issues: solution of economic problems and new projects. This may be explained by the new direction of the army after the signing of the peace treaty. A significant sector of the Egyptian army was directed to civil engineering projects such as reclaiming the desert and establishment new infrastructures all over Egypt.

# 7.5- Sources of Coverage Devoted to the Economic Dimension

The following table summarizes the most frequent sources of Egyptian press coverage of the economic dimension of the peace process. Figures in table (7.6) show that 'own writer' was the most frequent source for presentation of the economic dimension as a whole. It represents about 27.2% (45 out of 165). 'A combination of two sources' came second with 20.0% followed by 'own correspondent' with 18.7%. These figures mean that the Egyptian press relied on well-known journalists to explain the economic outcomes of the peace process.

Table (7.6) sources of coverage devoted to the economic dimension

|                                     | Most frequent sources of coverage N=155* |            |               |           |               |             |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-------------|--|
| Economic subjects                   | MENA                                     | Four big   | Correspondent | Writer    | Specialist    | Two sources |  |
| Improvement of income/              | 3  | 1          | 7             | 8         | 3             | 5           |  |
| satisfaction of needs               | 23.1%                                    | 5.6%       | 22.6%         | 17.8%     | 20.0%         | 15.2%       |  |
| Solution of economic problems       | 1  | 1          | 4             | 12        | 4             | 7           |  |
|                                     | 7.7%                                     | 5.6%       | 12.9%         | 26.7%     | 26.7%         | 21.2%       |  |
| Establishment of economic projects  | 1  | 2          | 8             | 9         | 1             | 6           |  |
|                                     | 7.7%                                     | 11.1%      | 25.8%         | 20.0%     | 6.7%          | 18.2%       |  |
| Economic aid                        | 5<br>38.5%                               | 9<br>50.0% | 5<br>16.1%    | 3<br>6.7% |               | 5<br>15.2%  |  |
| Equality of income/inde-            |  | 1          | 1             | 4         | 2             | 3           |  |
| pendence of community               |  | 5.6%       | 3.2%          | 8.9%      | 1 <u>3.3%</u> | 9.1%        |  |
| Economic normalization /cooperation | 2  | 3          | 4             | 7         | 1             | 6           |  |
|                                     | 15.4%                                    | 16.7%      | 12.9%         | 15.6%     | 6.7%          | 18.2%       |  |
| Decreasing of normaliz-<br>tion     |  | 1<br>5.6%  | 2<br>6.5%     | 1<br>2.2% | 4<br>26.7%    |             |  |
| Others                              | 1<br>7.7%                                |            |               | 1<br>2.2% |               | 1<br>3.0%   |  |
| Total                               | 13                                       | 18         | 31            | 45        | 15            | 33          |  |
|                                     | 100.0%                                   | 100.0%     | 100.0%        | 100.0%    | 100.0%        | 100.0%      |  |

<sup>\*</sup> Other national sources were: unidentified [9] and others [1]. The total number is 165

For source within each economic subject, it can be noted from the above table that 'MENA' and the 'four big' were the main sources of information on economic aid, 38.5% and 50.0% respectively. It seems that foreign aid and assistance, as an economic outcome of the peace process, reflected the interests of the international news agencies and MENA, which exchange news with the four big and other 21 news agencies. Own correspondent and combination of two sources focused basically on solution of economic problems and establishment of new economic projects.

The above figures also indicate that both 'own writers' (who wrote the daily columns) and 'specialists' (who wrote the analytical editorials), as sources of opinion materials, concentrated on information about solving economic problems and improving income and satisfying material needs. However, there was a relevant difference between them regarding economic normalization with Israel. While 'own writers' focused on economic normalization and cooperation with Israel, 'specialist', in contrast, dealt mainly with the lessening ties with Israel. On sensitive issues such as economic normalization, 'ownwriters', in the Egyptian press, were those who dealt effectively with the subject. Own writers were the important players connecting the peace process with qualitative indications of economic development such as equality of income and independence of local communities.

Concerning sources of economic subsidiaries, Appendix (D.4) shows that almost all the sources connected the peace process to three economic subsidiaries; the solution of economic problems, the establishment of new projects and the improvement of income. From the above table and Appendix (D.4), it can be concluded that while, all sources of news items in the Egyptian papers considered four economic issues the direct outcomes of the peace process (economic problems, projects, aid and improvement of income), two economic issues were left to own writers and specialists to deal with; qualitative indications of economic development and economic normalization. It seems that well-known journalist can influence the Egyptian public opinion towards not only political issues but economic subjects as well.

# 7.6- Coverage of the Economic Dimension Over Time

The economic situation in Egypt witnessed different phases in the implementation of an economic liberalization policy during the seventies and the eighties. President Sadat launched the open-door policy in the mid-seventies and framed new economic rules and regulations at the beginning of the eighties for organizing private sector activities. Egypt under Mubarak witnessed legislations aimed at economic growth and development. The economic problems facing Egypt varied under the two presidencies. While the most serious problems under Sadat were inflation, the unequal distribution of income and a deteriorating infrastructure, under Mubarak, Egypt faced unemployment, structural reform and became one of the world's most economically dependent countries. The following table shows how the Egyptian press presented the economic dimension of the peace process under the two presidencies.

Table (7.8) coverage of the economic dimension in two main periods

| Economic subjects                      | Unde | r Sadat | Under Mubarak |       |  |
|--|------|---------|---------------|-------|--|
|  | N    | %       | N             | %     |  |
| Improvement to income / material needs | 25   | 22.9    | 3             | 5.4   |  |
| Solution of economic problems          | 18   | 16.5    | 14            | 25.0  |  |
| Economic projects / industries         | 16   | 14.7    | 12            | 21.4  |  |
| Economic aid / assistance              | 23   | 21.1    | 6             | 10.7  |  |
| Equality of income / local communities | 10   | 9.2     | 1             | 1.8   |  |
| Economic normalization/cooperation     | 10   | 9.2     | 15            | 26.8  |  |
| Decreasing of normalization            | 4    | 3.7     | 4             | 7.1   |  |
| Others                                 | 3    | 2.8     | 1             | 1.8   |  |
| Total                                  | 109  | 100.0   | 56            | 100.0 |  |

From the above table, it can be noted that the main economic subjects, under Sadat, received approximately 66.0% of the total amount of coverage devoted to the economic dimension (109 out of 165). This gives a measure of the serious economic problems facing Egypt under Sadat and the importance of peace events that took place in his presidency.

As Egypt had one of the lowest personal income levels and a high level of inflation under Sadat, improvements to income and the satisfaction of material needs were two of the most urgent economic requirements in Egypt. Consequently, it was the most frequent economic issue connected to peace with Israel and appeared in nearly 30.0% out of all economic subjects under Sadat (25 out of 109). Economic aid came second with a 21.1%. After the signing of the peace treaty, the US devoted a large amount of economic assistance to Egypt (nearly \$1 billion per year). The reason for this was to support Sadat's peace policy through a growing economy. Following economic aid came the solution of economic problems and the establishment of new projects with 16.5% and 14.7% respectively.

Equality of income or independence of local communities as qualitative indications of economic development received a significant amount of coverage under Sadat. It

appeared in 9.2%. This may be explained by the high economic expectations of the peace with Israel. Sadat constantly repeated that peace would be the key not only to overcoming the serious economic problems but also to building a better future for Egypt. It would be the beginning of an economic renaissance.

Under Mubarak, the priority of economic issues was quite different. The most frequent economic issue was normalization and cooperation with Israel. It appeared in 26.8% of all economic subjects. This can be understood in terms of the deserved implementation of economic protocols with Israel after its withdrawal from almost all Sinai by April 1982 at the beginning of Mubarak's presidency. It can be argued that as a result of the critical events of the peace process (Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and the bombardment of the Headquarter of the PLO in Tunisia in October 1985), economic normalization and cooperation with Israel should have been reduced. It seems that the Egyptian press focused more on the economic cooperation and normalization when the peace process faced such critical moments. It seems also that the Egyptian newspapers tried to protect the peace process not only as a strategic choice of the political leadership in Egypt but also as the key for stability in the Middle East.

Solution of economic problems came second under Mubarak with a percentage of 25.0% followed by the establishment of new economic projects with 21.4%. Unlike Sadat, when Mubarak came to the office, he frankly explained the critical economic problems facing Egypt. He stated that Egypt should not rely on economic grants and assistance forever, so it received only 10.7% as a main economic subject. He emphasized the need for urgent economic reform and called for greater productivity. It seems that the Egyptian papers reflected this new economic policy and connected the peace process to solution of economic problems, desert reclamation and new economic projects and factories.

Concerning economic issues as subsidiaries one and two (Appendix D.5), the Egyptian papers concentrated on three economic subjects under Sadat; solution economic problems, improving of income and establishment new projects. This shows the importance of these issues not only as main subjects but also as subsidiaries. Under Mubarak, the peace was connected to two sub-economic issues: establishment new projects and economic normalization with Israel.

It can be concluded from the above table and Appendix (D.5) that the Egyptian press reflected the views of the political leadership in the two presidencies regarding what peace would lead to in economic terms of for Egypt. Under Sadat, the press connected the peace to improvements in income and economic aid. These two issues were the most important for both the president and the Egyptians. A small rise in food prices in 1977 led to serious riots and demonstrations that threatened the stability and legitimacy of the regime. Under Mubarak, Egypt began to benefit from the economic outcomes of peace. Egypt regained Sinai with its oil resources. American economic aid reached more than \$1 billion each year. Consequently the Egyptian press concentrated on solution the economic problems and supporting economic normalization and cooperation with Israel.

To have a better understanding of how the economic dimension differed over time, the coverage has been divided into four periods. The following table shows the coverage devoted to economic subjects through these periods. From table (7.8), it can be noticed that coverage of economic subjects decreased from period one to period four regularly. This may be understood by the importance of the peace events. The most important events took place in period one (Sadat's visit to Israel, the signing of the Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty). The coverage devoted to the economic dimension amounted to 43.6% in this period. In the subsequent three periods, what took place was the implementation of the peace treaty. Consequently, the coverage decreased to 25.4%, 17.0% and 14.0% respectively.

It can be noted that three main economic issues received the most frequent coverage in the first period, in which the most important events of the peace process took place. These issues were improvements to income and satisfaction of material needs, economic aid and solution the economic problems. In this period, the income rate of Egyptians was a critical issue because it was one of the lowest in the world. It seems that the peace was connected positively to improvements in income in order to convince the Egyptians of the new peace policy. Economic aid considered an important issue in both first and second periods, as it was crucial to securing basic economic needs.

The Egyptian papers focused on two economic issues in the third period, in which the main results and critical moments of the peace process took place. These issues were solution the economic problems facing Egypt and economic normalization/cooperation with Israel and the United States. In this period, at the beginning of the Mubarak presidency, Egypt faced massive economic problems and the inflation rate reached

serious proportions. Mubarak decided to face these problems by curbing imports of luxury goods, supporting investments directed to expanding Egypt's productive capacity and reclaiming new land. It seems that the Egyptian newspapers reflected these orientations and connected the peace mainly to economic problems.

Table (7.9) coverage of the economic dimension in four periods

| Economic subjects                                     | Periods*           |                   |                   |                   |  |  |  |
|---|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--|--|--|
|   | Period one         | Period two        | Period three      | Period four       |  |  |  |
| Improvement of income/ satisfaction of material needs | 19<br><b>26.4%</b> | 6<br><b>14.3%</b> | 3<br><b>10.7%</b> | -                 |  |  |  |
| Solution of economic problems                         | 15<br>20.8%        | 4<br>9.5%         | 7<br>25.0%        | 6<br>26.1%        |  |  |  |
| New projects  | 9<br><b>12.5%</b>  | 9<br><b>21.4%</b> | 5<br>17.9%        | 5<br><b>21.7%</b> |  |  |  |
| Economic aid  | 15<br><b>20.8%</b> | 9<br><b>21.4%</b> | 2<br><b>7.1%</b>  | 3<br>13.0%        |  |  |  |
| Equality of income/independent of local communities   | 9<br><b>12.5%</b>  | 1<br>2.4%         | 1<br><b>3.6%</b>  | -                 |  |  |  |
| Economic normalization/cooperation                    | 4<br>5.6%          | 7<br><b>16.7%</b> | 7<br><b>25.0%</b> | 7<br>30.4%        |  |  |  |
| Decreasing of normalization                           | -                  | 4<br>9.5%         | 3<br><b>10.7%</b> | 1<br><b>4.3%</b>  |  |  |  |
| Others  | 1<br>1.4%          | 2<br><b>4.8%</b>  | -                 | 1<br><b>4.3</b> % |  |  |  |
| Total   | 72<br>100.0%       | 42<br>100.0%      | 28<br>100.0%      | 23<br>100.0%      |  |  |  |

<sup>\*</sup> Period one lasted six weeks of analysis [weeks 1 to 6] and included main events of the peace process between Egypt and Israel as signing the Camp David and the peace treaty. Period two lasted five weeks [weeks 7 to 11] and included Israel's withdrawal from Sinai until the assassination of Sadat. Period three lasted six weeks [weeks 12 to 17] and included the most critical moments of the peace process as Israel invasion to Lebanon. Period four lasted four weeks [weeks 18 to 21] and included final Israel's withdrawal from Sinai.

The Egyptian papers also concentrated on economic normalization with Israel in the third period. This finding seems interesting because this period witnessed the most serious of Israel's actions, to threaten peace with Egypt, and should have led to a call for reducing normalization with Israel. However, while percentage of coverage devoted to economic normalization was one of the most frequent economic issues in this period (25.0%), the percentage of cutting links with Israel was only 10.7%. This may be explained by the Egyptian papers' views towards the peace as a strategic choice for

Egypt. The Egyptian press could criticize Israel's actions, but in the final stage, Egypt should respect its international and regional obligations toward peace. In the fourth period, in which Egypt returned Taba and witnessed the beginning of the Palestinian Uprising in the occupied territories, the coverage focused on three economic issues: increasing economic normalization with Israel, solving economic problems and establishment new projects. Again, economic normalization was the corner stone in the Agyptian press' coverage under Mubarak (third and fourth periods).

#### 7.7- Orientation of Coverage Towards the Economic dimension

Orientation of Egyptian press coverage towards the different dimensions of the peace process was coded in three categories: positive, neutral and negative. Positive and negative orientation was defined through frequencies of positive and negative words and values presented in chapter six In this chapter and the next two chapters, orientation of the coverage is dealt with as positive, negative or neutral. Some articles contained both positive and negative words and values. In such cases, all words or values were coded but the orientation of the articles was coded as positive or negative and not mixed according to the tone of the whole article.

The following table summarizes orientation of the coverage towards the different economic subjects. In order to define orientation towards each economic issue and the whole tone towards the economic dimension, the table contains percentages within each economic subject.

From table (7.10), it can be noted that the whole stance towards the economic dimension of the peace process was positive. While nearly 50.0% of the coverage of the economic subjects was positive, only 9.1% was negative. The rest of the coverage was neutral. This means that the Egyptian newspapers concentrated on the positive economic outcomes of the peace process with Israel. To analyze the stance towards each economic issue, the figures show that the orientation was mainly positive towards three economic subjects: solution of economic problems, improvements to income and establishment of new projects. It was neutral towards three other economic issues: economic aid, economic normalization and equalizing of income. The only economic issue that had a negative orientation was reducing of ties with Israel, which means that the orientation towards normalization was positive.

Table (7.10) orientation of the coverage devoted to the economic dimension

| Economia subjects                                    | Orientation | _           |            |              |
|--|-------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| Economic subjects                                    | Positive    | Neutral     | Negative   | Total        |
| Improvement of income/                               | 21          | 6           | 1 3.6%     | 28           |
| satisfaction of m. needs                             | 75.0%       | 21.4%       |            | 100.0%       |
| Solution of economic problems                        | 27          | 4           | 1          | 32           |
|  | 84.4%       | 12.5%       | 3.1%       | 100.0%       |
| Economic projects.                                   | 15          | 12          | 1          | 28           |
|  | 53.6%       | 42.9%       | 3.6%       | 100.0%       |
| Economic aid   | 8           | 19          | 2          | 29           |
|  | 27.6%       | 65.5%       | 6.9%       | 100.0%       |
| Equality of income./independent of local communities | 5<br>45.5%  | 6<br>54.5%  |            | 11<br>100.0% |
| Economic normalization/ cooperation                  | 6           | 15          | 4          | 25           |
|  | 24.0%       | 60.0%       | 16.0%      | 100.0%       |
| Decreasing of normalization                          |             | 2<br>25.0%  | 6<br>75.0% | 8<br>100.0%  |
| Others   |             | 4<br>100.0% |            | 4<br>100.0%  |
| Total  | 82          | 68          | 15         | 165          |
|  | 49.7%       | 41.2%       | 9.1%       | 100.0%       |

Concerning solution for economic problems, improvements in income and new projects, the percentages of positive orientation were 84.4%, 75.0% and 53.6% respectively. Negative orientation towards any of these issues did not exceed 3.6%. This shows that the Egyptian press connected the most urgent economic problems in Egypt positively to the peace with Israel. Peace would lead to a reduction of the army and consequently, a reduction in military expenditure. This, in addition to the increased foreign economic aid and assistance, would secure enough funds to face the serious economic problems, establish new factories, projects, and new jobs and, in turn, improve of incomes. It seems that positive orientation of the Egyptian press's coverage of the most important economic issues influenced Egyptian opinion towards peace with Israel. For more details about surveys conducted in Egypt in the late seventies, see chapter two.

Regarding orientation towards economic aid, more than 65.0% of the coverage was neutral, 27.6% was positive and only 6.9% was negative. Therefore, the overall orientation can be considered positive. Negative coverage may be due to connecting foreign aid to free decision-making and national security. While the majority of the coverage towards economic normalization with Israel was neutral (51.0%), positive orientation reached 36.0%. This means that the Egyptian press supported all kinds of

economic normalization and cooperation with Israel, even during the critical moments of the peace process.

Concerning stances on the coverage of the economic-subsidiaries, it can be noted from Appendix (D.6) that the coverage made a positive connection of most of the economic issues analyzed to the peace process, but with different percentages. The strongest positive stance involved solving of economic problems, improvements in income, equality of income and establishment of new projects. Stances regarding economic normalization were mainly neutral. One can conclude from table (7.10) and Appendix (D.6) that the Egyptian press connected the peace process with Israel positively and strongly to the solution of problematic economic issues in Egypt.

#### 7.8- Conclusion

The conclusion is dealt with in terms of two main factors: the objectives of the study and the theoretical framework. The main objective of this chapter is to analyze how the Egyptian press presented the economic dimension of the peace process with Israel. In this respect, the following points can be made:

- The Egyptian press, in dealing with the economic dimension of the peace process, concentrated on five economic issues: solution of economic problems, foreign economic aid, improvement in Egyptians income levels, establishment of new economic projects and economic normalization with Israel. Focusing on economic problems, income levels and new projects may be understood in terms of the economic situation in Egypt during the peace process. In the late seventies and at the beginning of the eighties, Egypt faced serious economic problems. Inflation was too high with, simultaneously, one of the lowest income level in the world. Peace with Israel was seen as a controversial solution to these economic problems, especially with the expectations of unlimited foreign aid.
- Concerning the characteristics of coverage or how the economic issues were
  presented through the Egyptian press, analysis shows that two subjects
  receiving most coverage were: solution of economic problems and
  improvements to income. Two other issues followed with nearly the same
  amount of coverage: economic normalization and new projects. These four
  economic issues received 77.5% of the total amount of coverage devoted to the

economic dimension. The Egyptian press also considered the above issues the most prominent economic subjects. They appeared on the front or back pages as main and sub-economic issues. For type of coverage, it can be concluded that, while news stories concentrated on quantitative indications of economic development, opinion materials focused on qualitative indications and the more sensitive issues such as economic normalization.

- The most frequent national actors involved in the economic dimension of the peace process were the president and ministers and Egyptians. As the first two were the most prominent actors in Egypt, they were mainly involved in the problematic economic issues: solution of economic problems, improving incomes and generating new economic projects. Egyptians were mainly concerned with improvements to income.
- In the analysis, two main categories of sources can be distinguished: opinion material sources (such as own writer) and sources of news stories (news agencies or correspondent). Results of the analysis show that sources of news stories represented nearly 57.6% and were the main sources of the most prominent economic issues such as solution the economic problems, economic aid and new projects. Apart from these issues above, 'own writers' were the main sources to deal with in-equality of income and economic normalization with Israel.
- The various periods of the study influenced coverage on the economic dimensions of the peace process. Nearly 44.0% of the coverage devoted to the economic dimension took place in the first period. During this period, which lasted six weeks in the late seventies, the Egyptian press focused on the most serious issue facing Egypt raising income levels. In the following three periods, the coverage reflected the economic situation in Egypt. The second period witnessed the appearance of economic aid, which was directed to establishment of new projects. During the eighties, Egypt began to gain the benefits of peace and started to mediate between Israel and the rest of the Arab World. Consequently, in the third and fourth periods, the Egyptian press concentrated on two main economic issues economic normalization with Israel and solution of economic problems.

• Concerning the coverage devoted to the economic dimension, it can be concluded that the orientation was either very positive or neutral. This shows that the Egyptian press considered peace would lead to the solving Egypt's economic problems. The orientation of the coverage was slightly neutral such towards sensitive issues as economic normalization with Israel and qualitative indications of development such as equality of incomes.

The second factor is the theoretical framework of the study. Following the construction of meaning approach, the following points can be made:

- The Egyptian press connected peace with the most critical economic problems in Egypt during the late seventies and the eighties. After the negative outcomes of the open-door policy in the mid-seventies and the subsequent riots at the beginning of 1977, the Egyptian leadership realized that Egypt was facing massive economic problems. These problems ranged from inflation, the great burden of defense expenditure and the pressure of a rabidly growing population. However, most Egyptians, according to surveys conducted in the mid-seventies (see chapter two), supported the PLO and objected to a solution along the line of Security Council Resolution 242. This situation needed a strong campaign through the mass media to convince the Egyptians with the importance of peace. In this respect, the Egyptian press started to connect the peace to the economic situation in Egypt. It is difficult to state that the Egyptian press changed public opinion towards the new peace policy. However, it can be argued that the intensive campaign regarding the new accommodation with Israel through the Egyptian media did influence public opinion. In 1978, a small survey showed that only 18% of the Egyptian still supported the PLO, while more than 77% supported the new peace policies. So how did the Egyptian press present the economic dimension of the peace process? And how was the economic meaning of peace built?
- Peace was connected strongly and positively to an improvement in Egyptians income levels. With the deteriorated economic situation in the 1970s and 1980s, this issue was important to all Egyptians. As the peace with Israel could lower military expenditure, it was connected positively higher personal levels

- The Egyptian press also connected the peace to the solution a whole range of economic problems facing Egypt. There is a demographic and geographic fact about Egypt that must be taken into consideration. Until the late eighties, nearly 94.0% of Egypt's population lived on less than 5.0% of the land, almost all beside the Nile. Peace would mean increasing foreign investment, a developing economy and reclaiming the desert, especially in Sinai.
- Peace was also connected positively to the establishment of new economic projects and factories. After the signing of the peace treaty with Israel, American economic aid to Egypt reached nearly \$I billion a year. A significant percentage of this was directed to the establishment of new projects and consequently the creation of new jobs. According to mid-1982 estimate: the working population in Egypt was about 10 millions (only 25.0% of the total number of population; 44.7 millions). The industrial labor force stands at just 19.0% of the working population or only 1.5 million of the total population. This means that the establishment of new projects and factories was vital for not only the country's economy but also for the Egyptians people.
- Implementing the peace treaty with Israel required economic agreements and normalization between the two countries. The Egyptian press considered economic normalization as a positive outcome of the peace process. Through this normalization Egypt would mediate between Israel and other Arab countries. Through talking about economic normalization with Israel, the Egyptian press created a new culture for peace not only in Egypt but also in the Arab world.
- From the above points, one can conclude that the Egyptian newspapers constructed symbolic economic meanings of peace among the Egyptians. These meanings were framed according to the economic situation facing Egypt and the most economic needs and requirements of the Egyptians. Accordingly, the peace would mean the improvement to income, the solution of serious economic problems facing Egypt, the reclamation of the desert, the establishment of new projects, and the end of suffering. In other words, peace would secure a better life and future for Egypt's population.

# **Chapter Eight**

# The Political Dimension of the Peace Process

This chapter discusses the political dimension of development regarding the peace process with Israel as presented by the Egyptian press. Questions asked were: What were the most frequent political subjects the Egyptian press concentrated on? To what extent did the Egyptian press connect political participation and plurality to the peace process? What kind, type and amount of coverage were devoted to the political dimension of the peace process? Who were the national actors and sources involved in the political dimension? Did the coverage of the political dimension of the peace process differ over time under Presidents Sadat and Mubarak respectively?

Results of the analysis regarding these political dimensions of the peace process between Egypt and Israel are presented as follows:

- Main and sub-political subjects as presented by the Egyptian press,
- Characteristics of coverage regarding the political dimension. Characteristics refer to amount, location and type of coverage,
- Main national and international actors involved in the coverage of this dimension,
- Main sources of coverage regarding the political dimension,
- Coverage of political dimension over time, and
- Orientation of coverage regarding the political dimension

# 8.1- Main and sub-political aspects of the coverage

The political dimension of the peace process between Egypt and Israel was considered to be one of the most important dimensions, with only the economic dimension rated more highly. As explained in Table (int. 6) in the introduction of this part of the study, the political dimension represented 20.4% as a main subject (n 126); 19.3% as a subsidiary one (n 119) and 18.5% as a subsidiary two (n 114). The following table (8.1) summarizes the kinds of political aspects the Egyptian press concentrated on as main and subsidiary subjects.

Table (8.1) political main and sub-subjects in the Egyptian press

| Political subject                 | Main subject |       | Subsidiary one |       | Subsidiary two |       |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|----------------|-------|
|                                   | N            | %     | N              | %     | N              | %     |
| Political participation/plurality | 29           | 23.0  | 37             | 31.1  | 33             | 28.9  |
| Activities of government          | 39           | 31.0  | 23             | 19.3  | 11             | 9.6   |
| Activities of parliament          | 12           | 9.5   | 6              | 5.0   | 7              | 6.1   |
| Activities of opposition          | 6            | 4.8   | 4              | 3.4   | 3              | 2.6   |
| Returning to Arab fold            | 10           | 7.9   | 6              | 5.0   | 3              | 2.6   |
| Stability in the Middle East      | 17           | 13.5  | 29             | 24.4  | 36             | 31.6  |
| Reducing of p. normalization      | 12           | 9.5   | 10             | 8.4   | 19             | 16.7  |
| Other political subject           | 1            | 0.8   | 4              | 3.4   | 2              | 1.8   |
| Total                             | 126          | 100.0 | 119            | 100.0 | 114            | 100.0 |

From the above table, it can be seen that the Egyptian press concentrated on for political subjects as the most important main and sub-political aspects of the peace process with Israel. These subjects were the activities of government, political participation, stability in the Middle East and reducing political normalization with Israel. Regarding the main political subject, the above figures show that "activities of government" was the most frequent political aspect. It appeared in 31.0% out of all the political subjects. This may be understood in terms of the relationship between political institution and the press not only in Egypt but also in almost all Third World countries. The activities of the government, officials and the ruling party usually appeared on the first pages of the newspapers. News of the peace process with Israel was not exception to this rule.

Political participation was an important issue in connection with the peace process with Israel. It ranked second with a percentage of 23.0%. As the peace process would lead to the end of war status between Egypt and Israel and, consequently, stability in Egypt, the press considered the development of political participation and plurality a direct outcome of the peace. It seems that the Egyptian press also connected peace to greater democratization and better political opportunities to influence Egyptian opinion towards the new policy of accommodation with Israel.

Stability in the Middle East also received a significant amount of coverage. It ranked third as a main political subject with 13.5%. The Egyptian press frequently stated that peace between Egypt and Israel would mean peace and stability in the Middle East with other Arab countries following Egypt and making peace with Israel. During the critical moments of the peace process such as Israel's invasion of Lebanon, "reducing political normalization" was used as a pressure tool on Israel. It appeared in 9.5% of all political subjects.

Regarding subsidiaries one and two, the above four political issues were the most frequent issues, but with different priority. For political subject as a subsidiary one, political participation ranked first with 31.1% followed by stability in the Middle East with 24.4%. The activities of government came third with 19.3% followed by reducing political normalization with Israel with 8.4%. Concerning political subject as a subsidiary two, stability in the Middle East was the most frequent political aspect followed by political participation, reducing normalization with Israel and government activities of respectively.

### 8.2- Amount of Coverage Devoted to Aspects of Political Dimension

The total amount of coverage devoted to the political dimension of the peace process was 11,940 column/centimeters. Having multiplied by 432 column/cm (the standard space of page), it can be noted that the political dimension occupied up to 26.6% of the pages. The following table summarizes the amount of coverage devoted to each aspect of the political dimension of the peace process.

From Table (8.2) it can be noted that political participation received the most coverage. It appeared in about 8 pages representing 28.6% out of all space devoted to the political dimension. Activities of government or travel of officials came second receiving about 6 pages of coverage and representing 22.5%. Stability in the Middle East and reduced political participation with Israel as political subjects was a significant aspects and received nearly the same amount. The former received 3.3 pages of space (12.1%) and 3.2 of pages (11.6%) for the latter.

From table (8.2), one can note also that "returning to the Arab countries" received an important amount of coverage as a political subject (3 pages represented 10.8%). The Egyptian press usually repeated that, in order to return to the Arab countries, there was a need to reduce political normalization with Israel, but without threatening the peace

process. After Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Egyptian ambassador was called to Cairo and political relations between the two countries declined. Two years later, in 1984, Egypt resumed political relations with Jordan and consequently the rest of the Arab countries. After this integration, "returning to Arab countries" and "reducing of political normalization with Israel" received significant coverage. They took 6.2 pages representing 22.4%. This means that the Arab dimension was an important one in the Hgyptian press coverage of the political dimension of the peace process with Israel.

Table (8.2) amount of coverage devoted to each political aspect.

| Political subject                 | Amount of coverage |         |         |  |  |  |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|---------|---------|--|--|--|
|                                   | By col./cm         | By page | Percent |  |  |  |
| Political participation/plurality | 3448               | 8.0     | 28.7    |  |  |  |
| Activities of government          | 2690               | 6.2     | 22.5    |  |  |  |
| Activities of parliament          | 1018               | 2.4     | 8.5     |  |  |  |
| Activities of opposition          | 580                | 1.3     | 4.9     |  |  |  |
| Returning to Arab fold            | 1296               | 3.0     | 10.8    |  |  |  |
| Stability in the Middle East      | 1450               | 3.3     | 12.1    |  |  |  |
| Reducing of p. normalization      | 1386               | 3.2     | 11.6    |  |  |  |
| Other political subject           | 108                | 0.2     | 0.9     |  |  |  |
| Total                             | 11,940             | 27.6    | 100.0   |  |  |  |

# 6.3- Characteristics of Coverage Devoted to the Political Dimension

Characteristics of coverage refer to how the Egyptian press dealt with the political dimension of the peace process. This includes the kind of coverage devoted to the political aspects and its location. The following table summarizes these locations of coverage concerning political subjects.

As because materials printed on the front page are considered to be the most prominent, it can be noted from table (8.3) that the Egyptian press regarded "activities of the government and officials" as the most important main political subject in connection with the peace process. It appeared in about 40.0% of all the political aspects published

on the front page. "Political participation" came second with 21.8% followed by "activities of parliament" and "stability in the Middle East with the same percent, 11.5%. While there was no significant difference among the political subjects printed on the pack page, it can be seen from table (8.3) that "political participation" and "activities of government" were the most frequent political aspects published on the inside pages.

Table (8.3) location of coverage devoted to the political dimension.

| Political subjects                | Front page |       | ge Back page |       | Inside page |       |
|-----------------------------------|------------|-------|--------------|-------|-------------|-------|
|                                   | N          | %     | N            | %     | N           | %     |
| Political participation/plurality | 17         | 21.8  | 1            | 12.5  | 11          | 27.5  |
| Activities of government          | 31         | 39.7  | -            | -     | 8           | 20.0  |
| Activities of parliament          | 9          | 11.5  | -            | -     | 3           | 7.5   |
| Activities of opposition          | 3          | 3.8   | 1            | 12.5  | 2           | 5.0   |
| Returning to Arab fold            | 2          | 2.6   | 2            | 25.0  | 6           | 15.0  |
| Stability in the Middle East      | 9          | 11.5  | 2            | 25.0  | 6           | 15.0  |
| Reducing of p. normalization      | 6          | 7.7   | 2            | 25.0  | 4           | 10.0  |
| Other political subject           | 1          | 1.3   | -            | -     | -           | -     |
| Total                             | 78         | 100.0 | 8            | 100.0 | 40          | 100.0 |

The above figures also show that the Egyptian press, in its coverage of the political dimension of the peace process with Israel, focused on the following three issues; political participation, activities of government and stability in the Middle East. It seems that the peace was connected to political participation because it was an urgent demand of Egyptian intellectuals and general public, especially in the liberalization decade of 1970s. the focus on the activities of the government can be understood in terms of the relationship between the political institutions and the media institution in Egypt. As the peace with Israel would lead to the end of war status between Egypt and Israel and could consequently attract new foreign investment, the Egyptian press made a direct link of the peace process with "stability in the Middle East" and published it on the front pages in order to convince the Egyptian of the importance of the new policy.

Concerning political subjects as subsidiaries, there was no big difference in the coverage that related to the main political subject (Appendix E.1). As for political subjects as subsidiaries one, political participation, activities of government and stability in the

Middle East were the most frequent political aspects to be published on the front pages. They represented 30.4%, 22.8% and 22.8% respectively. For political subject as a subsidiary two, stability in the Middle East was the most frequent subject, on the front pages (34.7%) followed by political participation with 26.4%. These findings may be understood in terms of the explanation given above.

Type of coverage is one of the characteristics that have been used to assess whether the news materials give only information about an issue (news stories) or give more than that (opinion materials). The following table (Table 8.4) shows the type of coverage devoted to the different aspects of the developmental dimension of the peace process.

