**Extraversion and the West African EPA Development Programme:**

**Realising the Development Dimension of ACP-EU Trade?**

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ABSTRACT

West African elites have successfully argued for an Economic Partnership Agreement Development Programme (EPADP) as part of free trade negotiations with the European Commission. ECOWAS officials state that the EPADP is necessary to realise the ‘development dimension’ of trade. In particular, they have (re)articulated Europe’s own narratives relating to Aid for Trade and private sector development – insisting that the European Commission delivers on its promises. Accordingly, European negotiators have conceded the principle of the EPADP, stating that around €6.5 billion will be delivered. This article, however, examines the likely (in)capacity of the EPADP to meaningfully marry trade and development in the context of premature liberalisation under Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Crucially, it argues that West African *extraversion* in terms of EPADP resources may entrench predatory elites while locking-in ECOWAS states into inequitable trade structures that re-embed poverty in the region.

INTRODUCTION

The European Commission has sought to conclude far-reaching Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with sub-regions of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group under the Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020). The EPAs involve extensive trade liberalisation, moving beyond tariff reductions to wider ‘behind the border’ issues relating to services liberalisation. In this context, scholarly attention has been paid to ACP elite agency within the negotiations. Notably, Hurt et al (2013) argue that African officials demonstrate discursive power in holding European counterparts to account in terms of ‘development’. ACP negotiators have delayed the signing of EPAs until European states acquiesce to demands on transitional aid. This is understood by Hurt et al (2013) in terms of the rhetorical entrapment of the EU. This view is broadly corroborated by Heron (2014: 18) who explains that the normative dimension of the EPAs has opened up space for critical contestation, and hence delays to conclusion (amidst ACP demands for aid). These perspectives are echoed within the longer history of ACP-EU trade – for instance, Zartman (1971: 4) arguing that ‘weaker’ African states may ‘provoke an encounter’ with Europe - conducive to winning concessions in trade negotiations.

 This article contributes to debates surrounding ACP officials’ elite agency within trade negotiations. It questions, however, whether the successful demonstration of elite agency is necessarily ‘progressive’ in terms of outcomes for poorer citizens. In contrast to Hurt et al (2013), it explores how ACP elites’ recourse to strategies of *extraversion* may have a negative impact for development (Bayart 2010). Namely, deliberate appeals to the ‘external’ for additional aid monies may not result in positive outcomes. In this discussion, the article specifically examines the recently agreed EPA between West African (ECOWAS)[[1]](#footnote-1) states and the EU in relation to an EPA Development Programme (EPADP). West African officials argue that Cotonou’s promise to realise the ‘development dimension’ of trade can only be fulfilled through the provision of generous Aid for Trade (AfT) and private sector development (PSD) assistance via the EPADP (ECOWAS 2009).[[2]](#footnote-2) This will apparently resolve supply-side constraints in agricultural and manufacturing sectors and (nominally) ensure a level playing field with European counterparts. Furthermore, the EPADP will compensate West African governments for tariff revenue losses incurred upon EPA implementation. The EPADP will thus provide financial means by which West African governments can continue to invest in enabling business infrastructure such as roads, pylons, and sanitation (Dalleau and Van Seters 2011). EPA trade opening will thus be made ‘development friendly’.

 The article underscores how the EPADP has been a source of tension in the negotiations. In particular, it highlights debates as to whether EPADP resources will be ‘new money’. Indeed, the ECOWAS countries stated that their trade capacity demands would require €9.5 billion of *additional* aid monies, quite apart from existing EU commitments under the European Development Fund (EDF). The European Commission responded by offering €6.5 billion from *existing* funds. This disagreement stood at the heart of recent negotiations, with many African commentators denouncing the EU offer as derisory in the comparative context of euro-zone bailouts (NANTS 2010; West African Civil Society Platform cited in EuropAfrica 2011). Nevertheless, ECOWAS officials do now appear to have acquiesced to the EU’s position.

 Crucially, in terms of a critical perspective on elite agency, the article then challenges whether or not ECOWAS officials’ extraversion (defined as the strategic recourse to the ‘external’) in relation to the EPADP will bring about pro-poor growth. It examines how extraversion may lock-in West African states into disadvantageous trade regimes detrimental to the wider economic base (and to the livelihoods of poorer citizens), while lubricating often corrupt power networks. Again, this departs from the existing literature on ACP agency that often assumes pro-poor outcomes. In this discussion, the first section of the article examines the historical evolution of Europe’s relations with ACP countries, and explains the current policy focus upon EPA free market reform combined to PSD/AfT. The second section then assesses negotiations for the ECOWAS EPA and the strategic position of the EPADP therein. The third section then considers the consequences of market opening and the capacity of the EPADP instrument for delivering genuine ‘pro-poor’ outcomes in West Africa. Significantly, the article then underscores how extraversion in this instance may result in regressive outcomes for ‘the poor’ (Bayart 2010).

ACP-EU RELATIONS AND A ‘RECIPROCAL’ TRADE AGENDA

EPAs have become the central tool of the EU’s current development platform in its relations with the ACP bloc, reflecting a normative emphasis on trade liberalisation and private sector competitiveness as crucial components of poverty eradication. Historically, however, EU relations with ACP states were based on ‘developmentalist’ policies embodied in successive Lomé Conventions (1975-2000). This earlier period of Association was predicated on preferential and *non-reciprocal* trade, as inspired by the New International Economic Order (NIEO) (Brown 2002). This phase of relations was not without its criticisms - based both on lack of developmental success and the characterisation of Lomé as neo-colonialist (Brown 2002; Hurt 2003).

Significantly, the Lomé Conventions came under mounting pressure to move away from a state-led paradigm to one increasingly focussed on the competitiveness of private enterprise and free market openness (Nunn and Price 2004). This strategic reframing mirrored a wider paradigm shift within what might be broadly termed the Washington Consensus in the 1980s and 1990s. Interventionist trade measures and parastatal industries were dismantled in ACP economies under structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) funded by both the EEC and the Washington institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This brought the ACP states into greater compliance with the norms of the GATT/WTO framework - but also resulted in severe social impacts, for instance, the loss of 70,000 textiles jobs in Kenya as deindustrialisation occurred after liberalisation (Langan 2009).