Table (8.4) type of coverage devoted to the political dimension

| Political subject            | News story |       | Main editorial |       | Daily co | lumn  | Analytic | cal editorial |
|------------------------------|------------|-------|----------------|-------|----------|-------|----------|---------------|
|                              | N          | %     | N              | %     | N        | %     | N        | %             |
| Political participation      | 14         | 18.7  | 4              | 30.8  | 6        | 50.0  | 5        | 19.2          |
| Activities of government     | 31         | 41.3  | 4              | 30.8  | -        | -     | 4        | 15.4          |
| Activities of parliament     | 8          | 10.7  | 2              | 15.4  | 1        | 8.3   | 1        | 3.8           |
| Activities of opposition     | 4          | 5.3   | -              | -     | 1        | 8.3   | 1        | 3.8           |
| Returning to Arab fold       | 3          | 4.0   | 1              | 7.7   | _        | -     | 6        | 23.1          |
| Stability in the Middle East | 8          | 10.7  | 2              | 15.4  | 4        | 33.3  | 3        | 11.5          |
| Reducing of p. normalization | 6          | 8.0   | -              | -     | -        | -     | 6        | 23.1          |
| Other political subject      | 1          | 1.3   | -              | -     | -        | -     | -        | -             |
| Total                        | 75         | 100.0 | 13             | 100.0 | 12       | 100.0 | 26       | 100.0         |

From the above table, it can be noted that, in total, about 60.0% of all main political subjects were news stories (75 out of 126). The Opinion materials in total represented only 40.0% (51 out of 126). This finding indicates that the Egyptian press tended to be informative in its coverage of the political dimension of the peace process. However this tendency differed according to the type of coverage and its political aspect. For news story as a coverage type, "activities of government" was the most frequent main political aspect. It appeared in more than 40.0% of coverage devoted to political aspects, followed by "political participation" with 18.7%. For main editorial, which reflects the views of the newspaper itself, "political "participation and "activities of "government" were the most frequent main political aspects; each representing about 30.0%.

The daily column, which reflects the views of well-known journalists, focused on two main political issues, "political participation" and "stability in the Middle East". While the former issue appeared in 50.0%, the latter represented 33.3%. The priority of political issues for an analytical editorial, which reflects the views of the specialists, was quite different. "Returning to Arab" and "reducing political normalization with Israel" were the most frequently covered political aspects. Each one appeared in 23.1% of all analytical editorial coverage. The last finding can be understood in terms of Table (6.2) that indicates the percentages of analytical editorial in both newspapers. While analytical editorials represented only 10.0% in Al-Ahram, they amounted 42.1% in Al-Shaab's coverage, which was already against political normalization with Israel and pro-Arab (see also table, 6.5).

From the above table and figures, it can be noticed that opinion materials in the Egyptian press: main editorial, daily column and analytical editorial were mainly concerned with the orientation of public opinion regarding the different dimensions of the peace process, and concentrated basically on political participation, stability in the Middle East and relations with both the Arab world and Israel. The opinion materials tried to influence Egyptian opinion towards the new policy by connecting peace with greater political participation, and regional stability. They also repeated that relations with Israel should not affect Egypt's relations with other Arab countries and that Egypt could cut its relations with Israel if it threatened the peace and security in the region.

Regarding the types of coverage of political subjects as subsidiaries (see Appendix E.2), figures show that all kinds of coverage focused on the three sub-political aspects of political participation, stability in the Middle East and political normalization with Israel. For political subject as a subsidiary one, the news story concentrated on political participation (28.2%), stability in the Middle East (24.4%) and activities of government (21.8%). All opinion materials focused on the two issues of political participation and stability in the Middle East. For a political subject as a subsidiary two, it can be noted from Appendix (E.2) that while all the ranked kinds of coverage considered political participation the important issue, analytical and main editorials concentrated also on political normalization with Israel as one of the most important political issues concerning the political dimension of the peace process.

# 8.4- National Actors Involved in the Political Dimension

Knowing the actor is important in understanding power relationships within a society and in assessing the prominence of an issue. In Egypt, if the President or the Prime Minister is involved in an issue, especially a political issue, it is considered prominent one. Where two national actors were coded, the analysis discussed only the main national actor. This is because the "main national actor" was considered to be the most important and more than 36.0% of political aspects did not include "other national actors" (46 out of 126). The following table shows the main national actors who involved in the political dimension of the peace process (the most frequent main national actors are shown in the table)

Table (8.5) main national actors involved in the political dimension

| Political subject            | Main national actors N = 107* |           |                                 |                      |  |  |  |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|----------------------|--|--|--|
|                              | President/<br>Prime minister  | Ministers | Local governor/<br>Ruling party | Political opposition |  |  |  |
| Political participation      | 17 (23.9%)                    | 3 (21.4%) | 1 (9.1%)                        | 3 (27.3%)            |  |  |  |
| Activities of government     | 29 (40.8%)                    | 6 (42.9%) | 5 (45.5%)                       | -                    |  |  |  |
| Activities of parliament     | 7 (9.9%)                      | -         | 3 (27.3%)                       | -                    |  |  |  |
| Activities of opposition     |                               | 1 (7.1%)  | -                               | 4 (36.4%)            |  |  |  |
| Returning to Arab fold       | 4 (5.6%)                      | 1 (7.1%)  | 1 (9.1%)                        | 1 (9.1%)             |  |  |  |
| Stability in the Middle East | 8 (11.3%)                     | 2 (14.3%) | -                               | 1 (9.1%)             |  |  |  |
| Reducing of p. normalization | 5 (7.0%)                      | 1 (7.1%)  | 1 (9.1%)                        | 2 (18.2%)            |  |  |  |
| Other political subject      | 1 (1.4%)                      | -         | -                               | -                    |  |  |  |
| Total                        | 71 (100.0%)                   | 14        | 11 (100.0%)                     | 11                   |  |  |  |

<sup>\*</sup> Other main national actors were (29): no human actor [8], parliament [5], Egyptian [4], social organization [1] and military/police officers [1]. Total number is 126

From the above table it can be noted that the president and prime minister as main national actors were mainly involved in three main political aspects; "activities of government", "political participation/plurality" and "stability in the Middle East". Apart from activities of government, the above table shows that there was an agreement between the main national actors in Egypt and the press about the importance of "political participation/plurality" and "stability in the Middle East" as a result of the

peace process between Egypt and Israel. Local governors as a main national actor were basically involved in the two aspects of "activities of government" (45.5%) and "activities of parliament" (27.3%). This can be understood in terms of interests directly related to local government. They were usually concerned with local and economic issues. As a result, they were mainly involved in the activities of officials and of parliament, in which the economic results of peace discussed.

The above table also shows that political opposition was involved mainly with three political aspects, "activities of opposition" (36.4%), "political participation" (27.3%) and "reducing political normalization with Israel" (18.2%). The last finding may be understood in terms of the orientation of the opposition in Egypt. All political parties, except the ruling party, were pro-Arab and anti-political normalization with Israel and frequently called for a wide political participation (see chapter three). One of the interesting findings regarding the political dimension was the Egyptian as a main national actor. He was involved basically in "political participation" (75%), 3 out of 4. This means that the Egyptian expected that increased participation and plurality should be a direct outcome of the peace process with Israel.

Concerning main national actors involved in political subjects as subsidiaries, there was not significant difference from those involved in the main political subjects. It can be noted from Appendix (E.3) that the *president and ministers* were basically concerned with three political aspects respectively for both subsidiaries one and two; "political participation", "activities of government" and "stability in the Middle East". While "local governor" was involved mainly in the "activities of parliament" (50.0%) as a subsidiary one, the *political opposition* concerned with three political issues as subsidiaries one and two; "reducing political normalization with Israel", "political participation" and the "activities of opposition".

One interesting finding can be noticed from Table (8.5) and Appendix (E.3). While the Egyptian President or Prime Minister was the primary person who protected the peace process with Israel, he became linked, somehow, to a significant extent as main and subpolitical subjects in "reducing political normalization with Israel". The president appeared in this issue with 7.0% as a main political subject, 9.4% as a subsidiary one and 6.0% as a subsidiary two. This may be understood in terms of the fact that the president is the main decision-maker regarding political issues in Egypt. When Israel invaded

Lebanon and bombed the Headquarter of the PLO in Tunisia, it was the president who called the Egyptian ambassador from Israel.

### 8.5- Sources of Coverage Related to the Political Dimension

Knowing the sources of political aspects regarding the political dimension of the peace process between Egypt and Israel is essential to understand the purposes of the Egyptian press's coverage. For example, the Egyptian press depended mainly on the views of well-known journalists as sources for issues directed at influencing public opinion. The following table summarizes the most frequent source of the political dimension of the peace process. Because of the difficulty of specifying numbers and percentage in this table, only the percentages of each political subject's sources and the total number of each source have been included.

Table (8.6) sources of coverage regarding the political dimension

| Main political subject        |              | Sour         | e N = 119          |               |              |                          |
|-------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------|--------------------------|
|                               | MENA         | Four big     | Correspo-<br>ndent | Own<br>writer | Specialist   | Combination of 2 sources |
| Political participation       | 10.0         | 13.3         | 35.0               | 44.0          | 15.4         | 17.4                     |
| Activities of government      | 60.0         | 40.0         | 40.0               | 16.0          | 15.4         | 34.8                     |
| Activities of parliament      | 10.0         | -            | 5.0                | 8.0           | 7.7          | 8.7                      |
| Activities of opposition      | -            | 6.7          | 5.0                | 4.0           | 3.8          | 8.7                      |
| Returning to Arab fold        | -            | -            | 5.0                | 4.0           | 23.1         | 8.7                      |
| Stability in the Middle East  | 10.0         | 40.0         | 5.0                | 24.0          | 11.5         | 8.7                      |
| Reducing of p. normalization. | -            | -            | 5.0                | -             | 23.1         | 13.0                     |
| Other political subject       | 10.0         | -            | -                  | -             | -            | -                        |
| Total                         | 10<br>100.0% | 15<br>100.0% | 20<br>100.0%       | 25<br>100.0%  | 26<br>100.0% | 23<br>100.0%             |

<sup>\*</sup> Other national sources were; unidentified [6] and other source [1]. The total number was 126

The above table shows that specialists and own writer were the most frequent sources used for providing political dimension to the peace process. Each represented about 20.0%. A combination of two sources and own correspondent were also important sources for this dimension. The findings show that the Egyptian press, in its coverage of

the political dimension, depended mainly on well-known journalists and specialists as sources of opinion materials

Concerning main political subjects, the above table shows that *specialists* were the main source of coverage "returning to Arab fold" and "reducing political normalization with Israel" (each represented 23.1%). This means that at the critical moments of the peace process between Egypt and Israel, the Egyptian press depended basically on specialists to explain why the political relations with Israel should be reduced on the one hand and resumed with Arab countries on the other. The own writer or well-known journalist was mainly the source of coverage on 'political participation" and "stability in the Middle East". It seems that the press regarded the credibility of well-known journalists as essential for connecting the peace process with increasing political participation, plurality, accessing to political opportunities stability in the Middle East, and thereby, in the final stage, foreign investment.

Sources of news stories such as news agencies were basically related to "activities of government" and the other three political aspects but with different percentages. While MENA (the Egyptian news agency) was the main source of "activities of government and "travel of officials", the international news agencies (the four big) were mainly the source of "stability in the Middle East". This finding may be understood in terms of the interests of the news agencies. MENA belongs to the government and as a result its interests were mainly the activities of the government, and of the ruling party and the travel of the officials in connection with the peace process. The four big, on the other hand, were concerned with the effects of the peace process on the region as a whole, so they concentrated on the stability of the Middle East. Own correspondent and combination of two sources were essentially the sources of "activities of government" and "political participation". However combination of two sources was also concerned with reducing of normalization with Israel and returning to the rest of the Arab world. This is because combination of two sources may include news agency and one of the opinion material's sources as own writer or specialist.

Concerning sources of political subjects as subsidiaries, one can note from Appendix (E.4) that there was less difference of what discussed above. However some findings can be noticed. There was an agreement among all sources of sub-political subjects on the importance of two political aspects as a result of the peace with Israel. These two subsubjects were "political participation" as an internal political issue and "stability in the

Middle East" as a regional one. Sources of "reducing political normalization with Israel" as subsidiaries one and two were mainly own correspondent, specialist and own writer. This means that the Egyptian press depended on one of its own writers or correspondents to deal with such sensitive issues during critical moments of the peace process.

### 8.6- Coverage of the Political Dimension Over Time

As the present study analyzes the coverage of the Egyptian press during thirteen years of the peace process, it is important to know how the coverage differed over this period. The following section discusses how its coverage of the political dimension of the peace process differed over time. Table (8.7) summarizes coverage of the different political subjects in two main periods. The first under President Sadat, lasted from the beginning of the peace process in 1977 to 1981 and the second under President Mubarak from the end of 1981 to 1989.

Table (8.7) coverage of the political dimension in two main periods

| Political subject            | Under Sadat |       | Under Mubarak |       |
|------------------------------|-------------|-------|---------------|-------|
|                              | N           | %     | N             | %     |
| Political participation      | 21          | 28.4  | 8             | 15.3  |
| Activities of government     | 27          | 36.5  | 12            | 23.1  |
| Activities of parliament     | 5           | 6.8   | 7             | 13.5  |
| Activities of opposition     | 2           | 2.7   | 4             | 7.7   |
| Returning to Arab fold       | -           | -     | 10            | 19.2  |
| Stability in the Middle East | 10          | 13.5  | 7             | 13.5  |
| Reducing of p. normalization | 8           | 10.8  | 4             | 7.7   |
| Other political subject      | 1           | 1.3   | <u>-</u>      | ~     |
| Total                        | 76          | 100.0 | 52            | 100.0 |

The above table shows that "activities of government" was the most frequent main political subject in the two presidencies but with different percentages. Under President Sadat, this subject represented 36.5% but only 23.1% under President Mubarak. The high percentage of "activities of government" and "travel of officials" under Sadat may be explained by the importance of events related to the peace process that took place in

Sadat's presidency. This very active period required executive travel to and from the United States and Israel. The frequencies and appearance of other main political aspects differed in the two presidencies.

Under Sadat, "political participation" came second position with 28.4%. Egypt under Sadat, at the beginning of the peace process, had just moved to a multi-party system and political participation was seen by the Egyptian press as a direct outcome of the peace and stability. Sadat frequently repeated that the peace would guarantee the stability of political institutions and consequently increased participation among Egyptians in the political life of their country. Under Sadat, "Stability in the Middle East" came third position and appeared in 13.5% of all political aspects' coverage. It seems that the Egyptian press concentrated on the positive relationship between the peace and the stability in the Middle East in order to convince not only the Egyptians but also the other Arabs in the region, who isolated Egypt, with the importance of peace for the whole of region.

As mentioned above the priority of political subjects, except for the activities of the government, under President Mubarak was different. "Returning to the Arab" was the second main political subject with 19.2%. After the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, the Arab countries decided to isolate Egypt from the Arab world and most of the Arab countries cut their political ties with Egypt. When President Mubarak came to the office in 1981, and after the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (except from Taba) in 1982, political leadership in Egypt looked forward to returning to normal political relations with the rest of the Arab countries. The United States supported this orientation as Egypt could play a vital role in achieving peaceful relationship between Israel and the other Arab countries. The Egyptian press reflected this orientation and assured Egyptians that the peace between Egypt and Israel should not have any negative effects on relations with the other Arab countries because Egypt had a national responsibility towards them. "Political participation" was ranked third position. It appeared in 15.3% of all main political aspects under Mubarak.

One of interesting findings under the two presidencies was the appearance of "reducing political normalization with Israel" as a main political subject. While this subject appeared in about 10.8% out of all political aspects under Sadat, it represented 7.7% under Mubarak. Why is this finding interesting? Under Sadat, the main events of the peace process took place. Then was Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the signing of the Camp

David Accords and the peace treaty. All these events should lead to a host of political, economic and cultural agreements between Egypt and Israel and, consequently, more talks about normalization. Under Mubarak, the most critical events related to, and which threatened, the peace process between Egypt and Israel took place; Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and Israel's bombarding of the Headquarter of the PLO in Tunisia 1985. As a consequence, Egypt decided to recall home its ambassador from Israel. All these events lead to reducing political normalization with Israel. However, the percentage of average on "reducing of political normalization" was less under Mubarak. This may be explained by the orientation of political leadership in Egypt. Mubarak frequently repeated that the peace was a strategic goal for Egypt and in the final stage no obstacles or threats could affect the peace. It seems that the Egyptian press reflected this strategy and assured the importance of political relations with Israel, especially when the critical moments occurred in peace process.

Regarding political subjects as subsidiaries (Appendix E.5), under both presidencies the Egyptian press concentrated on the two sub-political issues of political participation and stability in the Middle East but with different priority. While the "political participation" received most frequent coverage under Sadat, "stability in the Middle East was the most frequent under Mubarak. It seems that while connecting political participation with peace was thought important in order to convince the Egyptian of the value of the new policy under Sadat in the late seventies, the subsequent stability in the Middle East was deemed essential for convincing other Arab countries to follow Egypt under Mubarak. Concerning "reducing political normalization with Israel" as subsidiaries, the coverage was similar to that for a main political subject. This issue received less frequent coverage under Mubarak. The coverage devoted to the "reducing political normalization with Israel", under Sadat, was 12.0% and 15.9% as a subsidiary one and two respectively. These percentages decreased to only 2.3% and 15.9% under Mubarak. Explanation of this finding is similar to what has been discussed above.

To have a clear view of how the Egyptian press's coverage of the political dimension of the peace process differed over time, period of the study was divided to four periods. The following table shows coverage devoted to different political issues in each period.

From table (8.8), it can be noted that "activities of government" was the most frequent main political aspect in the first three periods, but with different percentages. In the first period it was 44.2%, reduced to 29.7% in the second period and appeared in 24.3% in the

third one. This can be understood in terms of the relationship between the press and political institution in Egypt, in which activities of government and officials have a priority in the news. The high appearance of this subject in the first period may be explained by two reasons; firstly, this period included the most important events of the peace process such as Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, signing the Camp David accords and the peace treaty. All these events required a lot of activities, travels to and from the US and Israel. These events attracted the attention of the press not only in Egypt but also around the world. Secondly, during this period all the Egyptian press had to follow each move of the political leadership regarding the peace process without criticism. Otherwise, the newspaper could be confiscated and the journalists could be jailed or forced to leave the country.

Table (8.8) coverage devoted to the political dimension in four periods

| Political subject            | Periods*            |                     |                     |                    |  |  |  |
|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--|--|--|
|                              | Period one          | Period two          | Period three        | Period four        |  |  |  |
| Political participation      | 12<br><b>27.9</b> % | 10<br><b>27.0</b> % | 5<br>13.5%          | 2<br>22.2%         |  |  |  |
| Activities of government     | 19<br><b>44.2%</b>  | 11<br><b>29.7%</b>  | 9<br><b>24.3</b> %  | -                  |  |  |  |
| Activities of parliament     | 1<br>2.3%           | 5<br><b>13.5%</b>   | 5<br>13.5%          | 1<br>11.1 <i>%</i> |  |  |  |
| Activities of opposition     | -                   | 3<br><b>8.1</b> %   | 2<br><b>5.4%</b>    | 1<br>11.1 <i>%</i> |  |  |  |
| Returning to Arab fold       | -                   | -                   | 8<br><b>21.6%</b>   | 2<br><b>22.2%</b>  |  |  |  |
| Stability in the Middle East | 11<br><b>25.6%</b>  | 1<br><b>2.7</b> %   | 3<br><b>8.1%</b>    | 2<br><b>22.2%</b>  |  |  |  |
| Reducing of p. normalization | -                   | 6<br><b>16.2%</b>   | 5<br>13.5%          | l<br>11.1%         |  |  |  |
| Other political subject      | -                   | 1<br><b>2.7</b> %   | -                   | -                  |  |  |  |
| Total                        | 43<br>100.0%        | 37<br><b>100.0</b>  | 37<br><b>100.0%</b> | 9<br>100.0%        |  |  |  |

<sup>\*</sup> Period one lasted six weeks of analysis [weeks 1 to 6] and included main events of the peace process between Egypt and Israel as signing the Camp David and the peace treaty. Period two lasted five weeks [weeks 7 to 11] and included first Israel's withdrawal from Sinai until the assassination of Sadat. Period three lasted six weeks [weeks 12 to 17] and included the most critical moments of the peace process as Israel invasion to Lebanon. Period four lasted four weeks [weeks 18 to 21] and included final Israel's withdrawal from Sinai.

Political participation also received a great deal of the Egyptian press's coverage during the first two periods (under Sadat). The Egyptian press in these two periods frequently connected the peace to political participation and plurality. It seems that increasing of

political participation was the most frequent positive outcome of the peace process, may be to convince the Egyptians with the new policy and the West that Egypt was moving to a democratic system. "Reducing of political normalization with Israel" appeared in only two periods; period two (16.2%) and period three (13.5%). In these two periods, the most critical moments of the relationship between Egypt and Israel took place. In the second period the Israel's fighters destroyed the Iraq's Nuclear Reactor after a meeting between Sadat and the Israel's Prime Minister, Begin, In Egypt in 1980. In the third period, under Mubarak, Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982 and bombarded the Headquarter of the PLO in Tunisia in 1985. All these actions gave the Egyptian press the opportunity (national and opposition) to criticize Israel's policy, which threaten the peace and asking for calling the ambassador from Israel.

Under President Sadat, the Egyptian press never talked about "returning to the Arab". In the second period, Arab countries decided to isolate Egypt. President Sadat attacked Arab countries and the press followed this orientation, especially with the future expectations and outcomes of peace. After Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the calling of the Egyptian ambassador from Israel, Egyptian leadership repeated that Egypt should resume its responsibilities towards Arab countries. The Egyptian press reflected this orientation. As a result, "returning to the Arab" received the second frequent coverage of the Egyptian press in the third period (21.6%) and was one of the most frequent political aspects in the fourth period (22.2%). It can be concluded from the above table that the Egyptian press's coverage of the political dimension of the peace process was influenced by several factors; orientations of the political leadership in Egypt towards the peace process and its outcomes, kind and importance of events related to the peace process and Israel's actions against other Arab countries.

# 8.7- Coverage's Orientation Toward the Political Dimension.

Orientation of the Egyptian press's coverage toward the political dimension of the peace process was coded in three categories; positive, neutral and negative. The following table shows orientations of the Egyptian press's coverage toward different aspects of the political dimension of the peace process. In this table the analysis is dealing with percentages within each political subject, not within each orientation. The reason for this is to know orientations of the coverage (positive, negative and neutral) toward political dimension as a whole and each political subject.

From (8.9), it can be noted that the overall orientation or stance of the Egyptian press coverage towards the political dimension of the peace process was positive. While the positive orientation represented 41.3% (52 out of 126), the negative orientation appeared in only 19.0% (24 out of 126). The rest of the coverage was neutral or informative, 39.7%. To have a close clarification of the stance of each political subject, one can notice that the orientation of the Egyptian press's coverage was positive towards three political aspects; political participation, stability in the Middle East and activities of government. Orientation of the coverage was negative towards three other political aspects; activities of government, activities of opposition and returning to Arab.

Table (8.9) orientations of the coverage toward the political dimension

| Political subjects           |                   | Orientation        | n                 | Total       |
|------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------|
|                              | Positive          | Neutral            | Negative          |             |
| Political participation      | 19 / 65.5%        | 7 / 24.1%          | 3 / 10.3%         | 29 / 100.0% |
| Activities of government     | 11 / 28.2%        | 25 / <b>64.1</b> % | 3 / <b>7.7</b> %  | 39 / 100.0% |
| Activities of parliament     | 2/16.7%           | 7 / 58.3%          | 3 / 25.0%         | 12 / 100.0% |
| Activities of opposition     | 2/33.3%           | 1 / <b>16.7</b> %  | 3 / <b>50.0</b> % | 6 / 100.0%  |
| Returning to Arab fold       | 3 / 30.0%         | 3 / <b>30.0</b> %  | 4 / 40.0%         | 10 / 100.0% |
| Stability in the Middle East | 9 / <b>52.9</b> % | 5 / <b>29.4</b> %  | 3 / 17.6%         | 17 / 100.0% |
| Political normalization      | 5 / 41.6%         | 2 / <b>16.7</b> %  | 5 / 41.6%         | 12 / 100.0% |
| Other political subject      | -                 | <del>-</del>       | 1 / 100.0%        | 1 / 100.0%  |
| Total                        | 52 / 41.3%        | 50 / 39.7%         | 24 / 19.0%        | 126/ 100.0% |

Concerning political participation, about two/third (65.5%) of the coverage was positive and only 10.3% was negative. This means that the Egyptian press highly considered political participation as a positive political outcome of the peace with Israel. The peace would give Egypt the opportunity to turn to internal problems, which required participation of all sectors of the society and consequently prepare the political environment for increased participation. It seems also that this subject was connected, positively, to the peace process to convince the Egyptians to accept the new policy. As

the "stability in the Middle East have an economic as much as political effects on the region, more than half of the coverage (52.9%) devoted to this subject was positive. The peace ended the war in the region because without Egypt the Middle East would not face any complete war. These notions about the conflict in the Middle East facilitated the connection between stability in the region as a political result of peace to economic outcomes for Egypt.

Orientation of the coverage towards "returning to the Arab" was slightly negative. This may be understood in terms of the political orientation in Egypt under President Sadat and especially during the second period (see table 8.8). During this period, Arab isolated Egypt from the Arab World. The Egyptian leadership frequently repeated that the Arab, who took the decision of isolation, should come back to Egypt. It seems that the Egyptian press reflected this orientation. As a result, 40% of the coverage devoted to "returning to the Arab" as a political subject was negative and 30.0% was positive. The slightly negative orientation of the coverage towards "activities of the opposition" and the "activities of the parliament" may be understood in terms of the national and opposition papers' dealing with different issue in Egypt. The national newspaper usually was pro-activities of parliament and against opposition. The reverse was correct for the oppositional newspapers.

For "reducing of political normalization with Israel" as a main political subject, the percentage of coverage devoted to positive and negative orientation was similar. Each received 41.6%. This means that the Egyptian press's coverage, as a whole, was not pro or against normalization with Israel. The stance of the coverage depended on the events related to the peace process itself and Israel's actions toward other Arab countries. During celebrations of peace agreements and travel of officials to and from Israel, the coverage was pro-normalization. When Israel took aggressive actions against other Arab countries, the coverage was usually anti-normalization.

Concerning orientation of the Egyptian press's coverage towards political subjects as subsidiaries one and two, there was not much difference of the orientation towards main political subjects (Appendix E.6). Four sub-political subjects (subsidiaries one and two) received a positive orientation; political participation, stability in the Middle East, activities of government and activities of parliament. While the stance of coverage was negative towards "returning to the Arab" as a subsidiary one, it was neutral as a subsidiary two. The orientation of the coverage towards "reducing of political

normalization with Israel", as a subsidiary one, was neutral. This orientation turned to be completely negative for this subject as subsidiary two. This last finding shows that the coverage was not anti-normalization with Israel as a political subject per se, but in connection with other main subject as military invasion or action.

Figures of this chapter indicates the centrality of the political participation and stability in the framing of the peace process by the Egyptian press. Having concentrated on the most urgent economic needs of the Egyptians as economic aspects of the peace process, the Egyptian press also concentrated on the most needed political aspect in connection to the peace process. This may draw our attention to one of the main and urgent needs of another society in connection to the peace process. That is the security need for Israelis. The following section illustrates this point and shows the important of security to Israel and how this can be mediated to promote and construct a new meaning of peace among the Israelis.

Garnett (1970) pointed out that security is 'freedom from insecurity' in which a feeling of danger arises out of the feeling that the order of things we live in is unstable. Security, therefore, must imply a state of tranquility, an absence of fear of disturbing elements in relation to state objectives. This definition of security is more relative to Israel's case because it ensures the psychological value of 'fear feeling'.

The Middle East conflict has always been the central point for Israel's external security. Chzan (1988) made the point that the Arab-Israeli conflict has been at the focal point of the Israeli political experience. Security considerations have been paramount in the eyes of their policymakers and population at large. The four wars between Arab and Israel have increased the feeling among Israelis of being a target of permanent foreign threats.

Internal security is also an important issue. As a result of the absent of peace with Palestinian and other Arab countries, Israelis have faced, according to Lesch (1992), numerous incidents not only in the occupied territories, but also inside Israel itself or what is known as the 'Green Line'. Such incidents enhance the sense of insecurity pervasive among not only Israeli settlers but also the rest of Israelis. Diminishing such violence is vital to the Israeli public, but there is no consensus as to how to effect that change. Some call for strengthened direct control and argue that Palestinian violence makes imperative Israel's permanent control over the occupied territories. Other Israelis argue that the occupation itself provokes Palestinian reaction and conclude that the

burden of policing Palestinians against their will has become increasingly unbearable, if not impossible.

Many researchers argue that force alone cannot achieve security. Garnett (1970) pointed out that many wars that have occurred in modern times prove that the threat to use force, even when sometimes made by an apparently superior force, has often failed to deter. Stephenson (1992) confirmed the same point and stated that we need to shift out investment toward building an infrastructure of peace. For a peaceful world, security can only be achieved by peaceful methods. Israeli leaders themselves, according to Quandt, (1993) began to acknowledge the desirability of pursuing a peaceful way to solve the problems. Hence the moves of the American Secretary of State towards a new peace settlement in the Middle East began. They were the beginning of the peace process in Madrid. This indicates that peace is the most suitable way to achieve security on both national and international levels.

In this context, peace agreements, according to Lesch (1992), will provide vital insurance for a regime's long-term security. National rights would accrue to the Palestinian community, trade and labour flows would be normalized for mutual benefit, and diplomatic relations established between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states. One of the Israeli-Palestinians suggested that the peace agreement by itself would reduce motivation for war and hostility in the region. Political stability in the region, resulting from a comprehensive peace settlement, will reinforce security in the region. Economic prosperity and interdependence will insure the common interests in maintaining a lasting peace.

The aim of the above discussion is to clarify that security is the central concern of Israel and to explore that the direct way to achieve security is through peace. Both Israeli and Palestinian leaders recognize and admit that. What happened? After the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister, Rabin, in early 1996, Israelis had chosen Netanyahu, the right-wing leader as a new Prime Minister, who opposed the peace process and saw it as a 'national disaster' (Ibid). These raises a question of the media's role in the peace process; role based on security-oriented view.

In the 1990s, the role of the media in war and peace has attracted many researchers, particularly after the obvious CNN role in the Gulf war and Bosnia, in which war events and the actual day-to-day functioning of armed forces in carrying out their tasks were

brought to 'living rooms'. The increasing role of the CNN in influencing political agendas nationally and internationally led Boutros-Ghali in 1995, the then United Nations Secretary-General, describe it as 'the sixteenth member of the UN Security Council' (Badsey, 2000).

The role of the mass media in political or military conflict, according to Wolfsfeld (1997), is interactive process and can be understood within construction of meaning approach. The media serve as a 'public interpreters' of events and as 'symbolic arenas' for ideological struggle between antagonists. In framing a conflict, the media attempt to find a narrative fit between incoming information and existing media frames, which shaped by the professional and political culture of each medium – professional norms, determine how events and incoming information would be turned into news. As incoming information, particularly in a conflict, is nearly the same for all media, framing this information acquire its vital role. For example, Oslo accords, the same piece of information, may be framed as 'a chance for peace' or 'national disaster'. Certainly, each frame would have a different effect.

Galtung and Vincent (1992) described peace as a highly desirable value – interpreted not only as survival, but also as peace with economic justice, political freedom, and cultural meaning. They suggested ten proposals for a peace-oriented news media. An important proposal, which related to scope of this discussion, is 'portraying more clearly the benefits of peace'. Peace is not merely the absence of war, or absence of the threat of war. Peace is the opportunity for everyone to unfold himself or herself more than ever before, unhampered by massive destruction and the fear of it. 'Everyone' means exactly that: common men and women, everywhere. 'Unfolding' means all the nice things that people can do alone and with each other. Without concentrating on the benefits of peace and connecting it with security, development and stability, the media may become a negative factor, contributing to worldwide insecurity rather than the opposite and training people to see violence as normal, even teaching them the techniques. How difficult it is to portray something positive, when all interests is focused on bad news.

According to Lehman-Wilzig & Schejter (1994), Israel has always had a strong press, circumscribed somewhat by its serious problems of national security. Per capita newspaper readership is among the highest in the world, with the number of printed press venues far beyond what one would expect from such a small country. Israel has a very robust and diverse daily press, which reflects the fact that over 85.5 percent of the

adult population reads newspaper on a daily basis. They added, "security problems and ongoing peace negotiations have made all Israelis news junkies" (p. 115)

Wolfsfeld (1997) pointed out that the frame contest, concerning Oslo accords, between the Rabin government and the anti-Oslo movements had two main directions: the chance for peace frame representing Rabin government, and national disaster frame being promoted by the right-wing opposition and encouraged by settles groups. The differences between the two frames were quite obvious. For the Rabin government, peace with Palestinians will move Israel closer to peace with its Arab neighbours, and will bring increased prosperity to the entire region. Israel will have diplomatic relations with the vast majority of the world and the Middle East can become a major economic power.

On the other hand, according to Wolfsfeld (Ibid), the opposition considered the agreement to be national disaster. They argue that the Palestinians never gave up their aim of destroying Israel, only changed their tactics. They will use any land given to them as a beachhead for taking the rest. Arafat and his cronies have never kept their word about anything, including their promise to stop terrorism. The Oslo agreement is a complete surrender by Israel, as it would lead to a Palestinian state that can threaten Israel's very existence. The settlers are the true pioneers of Israel, and Israel must continue to create settlements in Judaea, Samari (West Bank) and Gaza.