Furthermore, in the timeframe of Lomé IV (1995-2000), the European Commission (1996) published its landmark *Green Paper on the Relations between the European Union and* *the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century*. The Green Paper made clear that non-reciprocal trade between the partners would be phased out as part of the EU’s commitment to WTO norms. It also emphasised that there would have to be greater recognition of the role of non-state, private actors in poverty reduction drives. Following this logic, ACP countries were subsequently mandated in the Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020) to liberalise their own import tax regimes in order to continue to enjoy low tariff access to the EU (to be implemented under the EPAs). Importantly, Cotonou also emphasised the centrality of non-state actors in the development process, with particular stress on the role of private sector enterprise.

In this manner, Europe’s reciprocal free trade agenda (embodied in the EPAs) was legitimised as compatible with norms relating to poverty eradication and social participation. Moreover, this discursive stress on the progressive role of the private sector has been augmented by the EU’s commitment to a wider ‘Aid for Trade’ (AfT) agenda in wake of the WTO Hong Kong summit of 2005. The emergent AfT framework widened donor support beyond strict PSD remits to other trade-enhancing avenues - such as assistance to enabling infrastructure, and trade governance capacity (for instance, through direct aid to developing countries’ trade ministries). Notably, the European Commission’s (2007) *Towards an EU Aid for Trade Strategy* pledged to meet AfT objectives, and highlighted the centrality of existing PSD components.

Meanwhile, Heron and Siles-Brugge (2012) interestingly point out that the EPAs have in fact gone beyond the remit of mere WTO compatibility, to what they term a ‘WTO plus’ agenda. Through inclusion of the Singapore issues (involving services liberalisation) via a strategy of ‘bilateral liberalisation’, the EU has been able to move faster than had been possible during stalemate within the WTO Doha Round. Heron and Siles-Brugge (2012) view such liberalisation as ‘competitive’ in terms of the EU’s response to the actions of the US, Japan and other global economic players. In this context, the Cotonou era negotiations for EPAs represent a final step in the redesigning of the ACP-EU relationship to one based solely on the principles of free trade and private sector competition.

Furthermore, this strategic redesign of ACP-EU relations has been characterised by many scholars as being wholly neo-liberal – since it is predicated on ACP integration into the global economy through trade liberalisation, while emphasising the role of the *retracted, minimal* state in creating an enabling environment for private sector growth (Brown 2004; Langan 2015; Hurt 2012). It is in this conceptual context, that the Cotonou Agreement has emphasised EU commitment to PSD and broader Aid for Trade initiatives as a means of ostensibly realising the ‘development’ dimension of free market strategies in the current ‘Post’ Washington Consensus.

WEST AFRICAN FREE TRADE AND THE EPADP INITIATIVE

Europe’s PSD/AfT policies took on particular significance in the recently concluded EPA negotiations with West African states. Having declined to meet the original deadline of December 2007 for a region-wide EPA, the ECOWAS Commission made demands since early 2009 for the inclusion of an EPADP as a prerequisite for agreement. West African officials have historically been divided on the question of the EPA itself. Ghana and Ivory Coast – owing to their relative export vulnerability vis-à-vis Europe – have stood as relative proponents of the arrangements, themselves initialling interim and unilateral country EPAs with the EU upon failure to conclude a region-wide agreement by the original deadline (Werno 2013). These interim arrangements were meant as holding measures prior to conclusion of a full ECOWAS EPA - and allowed these states to maintain low tariff access to the EU while regional negotiations continued. Nigeria, on the other hand, given its relative non-dependence on exports to the EU, has stood as a more reluctant partner (ENDA CACID 2014). Indeed, EU Trade Commissioner Mandelson memorably referred to Nigeria as an ‘elephant’ blocking the road in way of the successful conclusion of regional talks (All Africa 2007).

Nevertheless, it is widely understood among ECOWAS officials (regardless of country origin) that a region-wide EPA will bring West African agricultural and manufacturing sectors into stiff competition with European counterparts (Werno 2013). Tariff dismantling, in particular, will leave less policy space for the protection of producers. ECOWAS negotiators thus contend that the EU must provide robust AfT/PSD assistance to ensure that a level playing field exists between the ‘partners’. Otherwise premature liberalisation will result in import flooding and deindustrialisation. Moreover, the EPADP should compensate West African governments for revenue losses incurred upon the lowering of import tariffs (ECOWAS Commission 2009: 23). Nigeria, in particular, has played an important role within the ECOWAS Commission in articulating these possible negative effects of the regional EPA, and in fashioning the EPADP as a key condition upon which acquiescence should depend (ENDA CACID 2014).

 In this vein, the resultant ECOWAS EPADP proposal contains five main axes of PSD and AfT intervention. The first axis (Axis A) outlines PSD assistance for capacity in relation to services sectors, agriculture, arts and crafts, manufacturing, and technological upgrading. This is estimated at around €2 billion of total EPADP monies. The second axis (Axis B) deals with AfT assistance in terms of support for a West African customs union and trade facilitation, support for compliance with hygiene and other regulatory standards, as well as support for trade governance capacity. This is estimated at around €500 million. The third axis (Axis C) details necessary AfT interventions in terms of enabling infrastructure such as roads and railways. This is estimated at around €6 billion. The fourth axis (Axis D) lists necessary support for trade defence instruments, macroeconomic stability, as well as for trade issues such as intellectual property rights (IPRs). This is estimated at just under €1 billion. Finally, the fifth axis (Axis E) deals with good governance and civil society dialogue on trade matters and is estimated at around €140 million (Bilal et al 2010: 4).