Neither side could dominate public discourse, partly, because neither of them could take complete charge of political events. Some events such as the breakthrough at Oslo gave advantages to the 'peace frame'; others, such as terrorist attacks gave advantages to the 'disaster' frame. What made differences was the 'settlers' movements'. They had got a significant amount of success in promoting their frames to the Israeli press. This appearance made the 'disaster frame' more effective. According to an analysis conducted on two of the Israeli dailies (Yediot Ahronot & Ha'aretz) after the signing of Cairo agreement between Israel and the PLO; from August 1993 to May 1994, three types of news were differentiated in relation to the peace with Palestinians; god news, bad news, and mixed news. While bad news represented 34%, good news represented only 21%. The rest, mixed news, appeared in 45% (Ibid). These figures show that the Israeli press was in favour to the 'disaster frame' and against the 'peace one'.

The above discussion illustrates that security was, and still is, the most important requirement and need for the Israelis. It is difficult to achieve security without peace,

particularly on the long run. Results of Wolfsfeld's analysis (1997) shows that the Israeli press favour the 'national disaster' frame, which considered that peace would lead to destruction of Israel and given back territories would become a 'safe heaven for terrorists and Israel will be unable to do anything about it'. There is no evidence that the framing of peace, in this way, has affected the Israelis. However the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister, Rabin, by one of settler extremist and electing a right wing government few months latter could be considered as a retreat or decline of the peace values among Israelis.

#### 8.8- Conclusion

To conclude the analysis regarding this chapter, two main points were taken into consideration the objectives and questions of the study related to this chapter and theoretical frame of this study.

#### 8.8.1- Conclusion in Terms of the Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this chapter was to analyze how the Egyptian press dealt with the political dimension of the peace process with Israel and to see if the peace process was connected to the political dimension of development in Egypt. The main conclusions are:

Concerning the most frequent main and sub-political subjects, the Egyptian press concentrated on the three aspects of the activities of the government, political participation and stability in the Middle East. Apart from the activities of government, it seems that the Egyptian press connected the peace process with Israel to increasing political participation (an internal issue) and stability in the Middle East (a regional issue). Political participation was and still is, a central point and a problematic issue in the political life in Egypt. The Egyptians did not trust the general elections because of the problems related to the counting of the votes (Ayad, 1998). Political participation and plurality was connected to the peace process in order to convince the Egyptians of the benefits of the new policy of an accommodation with Israel. Reducing political normalization with Israel also received significant coverage of the Egyptian press as a main and sub-political subject, especially as a subsidiary two. The Egyptian press concentrated on this subject when Israeli action threatened the peace process. It was presented mainly as a subsidiary subject as it was usually a result of another action.

- Concerning the characteristics of coverage or how the Egyptian press covered the political dimension of the peace process, the extent amount, location and type of coverage were discussed. Political participation, the activities of the government, stability in the Middle East, reducing political normalization with Israel and returning to the Arab fold received respectively the most coverage. The activities of the government and political participation represented together more than 60.0% of all political matter printed on the front pages. By dividing coverage into two main categories, news stories and opinion materials, it can be concluded that while the news stories concentrated on marginal issues such as the activities of the government, the opinion materials dealt with more problematic issues such as political participation, returning to the Arab fold and normalization with Israel.
- The most frequent actors involved in the political dimension of the peace process were the president or prime minister, ministers, local governors and the political opposition. The appearance of these actors in the political subjects reflected the power relationships in Egypt. The president, ministers and local governors were mainly involved in the activities of the government and political participation. The above three actors, who represented the government, appeared in more than 76.0% out of all actors involved in the political dimension. Consequently, it can be concluded that the appearance of the various actors' coverage of the political dimension of the peace process reflected the power relationship in Egyptian society.
- Concerning sources related to the political dimension of the peace process, there were two main categories. There were news stories sources (such as news agencies) and opinion material sources (such as own writers and specialist). The results show that the first category was mainly concerned with marginal political issues such as activities of government. The second category of sources appeared basically in the problematic political issues as political participation political normalization and returning to the Arab. It seems that the Egyptian press depended on the credibility of well-known journalists and specialists to deal with such issues.
- Political leadership in Egypt and the different periods of analysis influenced nature of the amount of coverage devoted to the political dimension of the

peace process. Apart world from the activities of the government, while the coverage concentrated on political participation under President Sadat, it was mainly on returning to the Arab under President Mubarak. Although the main critical moments and events which faced the peace process between Egypt and Israel took place under Mubarak, especially in the third period, reducing political normalization with Israel as a main and sub-political subject received less coverage under him than under Sadat. It seems that while the Egyptian press criticized some of Israel's actions, it tried to protect the peace process with Israel as a strategic policy.

• Coverage of the political dimension of the peace process, therefore, was on the whole positive. To be more specific, the orientation of the press coverage was positive in respect of political participation and stability in the Middle East. Concerning a return to the Arab fold, orientation was slightly negative. According to the political leadership, and consequently the press, the Arab countries isolated themselves from Egypt and were free to come back. The stance towards political normalization with Israel fluctuated between neutral orientation, as a main and subsidiary one, and a strong negative orientation as subsidiary two.

#### 8.8.2- Conclusion in Terms of the Theoretical Frame of the Study

The theoretical frame of the study originates from the two main approaches, the political economy approach and the construction of meaning approach. Following the construction of meaning approach, the following points explain how the Egyptian press constructed the political meaning of peace or how the political dimension of development was connected to the peace process.

The Egyptian press connected the peace process to the activities of the government. This point is usually routine news in the Egyptian media. However, when these activities are carried out by the President, in specific situations, they have another aims. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem had a great importance. It was very important because it is related to the legitimacy of the political leadership in Egypt, especially during the late seventies. After the negative outcomes of the economic open-door policy and the serious riots and demonstration across Egypt in January 1977, President Sadat recognized that he

lost most of his legitimacy. He was no more the hero of war. Many researchers argue that the January riots were the main reason that led to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem later in the same year (Heikal, 1996a). It seems that the Egyptian press concentrated on the activities and travels of the president and his officials as significant events in pursuit of peace and in order to rebuild the legitimacy of the war hero. The president received a historic greeting when he came back from Israel. He became the hero of both war and peace. Peace meant serious moves, difficult negotiations and brave decisions. Sadat made the moves and the decisions.

- The Egyptian press saw the important connection between increasing of political participation in Egypt and the peace with Israel. During the liberalization era in the seventies and after the new orientation towards the West, Egypt moved towards a new multi-party political system or what was called a controlled democratization. Egyptians were eager to participate in this political process, seeing it is the core point of political development. The press tried to construct a new meaning of peace through predictable political outcomes of the peace process with Israel. The peace would lead to the end of conflict in the region. This situation would prepare an environment in Egypt for increased participation, plurality and equal access to political opportunity.
- The peace process was connected also to the stability of the Middle East.

  Stability in the region means the political stability in Egypt. As a result Egypt would be a safe country for foreign economic investment and tourism.
- The press assured Egyptians that the peace with Israel would not restrict Egypt's role and responsibilities toward other Arab countries. When Israel destroyed Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, invaded Lebanon and bombarded the Headquarter of the PLO in Tunisia, the Egyptian press criticized these actions. It called for a reduction of political normalization, but no more. During these critical moments of the peace process, demonstrations arose in Egypt demanding the cancellation of the peace treaty. The press calmed the people and confirmed that all these actions were solvable but of peace was a valid strategic choice for Egypt. Consequently, the peace meant solving problems by negotiations and cooperation. These notions were a new culture not only for the

Egyptians but also for the Arab World. Egypt would not lead the Arab into a conflict with Israel, but to a complete and fair peace between Arab and Israeli.

• It can be concluded that the Egyptian press, in its coverage of the political dimension of the peace process, tried to build a new political culture for peace in Egypt and the Arab World. Peace means solving Egypt's critical political issues; political participation and political legitimacy. Peace means solving thirty years of conflict in the region. Replacing war with negotiation and cooperation. By dealing with the political dimension in such a way, the Egyptian press, it may be concluded, participated in changing Egyptian public opinion towards the conflict in the Middle East.

### Chapter nine

# Culture/Social Dimension of the Peace Process

As explained in chapter two, cultural aspects represent an important dimension of national development. An indication of a country's development national identity, according to Sorensen (1985), is one of the most important needs that should be satisfied. Egypt has been an Islamic and Arab country for fourteen hundred years. It also has been a Pharaonic civilization for more than five thousand years. National identity, therefore, has been a core issue in Egypt's culture. It can be argued that Egypt's identity fluctuated between Islamic, Arab and Pharaonic perspectives. The power relationships and external effects which have faced Egypt have influenced the issue. As the peace process with Israel, which begun in the late seventies, was one of the most controversial issues, this chapter analyses the cultural/social dimension of the peace process with Israel as presented by the Egyptian press. In this respect, the results of the analysis are presented as follows:

- The main culture and social aspects that were connected to the peace process,
- The amount of coverage devoted to the cultural/social dimension,
- The characteristics of the coverage devoted to both culture and social aspects,
- The most frequent national actors involved in culture and social subjects,
- The main sources of the coverage devoted to the culture/social dimension,
- The extent to which the coverage of the culture/social dimension differed over time, and
- The stance of the coverage towards this dimension.

### 9.1- Main and sub-cultural/social aspects of the coverage

Cultural and social dimensions received nearly the same frequent and amount of the coverage. Tables 6 & 7 in the introduction of this part, show that culture and social dimensions appeared in 11.8% and 11.7% of the coverage respectively. They also received the 11.0% and 11.3% of the amount of the coverage. This finding reflects the similarity of the coverage devoted to both dimensions. The importance of the

social dimension needs to be understood in terms of the serious social problems which faced Egypt during the 1970s and 1980s. Coverage of the cultural dimension may be understood in terms of two factors: that the peace process with Israel after more than three decades of conflict gave rise to a continuous debates among Egyptians towards the new peace policy with the core point being Egypt's identity; that the peace treaty included many cultural agreements that required implementation. So on what kind of culture and social aspects did the Egyptian press focused? The following tables (9.1 & 9.2) summarize the most frequent cultural and social subjects that appeared in the Egyptian press.

Table (9.1) Main and sub-cultural subjects

|                               | Main s | Main subject |    | Subsidiary 1 |    | Subsidiary 2 |  |
|-------------------------------|--------|--------------|----|--------------|----|--------------|--|
| Cultural subjects             | N      | %            | N  | %            | N  | %            |  |
| Arab identity of Egypt        | 21     | 28.8         | 13 | 20.6         | 9  | 15           |  |
| Pharaonic identity of Egypt   | 17     | 23.3         | 14 | 22.2         | 9  | 15           |  |
| Islamic identity of Egypt     | 6      | 8.2          | 6  | 9.5          | 5  | 8.3          |  |
| National integration          | 16     | 21.9         | 13 | 20.6         | 13 | 21.7         |  |
| Negative image about Israelis | 10     | 13.7         | 5  | 7.9          | 5  | 8.3          |  |
| Other cultural subjects       | 3      | 4.1          | 12 | 19           | 19 | 31.7         |  |
| Total                         | 73     | 100%         | 63 | 100%         | 60 | 100%         |  |

Table (9.2) main and sub-social subjects

| Social aubicata  | Main su | Main subject |    | Subsidiary 1 |    | ary 2 |
|------------------|---------|--------------|----|--------------|----|-------|
| Social subjects  | N       | %            | N  | %            | N  | %     |
| Housing services | 20      | 27.8         | 12 | 35.3         | 3  | 14.3  |
| Infrastructure   | 19      | 26.4         | 10 | 29.4         | 4  | 19    |
| Health services  | 14      | 19.4         | 8  | 23.5         | 10 | 47.6  |
| Unemployment     | 16      | 22.2         | 4  | 11.8         | 3  | 14.3  |
| Others           | 3       | 4.2          |    |              | 1  | 4.8   |
| Total            | 72      | 100%         | 34 | 100%         | 21 | 100%  |

On the cultural aspects of the peace process, Table (9.1) shows that the Egyptian press concentrated on three issues; Egypt's Arab identity, Pharaonic identity and

national integration as main and sub-culture subjects. In the course of the peace negotiations with Israel, the Egyptian press reflected Egypt's different identities. Immediately after President Sadat returned from Jerusalem on November 1977, according to many researchers (Heikal, 1996a; Ali, 1988), Cairo had begun to emphasize Egypt's Pharaonic past and its superiority over other Arab countries. A great debate arose among Egyptian intellectuals regarding this issue and was reflected on the newspapers. National integration ranked third (21.9%) as a cultural subject. This refers to Egyptian opinion towards the new peace policies with Israel. According to this finding, the Egyptian newspapers emphasized national integration towards the peace process. It is difficult to prove the reactions of Egyptians to the peace policies with Israel at that time. However this finding matches results of surveys conducted after Sadat's initiative and concluded that many Egyptians supported the new peace policies (see chapter two).

Table (9.1) shows that a significant percentage of the coverage (13.7%) concentrated on "negative images about Israelis". In this respect the Egyptian newspapers concentrated on such themes as 'Israelis still believe that they are the chosen people of the God', 'they can not live in peace because peace threaten the multi-ethnic society of Israel' and 'Israelis never respect their agreements'. It seems that such themes about Israelis arose during periods of tensions with Egypt. More about dealing with subjects of the cultural dimension of the peace process will be discussed later in this chapter. From Table (9.1), it can be seen that "Islamic identity of Egypt" received less than 10.0% of the coverage as a main and sub-cultural subject. This can be understood in terms of two factors: Firstly, since the Muslim Brothers were accused of trying to assassinate President Nasser in 1956, contributions from Islamic groups to Egyptian political life have been prohibited. Nationalism and liberalization were the leading forces for more than three decades in Egypt in the fifties, sixties, seventies and early eighties. In this respect many radical and violent Islamic groups have operated in Egypt. All publications that reflect the views of these groups were confiscated. In 1981, one of these groups, Al-Jihad assassinated President Sadat. Secondly, all Islamic groups (such as Muslim Brothers, Al-Jehad, and Islamic movement) were against the peace process and any kind of accommodation with Israel until its withdrawal from the occupied territories.

In such sensitive issues as the peace process, the Egyptian press rarely focused on Egypt's Islamic identity.

Concerning social aspects, Table (9.2) shows that the Egyptian press concentrated on the three issues of housing services (27.8%), infrastructure (26.4%) and unemployment (22.2%). It seems that the socio-economic situation in Egypt affected coverage of all the social aspects of the peace process. An involvement in four wars with Israel in thirty years left Egypt in a deteriorated economic and social situation. Rising inflation, as a result of economic liberalization in the mid-seventies, led to a sharply increase in the cost of house prices. After the first troops disengagement between Egypt and Israel in January 1974, as many as 400 thousand soldiers returned from service in the army and were looking for jobs.

These problems arouse considerable unrest among Egyptians to the extent that a small increase in food prices provoked serious riots and demonstrations in January 1977. The political leadership saw peace with Israel as a solution to all the economic and social problems facing Egypt. The Egyptian newspapers reflected that point. The new peace policy, it would claim, would lead to stability in the Middle East and the influx of foreign economic aid and investment. Consequently, Egypt would be able to solve its many social problems such as housing, infrastructure, unemployment and health care. Figures of Table (9.2) confirm that the Egyptian newspapers connected these problems to the peace process.

#### 9.2- Amount of Coverage Devoted to Social/Cultural Dimension

The total amount of coverage devoted to the all dimensions of the peace process was 126.6 pages (see table int. 6). Of these nearly the same number of pages was devoted to both the social and cultural dimensions. Each dimension received about 14 pages. This means that the socio/cultural altogether received about 28 pages of coverage representing nearly 22.0% out of the total amount of coverage analyzed. This brings the socio-cultural dimension to second position. Only the economic dimension received grater coverage. The following two tables show the amount of coverage that was devoted to both social and cultural issues of the peace process.

Concerning cultural subjects, the figures in Table (9.3) show that the Arab identity of Egypt received the most coverage devoted to the cultural dimension. It appeared in about four pages of space (28.8%). The pharaonic identity came second position

Consequently Islamic issues were ignored in the Egyptian papers especially those related to the peace process.

Concerning social aspects, as the above table indicates, two issues received the most coverage. These issues were housing services and infrastructure. The amount of coverage devoted to housing services, the first issue was 4.2 pages of space, representing 29.2%. The second issue, infrastructure received 3.8 pages of space (26.6%). Health services and solving unemployment came third position and received nearly the same amount of coverage, 2.5 pages.

As these figures match the figures in Table (9.2), it is clear that the Egyptian papers connected the peace process to the most important social problems in Egypt, housing and infrastructure. Housing problems refer to the availability of houses and accommodations for ordinary people. Three reasons have made housing the most critical social problem faced by Egypt in the two decades in which this study was conducted, the seventies and the eighties. Firstly, in the late seventies, more than 20% of the Egyptians of marital age and looking for houses, particularly in the cities (Vatikiotis, 1991). Secondly, after the first disengagement of troops between Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and re-opening of the Suez Canal in June 1975, as many as a half million soldiers and officers left the army and returned home with high expectations after wining the war. The majority of those soldiers and officers were of marital age and looking for accommodation. Thirdly, the negative outcomes of the economic liberalization era in the mid-seventies increased the inflation rate. Consequently, the price of houses increased sharply. Only having given limited resources, people found it too difficult to obtain accommodation. All the above reasons led to a deep housing crisis.

Thirty years of conflict and war status with Israel left the country's infrastructure in a dilapidated condition. Almost all the national resources were directed to military expenditure. Policies notions and slogans appeared in the Egyptian press such as "no voice should rise on the voice of war". By the mid-seventies, the Egyptian government had found that the whole of the infrastructure was in urgent need of immediate repair or replacement.

The difficulty of securing funds after the "open door" economic policy led peace with Israel to be seen from a range of different points of view, (Heikal, 1996a,

Dossuki, 1988), as the key step to solve the many social problems facing Egypt. That the Egyptian press reflected these views, stem from the fact that they were convinced that the peace policy would lead to the solution of the many social problems, or that they intended to persuade the Egyptians of the desirability the peace process with Israel after nearly three decades of conflict.

#### 9.3- Characteristics of coverage devoted to cultural/social dimension

This category refers to the location and kinds of coverage devoted to the cultural and social aspects. The following two tables show how the Egyptian press located the main cultural and social issues. Tables showing sub-cultural and sub social issues are presented in the appendices of the study.

Concerning location of main cultural issues, it can be noted from Table (9.5) that while only about 22.0% of all cultural issues was located on the front pages (16 out of 73), more than 64.0% was published on the inside pages (47 out of 73). Because having issues printed on front pages is considered more prominent, the above figures might indicate that the cultural dimension of the peace process did not receive as much importance as the economic and political dimensions.

Apart from the location of the cultural dimensions, the above figures show that national integration or harmonic values was the most frequent cultural issue to be published on the front pages (31.3%) and back pages (30.0%). Egypt's Arab identity came second on the front pages with 25.1%. The Pharaonic identity came third on the front pages and first on the back pages. As for cultural issues that were printed on the inside pages, Egypt's Arab and Pharaonic identities were the most frequently covered issues respectively. The first received 31.9% of the coverage and the second about 23.0%.

Figures in Table (9.5) also show that Islamic identity of Egypt mainly appeared on the inside pages. Having taken into consideration that the materials that are printed in the front pages and back pages are considered to be more prominent, as explained in the introduction of this part of the study, it can be argued that national integration, Egypt's Arab and Pharaonic identity were the most prominent cultural issues connected with the peace process.

Table (9.5) location of the coverage devoted to main cultural issues

| Culture subject                       |            | Location  |             |
|---------------------------------------|------------|-----------|-------------|
|                                       | Front page | Back page | Inside page |
| Arab identity of Egypt                | 4          | 2         | 15          |
|                                       | 25.1%      | 20.0%     | 31.9%       |
| Pharaonic identity of Egypt           | 3          | 3         | 11          |
|                                       | 18.8%      | 30.0%     | 23.4%       |
| Islamic identity of Egypt             | 1          |           | 5           |
|                                       | 6.3%       |           | 10.6%       |
| National integration /harmonic values | 5          | 3         | 8           |
|                                       | 31.3%      | 30.0%     | 17.0%       |
| Negative image about Israel           | 1          | 2         | 7           |
|                                       | 6.3%       | 20.0%     | 14.9%       |
| Other cultural subjects               | 2          |           | 1           |
|                                       | 12.5%      |           | 2.1%        |
| Total                                 | 16         | 10        | 47          |
|                                       | 100.0%     | 100.0%    | 100.0%      |

Table (9.6) location of the coverage devoted to social issues

| Social subjects      | Location   |           |             |  |  |
|----------------------|------------|-----------|-------------|--|--|
|                      | Front page | Back page | Inside page |  |  |
| Housing services     | 8          | 1         | 11          |  |  |
|                      | 23.5%      | 16.7%     | 34.4%       |  |  |
| Infrastructure       | 8          | 4         | 7           |  |  |
|                      | 23.5%      | 66.7%     | 21.9%       |  |  |
| Health services      | 6          |           | 8           |  |  |
|                      | 17.6%      |           | 25.0%       |  |  |
| Solving unemployment | 11         | 1         | 4           |  |  |
|                      | 32.4%      | 16.7%     | 12.5%       |  |  |
| Other social subject | 1          |           | 2           |  |  |
| •                    | 2.9%       |           | 6.3%        |  |  |
| Total                | 34         | 6         | 32          |  |  |
|                      | 100.0%     | 100.0%    | 100.0%      |  |  |

The above findings (Table 9.5) may contradict findings in Table (9.1), which show that the Arab identity of Egypt was the most frequent main cultural subject. This means that while an Arab identity was the most frequent cultural issue, it was mainly located on the inside pages, not on the front or back pages. But why was national integration as a cultural issue considered by the Egyptian papers as the most prominent? This may be explained by two reasons. Firstly, Egypt as a country, as described by the Financial Times (Financial Times Survey, Wednesday, May 10 2000), has a deep sensitivity to criticism and is allergic to bad news. Egyptian officials usually try to give impression that everything is on the right track. The

Egyptian press, especially which belongs to the government, always tries to justify its approach problems and crises. Regarding the new peace policy with Israel, it seems that the Egyptian papers took the view that the majority of people accepted the peace process. In other words, there was a kind of national consensus about the process among Egyptians. Secondly, the peace process was a sensitive issue itself, particularly after thirty years of conflict with Israel and because the whole country had stood behind the political leadership throughout the conflict, nearly all the people also supported the leadership in the peace process. So, there was a kind of harmonic value among Egyptians toward the new peace policy.

Regarding the location of cultural subjects as subsidiaries, Appendix (F.1) shows that the Pharaonic identity of Egypt as a subsidiary one was the sub-cultural subject that was published most frequently on the front pages. All other sub-cultural subjects followed with nearly the same percentages, except for negative images about Israelis, which were located mainly in the inside pages. For cultural subjects as subsidiary two, national integration was the issue most frequently printed on the front pages, followed by Egypt's Arab identity. What can be noted from the figures in Appendix (F.1) is the location of the Islamic identity of Egypt, which appeared on the inside pages not only as a main cultural issue but also as sub-cultural subject.

For the location of main social subjects, Table (9.6) shows that solving the unemployment problem was the social issue most frequently printed on the front pages. It appeared in more than 32.0% of all social subjects published in the front pages. Housing services and the infrastructure came second with the same 23.5%. On the back pages, infrastructure occupied about two thirds of the space.

These figures may differ from those in Table (9.2), in which housing services appear to be the most frequent social subject. Table (9.6) now shows that more than half of housing services as a social issue was located on the inside pages. However, this issue was still considered to be one of the most important and prominent issues in connection with the peace process as it occupied 23.5% out of all social issues printed on the inside pages. The importance of solving unemployment as a social problem may be understood in terms of the negative outcome of economic liberalization in Egypt in the late seventies. The open door policy shifted economic

orientation in Egypt. Many economic companies and institutions were privatized and the government's grip over these companies began to decrease.

Consequently, many workers lost their jobs and put pressure on the government, particularly after the returning nearly half a million of soldiers from the war. As peace with Israel would lead to increasing investment and to establishment of many new private projects (as explained in chapter seven on the economic dimension of the peace process), people thought it would bring increased job opportunities. It seems that the Egyptian newspapers reflected this and connected the peace process to a solving of the unemployment problem, and on the front pages.

Concerning social issues as subsidiaries, it can be noted from Appendix (F.2) that three social issues were printed in the front pages as subsidiaries. These issues were the country's infrastructure, housing services and health services. Housing services were also the most common social issue printed on the back pages as subsidiary one. For subsidiary two, health services received more than 55.0% of front page coverage devoted to social dimension.

The second category, after location of coverage, is type of coverage. These two categories are used to clarify characteristics of coverage devoted to socio/cultural dimension of the peace process. Kinds of coverage were coded in four categories; one of them represented news stories and the other three represented opinion materials (main editorial, daily column and analytical editorial). These materials are used in the Egyptian newspapers to form and influence public opinion, particularly on a sensitive issue such as the peace process. The following two tables show the kinds of coverage that were devoted to both cultural and social subjects.

Before discussing what kind of coverage was devoted to which cultural subject, it can be noted from Table (9.7) that the main kind of coverage devoted to the cultural dimension of the peace process was opinion material. The three kinds of opinion materials together represented about 78.0% of all coverage devoted to the cultural dimension (57 out of 73). News stories represented only 22.0% (16 out of 73). These figures may indicate the complexity and sensitivity of cultural issues such as identity and image, which require the more experienced journalists to deal with. As a result it seems that, in the main, opinion material journalists analyzed the cultural aspects of the peace process.

Table (9.7) kinds of coverage devoted to cultural subjects

|                                      |               |                   | Kinds        |                      |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|----------------------|
| Culture subjects                     | News<br>story | Main<br>editorial | Daily column | Analytical editorial |
| Arab identity of Egypt               | 3             | 6                 | 8            | 4                    |
|                                      | 18.8%         | 54.5%             | 30.8%        | 20.0%                |
| Pharaonic identity of Egypt          | 1             | 2                 | 6            | 8                    |
|                                      | 6.3%          | 18.2%             | 23.1%        | 40.0%                |
| Islamic identity of Egypt            | 4             |                   | 1            | 1                    |
|                                      | 25.0%         |                   | 3.8%         | 5.0%                 |
| National integration/harmonic values | 5             | 2                 | 6            | 3                    |
|                                      | 31.3%         | 18.2%             | 23.1%        | 15.0%                |
| Negative image about Israelis        | 1             |                   | 5            | 4                    |
|                                      | 6.3%          |                   | 19.2%        | 20.0%                |
| Others                               | 2             | 1                 |              |                      |
|                                      | 12.5%         | 9.1%              |              |                      |
| Total                                | 16            | 11                | 26           | 20                   |
|                                      | 100.0%        | 100.0%            | 100.0%       | 100.0%               |

Table (9.8) kinds of coverage devoted to social subjects

| Social subjects       |               |                   | Kinds        |                      |
|-----------------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|----------------------|
| •                     | News<br>story | Main<br>editorial | Daily column | Analytical editorial |
| Housing services      | 10            | 2                 | 5            | 3                    |
| •                     | 25.6%         | 25.0%             | 29.4%        | 37.5%                |
| Infrastructure        | 11            | 1                 | 4            | 3                    |
|                       | 28.2%         | 12.5%             | 23.5%        | 37.5%                |
| Health services       | 5             | 4                 | 4            | 1                    |
|                       | 12.8%         | 50.0%             | 23.5%        | 12.5%                |
| Solving unemployment  | 12            |                   | 4            |                      |
|                       | 30.8%         |                   | 23.5%        |                      |
| Other social subjects | 1             | 1                 |              | 1                    |
|                       | 2.6%          | 12.5%             |              | 12.5%                |
| Total                 | 39            | 8                 | 17           | 8                    |
|                       | 100.0%        | 100.0%            | 100.0%       | 100.0%               |

To have a closer view of each kind of coverage, Table (9.7) shows that news stories concentrated mainly on two cultural subjects, national integration (31.3%) and the Islamic identity of Egypt (25.0%). The last percentage of the Islamic identity of Egypt, means that the main coverage devoted to this cultural issue was mainly news stories, and not opinion materials that were basically directed at influencing public opinion. Concerning opinion materials, it can be seen that the main editorial which

reflects the view of the newspaper, mainly dealt with Egypt's Arab identity as a main cultural subject. The daily column, which reflects the views of well-known journalists focused basically on three cultural issues with the most frequent issue being Egypt's Arab identity. This appeared in about 31.0%. The other two issues were the Pharaonic identity of Egypt and national integration, which received the same percent of the coverage, 23.1%. Analytical editorials also concentrated on the above three cultural issues but with different priority. The Pharaonic identity of Egypt was the most frequent one, followed by the two other issues the Arab identity and national integration.

It may be concluded from Table (9.7) that while news stories, as a kind of coverage, concentrated on the Islamic identity of Egypt and on national integration, opinion materials (main editorial, daily column and analytical editorial) focused on the Arab and Pharaonic identity of the country. This last finding may be understood in terms of the cultural debate that arose in Egypt's intellectual circles after President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in the late 1970. The Egyptian newspapers, through their daily column and analytical editorial, reflected the debate about the Arab identity of Egypt. This debate intensified after the Arab countries cut their political and economic relations with Egypt as a result of the peace treaty with Israel being signed.

It can be noted also from Table (9.7) that negative images about Israelis as a main cultural issue is dealt with via the daily column and the analytical editorial only. The other two kinds of coverage never or rarely discussed the issue. This can be understood in term of the functions of some kinds of opinion materials in the press. While the main editorial usually gave an indication of government policy towards different issues, the function the daily column and the analytical editorial is to justify various actions or exert what can be described as a catharsis effect<sup>1</sup>. Talking about negative images regarding Israelis, as irresponsibility towards what they signed on,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The notion that aggressive impulses can be drained off by exposure to fantasy aggression has its roots in psychoanalytic and drive theories, which assume that mental as well as physical energies can be released in various ways. This is what is meant by catharsis (Liebert & Sprafkin, 1988, p. 75).

seems to be useful especially during some Israel's actions that threatened the peace process such as Israel's invasion to Lebanon.

As for coverage's devoted to cultural subjects a subsidiaries, Appendix (F.3) shows that there was no significant difference related to main cultural subjects. For subsidiary one, while news stories concentrated on the Pharaonic identity of Egypt, opinion materials focused mainly on national integration or the existence of harmonic values among Egyptians towards the new peace policy. For subsidiary two, it can be noted also that national integration was the most frequent sub-cultural issue in two kinds of coverage: main editorial and the daily column. For news story and analytical editorial, "other cultural subject", such as educational and cultural relations, received the most coverage.

Returning to social issues, Table (9.8) shows the difficulty of distinguishing between the kinds of coverage devoted to each social subject. This difficulty refers to the importance of all social issues under analysis for Egypt during the period of the study. However, some conclusions are possible. Unlike cultural issues, social subjects were mainly dealt with through news stories. While the news story represented about 54.0% (39 out of 72) of all coverage devoted to social issues, opinion materials, in total, represented only 46.0% (33 out of 72). This may be explained by the importance of and urgency for solving the numerous social problems facing Egypt. Consequently, these issues were dealt with directly through news stories.

A closer look at each kind of coverage shows that, for news stories, solving unemployment was the most frequent social subject. It appeared in about 31.0% of all the news stories dealt with cultural issues. Rebuilding the national infrastructure came second position with 28.2% followed by housing services (25.6%). If all opinion materials were taken altogether, it is apparent that housing services were the most frequent social issue. It appeared in more than 30.0% of all opinion materials devoted to social matters. Health services came second position with 27.0% followed by infrastructure with 24.0%.

Concerning social issues as subsidiaries, Appendix (F.4) shows that while news stories concentrated mainly on infrastructure and health services as subsidiaries one and two, opinion materials focused on housing services. The above figures indicate

the importance of social issues for all kinds of coverage, with some differences, that dealt with the social aspects of the peace process.

## 9.4- National Actors Involved in the Socio/Cultural Dimension

As explained in the last chapters, knowing who the actors are in the news stories is important for understanding the power relationships in a society. In Egypt, the very involvement of the president or of the prime minister in an issue gives it a prominent priority in the mass media. This may explain partly the invariable appearance of the president/prime minister and ministers on almost all occasion related to the peace process. The following two tables summarize the most important national actors who involved in both cultural and social matters.

Table (9.9) shows that the 'president', 'ministers' and 'Egyptians' were the most frequent national actors involved in main cultural issues. The president alone appeared in more than half of all cultural subjects, about 53.0% (39 out of 73). This gives an indication of the importance of the cultural aspects of the peace process. The Minister as a national actor came second with 16.0% followed by 'Egyptians' with only 8.0%. Other national actors involved in the cultural dimension were rare.

A closer view of the involvement of each national actor in every main cultural issue in table (9.9) show that the president was mainly involved in two cultural issues: Egypt's Pharaonic identity (33.3%) and its Arab identity (28.2%). This systematic involvement of the president in these two may be understood in terms of the developments of the peace process and its outcomes on relations between Egypt and the other Arab countries.

When the Arab countries cut their political and economic links with Egypt as a result of the peace process, the issue of Egypt's identity captured the attention of many intellectual and political actors on a variety of different levels. President Sadat frequently proclaimed that Egypt had had more than five thousand years of civilization, which had long pre-dated its Arab associations. He meant its Pharaonic identity. This situation differed after President Mubarak came to the office and particularly when Israel invaded Lebanon. Mubarak usually asserted Egypt's Arab identity. More will follow latter in this chapter on the fluctuating nature over time of Egypt's identity.

Table (9.9) main national actors involved in cultural subjects

| Culture subject                      | Natio     | nal actors l | N=57*     |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|
|                                      | President | Ministers    | Egyptians |
| Arab identity of Egypt               | 11        | 2            | 1         |
|                                      | 28.2%     | 16.7%        | 16.7%     |
| Pharaonic identity of Egypt          | 13        | 2            |           |
|                                      | 33.3%     | 16.7%        |           |
| Islamic identity of Egypt            | 3         | 2            |           |
|                                      | 7.7%      | 16.7%        |           |
| National integration/harmonic values | 5         | 4            | 3         |
|                                      | 12.8%     | 33.3%        | 50.0%     |
| Negative image about Jews            | 5         | 1            | 2         |
|                                      | 12.8%     | 8.3%         | 33.3%     |
| Other                                | 2         | 1            |           |
|                                      | 5.1%      | 8.3%         |           |
| Total                                | 39        | 12           | 6         |
|                                      | 100.0%    | 100.0%       | 100.0%    |

<sup>\*</sup> The other main national actors are: no human actor [7], local governor [2], political opposition [4], parliament [1], social organization [1] and military officer [1]. The total number is 73.