 Interestingly, West African states have placed heavy discursive emphasis on such EPADP assistance as a necessary vehicle for poverty reduction. The EPADP proposal document makes clear that AfT/PSD assistance is a vital means of translating market opening into social prosperity (ECOWAS Commission 2009: 7). Specifically, it highlights that 60% of West Africans live in poverty compared to only 15% in East Asia and the Pacific (2009: 14). In terms of policy coherence for development (PCD), meanwhile, the document makes clear that the EPADP aligns to the wider objectives of West Africa’s *Vision 2020* (2009: 13). This pro-poor emphasis is meanwhile repeated across a number of other related documents and policy statements. The ECOWAS Commissioner for Trade, for instance, explained that the EPADP is ‘the major development tool within the context of the EPA negotiations. We welcome whatever support we can get to counterbalance the potential negative effects of the EPA on our economy’ (cited in ICTSD 2010). ECOWAS officials thereby make an overt appeal to the consciences of EU elites through the mirroring of Europe’s pro-poor discourse in relation to PSD/AfT.

Significantly, ECOWAS negotiators have further confirmed that the lack of an equivalent EPADP concession lay behind their decision not to sign a regional EPA by the original 2007 deadline.[[3]](#footnote-3) These historical tensions reflect the fact that in the lead up to the original deadline that the European Commission made only very modest promises. A European Commission (2007) report, *Nigeria and the European Union - Trade for Development*, highlighted monies for a Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) amounting to a mere €477 million across the entire ECOWAS region from 2008-2013 under the 10th EDF. It also promised that an ‘incentive tranche’ would be made available - but only to the modest figure of €120 million (2007: 14). Reference was also made to the European Commission’s pledge to provide €1 billion in AfT support per annum to developing countries (as a whole) as part of WTO Doha Round pledges. Unconvincingly, however, the report claimed that such monies would be additional to EDF resources – despite the fact that the EDF is included within calculations of EU AfT assistance (2007: 16). These revenues fell well below West African expectations. Consequently, the original December 2007 deadline for EPA conclusion was not met.

Importantly, however, European officials have now conceded that they agree with the principle of the EPADP. A European Council (2010) statement in 2010 explained that the EU expected to provide AfT and PSD assistance under an EPADP. This was reiterated by the European Council (2014) in March 2014 and, crucially, soon followed by the ECOWAS Heads of State communique in July 2014 that they had reached an acceptable compromise with the EU regarding the full implementation of a regional EPA (European Commission 2014).[[4]](#footnote-4) However, Europe has explained that it is unwilling to finance a full €9.5 billion for the EPADP. Instead it will be prepared to finance €6.5 billion derived from *existing*channels. This has, nevertheless, been welcomed by certain commentators– see, for example, Akpe (2010) and Dalleau and Seters (2011).

There are mounting concerns, however, that the EPADP will be incapable of transforming trade liberalisation into a genuine opportunity for development in West Africa. Civil society organisations, in particular, have voiced reservations about Europe’s PSD/AfT assistance. The West African Civil Society Platform on the Cotonou Agreement (2010), for example, has stated that ‘the EU’s continued refusal to substantially and specifically commit to meet fiscal adjustment costs that the EPA will impose on ECOWAS economies as well as for ADDITIONAL funding for the PAPED [EPADP] are clear violations of existing understandings and commitments’ (original capitalisation). The National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS), meanwhile, has condemned the modesty of the EU offer in the relative context of billion-euro bailouts for Eurozone members (cited in Akpe 2010).

Moreover, many West African stakeholders remain sceptical about the notion of free market opening altogether. Many hold the belief that the EPA necessarily forecloses the possibility of ECOWAS industrialisation (see, for instance, Okere 2012). While PSD/AfT funds may support individual sectors in the short term, nevertheless, the long-term implications of an EPA will result in collapse of higher value import-competing sectors such as poultry and tomato agro-processing. Foreign direct investment, meanwhile, may be encouraged within lower value export-oriented sectors but nevertheless result in dubious consequences for vulnerable peoples earning low wages, for instance in export processing zones (EPZs).

Notably here, Nwoke (2009: 3) explains that ‘poor African countries are concerned that several analyses have shown that EPAs will have negative effects on their economies, including a stifling loss of critical tariff revenues, deepen de-industrialization and suffocate… small and medium-scale enterprises’. Trommer (2011: 122), meanwhile, confirms that non-governmental organisations continue to pressurise ECOWAS officials to resist the EPA altogether on the basis of likely deindustrialisation. Perhaps most forcefully, the Platform of Civil Society Organisations in West Africa has made clear that they are ‘strongly opposed to any new concession for opening up the West African market to the European Union and are warning West African negotiators against any violation of the mandate given to them by the region’ (ACTID 2013). In this context, the next section examines the anticipated impact of an ECOWAS EPA, as well as the likely capacity of the EPADP to marry free markets to development outcomes.

THE EPA AND THE EPADP: REALISING THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION?

West African officials have emphasised the EPADP as a means of promoting both offensive and defensive trade interests in their negotiations with the European Commission. The EPADP will (nominally) promote both productive capacity in the region and ensure that negative consequences experienced upon EPA implementation will be compensated. In order to examine the development capacity of the proposed EPADP, however, it is necessary to first consider the likely impact of the EPA upon West African producers and fiscal revenues. Only in this context can an evaluation be made in terms of whether the EPADP will provide sufficient resources to meaningfully marry free trade to development outcomes. Usefully, a number of studies provide detail on the likely repercussions of an EPA. These cover impacts of tariff dismantling upon agricultural and manufacturing sectors, policy space for pro-poor trade measures, impacts upon tariff revenues, and consequences for intra-regional trade flows.

In relation to this first major issue of impacts upon (predominantly import-competing) agricultural and food sectors, it is necessary to underscore that this sphere of economic activity provides livelihoods for 70% of West Africa’s working population. Moreover, agriculture provides between 30-40% of the region’s total GDP (Gérard and Bilal 2008: 236). In this context, there are growing concerns about the long-term consequences of an EPA. Patel (2007: 18) explains that tariff elimination will lead to loss of livelihoods for West African smallholders given their relative lack of capacity in comparison with European producers. Significantly, he cites the European Commission’s own Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) on an ECOWAS EPA which anticipates significant import surges of up to 16% for onions, 15% for potatoes, 16% for beef, and 18% for poultry - thereby displacing domestic production in the region (2007: 20). Patel further explains that ongoing European subsidies for agricultural production under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) close down the possibility of West African comparative advantage in otherwise competitive sectors such as dairy and millet rice. EU subsidies of around US$ 1 billion for dairy and $39.4 million for millet ensure that a level playing field cannot be realised for West African smallholders, whose livelihoods will thus be jeopardised under the EPA (*ibid*).

These concerns are confirmed by historical evidence. Bagooro (2011: 9-13), for instance, examines tariff reforms undertaken in 2003 in the Ghanaian poultry sector and the subsequent collapse of farms as cheaper European produce flooded the domestic market. This accounted for the loss of up to 200,000 jobs as compared to poultry production within a protected market (*ibid*). The EU Directorate General for Agriculture, meanwhile, confirms that ACP trade liberalisation under structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the 1990s resulted in import surges. In the case of poultry, it states that the value of European exports to ACP states rose by 113% from 1995-2004. It also explains that the value of European exports of cereals to ACP destinations increased by 182% from 1995 to 2004 - with negative consequences for local livelihoods (cited in Goodison 2007: 291). In similar terms, Action Aid (2004: 16) point to the historical collapse of smallholder tomato production in West Africa– a situation compounded by EU CAP subsidies in the sector of up to €300 million per annum. They fear that further liberalisation will threaten up to 3 million livelihoods in Ghana alone. Moreover, the ECOWAS Commission (2008: 4) explains that SAP ‘liberalisation... meant that the agricultural sector did not get the support that would have ensured food security for local populations and equipped it to resist unfair competition’.

It is important to also note that this crucial issue of food (in)security is severely exacerbated in West Africa by existing ‘pay, fish, and go’ EU access agreements that threaten local livelihoods and deplete fish stocks (Atta-Mills 2004: 20). Significantly, these asymmetric agreements, that allow European super-trawlers to overfish in the region, will remain in force despite the potential conclusion of an ECOWAS EPA. Furthermore, Europe’s current offer to allow West African states the opportunity to place up to 20% of tariff lines into a sensitive goods ‘basket’ subject to delayed liberalisation is deemed grossly insufficient in relation to food security concerns. Nwoke (2009: 10) explains in the Ghanaian context alone that 60% of agricultural goods require protection from tariff liberalisation. A sensitive goods basket covering only 20% of commodity lines across the entire economic base is thus incapable of protecting vulnerable production. Furthermore, an EU-sponsored EPA impact assessment in the case of Nigeria sets out the dangers of premature liberalisation for domestic food production – and food security:

Agricultural business in ACP countries like Nigeria is different from what obtains in EU countries. This disparity is not reflected in EPA’s trade rules, to take into account the plight of the millions of small-scale farmers who, in Nigeria, produce 95 percent of the nation’s food crops in small plots of land with rudimentary technology. Their ability to sell on the local market can be undercut by a rapid international trade liberalisation scheme that will open up the way for an influx of cheap and highly subsidised food imports (Enterplan 2005: 34).

In relation to manufacturing production, meanwhile, there are similar concerns surrounding the competitiveness gap between West African producers and European counterparts. ActionAid (2004) again provides useful insight - pointing to the historical collapse of Cote d’Ivoire’s chemical, textiles, automobile assembly and footwear industries in the aftermath of SAP liberalisation implemented in 1986. They also underscore the collapse of tomato agro-processing centres in Ghana during the 1990s as a result of earlier bouts of trade liberalisation. Enterplan (2005: 40), moreover, points to the loss of 30,000 jobs in textiles manufacturing in Nigeria under SAP reforms. This will be repeated if an EPA is signed, with imports of EU manufactured goods to Nigeria expected to increase by US $600 million – displacing local production (Nwoke 2009: 21).

Accordingly, many stakeholders fear that deindustrialisation will be entrenched by an EPA. Indeed, in light of Europe’s insistence upon the immediate liberalisation of 80% of total ECOWAS tariff lines, there are particular concerns that vital sectors such as apparel, soap manufacturing, carpet manufacturing, and confectionary production (among others) will not be included within a sensitive goods basket. Agricultural sectors will be given priority on the basis of food security, leaving sensitive manufacturing sectors highly vulnerable to import surges from the EU (Adenikinju and Alaba 2005: 19). This will have severely negative effects upon urban centres whose poorer populations are dependent upon domestic manufacturing jobs.

In addition to these ‘defensive’ trade concerns, there are also grounds upon which to doubt whether the safeguarding of low tariff access to European markets under an EPA will promote ‘offensive’ trade opportunities for West African manufacturing. Regardless of EPADP assistance, ECOWAS producers remain hampered by stringent rules of origin (ROOs) that in many cases effectively close down exports to the EU. In relation to fisheries, for example, ROOs mean that countries such as Ghana may not take fish from neighbouring ECOWAS states’ waters for processing purposes.[[5]](#footnote-5) Moreover, West African countries must own the trawlers fishing in their national waters – otherwise the fish caught are deemed as foreign under European ROOs (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002: 78-84). This means that i) local fish processing and canning facilities are deprived of potential raw materials; ii) West African producers cannot access EU markets on a competitive basis; and iii) ECOWAS regional integration is penalised (ibid). Combined to restrictive hygiene standards, ROOs are one of the main reasons why West African states acquiesce to ‘pay, fish and go’ EU access agreements in the first place.

Crucially, ROOs and hygiene requirements are not subject to EPA negotiations and will not be resolved upon the signing of an agreement. Additionally, high EU tariffs placed upon processed goods emanating from West Africa will not be lowered upon agreement of an EPA - since the talks aim only to preserve existing levels of ACP access. Entry of processed cocoa goods, for instance, will continue to face debilitating protectionist tariffs imposed by the European Commission. Exports of cocoa raw materials (however) will continue to receive duty free treatment in order to satisfy processors based in the EU (Solidar 2008: 14). The worrisome defensive trade issues experienced by ACP countries under EPA liberalisation are therefore unlikely to be compensated by greater opportunities for ‘offensive’ exports to EU destinations.