Table (9.10) main national actors involved in social subjects

| Social subject   |           | Nation    | al actor N=60*  |           |
|------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------------|-----------|
|                  | President | Ministers | Local governors | Egyptians |
| Housing services | 10        | 2         | 2               | 2         |
|                  | 27.0%     | 25.0%     | 18.2%           | 50.0%     |
| infrastructure   | 14        | 1         | 1               | 2         |
|                  | 37.8%     | 12.5%     | 9.1%            | 50.0%     |
| Health services  | 5         | 1         | 5               |           |
|                  | 13.5%     | 12.5%     | 45.5%           |           |
| Unemployment     | 6         | 3         | 3               |           |
|                  | 16.2%     | 37.5%     | 27.3%           |           |
| Other            | 2         | 1         |                 |           |
|                  | 5.4%      | 12.5%     |                 |           |
| Total            | 37        | 8         | 11              | 4         |
|                  | 100.0%    | 100.0%    | 100.0%          | 100.0%    |

<sup>\*</sup> The other main national actors are: no human actor [3], political opposition [3], parliament [3], and military officer [3]. The total number is 72.

Table (9.9) also shows that ministers and Egyptians as national actors were mainly involved in national integration. It seems that ministers confirmed the harmonic values among Egyptians regarding the peace policy with Israel so Egyptian mainly involved in that issue. Egyptians were basically involved on two issues: national integration and negative image about Israelis. During negotiations and as a result of

Israel's actions towards other Arab countries, it is clear that the Egyptian papers reflected a negative image of these actions among their readers.

Concerning national actors involved in cultural subjects as subsidiaries, Appendix (F.5) shows yet again that the president was the most frequent actor. He appeared in about 51.0% of all cultural subjects as a subsidiary one and in nearly 47.0% as subsidiary two. Among the most frequent other national actors were ministers and local governors. The president and local governor were mainly involved in three cultural issues in both subsidiaries: Pharaonic and Arab identity of Egypt and national integration. Political opposition came third as a national actor in subsidiary one. It mainly appeared in one cultural issue: Egypt's Arab identity. This may be understood when account is taken of the pro-Arab's stand of the political opposition. It strongly denied any Pharaonic identity for Egypt.

For main national actors involved in social issues, Table (9.10) shows that the president was one more the most frequent actor. He was the actor in more than 50.0% of all social subjects (37 out of 72). This figure indicates the central location of the president in all social issues connected with the peace process and also the importance of peace for solving critical social problems. After the president, came local governor with only 15.0%, followed by minister with 11.0%. Egyptians represented only about 6.0%. It can be noted that, unlike cultural issues, local governor appeared in a significant number of social subjects. This may be understood when account is taken of the nature of social issues and problems, which ere crucial to the regions of Egypt, in which the local governor is an important figure.

The president, as a national actor, was mainly involved in the two social issues of infrastructure (37.8%) and housing services (27.0%). President Mubarak frequently confirmed that rebuilding the nation's infrastructure would be a pre-requirement of any kind of economic or social development. A better infrastructure would encourage domestic economic participation, attract foreign investment and enable the development of an improved export and import system.

Securing houses and accommodation for Egyptians were also most important issues. So these matters captured the attention of the president in connection with the positive outcomes of peace. Apart from the president, ministers mainly appeared in

another social issue; unemployment. Local governors concentrated on health services (45.5%) as a social problem. It seems that all the executive authorities addressed the main and critical social issues in Egypt. The high level of involvement of these authorities in the above issues indicated the importance given to peace for solving the urgent social problems which faced Egypt during the seventies and the eighties.

For national actors involved in social subjects as subsidiaries, Appendix (F.6) shows that executive authorities (president and ministers) were the most frequent actors. They were mainly involved in major social problems that faced Egypt. These issues were housing services and infrastructure as subsidiary one, and unemployment as subsidiary two. The above findings indicate to the degree of executive power concentrated in the hands of the executive authority in Egypt. Actors such as parliament, the political opposition or any social organization rarely appeared in the Egyptian newspapers' coverage of the social dimension of the peace process. The rare appearance of parliament in cultural dimension of the peace process can be understood in terms of the superiority of executive authority over parliamentary authority. While the Egyptian constitution confirms three separate authorities (executive authority, parliamentary authority and judicial authority) in Egypt (Yassin, 1988), the executive authority was and still is the most prominent. Figures from the above two tables show how little attention the press gave to parliament, the first authority according to the constitution, in its coverage of the cultural dimension of the peace process. For more details about the political situation in Egypt, see chapter three.

# 9.5- Sources of Coverage Devoted to the Socio/Cultural dimension

The following two tables (9.11 & 9.12) summarize the most frequent sources of the socio/cultural dimension of the peace process.

From Table (9.11), it is clear that own writer was the most frequent source of cultural issues. It represented about 48.0% (35 out of 73). Specialists came second with 27.0%. The sources of opinion materials, own writer and specialist combined, represented about 75.0% of all cultural subjects' sources (55 out of 73). Given the importance of opinion material sources in forming public opinion in Egypt, as explained in chapter five, cultural issues were clearly sensitive and controversial

subjects. After the beginning of the peace process and the isolation of Egypt from the Arab League, Egyptians were subjected to an intensive 'propaganda' campaign which doubts on their Arab roots and emphasized their Pharaonic identity. Two of the most famous writers in Al-Ahram, Tawfiq Al-Hakim and Aniss Mansour, led that campaign. Egyptian public opinion was influenced to the extent that, for the first time, there was a demonstration against the Palestinian Liberalization Organization in Cairo in 1978.

Table (9.11) shows that the Egyptian newspapers' coverage of the cultural dimension of the peace process reflected the above campaign. 'Own writer' was mainly the source on the two cultural issues of Egypt's Arab and Pharaonic identities. The first issue represented more than 37.0% and the second received 23.0% of own writer attention. These two cultural subjects were also the main issues for specialists, but with a different priority. The Pharaonic identity was the most frequent issue with coverage of 40.0% followed by 25.0% for Arab identity. Table (9.11) also shows that the sources of news stories concentrated basically on national integration or the harmonic values among Egyptians regarding the peace policy with Israel. National integration as a cultural issue represented 50.0% for own correspondent and about 43.0% for combination of two sources as sources of news stories.

For cultural subjects as subsidiaries, Appendix (F.7) confirms the findings of the main cultural subjects' sources that were explored above. Sources of opinion materials (own writer and specialist) were the most frequent sources in both subsidiary one and two. In subsidiary one they represented nearly three quarters of all sources (73.0%) and in subsidiary two their percentage reached 65.0%. These findings indicate the overwhelming preponderance of opinion materials as sources for cultural issues.

Concerning sources of social issues, Table (9.12) shows that, unlike cultural issues, both sources of opinion materials and sources of news stories represented nearly the same coverage with about 45.0% each. It is obvious that the Egyptian newspapers, in dealing with the social dimensions, relied on both kinds of sources. Own writers and specialists connected the peace with solving the critical social problems that faced Egypt and tried to convince the people of the positive outcomes of peace.

News stories, through correspondents and news agencies, were used to disseminate information about new services, jobs and the infrastructure.

Table (9.11) sources of coverage devoted to cultural subjects

| Culture subject                       |               | Sources N  | =68*       |           |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|------------|------------|-----------|
|                                       | Correspondent | Own writer | Specialist | 2 sources |
| Arab identity of Egypt                | 2             | 13         | 5          | 1         |
|                                       | 33.3%         | 37.1%      | 25.0%      | 14.3%     |
| Pharaonic identity of Egypt           |               | 8          | 8          | 1         |
|                                       |               | 22.9%      | 40.0%      | 14.3%     |
| Islamic identity of Egypt             | 1             | 1          | 1          | 2         |
|                                       | 16.7%         | 2.9%       | 5.0%_      | 28.6%     |
| National integration/ harmonic values | 2             | 7          | 3          | 2         |
|                                       | 33.3%         | 20.0%      | 15.0%      | 28.6%     |
| Negative image about Israelis         |               | 5          | 3          |           |
|                                       |               | 14.3%      | 15.0%      |           |
| Others                                | 1             | 1          |            | 1         |
|                                       | 16.7%         | 2.9%       |            | 14.3%     |
| Total                                 | 6             | 35         | 20         | 7         |
|                                       | 100.0%        | 100.0%     | 100.0%     | 100.0%    |

<sup>\*</sup> The other sources are: MENA [2], four big [1] and other [2]. The total number is 73

Table (9.12) sources of coverage devoted to social subjects

| Social subject   |          | So            | urces N=63* |            |           |
|------------------|----------|---------------|-------------|------------|-----------|
|                  | Four big | Correspondent | Own writer  | Specialist | 2 sources |
| Housing services | 1        | 6             | 7           | 3          | 2         |
|                  | 16.7%    | 46.2%         | 28.0%       | 37.5%      | 18.2%     |
| Infrastructure   | 1        | 2             | 5           | 3          | 4         |
|                  | 16.7%    | 15.4%         | 20.0%       | 37.5%      | 36.4%     |
| Health services  | 1        | 2             | 8           | 1          | 1         |
|                  | 16.7%    | 15.4%         | 32.0%       | 12.5%      | 9.1%      |
| Unemployment     | 3        | 2             | 4           | }          | 4         |
|                  | 50.0%    | 15.4%         | 16.0%       |            | 36.4%     |
| Others           |          | 1             | 1           | 1          |           |
|                  |          | 7.7%          | 4.0%        | 12.5%      |           |
| Total            | 6        | 13            | 25          | 8          | 11        |
|                  | 100.0%   | 100.0%        | 100.0%      | 100.0%     | 100.0%    |

<sup>\*</sup> The other sources are: MENA [3], unidentified [5] and other [1]. The total number is 72.

As almost all social issues under analysis were crucial for Egypt during the time of the peace process, it is difficult to distinguish the most frequent sources of each social subject. However, from Table (9.12) some conclusions can be drawn. Own writer was the most frequent source for the two social issues of the health services and housing services. The specialist was mainly the source of the coverage on the infrastructure and housing services. Own correspondent was basically the source of housing services matters. International news agencies (the four big) concentrated on solution for the problem of unemployment that would as a result of the peace process.

Concerning sources of social issues as subsidiaries, Appendix (F.8) shows that, in total, sources of news stories achieved more coverage than sources of opinion materials. For social subjects as subsidiaries one, while own writer appeared in about 29.0%, sources of news stories (MENA & two sources) represented 32.0%. Other sources were rare. For subsidiaries two, sources of news stories also were the most frequent in comparison with sources of opinion materials. Sources of news stories, altogether, appeared in more than 75.0% (16 out of 21) of all subsidiaries two sources. It can be noted also from Appendix (F.8) that while sources of news stories appeared mainly in health services as a sub-social subject, housing services relied basically on opinion materials sources.

It may be concluded that while the Egyptian newspapers depended significantly on opinion material's sources to deal with the cultural dimension of the peace process, sources of news stories were the main sources of the social dimension. This needs to be understood in terms of the nature of the cultural ad social aspects. Social aspects were naturally important to every single person all over Egypt. Solving the critical social problems was considered to be a direct and positive outcome of the new peace policy. Consequently, in order to reach every person, these aspects were dealt with as news stories more than as opinion materials. On the other hand, cultural issues were mainly related to Egypt's identity and national integration among Egyptians in general. Such issues usually attracted the more educated people and were largely connected with political relations with the other Arab countries. To this end, well-known journalists and specialists engaged themselves presenting and analyzing the various cultural aspects of the peace process.

### 9.6- Coverage of Socio-Cultural Dimension Over Time

The study is carried out over a long period, thirteen years. This period in the Egypt's history witnessed significant political, economic and cultural/social changes and witnessed two presidencies. The most important changes in this period were economic liberalization, a reorientation in foreign policy towards Israel and the West, and re-identification regarding cultural heritage. The peace process was the central issue in the above changes. In this regard, the following section discusses how the Egyptian newspapers connected the peace process to the socio/cultural issues over time under both President Sadat and Mubarak. The following two tables show coverage of the cultural and social subjects in the two Presidencies.

Concerning coverage of cultural issues, Table (9.13) shows that despite the period of analysis under President Sadat lasting only five years (ten weeks out of 21 weeks), the coverage of cultural issues was slightly higher in his presidency, 25.0% (38 out of 73). This may be explained by the fact that the most important peace events took place under Sadat such as the Camp David Accords, the Peace Treaty and the subsequent deterioration in Egypt's political relations with the other Arab countries.

Table (9.13) shows that under President Sadat, the main and most frequent cultural issue was Egypt's Pharaonic identity. This issue alone appeared in more than 42.0% of all cultural subjects. In second position came two cultural issues with the same percent, national integration and Egypt's Arab identity (each represented 21.1%). The prevalence of the Pharaonic identity of Egypt over other cultural issues under Sadat may be understood in term of the direct outcomes of the new peace policy and in particular its effect on the relations between Egypt and the other Arab countries. The other countries anticipated with some anxiety an imbalance of power in the Middle East as a result of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Such a treaty would prevent Egypt from intervening in any military conflict between Israel and any other Arab country. Consequently, Arab leaders and media considered that Egypt had abandoned the Arab cause. They described Egypt's leaders as traitors. On the other hand, the political leaders in Egypt were angry about these accusations and replied that Egypt had paid a heavy price, more than a hundred thousand martyrs, for Arab cause. From that time on a great debate arose in the Egyptian newspapers

about Egypt's identity. In other words, the press argued Egypt's identity should be Pharaonic not Arab nor even Islamic.

Table (9.13) coverage of cultural subjects in two main periods

| Culture subject                      | Main        | two period    |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|
|                                      | Under Sadat | Under Mubarak |
| Arab identity of Egypt               | 8           | 13            |
|                                      | 21.1%       | 37.1%         |
| Pharaonic identity of Egypt          | 16          | 1             |
|                                      | 42.1%       | 2.9%          |
| Islamic identity of Egypt            | 1           | 5             |
|                                      | 2.6%        | 14.3%         |
| National integration/harmonic values | 8           | 8             |
|                                      | 21.1%       | 22.9%         |
| Negative image about Israelis        | 4           | 6             |
|                                      | 10.5%       | 17.1%         |
| Others                               | 1           | 2             |
|                                      | 2.6%        | 5.7%          |
| Total                                | 38          | 35            |
|                                      | 100.0%      | 100.0%        |

Table (9.14) coverage of social subjects in two main periods

|                  | Main        | two period    |
|------------------|-------------|---------------|
| Social subject   | Under Sadat | Under Mubarak |
| Housing services | 14          | 6             |
| _                | 32.6%       | 20.7%         |
| Infrastructure   | 12          | 7             |
|                  | 27.9%       | 24.1%         |
| Health services  | 9           | 5             |
|                  | 20.9%       | 17.2%         |
| Unemployment     | 5           | 11            |
|                  | 11.6%       | 37.9%         |
| Others           | 3           |               |
|                  | 7.0%        |               |
| Total            | 43          | 29            |
|                  | 100.0%      | 100.0%        |

Under President Mubarak, the political situation changed and consequently, media coverage of the cultural dimension followed suite. Table (9.13) shows that Egypt's Arab was the most frequent cultural subject under President Mubarak. It appeared in about 37.0%. National integration came second with 22.9%. It can be noted also that the Pharaonic identity of Egypt appeared in less than 3.0%. This finding is

interesting because the Pharaonic identity was the most frequent issue under Sadat. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, Mubarak's foreign policy was different from his predecessors. When Mubarak came to the office, he frequently repeated that the peace process and relations with Israel should not influence political and cultural ties with other Arab countries. He suspended all media campaigns against other Arab nations. Secondly, the closer ties between the political institutions and the Egyptian newspapers geared coverage towards the peace process and its dimensions. This is because the newspapers mainly reflected views of the government. Table (9.13) also shows that responses to such an issue as negative images of Israelis captured different percentages under the two presidencies. While this issue appeared in about 10.5% under Sadat, it reached 17.1% under Mubarak. The increase may be explained by the critical events that took place under Mubark (Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the bombardment of the PLO Headquarter in Tunisia in 1985 and the refusal to give back Taba until 1989. These issues were undoubted by relations between Egypt and Israel. It can be argued that Israel's actions against Arab countries, during Mubarak presidency, affected Egyptian newspaper coverage towards the peace process. This was not the case under Sadat.

Coverage of cultural issues as subsidiaries over time is nearly similar to that discussed above. Appendix (F.9) shows that the two main sub-cultural issues of the Egyptian papers' coverage under Sadat were the Pharaonic identity of Egypt and national integration. Pharaonic identity was the most frequent cultural issue as subsidiary one (35.0%) and subsidiary two (24.3%). Under Mubarak, Arab identity was the most frequent issue as subsidiary one (21.7%) and the second most frequent issue, after national integration, as subsidiary two. The Pharaonic identity of Egypt did not appear at all under Mubarak.

Next to be considered is the coverage of the social issues that came to the fore during the two presidencies. As table (9.14) indicates, it reached 60.0% under President Sadat (43 out of 72). This high percentage may have two explanations. Firstly, under Sadat, after the negative response to the open door economic policy, Egypt faced serious social problems. Peace was seen as the key solution to these problems. Secondly, the Sadat period witnessed a strong campaign to convince the people of pursuing the new peace policy after more than three decades of conflict

with Israel. It can be argued that connecting the peace process to a solution of the nation's social problems was a part of a campaign waged through the press.

Table (9.14) shows that the prioritization of social issues differed under the two presidencies. Under Sadat, housing services was the most frequent social issue (32.6%). Infrastructure came second (27.9%) followed by health services with 20.9%. Housing services was, and still is, one of the most important social problems facing Egypt. the high percentage achieved by this issue under Sadat may reflect the presidnet's objectives formulated at the beginning of the peace process. He began to establish many new cities around Cairo to absorb the increasing population and to decrease the pressure on the capital. Two of these cities, as a symbolic indication, have taken their names from the date of the last war with Israel: 6<sup>th</sup> October City (west of Cairo) and 10<sup>th</sup> Ramadan City (north east of Cairo). Under Mubarak, the most frequent social issue was unemployment. This issue represented about 40.0% out of all social subjects under Mubarak. When he came to the office, unemployment was a serious issue because of the heritage of the deteriorated economic and political relations with the Arab countries in the late seventies. After signing the peace treaty with Israel, almost all Arab countries cut their relations with Egypt. Many Egyptian workers in the Gulf and North African countries lost their jobs and were replaced by Far East workers. This immediately increased the level of unemployment. It can be argued that peace was seen as an indirect solution for this problem. It would lead to more foreign investment help to establish new projects, and consequently secure enough new jobs. It is evident that the Egyptian newspapers reflected on this line of thinking in their coverage of the social aspects of the peace process.

As for social issues as subsidiaries, Appendix (F.10) shows that there is a similarity in coverage of these issues under both presidencies. For social subjects as subsidiary one, the most frequent issues under both Sadat and Mubarak were housing services and infrastructure respectively. For subsidiary two, the health service was the most frequent issue. It appears in about 35.5% under Sadat and 62.5% under Mubarak. Though the order of priority might differ, it seems that all social issues under analysis were connected positively to the peace process for it was generally seen as the key solution for them.

To have clearer indication of how coverage of the socio/cultural dimension changed over time, coverage was divided into four periods. The following two tables (9.15 & 9.16) show how the Egyptian newspapers dealt with the socio/cultural issues during these four periods.

Table (9.15) coverage of cultural issue in four periods\*

| Culture subject                      | Period 1 | Period 2 | Period 3 | Period 4 |
|--------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Arab identity of Egypt               | 5        | 7        | 5        | 4        |
|                                      | 20.0%    | 36.8%    | 29.4%    | 33.3%    |
| Pharaonic identity of Egypt          | 11       | 5        |          | 1        |
|                                      | 44.0%    | 26.3%    |          | 8.3%     |
| Islamic identity of Egypt            | 1        |          | 4        | 1        |
|                                      | 4.0%     |          | 23.5%    | 8.3%     |
| National integration/harmonic values | 5        | 4        | 3        | 4        |
|                                      | 20.0%    | 21.1%    | 17.6%    | 33.3%    |
| Negative image about Israelis        | 2        | 3        | 3        | 2        |
|                                      | 8.0%     | 15.8%    | 17.6%    | 16.7%    |
| Others                               | 1        |          | 2        |          |
|                                      | 4.0%     |          | 11.8%    |          |
| Total                                | 25       | 19       | 17       | 12       |
|                                      | 100.0%   | 100.0%   | 100.0%   | 100.0%   |

Table (9.16) coverage of social issue in four periods\*

| Social subject   | Period 1 | Period 2 | Period 3 | Period 4 |
|------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Housing services | 7        | 8        | 3        | 2        |
|                  | 25.9%    | 42.1%    | 17.6%    | 22.2%    |
| Infrastructure   | 7        | 6        | 5        | 1        |
|                  | 25.9%    | 31.6%    | 29.4%    | 11.1%    |
| Health services  | 6        | 3        | 3        | 2        |
|                  | 22.2%    | 15.8%    | 17.6%    | 22.2%    |
| Unemployment     | 4        | 2        | 6        | 4        |
|                  | 14.8%    | 10.5%    | 35.3%    | 44.4%    |
| Others           | 3        |          |          |          |
|                  | 11.1%    |          |          |          |
| Total            | 27       | 19       | 17       | 9        |
|                  | 100.0%   | 100.0%   | 100.0%   | 100.0%   |

<sup>\*</sup> Definitions of these periods are in under table (7.9) in chapter 7.

From table (9.15), it can be noted that about 34.0% of the coverage devoted to cultural issue took place in the first period. This percentage decreased regularly over the following three periods. It was 26.0% in period two, decreased to 23.0% in period three and sank to 16.0% in the last. This may be explained by the importance of events related to the peace process that occurred in each period. The first period witnessed the most important developments of the peace process such as Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the signing of the Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty with Israel. In the following three periods, what happened was as a consequence of these main events.

During the first period, coverage was concentrated on three cultural issues with the Pharaonic identity of Egypt the most frequent subject. It appeared in 44.0% of all cultural issues in this period. National integration an Arab identity came second with 20.0%. The importance of a Pharaonic identity in the first period may stem from the deteriorated political relationship with the Arab countries as explained above. In the second period, an Arab identity of Egypt became the most frequent cultural issue. It represented nearly 37.0% of all cultural issues. This finding is quite interesting. This period included only two weeks of analysis after the assassination of Sadat (weeks 10 & 11). However, there was a turning point regarding the national identity. It seems that the Egyptian press changed its views towards a Pharaonic identity of Egypt immediately after the assassination of President Sadat in October 1981. In period three, an Arab identity was the first frequent issue (29.4%) followed by an Islamic one (23.5%). The later far more frequent appearance of a Pharaonic identity can be understood by what has been mentioned above when Mubarak came to the power. The appearance of an Islamic identity with this percentage in the third period is also interesting. Islamic identity as a cultural issue represented only 8.2% of all cultural issue in all periods (only 6 out of 73). Four of these six cases appeared in the third period and represented 66.7% of all coverage devoted to the Islamic issue. This may have two explanations: firstly, when Mubarak came to the office, he declared a new era of dialogue with all political orientations, which included the Islamic one. Secondly, a radical Islamic group was accused of having committed the assassination of Sadat. This opened a new dialogue about Egypt's Islamic identity one which had originated fourteen hundred years earlier, well before the existence of any of these groups (see chapter three for more about cultural situation in Egypt during the study's period).

For coverage of social issues over the four periods, it can be noted from Table (9.16) that there was no significant differences in coverage over the two main periods. In the first two, the most frequent social issues were housing services and infrastructure, but with different percentages. For example, while the percentage of housing services in the first period was 26.0%, it increased in the second period to 42.1%. This indicates the more critical situation of housing services in the last two years of Sadat's era and also the high expectations of what peace might lead to regarding this social problem. In the third period, the coverage concentrated on two social issues of unemployment and infrastructure. These were the most crucial problems which faced Mubarak in his first term. In the last period, unemployment was the most frequent social issue of discussion. It seems that freezing of relations with the Arab world, particularly with the Gulf countries, increased the burden of unemployment. Connecting this issue to the peace process in the last two periods confirms the anticipated positive outcomes of peace.

#### 7.7- Coverage's Orientation Towards the Socio/Cultural Dimension

As explained in chapter seven, orientation of the coverage was coded in three categories: positive, neutral and negative. The following two tables summarize orientation of the coverage towards the different cultural and social issues. In these tables the analysis deals with the percentages within each political subject, not within each orientation. The reason for this is to examine the orientation of the coverage (positive, negative and neutral) toward the political dimension as a whole and each political subject.

For cultural issues, Table (9.17) shows that the whole stance of the coverage was positive. According to Table (9.17), 43.8% of the coverage devoted to cultural issues was positive. Negative orientation represented 37.0% and the rest was neutral (19.2%). Consequently, it can be argued that the cultural dimension was connected positively, in the eyes the Egyptian press, to the peace process. In order to define the orientation of the coverage towards each issue, the figures of the last two tables show percentages within each cultural or social issue. On each culture issue, it can be noted that orientation of the coverage was positive towards three issues: Pharaonic identity, national integration and Islamic identity, but with different

percentages. It was neutral towards an Arab identity and negative in its views about Israelis.

Table (9.17) orientation of the coverage devoted to cultural subjects.

| Culture subject                      | Orient   |         |          |        |
|--------------------------------------|----------|---------|----------|--------|
|                                      | Positive | Neutral | Negative | Total  |
| Arab identity of Egypt               | 10       | 1       | 10       | 21     |
|                                      | 47.6%    | 4.8%    | 47.6%    | 100.0% |
| Pharaonic identity of Egypt          | 10       | 2       | 5        | 17     |
|                                      | 58.8%    | 11.8%   | 29.4%    | 100.0% |
| Islamic identity of Egypt            | 2        | 3       | 1        | 6      |
|                                      | 33.3%    | 50.0%   | 16.7%    | 100.0% |
| National integration/harmonic values | 7        | 5       | 4        | 16     |
|                                      | 43.8%    | 31.3%   | 25.0%    | 100.0% |
| Image about Israelis                 | 2        | 1       | 7        | 10     |
|                                      | 20.0%    | 10.0%   | 70.0%    | 100.0% |
| Others                               | 1        | 2       |          | 3      |
|                                      | 33.3%    | 66.7%   |          | 100.0% |
| Total                                | 32       | 14      | 27       | 73     |
|                                      | 43.8%    | 19.2%   | 37.0%    | 100.0% |

Table (9.18) orientation of the coverage devoted to social subjects

|  | Orient   | Orientation of the item |          |        |  |
|--|----------|-------------------------|----------|--------|--|
| Social subject                           | Positive | Neutral                 | Negative | Total  |  |
| Housing services                         | 10       | 8                       | 2        | 20     |  |
|  | 50.0%_   | 40.0%                   | 10.0%    | 100.0% |  |
| Infrastructure                           | 9        | 9                       | 1        | 19     |  |
|  | 47.4%    | 47.4%                   | 5.3%     | 100.0% |  |
| Health services                          | 8        | 4                       | 2        | 14     |  |
|  | 57.1%    | 28.6%                   | 14.3%    | 100.0% |  |
| Unemployment                             | 3        | 10                      | 3        | 16     |  |
| C. C | 18.8%    | 62.5%                   | 18.8%    | 100.0% |  |
| Others                                   | 2        | 1                       |          | 3      |  |
|  | 66.7%    | 33.3%                   |          | 100.0% |  |
| Total                                    | 32       | 32                      | 8        | 72     |  |
| 10441                                    | 44.4%    | 44.4%                   | 11.1%    | 100.0% |  |

To discuss each issue of the cultural aspects, it is clear from the above table that nearly 59.0% of the coverage devoted to a Pharaonic identity was positive. It can be argued that this positive concentration on a Pharaonic identity was to prepare and convince Egyptians of the value of reconciliation with Israel despite any anticipated response by the other Arab countries. The orientation was also positive towards

national integration, where 43.8% of the coverage positive and only 25.0% was negative. It seems that the Egyptian newspapers deemed that there were harmonic values and a common desire among Egyptians for peace. While the main orientation towards an Islamic identity for Egypt was neutral, it was considered positive since 33.3% of the coverage was positive and only 16.7% was negative. This may be understood in terms of a positive opinion towards the peace efforts with Israel, which had been expressed by some official Islamic institutions and Islamic figures in Egypt.

According to Yassin (1988), it is important to differentiate between official and unofficial Islamic institutions and organizations in Egypt. Official institutions such as Al-Azhar may be accepted by the political regime as legitimate institutions. Since Shaikh Al-Azhar (the highest official Islamic figure in Egypt) is appointed by the President, Al-Azhar usually agrees with and accepts the different orientation of the political institutions. Unofficial Islamic organizations and radical groups are not allowed to participate in any political affaires. Indeed there is a consensus among these groups that the political regime is illegitimate and they work to change it, but disagree on the means by which this may be achieved (for more details about these groups, see chapter three). The Egyptian press always reflects the views of the official Islamic institution (Al-Azhar) regarding different issues.

Positive and negative orientation toward Egypt's Arab identity received the same percentage of the coverage; 47.6%. This may be understood by the fluctuating orientation of Egyptian political leaders towards the Arab cause and Arab countries in connection with the peace process. This orientation was negative under President Sadat in the late seventies and the beginning of the eighties. It changed to positive under Mubarak, particularly after the mid-eighties. If Egypt's Arab identity is selected as a case, the following table (9.19) shows the orientation of the coverage towards this issue under the two presidencies. The figures of the table reflected the above conclusion. It can be noted that, under President Sadat, 87.5% of the coverage devoted to Arab identity of Egypt was negative (7 out of 8). Under Mubarak, the orientation towards this issue was quite different. While nearly 70.0% of the coverage towards Arab identity of Egypt was positive, the percentage of negative orientation was only 23.1%. This finding indicates clearly the close relationship

between newspapers and political institutions in Egypt and how this coverage of an issue usually reflected the orientation of the political leadership towards that issue.

| Orientation towards Arab identity of Egypt | Under<br>Sadat | Under<br>Mubarak | Total       |
|--|----------------|------------------|-------------|
| Positive orientation                       | 1              | 9                | 10          |
|  | 12.5%          | 69.2%            | 47.6%       |
| Neutral orientation                        | <u> </u>       | 1                | 1           |
|  |                | 7.7%             | 4.8%        |
| Negative orientation                       | 7              | 3                | 10          |
|  | 87.5%          | 23.1%            | 47.6%       |
| Total                                      | 8<br>100.0%    | 13<br>100.0%     | 21<br>100.0 |

The only negative orientation reflected the opinion Egyptian in general had, from the press point of view, about Israelis. From Table (9.17), it can be noted that 70.0% of orientation on this issue was negative. This undoubtedly stems from Israel's actions against the Arab countries such as the invasion of Lebanon, the bombardment of the PLO headquarter in Tunisia and the extensive use of power against the Palestinian Uprising from late 1987. Since all these actions took place under President Mubarak, it seems that most of this negative oriented coverage occurred in his presidency. Of the 70.0% of negative orientation appearing in table (9.17), 71.0% came in Mubarak's presidency (5 out of 7).

For cultural subjects as subsidiaries, there is no significant difference concerning the main cultural issues. Appendix (F.11) shows that orientation was, as a whole, positive towards both subsidiary one and two. For subsidiary one, the stance was positive in all cultural issues except two, an Islamic identity and images of Israelis which were neutral. For subsidiary two, coverage was also positive except for the images of Israelis. This was negative since the negative orientation represented 60.0%.

Concerning orientation of the coverage towards social issues, Table (9.18) shows that the whole stance of the coverage was positive, since the percentage of positive orientation was 44.4% and the negative only 11.1%. Almost all social issues received positive oriented coverage in connection with the peace process, where peace was seen as a dramatic solution for all these problems. The only issue that received neutral coverage was unemployment. This may be explained by the

controversial debate about the effects peace might have on issue. Some journalists made positive connection between peace and unemployment. From their point of view, peace would increase foreign investment and consequently promote employment. On the other hand, other journalists argued that the peace process would lead to the suspension of political and economic relations between Egypt and the other Arab countries with the consequent that many jobs would be terminated and opportunities for others decreased.

It can be seen that there was a clearly positive orientation towards health services with a notable percentage of 57.1%. Housing services received the secondly most positively oriented coverage (50.0%) followed by infrastructure (47.4%). Negative orientation towards the three above issues was 14.3%, 10.0% and 5.3% respectively. These figures indicate the high positive expectations of a successful outcome of the peace process of the social problems that faced Egypt. This finding shows that the Egyptian newspapers regarded peace as the key solution for the crucial social problems facing Egypt in the seventies and the eighties.

Concerning social issues as subsidiaries, coverage was mainly positive (Appendix F.12). In a similar manner to the way they had approached the main social issues, the Egyptian newspapers connected sub-social subjects positively to the peace process. It can be noted that while coverage's orientation towards unemployment, as main social issue, was neutral (Table (9.18), it was completely positive for this issue as subsidiaries one and two. This means that when this issue was dealt with as supplementary, it was connected positively to the peace. In other words, the peace would solve this social problem as well.

### 9.8-Conclusion

### 9.8.1- Conclusions in terms of objectives of the study

The main objective of the study in this chapter, as stated in chapter five, is to analyze how the Egyptian press covered and dealt with the socio/cultural dimension of the peace process. In this respect, the main conclusions are:

 The most frequent cultural issues were Egypt's Arab identity, Pharaonic identity and national integration. Focus on the Pharaonic identity of Egypt that followed the signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel reflected the main political tone in Egypt and the deteriorated political relationship with the Arab countries. As a Pharaonic identity denies an Arab one, concentration on one of these identities usually reflected the prevalent political orientation. The Egyptian newspapers also concentrated on national integration, which means that there was a feeling of contentment and satisfaction among Egyptians towards the new peace policy. For social issues, the coverage focused on three subjects: housing, infrastructure and unemployment. These three issues were, and to some extent still are, the main social problems facing Egypt. Connecting these issues to the peace process reflected an anticipating of the positive outcomes of peace. It would end the war status and increase stability in the region. Defense expenditure would decrease and foreign investment Consequently, enough funds could be secured to solve such social problems.

- As for location and types of coverage, three cultural issues received the most amount of coverage respectively: Arab identity, Pharaonic identity and national integration. However national integration was the most frequent cultural issue located on both front and back pages. In dealing with cultural issues, the coverage used mainly opinion materials such as daily column and analytical editorial. For social subjects, housing services and infrastructure received the most coverage. Health services and unemployment also received a significant, and nearly the same, amount of coverage. Unemployment was covered more frequently on the front pages. Unlike cultural issues, social subjects were mainly presented through news stories. It seems that the Egyptian press regarded the peace as the key solution of the crucial social problems that faced Egypt.
- The most frequent national actors involved in both cultural and social issues were the President and ministers. Again, the executive authority represented the main actors in various issues.
- Concerning sources of cultural subjects, it is clear that sources of opinion materials were the journalists who addressed and approached the cultural issues. More than 75.0% of cultural subjects' sources were well-known

journalists and specialist. This may be understood in terms of the obvious effects of well-known journalists and specialists on public opinion, in particular on such sensitive cultural issues. For social subjects, sources of news stories (correspondent, news agencies) and sources of opinion materials (well-known, specialist) appeared in nearly the same percent; 45.0%. In social issues, people need not only to be convinced by the positive social outcomes of the peace, but to be informed by daily developments concern these issues.

- As for the coverage over time, the press, under Sadat began to stress the Pharaonic nature of Egypt's national identity. It is clear that Egypt was considered to have betrayed the Arab cause. Under Mubarak, on the contrast, the coverage began to focus on the Egypt's Arab identity.
- Egyptian press coverage was generally positive towards cultural and social issues. The only issue that received negative coverage was images about Israelis. These findings indicated the highly positive anticipation of a successful outcome the peace process.

#### 9.8.2- Conclusion in terms of the theoretical framework

Two main approaches represent the theoretical background of the study: the political economy approach and the construction of meaning approach. The political economy approach was discussed in details in chapter six. In this chapter it can also be noticed that the Egyptian newspapers followed the orientations and views of the political leadership in Egypt. For example, under President Sadat, the Egyptians were subject to a 'propaganda' campaign in which the discussion centered on the kind of identity Egypt should have. This campaign followed the Arabs decision to isolate Egypt and transfer the headquarters of the Arab League from Cairo to Tunisia. The Egyptian newspapers, however, reflected the views of the political leadership. Percentage of coverage dealing with the Pharaonic identity of Egypt alone represented 42.1% of all cultural subjects under Sadat. When Mubarak came to the office, he confirmed Egypt's Arab identity and frequently repeated that relations with Israel should not affect Egypt's strategic relations with all the other Arab countries. Again the Egyptian papers reflected this view. While the Arab nature of Egypt's identity alone received more than 37.0% of all the coverage

devoted to cultural subjects under Mubarak, the Pharaonic identity received less than 3.0%. This finding indicates the close ties between national newspapers and the government.

For the construction of meaning approach, the following section discusses how newspapers coverage constructed and built the social and cultural meaning of peace.

Culturally, two main issues dominated coverage of the peace process: Egypt's identity and national integration. When the Arab countries cut their political relations with Egypt, the Egyptian press tried to construct a new identity for Egypt. The alternative one was the Pharaonic identity. In order to do this, the press started to recall old notions of nationhood and rebuild new ones. Some of these notions took the following line: Egypt had spent more than one hundred billion dollar in four wars. It sacrificed more than one hundred thousand martyrs in the conflict. Egypt has an older civilization than the Arab one. Egypt is more connected to European traditions than the Arab-Islamic values. Egypt has done enough for the Arab cause and it is the time to concentrate its efforts on rebuilding the country. Peace with Israel and the reconciliation with the West is the main hope. It seems that these notions affected public opinion towards the peace policy and the Arab countries, particularly under Sadat. The Egyptian press also tried to build a new meaning in connection with the peace process, a sense of national integration. This means that there was little disagreement among the Egyptians regarding the values of a peace policy. These sentiments received strong support in the national newspapers which strove hard to mobilize support for the peace policy. They frequently stated that all Egyptian supported the peace and that Egyptians would welcome Sadat back from Camp David and Jerusalem. It can be argued that the Egyptian press tried to build a 'climate of opinion', or what was known as 'the spiral of silence hypothesis' towards the new peace efforts,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The spiral of silence theory, which was introduced by Noelle-Neumann in 1974, assumed that society threatens individuals with isolation. The fear of isolation make individuals assess and follow the climate of opinion, which influence their behaviour in public and their willingness to express opinion openly (Noelle-Neumann, 1984)

on social issues, the Egyptian press emphasized that peace would solve the social problems facing the country. Peace means a sufficient number of accommodations to gratify the expectations of most people. Peace would mean unlimited foreign economic aid enough to secure funds to rebuild the country's ruined infrastructure. Peace would reduce defense expenditure and consequently secure more funds to improve other service as well such as the health services. Peace would mean more cooperation with the Western countries and economic investment from these countries would replace the need for Arab investment and help to generate new projects and factories, which in turn, would secure more jobs. In short, it may be concluded that the new peace process with Israel would be the key for overcoming all the country's crucial social problems. All these problems, therefore, were connected positively to the peace process. It seems that this kind of intensive coverage convinced the public opinion of the positive outcomes of the peace policies.

### **Chapter Ten**

# How Journalists Consider the Egyptian Press Situation

This chapter discusses the results of interviews with Egyptian journalists. These interviews were carried out with a sample of journalists from both Al-Ahram and Al-Shaab (the two analyzed newspapers). The main objective of these interviews was to explore the political environment of the Egyptian press and to see how journalists view the role of the press and the obstacles which face them in carrying out their work. Ten interviews were carried out. The interviewees consisted of a deputy editor-in-chief, two well-known journalists and two specialists or intellectuals from each newspaper.

All the interviews took place in Cairo between 25 January and 20 March 1998. Three main issues were discussed: (1) the relationship between the press and the government in Egypt, (2) the nature and extent of the role of the press in the development and its connection with the peace process, and (3) restrictions which confronted journalists and the press.

### 10-1- The relationship between the press and the government

As detailed in chapter three, the history of Egypt has witnessed the dominance of the state over society. Just as mass media institution is part of society, so it has been dominated by the state, particularly during the second half of the twentieth century. Since its establishment, the broadcasting system has been owned and controlled by government. Except for the opposition newspapers, the Egyptian press, too, has had very close ties with the government,. In this respect, this section illustrates how the Egyptian journalists see the relationship between the political and the media institutions, and the extent to which this relationship has influenced media output.

Negrine (1994) pointed out that the mass media are a vital part of the political system. Much recent research has focused on the degree of cooperation and collusion between them and those with the power to impress their own definitions of the world onto the practices of the various news organizations. This suggests that the study of politics and the mass media needs to take into account the relationships between the media and those in positions of power.

Researchers argue that the media output depends mainly on who owns and controls them. Curran (2000) distinguishes between four 'ideal-typifications' that shape media output. In the first model, the economic elite is the leading group in society and exerts influence over the political system through its power base in the economy, control of private media, funding of political candidates and informal channels of access to the corridors of power. In the second ideal-type, the leading group is the political elite. The political elite generally uses state power to develop systems of influence. Some of its methods of control are generous state loans, subsidies and government advertising to lubricate media goodwill, state posts for top media people, and highly restrictive laws enabling the imprisonment of dissident journalists who stray outside this system of control. The third model is a relationship of relative parity between political and economic elites leading to a sometime uneasy alliance between the two. The media, in this model, represent the elite consensus, and seek to win popular acceptance of it. The fourth model is liberal corporatism, based usually on a three-way relationship of power sharing and a consensus that powerfully influences the discursive terms of reference of the media.

According to the above distinction, it can be argued that the Egyptian media system comes within the second model for the government controls the broadcasting system and the national papers. How do the Egyptian journalists see the relationship between the state and the press? There is an agreement among the journalists in both national and opposition newspapers that there is a close tie between the government and the press, and the former has usually dominated the latter. The difference is that, while the majority of interviewed journalists in the national newspapers believe that the press under Mubarak has witnessed a significant degree of freedom, opposition journalists argue that the press is facing many problems regarding freedom and access to information. The following section traces what the journalists say.

Concerning journalists of Al-Ahram, the national paper, they concentrate on the freedom of the press under Mubarak, but with different degrees. One of the specialist journalists argues that in the third world the press usually reports the existing political regime version of events:

"The difference between Europe and the Third World is the nature of the political system. While in Europe there are political systems, there are only 'rulers' regimes in the Third World countries. Accordingly, we have had three ruler regimes in Egypt since the 1952 revolution; each has claimed a

democratic circumstance for itself. Under Nasser, from 1952 to 1970, there was a direct censor who had determined what should be published and what should not. Under Sadat, from 1970 to 1981, editors-in-chief had become responsible for what have been published which should be in line with the government outlines. When Mubarak came to office in 1981, editors-in-chief have had the same responsibilities, but with some margin of freedom"

The deputy editor-in-chief of Al-Ahram focuses on self-censorship under Mubarak. He goes further and argues that the press and audiences in the third world are different from those in the First World and control over the mass media is imperative. His view is:

"In the seventies, there was a censor who observed each publishable word. In the 1980s, the censor disappeared and was replaced by the editor-in-chief himself. Under Mubarak, the control over the press has sharply decreased and there is no control over what the well-known journalists write in their daily columns. However, I prefer some kinds of control on the press in the developing countries".

As Curran mentioned above, one of the main restrictions facing the state-controlled press is the appointment of top media people such as editors-in-chief. One of the well-known writers in Al-Ahram focuses on the difference between passing a law and putting it into practice. He also believes that government appointment of people to the top positions in the press erodes press freedom:

"In the last two years of Sadat's rule, a new law was passed which allowed the political parties to publish their newspapers. It also gave a significant margin of freedom and independence to the national papers. However, practice of this freedom appeared only under Mubarak. The main point was, and still is, the appointment of editors-in-chief to the national papers. The Press Supreme Council has the right to appoint them, but only after approval by the President. This means that the authority of the state exists indirectly and the freedom of the press is far from being a reality".

The journalists of Al-Shaab, the opposition newspaper, concentrate on the difference between the national and opposition papers in terms of the relationship with the government and access to information. One well-known writer argued that the Egyptian press reflected the reality of the political system, in which the ruling party, which has controlled the power for more than three decades, dominates the media:

"The press system reflects an unbalanced political system. The National Democratic Party (NDP), the ruling party, inherited the legacy of the Social Unionist and particularly its close ties with the government. The political system can be described, legally, as a multiparty system. However, it guarantees full control for the NDP (the majority party). The press reflects these circumstances. The NDP,

which represents the government, controls all the national newspapers with their huge resources and ability to reach the public".

Negrine (1994) pointed out that a newspaper owned by the state might be under heavy pressure to adopt a certain political line in its columns. Such pressure is often regarded as improper and undermining of editorial sovereignty and responsibility. This means that state control undermines press freedom. The deputy editor-in-chief of Al-Shaab confirms this view. He believes that the government wants from both the national and opposition papers to act as a mouthpiece for its policies. He adds that this may be acceptable to the national papers, not to the opposition ones. Therefore:

"The opposition newspapers came under, and suffered from, repressive procedures by the government. In their duty to explore negative aspects in society and illegal conduct of the executive authorities, opposition papers have faced many quantitative and qualitative obstacles some of which are to jail opposition journalists or, at least, prevent them from gaining access to information".

Amin and Napoli (2000) pointed out that the Egyptian government is highly sensitive to unfavourable news reports, negative stereotypes, and images damaging to the state. The relationship between the press and the government becomes more sensitive if such reports concern domestic issues where the government is allergic to any criticism regarding failure in such internal issues such as economic or social policies. A specialist in Al-Shaab took this view:

"Concerning the relationship with the government, there is a big difference between national and opposition papers, particularly on domestic issues. When the government adopts a specific policy, this gives a green light to the national papers to reflect this policy. On international issues, the gap decreases, particularly in such aspects as the peace process and the Iraqi crises. After the negative effects of the Oslo agreement and the Israeli actions towards the Palestinians, the political leadership in Egypt has realized that Israel does not want peace. The national papers reflected this view and, accordingly, agreed with the opposition papers"

Another issue related to the relationship between the government and the press in Egypt is legislation. As Curran (2000) pointed out, restrictive laws are one of the features of a state-controlled press. This is the case in Egypt where the same ruling party has dominated the legislation authority (the People's Assembly) which is expected to approve any governmental legislation. One well-known writer criticized the appointment of top media people by the government and decried the restrictive publications law. He pointed out that:

"The national papers, for the first time, have begun to criticize some activities of the government after Mubarak came to office in the beginning of eighties. However, the governmental appointment of editors-in-chief has made the national papers follow the main guidelines of the government. When the opposition newspapers began intensively to criticize the government, a new law was passed (Law 96, 1996) which allowed imprisonment of journalists as a result of their criticizing opinion. Some of Al-Shaab newspaper journalists were jailed according to this law. One of them was the editor-in-chief".

The discussion now turns to one of the main issues concerning the relationship between a state-controlled press and its publications output. Press output of all kinds has received the attention of media scholars since the fifties. Researchers differentiate between organizational (internal) and ideological (external) factors in news selection (McQuail, 1994). One of the pioneer studies which focused on internal factors affecting the selection of news was the 'gatekeeper' study conducted by David White in 1950. Studies which have depended on that approach have assumed that, in order to understand the selection of news in a given organization, it is important to study and identify those who are responsible for selecting and rejecting incoming news within that organization (McQuail, 1994; Snider, 1967)

Boyd-Barrett (1995) pointed out that identifying the characteristics, views and attitudes of those individuals who are responsible for acting as 'gatekeepers' is not enough to understand news construction and distribution. It is important to understand the context within which the selection occurs. Such a context should include those who determine the profile and style of news that is made available to a newspaper. The content should encompass the degree of dependence of a newspaper to select from external as well as from its own internal resources. The environment of news production should be also taken into account. This includes the news selection processes of the major news agencies, professional ideologies (such as news values), the political economy of news media, and the general social and cultural environment.

Studies of news values assumed that events would become news the more they fitted certain organizational and cultural criteria. Galtung and Ruge (1965) hypothesized that news values would include negativity, proximity, consonance, un-ambiguity, personalization, elite persons, attribution, and accuracy. Bell has added (cited in Boyd-Barrett, 1995) to this list continuity, competition (a news story has more value if other media also use it), composition (a news story is more likely to be chosen if it fits the

overall style and genre-mix of a particular newspaper or news programme), predictability (which refers to the ease with which a story can be covered through established routines and sources), and prefabrication (which refers to the availability of existing textual sources which will make a story easier to develop). Such hypotheses are relatively easy to test and offer a powerful predictive yield.

According to Negrine (1994), news values and considerations of what is newsworthy also prioritise events for they describe, establish and reinforce images and relationships of order and power in our society. The prominence accorded to certain political actors, institutions, and practices is not simply an outcome of judgements of what is, or is not, perceived as important. News judgements contain within them an implicit understanding of the nature of our society, where power lies and how it is, or should be, exercised. The media also perceive some institutions as more important and, therefore, more newsworthy than others. Political institutions are considered, for example, newsworthy and become natural sources of information for the mass media.

The criteria of selecting news in the Egyptian newspapers are not the main point in this section. It is to identify to what extent Egyptian journalists see how the relationship between the press, the government and state ownership affect newspaper output. When journalists were asked about this, they disagreed. The majority of Al-Ahram interviewed-journalists argued that the relationship with the government rarely influenced the newspaper's output, particularly under Mubarak. Only one of the well-known writers pointed out that the state ownership and the appointment of the editors-in-chief by the government influenced the content of news and editorials. He added:

"I think that the national press usually reflected what the government is interested in. The prioritization of news is not according to professional criteria. It is for satisfying the political leadership. The press takes the initiative only in the case of catastrophes".

What the well-known journalist in Al-Ahram said matches the findings of many studies around the world. Schudson (2000) pointed out that the media in state-operated systems serve directly as agents of state social control and mobilize support for the special interests of the political elite. Murdock (1990) stated that owners of the media are able to regulate the output of the media they own directly, either by intervening in day-to-day operations, or by establishing general goals and understandings and appointing

managerial and editorial staff to implement them within the constraints set by the overall allocation of resources.

To illustrate this argument on government influence content over the Egyptian press, two examples, both related to the peace process, are given. The first took place on 10 November 1979. When President Sadat was giving a speech in the People's Assembly (the parliament), he said 'I am ready to go to Jerusalem and give a speech in the Israeli Knesset if this will save the blood of our sons'. Because all were taken by surprise, after the speech, Sadat asked the Foreign Minister, Fahmy, to censor what he said completely as it was 'a slip of the tongue'. Fahmy ordered the governmental (national) newspapers not to publish anything related to the visit to Jerusalem and it did not appear in the first edition of the next day papers. In the evening, Sadat changed his mind. He called some editors-in-chief and asked how his speech would be handled. Knowing that the editors-in-chief had followed Fahmy's instructions, he ordered them to ignore that and concentrate on his initiative of visiting Jerusalem. Fahmy, 1983; Heikal, 1996b).

The second example directly followed the signing of the Camp David accords in November 1978. When the two Egyptian and Israeli delegates reached the Camp David accords, they were unacceptable to the new Egyptian Foreign Minister, M. I. Kamel. He resigned and refused to attend the signing ceremony in Washington. On the next day, Sadat met with the Egyptian editors-in-chief, and pointed out what he had achieved at Camp David and indicated the guidelines they were to follow in presentation of the Accords to the public. When the editors-in-chief asked about rumors of the Foreign Minister's resignation, Sadat replied that the rumors were true but requested them not to publish the news without his permission (Kamel, 1986).

The above two examples show how the political institution interferes directly in day-to-day routines and decides which news is to be published. Journalists of Al-Shaab who were interviewed confirm this point. They pointed out that while they consider such news criteria as important and matters of public interests, they follow party guidelines (Socialist Labor Party). The deputy editor-in-chief comment on this point:

"Political institution and interests govern the publication of news in the national newspapers. For example, last week, while there was a sandstorm which affected the whole country and captured the interest of the public, the national press published an interview between the President and an ambassador on the front pages. In Al-Shaab, we follow the general rules of important news according to the news values. In

addition, we also follow the main guidelines of the party. Priority of news is Islamic, Arabic and then Egyptian. We are also interested firstly in political news. Then comes economic, social and sports news respectively".

It can be argued that these two examples occurred under President Sadat. Under Mubarak, the press, as Amin and Napoli (2000) argued, operates far more freely than under the two previous regimes and more freely than in the majority of other Arab and African countries. However, there is no evidence to support this argument. Al-Shaab, the opposition paper, for example, was suspended in 1999 under national security and national unity reasons. Though there are 13 verdicts of re-issue, the government is refusing to do that (Al-Maraghy, 2001). Results of the content analysis in the present study support the argument that the Egyptian national press reflects the views of the political institutions under both Sadat and Mubarak. An apparent climate of greater freedom for the press may be understood by the appearance of a number of opposition newspapers which reflect different views.

Furthermore, this tendency towards freedom has begun to decline, surprisingly, in the second half of the 1990s. In May 1995, for example, amendments to the penal code were peremptorily passed by parliament. They impose heavy fines and prison sentences from five to fifteen years for journalists for a range of vaguely worded crimes. These included publishing false or malicious information or anything that disturbs the public peace. Later, in 1996, a new press law (Law 96, 1996) was ratified reaffirming earlier bills proscribing criticism of public officials, especially the head of the state. Since then, the Egyptian public has been entertained by the spectacle of skirmishes between the press, particularly Al-Shaab, and top officials (Amin and Napoli, 2000)). As explained in chapter four, four journalists of Al-Shaab were sentenced under this Law, one of whom was the editor-in-chief. In 2000, and as a result of this battle, Al-Shaab and the Socialist Labour Party itself were banned.

### 10-2- Press and development

The role of the media in the developments of the last three decades has changed according to new concepts of development. While it, in the sixties and seventies, concentrated on approaches such as the communication effect and the diffusion of innovation, it focused on participatory approaches in the eighties and nineties, in which

the media could develop a cultural identity, self-expression, and new values (Melkote, 1991)

In the developing countries, the role of communication in development is considered to be top-down as a reflection of the media system itself. In the Arab countries, developmental communication studies have followed the Western model, for nearly three decades, as the ideal model by which the media can participate in national development. During the 1980s, many critics appeared and refused Western models of development and developmental communication as a result of many problems Arab countries faced. These problems are increasing rates of unemployment, poverty and literacy; the widening gap between ruling elites and the public; and the spurning of public opinion and people participation in decision-making (Al-Gammal, 1991).

Apart from the theoretical background of developmental communication models in the West and the views of Arab media-scholars on these models, this section concentrates on how the Egyptian journalists consider the developmental role of the press, and the extent to which the press connected the peace process to development during the late seventies and eighties. The views of journalists interviewed varied regarding this issue not only between national and opposition papers but also among the journalists of each paper. This may reflect the notion that there is no theoretical framework shared by Egyptian media scholars and media professionals of the developmental requirements and kinds of role the media may play.

One Al-Ahram journalist of concentrated on the role of the press in constructing new concepts and values related to development and promoting these values among the public. He pointed out that:

"In the last three decades, the press played an important role in the economic and social development. It introduced and promoted new concepts of economic development in the 1980s and 1990s such as 'privatisation' as it decreases unemployment and reforms the economy. It also participated in many social issues such as education and rural problems. The people have begun to recognize that they should participate — along with the government — in the nation's economic development".

One of the main factors marginalizing the role of the Arab media in development is the lack of applied research and surveys concerning Arab society. It is difficult, therefore, to introduce useful strategic and empirical plans for a media-role in development. Each

country and institution tries to participate in this process, but without co-operation with other countries or institutions (Ibid). The Al-Ahram Deputy Editor-in-Chief concentrated on what AL-Ahram has done in development. He said:

"The press should play a significant role in development. Two of the main issues the press could participate in are education and literacy. Al-Ahram has played an important role in changing attitudes to higher education. It was the first to introduce computers in Egypt. It has also conducted many researches about causes and effects of terrorism in Egypt".

Some researchers concentrated on the cultural dimension as a mediated factor in studying the role of media in development. The media should develop and reinforce values, norms and behaviours that favourable to development. Therefore culture can be seen as the main dimension of development (Saber, 1987). In this respect one of the specialists in Al-Ahram criticized the role of the press in development:

"We need in Egypt a new type of development human development. I argue that the press has had a negative effect in this respect. It did not concentrate on the human dimension or the socially accepted behaviours. For example, knowing and respecting 'traffic rules' is an important indication of development. However the press and the other media rarely participated in this issue".

Al-Shaab journalists stated that the weak role of the press in the national development stems from the relationships with the political institutions. They argued that in their dealing with different dimensions of development, the press reflected mainly the views of the government not the real needs of people. One key Al-Shaab journalist argued that:

"The press played a marginal role in economic development. It just reflected views of the political system. In the 1970s, when Sadat introduced the open-door economic policy and re-accommodated with the west, the national press concentrated on consumption values, not productivity. This tendency changed when Mubarak came to office in the beginning of 1980s and emphasized the value of productivity. However, we are still influenced by consumption values to the extent that the savings rate in Egypt stands at only 16%".

According to Negrine (1994), freeing the press from the state or any other form of control was based on the idea that censorship and the control of ideas inevitably resulted in the loss of an element of truth. Therefore, the press may lose its role as 'watchdog', protecting the public interest and representing public opinion. McQuail (1994) considered the independence of the press as a precondition of the exercise of the 'watchdog' role of exercising public vigilance in relation to those with most power,

especially government. The deputy editor-in-chief of Al-Shaab focused on this point and connected the role of the press in development to the level of freedom it has:

"The role of press in development is to follow and evaluate projects and criticize the negative activities of the government. This role depends mainly on the level of freedom the press has. This freedom is important for tracing and revealing corruption. Al-Shaab has had a long battle against corruption among top officials. Many journalists have been prosecuted for that role".

Concerning the extent to which the Egyptian press connected the peace process with developmental dimensions, the majority of journalists in both newspapers avoided discussing this issue saying they could not remember. Only two well-known journalists, one from each paper, answered the question and agreed on the important role the press and other media played in influencing the public in favour of the new peace policy. The Al-Shaab writer pointed out that the press has connected peace to welfare since the signing of disarmament agreements in 1974. After Camp David, this role intensified and it was claimed that not only would peace solve all Egypt's economic and social problems but that there was no other alternative. Al-Ahram's well-known journalist took nearly the same view:

"In the late seventies, the national press played a significant and noticeable role in changing orientation of public opinion from an antagonistic opinion about Israel to a new one which considers the peace as the basic means of solving conflicts. The peace would achieve development, progress and stability. The press also claimed that peace would solve the inveterate economic problems particularly that of military spending".

### 10-3- Restrictions facing journalists and the press

Restrictions facing the Egyptian press and journalists in carrying out their work are more than enough to be discussed in details in this section. They include professional issues such as rights and limitations of practice; legal issues such as tied publications laws; economic issues such as limited resources and governmental subsidies; and political issues which reflect state control. In this section one of the issues facing journalists, and particularly those of the opposition, is briefly discussed. This is the problem of trying to access information.

Two main issues are concerned with accessing data and information in societies, the government and the relationship between journalists and politicians. According to Gandy (1982), government is not only the main source of information but also the main barrier to what may be published. He added that at every level of government, in every

nation's public media carry the desired message forward to the general public, other government officials, and key corporate leaders who have a role to play in the formulation and implementation of public policy. Negrine (1994) pointed out that government in Britain is more than a mere source of information. It distributes deliberately incomplete, and sometimes inaccurate, information. Such practices are not new but they illustrate the ability of those in power to manipulate others by selectively releasing information to journalists who may wish to use that information.

The relationship between journalists and politicians is important in this context. Each side has certain goals related to the audiences targeted. Politicians try to persuade their audience to adopt a certain view of themselves, their parties, and their political aims. Journalists primarily aim to hold the attention of a target audience through a mixture of alerting, informing, and entertaining them. Each side needs the other. Whereas politicians need access to the communication channels that are controlled by the mass media, journalists cannot perform their task as political guardians without being able to access politicians for information, news, interviews, action and comment (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1981)

If that is true of the relationship between journalists and governments in countries like the USA and Britain, it is the more so in Third World countries. In a study about production of news in the Egyptian media, Tayie (1989) found that governmental sources were the most reliable for home news. In every government ministry or administration there is a special department which deals with journalists. Its main task is to issue press releases and information about government activities of ministries. These departments only issue selective information or what they think the public should be allowed to know. Even if the journalists have information from another source, they may not publish it without permission.

There was disagreement between journalists concerning freedom of information in Egypt. The majority of the Al-Ahram journalists interviewed, three out of five, and all the Al-Shaab journalists pointed out that the press is facing serious problems of access. Two journalists from Al-Ahram, one of them the deputy editor-in-chief, argued that the problem at present is the colossal amount of information and the increasing number of sources. Basically, they meant by this secondary sources such as the Internet, mass media and news agencies. Other Al-Ahram journalists interviewed stated that there is a

confidence crisis between the press and government officials. They also mentioned the ease of obtaining more accurate information about the domestic economy from foreign sources. One journalist concluded:

"We are facing a serious problem in this respect. An equal understanding of the concept of freedom and freedom for journalists to access economic data and statistics has not accompanied the economic developments that have taken place in the last three decades. The officials and politicians do not recognize the importance of the press and its role in society. There is a lack of confidence between journalists and officials. The officials want journalists to publish what they want only. This process (access to information) is facing many obstacles and journalists need to look around to get information. It is easier to access data and information from international rather than domestic sources. In many cases, particularly for economic and education statistics, one may get more accurate information from the World Bank or the United Nations than from the Egyptian ministries".

The opposition journalists agreed that, while all Egyptian journalists are facing many restrictions in accessing information, the case is most difficult for opposition journalists. They pointed out that the available information is mainly what ministries produce. Many ministries refuse to accept correspondents from opposition journalists. A well-known journalist said:

"The official institutions see journalists as spies who come to collect information and to reveal what is going on. There is no legislation enabling journalists to access information. Many institutions and ministries refuse to accept opposition journalist as reporters. It is too difficult for opposition journalists to access even economic information particularly what concerns relationships with the International Monetary Fund".

One of the main problems facing journalists is not only accessing information but also having it published. In theory the press operate under the permanent Egyptian constitution, which bans censorship, and under Law 148 shows clearly that the press is 'an independent popular authority performing its duty and responsibility freely in order to serve the society'. But though in theory, there is no press censorship, according to Amin and Naploi (2000), in fact it intervenes in almost every aspect of press. The principal censoring organization is the Office of Information in the Ministry of Culture. But other organizations that exercise censorship include the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Information, Al-Azhar University, the state information service and many others. The deputy editor-in-chief of Al-Shaab illustrated this point:

"The opposition newspapers are facing many obstacles in accessing information in comparison with the governmental ones. Furthermore when opposition journalists manage to access information about social or health problems, they are surprised by a decision of to impose a 'publishing ban'. For example, when Al-Shaab newspaper obtained information about the spread of AIDS in the Haemodialysis Unit in Ahmed Maher Hospital in central Cairo, we asked the Minister of Health, as we usually do in these sensitive issues, for permission to publish. He refused and we received, in two hours, a judicial decision to ban publication. The next day other newspapers published a press release from the Ministry of Health about that issue and we had not received that press release at Al-Shaab. So, there is not only a narrowing margin of accessing information for opposition journalists, but a ban on the publication of what they have already".

The Egyptian press is facing not only political but economic challenges. As Curran and Park (2000) pointed out the political groups dominating the state, in countries like Egypt are exerting pressure over the media and using state power to structure media markets. Negrine (1994) argued that economic and organizational pressures are qualitatively different from the sorts of constraint that governments or states are able to impose. Advertising is an important factor, which partly shapes a newspaper. So the needs of advertising, to some extent, determine the nature of a newspaper.

In this respect, the opposition journalists pointed out that, in comparison with the national papers, opposition papers have very limited resources and depend mainly on donations from party members, sales income, and very limited revenue from advertising. They also agreed that the government tries deliberately to weaken the economic capacity of opposition newspapers as a reply to their criticism of official's activities. The deputy editor-in-chef of Al-Shaab said:

"Because the opposition papers are criticizing the government and tracing the negative activities of officials, they are facing many economic restrictions. The main restriction is the unjustified tax on the price of printing paper and ink, which puts a great burden on the opposition papers. Many companies are refraining from advertising in opposition papers because the government threatens companies or organizations which choose to advertise in them".

### 10-3- Conclusion:

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the Egyptian press reflects the political situation. The government usually claims that the political system is

democratic: there are general elections and the people have the right to vote. However, the reality is quite different. There is a lack of credibility among the public concerning elections. While there are many political parties, a single party has ruled the country for the last three decades. Indeed the Emergency Law imposed since 1991, is still in place. This means that there is a huge gap between theory and reality.

The same situation applies to the press. According to the constitution and publication laws, all people have the right to be kept informed and to express opinion. There is no restriction against any person wishing to practice journalism. The press is an independent authority carrying its duty freely (Law 148 of 1981). But practice and reality are also quite different. The Council of Advice appoints editors-in-chief after approval by the President. They work as government representatives inside press organisations. They follow governmental policy guidelines. Not even a senior-journalist, as Al-Gammal (1991) indicated, should express his opinion in front of the editor-inchief for, if he does, he may lose his job or at least be moved to an administrative position. The national press uses its initiative only in a catastrophe. Otherwise it awaits instructions from the government. While many journalists pointed out that the press has greater freedom under Mubarak, others argued that this was only the case until the first half of the 1990s when one of the most restrictive press laws in Egyptian press history (Law 96 of 1996), as Amin and Napoli (2000) described it, was issued and imposed. For a first offence journalists could be convicted for singling out officials for serious criticism.

The situation of the opposition newspapers is more difficult. As the opposition journalists pointed out, they are facing many serious problems in performing their work to the extent their employment and lives may be threatened. The nature of their employment and political affiliations motivates them to criticize the government, follow negative activities and trace corruption. This is not acceptable to the government. They claim that the last press law (Law 96 of 1996) was passed through the government controlled People's Assembly in order to prevent increasing criticism by opposition papers. Many journalists were charged and convicted according to that law. The government wants not only the national papers but also those of the opposition to reflect its views regarding different issues. This may explain why many ministries and institutions refuse to accept opposition journalists as reporters and prevent them from accessing information even on economic and social issues.

### Chapter Eleven

# Main Conclusion and Future Perspective

Two main factors are taken into consideration in the conclusion. First, how the *objectives* and questions of the study mentioned in chapter five, have been met and answered. Second, how the results reflect the theoretical approaches used in the study, the political economy and the construction of meaning, which were dealt with in chapter one. In terms of the main conclusion, the study tries to draw a future perspective derived from the results of the study.

The main idea behind this perspective is the mediation of the social context in examining the media's role in the peace negotiations. The Egyptian press have played an important role in the peace process with Israel through marketing this process within the social context in which economic and political needs signified the urgent requirement for the Egyptians. To this extent the press should be able to play a significant role in the peace process through framing it within the most important needs of audiences. Let us begin by examining the results of the analysis and interviews and explore how the Egyptian press set about framing and constructing the meaning of peace.

### 11-1- Main conclusion in terms of the study's objectives:

The study addresses five main objectives. Each one includes many questions. These objectives are: exploring differences between national (governmental) and opposition newspapers in dealing with the developmental dimensions of the peace process; examining how the economic dimensions were framed; examining how the political dimensions were presented; exploring how the social/cultural dimensions were portrayed; and how the Egyptian journalists consider the role of the press within its relationship with the political institutions.