More broadly, there are concerns that an EPA will close down policy space for pro-poor growth. Not only will the signing of an EPA open domestic sectors to increased EU corporate penetration - with the likely effect of crowding out local suppliers – but it will also constrain West African policy space to reap development dividends from European investment. In the manufacturing sector, for example, the Association of Ghanaian Industries condemns the likely ‘narrowing or abandonment of industrial policy measures such as performance requirements on FDI’ which had included the tying of foreign investment to mandatory joint partnerships with local firms (EuropAfrica 2011). In the services sector, moreover, there are concerns about the binding effects of Intellectual Property Right (IPRs) clauses, with likely limiting effects upon West African providers in telecommunications, for instance. This is combined to concerns about the prohibition of the manufacture or importation of generic medicines used to treat HIV/AIDs. Nigeria, for example, has historically imported cheap generic medicines with positive benefits for poorer citizens (McGreal 2001). This would be jeopardised under an ECOWAS free trade agreement. Moreover, charges placed upon raw material exports in countries such as Ghana – used to encourage value-addition within local industry - would have to be removed upon an EPA (Nwoke 2009: 8-10). South-South trade will also be discouraged since the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause will mean that any tariff liberalisation offered by ECOWAS to Southern partners will have to be reciprocated to the EU under the terms of an EPA.

Perhaps most seriously, there are grave concerns as to the impact of an EPA on tariff revenues in West Africa, as well as about trade diversion and subsequent damage to ECOWAS regional integration. On the first question of tariff revenues, several studies point to severe consequences. In the case of Nigeria, the largest country in the region, it was anticipated that - should this ACP state have signed the EPA by the original December 2007 deadline - that it would have lost revenues of US $478 million in 2008 alone. This figure would remain relatively constant within any given year in a post-EPA environment, with predicted losses of US $433 million in the fourth year following conclusion of an EPA. In fact, Nigerian tariff loses would have remained as high as US $341 million up to twelve years after EPA implementation (Nwoke 2009: 18). Ghana, meanwhile, would have experienced tariff losses to the amount of US $194 million in 2008 had a region-wide ECOWAS EPA come into effect (Lang 2006: 22). Moreover, a more recent study by the South Centre has concluded that total ECOWAS tariff revenue losses would reach €1.8 billion in the immediate year following EPA conclusion (cited in EuropAfrica 2011). These concerns are combined to fears surrounding the diminution of intra-regional trade as a result of trade diversion. Namely, EPA tariff reductions upon EU imports will mean that European products will become more affordable to citizens in middle income brackets – thereby displacing imports from West African destinations.[[6]](#footnote-6) Togolese exports to its ECOWAS partners, for instance, are expected to decline by 16.22% (Karingi 2005: 50). This will have obvious revenue implications. Nigeria alone is itself expected to lose US $229 million in any given year as a result of lost exports to ECOWAS partners (Busse and Großmann 2007: 795). This will also affect importing ECOWAS states since most EU goods benefitting from trade diversion will not be subject to tariffs, unlike non-EU imports.[[7]](#footnote-7)

It is in this context that any evaluation of the EPADP must take place. Namely, the prospect of agricultural decline, deindustrialisation, receding policy space, disruption of intra-regional trade, and lost tariff revenues must be weighed against the resources of AfT/PSD aid. As stated, the European Commission has rejected the prospect of €9.5 billion and has instead proposed €6.5 billion derived from existing channels. Significantly, West African officials appear to have acquiesced to the lower figure of €6.5 billion – the remaining issue is thus whether EPADP resources will be made available *in addition* to existing funds. Mohammed Daramy, a chief ECOWAS negotiator, stated that West African states would look to make up the €3 billion shortfall from other donor sources – thereby apparently accepting that EU aid would amount to the €6.5 billion figure (ICTSD 2010). West African commentator, Udo (2013), meanwhile, remarks that ECOWAS officials are ‘insisting that the EU fund the EPADP programme... with the injection of €6.5 billion euros in fresh funds’. The earlier figure of €9.5 billion has therefore receded.

Regardless of whether EPADP monies are derived from ‘new’ or existing aid channels, however, it would appear that the programme is wholly deficient in relation to its development aspirations. First, anticipated ECOWAS tariff losses of around €1.8 billion per annum outstrip the likely €1.3 billion derived each year from a five year EPADP instrument (EuropAid 2011). Moreover, EPADP resources appear financially anaemic in relation to EU export gains to West Africa amounting to US $1.87 billion in any given year upon conclusion of an ECOWAS EPA, as well as annual CAP subsidies to EU dairy farmers alone of around €5 billion per year (Lang 2006: 12; ActionAid 2011: 4). EPADP resources would thus not cover the full defensive trade interests of West African countries vis-a-vis European competition. Moreover, even if large sums were delivered for business capacity in export-oriented sectors such as fisheries, EU ROOs, hygiene requirements, and high tariffs placed upon processed goods would continue to stifle ECOWAS entry into European markets. Import-competing sectors such as tomatoes, poultry, textiles and carpet manufacturing (to name but few) would meanwhile collapse amidst import surges of cheap EU produce. Livelihoods losses anticipated in import-competing sectors (at the level of 30,000 jobs in Nigerian textiles alone) would therefore be unlikely to be made up by gains in export-oriented sectors impeded by ROOs, stringent regulations, high tariffs, and a lack of financial resources for genuine PSD aid.

Furthermore, if EPADP revenues were in fact complemented by existing AfT/PSD funds there is still much ground to doubt whether ‘development’ gains would be forthcoming. Notably, there is significant evidence that existing EDF and EIB aid monies have not promoted pro-poor private sector activities. Instead, the lion’s share of existing AfT/PSD assistance has historically gone to i) extractive mining activities in sectors such as copper with regressive outcomes for workers and host communities; ii) European corporate investment in exploitative (EPZ) manufacturing in violation of decent work prerogatives, and iii) lucrative road-building projects undertaken by European construction firms, irrespective of long project delays and use of sub-standard materials (see CounterBalance 2010 and Langan 2011). This is compounded by recent EU proposals to endorse so-called ‘innovative aid’ schemes in relation to the EDF. This would see European private sector resources being combined to those of the European Commission and (thus) counted within official calculations of AfT/PSD assistance (Lui et al 2012). This would buttress aid flows in the context of Eurozone indebtedness and the recently announced freezing of the resources of the 11th EDF at the levels of its predecessor. However, it would mean that development concerns would become even more subservient to European commercial motive in the distribution of aid to ACP countries.