# 11-1-1- Differences between the selected newspapers:

The results show that both the national and the opposition papers differed in their handling of the peace process, not only on what type of dimension they considered as important, but also on what each should imply. The national paper concentrated mainly on the economic perspective. In contrast, the opposition paper focused on the political.

Concerning the economic dimension, while the national paper considered mainly issues related to the solving of economic problems, the opposition paper stated that all economic normalization with Israel should be reduced.

The two papers also disagreed about what the important political issue was. Whereas the national paper concentrated on the activities of the government, developing political participation was the main focus of the opposition one. Priority of cultural and social issues also differed in both papers. While the national paper devoted nearly the same coverage to the Arab and Pharaonic identity, the opposition paper concentrated on only the Arab one. Whereas housing problem was the most important social issue for the opposition paper, the national paper focused on infrastructure.

Moreover the orientation or stance of the coverage differed in both newspapers. While the national paper considered peace would lead to positive economic, political and social outcomes, the opposition paper argued that this was not necessarily so. There was also difference in the coverage between the two papers over time. The majority of the national paper's coverage took place under President Sadat. There could be two reasons for this. First, intensive coverage was required to convince the Egyptians of the desirability of peace. Second, most of important events related to the peace process such as Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the signing of the Camp David Accord, and the signing the peace treaty, took place under Sadat.

On the other hand, the opposition paper's coverage occurred mainly under Mubarak. Here there may be two reasons also. First, Mubarak has given a margin of freedom to opposition papers which allows them to print criticisms. Second, under Mubarak, Israel committed many aggressive actions against other Arab countries such as its invasion of Lebanon. This certainly gave an opportunity for opposition papers to criticize the whole peace process.

#### 11-1-2- The Economic Dimension

This section deals with the second main objective of the study. It addresses the kinds of economic subjects the Egyptian press focused on and how these subjects were covered. Five economic issues formed the main focus of the coverage: solving economic problems; receiving foreign economic aid and assistance; raising Egyptian income levels, establishing new factories and projects; and pursuing economic normalisation with Israel. Concentration on these issues may be understood in terms of the economic

economic problems which ranged from high levels of inflation to a serious shortage of basic necessities. A small rise in basic food prices in January 1977 led to violence all over the country. The situation was brought under control only after the intervention of the army. Peace with Israel was seen as a solution to that problem. The press reflected this view.

The press not only considered the above economic issues as most important, but also framed them from the same standpoint. These issues received the most coverage. The first four issues together received more than 77.0% of the total amount of coverage devoted to the economic dimension. These issues were also printed mainly on the front and back pages, the very pages which most Egyptians would ordinarily read. Sensitive issues such as normalization with Israel were covered mainly by well-known journalists and specialists who, through their opinion columns, usually have the ability to set the agenda to influence Egyptian opinion. This might be an indication that the press recognized the importance of influencing public opinion towards peace with Israel.

Cover of the above economic issues differed over time. This may be connected to the various developments in the peace process and economic situation in Egypt. When the peace process began in the late seventies, the more serious economic problem was the level of average incomes. Consequently, improving income levels to meet basic needs received a great deal of coverage in the first two years. With an inflow of economic aid, coverage focused on establishing new economic projects. When Mubarak came to office and political relations with Arab countries were resumed, Egypt began to mediate for peace and, therefore, economic normalisation and solving general economic problem became the main focus.

Coverage was either very positive or neutral. Almost all the above economic issues received a positive-oriented coverage. This meant that the press considered peace as a genuine solution to many urgent economic problems. The issue that received a slightly neutral coverage was 'economic normalisation' with Israel. This may be understood in terms of psychological factors. Just to talk about 'Israel' and not 'the enemy' was unacceptable a few months before the beginning of the peace process. Accordingly, it took time before talk about normalising relations between Egypt and Israel was acceptable to readers.

#### 11-1-3- The Political Dimension

In covering the political dimension of the peace process, the press concentrated on three issues: the activities of government, political participation and stability in the Middle East. Aside from the first which was considered routine in all Egyptian media, the focus on political participation may be understood from the orientation of political leadership and the political climate in Egypt during the second half of the 1970s. Sadat introduced a new economic policy, the open-door policy, in 1974. This changed the nature of the economic system from a socialist to a capitalist orientation.

In Sadat's views, this required a matching political orientation. Sadat, therefore, introduced a multi-party political system in 1977. It seems that connecting peace with an increasing political participation was an indication that a new era of political life would start. As there have been no more significant differences in the political environment during the two decades of peace, the above finding indicates that this connection was to convince the more educated people of the value of peace. As for the second issue, stability in the Middle East, it was geared more to economic than to politics. Stability in the region would mean more economic investment, economic aid and foreign tourism.

These three issues received the greatest coverage. Other issues such as political normalization and returning to the Arab fold received less. The first two issues alone government activities and political participation) received about 60.0% of the coverage devoted to the political dimension. The significant difference was that while the activities of the government were dealt with as news stories, political participation was mainly framed as opinion material. This finding reinforces the above explanation that connecting peace with political participation, via well-known journalists, could influence public opinion, particularly that of the educated.

Coverage of political issues significantly differed over time. Political participation received the most coverage under Sadat. Under Mubarak, another issue which received significant coverage was returning to the Arab world. This may be understood in terms of Egypt's new role as a mediator between Israel and other Arab countries. The press pointed out that peace with Israel should not be understood as a denial of Egypt's obligations towards the Arab world. One of the most interesting findings was coverage devoted to 'reducing political normalization with Israel'. Despite the many Israeli actions against Arab countries which took place in Mubarak's time, this issue received less

coverage under him than under Sadat. It seems that protecting political normalization with Israel indicated that Egypt's political leaders view of peace as a strategic choice. On the whole, coverage was positive over political issues, particularly political participation and stability in the Middle East.

#### 11-1-4- Socio/Cultural Dimension

This coverage focused on three cultural issues: a Pharaonic identity, an Arab identity, and national integration. After signing the Camp David Accords, the Egyptians found themselves in a circle of debate concerning Egypt's Arab identity. This debate increased after the Arab countries suspended Egypt's membership of the Arab league. Contradictions between these types of identities prevailed in connection with the peace process. Concentration on national integration was seen as an indication that there was a feeling of agreement about the desirability of peace. Concerning social issues, the coverage concentrated on housing services, unemployment and infrastructure. Peace was seen as a solution to these 'permanent' social problems. Again, connecting these problems to peace was designed to convince the vast majority of people of the advantages of the new policy.

These cultural and social issues received most coverage by the press. What is important is that while social issues were covered mainly by news stories, cultural issues were left to well-known journalists through their opinion materials. Cultural issues would have to be addressed by more experienced journalists who could present a historical background about them. Coverage of social and cultural issues also differed over time. Under Sadat, the press focused mainly on Egypt's Pharaonic identity and housing services. Under Mubarak, Egypt's Arab identity and the social implications of unemployment received the greater coverage.

Coverage was generally positive towards cultural and social issues. The only cultural issue that received a negative oriented-coverage was the image of the Israelis. The interesting finding is that this negative image was most frequently encountered under Sadat. It is difficult to give a reasonable explanation for this since the main positive peace events took place under Sadat himself. The press may have been trying to show that neither the Camp David Accords nor the peace treaty would prevent criticism of the Israelis.

# 11-2- Main conclusion in terms of theoretical framework:

The study adopted two approaches: the political economy approach and the construction of meaning approach.

### 11-2-1- The Political economy approach

As explained in chapter one, the political economy approach was used in the study to explore two main points: the relationship between the media institutions and the political institutions in Egypt, and the extent to which this relationship influenced the press's coverage of the developmental dimensions of the peace process. In this respect, the following points can be made:

- Interviews with Egyptian journalists from both the national and the opposition papers under analysis considered the relationship between the press and the government to have been very close all along. On the whole, governments generally dominated and manipulated the press since it owns all the national newspapers and appoints their editors-in-chief. Consequently, the press usually reflects the orientation of the government. Legislation is used as a government tool to restrict the work of the journalists. Though theoretically protected by laws to establish their rights, journalists find a huge gap between theory and application. While the Law of 1980 gave the press more freedom and considered it as an independent institution, a new Law passed in 1996 put even more restrictions on the press and journalists, to the extent that a journalist may now be prosecuted as a result of criticizing top officials. Though opposition parties have had the right to publish their own newspapers since the late 1980s, these newspapers face numerous political and economic restrictions. Opposition journalists constantly find difficulties in accessing information. Many governmental institutions have refused to deal with reporters from opposition newspapers. Opposition journalists are frequently unable to establish a relationship with top officials whom they consider as main sources of information. The government threatens any company showing a preference to advertise in opposition newspapers. This in turn increases the burden on their economic capability.
- The interviews concluded that all these factors have strongly influenced newspaper content. The criteria of selecting news in the national newspapers are

far from professional news values. Governmental policy and orientation are the most important ones. The critics of negative performance by government and officials are mainly well-known journalists. Opposition newspapers usually criticize corruption and illegalities, but their effect is lessened by limited circulation and being weekly. However, when the opposition newspaper, Al-Shaab, undertook a strong campaign against some top officials and began to gain support and increase its circulation, many of its journalists were prosecuted. In 2000, the newspaper itself was suspended on the allegation that it was threatening national unity and security. This shows that national newspapers are not only state owned but also state operated. This may explain comments of interviewed-journalists from both national and opposition newspapers about the role of the press in the peace process and how the Egyptians were subjected to a strong campaign during the late 1970s and 1980s regarding the desirability of the peace policy with Israel.

Results of the content analysis reinforce the views of these journalists about the close relationship between the government and the press and how this relationship influence content. In this respect, it is clear that the national paper, Al-Ahram, reflected the views of the government in its coverage of the peace process. As the government claimed that peace would lead to a solution of all the economic problems facing Egypt, Al-Ahram reflected that view. When Sadat began to criticize Arab countries for their spurning of peace initiatives, Al-Ahram went further and began to focus on Egypt's Pharaonic identity. When Mubarak began to improve relations with Arab countries in the mid-eighties, Al-Ahram started to rediscover Egypt's Arab identity. Political and economic normalization with Israel was also an obvious example. Reducing all kinds of normalization represented one of the most frequent political and economic issues in Al-Shaab, and this matched the views of the Socialist Labour Party, the owner of Al-Shaab. Reducing economic and political normalization was a marginal issue in Al-Ahram, a view reflected by the government in its protection of the peace process. The appearance of actors is considered an indication of power relationships in a society, where the top officials are the most powerful figures. The most frequent actors in Al-Ahram's coverage of all dimensions of the peace process were the president, ministers and other top officials. On the other hand Al-Shaab included the leaders of the opposition as main actors, but only after the president. Sources of coverage are also an indication of the relationship between the press and government. Correspondents represented one of the most frequent sources of news in Al-Ahram. This was not the case in Al-Shaab. This matched what the interviewed journalists said about the difficulties facing opposition journalists in accessing information.

### 11-2-2- The Construction of meaning approach:

The construction of meaning approach focuses on two main aspects: first, the media content construct meaning of events and policies, in terms of their environment, by framing them and presenting them to audiences. Second, the audience interpret media content and construct meaning within their own views of events and policies. As detailed in chapter one, the study adopts the first aspect of the approach. It is used to explore how the Egyptian press framed and constructed the meaning of the peace process. The media frame is usually used to indicate how journalists select and present content and messages. In this study, the construction of meaning approach is used not only to show how the press framed the peace process, but also how its meaning was constructed within the economic, political and socio/cultural environment. In other words how the mass media constructed meaning in terms of the social context.

Egypt in the late seventies was facing serious economic, political and social problems. Since its independence in 1952, it had been involved in three major wars in 1956, 1967 and 1973. Almost all economic capability was directed to military and defence expenditure. After the October War (1973), and after the negative effects from its opendoor economic policy, Egypt was in a critical situation. On the economic level, while the inflation level was one of the highest in the world, income levels were among the lowest. The country was suffering shortages in basic materials and needs. On the political level, the country was governed by a single political organization for nearly three decades, and political participation was restricted. Freedom of expression, where it existed, was limited. On the social level, the rising population affected all other social services. Unemployment was very high, particularly among the many soldiers returning from the army. The country was facing a deteriorated infrastructure, particularly in rural areas. Providing enough houses, health services and education opportunities were other serious problems (more details in chapters two & three)

Within this social context, the people received messages about the new peace policy with Israel, and could see how the press constructed the meaning of peace. It can be concluded, according to the results of the content analysis, that it was built and constructed as follows:

- On the economic level, peace would lead to higher income levels, satisfaction of material and basic needs, and the establishment of new projects, which, in turn, would secure sufficient new jobs. On the political level, political participation would increase as a result of peace and stability. There would be greater accessibility to political opportunity and a better chance to expand political plurality. Peace would also secure stability in the Middle East, which, in turn, would prepare the region for foreign aid, assistance and investment. On the social level, reducing military expenditure and foreign aid would secure enough funds to build houses, renew the infrastructure, decrease unemployment, and improve health care. Generally, peace would help to solve economic, political, and social problems.
- There was coherence among Egyptians regarding the peace process. The vast majority supported the political leadership in their policies. On the regional level, peace with Israel would not restrict or demolish Egypt's role in the region, particularly among the other Arab countries. Peace would promote economic and political normalization with Israel, which, in turn, would exert a positive effect, since Egypt could mediate between Israel and the other Arabs. However, if Israel committed unacceptable actions, reducing economic and political normalization would bring pressure to support the Arab cause. On the other hand, if the Arab countries were not interested in peace and merely wanted to isolate Egypt, they would lose opportunities for peace and have little capability to start war in the region without Egypt. According to the above meanings of peace, the press began to talk about a new culture; they meant 'a peace culture'.

The question is to what extent the press succeeded in convincing the Egyptians of the desirability of this new 'peace culture'. It seems that it achieved significant progress. Many surveys conducted before and after the beginning of the peace process indicate a dramatic shift in public opinion and that people have begun to adopt many of the statements, which the press devised and constructed. Some of the more common statements were: Egypt should reduce its defence expenditure; Egypt should redirect its

foreign policy peacefully and focus all its efforts on economic and social development; the Arab cause has been generously propagated by Egypt, and it was time to concentrate on its own issues; Egypt has a much older civilization that other Arab countries and it is generally closer to western civilization. (Details in chapter two)

Whether this means that the mass press were the most important factors in changing public opinion towards the peace process, is not easy to prove. It is also unreasonable to deny the role of the press in this process. More important for and relevant to this study is that the effectiveness of the press occurred through its framing of the content and its construction of the meaning of peace in terms of the economic, political, social and culture environment in Egypt. These aspects of the environment represented the most serious and critical problems facing Egypt in the late seventies and eighties. Furthermore, it can be argued, according to findings of the analysis, that the press succeeded not only in framing and constructing the meaning of peace, but also influenced public opinion in this matter. This leads us to the following and more important point, the future perspective.

### 11-3- Future perspective

As explained above, the Egyptian press has played a significant role in constructing a new meaning of peace among Egyptians through framing this meaning within Egypt's economic, political and socio/cultural environment. The question now is whether we can generalize these results on other countries in the same region. Can the mass media construct a new meaning of peace in a given country and convince people of its meaning by framing it within the most urgent needs and requirements of that county? It can be argued that, in this context, the press can play that role.

As this study was carried out on two newspapers as a sample representing the entire Egyptian media, it may be useful to conduct future studies on the same issue but on different media in Egypt. There is a significant percentage of illiteracy among the Egyptians. This percentage represents about 55% of the entire population. In this respect, the broadcasting system, particularly television, has a vital role to reach this huge number of people who can not be exposed to the printed media. The researcher is aware of the importance of television in different issues in such an illiterate society, particularly for the peace process which was considered a media event. He found various difficulties in accessing broadcasting data relevant to the study. Accessing such data and analysing

how the Egyptian broadcasting presented and screened the peace process within the social context in Egypt will be an important task for future research.

As the present study concluded that mediating the economic, political and social needs of the Egyptian people was important for promoting the peace process with Israel, this conclusion might be useful in not only understanding the content of the Egyptian media but also using them on different issues in different contexts. One of the main issues which was and still is arguable in Egypt, is economic privatisation. After more than two decades of the socialist economic system of the fifties and sixties, a new economic era started in the mid-seventies. President Sadat decided to change Egypt's economic system to one based on capitalism. This was known as economic liberalization or an open-door economic policy. The main issue raised in this policy was privatisation. The Egyptians were reluctant to adopt such a policy as they used to depend on the government for securing job opportunities, free health services, free education and subsidized goods.

According to the results of the present study, the mass media can be used to construct a new meaning of economic privatisation. This meaning can be connected to the economic needs of the people. It can be argued that privatisation means the creation of not only more jobs but also ones with higher salaries. It can lead to the expansion of exports, which in turn will improve the national revenue and people's incomes. Economic privatisation will also lead to the establishment of new projects and factories, which in turn may increase competition and improve consumer choice. These new concepts and meanings may not only change people's attitudes towards the privatisation but also encourage Egyptians to participate in this process.

Another issue which might be drawn from the results of the study is the orientation of media research in Egypt. Because it has close ties with media research in the United States, research in Egypt is carried out with a view to improving the effectiveness of the media and improving methods to achieve specific goals rather than to refine concepts, develop theories, or achieve social change. In such an approach, which is centred on the media rather than the society, theory is neglected and the media are not seen in relation to other institutions. The present study shows that the content of the Egyptian media can be understood and analysed better within the social context. Future research about Egypt should concentrate on mass communication as a social process. Studying the media should emphasise all aspects of the communication process and include factors that affect what is produced (such as historical, economic, political, organizational,

technological, professional and personal factors), and factors that influence how what is produced is used. The media should be studied in relation with other Egyptian institutions. This type of media research will make it not only more balanced between the American and European schools of communication but also more suitable to Egypt's society.

In conclusion it may be said that Egypt's press has achieved a significant success in promoting peace to the Egyptians through mediating the most urgent need to solve the economic, political and social problems. It can be argued that this success refers to the social context in which the peace policy was promoted and a meaning of peace constructed. One can ask if we may reach a stage where we can argue that the mass media can participate in achieving peace in a given society through mediating the most urgent needs and requirements of that society. Indeed, can the Egyptian media participate in other issues such as economic privatisation through connecting it to people's needs? What can be said is that more research is required in different societies in different times and different kinds of conflicts in order to generalize such an argument.

It may be useful to finish this thesis with what Galtung and Vincent (1992) said in this context:

"No one would assume that the media are the major causes of war and peace. The deeper causes are located elsewhere, in our structures and culture; in people, in us. But the media, as that very word indicates, mediate between deep structures and cultures, between the reality of events and the images of news. They become interested between the deeper aspects of reality and people as actors, be they elite or non-elite. The media shape their images, and as people act on the basis of media-mediated images rather than reality, the way the media mediate becomes a major factor" (p. 141).

**Appendices of the Study** 

### **Appendix A: Analytical categories**

#### (1) Item Serial Number:

Because of up to 1000 numbers of two newspapers were analysed, each item in each number of the two newspapers was given a coding number between 001 and 999.

### (2) Newspaper:

As the analysis was carried out on two Egyptian newspapers, national daily-newspaper (Al-Ahram) and opposition weekly-newspaper (Al-Shaab), codes were dealt with as Al-Ahram [1] and Al-Shaab [2].

#### (3) Date:

The study was carried out in a period of 21 weeks during 1977 to 1989. Date is recorded as day / month / year. For example, if we analysed the number of the newspaper in the first of January in 1977, the date was recorded as 01. 01.77

#### (4) Main Topic of the Item:

The main topic of an item was classified into eight categories: peace topics, economic topics, political topics, cultural topics, military topics, terrorism topics, social topics, and other topics. In the coding process each item might contain more than one topic. Each item, for example may have contained a peace topic, economic topic, political topic, ...etc. Up to three topics were recorded in each item. They were recorded in the range of 1 through 8.

#### (5) Subject of the topic

Subject of a topic means the sub-category of the main topic. Each main topic contains many subject or sub-categories. The peace topic, for example, includes peace agreement, peace negotiations, peace summit, official visits ...etc. Up to three sub-categories were coded. The subject, if exist, will take its code number as it is determined in coding schedule (e.g. the code number of the peace agreement as a sub-subject of peace topic is [01], if not, it will be considered as [00].

### (6) Orientation of the Item:

In this category, the language in which an item was presented was taken into consideration. A number of words and adjectives are recorded to indicate the stance of an item. Orientation of an item was determined according to the words and adjectives, which were used in this item. If an item contained positive words and/or adjectives (such as peaceful, cooperative, democratic, etc.) it was classified as positive orientation. If an item, in contrast, contained negative words and/or adjectives (such as harmful, isolated, dictatorial,...etc.), it was classified as negative orientation. When an item includes both positive and negative values and words, it was coded according to the whole tone of the item. More than one word and/or adjective may be presented in an item. In this category, the orientation of an item was recorded as: [0] the absence of a word or an adjective, and [1] the presence of a word or an adjective.

#### (7) Actor / Actors:

The actor is the main subject of the news story or opinion material. If there was for example, a summit between President Sadat and Israeli Prim Minister Begin, the actors would have been Sadat (President) and Begin (Prim Minister). In this study, the actor category was classified to two sub-categories: National actor/actors, meaning the Egyptian actor/actors in the peace process, and international actor/actors, meaning non-Egyptian actor/actors in that process. There may have been more than one actor in an item, but up to two actors. The actor/actors of an item may be human, or may a military attack, organization, or accident), or may be both.

#### (8) Source of the Item:

Each item may have one source or multi-sources. In case where the source was unknown, it was coded as unidentified. Each source took a separate column, so multi-sources were taken into consideration.

#### (9) Type of the Item:

In this category, there were six types of classifications: news story, news story with

picture, picture only, main editorial which might reflect the newspaper's opinion, daily column which was written by one of the dominant journalists, and analytical editorial written by one of the key intellectuals. Each item was dealt with as one type. It was recorded in the range of 1 through 6. During the analysis this category was recoded.

#### (10) Location of the Item:

An item may have been the main topic of the front page, on the front page on the back page, or on an inside page. If the item was published on the front page and had a supplement on an inside page, it was dealt with as if it is published on the front page. The item was recorded in the range of 1 through 4. This category was recorded during the analysis.

#### (11) Length of the Item:

As the study was carried out on the newspapers, the length of an item was calculated by centimetres/column (cm/col.). The standard space of the sample's newspapers (Al-Ahram and Al-Shaab) is eight columns width and 54 centimetres height. This means that if an item is published on the whole space of one page, it was calculated as 432 cm/col. If we had an item of four columns of twenty centimetres height, it was calculated as eighty cm/col., and were coded as [080]. If there are supporting materials in an item (such as figures, diagrams, pictures, or tables), it will be included in calculating space of this item.

# **Appendix B: Coding Schedule**

|   |  | Col.  |
|---|--|-------|
| (1) Item serial number:   |  | 1-3   |
| (2) Newspaper:  |  |       |
| (1) Al-Ahram  |  | 4     |
| (2) Al-Shaab  |  |       |
| (3) Date:   |  | 5-10  |
| (4) Main Topic  | up to three topics   | 11-13 |
| <ul> <li>1- Peace topic</li> <li>2- Economic topic</li> <li>3- Political topic</li> <li>4- Cultural topic</li> <li>5- Military topic</li> <li>6- Terrorism to</li> <li>7- Social topic</li> <li>8- Others (identified)</li> </ul> | c<br>c<br>c<br>pic   |       |
| (5) Subjects of topics  |  |       |
| 5-1- Peace subjects   | up to three subjects   | 14-16 |
| 03- Multin<br>04- Secret<br>05- Peace<br>06- Result<br>07- Excha<br>08- Officia<br>09- Peace<br>10- Peace<br>11- Peace  | ral negotiation national negotiation talks summit s of peace nge of ambassadors al visits settlement |       |

|                 | 14- Cancellin<br>15- Other pea | ng Camp David             |                  |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------|
|                 | 13- Other pea                  | ice subjects              |                  |
| 5-2- Economi    | c subjects                     | up to three subjects      | 17-19            |
|                 | 16- Improver                   | nent of income            |                  |
|                 | 17- Equality                   | of income                 |                  |
|                 | 18- Satisfacti                 | on of material needs      |                  |
|                 | 19- Independ                   | ence of local communit    | y                |
|                 | 20- Economi                    | c problems / solution of  |                  |
|                 | 21- Decreasing                 | ng of economic coopera    | tion with Israel |
|                 |                                | c projects / factories    |                  |
|                 | 23- Industrial                 | l relations / negotiation |                  |
|                 | 24- Economi                    | c agreement               |                  |
|                 | 25- Exports,                   | Investments               |                  |
|                 | 26- Economi                    | c normalization           |                  |
|                 | 27- Economi                    | c cooperation             |                  |
|                 | 28- Economi                    | c aid                     |                  |
|                 | 29- Reform o                   | of desert                 |                  |
|                 | 30- Taxes, re                  | duce or increase          |                  |
|                 | 31- Other eco                  | onomic subjects           |                  |
| 5-3-Political s | subjects                       | up to three subjects      | 20-22            |
|                 | 32- Political                  | participation             |                  |
|                 | 33- Political                  | plurality                 |                  |
|                 | 34- Political                  | plurality                 |                  |
|                 | 35- General e                  | elections                 |                  |
|                 | 36- Activities                 | s of government           |                  |
|                 | 37- Activities                 | s of ruling party         |                  |
|                 | 38- Activities                 | s of opposition           |                  |
|                 | 39- Travel of                  | fofficials                |                  |
|                 | 40- New legi                   | slation/laws              |                  |
|                 | 42- Stability                  | in the Middle East        |                  |
|                 |                                | /local authority          |                  |
|                 |                                | ng normalization to the   | progress in the  |
|                 |                                | nomy negotiation          |                  |
|                 | 45- Israeli de                 | ecision of taking Jerusal | em               |
|                 | 46- Stop of p                  | political normalization w | ith Israel       |
|                 |                                | ion of relation with Ara  |                  |
|                 |                                | o political opportunities |                  |
|                 | 49- Other po                   | litical subjects          |                  |
| 5-4- Cultural   | subjects                       | up to three subjects      | 23-25            |

51- Arabic identity of Egypt

50- Education opportunities / no opportunity

|                 | 52- Islamic ide                 | ntity of Egypt             |       |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|-------|
|                 | 53- Pharaonic identity of Egypt |                            |       |
|                 |                                 | tegration / no integration |       |
|                 |                                 | values / competing values  |       |
|                 | 56- Image of Is                 |                            |       |
|                 | 57- Educationa                  |                            |       |
|                 | 58- Cultural re                 |                            |       |
|                 |                                 | tural relation with Israel |       |
|                 | 60- Other cultu                 |                            |       |
|                 | oo- Onier cuitt                 | irai subject               |       |
| 5-5- Military s | subjects                        | up to three subjects       | 26-28 |
|                 | 61- Military ta                 | lks                        |       |
|                 | 62- Troop with                  | ndrawals                   |       |
|                 | 63- Military ai                 | d                          |       |
|                 | 64- Military ex                 | tercises                   |       |
|                 | 65- National se                 |                            |       |
|                 |                                 | penditure/ decreasing of   |       |
|                 | 67- Military in                 | -                          |       |
|                 | 68- Military at                 | •                          |       |
|                 | 69- Stop of wa                  |                            |       |
|                 | 70- Other milit                 |                            |       |
|                 |                                 |                            |       |
| 5-6- Terrorism  | n subjects                      | up to three subjects       | 29-31 |
|                 | 71- Attack of o                 | officials                  |       |
|                 | 72- Riots/Dem                   |                            |       |
|                 | 73- Terrorist o                 |                            |       |
|                 | 74- Hijack of a                 |                            |       |
|                 |                                 | n of police violence       |       |
|                 | 76- Accusation                  | -                          |       |
|                 | 77- Denial of a                 |                            |       |
|                 | 78- Palestiniar                 |                            |       |
|                 | 79- Other terro                 | <u>-</u>                   |       |
|                 | 1)- Other terre                 |                            |       |
| 5-7- Social su  | bjects                          | up to three subjects       | 32-35 |
|                 | 80- Social pro                  | blems                      |       |
|                 | 81- Housing se                  |                            |       |
|                 | 82- Health ser                  |                            |       |
|                 | 83- Infrastruct                 |                            |       |
|                 |                                 | nning/population           |       |
|                 | 85-Falling une                  |                            |       |
|                 | 86- Human rig                   |                            |       |
|                 | 87- Other soci                  |                            |       |
|                 | J. J. 2.2.2                     | •                          |       |
| 5-6- Other su   | bjects                          | up to three subjects       | 36-38 |

| <ul> <li>92- Natural disasters</li> <li>93- Entertainment</li> <li>94- Religion</li> <li>95- Building new houses for Jews in the occupied lands</li> <li>00- No sub-subject</li> </ul>   |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| (6) Orientation of the Item  |   | 39   |
| (1) Positive Orientation:  |   |  |
| (2) Natural orientation  |   |  |
| (3) Negative orientation   |   |  |
| (7) Values of orientation  |   |  |
| 7-1 Positive Orientation:  |   |  |
| - Peaceful - Friendly - Normalization - Cooperative - Growth - Developing - Equality - Democratic - Freedom - Participation - Plurality - Stability - Homogeneity - Culture - Reform - Secure - Confidence - End of suffering - Renaissance - Successful | [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] | 40<br>41<br>42<br>43<br>45<br>46<br>47<br>48<br>49<br>50<br>51<br>52<br>53<br>54<br>55<br>56<br>57<br>58<br>59<br>60<br>61 |
| - Praise   | . ,                                     |  |
| 7-2- Negative Orientation: - Aggressive  | []                                      | 62   |

88- Crime / legal 89- Sports 90- Scientific topics

91- Human accidents

| - Terrorist                 | []  | 63 |
|-----------------------------|-----|----|
| - Violent                   | ίi  | 64 |
| - Killer                    | Ϊĵ  | 65 |
| - Apartheid                 | ίi  | 66 |
| - Inequality                | ii  | 67 |
| - Dependent                 | ίí  | 68 |
| - Isolation                 | ίi  | 69 |
| - Refusing of normalization | ίi  | 70 |
| - Centralization            | ίí  | 71 |
| - Imperialist               | ίi  | 72 |
| - Dictatorial               | ίi  | 73 |
| - Opposition                | ίi  | 74 |
| - War-supporter             | ίi  | 75 |
| - Threatening               | ίi  | 76 |
| - Illegal / Criminal        | ίi  | 77 |
| - Competition of interests  | ΪÌ  | 78 |
| - Refusal                   | ΪÌ  | 79 |
| - Corruption                | [ ] | 80 |

### (8) Actor /Actors

### (1) National Actor / Actors:

| Up to two actors.                 | [ ][ ][ ][ ] 81-82    |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 01- President / Prime Mini        | ster / vice-president |
| 02- Ruling party                  |                       |
| 03- Parliament                    |                       |
| 04- Ministers                     |                       |
| 05- Local government              |                       |
| 06- Political opposition          |                       |
| 07- Ambassadors                   |                       |
| 08- Military officials            |                       |
| 09- Social organizations          |                       |
| 10- Police officers               |                       |
| 11- Terrorists                    |                       |
| 12- Education/scientific          |                       |
| 13- Mass media                    |                       |
| 14- Egyptian people               |                       |
| 15- Other national actor          |                       |
| 00- No national actor             |                       |
| (2) International Actor / Actors: |                       |
| Up to two actors                  | [ ][ ][ ][ ] 83-84    |
| 01- President / Prime Mini        | ster / vice-president |
| 02- Ministers                     |                       |
| 03- Parliament                    |                       |
| 04- Political opposition          |                       |
|                                   |                       |

|                    | 05- Ambassadors                       |    |    |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|----|----|
|                    | 06- Military official                 |    |    |
|                    | 07- Pressure groups                   |    |    |
|                    | 08- United Nations / UNESCO           |    |    |
|                    | 09- Arab League                       |    |    |
|                    | 10- PLO                               |    |    |
|                    | 11- Terrorists                        |    |    |
|                    | 12- Guerrillas                        |    |    |
|                    | 13- Other international actor         |    |    |
|                    | 00- No human actor                    |    |    |
| (9) Functio        | n of Item                             |    |    |
|                    | Only one function                     | [] | 85 |
|                    | (1) Information                       |    |    |
|                    | (2) Correlation                       |    |    |
|                    | (3) Continuity                        |    |    |
|                    | (4) Entertainment                     |    |    |
|                    | (5) Mobilization                      |    |    |
| (10) Source        | of Item                               | [] | 86 |
|                    | (1) Egyptian News Agency (MENA)       |    |    |
|                    | (2) Arab News Agencies                |    |    |
|                    | (3) International Agencies (Four Big) |    |    |
|                    | (4) Tass                              |    |    |
|                    | (5) Other Agency or Network           |    |    |
|                    | (6) Foreign Media                     |    |    |
|                    | (7) The newspaper under analysis      |    |    |
|                    | (8) Other Egyptian media              |    |    |
|                    | (9) Own correspondent                 |    |    |
|                    | (10) Own writer (dominant journalist) |    |    |
|                    | (11) Intellectuals                    |    |    |
|                    | (12) Other source                     |    |    |
|                    | (13) Unknown                          |    |    |
| (11) <i>Type o</i> | f the Item                            |    |    |
|                    | Only one type                         | [] | 87 |
|                    | (1) News story                        |    |    |
|                    | (2) News story with picture           |    |    |
|                    | (3) Picture only                      |    |    |
|                    | (4) Main editorial                    |    |    |
|                    | (5) Daily column / Weekly column      |    |    |
|                    | (6) Analytical editorial              |    |    |

| (12) Loca | ation of the Item   |        |       |
|-----------|---|--------|-------|
|           | Only one location   | []     | 88    |
|           | <ul><li>(1) Main topic of the front page</li><li>(2) Front page</li><li>(3) Back page</li><li>(4) Inside page</li></ul> |        |       |
| (13) Len  | gth of the Item  Length of the item will be  Calculated by cm/col.  | [][][] | 89-91 |
| (14) Sup  | porting Material  |        |       |
|           | Only one supporting material  | []     | 92    |
|           | (1) Figures   |        |       |
|           | (2) Maps<br>(3) Pictures  |        |       |
|           | (4) Tables  |        |       |
|           | (5) Frame   |        |       |
|           | (6) Other supporting material   |        |       |
|           | (0) No supporting material  |        |       |

## APPENDIX C: Appendices of chapter 6

# Appendix C.1, international actors in both papers

| International actor      | Al-Ahram |       | Al-Shaa | ıb    |
|--------------------------|----------|-------|---------|-------|
|                          | N        | %     | N       | %     |
| President/prime minister | 120      | 22.2  | 21      | 22.9  |
| Ministers/ambassadors    | 55       | 10.2  | 6       | 9.9   |
| Parliament/opposition    | 17       | 3.1   | 3       | 3.2   |
| Military officers        | 16       | 3.0   | 2       | 2.9   |
| Other actor              | 5        | 0.9   | -       | 0.8   |
| No human actor           | 328      | 60.6  | 44      | 60.3  |
| Total                    | 541      | 100.0 | 76      | 100.0 |

### Appendix C.2, negative values in both papers in four periods

| Newspap  | er and   |            | Negativ   | e values o | r wards    |            |
|----------|----------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|
| periods  |          | Aggressive | Violent   | Opposition | Threaten   | Refusal    |
| Al-Ahram | Period 1 | 9.3        | 17.4      | 12.5       | 11.1       | 17.9       |
|          | Period 2 | 11.6       | 13.0      | 41.7       | 25.0       | 39.3       |
|          | Period 3 | 46.5       | 30.4      | 37.5       | 38.9       | 42.9       |
|          | Period 4 | 32.6       | 39.1      | 8.3        | 25.0       | -          |
|          | Total    | 100.0 / 43 | 100.0/23  | 100.0 / 24 | 100.0 / 36 | 100.0/ 28  |
| Al-Shaab | Period 1 | -          | -         | -          | -          | -          |
|          | Period 2 | 36.4       | -         | 36.8       | 40.0       | 37.5       |
|          | Period 3 | 54.5       | 100.0     | 36.8       | 50.0       | 45.8       |
|          | Period 4 | 9.1        | -         | 26.4       | 10.0       | 16.7       |
|          | Total    | 100.0/22   | 100.0 / 4 | 100.0 / 19 | 100.0 / 10 | 100.0 / 24 |

### APPENDIX D: Appendices of chapter 7

## Appendix (D.1) Location of coverage devoted to the economic-subsidiaries

|                             |            | LOC       | ation of t  | the coverage |           |              |  |  |
|-----------------------------|------------|-----------|-------------|--------------|-----------|--------------|--|--|
|                             | as a       | subsidiar | y one       | as a         | subsidiar | bsidiary two |  |  |
| Economic subjects           | front page | back page | inside page | front page   | back page | inside page  |  |  |
| Improvement of income/      | 14         |           | 9           | 10           |           | 6            |  |  |
| material needs              | 18.9%      |           | 20.9%       | 17.2%        |           | 20.0%        |  |  |
| Solving of economic         | 18         | 3         | 12          | 18           |           | 9            |  |  |
| problems                    | 24.3%      | 60.0%     | 27.9%       | 31.0%        |           | 30.0%        |  |  |
| Economic projects/          | 19         |           | 11          | 8            | 4         | 7            |  |  |
| industries                  | 25.7%      |           | 25.6%       | 13.8%        | 50.0%     | 23.3%        |  |  |
| Economic aid                | 6          |           |             | 2            |           | 1            |  |  |
|                             | 8.1%       |           |             | 3.4%         |           | 3.3%         |  |  |
| Equality of income          |            |           | 1           | 4            | 1         | 2            |  |  |
|                             |            |           | 2.3%        | 6.9%         | 12.5%     | 6.7%         |  |  |
| Economic normalization      | 13         | 2         | 9           | 9            | 1         | 2            |  |  |
|                             | 17.6%      | 40.0%     | 20.9%       | 15.5%        | 12.5%     | 6.7%         |  |  |
| Decreasing of normalization | 2          |           |             | 4            |           | 1            |  |  |
|                             | 2.7%       |           |             | 6.9%         |           | 3.3%         |  |  |
| Others                      | 2          |           | 1           | 3            | 2         | 2            |  |  |
|                             | 2.7%       |           | 2.3%        | 5.2%         | 25.0%     | 6.7%         |  |  |
| Total                       | 74         | 5         | 43          | 58           | 8         | 30           |  |  |
|                             | 100.0%     | 100.0%    | 100.0%      | 100.0%       | 100.0%    | 100.0%       |  |  |

#### Appendix (D.2) Types of coverage devoted to the economic-subsidiaries

|                     |        | As a sub          | sidiary o | ne                      | -      | As a sub          | sidiary t | NO                      |
|---------------------|--------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------------|--------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------------|
| Economic subjects   | 116443 | main<br>editorial |           | analytical<br>editorial |        | main<br>editorial |           | analytical<br>editorial |
| Improvement         | 17     | 1                 | 3         | 2                       | 10     | 1                 | 3         | 2                       |
| of income           | 21.5%  | 7.7%              | 16.7%     | 16.7%                   | 17.9%  | 8.3%              | 16.7%     | 20.0%                   |
| Solving of economic | 19     | 3                 | 6         | 5                       | 16     | 5                 | 5         | 1                       |
| problems            | 24.1%  | 23.1%             | 33.3%     | 41.7%                   | 28.6%  | 41.7%             | 27.8%     | 10.0%                   |
| New projects        | 20     | 5                 | 3         | 2                       | 8      | 2                 | 5         | 4                       |
|                     | 25.3%  | 38.5%             | 16.7%     | 16.7%                   | 14.3%  | 16.7%             | 27.8%     | 40.0%                   |
| Economic aid        | 5      |                   |           | 1                       | 2      | 1                 |           |                         |
|                     | 6.3%   |                   |           | 8.3%                    | 3.6%   | 8.3%_             |           |                         |
| Equality of income  |        |                   | 1         |                         | 4      | 1                 | 1         | 1                       |
|                     |        |                   | 5.6%      |                         | 7.1%   | 8.3%              | 5.6%      | 10.0%                   |
| Economic            | 14     | 4                 | 4         | 2                       | 9      | 1 .               | 2         |                         |
| normalization       | 17.7%  | 30.8%             | 22.2%     | 16.7%                   | 16.1%  | 8.3%              | 11.1%     |                         |
| Decrasing of        | 2      |                   |           |                         | 4      |                   |           | 1                       |
| normalization       | 2.5%   |                   |           |                         | 7.1%   |                   |           | 10.0%                   |
| Others              | 2      |                   | 1         |                         | 3      | 1                 | 2         | 1                       |
| -                   | 2.5%   |                   | 5.6%      |                         | 5.4%   | 8.3%              | 11.1%     | 10.0%                   |
| Total               | 79     | 13                | 18        | 12                      | 56     | 12                | 18        | 10                      |
|                     | 100.0% | 100.0%            | 100.0%    | 100.0%                  | 100.0% | 100.0%            | 100.0%    | 100.0%                  |

Appendix (D.3) National actors involved in the economic-subsidiaries

| Economic            | 5         | Subsidiary | one N=10           | 7*        | Subsidiary two N=75** |           |           |  |
|---------------------|-----------|------------|--------------------|-----------|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|--|
| subjects            | president | ministers  | local<br>governors | Egyptians | president             | ministers | Egyptians |  |
| Improvement         | 11        | 4          | 1                  | 3         | 6                     | 5         | 2         |  |
| of income           | 17.7%     | 15.4%      | 10.0%              | 33.3%     | 11.8%                 | 31.3%     | 25.0%     |  |
| Solving of economic | 22        | 4          | 3                  | 3         | 15                    | 5         | 2         |  |
| problems            | 35.5%     | 15.4%      | 30.0%              | 33.3%     | 29.4%                 | 31.3%     | 25.0%     |  |
| New projects        | 12        | 8          | 5                  | 1         | 10                    | 4         | 1         |  |
|                     | 19.4%     | 30.8%      | 50.0%              | 11.1%     | 19.6%                 | 25.0%     | 12.5%     |  |
| Economic aid        | 4         |            | 1                  |           | 2                     |           |           |  |
|                     | 6.5%      |            | 10.0%              |           | 3.9%                  |           |           |  |
| Equality of income  | 1         |            |                    |           | 5                     |           | 1         |  |
|                     | 1.6%      |            |                    |           | 9.8%                  |           | 12.5%     |  |
| Economic            | 10        | 8          |                    | 2         | 5                     | 2         | 1         |  |
| normalization       | 16.1%     | 30.8%      |                    | 22.2%     | 9.8%                  | 12.5%     | 12.5%     |  |
| Decrasing of        | 1         | 1          |                    |           | 2                     |           |           |  |
| normalization       | 1.6%      | 3.8%       |                    |           | 3.9%                  | <u> </u>  | l         |  |
| Others              | 1         | 1          |                    | [         | 6                     |           | 1         |  |
|                     | 1.6%      | 3.8%       | <u></u>            |           | 11.8%                 |           | 12.5%     |  |
| Total               | 62        | 26         | 10                 | 9         | 51                    | 16        | 8         |  |
| _                   | 100.0%    | 100.0%     | 100.0%             | 100.0%    | 100.0%                | 100.0%    | 100.0%    |  |

<sup>\*</sup> Other national actors were: no human actor [7], parliament [2], social organization [2], military officers [3] and others [1]. The total number is 122

#### Appendix (D.4) Sources of sub-economic subjects

|                        | Subsi       | idiary o           | ne N=1 | 109*                         |                | Subsidi            | iary tw       | o N=74*    | *              |
|------------------------|-------------|--------------------|--------|------------------------------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|----------------|
| Economic subjects      | Four<br>big | Corresp-<br>ondent |        | specialist                   | two<br>sources | Corresp-<br>ondent | own<br>writer | specialist | two<br>sources |
| Improvement            | 2           | 5                  | 4      | 2                            | 7              | 4                  | 4             | 2          | 1              |
| of income              | 15.4%       | 16.7%              | 12.5%  | 18.2%                        | 30.4%          | 26.7%              | 13.3%         | 20.0%      | 5.3%           |
| Solving of economic    | 4           | 7                  | 9      | 5                            | 5              | 4                  | 10            | 1          | 6              |
| problems               | 30.8%       | 23.3%              | 28.1%  | 45.5%                        | 21.7%          | 26.7%              | 33.3%         | 10.0%      | 31.6%          |
| New projects           | 3           | 9                  | 8      | 2                            | 6              | 2                  | 7             | 4          | 2              |
| . ,                    | 23.1%       | 30.0%              | 25.0%  | 18.2%                        | 26.1%          | 13.3%              | 23.3%         | 40.0%      | 10.5%          |
| Economic aid           |             | 2                  |        | 1                            | 2              |                    | 1             |            |                |
|                        |             | 6.70%              |        | 9.10%                        | 8.70%          |                    | 3.30%         |            |                |
| Equality of income     |             |                    | 1      |                              |                |                    | 2             | 1          | 4              |
| •                      |             |                    | 3.1%   |                              | L              |                    | 6.7%          | 10.0%      | 21.1%          |
| Economic               | 4           | 6                  | 9      | 1                            | 2              | 2                  | 3             |            | 4              |
| normalization          | 30.8%       | 20.0%              | 28.1%  | 9.1%                         | 8.7%           | 13.3%              | 10.0%         |            | 21.1%          |
| Decrasing of           |             | 1                  |        |                              | 1              | 3                  |               | 1          |                |
| normalization          |             | 3.3%               |        |                              | 4.3%           | 20.0%              |               | 10.0%      |                |
| others                 |             |                    | 1      |                              |                | 1                  | 3             | 1          | 2              |
|                        |             |                    | 3.1%_  |                              |                |                    | 10.0%         | 10.0%      | 10.5%          |
| Total                  | 13          | 30                 | 32     | 11                           | 23             | 15                 | 30            | 10         | 19             |
|                        | 100 0%      | 100.0%             | 100.0% | 100.0%                       | 100.0%         | 100.0%             | 100.0%        | 100.0%     | 100.0%         |
| * Other sources of sub | sidiary o   | ne were:           | MENA ( | 6], unidenti<br>161 four bio | fied [7]. 1    | he total n         | umber is      | 3 122      | is 96          |

<sup>\*\*</sup> Other national actors were: no human actor [5], local governors [4], parliament [2], social organization [6], military officers [2] and political opposition [2]. The total number is 96

<sup>\*\*</sup> Other sources of subsidiary two were: MENA [6], four big [8], unidentified [5]. The total number is 96

## Appendix (D.5) coverage of sub-economic subjects over time

| Economic subjects            | As subsidia        | ary one       | As subsidia | ary two       |
|------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
|                              | <b>Under Sadat</b> | Under Mubarak | Under Sadat | Under Mubarak |
| Improvement of income        | 17                 | 6             | 13          | 3             |
|                              | 21.5%              | 14.0%         | 20.0%       | 9.7%          |
| Solving of economic problems | 24                 | 9             | 21          | 6             |
|                              | 30.4%              | 20.9%         | 32.3%       | 19.4%         |
| New projects                 | 19                 | 11            | 9           | 10            |
|                              | 24.1%              | 25.6%         | 13.8%       | 32.3%         |
| Economic aid                 | 3                  | 3             | 3           |               |
|                              | 3.80%              | 7.00%         | 4.60%       |               |
| Equality of income           | 1                  |               | 4           | 3             |
|                              | 1.3%               |               | 6.2%        | 9.7%          |
| Economic normalization       | 14                 | 10            | 8           | 4             |
|                              | 17.7%              | 23.3%         | 12.3%       | 12.9%         |
| Decrasing of normalization   |                    | 2             | 2           | 3             |
| -                            | 1                  | 4.7%          | 3.1%        | 9.7%          |
| Others                       | 1                  | 2             | 5           | 2             |
|                              | 1.3%               | 4.7%          | 7.7%        | 6.5%          |
| Total                        | 79                 | 43            | 65          | 31            |
|                              | 100.0%             | 100.0%        | 100.0%      | 100.0%        |

### Appendix (D.6) Orientation of the coverage towards economic subsidiaries

| Economic subjects   | As su  | bsidia  | ry one   |        |          | As s    | ubsidiar | y two  |
|---------------------|--------|---------|----------|--------|----------|---------|----------|--------|
|                     |        | natural | negative | Total  | positive | natural | negative | Total  |
| Improvement         | 12     | 9       | 2        | 23     | 9        | 5       | 2        | 16     |
| of income           | 52.2%  | 39.1%   | 8.7%     | 100.0% | 56.3%    | 31.3%   | 12.5%    | 100.0% |
| Solving of economic | 24     | 8       | 1        | 33     | 14       | 12      | 1        | 27     |
| problems            | 72.7%  | 24.2%   | 3.0%     | 100.0% | 51.9%    | 44.4%   | 3.7%     | 100.0% |
| New projects        | 14     | 16      |          | 30     | 11       | 7       | 1        | 19     |
| • •                 | 46.7%  | 53.3%   |          | 100.0% | 57.9%    | 36.8%   | 5.3%     | 100.0% |
| Economic aid        | 1      | 5       |          | 6      | 1        | 2       |          | 3      |
|                     | 16.7%  | 83.3%   |          | 100.0% | 33.3%    | 66.7%   |          | 100.0% |
| Equality of income  | 1      |         |          | 1      | 4        | 3       |          | 7      |
|                     | 100.0% |         |          | 100.0% | 57.1%    | 42.9%   |          | 100.0% |
| Economic            | 10     | 8       | 6        | 24     | 1        | 10      | 1        | 12     |
| normalization       | 41.7%  | 33.3%   | 25.0%    | 100.0% | 8.3%     | 83.3%   | 8.3%     | 100.0% |
| Decrasing of        |        | 2       |          | 2      | 1        |         | 4        | 5      |
| normalization       | į      | 100.0%  | ,        | 100.0% | 20.0%    |         | 80.0%    | 100.0% |
| Others              | 2      | 1       |          | 3      | 3        | 3       | 1        | 7      |
|                     | 66.7%  | 33.3%   |          | 100.0% | 42.9%    | 42.9%   | 14.3%    | 100.0% |
| Total               | 64     | 49      | 9        | 122    | 44       | 42      | 10       | 96     |
| 10441               | 52.5%  |         | 7.4%     | 100.0% | 45.8%    | 43.8%   | 10.4%    | 100.0% |

#### **APPENDIX E: Appendices of Chapter 8**

#### Appendix E.1- Location of political subjects as subsidiaries

| Political subjects           | Subsidiar    | y one     |              | Subsidiary two |           |              |  |
|------------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------------|----------------|-----------|--------------|--|
|                              | Front page   | Back page | Inside page  | Front page     | Back page | Inside page  |  |
| Political participation      | 30.4         | 50.0      | 30.6         | 26.4           | 50.0      | 32.5         |  |
| Activities of government     | 22.8         | 25.0      | 11.1         | 12.5           | -         | 5.0          |  |
| Activities of parliament     | 6.3          | -         | 2.8          | 6.9            | -         | 5.0          |  |
| Activities of opposition     | 1.3          | -         | 8.3          | 1.4            | -         | 5.0          |  |
| Returning to Arab            | 6.3          | -         | 2.8          | 4.2            | -         | -            |  |
| Stability in the Middle East | 22.8         | 25.0      | 27.8         | 34.7           | -         | 27.5         |  |
| Reducing of p. normalization | 8.9          | -         | 8.3          | 12.5           | -         | 25.0         |  |
| Other political subject      | 1.3          | -         | 8.3          | 1.4            | 50.0      | -            |  |
| Total                        | 79<br>100.0% | 4 100.0%  | 36<br>100.0% | 72<br>100.0%   | 2 100.0%  | 40<br>100.0% |  |

Appendix E.2- Type of Political Subjects as Subsidiaries

|                              | As a s          | ubsidiary         | y one           |                      | As a subsid  | liary two         |              |                      |
|------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------------|--------------|-------------------|--------------|----------------------|
| Political subjects           | News<br>stories | Main<br>editorial | Daily<br>column | Analytical editorial | News stories | Main<br>editorial | Daily column | Analytical editorial |
| Political participation      | 28.2            | 37.5              | 31.3            | 44.4                 | 26.9         | 15.4              | 50.0         | 38.5                 |
| Activities of government     | 21.8            | 18.8              | 12.5            | 11.1                 | 10.3         | 7.7               | -            | 15.4                 |
| Activities of parliament     | 6.4             | -                 | -               | 11.1                 | 7.7          | 7.7               | -            | -                    |
| Activities of opposition     | 1.3             | 6.3               | 12.5            | -                    | 2.6          | -                 | 10.0         | -                    |
| Returning to Arab            | 6.4             | _                 | 6.3             | -                    | 3.8          | -                 | -            | -                    |
| Stability in the Middle East | 24.4            | 31.3              | 25.0            | 11.1                 | 32.1         | 46.2              | 30.0         | 15.4                 |
| Reducing of p. normalization | 10.3            | -                 | 12.5            | -                    | 15.4         | 23.1              | 10.0         | 23.1                 |
| Other political subject      | 1.3             | 6.3               | -               | 22.2                 | 1.3          | -                 | -            | 7.7                  |
| Total                        | 78<br>100.0     | 16<br>100.0%      | 16<br>100.0%    | 9 100.0%             | 78<br>100.0% | 13<br>100.0%      | 10<br>100.0% | 13<br>100.0%         |

Appendix (E.3) National actors involved in sub-political subjects

|                              | As a subsid               | iary one     | N=94*             |                      | As su                    | bsidiary t   | wo N=             | 97**                |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|--------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Political subjects           | President/<br>P. minister | Ministers    | Local<br>governor | Political opposition | President/p.<br>minister | Ministers    | Local<br>governor | Political oppositio |
| Political participation      | 34.4                      | 35.3         | -                 | 14.3                 | 29.9                     | 38.5         | 33.3              | 18.2                |
| Activities of government     | 21.9                      | 35.3         | 33.3              | -                    | 9.0                      | 23.1         | 16.7              | -                   |
| Activities of parliament     | 4.7                       | -            | 16.7              | -                    | 9.0                      | 7.7          | -                 | -                   |
| Activities of opposition     | 1.6                       | -            | -                 | 28.6                 | 3.0                      | -            | -                 | 9.1                 |
| Returning to Arab            | 6.3                       | -            | 16.7              | 14.3                 | 4.5                      | -            | <b>-</b>          | -                   |
| Stability in the Middle East | 18.8                      | 29.4         | 33.3              | -                    | 35.8                     | 23.1         | 33.3              | -                   |
| Reducing of normalization    | 9.4                       | -            | -                 | 28.6                 | 6.0                      | 7.7          | 16.7              | 72.7                |
| Other political subject      | 3.1                       | -            | -                 | 14.3                 | 3.0                      | -            | -                 | -                   |
| Total                        | 64<br>100.0%              | 17<br>100.0% | 6<br>100.0%       | 7<br>100.0%          | 67<br>100.0%             | 13<br>100.0% | 6<br>100.0%       | 11<br>100.0%        |

<sup>\*</sup> Other national actors were: no human actor [12], parliament [4], social organization [2], military/police officers [3] and Egyptians [4]. The total number was 119

<sup>\*\*</sup> Other national actors were: no human actor [8], parliament [4], social organization [2], military/police officers [2] and Egyptians [1]. The total number was 114

Appendix (E.4) Sources of sub-political subjects

| Political subject            | Sources<br>N = 11 |                  | itical subject | as a subsic  | diary one    |              | Sources for political subject as a subsidiary two, $N = 102**$ |              |              |              |              |
|------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| ı                            | MENA              | Four<br>big      | Corespondent   | Writer       | Specialist   | Two sources  | Four big   | Corespondent | Writer       | Specialist   | Two sources  |
| Political participation      | 14.3              | 21.4             | 41.7           | 30.0         | 50.0         | 25.0         | 38.5   | 33.3         | 30.4         | 35.7         | 22.7         |
| Activities of government     | 35.7              | 21.4             | 12.5           | 16.7         | 10.0         | 25.0         | 7.7  | 10.0         | 4.3          | 14.3         | 9.1          |
| Activities of parliament     | 7.1               | 7.1              | 4.2            | -            | 10.0         | 10.0         | 7.7  | 3.3          | 4.3          | -            | 13.6         |
| Activities of opposition     | -                 | -                | 4.2            | 10.0         | -            | -            | -  | -            | 4.3          | 7.1          | _            |
| Returning to Arab            | 7.1               | 7.1              | -              | 3.3          | -            | 10.0         | -  | 3.3          | -            | -            | 4.5          |
| Stability in the Middle East | 35.7              | 21.4             | 25.0           | 30.0         | 10.0         | 25.0         | 30.8   | 23.3         | 43.5         | 7.1          | 40.9         |
| Reducing of p. normalization | -                 | 14.3             | 12.5           | 6.7          | -            | 5.0          | 15.4   | 23.3         | 13.0         | 28.6         | 9.1          |
| Other political subject      | -                 | 7.1              | -              | 3.3          | 20.0         | -            | _  | 3.3          | 0.2          | 7.1          | -            |
| Total                        | 14<br>100.0<br>%  | 14<br>100.0<br>% | 24<br>100.0%   | 30<br>100.0% | 10<br>100.0% | 20<br>100.0% | 13<br>100.0%   | 30<br>100.0% | 23<br>100.0% | 14<br>100.0% | 22<br>100.0% |

<sup>\*</sup> Other sources for political subject as subsidiary one were: unidentified [3] and other sources [4]. Total number is 119.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Other sources for political subject as subsidiary one were: MENA [4], unidentified [5] and other sources [3]. Total number is 114.

Appendix (E.5) Coverage of sub-political subjects in two periods

| Political subjects           | Subsidia           | ry one            | Subsidia          | ry two           |
|------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| I ontical subjects           | Under<br>Sadat     | Under<br>Mubarak  | Under<br>Sadat    | Under<br>Mubarak |
| Political participation      | 25                 | 12                | 22                | 11               |
| Activities of government     | 33.3<br>15<br>20.0 | 27.3<br>8<br>18.2 | 31.4<br>7<br>10.0 | 25.0<br>4<br>9.1 |
| Activities of parliament     | 5 6.7              | 1 2.3             | 6<br>8.6          | 1 2.3            |
| Activities of opposition     | 2 2.7              | 2 4.5             | 2 2.9             | 1 2.3            |
| Returning to Arab            | -                  | 6 13.6            | -                 | 3 6.8            |
| Stability in the Middle East | 15<br>20.0         | 14<br>31.8        | 20<br>28.6        | 16<br>36.4       |
| Reducing of p. normalization | 9 12.0             | 1 2.3             | 12<br>17.1        | 7<br>15.9        |
| Other political subject      | 5.3                | -                 | 1 1.4             | 1 2.3            |
| Total                        | 75<br>100.0%       | 44<br>100.0%      | 70<br>100.0%      | 44 100.0%        |

Appendix (E.6) Orientation of coverage towards sub-political subjects\*

|                              | Orientati | on toward | ds subsidi | iary one    | Orientation towards subsidiary two |         |          |              |  |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------|------------------------------------|---------|----------|--------------|--|
| Political subjects           | Positive  | Neutral   | Negative   | Total       | Positive                           | Neutral | Negative | Total        |  |
| Political participation      | 51.4      | 40.5      | 8.1        | 37 / 100.0% | 45.5                               | 33.3    | 21.2     | 33 / 100.0%  |  |
| Activities of government     | 26.1      | 56.5      | 17.4       | 23 / 100.0% | 36.4                               | 54.5    | 9.1      | 11 / 100.0%  |  |
| Activities of parliament     | 33.3      | 50.0      | 16.7       | 6 / 100.0%  | 57.1                               | 28.6    | 14.3     | 7 / 100.0%   |  |
| Activities of opposition     | 50.0      | -         | 50.0       | 4 / 100.0%  | 33.3                               | 33.3    | 33.3     | 3 / 100.0%   |  |
| Returning to Arab            | 16.7      | 50.0      | 33.3       | 6 / 100.0%  | -                                  | 100.0   | -        | 3 / 100.0%   |  |
| Stability in the Middle East | 48.3      | 41.4      | 10.3       | 29 / 100.0% | 30.6                               | 47.2    | 22.2     | 36 / 100.0%  |  |
| Reducing of p. normalization | 20.0      | 60.0      | 20.0       | 10 / 100.0% | 73.7                               | 10.5    | 15.8     | 19 / 100.0%  |  |
| Other political subject      | 25.0      | 25.0      | 50.0       | 4 / 100.0%  | 50.0                               | _       | 50.0     | 2 / 100.0%   |  |
| Total                        | 39.5      | 44.5      | 16.0       | 119 / 100.0 | 43.9                               | 36.8    | 19.3     | 114 / 100.0% |  |

<sup>\*</sup> The above figures show percentages of orientation within each political sub-subject, not within each orientation.

# **APPENDIX F: Appendices of Chapter Nine**

Appendix (F.1) Location of sub-cultural subjects

| Culture Subjects                     |            | Subsid       | iary 1         | j          | Subsi        | diary 2        |
|--------------------------------------|------------|--------------|----------------|------------|--------------|----------------|
|                                      | Front page | Back<br>page | Inside<br>page | Front page | Back<br>page | Inside<br>page |
| Arabic identity of Egypt             | 3          | 1            | 9              | 5          |              | 4              |
|                                      | 16.7%      | 20.0%        | 22.5%          | 20.0%      |              | 13.3%          |
| Pharaonic identity of Egypt          | 4          | 2            | 8              | 1          |              | 8              |
|                                      | 22.2%      | 40.0%        | 20.0%          | 4.0%       |              | 26.7%          |
| slamic identity of Egypt             | 3          |              | 3              | 2          |              | 3              |
|                                      | 16.7%      |              | 7.5%           | 8.0%       |              | 10.0%          |
| National integration/harmonic values | 3          |              | 10             | 7          | 1            | 5              |
|                                      | 16.7%      |              | 25.0%          | 28.0%      | 20.0%        | 16.7%          |
| Negative image about Israelis        | 1          | 1            | 3              | 2          | 2            | 1              |
|                                      | 5.6%       | 20.0%        | 7.5%           | 8.0%       | 40.0%        | 3.3%           |
| Other                                | 4          | 1            | 7              | 8          | 2            | 9              |
|                                      | 22.2%      | 20.0%        | 17.5%          | 32.0%      | 40.0%        | 30.0%          |
| Total                                | 18         | 5            | 40             | 25         | 5            | 30             |
|                                      | 100.0%     | 100.0%       | 100.0%         | 100.0%     | 100.0%       | 100.0%         |

#### Appendix (F.2) location of sub-social subjects

| Social subject   |            | Subsi     | diary 1     |            | Subs      | idiary 2    |
|------------------|------------|-----------|-------------|------------|-----------|-------------|
| ,                | Front page | Back page | Inside page | Front page | Back page | Inside page |
| Housing services | 6          | 3         | 3           | 2          | 1         |             |
|                  | 27.3%      | 60.0%     | 42.9%       | 12.5%      | 50.0%     |             |
| Infrastructures  | 7          | 2         | 1           | 3          |           | 1           |
|                  | 31.8%      | 40.0%     | 14.3%       | 18.8%      |           | 33.3%       |
| Health services  | 6          |           | 2           | 9          | 1         | 1           |
|                  | 27.3%      |           | 28.6%       | 56.3%      | 50.0%     |             |
| Unemployment     | 3          |           | 1           | 1          |           | 2           |
| •                | 13.6%      |           | 14.3%       | 6.3%       |           | 66.7%       |
| Others           |            |           |             | 1          |           |             |
|                  |            |           |             | 6.3%       |           |             |
| Total            | 22         | 5         | 7           | 16         | 2         | 3           |
|                  | 100.0%     | 100.0%    | 100.0%      | 100.0%     | 100.0%    | 100.0%      |

Appendix (F.3) Kinds of coverage devoted to sub-cultural subjects

| Social subjects       |               | 1                 | Subsidiar       | y 1                  |               |                   | Subsidia     | ry 2                 |
|-----------------------|---------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|----------------------|
|                       | News<br>story | Main<br>editorial | Daily<br>column | Analytical editorial | News<br>story | Main<br>editorial | Daily column | Analytical editorial |
| Arabic identity       | 4             | 3                 | 2               | 4                    | 3             | 2                 | 2            | 2                    |
| of Egypt              | 25.0%         | 27.3%             | 14.3%           | 18.2%                | 15.0%         | 16.7%             | 13.3%        | 15.4%                |
| Pharaonic identity    | 4             | 2                 | 4               | 4                    | 2             | 3                 | 1            | 3                    |
| of Egypt              | 25.0%         | 18.2%             | 28.6%           | 18.2%                | 10.0%         | 25.0%             | 6.7%         | 23.1%                |
| Islamic identity      | 2             | 1                 |                 | 3                    | 1             | 1                 | 2            | 1                    |
| of Egypt              | 12.5%         | 9.1%              |                 | 13.6%                | 5.0%          | 8.3%              | 13.3%        | 7.7%                 |
| National integration/ | 2             | 2                 | 4               | 5                    | 4             | 4                 | 4            | 1                    |
| harmonic values       | 12.5%         | 18.2%             | 28.6%           | 22.7%                | 20.0%         | 33.3%             | 26.7%        | 7.7%                 |
| Negative image        | 1             | 1                 | 2               | 1                    | 1             |                   | 3            | 1                    |
| about Israelis        | 6.3%          | 9.1%              | 14.3%           | 4.5%                 | 5.0%          |                   | 20.0%        | 7.7%                 |
| Others                | 3             | 2                 | 2               | 5                    | 9             | 2                 | 3            | 5                    |
|                       | 18.8%         | 18.2%             | 14.3%           | 22.7%                | 45.0%         | 16.7%             | 20.0%        | 38.5%                |
| Total                 | 16            | 11                | 14              | 22                   | 20            | 12                | 15           | 13                   |
|                       | 100.0%        | 100.0%            | 100.0%          | 100.0%               | 100.0%        | 100.0%            | 100.0%       | 100.0%               |

Appendix (F.4) Kinds of coverage devoted to sub-social subjects

| Social subjects       |            | Subsidiary   | 1 no=33*             | Subsidiar  | y 2          |
|-----------------------|------------|--------------|----------------------|------------|--------------|
|                       | news story | daily column | analytical editorial | news story | daily column |
| Housing services      | 6          | 4            | 2                    | 2          | 1            |
|                       | 27.3%      | 50.0%        | 66.7%                | 10.5%      | 50.0%        |
| Infrastructures       | 7          | 2            | 1                    | 4          |              |
|                       | 31.8%      | 25.0%        | 33.3%                | 21.1%      |              |
| Health services       | 6          | 2            |                      | 10         |              |
|                       | 27.3%      | 25.0%        |                      | 52.6%      |              |
| Solving unemployement | 3          |              |                      | 2          | 1            |
|                       | 13.6%      |              | İ                    | 10.5%      | 50.0%        |
| Others                |            |              |                      | 1          |              |
|                       |            |              |                      | 5.3%       |              |
| Total                 | 22         | 8            | 3                    | 19         | 2            |
|                       | 100.0%     | 100.0%       | 100.0%               | 100.0%     | 100.0%       |

<sup>\*</sup> main editorial represented only one case. Total number is 33.