The scenario of EPADP resources being derived from the EDF also raises serious questions in terms of negative revenue impacts upon humanitarian projects funded under this aid instrument. West African officials themselves have raised concerns about the so-called ‘raiding’ of EDF revenues for the financing of ECOWAS EPA adjustment costs (NANTS 2010). Many fear that aid for private sector capacity building would thus come at the expense of revenues otherwise earmarked for health, education and social protection. If, however, current spending levels on West African social sectors are to be maintained, then the overall proportion of EDF monies allocated to the ECOWAS region would have to increase relative to other ACP sub-regions. This would be detrimental to ACP solidarity and an extension of ‘divide and rule’ strategies perpetuated by the EU in its approach to EPA negotiations.

More practically, there are concerns relating to EDF disbursement since the European Commission has long been condemned for non-delivery of promised aid revenues. Patel (2007: 26) explains that only 28% of a total €15.2 billion allocated under the 9th EDF were tangibly delivered to ACP states within its five year timeframe. Moreover, there are also fears surrounding allocation within ECOWAS itself – with concerns about intra-regional power politics and resulting ‘aid orphans’ among least developed West African countries (c.f. Dalleau and Seters 2011: 20). Overall, therefore, given the likely adjustment costs of an EPA and the relative financial paucity of the EPADP instrument, it would appear that more developed West African states such as Nigeria and Ghana would likely fare better in the long-term under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) - despite immediate tariff hikes upon commodities entering European markets. Least developed ECOWAS countries such as Liberia and Guinea, meanwhile, could continue to access EU markets at their current low tariff levels under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. Either scenario would seem far preferable to prospects of lost tariff revenues, agricultural collapse and deindustrialisation under a region-wide EPA. Nevertheless, as noted, the ECOWAS Heads of State endorsed the regional EPA in July 2014 and ratification of the free trade arrangement now seems most likely.

THE EPADP AND WEST AFRICAN EXTRAVERSION

The concerns raised in relation to the likely regressive outcomes of an EPA/EPADP underscore several important issues in terms of the wider relationship between West Africa and the EU. Specifically, it raises important questions about whether the agency of African negotiators in trade relations with Europe necessarily results in progressive outcomes for ‘the poor’. In contrast to existing studies of ‘weak’ ACP states’ discursive power (Hurt et al 2013; Zartman 1971), West African elites’ attempts to maximise the gains of conformity to the EPA agenda (via EPADP resources) can be more usefully understood in terms of Bayart’s (2010) concept of *extraversion*. Bayart’s critique of overly-structuralist accounts of certain dependency theorists highlights the agency of the African state (and therein of African elites) in the management of dependence. Specifically, Bayart (2010: 23) emphasises the active participation of African officials in relations of dependency in order to maximise their own economic position. African policymakers ‘have been active agents in the *mis en dependence* of their societies, sometimes opposing it and at other times joining in it’ (Bayart 2010 xii). He explains that:

the leading actors in sub-Saharan societies have tended to compensate for their difficulties in the autonomisation of their power and in intensifying the exploitation of their dependants by deliberate recourse to the strategies of extraversion, mobilising resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment’ (2010: 21-22).

 Bayart’s concept of extraversion is important in the analysis of West Africa-EU relations in that it illustrates the role of African policy elites in making strategic appeals to the norms, and interests, of the external European ‘partner’. Rather than exist as passive victims of economic agendas imposed by the European Commission, West African negotiators exhibit a high degree of agency in their construction of the EPADP. Mirroring the language of Cotonou on the need for socially equitable market-opening and job-creating PSD/AfT interventions, the EPADP document makes an explicit appeal for Europe to fulfil its normative commitments to the ECOWAS region, and (more implicitly) to the ACP bloc as a whole. This coincides with Hurt et al (2013) to the extent that they point to ACP elites’ utilisation of rhetorical entrapment.

It is important to recognise, however, that such strategies of extraversion are not a novel feature of Africa-Europe relations, whether in the colonial period itself or in terms of postcolonial relations as characterised by accords such as Lomé and Cotonou. For example, it is perhaps relevant to contrast the recent extraversion of the EPADP with an earlier form in which West African elites in the 1950s sought to align themselves to the then prevalent ‘francafrique’ discourse espoused by French colonial administrations in countries such as Senegal and Ivory Coast. The historical appeal of West African personnel such as Felix Houphouet-Boigny in the 1950s to a shared cultural heritage with the French colonisers bears parallels to contemporary appeals to shared norms regarding poverty reduction. Notably, Houphouet-Boigny – even at the Independence Day events in Ivory Coast - explained that:

When we become mature, we are going to leave the family house, where we have so often been spoiled, and also sometime reprimanded… to found our own house, our own hearth. I would like to tell you that in leaving the French family, we do not intend to forget all that we have received from it. We would like, instead, to develop and to enrich the large patrimony which it has left to us, to the benefit of our people (cited in Bayart 2010: 196).

Such statements enabled Francophone elites in West Africa to appeal to external French authorities in terms of ongoing development assistance and preferential trade. By strategically emphasising the ‘good’ done by France in bygone days and the feeling of a French fraternity, the West African elite could successfully appeal for *continued* French assistance via explicit strategies of extraversion. Interestingly, Bayart (2010: 24) notes that such processes of extraversion existed even prior to the onset of European colonialism - in terms of pre-colonial trade interactions.

In similar terms today, ECOWAS policymakers consciously appeal to the EU’s stated intentions to deliver social and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. With parallels to earlier ruling strategies, they make what Bayart call this ‘alliance with the outside world in the area of trade’ and – perhaps most importantly – draw upon the external for means of ‘ideological legitimation’ (*ibid*). By appealing to the developmental promise of private sector competitiveness in free market conditions – and by emphasising their requirements for PSD/AfT assistance – West African elites seek to lever in greater resources through appeal to their European partners. By building their proposal for the EPADP on the discursive terrain already established by European counterparts, pressure can be laid upon the European Commission to tangibly deliver aid resources in the context of EPA implementation.

 Interestingly, the elite extraversion on the part of West African policymakers in the case of the EPADP mirrors broader happenings in terms of contemporary ACP-EU arrangements. As discussed, Hurt et al (2013) have argued that ACP negotiators made strategic overtures to EU narratives surrounding ‘development’ and poverty elimination in the timeframe of the Cotonou Agreement in order to *resist* EPA implementation. Significantly, they tie this to wider debates surrounding Normative Power Europe (qua Ian Manners) – arguing that African elites consciously seek to appropriate, and appeal to, European norms as a means of winning influence in ACP-EU negotiations. For instance, Hurt et al (2013: 70) make clear that:

Materially weak states can use prevailing discourses to remind more materially powerful states of their commitments and promises: imitating and accentuating dominant discourses become a source of influence… there are of course limits to such discursive power, and the difficulties that African states are facing in moving from a strategy of resistance to agenda-setting are reflective of these limits (2013: 83).

The case of the EPADP demonstrates, however, that African elites have not in fact solely utilised development discourse as a means of forestalling EPA implementation – *and are in fact successfully moving to a stage of agenda-setting*. Moreover, ECOWAS policymakers seem to favour the implementation of a region-wide free trade agreement – on the stipulation that the €6.5 billion for PSD/AfT are tangibly supplied by the EU. Rather than use the language of poverty elimination to reject EPAs en masse (as per the strategies of certain European and African NGO movements), African governance elites in the ECOWAS region seek to comply with European free trade prerogatives – and thereby demonstrate a clear capacity for agenda-setting in order to lever in greater resources for their own patronage networks in the process of EPA roll-out.

Crucially, however, as Bayart (2010: 21) reminds us, processes of extraversion may not in fact have positive outcomes for ordinary peoples in sub-Saharan Africa. Contrary to assumptions as to pro-poor outcomes for ‘weaker states’, elite extraversion may in fact entrench predatory regimes who misuse external resources for the purposes of power enhancement while ‘intensifying the exploitation of their dependents’. In the case of West African states this is clearly a major concern when considering the likely regressive impact of an EPA for vulnerable workers and producers in sectors such as textiles and agricultural processing. Additionally, Bayart’s warning helps to guard against optimistic assumptions that the EPADP could in fact meaningfully marry the EPA to genuine poverty reduction. It should remind us that the interests of ECOWAS policymakers in their interactions with European officials are not necessary synonymous with the interests of the wider population. Indeed, as was seen during the Lomé era, aid resources (such as STABEX) were routinely utilised as lubricants for elite patronage networks, without much tangible benefit for ostensible beneficiaries in economic sectors such as cocoa and coffee production (Brown 2002). The use of additional aid monies to prolong the ascendancy of predatory elites may in fact undermine long-term development. Contrary to EU announcements on ‘good governance’ within the Cotonou Agreement itself, ECOWAS elites’ successful extraversion in the case of the EPADP in West Africa may entrench kleptocratic rulers, at the expense of the wider economic base and poorer citizenry.[[8]](#footnote-8)

It is also important to recognise, however, that Bayart’ own account of extraversion has been accused of a certain ‘cultural primordialism’ in that his analysis apparently tends towards generalisations about the agency of *Africans* per se (Meagher 2006). This is a possible stumbling block for applications of *extraversion* in ACP-EU studies – one which can be partly mitigated with fuller recognition of the progressive role of African civil society organisations (CSOs). Indeed, while ECOWAS elites may acquiesce to asymmetric trade arrangements in order to lever in additional aid resources, their main challengers reside within local CSOs. As discussed, NANTS and the Civil Society Platform on the Cotonou Agreement EPA have both played a crucial part in underscoring the negative impact of EPAs. They have also been crucial in providing the discursive terrain for a wholescale rejection of the EPA agenda in favour of pro-poor alternatives, such as a return to non-reciprocity as enabled under the preceding Lomé Conventions. The progressive agency of West African CSOs, in particular, has been convincingly underlined by Trommer (2014) and helps us to guard against the essentialism that critics of Bayart find apparent in his own analysis of extraversion.

Furthermore, it is clear that ECOWAS elites are conforming to processes of *neoliberal lock-in* through strategies of extraversion in which they align themselves to a European discourse concerning private sector competitiveness and trade liberalisation (Nunn and Price 2004). This underscores the importance of the ideational element of the ACP-EU relationship in which the ‘logic of competition’ has become dominant and in which norms and material interests interplay to frame the process of trade liberalisation (Storey 2006; Langan 2011). In fact the EPA framework represents the combination of material self-interests with the normative logic of liberalisation. ECOWAS elites’ apparent conformity to the logic of neo-liberal restructuring – and their material interest to lever in additional aid resources via extraversion – explains the on-going roll-out of the Cotonou Agreement, and regional acquiescence to the regressive EPA agenda. This is despite the negative empirical assessments of likely outcomes of EPA implementation for West Africa. Elite extraversion – and conformity to EPA free market agendas – characterises the contemporary state of play in EU-West Africa affairs.

Overall, therefore, it is important to restate that West African elites have engaged in strategies of extraversion characterised by their acquiescence to the logic of private sector competition and free market opening embodied in the EPAs. In so doing, they remain locked into a dependency relationship with the EU that will likely lead to further neoliberal reform, albeit with the potential for maximising their own short term gains (particularly for lubrication of domestic power networks) through PSD/AfT assistance. This, however, bodes ill for vulnerable producers and workers in the region who will likely face severe social disruption upon the implementation of free market reforms. Extraversion – and ECOWAS elite agency in EPA negotiations– does not represent a positive force for development, quite the contrary.

CONCLUSION

The European Union has sought to promote PSD/AfT assistance to the ACP bloc as a strategic means of aligning EPAs to legitimising norms concerning poverty elimination and participatory development. In the shift from Lomé to Cotonou, EU officials have emphasised the need to promote private sector competitiveness as a means of achieving ACP countries’ ‘smooth and gradual’ liberalisation into global free markets. By emphasising Europe’s commitment to private sector development (PSD) and Aid for Trade, European institutions, notably the European Commission, have thereby legitimised the EPA agenda as a progressive enterprise that benefits both ‘partners’. This has been solidified within key policy documents, including the Cotonou Agreement itself, and more recent EU communications on Aid for Trade and PSD.

 Interestingly, however, the case of the ECOWAS countries demonstrates the agency of African elites in not merely acquiescing as passive actors to the imposition of EPAs. On the contrary, West African negotiators have put forward proposals for an EPADP which, at least originally, demanded €9.5 billion of new monies to facilitate their transition to free market conditions. Mirroring the PSD and AfT narratives enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement itself, ECOWAS officials have sought to manoeuvre EU counterparts into a position whereby they are obliged to disburse greater aid resources and to fulfil moralised development pledges. Drawing upon Bayart (2010), this can usefully be understood as a process of *elite extraversion* whereby ECOWAS policymakers consciously seek to utilise the ‘external’ as a means of revenue generation. Whether in terms of historical appeals to ‘francafrique’ or the more recent mirroring of AfT/PSD discourse, West African elites seek to benefit from relations of dependency – in the sense of making gains from their compliance to European agendas. Rather than sit as mere victims of European (neo)colonialism, therefore, West African policymakers can be seen as active participants in their relationship with the external.

 As the empirical analysis of the likely impact of EPA implementation illustrates, however, this ECOWAS elite compliance with the remit of free market reform does not bode well for ordinary workers and producers in the region. On the contrary, the roll-out of such neo-liberal prerogatives would likely have severe social consequences for the region’s population as a whole – whether in terms of job losses in industries such as tomato agro-processing, or in terms of diminished social services in wake of reduced tariff revenues. Any aid resources gained within an EPADP would likely pale in comparison with the negative impacts of a fully-fledged free trade agreement. Certain prioritised sectors (and elites) might gain in the short term – but the medium to long term picture of EPA implementation is bleak in terms of regional development. Therefore, while it is the case that African elites do possess agency in their negotiations with Europe, nevertheless, this does not necessarily translate into greater gains for the population at large as has been often assumed and/or implied within existing studies (Hurt et al 2013; Zartman 1971). Indeed, there should be scepticism as to whether the EPADP resources (if delivered) would be tangibly utilised for the benefit of the private sector (particularly in terms of kleptocracy in the region), and as to whether the business community could in fact thrive in the long-term in the liberalised conditions of the EPA.

 As a final note, it should be re-emphasised that the consideration of ECOWAS elites in strategies of extraversion should not be read as a historical novelty. In fact, as discussed, earlier agreements such as the Lomé Conventions also evolved in negotiation with then prevailing norms in terms of calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). ACP policymakers, at that time, successfully appealed to the norms and ethics embedded in NIEO proposals in order to win gains such as the STABEX price support measure from their EEC counterparts. And as discussed, West African elites historically sought to conform to prevailing norms of ‘francafrique’ in the 1950s in order to secure on-going assistance from the former French coloniser. Likewise, ECOWAS elites today, by appealing to PSD/AfT discourse seek to win resource gains in the form of an eventual EPADP. Just as with STABEX, however, such resources may prove ineffective in face of wider trade trends – particularly if, as the empirical evidence suggests, the EPA results in severe deindustrialisation and job losses in the region. ECOWAS elite agency may reinforce regressive conditions for ‘the poor’ through acquiescence to asymmetric trade arrangements with the EU. Again, this stands in marked contrast to the agency of civil society activists in the region who repeatedly emphasise (in convincing manner) that the EPAs are incompatible with genuine development in West Africa.

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1. Economic Community of West African States [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. PSD activities fall under the wider AfT umbrella which also includes aid for infrastructural development and assistance for trade governance capacity. AfT concessions have become increasingly prominent since the WTO Hong Kong summit of 2005 in response to developing country concerns surrounding Doha Round liberalisation. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. ECOWAS official, Mohammed Daramy, made clear that ‘among the reasons was the inability of the European Union (EU) countries to provide the funds to take care of the adjustment costs under the EPA’ (cited in Nduwugwe 2008) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Interestingly, Draper (2014) and Siles-Brugge (2014a; 2014b) explain that parallel EU trade negotiations (for instance with the USA regarding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) are important for understanding Europe’s global strategy vis-à-vis ‘competitive liberalisation’, and for making sense of the position of ACP countries. In particular, Draper explains that norms regarding services liberalisation are being embedded within parallel arrangements, likely influencing African countries’ own acceptance of such measures within the EPAs. The impact of ‘mega deals’ upon the ACP-EU relationship is an interesting element that, although not within the remit of our current discussion, is something which deserves closer scrutiny in the Africa-EU literature. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. In Ghana’s case the sole exception here is fish deriving from Cote d’Ivoire since both have initialled or signed unilateral EPAs– although neither agreement has yet been fully ratified. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Supporters of the EPA point to lower costs for West African consumers as a development gain. This is highly questionable given many low-income consumers will be employed within the import-competing sectors threatened by import flooding under an EPA. Purchasing power will fall for those workers impacted by deindustrialisation. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. As Draper (2014 and Siles-Brugge (2014, 2014a) note, the conclusion of TTIP – alongside other EU trade deals – may also have a trade diversion effect. Despite the signing of EPAs, ACP countries states may lose out as new trade agreements bring ACP commodities into greater competition with non-ACP states. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. For further discussion of predatory elites’ use of aid monies to lubricate power networks and the development challenges faced by states characterised by kleptocratic governance models, please see Langan (2015) on the utilisation of EU budget support monies in the ACP countries. In particular, this explains the role of aid in the ongoing rule of the Museveni regime in Uganda (to the detriment of the citizenry’s economic interests in terms of that regime’s own acquiescence to EPAs). Such practices can again be usefully defined in terms of extraversion and rent-seeking from donor aid flows. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)