Appendix (F.5) National actors involved in sub-cultural subjects

| Culture subject               |           | Sub       | sidiary 1         | no.=52*              |           | Subsidiar | 2 no.=37**        |
|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|
| -                             | President | Ministers | Local<br>governor | Political opposition | Egyptians | President | Local<br>governor |
| Arabic identity of Egypt      | 8         | 2         |                   | 2                    |           | 4         | 2                 |
|                               | 25.0%     | 25.0%     |                   | 50.0%                |           | 14.3%     | 22.2%             |
| Pharaonic identity of Egypt   | 10        |           | 1                 |                      | 2         | 5         | 1                 |
|                               | 31.3%     | <u> </u>  | 25.0%             |                      | 50.0%     | 17.9%     | 11.1%             |
| Islamic identity of Egypt     | 2         | 1         |                   |                      |           | 2         | 1                 |
|                               | 6.3%      | 12.5%     |                   |                      |           | 7.1%      | 11.1%             |
| National integration          | 7         | 1         | 1                 |                      | 1         | 8         |                   |
| /harmonic values              | 21.9%     | 12.5%     | 25.0%             |                      | 25.0%     | 28.6%     |                   |
| Negative image about Israelis | 1         | 1         | 1                 | 1                    |           |           | 1                 |
|                               | 3.1%      | 12.5%     | 25.0%             | 25.0%                |           |           | 11.1%             |
| Others                        | 4         | 3         | 1                 | 1                    | 1         | 9         | 4                 |
|                               | 12.5%     | 37.5%     | 25.0%             | 25.0%                | 25.0%     | 32.1%     | 44.4%             |
| Total                         | 32        | 8         | 4                 | 4                    | 4         | 28        | 9                 |
|                               | 100.0%    | 100.0%    | 100.0%            | 100.0%               | 100.0%    | 100.0%    | 100.0%            |

<sup>\*</sup> Other actors of subsidiary one are: no human actors [9] and social organization [4]. The total number is 63

<sup>\*\*</sup> Other actors of subsidiary two are: no human actors [5], ministers [3], political opposition [2], parliament [2], social organizations [2] and military/police officers [3]. The total number is 60.

Appendix (F.6) national actors involved in sub-social subjects

| Social subject  | Sub       | sidiary 1, N: | =30*               | Subsidia  | y 2, N=14 |
|-----------------|-----------|---------------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|
|                 | president | ministers     | local<br>governors | president | ministers |
| Hosing services | 6         |               | 3                  | 2         | 1         |
|                 | 31.6%     |               | 42.9%              | 18.2%     | 33.3%     |
| Infrastructures | 5         | 2             | 2                  |           | 2         |
|                 | 26.3%     | 50.0%         | 28.6%              |           | 66.7%     |
| Health services | 5         | 2             | 1                  | 8         |           |
|                 | 26.3%     | 50.0%         | 14.3%              | 72.7%     |           |
| Unemployment    | 3         |               | 1                  |           |           |
|                 | 15.8%     |               | 14.3%              |           |           |
| Other           |           |               |                    | 1         |           |
| 1               | 1         | ĺ             |                    | 9.1%      |           |
| Total           | 19        | 4             | 7                  | 11        | 3         |
|                 | 100.0%    | 100.0%        | 100.0%             | 100.0%    | 100.0%    |

<sup>\*</sup> Other actors of subsidiary one are: political opposition [1], parliament [2]
AND Egyptian [1]. The total number is 34.

\*\* Other actors of subsidiary two are: local governor [2], social organizations

<sup>[2],</sup> Egyptians [2] and others [1]. The total number is 21.

Appendix (F.7) sources of sub-cultural subjects

| Oulture oublest      | Subsidi       | ary 1, no= | :55*                     | Sı       | ıbsidiary 2, | n <b>o=</b> 47** |
|----------------------|---------------|------------|--------------------------|----------|--------------|------------------|
| Culture subject      | own<br>writer | specialist | combination of 2 sources | four big | own writer   | specialist       |
| Arabic identity      | 5             | 4          | 3                        | 1        | 4            | 2                |
| of Egypt             | 20.8%         | 18.2%      | 33.3%                    | 12.5%    | 14.8%        | 16.7%            |
| Pharaonic identity   | 6             | 4          | 2                        | 1        | 4            | 3                |
| of Egypt             | 25.0%         | 18.2%      | 22.2%                    | 12.5%    | 14.8%        | 25.0%            |
| Islamic identity     | 1             | 3          | 2                        |          | 3            | 1                |
| of Egypt             | 4.2%          | 13.6%      | 22.2%                    |          | 11.1%        | 8.3%             |
| National integration | 5             | 5          | 1                        | 2        | 7            | 1                |
| /harmonic values     | 20.8%         | 22.7%      | 11.1%                    | 25.0%    | 25.9%        | 8.3%             |
| Negative image       | 3             | 1          | 1                        |          | 3            | 1                |
| about Israelis       | 12.5%         | 4.5%       | 11.1%                    |          | 11.1%        | 8.3%             |
| others               | 4             | 5          |                          | 4        | 6            | 4                |
|                      | 16.7%         | 22.7%      |                          | 50.0%    | 22.2%        | 33.3%            |
| Total                | 24            | 22         | 9                        | 8        | 27           | 12               |
|                      | 100.0%        | 100.0%     | 100.0%                   | 100.0%   | 100.0%       | 100.0%           |

<sup>\*</sup> Other sources for subsidiary one are: four big [2], own correspondent [5], and unidentified [1]. The total number is 63.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Other sources for subsidiary two are: MENA [3], own correspondent [4], combination of two sources [4] and others [2]. The total number is 60.

Appendix (F.8) sources of sub-social subjects

| Social subject  | Sul    | osidiary 1 l | N=21*     |          | Subsidiary    | 2 N=17**   |           |
|-----------------|--------|--------------|-----------|----------|---------------|------------|-----------|
|                 | MENA   | own writer   | 2 sources | four big | correspondent | own writer | 2 sources |
| Hosing services | 1      | 4            | 1         |          | 1             | 1          | 1         |
|                 | 20.0%  | 40.0%        | 16.7%     |          | 16.7%         | 33.3%      | 20.0%     |
| Infrastructures | 2      | 3            | 1         | 2        |               |            | -         |
|                 | 40.0%  | 30.0%        | 16.7%     | 66.7%    |               |            |           |
| Health services | 1      | 2            | 3         | 1        | 3             | 1          | 4         |
|                 | 20.0%  | 20.0%        | 50.0%     | 33.3%    | 50.0%         | 33.3%      | 80.0%     |
| Unemployment    | 1      | 1            | 1         |          | 1             | 1          |           |
|                 | 20.0%  | 10.0%        | 16.7%     |          | 16.7%         | 33.3%      |           |
| Others          |        |              |           |          | 1             |            |           |
|                 |        |              |           |          | 16.7%         |            |           |
| Total           | 5      | 10           | 6         | 3        | 6             | 3          | 5         |
|                 | 100.0% | 100.0%       | 100.0%    | 100.0%   | 100.0%        | 100.0%     | 100.0%    |

<sup>\*</sup> Other sources of subsidiary one are: four big [3], own correspondent [4], specialists [3] and unidentified [3]. The total number is 34.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Other sources of subsidiary two are: MENA [2] and identified [2]. The total number is 21.

## Appendix (F.9) sub-cultural subjects in two periods

| Culture subject             | Subsid         | diary 1          | Subsidiary 2   |                  |  |
|-----------------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|--|
|                             | Under<br>Sadat | Under<br>Mubarak | Under<br>Sadat | Under<br>Mubarak |  |
| Arabic identity of Egypt    | 8              | 5                | 4              | 5                |  |
|                             | 20.0%          | 21.7%            | 10.8%          | 21.7%            |  |
| Pharaonic identity of Egypt | 14             |                  | 9              |                  |  |
| or Egypt                    | 35.0%          |                  | 24.3%          |                  |  |
| Islamic identity            | 2              | 4                | 3              | 2                |  |
| of Egypt                    | 5.0%           | 17.4%            | 8.1%           | 8.7%             |  |
| National integration/       | 9              | 4                | 7              | 6                |  |
| harmonic values             | 22.5%          | 17.4%            | 18.9%          | 26.1%            |  |
| Negative image              | 1              | 4                | 3              | 2                |  |
| about Israelis              | 2.5%           | 17.4%            | 8.1%           | 8.7%             |  |
| Others                      | 6              | 6                | 11             | 8                |  |
|                             | 15.0%          | 26.1%            | 29.7%          | 34.8%            |  |
| Total                       | 40             | 23               | 37             | 23               |  |
|                             | 100.0%         | 100.0%           | 100.0%         | 100.0%           |  |

#### Appendix (F.10) sub0social subjects in two periods

| Social subject  | Subsi          | diary 1          | Subsidiary 2   |                  |  |
|-----------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|--|
|                 | Under<br>Sadat | Under<br>Mubarak | Under<br>Sadat | Under<br>Mubarak |  |
| Hosing services | 7              | 5                | 3              |                  |  |
|                 | 31.8%          | 41.7%            | 23.1%          |                  |  |
| Infrastructures | 6              | 4                | 3              | 1                |  |
|                 | 27.3%          | 33.3%            | 23.1%          | 12.5%            |  |
| Health services | 7              | 1                | 5              | 5                |  |
|                 | 31.8%          | 8.3%             | 38.5%          | 62.5%            |  |
| Unemployment    | 2              | 2                | 1              | 2                |  |
|                 | 9.1%           | 16.7%            | 7.7%_          | 25.0%            |  |
| Others          |                |                  | 1              |                  |  |
|                 | 1              | _                | 7.7%           |                  |  |
| Total           | 22             | 12               | 13             | 8                |  |
|                 | 100.0%         | 100.0%           | 100.0%         | 100.0%           |  |

### Appendix (F.11) stance of sub-cultural subjects' coverage

| Culture subject       | Subsidiar 1 |         |          |        | Subsidiary 2 |         |          |        |
|-----------------------|-------------|---------|----------|--------|--------------|---------|----------|--------|
|                       | positive    | natural | negative | Total  | positive     | naturai | negative | Total  |
| Arabic identity       | 7           | 4       | 2        | 13     | 5            | 2       | 2        | 9      |
| of Egypt              | 53.8%       | 30.8%   | 15.4%    | 100.0% | 55.6%        | 22.2%   | 22.2%    | 100.0% |
| Pharaonic identity    | 8           | 4       | 2        | 14     | 6            | 1       | 2        | 9      |
| of Egypt              | 57.1%       | 28.6%   | 14.3%    | 100.0% | 66.7%        | 11.1%   | 22.2%    | 100.0% |
| Islamic identity      | 2           | 2       | 2        | 6      | 4            |         | 1        | 5      |
| of Egypt              | 33.3%       | 33.3%   | 33.3%    | 100.0% | 80.0%        |         | 20.0%    | 100.0% |
| National integration/ | 10          | 1       | 2        | 13     | 9            | 3       | 1        | 13     |
| harmonic values       | 76.9%       | 7.7%    | 15.4%    | 100.0% | 69.2%        | 23.1%   | 7.7%     | 100.0% |
| Negative image        | 2           | 1       | 2        | 5      | 2            |         | 3        | 5      |
| about Israelis        | 40.0%       | 20.0%   | 40.0%    | 100.0% | 40.0%        |         | 60.0%    | 100.0% |
| Others                | 6           | 1       | 5        | 12     | 8            | 7       | 4        | 19     |
|                       | 50.0%       | 8.3%    | 41.7%    | 100.0% | 42.1%        | 36.8%   | 21.1%    | 100.0% |
| Total                 | 35          | 13      | 15       | 63     | 34           | 13      | 13       | 60     |
|                       | 55.6%       | 20.6%   | 23.8%    | 100.0% | 56.7%        | 21.7%   | 21.7%    | 100.0% |

Appendix (F.12) stance of sub-social subjects' coverage

| Social subject  | Subsidiar 1 |         |          |        | Subsidiar 1 |         |          |        |
|-----------------|-------------|---------|----------|--------|-------------|---------|----------|--------|
|                 | positive    | natural | negative | Total  | positive    | natural | negative | Total  |
| Hosing services | 9           | 3       |          | 12     | 3           | 1       |          | 3      |
|                 | 75.0%       | 25.0%   |          | 100.0% | 100.0%      |         |          | 100.0% |
| Infrastructures | 5           | 5       |          | 10     | 1           | 3       |          | 4      |
|                 | 50.0%       | 50.0%   |          | 100.0% | 25.0%       | 75.0%   |          | 100.0% |
| Health services | 1           | 6       | 1        | 8      | 3           | 6       | 1        | 10     |
|                 | 12.5%       | 75.0%   | 12.5%    | 100.0% | 30.0%       | 60.0%   | 10.0%    | 100.0% |
| Unemployment    | 3           | 1       |          | 4      | 3           |         |          | 3      |
|                 | 75.0%       | 25.0%   |          | 100.0% | 100.0%      |         |          | 100.0% |
| Others          |             |         |          |        | 1           |         |          | 1      |
| L               |             |         |          |        | 100.0%      |         |          | 100.0% |
| Total           | 18          | 15      | 1        | 34     | 11          | 9       | 1        | 21     |
|                 | 52.9%       | 44.1%   | 2.9%     | 100.0% | 52.4%       | 42.9%   | 4.8%     | 100.0% |

#### **Bibliography**

- Aboubakr, Y (1980), "Towards an Intra-cultural Exchange in the Arab States", in A. Da Costa et al. (eds.), News Values and Problems of Cross-Cultural Communication, Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, (Paris: UNESCO, ICSCP)
- Ajami, F (1983), "In the Pharaoh's Shadow: Religion and Authority in Egypt", in J. Piscatori (ed.), Islam in the Political Process, pp. 12-35 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Al-Ahram (1998), Advertising Price List (Cairo: Al-Ahram Publishing House)
- Al-Gammal, R (1991), Communication and Information in the Arab World
  (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies)
- Ali, S. A. (1988), "Egypt: A Decade after Camp David", in W. Quandt (ed.), The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David, pp. 63-93 (Washington: The Brooking Inc.).
- Almaraghy, M. (2001), Al-Ahram, April, 17, 2001
- Altescull, J. (1995), Agents of Power: The Media and Public Policy (New York: Longman).
- Amin, G. (1982), "External Factors in the Re-orientation of Egypt's Economic Policy", in M. Kerr and S. Yassin (eds.), Rich and Poor States in the Middle East, pp. 112-36 (London: Boulder).
- Amin, H. and J. Napoli (2000), "Media and Power in Egypt", in J. Curran and M. Park (ed.), De-Westernizing Media Studies, pp. 178-88 (London: Routledge)
- Ayad, K. (1992), 'The Role of Communication in the Political Development: A Comparative Study on Two Egyptian Villages', Unpublished Thesis, In Arabic (Cairo University).
- Ayad, K. (1998), Mass Media and Political Participation in Egypt, *Paper Presented* in the 21 Conference of IAMCR (Glasgow, 26-30 July).

- Azzam, M. (1998), "Egypt: the Islamists and the state under Mubarak", in A. Moussalli (ed), Islamic Fundamentalism: Myths and Realities, pp. 109-22 (Reading: Garnet Publishing Limited).
- Badsey, S. (2000), "Introduction", in S. Badsey (ed.), The Media and International Security, pp. xvii-xxxii (London: Frank Cass)
- Baily, S. (1990), Four Arab Israeli Wars and the Peace Process (London: Macmillan)
- Becher, J. (1982), "Communication and Peace", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 19 (3), 227-240
- Berelson, B (1952), Content Analysis in Communication Research (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press).
- Berger, A. (1998), *Media Research Techniques*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (London: Sage Publications).
- Bernstein, A. (1997), "British and Israeli newspaper coverage of the 1992 Barcelona Olympics: a comparative analysis", *Unpublished Thesis*, (University of Leicester).
- Blumler, J. & M. Gurevitch (1981), "Politicians and the press: an essay on role relationships", in D. Nimmo & K. Sanders (eds.), handbook of Political Communication, 476-85 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications). Cited in O. Boyd-Barrett & C. Newbold (eds.), (1995), Approaches to Media: A Reader, pp. 108-16, (London: Arnold).
- Blumler, J. & M. Gurevitch (1986), "Journalists orientations to political institutions: the case of parliamentary broadcasting", in P. Golding et al. (eds.), Communicating Politics: Mass Communication and Political Process, pp. 57-92 (Holmes, Meier & New York: Leicester University Press).
- Blumler, J. & M. Gurevitch (1995), *The Crisis of Public Communication* (London: Routledge)

- Boern, A. (1992), "Getting involved: communication for participatory development", in A. Boeren & K. Epskam (eds.), The Empowerment of Culture: Development Communication and Popular Media (Netherland: CESO; Paper book 17).
- Bowen-Jones, H. (1988), "Egypt", in M. Adams (ed.), The Middle East, pp. 1-19 (New York: Facts On File Publications).
- Boyd, D (1982), Broadcasting in the Arab World: A Survey of Radio and Television in the Middle East (Philadelphia: Temple University Press).
- Boyd-Barrett, O. (1995), "The analysis of media occupations and professionals", in
  O. Boyd-Barrett & C. Newbold (eds.), Approaches to Media: A Reader,
  270-76 (London: Arnold).
- Boyd-Barrett, O. (1995a), "Early theories of media research", in O. Boyd-Barrett & C. Newbold (eds.), Approaches to Media: A Reader, 68-76 (London: Arnold).
- Boyd-Barrett, O. (1995b), "The political economy approach", in O. Boyd-Barrett & C. Newbold (eds), Approaches to Media: A Reader, 186-92 (London: Arnold).
- Boyd-Barrett, O. (2000), "Pan-Arab satellite television: a dialectics of identity", in H. Tumber (ed.), Media Power, Professionals and Politics, 314-31 (London: Routledge).
- Bruch, P. & C. Roach (1993), "Dealing with reality: the news media and the production of peace", in C. Roach (ed.), Communication and Culture in War and Peace, pp. 71-96 (London: Sage Publications).
- Bunnett, T. (1982), "Theories of the media, theories of society", in M. Gurevitch et al (eds.), Culture, Society and Media, pp. 11-29 (London: Methuem)
- Chazzan, N. (1988), "Domestic development in Israel", in W. Quandt (ed), The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David, 150-86 (Washington D.C.: The Brooking Inc)
- Corner, J. (2000), "Influence: the contested core of media research", in J. Curran & M. Gurevitch (eds.), Mass Media and Society, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., 276-97 (London: Arnold).

- Curran, J. (1990), "Culturalist perspectives of news organizations: a reappraisal and a case study", in M. Ferguson (ed.), Public Communication: The New Imperatives, pp. 114-34 (London: Sage Publications).
- Curran, J. (2000), "Rethinking media and democracy", in J. Curran & M. Gurevitch (eds.), Mass Media and Society, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., 120-54 (London: Arnold).
- Curran, J. & J. Seaton (1997), Power Without Responsibility: the Press and Broadcasting in Britain, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (London: Routledge).
- Curran, J. & M. Park (2000), "Beyond globalization theory", in J. Curran & M. Park (eds.), **De-Westernizing Media Studies**, pp. 3-18 (London: Routledge)
- Curran, J. et al. (1982), "The study of media: theoretical approaches", in M. Gurevitch et al. (ed.), Culture, Society and Media, 12-16 (London: Methuem). Cited in O. Boyd-Barrett & C. Newbold (eds), (1995), Approaches to Media: A Reader, pp. 103-107, (London: Arnold).
- Dabbous, S. (1994), "Egypt", in Y. Kamalibour & H. Mowlana (ed.), Mass Media in the Middle East: A Comprehensive Handbook, 60-73 (London: Greenwood Press).
- Dawisha, A. (1976), Egypt in the Arab World: the Elements of Foreign Policy (London: The Macmillan Press).
- Dayan, D. and E. Katz (1992), *Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History* (Cambridge & Massachusetts: Harvard University Press)
- Deacon, D. et al. (1999), Broadcasting Communications: A Practical Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis (London: Oxford University Press).
- DeFleur, M. & S. Rokeach (1989), *Theories of Mass Communication*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Longman)
- Dessouki, A. E. (1988), "Egyptian foreign policy since Camp David", in W. Quandt (ed), The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David, pp. 94-110 (Washington D.C.: The Brooking Inc).

- Eapen, K. E. (1994), "Communication and development: the contribution of research", in C. Hamelink & O. Linne (eds.), Mass Communication Research: Problems and Politics, 277-90 (Norwood & New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation).
- Egyptian Radio & Television Yearbook (1976, 1985, 1986, and 1995), (Cairo: The Egyptian Radio & Television Union)
- Eilts, H. (1988a), "The United States and Egypt", in W. Quandt (ed.), The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David, pp. 111-49 (Washington D.C.: The Brooking Inc)
- Eilts, H. (1988b), "Egypt", in M. Adams (ed.), *The Middle East*, pp. 269-95 (New York: Facts On File Publications)
- Epstein, E., (1973), News from nowhere (New York: Random House).
- Fahmy, I. (1983), *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, (Maryland: Johns H. University Press).
- Faksh, M. A. (1997), The Future of Islam in the Middle East: Fundamentalism in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia (London: Praeger).
- Fishman, M. (1980), *Manufacturing the News* (Austin & London: University of Texas Press).
- Gallapher, M. (1982), "Negotiating of control in media organizations", in M. Gurevitsh et al. (eds.), Culture, Society and Media, pp. 151-73 (London: Methuen)
- Galtung, J. (1992), "The emerging of conflict formations", in M. Tehranian & K. Tehranian (eds.), Restructuring for World Peace: on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, pp. 23-46 (Cresskill & New Jersey: Hampton Press)
- Galtung, J. & M. Ruge (1965), "The structure of foreign news", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 1 pp. 64-90
- Galtung, J. & R. Vincent (1992), Global Glasnost: Towards a New World Information and Communication Order (Cresskill & New Jersey: Hampton Press).

- Gamson, W. (1992), Talking Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
- Gamson, W. & A. Modigliani (1989), "Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: a constructivist approach", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 95 pp. 1-37.
- Gamson, W. et al. (1992), "Media images and the social construction of reality", Annual Review of sociology, Vol. 18 pp. 373-93
- Gandy, O. J. (1982), Beyond Agenda Setting: Information Subsidies and Public Policy (Norwood: Ablex Publishing Company).
- Garnett, J. (1970), Theories of Peace and Security: A Reader in Contemporary

  Strategic Thought (London: Macmillan St Martin's Press).
- General Institution of Information (1995), *Information Yearbook*, (Cairo: General Institution of Information)
- Gitlin, T (1980), *The Whole World Is Watching* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Golding, P. & G. Murdoch (2000), "Culture, communication and Political economy", in J. Curran & M. Gurevitch (ed), Mass Media and Society, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., pp. 70-92 (London: Arnold).
- Golding, P. & Ph. Elliot (1979), *Making the News* (London & New York: Longman)
- Gunter, B. (2000), Media Research Methods (London: Sage Publications).
- Hackett, R. (1991), News and Dissent: The Press and Politics of Peace in Canada (New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation).
- Halloran, J. (1981), "The context of mass communication research", in E. McAnany et al. (eds), Communication and Social Structure: Critical Studies in Mass Media Research, pp. 21-50 (New York: Praeger). Cited in O. Boyd-Barrett & C. Newbold (eds.), (1995), Approaches to Media: A Reader, pp. 33-42, (London: Arnold).
- Halloran, J. (1998), "Mass communication research: asking the right question", in A. Hansen et al., Mass Communication Research Methods, pp. 9-34 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd).

- Hammoud, M. (1996), "Causes for fundamentalists popularity in Egypt", in A. Sinahmed & A. Ehteshami (eds), Islamic Fundamentalism, pp. 303-30 (Colorado: Westview Press).
- Hansen, A. et al. (1998), *Mass Communication Research Methods*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd).
- Haris, Ph. (1997), "Glossary", in P. Golding & Ph. Haris (eds.), Beyond Culture Imperialism: Globalization, Communication and the International order, pp. 208-40 (London: Sage Publications).
- Heikal, M (1996a), Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab-Israeli Peace

  Negotiations (London: Harber Collins)
- Heikal, M (1996b), Secret Negotiations Between the Arab and Israel: Storms of War and Peace, In Arabic (Cairo: Dar Al-Shrouk)
- Herman, E. (1990), "Media in the US political economy", in J. Dowing et al. (eds.), Questioning the Media: A Critical Introduction, pp. 75-87 (London: Sage Publications)
- Hettne, B (1983), "Peace and development, contradictions and compatibility's", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 20 (4), pp. 229-43.
- Hofstetter, R. (1981), "Content analysis", in D. Nimmo & K. Sanders (eds), Handbook of Political Communication, pp. 529-60 (London: Sage Publications).
- Holsti, O. (1969), Content analysis for Social Since and Humanities (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley).
- Ibrahim, M (1991) 'The relationship between the question of cultural imperialism in the third world and the import of popular media programmes', Unpublished Thesis, (University of Leicester).
- Ibrahim, S. E. (1980), Trends of Arab Public Opinion toward the Question of Unity, In Arabic (Beirut: Center For The Arab Unity Studies).
- Ibrahim, S. E. (1988), "Domestic development in Egypt", in W. Quandt (ed.), The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David, pp. 19-62 (Washington D.C.: The Brooking Inc).

- Janokouwski, J. (1975), *Egypt's Young Rebels* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
- Kamel, M. I. (1986), The Camp David Accords: A testimony (London: KPI).
- Katz, E. & G. Wedell (1978), Broadcasting in the Arab World: Promise and Performance (London: The Macmillan press Ltd).
- Kepel, G. (1985), The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt (London: Al Saqi Books).
- Krippendorff, K (1980), Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology (London: Sage Publications)
- Klapper, J. (1960), The Effects of Mass Communication (New York: Free Press).
- Lehman-Wilzing, S. & A. Schejter (1994), "Israel", in Y. Kamalipour & H. Mowlana (eds), Mass Media in the Middle East: A Comprehensive Handbook, pp. 109-25 (London: Greenwood press).
- Lesch, A. M (1992), Transition to Palestinian Self-Government: Practical Steps

  Toward Israeli-Palestinian Peace: Report of a Study Group of the

  Middle East Program Committee on International Security Studies

  (Bloomington: American Academy of Arts and Sciences in collaboration with Indiana University Press)
- Lesch, A. M. & M. Tessler (1989), *Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University press).
- Liebert, R. & J. Sprafkin (1988), *The Early Window: Effects of Television on Children and Youth*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York & Oxford: Pergamon Press).
- Lindlof, T (1995), *Qualitative Communication Research Methods* (Thousand Oks & London: Sage Publications).
- Martins Printing Group (1998), *Europe Yearbook* (London: European Publication Limited)
- McQuail, D. (1994), Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., (London: Sage Publications).
- Melkote, S. (1991), Communication for development in the Third World: Theory and Practice (London: Sage Publications).

- Merrill, J. (1988), "Inclination of nations to control press and attitudes on professionalization" Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 65 (4), pp. 831-44
- Merrill, J. (1968), *The Elite Press: Great Newspapers of the World* (New York & London: Pitman Publishing Corporation)
- Merrill, J. et al (1970), *The Foreign Press: A Survey of the World's Journalism* (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press)
- Mody, B. (1991), Designing Messages for Development Communication: An Audience Participation-Based Approach (London: Sage Publications).
- Mosco, V. (1996), *The Political Economy of Communication* (London: Sage Publications)
- Mowlana, H. (1988), "Mass media systems and communication", in M. Adams (ed.), The Middle East, pp. 825-40 (New York: Facts On File Publications)
- Murdock, G. (1990), "Redrawing the map of communications industries: concentration and ownership in the era of privatization", in M. Ferguson (ed), Public Communication: The New Imperatives, pp. 1-15 (London: Sage Publications).
- Murdock, G. & P. Golding (1977), "Capitalism, communication and class relations", in J. Curran et al. (eds), Mass Communication and Society, pp. 12-43 (London: Edward Arnold)
- Mytton, G. (1983), Mass Communication in Africa (London: Edward Arnold)
- National Center for Social and Criminological Research (1985), Egyptian Opinion towards the Appling of Sharia for Certain Crimes, In Arabic (Cairo: National Center for Social and Criminological Research)
- Negrine, R. (1994), *Politics and the mass Media in Britain*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (London: Routledge)
- Negrine, R. (1996), The Communication of Politics (London: Sage Publications).
- Noelle-Neumann, E. (1984), The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion Our Social Skin (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press).

- O'Brien, R. C. (undated), Mass Media Ownership: An Analytical Summary of Transnational and National Trends (Paris: UNESCO), ICSCP.
- Olsen, G. (1988), "Islam: what is the political significance? The case of Egypt and Saudi Arabia", in M. Mozaffari (ed), Islam: State and Society, pp. 127-42 (London: Curzon Press).
- Ovendale, R. (1999), *The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (London: Longman).
- Peled, M. (1979), "The year of Sadat's initiative", in M. Leitenberg & G. Sheffer (eds), Great Power Intervention in the Middle East, pp. 301-12 (New York: Pergamon Press).
- Quandt, W. (1986), *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington D.C.: The Brooking Institution).
- Quandt, W. (1993), Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington D.C.: The Brooking Institution).
- Rogers, E. (1969), *Modernization among Peasants: The Impact of Communication* (New York: Holt, Rinehar and Winston)
- Rogers, E. (1976a), "Communication and development: the passing of dominant paradigm", Communication Research, Vol. 3 pp. 213-240.
- Rogers, E. (1976b), Communication and Development: Critical Perspectives, (London: Sage Publications)
- Roy, D. & W. Irelan (1989), "The law and economics in the evolution of contemporary Egypt", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25 (2), pp. 163-85
- Rugh, W. (1979), The Arab Press: News Media and Political Processes in the Middle East (London: Croom Helm).
- Ryan, C. (1991), Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies for Grassroots organizing (Boston: South End Press)
- Saber, M. (1987), "Development and culture", Arab Periodical of Culture, Vol. 7 (12) pp. 3-28
- Sadat, M. A. (1981), In Search of identity, (London: Faber & Faber).

- Saunders, H. (1988), "Reconstituting the Arab-Israeli peace process", in W. Quandt (ed), The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David, pp. 413-41 (Washington D.C.: The Brooking Inc)
- Schramm, W. (1979), *Mass Media and National Development*, (Honolulu & Hawaii: East-West Communication Institute)
- Schudson, M. (2000), "The sociology of news production", in J. Curran & M. Gurevitch (eds.), Mass Media and Society, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., pp. 175-200 (London: Arnold).
- Schulman, M (1990), "Control mechanisms inside the media", in J. Downing et al. (eds), Questioning the Media: A Critical Introduction, pp. 113-24 (London: Sage Publications).
- Shakh, F. (1992), Islam and Islamic Groups: A Worldwide Reference Guide (Essex: Longman).
- Shamir, Sh. (1988), "Israeli views of Egypt and peace process: the duality of vision", in W. Quandt (ed), The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David, pp. 187-216 (Washington D.C.: The Brooking Inc).
- Shoemaker, P. & S. Reese (1991), Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content (New York & London: Longman).
- Snider, P. (1967), "'Mr. Gates' revisited: a 1966 version of the 1949 case study", in
  E. Emery (ed), Journalism Quarterly, Association for Education in Journalism, pp. 419-21, 425-27 (Jowa City: Vol. 44). Cited in O. Boyd-Barrett & C. Newbold (eds), (1995), Approaches to Media: A Reader, pp. 383-86, (London: Arnold).
- Sorenson, G. (1985), "Peace and development, looking for the right track", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22 (1), pp. 69-77
- Stempel III, G. (1989), "Content analysis", in G. Stempel III & B. Welstley (eds.), Research Methods in Mass Communication, pp. 119-31 (New Jersey: Prentice Hall).

- Stephenson, C. (1992), "New conceptions of security and the their implications for means methods", in M. Tehranian & K. Tehranian (eds.), Restructuring for world Peace: on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, pp. 47-61 (CressKill & New Jersey: Hampton Press Inc).
- Stevenson, N. (1995), Understanding Media Culture: Social Theory and Mass Communication (London: Sage Publications).
- Sullivan, D (1994), "Islam and development in Egypt: civil society and the state", in
  H. Mutalib & T. Hashmi (eds.), Islam, Muslims, and the Modern State,
  pp. 211-31(London: Macmillan Press Ltd).
- Supreme Press Council (1977, 1987, 1997), Newspapers Statistics, In Arabic (Cairo: Supreme Press Council)
- Tayie, S. (1989), 'The role of the Egyptian mass media in the formation of young Egyptians' images of foreign countries: a content analysis and audience study', Unpublished Thesis (university of Leicester).
- Tehranian, M. (1990), "Communication, peace, development: a communitarian perspective", in F. Korzenny & S. Toomey (eds.), Communicating for Peace Diplomacy and Negotiation, 157-75 (London: Sage Publications).
- Tehranian, M. (1992), "Restructuring for peace: a global perspective", in M. Tehranian & K. Tehranian (ed.), Restructuring for world Peace: on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, pp. 1-22 (Cresskill & New Jersey: Hampton Press Inc).
- The Financial Times, May 10, 2000.
- The Publication Law (1960), Law no. 156 Concerning Publication Matters, (Cairo: Official Publication House)
- The Press Authority Law (1980), Law no. 148 Concerning Authority of the Press, (Cairo: Official Publishing House)
- The Press Law (1996), Law no. 96 Concerning Organization of the Press, (Cairo: Official Publishing House)

- Thompson, J. (1988), "Mass communication and modern culture: contribution to a critical theory of ideology", Sociology, Vol. 22 (3), pp. 360-79. Cited in O. Boyd-Barrett & C. Newbold (eds.), (1995), Approaches to Media: A Reader, pp. 54-65, (London: Arnold).
- Tuchman, G. (1974), "Assembling a network talk-show", in G. Tuchman (ed), The TV Establishment: Programming for Power and Profit, pp. 119-36 (New Jersey: Prentice Hall)
- Vaticiotis, P. (1991), The History of Modern Egypt: From Mohammed Ali to Mubarak, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicollson).
- Waldheim, K. (1980), *The Challenge of Peace* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicollson).
- Waterbury, J (1978), Egypt: Burden of the Past, Options for the Future (Bloomington & London: American University Field staff)
- Weinbaum, M. (1985), "Egypt Infitah and the politics of US economic assistance", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 21 (2), pp. 206-223.
- Wimmer, R. & J. Dominic (1994), *Mass Media Research: An Introduction* 6<sup>th</sup> ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company).
- Wimmer, R. & J. Dominic (1994), Mass Media Research: An Introduction (Belmont: Wadsworth Inc).
- Wolfsfeld, G. (1993), "Introduction: Framing political conflict", in A. Cohen & G. Wolfsfeld (eds.), Framing the Intifada: People and Media, pp. 3-16 (Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation).
- Wolfsfeld, G. (1997), *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Wright, C. (1960), "Functional analysis of communication", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 24 pp. 606-20
- Yassin, S. (1987), *The Arabic Strategic Report*, In Arabic (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies)