

**UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER**

**Politicising Arab Image in American  
Elite Press In Light of the Intifada and the Gulf War: A Retreat to  
Zero Degree or an Investment of Change?**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE  
OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**Centre for Mass Communication Research**

**by**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **Politicising the Arab Image In the American Elite Press In Light of the Intifada and the Gulf War: A Retreat to Zero Degree or an Investment of Change?**

**By  
Khaled Alruwaite**

The study focuses on the Arab image in segments of the American elite press during the Gulf war. It content analysed three elite newspapers- the New York Times (NYT), Washington Post (WP) and Los Angeles Times (LAT). The analysis covers the period from January 16, 1991 when the war erupted, to February 28, 1991, when a cease-fire was declared.

The Gulf war could have represented a decisive moment of a possible variation in the American interaction with the Arabs. The study, however, reveals that neither the American government nor the Press exploited the change in the positionality of the Arabs to particularise the generalised image of the Arabs and to initiate a new way of perceiving them. Another case study (Intifada) has been incorporated to establish a point of comparison.

The Gulf war has been analysed in the context of State-Media relationships. The study emphasises the dynamic and mobile nature of media-government relationships. Multi-perspectives have been utilised to capture the mode structuring the variation of interaction between the state's foreign policy and the press support. These perspectives are: crisis, 'our' war, 'their' war, civil society, global civil society, values, cultural archive and self/other.

The intersection of foreign coverage with crisis, 'our' war, national civil society, values, cultural archive and self/other, fosters a fusion with the state and nourishes monologic relations with the postulated foreign other, the Arabs (Gulf war). The intersection of foreign coverage with 'crisis', 'their' war, values and global civil society, however, weakens the fusion between media and the state and fosters a dialogic relationship with the perceived foreign other (Intifada). In brief, the fusion between media and government and consequently the reproducibility of enclosure toward the projected foreign other is context dependent. It depends on local analysis or the intersected lines in one point of time.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

In February 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein made a verbal attack on other oil producing Arab states, in particular Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, for having caused serious economic damage to Iraq. The campaign of criticism increased in the next six months with, for example, Iraq raising its frontier claim to Kuwait, and announcing that it did not consider itself bound to repay money loaned by Kuwait during the war with Iran. In July 1990, Iraq and Kuwait representatives held talks in Saudi Arabia, against the background of some 100,000 Iraqi soldiers positioned along the Kuwait border. The Arab and world community was assured by Iraq that it would not invade Kuwait, but on 2 August, 1990 it did so (Khalidi, 1991; Matthews, 1993; Halliday, 1996). The reasons and justifications for the invasion multiplied as the months unfolded (e.g. unification, redistribution of oil wealth, liberation of Palestine and resistance to infidels). The invasion was followed by five months of diplomacy and military build up. Iraq did not withdraw and on 17 January, 1991 a counter air war against Iraq began, followed by a ground assault on February 23, 1991 that lasted five days.

The crisis following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was unique because of the multiple levels upon which it was being played out (Halliday, 1991). In international terms, it is comparable to the major crises of the post-World War.II era- Korea 1950, Suez 1956, Cuba 1962, the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973. Yet “It is distinct from, and more complex than any of these crises”(Halliday, 1991: 395). It is distinct because this crisis involved American-Soviet co-operation. In its report of the invasion, the first in the post-cold war era, *The*

*Economist* (8th September, 1990) said that this event had turned the world upside down. The report went on to say, five weeks after the invasion:

The United States assembled its first big post-cold war consensus against a regional aggressor. The Russians have stood alongside the West against one of their traditional allies in the Gulf, supposedly neo-isolationist America has rushed an army half-way across the world. (p 15).

The Gulf War was more complex because it has several other dimensions: "It has provoked a crisis within the Arab world, between the bloc led by Iraq and that led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt; it involves to a degree never seen in modern times all three of the non-Arab states in the Middle East-Iran, Turkey, Israel; it is a crisis within the US alliance, over the degree of military and financial support being given to USA in the Gulf; it is also a crisis of the international economic system, given the importance of oil and the inflationary pressures which higher oil prices and increased military expenditures in the developed capitalist states have brought; finally, it is a crisis of the global political system, as reflected in the question of whether the United Nations can, or cannot, act to prevent evident breaches of its charter"(Halliday, 1991: 395).

In the Arab world, the Gulf crisis marks a critical moment in contemporary Arab history. The Arab states have divided strongly in the past, as after the 1962 revolution in Yemen and Sadat's journey to Jerusalem in 1977. But this division appears to be deeper than any previous one (Halliday, 1991). Iraqi occupation and the annexation of Kuwait, the invitation of foreign armies by Saudi Arabia and the alliance of most of the Arab states with the United States against Iraq, promise to strengthen the fragmentation of the Arab world.



In the Arab world, the invasion also created an unprecedented level of political, economic and military co-operation between most of the Arab countries and the US. The bulk of the Arab states endorsed all UN resolutions with reference to the Gulf crisis. Further, Saudi Arabia boosted its oil production to make up for the Iraqi and Kuwaiti losses, spending over 55 billion dollars on the Gulf war. On the military side, Saudi Arabia agreed to let American forces onto its soil. The “Arab League” not only endorsed, but also voted to send Arab forces to join the Saudi-American led Coalition force in the Gulf.

Therefore, the Gulf war emerged at a moment of converging national and international wills towards a new era, the post cold war- a phase of history in which one would presume an extensive reign of mutual understanding between nations, was enhanced by an increasing involvement of the United Nations. Such context produces positive expectations of crucial transformations in the ways people of different nations interact and communicate.

However, the mode in which the Gulf war evolved showed very clearly the mistaken anticipation of the changes towards better national and international relations. The war proved more than ever before the complexity of the socio-political and cultural relations among national policies, national communities and their media systems. At the heart of this complexity, which this thesis is aimed to focus at, is the mode structuring the variations of the interactions among cultural world views, state's foreign policy, media institutional bearings and their potential impact on the public agenda.

Primarily, such focus is developed through a close attention to the interstices of the American-Arab relationships whereby the Gulf war could be said to have represented a critical moment of possible variation. Variations that might cut through different levels constituting the socio-political, economic and historical conditions of the media interactions with the 'Other', particularly, overlapping or sifting through the State's international machineries of intervention.

The variations in the American-Arab relationship which is presumed to be a possibility of a positive change toward the Arab image are not ad hoc ones. This thesis argues about a precedent variation which could have been invested to further a difference in the way the Arabs are perceived and portrayed by the American institutions. The preceding variation is believed to be embodied in the 1987 Intifada that occurred in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Intifada is a product of many factors. Some have to do with the Israeli policies in the occupied West Bank and Gaza strip in the first two decades of the occupation, while others are connected to the American's persistent unconditional support for Israel. Additionally, the Palestinians' feeling of abandonment by the Arab governments, and their attitude that they could no longer rely solely on the PLO to end the occupation, are other types of factors contributing to the way the Intifada has taken shape. The interaction of these factors led to the setting up of the national Intifada by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip.

The Intifada began early in December 1987 as a demonstration against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip. Soon, what began as a sporadic protest transformed into daily confrontations between stone-throwing Palestinian youths and Israeli soldiers. The intensity and particular nature of the confrontations and the disparity of

power between unarmed Palestinian civilians and a heavily equipped Israeli army, challenged many assumptions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel is no longer a tiny Jewish David facing an Arab Goliath. As Daniel(1995) puts it “The conventional wisdom about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was called into question; the news report presented a serious challenge to the predominant conception of Israel as a tiny democracy surrounded by hostile forces and constantly threatened by Palestinian terrorists” (Daniel, 1995: 62).

The Intifada event took on momentum in such a way that it had been thought it could produce resisting signs against the sustainability of the negative elements toward the Arabs. This had not been witnessed since the 1973 oil crisis stage.

In 1973 oil producing Arab states exercised their sovereign right over their resources, adjusted oil prices and used oil as a political tool to secure a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The oil embargo and oil price adjustments in the 70's was a major turn in the relations between the Arab states and the United States. For the first time in modern Arab history, contrary to American expectation, the Arab countries were able to unite. By combining the military strength of non-oil producing countries including Egypt and Syria, with the economic power of oil producers including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, political influence flowed from the Arab world toward the west. Convergence of oil shortage caused by the embargo along with rocketed prices triggered the oil shock of the 1970's and seemed to restore “some of the political balance in favour of the Middle Eastern countries”(Peretz, 1983: 133). In this context, Arabs were associated with the economic illness of the west.

Arabs were blamed by western governments and western media institutions for the rise of energy cost, high rate of inflation and high rate of unemployment. Thus, the scene was set for re-instigating an orchestrated antagonistic view of the Arabs in the American mass media. The Arabs oil producers were pictured threatening to cut fuel supplies and strangling Western civilisation (Khadderi, 1979; Ghareeb, 1979; Oxtoby, 1980). This campaign manifested itself clearly in political cartoons. Bill Auth of the Philadelphia Inquirer published a cartoon showing an Arab trying to soothe American fears about oil cutback: "The caption says, 'The news is we've raised the price of oil. The more you buy the worse recession. A second caption: 'The good news is we're going to produce more oil, so you can buy more'. And then he says as an aside. 'The more you buy the worse the recession' " (in Ghareeb, 1979: 71). In another play on the same theme Herblock published a cartoon on July 12, 1979. The cartoon "... shows a man in rage shaking from drug withdrawal labelled 'US' with his hands out accepting an oil-barrel syringe labelled 'Saudi Quick-Fix Oil Sales' from a sinister looking Arab. The Arab is holding behind his back a second syringe labelled 'Saudi Middle West Policy' The Arab is saying 'After all, what are friends for?' " (in Ghareeb, 1979: 71).

Therefore, the 1973 oil crisis stage is believed by several studies (see Chapter Four) to have witnessed the most orchestrated attack on the Arabs at all levels, not only by the United States itself but also by all the western societies as one bloc. The plethora of research conducted about the image of the Arabs in the West returns actually to that period. Such academic problematization is just one sign of how the elements of the 'Other', especially those that have historical residues and implications, become an aptitude for mobilisation, politicisation and stigmatisation.

The historical evidence of the way the American government, media, and the public interacted with the Intifada event reveal a distinctive feature of a change towards 'some' elements of the Palestinian cause. The change, as the thesis debates, should be taken with caution. The reason is basically related to the persistence of some structural functions that are continuing to constrain the extent and the scope of the change towards the Palestinian cause. These structural functions have retained an impact of diffusion and containment through certain mechanisms and machineries. The potentiality of investing the positive 'mood' in relation to the Palestinians is soon exhausted before it has been embodied into conditional structures. It has not been built upon to constitute a new way of perceiving the Arabs. That is, less work has been done to move beyond the mood towards reproducible structure which is essential to a more positive relationship with the Arabs.

As it will be illustrated in the body of the thesis, the signs of the restrictive change of the Intifada are detected in the failure to be a node in the Gulf war that would fortify a positive cultural change, believed to be given impetus by some preceding political changes, such as the new alignments between many Arab states and the western alliance bloc. It is worth noting that the position of the Palestinian cause in respect to the thesis argument is a critical catalyst of the direction of the reconciliation towards the Arabs in the American system of values and initiations. It represents a point of variation in relation with the Arabs. This has to do with the fact that the Palestinian cause has always been represented as a central locus of political, economic and social activities which summarises the politics of the Arabs of identity (see Chapter Two).

The emergence of the Gulf war and even the 1987 Intifada have correlated with the increasing discourses and practices related to

globalisation. Both events found themselves facing a new context. It is a new socio- political and economic emergent at a more abstract level to what the people of nation-states are familiar with. Globalisation is gaining footholds more than ever, cutting across and circulating through the whole variety of social formations of the nation-states. Taking Fredrick's (1993) comment seriously that in the last decades a new kind of global community (coming to be known as global civil society) is emerging with impetus at the international arena, it is important to shed light on it. Such a venture could clarify for us the extent of variability of the intervention of globalisation on the coupling relationship between civil society and nation-states institutions. That is, whether the new phenomenon will weaken the relationship between civil society institutions and nation-states.

Since media is an integral part of civil society, it is important to pay attention to the consequences of this new context on it. The questions that cannot be avoided in this respect are: Has globalisation weakened the close relationship between civil society institutions and nation-states? In consequence, will that break of close relationship, (a relationship mostly seen activated in crisis and war situation), further any changes in the reproducibility of monologic relations with the Arabs?

At this stage, it can be said that our position does not have any ontological presupposition towards globalisation. The way the questions are introduced, which as a result would require a construction of a perspective, is presupposed to be pervaded by strategical and political concerns. Such a position is constitutive to our adaptation with the advocacy of globalisation. This will entail that globalisation is not favoured as such, except as a strategical escape route from the already

existing nationalistic enclosures, which are actually believed to be (as the thesis will show) sustaining the power modalities of the American relationship with the Arabs.

### **1.1 Encountering the Event and its Implications**

Perhaps two incidents which the writer of this thesis experienced at the Post-Gulf period are a crucial indication of the presupposition mentioned above. The political changes in the Gulf war have not been a point of investment and articulation except from within certain machineries and mechanism that restore requisites of subsuming the 'otherness of the other'. In that sense, the current politics would always be a means for reproducing the cultural enclosures that appear to exclude any moment of real change and openness towards the 'other'.

The first incident happened four years ago (1992). A pilot study was conducted in a class of 12 undergraduate students at Southern Illinois University(USA). The study focused on American students' perception of the Arabs in the post Gulf War period. It began with the assumption that the Gulf War could represent a point of variability or a new phase in the American relations with the Arabs. Once the class instructor, however, asked the respondents to see several photographs and tell him how they make them feel about the Arabs (Favourable, Unfavourable, or Neutral), one student automatically replied: "I do not need to see a photograph to tell you about the Arabs". At that moment, I realised that he is one of those who are imprisoned in an enclosed perception. For it was apparent that he had resorted to widespread cultural frames, still deeply functioning, that put the Arabs into certain categories, labels or stereotypes. The Arabs are either X or Y and nothing further seems needed to be done.

The second incident was when the class instructor, following the study, introduced me to the class and asked me to talk about the media image of the Arabs. Soon after, another student asked: "What do the Arabs look like?" The question seemed to imply that the Arabs can be reduced to a very simple thing, whatever that thing might be. So, I responded to her by saying: "What do the Americans look like?" She replied with a total silence.

These two incidents are not minor and superficial. They are actually very important in signifying the persistence of particular effectivity of cultural formations cutting across those individuals in various social locations. Those negative cultural resources conditioning the perception of the Arabs in the Post-Gulf war, at an institution and department believed to be very crucial in en-culturation, are indexical of the direction of politics to where it has ended up. The American politics has been just a hinge element for ad hoc interests.

The way the two incidents proceeded shows the continuity of the static, reductive and inferior view of the Arabs. In brief, the presuppositions embedding such discourses negate the Arabs by reducing them not only into a simple thing but also into a linear context; "The Arabs are 'out there' and we know their 'true' nature". For as we shall see in Chapter Two, such a view promotes self deception. Further, there is a rationalisation of one's feelings toward the 'other' by degrading the nominated other. That is to say, there is a justification of the individual's view of the postulated 'other' for no normal human being could live at peace with himself/herself were he or she to believe that he/she is unjust or evil. If indeed the 'others' are seen to be inferior and unworthy, the self may then breathe a sigh of relief and go on with



its unwarranted view. In this climate, the individual and the State would look always at the 'out group' rather than turning toward its 'inwardness'. Moreover, there is in these discourses an attempt to ignore the fact that the Arabs, as any other group, are a heterogeneous group of people. Indeed, to talk about the 'Arabs' as a totality is to wipe out the important distinctions between various societies within the Arab world and to marginalize the dynamic nature of Arab societies. It is important to bear in mind that we also embrace a non-essentialist and contingent view of the 'US' (more broadly the West). Indeed, we do not accept the view that the US is a totality and our reference to it should not be seen as a suggestion that the US is monolithic. Our reference, rather, is to the 'US' ( or the West) which is producing and sustaining monological discourses toward the 'Arabs' at a particular historical moment.

These implications are actually the bedrock moment that encouraged the writer of this thesis of taking the task of understanding the forces structuring the sustenance of the negative Arab image in the American elite press. These should not have been reproduced if one has taken into consideration the attitude of the Arabs towards the American intervention in the Gulf. Many Arab countries not only endorsed the American intervention in the Gulf but also fought shoulder to shoulder with the United States. The difference within the Arab World and the dramatic change in the American-Arab relations could have represented a decisive moment of possible variations. But, as this thesis attempts to demonstrate clearly, the American media and government are less concerned about changing those national enclosures which are believed to be effective in sustaining the reproduced skewed image of the Arabs.

## **1.2 American Media Nourishment on Negative Arab Image**

A quick look at some excerpts that managed to resurface, with difficulty now and then, in different American media institutions reveals the issue at stake . In the words of Washington based syndicated columnist, Nicholas Von Hoffman: "No national, religious or cultural group...has been massively and consistently vilified [as have the Arabs]" (Shaheen, 1984: 124), and John Cooly supports this view by saying "No other ethnic group in America would willingly submit to what Arabs and Muslims in general have faced in the US media" (Curtiss, 1982:153). Portrayal of the Arabs in the American press signifies the re-instigation of many machineries that worked out the portrayal of the Jews by the Nazi propaganda machine during World War II (Curtiss, 1982). The volume and intensity of the Arab stereotypes in the American media led Jack Shaheen, Professor of Mass Communication at Southern Illinois University, to contend that: "The image of the Arab is so pervasive that it threatens to engulf public opinion and ultimately influence American foreign policy in the Middle East" (Shaheen, 1985: 161).

In his paper to the International Press Seminar in 1979, Edmund Ghareeb said:

During and after the 1973 war and the ensuing oil embargo emerged the image of the fat, rich, bearded sheiks, grinning at the world as they gorge themselves on the fruits of the oil wealth and squeezing the jugular vein of the western world by threatening its oil supply. Editorials, advertisements and feature articles in leading papers and television commentaries charged that the Arab embargo was 'blackmail'.

(Ghareeb, 1979: 61)

W. Oxtoby argues that:

Until [the 70s] the rulers of the Gulf states were often cast in the role of frivolous playboys, burdensome perhaps to the small populations of their own lands but hardly a threat to the rest of the world. The dramatic effects of the oil embargo following the 1973 Middle East war soon altered this perception. Feared at first for their ability to cripple the oil-consuming industrialised world by withholding fuel, the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states soon came to be feared for economic power that they began to accumulate when they restored the oil supply but at a higher price. (Oxtoby, 1980: 10)

Two CBS *60 Minutes* programmes, for example, asserted to 40 million viewers the myth that Arabs are a threat. The first, *The 600 Million \$ Man* with Morley Safer went out in January 1977 and proposed that Arabs, especially Saudis, were buying up America. The script included the line : "Arab investment in the US has now passed twenty billion - twenty billion dollars! and rises by about one billion a year." The second *60 Minutes* programme, *The Arabs are Coming* was broadcast in December 1977. The title parodies the then popular phrase, taken from the motion picture, *The Russians are Coming*, equating Arabs with the nation that was America's greatest threat <sup>1</sup>(Shaheen, 1984: 84-85).

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<sup>1</sup>In presenting this narrow and over-simplified view of the Arabs, the US media apparently overlooked four crucial issues. First, the oil export countries had tried vigorously since 1949 to increase the oil prices gradually; however, the response of the oil companies was extremely negative (*Altrakee*, 1982:54). In 1950, the Iranian Prime Minister, M. Mossadegh negotiated a new price deal with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The negotiation, however, failed to convince AIOC to accept a raise in Iranian oil prices. The failure of the negotiation led Mr. Mossadegh to nationalize the Iranian oil industry in 1954. Following the nationalization of the AIOC, the Western government and oil companies boycotted Iranian oil while the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) arranged to overthrow Mossadegh's regime (*Hoveyda*, 1982:128). The oil companies not only rejected the increase in oil prices, but also decreased the prices in 1960 in a step that led to the foundation of the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC) in 1960. The refusal of Western oil companies in the Middle East and South America to increase oil prices gradually during the 1950s and 1960s was the main cause of the oil shock in the 1970s.

Second, inflation began before OPEC raised the price of oil and continued to increase while oil prices were stabilizing. The International Deposit Organization report in 1979 revealed that oil prices accounted for only 1.5 percent of the 13.3 percent of inflation in 1979. Further, Dijani noted that the oil price in 1979 was equal to six dollars by 1971 dollar standards (*Dijani*, 1982:24). Former Saudi

The excerpts mentioned above indicate very clearly the negative perception towards the Arabs in which the American media breath out and nourish on. That is, the American media have continuously tended to present a partial view of the Arab world as a threat, except very few cases that could not survive to furrow an alternative path. Apparently, one can trace out the background of such negativity. There is a cumulative history of ad hoc tensions, enmity and differential relationships. Taking over the Europeans' colonisation and world dominance on the overseas continents, the Americans, so soon, reinstated the long heritage of Orientalism and initiated a leading role in a new post-Colonial era. They did not escape its static, essentialised and stereotypical representation of the Islamic world ( see Chapter Two for further discussion of 'Orientalism' and western perspective on the Arabs ) although their social and political ethos have always resonated humanistic ideals at both national and international levels crystallising around freedom, national independence, and self determination.

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oil minister Abdullah Altrakee reported that until September 1979, the prices of Saudi oil in 1979 were less than the value of 1973 prices.

Shortly after the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war in 1979, both countries lost a high percentage of their capacity to export. The Saudis responded by increasing their production to make up for the Iranian and Iraqi losses. Further, the Saudis continued to sell their oil at less than the market price. The former oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani, asserted that the Saudi goal was to protect the health of the international economy. The policy of American oil companies operating in Saudi Arabia, however, did not help this goal to materialize. The American companies sold only fifteen to twenty percent of the cheap Saudi oil in the United States, and transferred the rest to the European markets where they could get a higher profit (*Andrescan*, 1982:125). Former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James Akins, notes that the moderate price of Saudi oil did not affect the price at the pump (*Akins*, 1982:177).

Fourth, Arab aid to the underdeveloped nations in the 1970s had averaged as a percentage of GNP: United Arab Emirates over 20 percent, Kuwait over 5 percent, Qatar over 15 percent, and Saudi Arabia over 5 percent. In contrast, member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD) contributed during the same period less than 0.5 percent of their GNP.

Finally, Arab investment fell well behind the Japanese, Canadian and Europeans who accounted for almost ninety percent of direct foreign investments in the US in 1980, for example. Further, members of the OPEC, Arabs and non Arab together: accounted for less than one percent of foreign investment in the US during 1980 according to US Department and Commerce reports (*Shaheen*, 1984:15).

No doubt that these ideals have always been apt to be articulated as part of more concrete interests, interests that have been moulded and blended pervasively by the increasing American participation in the international community since World War II. With the Arabs, specifically, the interests were economic and political. The former interests rotated around the increasing world dependency on oil, particularly the highly industrialised societies. This has made the oil to become increasingly a stake fought for. As a result of being the main suppliers of crude oil, the Arabs were shackled into the terms and implementations of the international relations which the Americans had managed to dictate. On the other side, the latter interest was anchored by the increasing full support and defence of the Israeli state. A state that was established in 1948 and which has gained progressively in power and influence inside the American political and economic systems<sup>2</sup>.

The Intifada case study which will be discussed in Chapter Six reveals, in the light of the Gulf War case study, the emergence of a point of tension in the background of deeply supportive commitment to Israel. The tension expressed itself in those elements which created a positive mood towards the Intifada. However, those elements, as we shall see later on, did not succeed to transforming themselves into a new perspective due to the consistent American support for Israel. The case

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<sup>2</sup>Support for Israel stems, in part, from a powerful and vocal pro Israel lobby in the United States. According to Steve Bell (1980), the pro Israel lobby has deeply affected both the American media and American public opinion: 'It has pointed reporters toward favorable stories, with a sure sense and understanding of American news values. It has made interviews available with well-known and articulate visiting Israelis. Its influential adherents in the congress and elsewhere have frequently made news with their statements or actions' (Bell, 1980:57). This situation affords pro Israel actors advantages in shaping the media and public agenda in many issues falling within Israel's spectrum of interests. Moreover, the ability of pro Israel groups 'to marshall and maintain the support of the mass media, main public opinion, and broad cross-sections of associational life in this country such as organized labor and non-Jewish interest groups have enabled them to amplify and disseminate their policy preferences far beyond the limits of their own organizational structures' (quoted in Curtiss, 1982; 113).

study will show how the mechanism which created the positive mood toward the Intifada so soon has been transformed into machinery that protect the Israeli image, finding a way out of the dilemma that Israel has ended up with. Put differently, what was at stake was Israel rather than the Palestinians national rights.

### **1.3 The Gulf war: A Revival of the Repressed Values and a Flee from 'Vietnam Syndrome'**

It is not surprising that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has again given life and impetus to the American foreign policy's historical principles at the international level. President Bush did not hesitate to propel and instigate all the baggage of resemblance and differences with the past in a way that he could establish an effective politics of identity in support of his intervention. He drew an analogy between Iraqi aggression and Nazi aggression half a century before. He perceived Saddam Hussein as a new Hitler, and Kuwait as another Poland: "Half a century ago our nation and the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who should and could have been stopped. We are not going to make the same mistake again" (Staff of US News & World Report, 1992:123). The justification for the intervention has settled on four main propositions: (1) The crisis is due to Saddam Hussein's naked aggression against peaceful Kuwait. (2) Saddam's appetite for expansion can't be appeased. (3) The US as a leader of the free world is obliged to reverse the aggression. (4) By fighting small wars now, it could avoid a bigger one later.

Ostensibly, introducing the revived principles structuring the American foreign policy in the Gulf war is not the case at study. It is rather a backdrop contextualising the conditions of the interacting

continuum (government-media-public) that are participating in sustaining a historical 'generalised', 'skewed' and monologic perception of the postulated target irrespective of the changes and differences that have emerged within. Ironically, one is puzzled by the fact that the political changes in the stance of yesterdays' 'generalised enemies', the Arabs, have not yet received a recognition of recuperation into the accepted camp. There is still a continuous unleashed tendency to stigmatise them no matter how far situated alliances are established. This generalisation and other forms of ideological processes, as the thesis will illustrate, are crucial evidences of the vacuous ideals which the forces of the American continuum of communication tries to identify with.

Part of the argument of this thesis is that there is a crucial change in the political situation. This is represented by a remarkable differentiation within Arab policies in the Gulf war. The change is not taken seriously into consideration by the Americans. The continuation of American media portrayal of Arabs as a threat could imply that the American government did not seek to exploit the opportunity of a change in Arab positions. This view is based on a presumed leverage the American government has over the US press ( see Chapter Three ). The leverage is evident for instance in the second phase of the Intifada ( see Chapter Six). The Intifada witnessed a change in the way the American press interact with the Arabs. The change, as Chapter Six will argue and demonstrate, can be linked, in part, to changes in the political environment ( see also Wolfsfield, 1997). These changes manifested themselves partially in reactivating the American involvement in the peace process in the Middle East through the Shultz plan. Also, the changes crystallised in the split in the bipartisan support for Israel in the Capital Hill. The intersection of these two forces widened the range of

coverage. It moved the Palestinian plight from 'sphere of consensus' to 'sphere of legitimate controversy'.

Hallin (1984) argues that there are three 'spheres of opinion'. These are the 'sphere of consensus', the 'sphere of legitimate controversy' and the 'sphere of deviance'. Media tend to be relatively critical and open to dissident voices when issues fall within the realm of legitimate controversy. On the other hand, Bennett (1990) argues that media coverage 'index' the rise and fall of official debate in the American capital. As the thesis will show, this argument explains to us in part the press coverage of the second phase of the Intifada (Feb-Apr 1988). The American government could have exploited its leverage over the press to initiate a new way of seeing the Arabs during the Gulf war.

As the thesis will argue and reveal, there is no way that one can avoid an inevitable conclusion emerging from particular American administration-media policy towards the Others. The passivity in confronting the negativity of the Arab image constituted by the whole assembling machineries of American intervention abroad reinforces the view that the government was in some sense not caring to particularise the image of the "generalised Other", the Arabs. The mobilisation of the domestic front swept all serious attention to establish a better policy orientation towards the outside world, that is, towards one's own cultural enclosures. Could it be said that such insistence on reproducing historical standardised and generalised images is an accomplice for internal interests? This is a question that the thesis will try to track and examine all through out the discussion of the interrelations structuring the American foreign policy, American media interactions and Arabs during the Gulf war from January 16, 1991 to February 28, 1991.



#### **1.4 Orientation of American Media policy: Responsibility or Negligence?**

Even though the research done on Vietnam and Granada show the impact of US' policy on the media, they have also signalled the tensions in such relations. Considerably, the tensions arise from the media's identification with ideals or values that restore independence as a guarantor against excessive government power. The independence value resonates with many other values (for instance, individual freedom). Altogether, they are a subset of values constituting the particular cultural system of the United States. These values are the core which represent the ideological outlook of the media in a social system. Through its identification with these values and seeing through their tinted lens, mediated by other higher encompassing social values, the media approach and interpret events. The perception of events is related to the frame of reference, which in turn is fashioned by the socialisation in a particular setting. The values, according to Rokeach, "are enduring beliefs that certain modes of conduct which exist are and should be actively encouraged and appreciated within a social system" (Rokeach, 1973: 19).

Upon acknowledging the fact that the media, in our case the elite press, is an integral part of the society, this should not exclude the necessity of having a critical evaluation of the media from within the principles in which they operate. This is said to point out that having the media identifying with the independence value, protected with a socialisation of social responsibility, the media would have had a chance in the Gulf war to act differently. That is, acting critically by acknowledging the changes and transformations of the conditions which

have been constituting and have been sustaining the reproduction of the negative image of the Arabs. This sort of venture is believed to be possible if these changes are 'hooked' into a preceding positive variation, the Intifada in 1987. This context is helpful to further an alternative investment which could disperse those negative cultural and structural conditions towards the Arabs.

Apparently, the negligence and irresponsibility which the thesis will conclude with do not just apply to the government but also to the media. The latter has lost a chance to practice its own theory of social responsibility. A theory that is very widely accepted and propagated within the American society and the American media system to mean 'a forum for exchange of comment and criticism' which can sustain a provision of 'a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which give them meaning' (Sierbert et al, 1971).

As the thesis will reveal through a close look at the tensions of various conditions of the media -State-public interactions which are resulting in a particular mode of composition and setting of the news issues, the media has hardly ever initiated in the Gulf war new ways of perceiving the Arabs or at least, approaching them in a problematised way. Even if one has to accept the now well known argument among media researchers that 'the individual reporter or editor views and interprets the world in terms of his own image or reality...his own beliefs, values and norms. Thus to the extent that his image reflects existing norms and values, he is likely to overlook or ignore new way of perceiving the world or approaching problems' (Roberts & Schramm, 1971: 382), this should not blind or give us an excuse for such types of partial and skewed relations towards the other, the Arabs. At least, the

media should have committed themselves with the provision of a forum for various viewpoints, thus showing the least that they can do. However, the thesis will show that even this did not happen.

### **1.5 Design of the Thesis**

The remainder of the thesis is divided into seven chapters:

Chapter II aims to give a picture of the ‘remote’ conditions that are shaping media representation of the Arabs. It presents a discussion of the cultural or remote conditions that shape the American media representation of the Arabs. The chapter outlines the western perspective on the Arab world and Islam especially those Orientalist points that certain orientation of the American society are identifying with. It argues that western perspective on the Arabs conditions media images of the Arabs. Western perspective on the Arab, we argue, is characterised by a static and hierarchical mode of thought

Chapter III considers the proximate conditions that are structuring international news coverage. These conditions include news gathering routines, government-media-public interactions, foreign policy, globalisation, national crisis and sources’ interaction. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section emphasises the view that the majority of literature on agenda setting is characterised by an inconsistency of results. Our way of resolving the problem of the issue, given that the present study is not an agenda setting study, is to consider the potentiality vis-à-vis the actualisation of the setting process. The second section focuses on the basic principles of political values that have emerged from historical contingent relationships of the Americans with the postulated foreign ‘Other’. The argument will

proceed to show the conditions dictating the American view of international relations that appear to be bounded with nation-state values. The third section introduces the emerging concept of global civil society and its relation to state-media relation. Lastly, the chapter incorporates crisis as another perspective to understand media relation with nation-state and their interaction with the foreign other. The fourth section focuses on source-press interaction in 'crisis' situation, and the fifth section zoom in on the Gulf war.

Chapter IV reviews the literature on the Arab image in the American media and is divided into two sections. The first attempts to establish a link between the literature on the media and the Arabs with the theoretical frameworks discussed in chapter three. The second section reviews the literature on the Arab portrayal in the American media.

Chapter V describes the methodology used in a content analysis of the US press coverage of the Intifada and the Gulf war. It explains content analysis as a methodology employed to generate a frame that make sense of the data. It also presents the rationals behind the selection of the American media and the sampled newspapers, the data gathering procedures and the description of the coding schedule.

Chapter VI analyses the American media coverage of the Palestinian Intifada in the occupied West Bank and Gaza strip between December 8, 1987, and March 8, 1988. The study indicates that there was a change in the media image of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Before the 'Intifada', as Chapter Four reveals, the media viewed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as 'ours' or an American issue and it identified almost totally with Israel. After the 'Intifada' the media

viewed the Israeli-Palestinian dispute as 'their war'. This view produced a new interpretation of the dispute. The new interpretation challenged the traditional image of the Palestinian as 'terrorist' and 'topdog'. Thus the Intifada represents a point of a variation in the media coverage of the Arabs. This is not to say, however, that the change eliminated the old frame. The Chapter is divided into two sections : content analysis, and textual analysis.

Chapter VII presents the findings from the Gulf war case study. The chapter argues mainly that the media coverage of the Gulf war is structured by the cultural and proximate conditions discussed in Chapters Two and Three. It also contends that neither the government nor the media is concerned about initiating a new way of perceiving the Arabs. Thus, the signs of a possible change in the media coverage of the Intifada discussed in Chapter Six cannot but be interpreted as a temporary situation that did not get to a point of transformation. It lasts only for a limited time.

The Final Chapter presents the conclusion of the study .

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **WESTERN PERSPECTIVE ON THE ARABS IN LIGHT OF**

### **ORIENTALISM AND DYNAMISM**

To understand the structures shaping the media interactions with respect to the West and Arabs, it is indispensable to consider the remote or sedimented conditions which allow us to see the role of key historical institutions. These institutions are actually helpful in providing a frame that could shed the light on those historical particularities that are still restoring critical momentum in crystallising the American media formations of Arab representation.

The necessity of these historical institutions in our analysis of structures of American media representation resides in the reality of their transformation into cultural forces and resources. Such transformation is not without relevance. In the actual reality, the power in its negative sense finds the best opportunity to breath out in the cultural sphere. They are the ‘backstaged’ ones that are conditioning many ‘frontstaged’ processes. Their distal status are not meant to be as absolute determination. Simply, they are not like that. These conditions come to be active, now and then, as a result of some particular local and complex relations. They might function for ideological (conserving the status quo) or for subversive (ineptitude to change and mobilisation) ends. In both cases, these historical institutions are necessary components for actions.

While focusing on the distal conditions of the media representation in this Chapter, there is an implicit attention to the activeness and the reciprocity of the proximal conditions which are expected to be discussed in detail in Chapter Three. The proximate

conditions include source media interactions and news values seen within special context, the abstract and the local crisis (e.g. global and national crises). Distinctively, the interconnections of the distal conditions will take shape along two lines.

Two basic lines, distributed into two sections, are discussed in detail. The first line puts into focus the re-instigation of a historical force, the Orientalism, as a result of constant resort to the imaginary which is believed to be crucial in the emergence of a secured Self, the West. So, the point of departure of the following discussion is the “Self and the Other” paradigm, with the view that the media in its representation of the other act as a carrier of some of the cultural materials that are already existing in a society. The problem in that action, which this chapter builds upon, is the embodying assumptions giving impetus for the Western perspective. The Western gaze assumes a perspectiveless and objective knowledge. In contrast, we approach the topic from a perspectivist point view. A distinctive feature of this view is the assumption that no knowledge about human society is perspectiveless (Sharabi, 1990: 1-2). Thus all knowledge about social and historical reality is never neutral or objective as such but always linked to forces and factors that come together to form a determinate perspective. To illustrate the conditions of the “Self” and “Other” paradigm, two basic points distributed into two sections are discussed in detail.

Having made clear the particular forces, practices and routes which are forming the determination of the Orientalist perspective, a more specific articulation is going to be brought forward. This is the second line that the distal conditions would take shape. Four dialectical principles are put under scrutiny to particularise the directions that this perspective has taken. Accordingly, one is expressing the concrete terms

and the reciprocal relations that have given a possibility for the reproducibility of the Orientalist discourse.

However, the proximal conditions of the argument are left for the following chapter, that is, chapter III, where a close look at them is initiated. It is inevitable to point out that these conditions are no less important than the remote ones. They are adjacent to them, functioning to reveal the impact of local interconnections of the current modern instantiation of media organisational, normative and institutional relations.

## **2.1 Recourse to the Imaginary: Determining Self Boundaries**

Most human expression and activity, Gilbert Durand remarks (1993), are representation, and the reservoir of all human representation is imaginary. John Shotter (1994) refers to imaginary as the 'organised setting' people through which all understanding necessarily passes history (Shotter, 1994: 79). The imaginary, or cultural archive, is viewed as essential to the process of social representation (Tacussel, 1993). The image becomes a culture belt. The 'binding' process takes place around images which one share with others (Maffesali, 1993: 3-4).

Indeed all knowledge about human society is socially produced and powerfully articulated. As Said (1997) has pointed out all knowledge rests upon interpretation which in turn is situational: " For interpretation depend very much on who the interpreter is, who he or she is addressing, what his or her purpose is in interpreting, at what historical moment the interpretation takes place. In this sense, all interpretations are what might be called situational: they always occur in a situation whose bearing on the interpretation is affiliative. It is related to what other interpreters have



said, either by confirming them, or by disputing them, or by continuing them. No interpretation is without precedents or without some connection to other interpretation " (Said, 1997: 162-163).

Similarly, Sue Jansen (1991) argues that all knowledge is socially produced. This is in contrast to objectivist theories of knowledge which assume that knowledge is 'out there' to be uncovered. Jansen contends that knowledge and truth are "social construction, artifacts of communication, community, and culture" (Jansen, 1991: 182). People always approach knowledge through the partials of their interests: "[interests] make inquiry possible. They provide the grounding for and auspices of knowledge... we know because we need to know. We have a vested interest in knowing" (Jansen, 1991: 183). Put differently, knowledge is activated in many social spaces through socially constructed "quasi illusions" which are influenced by human interests.

John Shotter (1994) suggests that no matter how strongly we may possess a sense of the reality of the topic we talked at, often, we are talking about things which only subsist in the speech we use for co-ordinating our activities with those around us. We have 'given' or 'lent' the things we talk of, a nature which they do not actually have. The sequence of events involved is as follows:

- 1 Firstly, a situation is described which, although we do not realise it at the time, is open to a number of possible interpretations.
- 2 We are, however, then tempted to accept one of these descriptive statements as true.
- 3 The statement then 'affords' or 'permits' the making of further statements, now of a better articulated nature, till a systematic account has been formulated.
- 4 The initial interpretation (already accepted as true, of course) now comes to be perceived, retrospectively, as owing

its own quite definite character to its place within the new well-specified framework produced by the later statements. (Shotter, 1994: 85)

In other words, the original situation has now been 'given' or 'lent' a determinate character, which it did not, in its original openness, actually possess. In this context, perception, is a socially constructed and socially maintained "quasi illusion" in terms of which people make sense of themselves in relation to 'the other'. Thus perception plays a real part in our lives, not in the sense of correspondence with 'reality' but in the sense of achieving reproducible results by the use of socially sharable discourse or common knowledge.

## **2.2 Orientalism: Essentialist and Dichotomist Representation of Islamic Societies**

Orientalism is one institutional manifestation of the imaginary that is active in the current Western social and political fields. The Orientalist discourse is an archive of images and statements providing common language for presenting knowledge about the Middle East: " In a sense, orientalism was a library or an archive of information commonly held. What bound the archive together was a family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be effective. These ideas explained the behaviour of Orientals; they supplied Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics" (Said, 1978: 41-42). This cultural archive suggests " an enormously systematic" (Ibid) mechanism capable of largely determining whatever may be said or written about the Middle East.

The field of 'Orientalism' later to be captured or resort to extensively by Area Studies in United States , as explained by Said (1978), Abu-Lughod (1990), Farsoun and Hajjar (1990) and Sharabi (1990), represents one particular western framework rooted in a history of cultural imperialism in the Orient. Orientalism no sooner established itself as a field of 'objectifying' the Other since the 19th century, it has produced, in the spaces of its activities, strong potentialities for getting logged into centralised affiliations and universalised aspirations. In due course, Orientalism, in one of its stream of thought and action, was captured as an area that could be built upon a ground for discursive rationale for European colonial expansion into Islamic countries. It provided a cultural rationale for Europe's exploitation and manipulation of Islamic societies through the construction of cultural stereotypes of the orient. In this context, knowledge about the Middle East is inextricably tied to power. These links may work through individuals as Said suggests in the following passage:

If it is true that no production of knowledge in human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author's involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances, then it must also be true that for a European or American studying the orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his actuality : that he comes up against the orient as a European or American first, as an individual second. And to be a European or an American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a power with definite interests in the orient, and more important, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of involvement in the orient almost since the time of Homer. (Said, 1978: 11)

The problematic elements of the Orientalist discourse resides in its essentialist mode of thought about " the orient, its people, customs, 'mind', destiny and so on" ( Ibid, 2-3)and in its basic dichotomy between the East and the West (Ibid). This mode of thought has been a determining factor in the conceptualisation of the Islamic and Arab societies of the Middle East. The social structure of these societies are presented as static and uninfluenced by historical change except perhaps the result of contact with the West. It is as "if historical Middle Eastern societies were self - contained, isolated from external relations, frozen in an immobile dynamic, and unchanging before their incorporation into the modern system" (Farsoun & Hajjat, 1990: 164). This essentialist concept of the stasis of Islamic and Arab social structure is expressed in different ways.

One essentialist view of Islamic societies in Orientalism is the segmentary model of mosaic. In this view, these societies are typically isolated from each other and are self-contained. Hence, Islamic societies are seen as simple structures of social grouping dividing along ethnic, religious, sectarian and tribal lines. The mosaic is held together from above by a despotic state (Farsoun & Hajjar, 1990; Sharabi, 1990; Abu-lughod, 1990).

The image of Middle East despotic and their subjects is seen in terms of force, repression and violence on the one side and submission on the other (Asad, 1973). Ralph Coury (1975) noted that one of the long lived thematic of western orientalism has centred on the conviction that Islam and Islamic society are by nature totalitarian . "... they are based upon the right of brute force unchecked by any mechanisms which work for self-criticism or which might lead toward a democratic and egalitarian humanism. It has been the conviction that Islamic society is by necessity

a closed society in which force and violence and those who wield them are sanctified by religious and political traditions that are passively and unquestioningly accepted by cowering people" (Corry, 1975: 115).

i) Three Exemplary Orientalist Readings;

Consider for example the following two passages from the works of the two most prominent Orientalists in the United States, H. Gibb of Harvard University, and Gustave Von Grunebaum of Chicago University and UCLA. In his essay 'Religion and Politics in Christianity and Islam', Gibb states " [the governor's] administrative regulations and exaction on land, industry and persons, and the processes resorted to by [their officers] were regarded as arbitrary and without authority in themselves, and directed only to the furthering of their private interests. In the eyes of the governed, official 'justice' was no justice. The only authoritative law is of Islam; everything else is merely temporary accommodating to the whims of a changing constellation of political overlords " (Gibb, 1965: 12).

A similar view underlines the following remarks by G. Von Grunebaum (1955): " As an executive officer, the [Islamic] ruler is unrestricted. The absoluteness of his power was never challenged. The Muslim liked his rulers terror - inspiring, and it seems to have *bon ton* to profess one's self awe-struck when ushered into their presence ... [The medieval Muslim] is frequently impatient with his rulers and thinks little of rioting, but on the whole he is content to let his princes play their games" (Grunebaum, 1955: 25-26).

Grunebaum (1964) has no difficulty assuming that Islam is a static phenomenon, unlike Christianity, and therefore he presents it

to be antihuman and incapable of change, self-knowledge, or objectivity:

It is essential to realise that Muslim civilisation is a cultural entity that does share our primary aspirations. It is not vitally interested in the structure study of other cultures, either as an end in itself or as a means towards clearer understanding of its own character and history. If this observation were to be valid merely for contemporary Islam, one might be inclined to connect it with the profoundly disturbed state of Islam which does not permit it to look beyond itself unless forced to do so. But it is valid for the past as well, one may perhaps seek to connect it with the basic anti-humanism of this [Islamic] civilisation, that is, the determined refusal to accept man to any extent whatever as the arbiter or the measure of things, and the tendency to be satisfied with the truth as the description of mental structures, or in other words, with psychological truth.

[Arab or Islamic nationalism] lacks, in spite of its occasional use as a catchword, the concept of the divine right of a nation, it lacks a formative ethic, it also lacks, it would seem, the later nineteenth century belief in mechanistic progress. (Grunebaum, 1964: 55, 261)

A similar theme or mode of thought appears in Kenneth Cragge's book, 'The Privilege of Man'. Cragge (1968) claims that Islamic-Arab societies do not have the capacity for self-criticism that is found in the Judaeo-Christian West. Consider for example the following passage " It may not be so ready a matter to see and express this self-critical quality in Islam ... the criteria of finality and success tended to generate, if not also require, a self-vindicating or self-approving temper. The close identity between the will of God and the way of the prophet, between the purpose in heaven and the policy in the field, checked, if did not wholly preclude, the dimension of inward criticism."

David Pryce-Jones ( 1989) titled his book on the Arabs ' The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs'. The title is a reflection of

his argument: The Arabs have trapped themselves in a closed circle, “ ... within which identity and its supportive value paralyse endeavours of rescue” ( Pryce-Jones, 1989: 403).

## ii) Reproducing the Undifferentiation: Subordinating the Arab Subject to Origins

At large, with the political and economic transformations of the region, new nodes of articulations were emerging. At the time that the Arabs have re-initiated new types of struggles, affiliations and structures, they have actually turned some of their dimensions into a sort of attractor to previous historical mechanisms of power relations. As it will be realised in the coming discussion about the dialectical principles governing the Arab region, many elements of the resources drawn upon in defining the Islamic culture and society are been ‘transplanted’ into the new emergence of ‘Arab character’, muting thus its potentiality to differentiates itself away from being subsumed.

The essentialist view towards the Arab societies is recuperated. Consider for example Rapheal Patai's book ‘The Arab Mind’. In Patai's text the ‘Arab mind’ is represented as a unified and static structure and the Arab culture as transparent and comprehensible. Further, Patai, draws on other orientalists to make sweeping generalisations and dichotomises the human continuum into ‘we/they’ classification. Patai's conclusion is that “Arab thought processes are more independent of reality than the thought processes typical of western man” (Patai, 1973: 311).

One would presume that the plethora of Orientalism critiques could have restrained the audacity of many advocates for an essentialist view of the Arabs. However, this is not the case. There are still dozens,

if not hundreds, of studies of the 'current' situation which repeatedly reflect the effectivity of one stream of Orientalist thought. For instance, P. J. Valikiotis ( 1986) recycles a classical Orientalist view of the Arab and Islamic societies. He argues that the Islamic-based identity of Middle Easterners is incompatible with " ... scepticism, experimentation, and tolerance, so essential to pluralistic politics" ( Valikiotis, 1986: 78). He adds " The dichotomy ... between the Islamic and all other systems of government and authority is clear, sharp and *permanent* ( emphasis added)" ( Ibid., 80). Nothing changes and nothing will change. It is a 'closed circle'.

Bernard Lewis (1993) in his article ' Islam and Liberal Democracy' questions the compatibility of Islam with democracy: " The question ... is not whether liberal democracy is compatible with Islamic fundamentalism- clearly it is not- but whether it is compatible with Islam itself" ( Lewis, 1993: 93).

Daniel Pipes (1995) in the article entitled "There are No Moderates: Dealing with Fundamentalist Islam" uses 'Fundamentalist Islam' and 'Islam' interchangeably as if the former was equal to the latter or as if the two had a simple and fixed meaning. He also draws the analogy between 'Fundamentalist Islam' and communism and fascism: " While fundamentalist Islam differs in its details from other utopian ideologies, it closely resembles them in scope and ambition. Like communism and fascism, it offers a vanguard ideology; a complete program to improve man and to create a new society; a complete control over that society; and cadres ready, and even eager, to spill blood" (Pipes, 1995).



### **2.3 Modality of Power Continuity of Orientalism: Coupling Dualism in Relation with the Other**

Apparently, from the discussion above in relation to Orientalism which structured both the image of the Islam and Arabs, the 'Self-Other' view is underpinned by "stereotypical dualism". The dualism means that the stereotypes are split in two opposing elements, operating to secure the modality of power relations. These could be accomplished through two main features of the Self's discourse of the Other. According to the inspiring diagnosis of Stuart Hall (1994), in such sort of discourse firstly, 'several characteristics are collapsed into one simplified figure which stands for or represent the essence of the people; this is stereotyping, secondly, the stereotype is split between two halves- its good and bad sides; this is splitting or dualism" (Hall, 1994: 308). Moreover, the 'Other' becomes defined as everything the 'self' is not. It is represented as absolutely different other. Such 'binary opposition' seems to be fundamental to the formation of the western identity. As Hall(1994) argues "national cultures acquire their strong sense of identity by contrasting themselves with other cultures. Thus, the west's sense of itself was formed, not only by the internal processes that gradually moulded Western European countries into a distinct type of society, but also through Europe's sense of difference from other worlds-how it came to represent itself in relation to these 'others' " (Hall, 1994:279).

### **2.4 Colonial Modernisation and Development: New bottle Old wine**

The post-World War II emergence of the Middle East as pivotal not only to American interests but also to superpower rivalry produced a 'new' knowledge about the Middle East. The need to understand the

area is, ironically, a strong factor behind the demise of traditional Orientalism, which is more concerned with the past than the present. It is this urgency of the present that pushed the established Orientalism into modernisation theory and area studies (Farsoun & Hajjar, 1990). This knowledge, then, was not innocent. It was moulded and influenced at least in part by the American role and foreign policy in the 50's and the 70's.

After World War II, the United States took over the position of dominance once held in world affairs by France and Britain, and a set of policies was developed to suit the problem of each region that affected United States interests. The Middle East seemed to American policy-makers to be " 'underdeveloped' in the grip of unnecessarily archaic and static 'traditional' modes of life, dangerously prone to communist subversion " (Said, 1997: 29). The prevalence of this view has made it a force shaping the modernisation.

In post-world war II, the theme of social change permeated the analysis of the developing countries. But social change in the developing countries had one meaning 'Westernisation'. That is, "*becoming what the west is*". In this perspective, the relation between self and the other is no longer that of colonialists and colonised but between the developed and the developing Third World. Hence, the blueprint of change for the developing countries is a denouncement of the old self and an emulation of the West.

For modernisation theorists, modernisation represented a challenge to 'traditional' Middle East societies which would become a mere historical souvenir as secularisation and rationalisation proceeded (Anderson, 1990: 56). As Daniel Lerner (1958) put it "Whether from

East or West, modernisation poses the same basic challenge - the infusion of 'a rationalist and positivist spirit' against which, scholars seem agreed, Islam is absolutely defenceless" (Lerner ,1958: 45).

## **2.5 Routes for Politicising the Academic Knowledge for Media Institutions**

Whichever emergent properties take hold on Orientalism, there is a very clear element reproduced. This is the power feature that is configuring the extent of social and political effectiveness. The location of these relations are mostly given legitimacy by certain institutions well established in knowledge production, dissemination and commodifications. These institutions are representing the means and resources for establishing effective power movement across various social, political, economic and cultural sites. The reproducibility of the archive and the functionality of it find their expression in those produced information professions and academic organisations that acquire symbolic capital and invested legitimacy.

As the Middle East importance to the United States increased in the 1970s, studies about the region have increasingly appeared . This has been evidenced, for example, in the growing number of university centres, departments and students, and the growing size of various associations concerned with Middle East studies (Said, 1981; Farsoun & Hajjar, 1990). According to a survey of American Middle East studies centres, about 1650 Middle East specialists in 1970 taught the area's languages to 6809 graduate and undergraduate students. Area courses on the Middle East enrolled 28700 graduates and undergraduates. The Middle East studies , as Said pointed out correctly, are not value free (Said, 1997).

In 1973, the Middle East Studies Association surveyed the entire field in order to assess its state, needs, prospects and problems. The result was a large volume called “‘The Study of the Middle East: Research and Scholarship in Humanities and the Social Sciences’ edited by Leonard Binder”. Binder noted the closeness between politics and area studies: "The basic motive in the development of area studies in the United States has been political" (quoted in Said, 1997: 141).

The Near East Studies program at Princeton University held a series of seminars between 1971 and 1978 . The seminars were funded by the prestigious Ford Foundation. The co-operation between a very respectable program in Near East studies and a prestigious social science foundation, Ford, helped to shape the intellectual concerns in the scholarly community in the United States. It “suggests and meant to suggest emphases, priorities .... ” (Said, 1997: 145).

One of the seminars dealt with “slavery and related institutions in Islamic Africa.” In the proposal for that seminar, Said (1997) noted that much emphasis was placed on African fear and resentment of Arab Muslims, and it was noted that “ some Israeli scholars” have attempted to warn African nations against depending too much on Arab nations “who depopulated their countries in time past.” Said argues that “ by choosing slavery in Islam, the sponsors were highlighting a subject certain to worsen relations between Africans and Arab Muslims: It was as part of achieving this aim that no scholars from the Arab Muslim world were invited” (Said, 1997: 145).

A second seminar dealt with the ‘millet’ system and its theme was the position of minorities and in particular of religious minorities within

the Muslim state. The topic, as Said has pointed out, is far from being a neutral academic topic. “ the ‘*millet*’ system was in its very formulation the expression of a preferred policy solution for the complex nationality and ethnic problems of the contemporary Islamic world .... The millet system represent a throwback to an earlier time, by which imperial powers divided and ruled a large and potentially fractious population ” (Said, 1997: 146). It is not surprising that as in the case of the slavery seminar, no members of the majority Muslim community were invited.

Not only were seminars held, now and then, but also multiple written articles were provided and aimed at close circles of the American establishment and its research institutions. A more recent example which signifies the continuation and re-activation of the means through which Orientalism finds an outlet is Judith Miller’s (a fellow at the Twentieth Century Fund) recent article ‘The Challenge of Islam’ in the Foreign Affairs journal. She does not hesitate to assume that ‘Islam’ is incompatible with pluralism, democracy and human rights. “American officials formulating new policies toward Islam and the Arabs should be sceptical of those who seek to liberate Arabs through Islam. First, they should understand that no matter how often and fervently Islamic groups assert ideological covenants and tracts, published declarations and interviews ( especially in Arabic) appear to make these pledges incompatible with their stated goals of establishing societies under Islamic law and according to Islamic values. Far too many Middle Easterners , and Islamists in particular , have learned how to mollify the West by manipulating the words of democracy ” (Miller, 1993: 51).

Similarly, Bernard Lewis of the Near Eastern studies program at Princeton University, assumes that the nature of ‘Islam’ do not make liberal democracy and Islam natural bedfellows . He ‘explains’ that

devout Muslims believe that legitimate authority comes from God alone . Since the ruler derives his power from God and not from the people , defying the ruler has been tantamount to defying God. “Disobedience was a sin as well as a crime ” (in Miller, 1993: 50-51). This oversimplified statement ignores the reciprocal rights and obligations between rulers and ruled and the consensual basis of the ruler’s political authority.

Another prominent ‘expert’ on the Middle East, Fouad Ajami, offered his explanation, during the Gulf war, of the alleged absence of ‘Arab rioting’ against the war. This ‘explanation’ was based mainly on the ‘expert’s’ view of Arabs and Arab character which includes an “ acute respect for power”. Viewers were told that ‘the Arabs’, some 220 million, are unlike any other people in the world in that they have tremendous respect for power . And what is the evidence for this statement ? It is a single Arab proverb which states “Kiss the hand you cannot bite.” This resort to proverbs to ‘explain’ Arabs and their character has become a favourite of Arab bashers on the American media . It ignores the fact that every people has thousands of proverbs , many of them contradictory . For example in conjunction with the above proverb , one might cite a related and complementary aphorism , namely “the son of the ruler is an orphan.” That one is a clear reminder that the rulers, particularly despotic ones, do not last long (Suleiman, 1991).

For most Americans, the branch of the cultural system that has been delivering Islam and Arabs to them for most part includes television, newspapers, radio, and magazines . Together these powerful mass media constitute a common core of interpretations providing a certain picture of Arabs and Islam and reflecting the interests of the society served by the media (Said,1997). This picture on the whole is a depressing one. Said (1979) noted that “what emerges is that Colonel Qaddafi, Sheikh Yamani,

and Palestinian “terrorists” are the best known figures in the foreground, while the background is populated by shadowy notions about *jihad*, slavery, subordination of women, and irrational violence” (Said, 1979: 100). What adds to that depressing picture is that the few revisionist and reformist institutions such as the Middle East Studies Seminar (AMESS) and the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) which tried to avoid the complicity with the government did not actually represent a shifting force against the already dominant activities of the Orientalist discursive practices.

Twelve years later the overall picture seem to remain the same. Said (1991) noted that “For decades in America there has been a cultural war against Arabs and Islam: the most appalling racist caricatures of Arabs and Muslims have converged that they are all either terrorists or sheikhs,...” (Said, 1991: 7). This, obviously, does not mean that there is no variety within the American media, but despite this variety there is a tendency to favour certain representations of reality over others (Said, 1997). Moreover, it ought to go without saying that we are not suggesting that the picture is an inaccurate one or that there is a ‘real’ Islam existing out there that the media may have perverted, we mean rather that it is a picture that has the consistency of something made up, and that “... the media’s Islam, the Western scholar’s Islam, [and] the Western reporter’s Islam ... are all acts of will and interpretation ... ” (Said, 1997: 45).

As we shall illustrate comprehensively in the following Chapter, the situation is complicated, in part, by the concentration of the news - gathering process. Most foreign news for the American press is gathered by seven newspapers, the two wire services, and the three national television Networks. The papers are the New York Times, Washington

Post, Los Angeles Times, Baltimore Sun, Chicago Tribune, Wall Street Journal, and Christian Science Monitor. The Networks are ABS, CBS, and NBC, (Graber, 1989). Graber noted that “ The stories gathered by this small corps of initial gatekeepers reach huge audiences. Newspaper syndicates, like the New York Times syndicate or the Los Angeles Times - Washington Post syndicate and feature service, are able to frame foreign news for hundreds of papers in the United States and abroad” (Graber, 1989: 330).

To sum up, US (or, more broadly, western) perspective on the Arab has two main characteristics. It essentialises and dichotomises the Middle East remaining generally unmindful of its own biases or the consequences of its own rhetoric and mode of discourse. This mode of thought is under pinned by stereotypical thinking which implies simplicity, rigidity and stasis. People become prisoners without realising it because the prison in which they are trapped is invisible. They are unaware that what they see is determined by what they expect to see, never responding to the ‘reality’ but to their view of it. W. Thomas notes “... if men define situations as real , they are real in their consequences ” ( Finlay et al ,1967: 25). Alfred Korzybski points out that the majority of the human race , “... takes labels, creation of their own rational will for objects, and objects for events , as true constituents of nature , and then fight and dies for them “ (quoted in Almeraiie.1984: 107).

Western categorisation of the Arabs is based on an unquestioned assumption. It is assumed to be the thing it represents. It ignores the fact that we live in a world of constant change. It casts one mind into fixity and inflexibility of things . Nothing remains the same in spite of its given name . The assumption that Arabs are an adversary may not necessarily be true and even if it was , the next moment it may no longer be so . The



act of labelling and stereotyping excludes other perceptions , and widens the gap between the map and the territory.

## **2.6 Reversing Orientalism: Dynamism and Complexity of Arab History**

This section has a dual function: First it complements the previous section. It establishes an alternative relay of resources which would constitute a relation much needed to establish a critical position in consequence. The present section is also tied to the rest of the thesis . It provides an engaging background that can reveal meaning which helps in either destabilising the for granted themes or those elements that have been backstaged by the description in the case studies, that will be introduced in subsequent chapters. As part of the central theme which weaves this section, where the Arab should be approached from a dynamic perspective, the provision of selective elements can shed light upon those Arab actors participating in the events which the case studies are derived from.

In the Middle Ages the Arabian Peninsula witnessed the birth of a religion and a people who laid the foundation stone of an empire that was soon to embrace a large part of the then civilised world. Since then the Arab- Islamic history has been a continuous dynamic process. Within this framework, it is possible to pin point several processes which have dominated Arab history. Some of these major dialectical processes are: a) The dialectic of unification and fragmentation, b) the dialectic of the interior and the exterior, c) The dialectic of the major and minor traditions and, d) The dialectic of spiritualism and materialism (Salame et al, 1988).

### **The Dialectic of Unification and Fragmentation.**

The concept of 'unification' means the process of merging smaller entities into larger wholes, while 'fragmentation' means the disintegration of larger wholes into smaller ones. In this context both unity and fragmentation are no more than two temporary historical moments and each one of them carry seeds of opposite states of affairs.

Historical evidence supports this view. For it is not right to say that the Arab homeland - as we know it today-has continued to be in a state of universal unity in most of its history, which started with Arabic - Islamic conquests. It was politically united for about two hundred years and governed by the four caliphs Abu-Bakr (632-634), Umar (634-644), Uthman (644-656) and Ali (656-661), during the reign of Omayyads<sup>1</sup> (661-750) and the first century of the Abbasids<sup>2</sup> (750-1258)

However, historical evidence also shows that the Arab homeland has not been in a state of fragmentation throughout the remaining part of the last fourteen centuries. The twelve centuries that followed witnessed the formation of small entities which underwent political unification and were combined to form bigger entities. These did not necessarily cover all parts of the Arab homeland but definitely they were larger than the present political units. After factors of fragmentation continued to attack these large entities, this was usually followed by a process of unification. Therefore, 'unification' represented a continuous historical trend, and 'fragmentation' represented an opposing historical trend

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<sup>1</sup> Umayyad Caliphate is a new brand of the caliphate-monarchical, worldly and anchored in Syria. The Umayyad caliphate was founded by Muawiyah.

<sup>2</sup> The Abbasid Caliphate is the second caliphate. It was founded by Abu-al-Abbais.

It is not our intention within the scope of this discussion to go into the details of each process, whether it is that of 'unification' or of 'fragmentation'. The important point is to prove that the two processes have dominated Arab history in a continuous dialectical relationship.

### **The Dialectic of Interior and Exterior:**

The Arab homeland, as we know it by its present boundaries, has been confronted by another historical dialectic, that is, the conflict between the internal forces within its structure, and the external forces which have tried subjugating it. The first four centuries of the Arab - Islamic history represented a period of conquests and expansions. The three centuries that followed crystallised as a period of retreat. Foreign forces (i.e. Moguls, Crusaders) had invaded the Arab homeland. Five centuries later a state of resistance and counter resistance between the internal and the external forces emerged with a relative triumph for the internal forces. This is true if we regard the Ottoman empire of being representative of these forces. However, the last two centuries became a period of retreat for the internal forces and a period of expansion for the external forces

The last round in particular has special importance. It resulted not only in the geo-political and economic domination but also in the transformation of the state of 'fragmentation' into 'regional partitioning'. Prior to the last imperialistic invasion which had started two centuries previously, the internal boundaries between the regions of the Arab homeland had no meaning with regard to the movement of people, commodities or thoughts. Faith, language and the way of life were the common factors binding the members of that region, giving any one of them the right to travel and choose the place he would like to settle down,

in that area expanding from the Ocean to the Gulf, without any feeling that he was outside the land of the Arab and Islam, and without the need for any legal documents.

i) Statism; An External Implication Functioning against Pan- Arabism

It is in this round that the era of Nation-state in the Arab homeland has had its origin (Matthews, 1993). The legitimacy of Nation-State was challenged on the grounds of Islamic unity and Arab unity. The creation of several independent entities, however, " caused the development of a built-in obstacle to achievement of unity in as much as ideal unity would demand the abolition of newly won sovereignty of each of the component parts" (Lenczowski, 1974: 57). Similarly, Matthews (1993) remarks that " the post-Colonial nation-state building process ... pulls strongly against a declared integration Pan - Arab ideology " (Matthews, 1993: 22).

The Arab league is one manifestation of the power of Statism. The Arab league, created in 1945, was a loose federation of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Member states surrendered none of their sovereignty. Indeed the league is no more than "association of sovereign power, each entitled to veto any attempt to impose the will of others upon itself" (Lenczowski, 1974: 57). Since the organisation has been founded, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait, the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen, Bahrain, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Djibouti; Somalia, United Arab Emirates, Palestine and the Comoro Island have joined in.

Border disputes is another manifestation of the power of Statism over Pan - Arabism. There have been territorial claims between most of the Arab States as, for example, between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Iraq and

Kuwait. These disputes, of course, are incompatible with the logic of Arab unity which regards frontiers irrelevant. Due to the nature of this study we will zoom in on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti case

## ii) Border Disputes Between Iraq and Kuwait

The frontiers between Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were drawn up largely by Sir Percy Cox, the British Chief Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, at the 1922 Uquair conference (Simons, 1994). The delegates came to the conference with conflicting demands. Cox soon lost patience and decided that he would determine the frontiers (Simons, 1994). The frontiers, as Marlowe put it, were 'imposed on Nejd, Kuwait and Iraq by Sir Percy Cox on behalf of H.M.G....' (Marlowe, 1962: 75). Cox gave Iraq a large slice of the Najd territory it claimed, gave Najd a large slice of Kuwait territory, and carved away a small slice of land from Iraq and gave it to Kuwait, thus leaving Iraq virtually landlocked (Darwish et al: 1991). Iraq's main port Basra, is linked to the Gulf by Shatt-al -Arab which also has constituted a border between Iraq and Iran.

In a letter to the British government on September 17, 1938, the Iraqi deputy foreign minister, Mahdi Abbas wrote; 'In the light of the Iranian threats to the Shatt al-Arab, we wish to start a project to guarantee an outlet to the sea via Kuwait' (Darwish et al, 1991: 12). This demand for better access to the sea transformed to demands for the annexation of Kuwait, an important part of the Nationalist's strategy of King Ghazi of Iraq. Ghazi's actions set a precedent for succeeding Iraqi governments and their attempts to annex Kuwait.

Iraq's claim to Kuwait rested on its interpretation of the status of Kuwait as part of the Ottoman - that is, as part of the Ottoman Velayet of

Basra- and the fact that Iraq was constructed out of unification of the Ottoman Velayets of Mosoul, Baghdad and Basra and since Kuwait was part of Basra it should also be part of Iraq (Matthews, 1993). The validity of the claim, however, has been challenged mainly because there was no pre-Ottoman logic making for the state of Iraq that Kuwait could be said to be part of. Matthews (1993) argues that “ ‘Mesopotamia’ is commonly used to refer to the three provinces (Baghdad, Mosoul and Basra). However, its existence as a legal entity- in the sense of being a coherent state- cannot be established” (Matthews, 1993: 133). In addition, since the eighteenth century, the status of Kuwait as part of the Ottoman Empire had been ambiguous. There is also the view that “if Kuwait is an artificial political entity, created by colonial power, so too is Iraq” (Halliday, 1991: 400).

### **The Dialectic of Major and Minor Traditions:**

The Arab homeland -as we know it today- has been confronted by a third dialectic, that is " the major cultural unifying forces' facing 'the minor cultural dividing forces'. The former refers to such factors as Islam and Arabic language. The latter includes local variations for each one of the major unifying factors. For example, Islam as a general universal faith has within itself several sectarian and theological variations. The Arab language which acts as a medium of communication has within itself several dialects within which exist dozens of subdivisions. These forces of one time or another converge and diverge. A pertinent case in point are the two case studies which this thesis is concerned about: Palestinian struggle and the Gulf war.

During the generation after the establishment of Israel in Palestine in 1948, most Palestinians identified their national aspiration mainly with

Nasser and Pan Arabism. After the overwhelming nature of the Arab defeat in 1967, however, the Palestinians established their own organisation. These organisations were generally divided into those whose principal objective was to liberate Palestine and those with large political and social objectives in which liberation of Palestine was a part (Peretz, 1983). The resistant movement challenged the established Arab government both revolutionary (Egypt which had accepted the UN resolution) and non-revolutionary (Jordan and Lebanon.) The Fedayeen organisations had at one time or another profoundly shaken the existing official structures in Jordan and Lebanon to the point of achieving a virtual duality of power (Lenczowski, 1974).

Today's Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) demands for an individual secular Palestinian state. This demand, apparently, diverges with Pan- Arabism and converges with nation-state. It also diverges with Islam. The PLO 'secular' politics is challenged by the Islamist group Hamas. Hamas argues that Israel wins because it is faithful to its religion, and Arabs are defeated because they are insufficiently devoted to Islam (Salame, 1993). Unlike the PLO politics, Hamas political line converges with Islam.

During the Gulf war, Saddam Hussein used Arab nationalism and Islam to manipulate the Arab masses. Saddam Hussein revived the dynamic of Arab nationalism with its core the goal of Arab unity and the redistribution of wealth. He also used Islamic language and posed as the champion of Islam (Halliday, 1991). Most of the Arab States led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, however, opposed the Iraqi attempt to impose unity by force, leading thus to the formation of an anti Iraqi alliance.

### **The Dialectic of Spiritualism and Materialism**

It is possible to view the Arabic-Islamic history as a constant dialectic between 'the sinful' and 'the holy ' and between the existing reality and the ideal inspiration. When the realm of the Caliphate came to an end and the Omyyads succeeded in securing power, the Arab - Islamic history since that time had been generating religious-political movements which rejected the existing reality and aspired to recreate ' the lost paradise' or the just and virtuous society which had existed at the beginning of the Islamic era, during the days of the Prophet and the Orthodox Caliphs. As time passed by, the Moslem Arabs added an idealistic state to that historical period which did not exceed half a century, and its history inspired the imagination of those who rejected the existing reality and aspired to a perfect society. These rejectionists were - and still are- the fuel of many political movements in the Arab - Islamic history. Some of these movements had succeeded in controlling power (like the Abbasides). But soon afterwards, what had been achieved, was not much different from the existing reality they came to replace. Thus, new rejectionists movements were created to examine in depth the Koranic texts and the Prophet Sunnah (Mohammed's words and deeds) and the life of the Orthodox Caliphs. Out of this, a new idealistic revelation was introduced as a holy substitute for the 'sinful reality' which existed at the time.

During the last two centuries , the Arab homeland has witnessed many such religious-political movements . The important ones among these , might be “Senussism”, and “Mahdism”. Each one of these movements had managed to secure power in one of the Arab countries (Libya and Suddan). But soon after they were transformed into ruling



dynasties with little difference from other dynasties , which the Arab - Islamic history is full of .

### **Relationship between Dialectic of ‘Unity and Fragmentation’ and ‘Interior and Exterior’**

The dialectic of ‘unity and fragmentation’ seems to relate closely to that of ‘the interior and the exterior’. Arab nationalism emerged in the latter half of the 19th century as a counter project of the Ottoman, one which was based on Islam as a unifying force. Arab nationalism was to a large extent a product of interior and exterior forces. The former refers in part to the Turkification program in 1909 which expected all groups, including Arabs, to become Turkified within a homogeneous Ottoman state. At least ten groups opposed the Turkification program. They sprang up among Arabs in Istanbul, Paris, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo and other Arab cities, some were secret and others were public, all probably worked in some degree of harmony (Peretz, 1983). No sooner than the Ottoman empire, however, failed to maintain its existence in opposition to new national and international conditions, the degree of harmony structuring the principles of Arab nationalism went into disarray. As we will illustrate throughout our argument, the Arab nationalism took different formations for different stakes. Egyptians deeply involved in their own struggle with Great Britain did not yet identify with neighbouring movements (Peretz, 1983). In Greater Syria several competing ideological variants emerged. One was the Syrian nationalism of Antwan Sa’adah. His Syrian Social Nationalist Party which was established in 1932 advocated Pan-Syrian nationalism. It favoured unity among ‘natural Syrians’, including the population of the Levant, Cyprus and Mesopotamia (Tibi,1981). The other principal transitional competitor to the mainstream Arab nationalism was the Greater Syria plan sponsored

by Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, which included Jordan, Syrian, Lebanon and Palestine; and the fertile crescent plan put forth by the Iraqi prime minister Nuri-al-Sa'id, which would have linked Iraq to greater Syrian and eventually other Arab states as well (Hudson, 1977).

The exterior forces refers to the outside forces which added the fuel to the fire that was to become Arab nationalism. These forces included contacts with western nationalist ideas (European and US missionaries to the Levant, and the Arab intellectuals studying abroad); the Zionist movement and the Zionist intention to establish a Jewish state by detaching Palestine territory from the Arab world (Gerner, 1991); French support of most of the Arab societies. The first Arab congress of nationalist groups was held in Paris in 1913 under the auspices of French ministry of Foreign Affairs; and British encouragement and support of Arab nationalists led by Sharif Hussein was to turn the Arabs against the Turks. In return, Britain promised to support an independent Arab Kingdom (Hudson, 1977).

The emergence then, of the Arab nationalism was partly a reaction against the young Turks who followed Turkification which tried to force the Arabs to abandon their cultural heritage entirely. Exterior forces sought to exploit potential fragmentation of the Ottoman empire to their advantage. The European colonial powers, who fought against the Ottoman empire and its ally Germany, gave wide support to the separatist movement. Other exterior forces that acted as awakenings of Arab nationalism were the contacts with the west and the Jewish occupation of Palestine.

i)The Colonial Challenge :Europe Versus Arab Nationalists

After the end of World War I, a fall of disillusionment fell over Arab nationalists when they discovered that the promises of an independent Arab Kingdom made during the war was now to be sacrificed to European political claims in the region (Peretz, 1983). When it became clear in March 1920 that the Paris Peace conference would reject any proposals to modify British and French plans to carve up the area, the Syrian National congress unilaterally declared Syria independent (including Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq), demanded evacuation of British and French troops, and the repudiation of the Sykes-Pico Agreement and the Balfour Declaration (Simon, 1994). Within a month, the San Remo conference met and completely disregarded the Arab congress decisions dividing the region into French and British Mandates (Peretz, 1983). By the end of 1920, the Arab parts of Asia outside the Arabia Peninsula had come under an Anglo-French colony

European powers not only divided the Arab homeland but helped to create a Jewish state in Palestine. In November 1917, British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, promised the Zionists a homeland in Palestine.

Britain's betrayal of its promise to the Arabs of an independent Arab Kingdom, and the Balfour Declaration, transformed Arab nationalists. They wanted to keep their identity and to live under the rule of an Arab governor (Gerner, 1991; Rodinson, 1982; and Tibi, 1981). In 1920, a revolt by Arab nationalists took place in Iraq against what was regarded in Iraq as the British betrayal of its 1916 pledge of Arab independence (Simons, 1994). The revolt spread widely and it was not completely suppressed until February 1921. Palestine also became a centre of nationalist revolt. The revolt grew and between 1936 and 1939 turned into a full fledged Arab rebellion (Peretz, 1983). The Arab defeat in 1948 seemed to many youthful nationalists to point out clearly the

ineffectualness of the methods used by the older generation and a quite fundamental defect within the existing Arab order. In this context within a decade after the 1948 war, the defeat contributed at least in part to nationalist revolutions in Egypt, Syria and Iraq.

## ii) The United States and The Palestinian- Israeli Dispute

As the major western power at the end of World War II, the United States was expected by the international community to take a leading role in dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. The United States first became intimately involved in the controversy over Palestine in the 1940's and was instrumental in the passage of UN Resolution 181, that is to say, the partition of Palestine and the creation of Israel. The American role (exterior forces) in the partition of Palestine and the creation of Israel (fragmentation ) stimulated opposition by Arab Nationalists( interior forces) who emphasised Pan-Arabism (unity) as a way to meet the exterior threat. In doing so, they called upon major unifying forces (major traditions). In this context, the American policy in Palestine triggered the dialectics of the 'interior and exterior', 'unity and fragmentation' and the 'major and minor traditions'. The existence of Israel (exterior force) in the region triggered in the post 1947 era those four dialectics described earlier.

At this point, however, the overall objectives of the United States in the middle East conflict were still being formulated. Hence, it did not have a clear policy toward Israel or the Palestinians (Gerner, 1992).

The Eisenhower administration fully developed the US Foreign policy orientation toward the Israeli-Palestinian issue. This policy did not view the Palestinians as distinct national group with political rights. In

contrast of the positive portrayal of the Jewish Israelis, the Palestinians were viewed merely as a refugee population. From the 1950s onward, therefore, the United States pursued politics in direct opposition to Palestinian national autonomy (Gerner, 1992). The US policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict underlined the dialectic, the interior and the exterior. Moreover, the United States began to develop a 'special relationship' with Israel that continued into the 1990s. Between 1951 and 1960, for example, Israel received nearly \$100 million in US financial aid. Kennedy increased this aid and began to sell Israel advanced weapons something, Eisenhower refused to consider (Gerner, 1991).

President Nixon, like his predecessors, viewed the Middle East primarily in the context of continuing US-USSR rivalry. This view was shared by Nixon's foreign policy architect, Henry Kissinger. "Israel was important because it could serve as a surrogate for the US interests in the Middle East" (Gerner, 1992: 361). As US scholar Cheryl Rubenbery wrote "...the strategic asset thesis came to be accepted during these years as absolute dogma in the conventional wisdom of American political culture" (Rubenbery, 1986: 188).

After the October 1973 war, Kissinger focused on negotiation to bring about a partial Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian Sinai. The Palestinian problem which is the core of the Arab -Israeli conflict was not the issue he was out to solve. As Madiha Al Madfai(1993)has pointed out the immediate issues that dominated Kissinger's thinking were "the destruction of the sort of Arab co-ordination shown by Syrian and Egypt in initiating the 1973 war, and blunting of the oil weapon which the Arab used during the war" (Al Madfai, 1993: 29).

In September 1975, the Sinai accord was concluded by Israel and Egypt under American auspices. In November 1977, Sadat visited Jerusalem and in 1978 signed a peace treaty with Israel. "Sadat distanced himself from Arab grievances and concerns. Putting domestic before Pan-Arab issue, he undertook radical orientation of Egyptian goals by abandoning the position of dominance within Arab councils which had been the main feature of inter-Arab relations since the second world war" (Al Madfai, 1993: 64).

The treaty strengthened Israel vis-à-vis the Arabs and increased Arab fragmentation and disunity. After the treaty had led to the neutralisation of Egypt- then the most military strong of the Arab states- Israel, was left free to attack elsewhere. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon was a case in point. Moreover, because of the treaty, Egypt was expelled from the Arab league in 1979. At the same time, the Arab League voted to transfer its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis where it remained for the next twelve years.

The basis of the United States commitment to Israel is not only strategy but culture. Ball and Ball (1992) have pointed out "the ethnocentric bias of American education denies young American even the scantiest acquaintance with the debt the west owes to the Arab civilisation"(Ball & Ball, 1992: 230). As stated by historian William E. Leuchtenburg " from the perspective of American historian... the Arabs are people who have lived outside of history. ... one may read any standard account of the history of American , until the most recent times and derive from it the impression either that the Arabs have had no history or that it was of the most inconsequential sort" (Leuchtenburg, 1977: 15).

The American friendly predisposition toward Israel ,in part, reflects also the fact that Pro-Israel lobby in the American capital have repeatedly presented Israel's side of the story to American foreign policy makers. The pro- Israel organisations and individual sympathies to Israel have influenced United States foreign policy on the Palestine question. This task was facilitated by the lack of pro-Arab lobby in the United States. It was not until 1979 and 1980, for example, that the Foundation for Middle East Peace, and the American -Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee were founded in the American capital.

### iii) Nasser and Egypt : A challenge to the Colonial Forces and Israel, and New Hope of Arab Unity

President Nasser and the Egyptian revolution came to symbolise a 'new nationalism'. The slogans of the new Arab nationalism were republicanism, socialism, positive neutralism and Arab unity. (Dekmejan, 1972). Republicanism suggested the "masses rule". Nasser overthrew a monarchy, one considered the symbol of old regimes along with their ills. Socialism suggested redistribution of national income, 50 percent of which had been in the hands of 1.5 percent of the population before the revolution (Peretz, 1983). The doctrine of positive neutralism or non-alignment in international politics was made a part of the ideology of Arab nationalism . This doctrine was evident in the explicit rejection of involvement in foreign military pacts and the Egyptian attempt to claim the Arab world as its own sphere of influence to the exclusion of the West and the East (Dekmejan, 1972).

Nasser's Egypt came to symbolise a new hope of Arab unity. Under Nasser, the Egyptian nationalism which was behind the 1919 revolution evolved into Arab nationalism. In the past, Egypt's national

movement was opposed to Arab nationalism. The difference between the two movements reflected at least in part the different strategic roles played by the Ottoman empire in the early stages of the two movements; “ The Syria-Lebanese intellectuals desired to free their country from the Ottoman rule.. In contrast, the focus of opposition for the Egyptian nationalists was not the Ottoman Empire, which no longer wielded any influence in Egypt, but the British colonial system under which they lived” (Tibi, 1981: 153).

Nasser’s early pamphlet, the philosophy of Revolution, declared that Egypt was part of three ‘circles’, the Arab, which has priority, the Islamic and the African (Abdel Nasser, 1976: 230). The Egyptian constitution of 1956 stated in its first article that “Egypt is a sovereign independent Arab state, ...; and the Egyptian people are an integral part of the Arab nation ” (Haim, 1976: 51-52). The high-water mark of the Nasser project came in 1958 when Syria fused with Egypt to become the United Arab Republic (UAR). The unification ended three years later when the Syrians grew weary of playing a junior partner .

#### iv) Statism Versus Pan-Arabism

After Syria’s breakaway from the union in September 1961, a new charter of the UAR was introduced in 1962. The charter reiterated the soundness of the Arab unity. It stated in part “ unity ...is identified with the Arab existence itself. Suffice it that the Arab Nation has a unity of language, framing the unity of mind and thought. Suffice it that the Arab nation enjoys unity of hope, the basis of the unity of future and fate” (Dekmejan, 1972: 103-104). Nevertheless, the charter calls for a policy of non-interference between Arab states, thereby recognising defacto



power of Statism; 'Unity cannot ....be imposed' and 'coercion of any kind is contrary to unity' (Dekmejian, 1972: 106). In other words, although the character reiterated the rationale of Arab unity, it recognised the power of state. Egypt's position on the Pan -Arab issue was illustrated in Nasser's letter to King Hussein of Jordan in 1961 (Binder, 1979). The letter stated in part:

... Arab solidarity is essential in the face of grave dangers and powerful enemies. True solidarity is needed, not a facade; nor should it be a solidarity which limits the Arab effort or restricts the Arab vanguards .... We supported every Arab country in its struggle for freedom; the Palestine case was our motive for opposing the Baghdad Pact, it was our motive for purchasing arms from the Soviet bloc (breaking the arms monopoly), and our stand on Palestine was the reason for the tripartite armed aggression in 1956. We have borne the major burden of supporting Algeria's struggle for freedom, and we supported the independence of Tunis, Morocco, Sudan, Iraq, Oman, the Arab South (Aden), Lebanon and even Jordan. This we do as our duty, for we believe that our people, as a result of its material and moral potentialities, was placed by fate at the head of the Arab struggle and form its base. The rôle of the base is not domination but service.

Domestically we seek democracy, not only in general elections, but also including participation in a national economic revolution to increase production and achieve equality in distribution. We seek to equalise opportunities and to melt the differences between citizens ....

We believe in Arab nationalism as a true and genuine current moving towards comprehensive Arab unity. We are not so much interested in its constitutional reform as we are in the will of the Arab people.

Our policy is a reflection of our existence, an existence against which we cannot rebel. But this does not mean that we wish to impose that policy on other Arab states, for I know that each Arab state is more capable than others in facing its special circumstances and has more right to have

the last word regarding those circumstances. There is no doubt that there are things about which we can differ, but let us face those in a spirit of brotherly forgiveness.

(Binder, 1979: 252:3)

#### v) The Arab Defeat in 1967 and Trans-National Palestinian Movement

The Arab defeat by Israel in June 1967 discredited the Arab order and consequently accelerated the development of the Palestinian National Movement with armed struggle and self-reliance as key concepts (Quandt et al, 1973). This emphasis on self-reliance, however, should not be allowed to obscure the plain fact that the resistance organisations remained highly dependent on official Arab backing. This backing was not without its price. Quandt et al (1973) remark that :

the proliferation of commando organisations witnessed during 1968 and 1969 is traceable partly to ideological splits and partly to the desire of various Arab regimes to extend their influence within the growing resistance by creating groups, that would represent their interests and be counted on to follow their directions. The vanguards of the popular war of liberation (better known as Sa'iqwa) and the Arab Liberation Front, which rank in terms of military strength among the larger commando groups, were set up and trained, armed and financed by Syria and Iraq respectively. While perhaps independently established other smaller organisations were so dependent on one source of financial support that they were practically under the political control of their sponsors. Such was the case of the Action organisation for the Liberation of Palestine and the organisation of Arab Palestine, both of which were funded by the UAR. (Quandt et al, 1973: 180)

The desire of various Arab regimes to control the Palestinian movement reflected the state system's sensitivity about free-lance guerrillas who play by different sets of rules. Hence, the state system had to come to terms with these forces in one way or another. Deborah

Gerner argued that “....the PLO was created not only to support Palestinian nationalism but primarily as a way for the Arab states to control the nationalist guerrilla groups. Egypt wanted to assure that Palestinian military actions did not involve Egypt in a war involuntarily.” (Gerner, 1991:57-58). Moreover, as the Palestinian commando movement gained prestige and popularity in the Arab street, the established Arab regimes sought to increase their influence within the movement and consequently within the Arab masses by creating new groups of ‘Fedayeen’ or supporting an old one.

#### vi) The Activation of Israel: a Recuperation of the Destabilising Spear

Another consequence of the June war was the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip by Israel. Following their capture, Israel initiated a policy of dismantling the infrastructure of any potential independent entity in the territories to prevent the establishment of any independent Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan (Peretz, 1990: 4). This included first the economic and territorial integration of the territories to Israel, a major feature of Israeli policy was to dismantle the infrastructure of the territories economy. A UN special committee in 1972 characterised Israel’s policy as “ a classic pattern of colonial economic dominance and exploitation. Such a policy if given free rein, would reduce the economy of the occupied territories to a position of almost entire dependence on the economy of the occupying power for a long time after the end of the occupation. In this sense, the special committee came to a conclusion that the occupation was causing undue interference in the economic life of the occupied territories”(Benvenisti, 1986: 588).

By far, the most important aspect of the integration policy was the annexation and defacto annexation of land throughout settlements implanted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel's critic and former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, Meron Benenisti (1986), estimated that around 52 percent of the West Bank and 30 percent of Gaza lands were being confiscated in what M. Hallaj (1982) described as "practically daily affairs". In his article, 'Israel's Palestinian policy' Halaj stated "in the territories occupied in 1967, the seizure of public land and private land for the exclusive use of Israeli Jews, military and civilian was practically a daily affair"(Hallaj, 1982: 98). The second ten years of occupation witnessed a more aggressive policy. Esther Cohen pointed out that "while previous settlements had been referred to by its opponents as 'creeping annexation', this term no longer described the giant determined thrust in which the government channelled vast sums to finance the infrastructure and subsidise the settlement in Judaea and Sumari." (Cohen, 1985: 150).

A major goal of the ultra-nationalist Likud government headed by Menahem Begin in 1977 was to 'spray' Jewish settlements in the territories 'to eliminate all options for the future of the West Bank except permanent incorporation into Israel' (Peretz, 1990: 51). The National Lawyers (US) reported in 1977 that Israel's policy was designed to 'create facts' to render impossible any solution other than incorporation and annexation into Israel of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (The National Lawyers Guild, 1977: 21). Secondly, the policy meant to sustain the denial of Palestinian's right to self-determination. This includes (a) the denial of Palestinian's national and territorial identity ,(b) the right to national independence and (c) the right to representation. Israel did not perceive the Palestinian population as a national community. It referred to them as 'resident' or 'inhabitant' of 'Judea and Sumaria'. The words

Palestine and West Bank were discontinued and replaced with the names Israel, Judea and Samari respectively. Moreover, Israeli policy was total rejection of an Arab state between Israel and Jordan. Lastly, Israeli policy was to “ de-legitimise the PLO as the voice of the Palestinian ...” (Bing, 1987: 14) by labelling the PLO as a ‘terrorist’ organisation and by attempting to create an alternative leadership through a system of village leagues.

The denial of the Palestinian right to self determination was coupled with growing violation of Palestinian human rights: “one-half of the thirty articles of the human rights declaration were denied to Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza” (Adams, 1982: 69).

The conditions under which Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip for twenty years, were combined by the Palestinian feeling that the Arab league, which had met in Jordan in November 1987 and had virtually ignored the Palestinian issue, could not be counted on to create a political solution. By December 1987, the Palestinians frustration and anger “ needed only a chance spark to create a long- anticipated explosion” (Peretz, 1988: 966-967). It was provided by a relatively minor incident on December 7, when an Israeli military vehicle ran down and killed four Palestinian workers. The incident precipitated spontaneous anti-Israeli demonstrations by youths in the Gaza strip. The Palestinian uprising had begun. The death of the four workers was the immediate cause but Israel’s policy in the first two decades of occupation and the Palestinians feeling of abandonment by the Arab League were the underlying causes of Intifada which erupted on December 8, 1987.

**The Principle of Interior and Exterior, Unity and Fragmentation and Major and Minor Tradition: Lines of Convergence and Divergence**

The dialectics of ‘unity and fragmentation’, ‘the interior and the exterior’ seem to be related to the dialectic of ‘major and minor traditions’. No leading Muslim advocated Arab separation from the Ottoman Empire before the end of the nineteenth century. The Muslims desired reforms and greater Arab autonomy. The separatists were principally Maronite, Greek orthodox, or Protestant Arabs. By appealing to a universal identity they hoped to ‘mask the qualities that make them different’ (Norton, 1991: 1).

#### i) The French Colonial Policy Centered Around Minor Traditions, and Fragmentations

The colonial system’s ‘divide and rule’ policy by encouraging the minor dividing forces, “tended to strengthen sub-national structures” (Tibi, 1981: 26). France’s policy in Syria was a classical example of divide and rule (Nutting, 1964). It split the Levant into several autonomous regions based on religious differences. Lebanon was tripled in size expanding from the old autonomous Christian province- Mount Lebanon- to a state that included the predominantly Muslim city of Beirut; Muslim Tripoli in the north; southern Lebanon up to the Palestinian border; and Biqua’a valley, occupied by a mixture of Muslim and Greek Orthodox residents. Lebanon was therefore “enlarged to include enough Christians to justify setting up a separate government, but also a sufficient number of Muslims to assure the need for continued French protection of their political hegemony” (Peretz, 1983: 362). The Syrian section was also divided into four districts on the basis of ethnic and religious differences- Jebel Druze (Druze-Muslim), Latakia (Alawite Muslim) and Damascus and Aleppo (Sunni Muslim). French policy in the Druze and Alawite districts encouraged “communal differences by

nurturing the already existing germ of an idea that neither group was Syrian Arab” (Peretz, 1983: 402). Arab nationalists, however, emphasised the unifying forces. They insisted that the two minority groups were merely Syrian Arabs with distinctive traditions (Peretz, 1983).

## ii) The British Colonial Policy Reflected and Deflected away from Major Traditions and Unity and Fragmentation

British policy in the Middle East after 1945 was to carve out a role as the ‘father figure’ of the Arab co-operation (Holland, 1985). With this in mind the UK foreign office encouraged the major regional states into forming the Arab League. Indeed, recognition of the growing nationalists fever stimulated Foreign Minister Anthony Eden to announce in May 1941 that Great Britain realised that “ may Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered.., It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries and the political ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty’s Government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval” (cited in Peretz, 1983: 148). The British hoped to acquire Arab goodwill and to define Arab nationalism in a way which did not clash with a continued British presence in the region and which would allow the Soviet Union to be portrayed as the chief threat to Islamic civilisation (Holland, 1985). The irony is that the colonial system tilted toward nation-state vis-a-vis Pan-Arabism. It left border disputes between all Arab states, as for example between Egypt and Suddan, Qatar and Bahrain, and Oman and Saudi Arabia.

## ii) American Policy Converged with the Status quo : United States Versus Arab Nationalism

The United States policy toward the Middle East since the end of World War II was determined primarily by a series of broad foreign policy goals that included assuring access to oil of the region;

In 1943 President Franklin Roosevelt declared that Saudi Arabia “was vital to the defence of the United States”. George Kennen, who was a key planner of US foreign policy, pointed out in 1949 that if the United States maintained control over energy resources of the Middle East oil it would have ‘veto power’ over the actions of potential rivals. The role of the third World in Kenan’s view is to be exploited as a source of resources and markets of industrial world (Chomsky, 1991).

Since, 1943 all subsequent administrations have had the Middle East oil at the centre of their sights. From the Truman through the Bush administrations the principal objective had been to prevent hostile powers from gaining control of the oil resources of the region (Hooglund, 1992). In this context, it was necessary to ‘defend’ this primary interest against various threats (Chomsky, 1983).

One threat from which the Middle East must be ‘defended’ is pictured to be the Soviet Union. Before 1990, Washington perceived the Soviet Union as the primary threat to its economic interests in the region (Hooglund, 1992). The Truman Doctrine was proclaimed to ‘contain’ the Soviet influence in the area. William Polk (1975) observes that “a touchstone of American policy has remained its desire to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle East” (Polk, 1975: 366).



In 1953, the US secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, proposed a Middle Eastern Defence organisation. The plan was intended as part of the global strategy to contain the spread of communism. Egypt turned down the plan because its leaders felt that by joining a Middle East organisation they would be compromising their own freedom of action against the British in the Canal Zone. Furthermore, neutralism was beginning to gain wide popularity among Arab nationalists who believed that too close an identification with either power blocs would undermine their national sovereignty (Peretz, 1983).

Nasser (interior forces) resisted the foreign intrusion in the Arab world with Pan-Arabism (unity). Therefore, Pan -Arabism was directed to achieve resistance against the intrusion of foreign powers in the Arab homeland.

Hence, Dulles conceived the 'northern tier' scheme. Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran would become the defensive bulwark against communism. They were joined by Great Britain in the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Interior forces, however, opposed any alliance outside the Arab area. Nasser criticised the pact as inconsistent with the Arab League security pact. The pact was also strongly opposed by Arab Nationalists in and outside Iraq. In another way, the Pact increased the fragmentation in the Arab world and the division between Iraq and Egypt.

In 1957, President Eisenhower announced that the United States would defend any country in the Middle East requesting assistance against armed aggression from country controlled by international communism' (Sifry, 1991: 27). This policy is better known as the Eisenhower Doctrine and apparently equated 'radical' Arab nationalism with communism. The process of equalisation functioned to mobilise the

homefront behind the President's foreign policy. Yet, it failed to appreciate the conflict between Pan-Arabism and communism. Eisenhower seemed blind to the obvious conflict between Arab nationalism and Communism. Arab nationalists were united in advocating Arab unity from the ocean to the Gulf, communists, however, concentrated on 'international solidarity'.

Moreover, most Arabs and many revolutionary leaders had strong attachments to Islam which opposed communism. Ironically, the American policy itself largely opened the gates for the Soviet Union. First, when Egypt in 1955 asked the United States for arms, the Americans refused. As a result President Nasser turned to the Soviet Union and acquired arms through Czechoslovakia. This is the beginning of a large-scale supply of Soviet Bloc arms to the 'radical' Arab states. Second, the United States in 1956 withdrew its offer to help in financing the Aswan High Dam. The Russians extended their offer and Nasser accepted. Third, the Baghdad Pact and Eisenhower Doctrine were viewed as Western interference in Arab Affairs. Hence opportunities for Soviet arms sales in 'radical' Arab states increased.

On 14 July 1958 a group of Nationalist and Nasserists officers succeeded in overthrowing Iraq's pro-western monarchy and in replacing it with a republic. The United States, fearing the collapse of other pro-western factions in the Middle East, acceded to Lebanese President Camille Chamoun's request and sent 14,000 marines to Lebanon (Simons, 1994: 319). The Eisenhower Doctrine (exterior forces) was seen by Arab nationalists (interior forces) as an attempt by the United States directly to interfere in Arab affairs. Hence, it was forcefully challenged by Egypt (interior force). Nasser called upon the major unifying forces inherent in the Arab society. The call for Arab unity was in resistance to

encroachments from outside. In another way, the Doctrine aggravated the divisions in the Arab world (fragmentation). The US policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict underlines the dialectic of the interior and the exterior.

In his message to congress, Eisenhower justified the US action by claiming that “ events in Iraq demonstrate a ruthlessness of aggressive purpose which tiny Lebanon cannot combat without further evidence of support from friendly nations” (in Sifry, 1991: 30). As William Quandt puts it “ nothing was said of broad concerns with Iraq, oil or the Arab-Israel conflict. For public purposes this was a Lebanese crisis behind which communism’s malign could be detected” (Quandt quoted in Sifry, 1991: 30). Quandt argued that US troops were moved to be in a position to intervene if Iraq did threaten Kuwait, who was the leading Middle East oil producer at about 1.15 million barrels a day (Sifry, 1991). Certainly, Iraq’s threat to Kuwait was taken seriously by the United States. “On the first day of the crisis, Eisenhower dispatched US marines to the Gulf to guard against a possible Iraqi move into Kuwait” (Sifry, 1991: 30).

Newly uncovered documents from the British Public Record office gave more evidence of the American and British attentions. Consider the following excerpt from a cable sent by British Foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd from Washington back to London “they (the US Administration ) are assuming that we will take firm action to maintain our position in Kuwait. They themselves are disposed to act with similar resolution in relation to the Aramco oil fields in the area of Dahrán. They assume we will also hold Bahrain and Qatar... They agree that at all costs these oil fields must be kept in Western hands” (in Sifry, 1991: 31).

During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war and subsequent oil embargo by the Arab OPEC nations, the Ford administration considered plans to occupy the Gulf's oil wells (Gresh, 1991). In 1980, President Carter declared that the United States would go to war if necessary, to prevent 'any outside force' from gaining control of the Gulf area (Draper, 1991).

In 1987, President Reagan responded to a Kuwaiti request to place its oil tankers under US protection and sent the US Navy to the region. Former National Security Advisor Brzezinski (1981) wrote on the American action " Access to Persian Gulf oil reserves, which contain two-thirds of the free world's proven reserves, is the principal stake in Southwest Asia... The United States has no choice but to stand firm against any challenges in the defence of Western interests in the Persian Gulf...The major beneficiary of a US retreat would be the Soviet Union. The United States must do whatever is necessary to assert Western interests in the Persian Gulf-alone if necessary" (Washington Post, June 7,1987).

Similarly, Senator Daniel Patrick Maynihan (1987) stated that " the West risk losing control of two thirds of the world's oil reserves. The great geo-political prize of the twentieth century is now in their (the Soviet's) grasp. Congress should be seen to support the policy of every American President back to Harry S. Truman. We have no choice. The Persian Gulf is vital to American interests. We cannot accept their intrusion" (Washington Post, June 7,1987).

After the end of the Cold War, it was important to find a new justification for the American involvement in the region to build political

support for the Gulf war, an ideological justification other than anti-communism was necessary (Falk, 1991). Hence, the call for a New World order. Bush maintained that if Saddam Hussein got away with taking over Kuwait by force, then other regional powers might be tempted to pursue similar means to advance their interests in their corners of the world. In his speech to Nato, US Secretary of State James Baker said: ‘if might is to make right, then the world will be plunged into a new dark age’ (in Friedman, 1991: 203). From this perspective, the United Nations can be used as intended, following its establishment in 1945, namely as an instrument of collective security in response to an act of aggression. Such a collective response was viewed as an alternative to appeasement which had failed to stop Hitler in the pre-second World War phase. In this context, US policy converged with the charter of the United Nations which expected all nations to respond to challenges to international order from a common perspective and by united opposition. (Kissinger, 1991)

Another threat from which the regions must be defended is the indigenous one or radical nationalism. It was in this context that Israel has been seen as a strategic asset for the United States serving as a barrier to indigenous radical nationalist threat to American interests, which might gain support from the Soviet Union (Chomsky, 1983). A recent declassified National Security council memorandum of 1958 noted that a ‘logical corollary’ of opposition to radical Arab nationalism “would be to support Israel.” (in Chomsky, 1983: 21). This conclusion was reinforced by Israel’s smashing victory in June in 1967, when Israel crushed the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

Washington's preoccupation with maintaining the status quo in the region strengthened the division among the Arab states which derive partially from wide disparities between those with oil and those without it. The per capita income of the native populations of the oil producing countries ranged between \$15,000 and \$20,000 while the vast majority of the 200 million Arabs was below \$1,000. For example, Egypt's 53 million (\$690), Morocco's 25 million (\$750), Sudan's 24 million (\$310), Yemen's 9 million (\$545) (Khalidi, 1991; 26). This served to deepen resentment between those Arab states which have virtually no economic resources at all on the one hand and the western oriented studies of the south on the other.

The major unifying forces have made the Arab homeland always ready to respond to these unifying factors against foreign domination. In 1990, Saddam Hussein had shrewdly manipulated major Arab causes, particularly that of the Palestinian people, for his own purposes. Hussein always presented himself as the champion of the Palestinian cause. Deeds, however, failed to match words in September 1970 in Jordan and in 1976 in Lebanon. In September 1970, the Jordanian army attacked the Palestinian stronghold in Amman, resulting in thousands of casualties and eventually driving guerrillas out of Jordan while Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan remained inactive (Mansfield, 1976).

Indeed, Hussein's practice contradicted a promise he personally made to Yasser Arafat that the 15,000 Iraqi soldiers then stationed in Jordan would go to the aid of the Palestinians if King Hussein attacked them (Yousif, 1991). Six years later when Syria intervened militarily against 'the left-wing' forces and the Palestinian guerrillas in the Lebanese civil war in 1976, Iraq provided little help beyond a propaganda campaign. In the words of Professor Michael Hudson "... just as the

Palestinians in Jordan in 1970 had waited in vain for the Iraqi troops based in the country to assist them against the King's army, so again they waited with their Lebanese allies in 1976 for decisive military help above and beyond propaganda and material aid in their losing battle against the Lebanese Right and the Syrians" (Hudson, 1977: 279). So, when Saddam Hussein offered to link the question of Kuwait with that of Palestine he was no more sincere about Palestine than when he promised Arafat in 1970 that the Iraqi army would defend the Palestinians if the Jordanian army attacked them.

## **Conclusion**

Generally speaking, the relation between the three dialectics mentioned above is between mechanism and products. Forces of unity in the Arab region call upon the 'the major traditions' inherent in the Arab society while the forces of fragmenting the region call upon the 'minor traditions' which also are inherent in the Arab society.

Some of the important internal factors which arouse the mechanism of fragmentation are oppression and tyranny practised by the ruling authority (e.g. the Turkification program). These are factors which help to create ethnic and regional divisions. But these internal factors, oppression etc., could provoke widespread anger or resentment which would generate political, religious movements as a protest and as a challenge to these internal factors not through separation or fragmentation but by introducing substitutes for a unified perfect society (e.g. the Egyptian revolution of 1952, and the Islamic movements throughout the Arab region). The wider acceptance of these substitutes is supported by the existence of a foreign threat which the ruling authority could not successfully challenge (e.g. Israel). In this context, one could

grasp, on one hand, the reciprocal relationship between the three dialectics 'unity and fragmentation', 'interior and exterior', and 'major and minor traditions' and the dialectics of 'spiritualism and materialism' on the other hand.

This Chapter has focused on the cultural or external conditions that structure in part, media representations of the Arab and has introduced a new perspective represented in four dialectical dynamics. This perspective is meant to function as a destabilising factor to the already dominant American ( or, more broadly, western) perspective on the Arabs. There is evidence that the Americans are misinformed or uninformed about the complexity and pluralism of the Arab world and Islam. In the next Chapter, the proximal and distantiated conditions which include newsgathering routines, news values, reporter-sources interaction, national crisis, and globalisation, will be discussed.



### **CHAPTER III**

#### **MACHINERIES OF FOREIGN COVERAGE: GOVERNMENT-MEDIA INTERACTION IN TIME OF NATIONAL AND DISTANCE CRISIS**

The previous chapter dealt with the role of major historical and contemporaneous institutions that are establishing the perspective which has been shaping media interaction with the Arabs. There is yet more proximal conditions that coexist with the remote conditions. Unlike the layer's perspective that asserts some layers are more important than others, we advocate a co-existential perspective where various forces coexist and compete. In a sense that various forces constitute a reservoir of rules and resources to be drawn upon, they act together in providing the modality of the coverage.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section focuses on the setting process as a site where ideological inclinations are mostly activated. Ideology, as we shall see below, ensures the reproduction of enclosed perspectives that would encourage the force of differential power relations. In other words, the continuum which would provide the functionality of ideology is in between empowerment and disempowerment. It sets the boundaries within which the debate of ideology which dictates the American Arab news coverage should take place. Hence, ideology is measured by detecting the degree of monologic extension at the expense of the dialogical relations. In the background of this assumption, this section would inevitably advocate going beyond the agenda setting.

The second section introduces basic elements of the American perspective on International Relations which the media find itself identifying with. These elements serve to contextualise government-media interaction. They are the most articulated themes for effective intervention abroad.

The third section zooms in on media coverage of national and distance crises. It is not enough to approach the Gulf War coverage from the foreign coverage perspective. But there has to be a resort to a perspective from within a context of a national and distance (global) crisis. There are two justifications for the incorporation of the crisis situation. The first one has to do with the nature of our case study. It is anchored from a particular context which is known as national and distance crisis. What is more important is that the situation of crisis is a very significant indication to how far the margins of invariability and variability have competed in extending their limits. At large, the discussion would aim at building the perspective that can introduce a variability as part of a political choice to break the nation-state's subsumption of the Other.

The fourth section deals with the machineries of news production that relay in the process of setting the mode of the coverage. Largely, these machineries are designated from within particular perspectives, namely the foreign coverage. In contrast to the traditional agenda-setting which makes inference about the effects of communication, we make inference about the antecedents of communication and more specifically about the proximate and remote conditions that are shaping media content. These conditions define what news is and how it should be interpreted. The fifth section zoom in on the Gulf war.

### **3.1 Ways of Surpassing Agenda Setting: Inscribing the Bakhtinian Sense.**

The rationale for starting our theoretical reflection from the agenda setting theory stems from three considerations. The first is related to the resultants of research which advocated going beyond the agenda setting. However, such a trend should not neutralise all the themes which the theory signifies to. The writer of this thesis still believes in the utility of the setting process that the agenda setting theorisation has paid attention to. Apparently, there is no doubt that if one wants to expand this theory, one should incorporate more complex articulation to that affect. There is no cause-effect relationship and multiple relations would require particular concepts and means.

It is crucial to notice here that there is a very clear line weaving through the whole set of research on both sides. There is an implicit assumption of public agenda-setting. The problem resides in the fact that those who advocate going beyond the agenda-setting overlook the force of the message, while those who believe in the utility of agenda-setting theory ignore the forces that are shaping the setting process. Our way of resolving the issue does not follow those positions which would neglect the force of the message itself. Indeed, there should be a differentiation between the force of the message, its potentiality and its actualisation. The message is a force and has potentiality. The actualisation of such potentiality is situational. In other words, the message is force, it has power, it sets the parameters and frames through which a variety of actualisations could take shape. Respectively, one should not subsume completely the power of the message. Having these assumptions would entail in some sense having certain methods of accounting the data

collected. The choice of content analysis, however imbued with a qualitative orientation, provides representable recognition of the message's force. It has to be taken into account and that's why we have conducted content analysis. Nevertheless, with the presumption that the force is always already a potentiality, e.g., not only form, there is an implication of having an indeterminacy involved whereby the actualisation of its properties is conditional to various other forces.

The second element is related to the assumption of an ideological effectivity working throughout the setting process of the message. The message is the terrain in which the setting process comes in contact with ideology. It is worth noting that there is a sort of differentiation between the setting process and ideology. The former one has a positive connotation, mostly formulated in terms of perspective or paradigm. The latter has been accompanied most of the time with negative values, i.e., a complex of fortifying machines of enclosures.

Within this general classification mentioned above, there are advocates of each. For instance, Shoemaker and Reese's research (1991) very clearly perceives ideology in positive terms. For them, ideology is "a symbolic mechanism that serve as a cohesive and integration force in society" (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991: 183). Along the same line, Samuel Becker defines ideology as "... an integrated set of frames of reference through which all of us see the world and to which all of us adjust our actions" He adds that ideology " governs the way we perceive our world and ourselves; it controls what we see as 'natural' or 'obvious' " (quoted in Shoemaker & Reese, 1991: 183).

On the contrary, the research done by Baherall et al (1980) inscribes ideology into a negative territory by reconsidering the role of

power relations. The research notices that media displays feature in its performance which " can only be explained by reference to its tacit trading on a given ideology" . Ideology is defined as " ... a representation of set of events or facts which consistently favours the perceptual framework of one group " (Beharell et al, 1982: 121-122).

Indeed, even though news occurs within a cultural framework which stresses balance and impartiality, it consistently maintains and support a cultural framework which gives viewpoints favourable to the status quo's preferred reading. Simply, this representation of events on news takes for granted many assumptions and undermines the capacity for reflexivity and self criticism.

Distinctively, our argument in this thesis tries to incorporate a complementary approach to the definition of ideology. It can see the strengths of both types of research mentioned above. However, it goes further than that by grounding the definition on a different conceptualisation. To achieve that, the research introduces a different binary machine. Media performance is examined against the concept of dialogue/monologue in the Bakhtinian sense (Lodge, 1990; Morris, 1994; Shotter, 1994). dialogue/monologue in the Bakhtinian sense (Lodge, 1990; Morris, 1994; Shotter, 1994). Given our awareness of the complexity and multiplicity of reality, there is no choice but to embrace some Bakhtinian inspiration. The dialogue can be articulated to convey the meaning of sustaining a return to the openness toward the other. In contrast, monologue at its extreme denies the existence outside itself of an Other with equal reciprocity. The other remains merely an object, stratified and hierarchised. One should bear in mind here that dialogue, as we understand it, has no content; rather it is a passage way. This is because the multiplicity of reality is what gives the dialogue its value or

necessity. Within this frame, the issue is not any more to uncover existing reality or being inside or outside, as much as whether the text gives a possibility for thinking and action or not, is it open to complexity or not, is it dialogic and therefore in touch with the multiplicity of reality or not. That is the issue. In this way, a step forward is established to get off the hook of negativity/ positivity argument.

To understand this step, the media performance should be looked at as a two-sided act. " The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future answer word. It provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the answer's direction" (Bakhtin quoted in Lodge, 1990: 57). There is " no existence, no meaning, no word that does not enter into dialogue or 'dialogic' relations with the other .... Monologue and 'monologic' refers to any discourse which seeks to deny the dialogic nature of existence, which refuses to recognise its responsibility as addressee, and pretends to be the 'last word' " (Morris, 1994: 247). Thus, for Bakhtin, meaning should be produced in a dialogic interaction or an open-ended dialogue between the self and the other. Monologue, as Bakhtin puts it is "finalised and deaf to the other's response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any decisive force" (quoted in Shotter, 1994: 62). It is worthwhile to point out that both dialogue and monologue are not far away from power relation. Power, in this context, should be conceived in two ways; power in terms of existence or enrichment and power in terms of domination. Dialogue is power in the first sense, an enrichment. It is a passage way to sustain our openness toward the multiplicity and complexity of reality. Monologue is power in the second sense, a domination. Indeed, within the monological sense of power, the other remains an objectified realm, no more, no less.

The third reason for resorting to the agenda setting is a methodological one. The incorporation of content analysis would mean that our attention would have to sift through those social markers that are presumed to set the parameters of public framing and to create a potentiality of limited inferences about the force shaping the setting process.

### **3.1.1 In Light of Public Agenda Research: Inconsistent Conceptualisations and Results**

The first empirical application of the agenda-setting function of the media was carried out by McCombs and Shaw in 1972. The study examined the impact of the media on the public agenda during the 1968 Presidential election. One hundred undecided voters in September and October 1968 were asked to name "two or three main things that the government should concentrate on doing something about." The outcome of the survey (Table 1) led to the conclusion that the media agenda influenced the public agenda (McCombs & Shaw, 1972: 176-184).

Table 1:Public Agenda and Media Agenda of Five Main Campaign Issues  
in the 1968 Presidential Campaign

Public Agenda		Media Agenda	Media Agenda
Rank order as indicated in survey of 100 undecided voters		Index of the number of News article, editorials, or broadcast stories in nine Mass Media	In rank order
1st	Foreign Policy	56	1st
2nd	Law and Order	33	2nd
3rd	Fiscal Policy	11	4th (tie)
4th	Public Welfare	11	4th (tie)
5th	Civil Rights	11	4th (tie)
	Others	84	
		Total	206

Since McCombs and Shaw's pioneering study, over 102 studies were carried out to examine the agenda-setting effect. The one consistent attribute of these studies is inconsistency of conceptualisations, and results (Swanson, 1981).

Media agenda have been determined by examining the prominence given to coverage of a single issue or set of issues and public agenda have been measured using aggregate data from a population, or in terms of individual data from a population. This has yielded as Figure 1 illustrates, four different modes of studying the agenda setting role of the press; 1- set of issues and aggregate data ( e.g. McComb & Shaw,1972; Funkhouser, 1973;Aps, 1983; Neuman & Fryling,1985); 2- set of issue and individual data (e.g. Mcleod, Becker & Byrnes, 1974; Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; Tardy et al, 1981; Weaver et al, 1981; Iyengar & Kinder, 1985; Behr & Iyenger, 1985); 3-



single issue and aggregate data (e.g. Winter & Eyal, 1981); 4- single issue and individual data. This latter category, according to McCombs, remained unexplored.

The first three categories ignore one or more of the following elements: 'real-world' conditions in the respondents' community, stimulus attributes and audience attributes. They overlook the obvious fact that encoding and decoding are diffracted by multiple relations, whereby the personal ones are just an element in the whole setting process.

**Figure 1: A Typology of Agenda - setting Research**

	Aggregate data	Individual data
set of issues	1	2
single issue	3	4

Source: McCombs, 1981

The bulk of literature has found contingent and inconsistent results (e.g. Winter & Eyal, 1981; Asp, 1983; Weaver et al, 1981; Tardy et al 1981; Iyengar & Kinder, 1985; Mcleod, Becker & Byrnes, 1974; Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; Neuman & Fryling, 1985; Behr & Iyengar, 1985).

Winter and Eyal (1981) analysed the agenda setting effect for the civil right issue. The media agenda consisted of front page stories of civil rights over a 22 years period. The public agenda was determined from 27 Gallop studies between 1954 and 1976. The study showed

evidence of a strong agenda setting effect for civil right issues at the aggregate level. It also showed that for the civil rights issue, the peak association between media and public agenda is four to six weeks. This indicates that duration of exposure is a contingent condition for agenda setting. Another contingent result was reported by Kent Asp.

Asp (1983) examined the role of newspapers and television news in setting the voters' agenda in Sweden by examining one of the factors that might be of importance to both the media and voter agenda -the political parties. The study used a set of issues, a dis-aggregate public agenda and an open ended questionnaire. The study revealed that the media content influences public agenda. Further, it showed that the newspapers seem to be more powerful agenda setters than television. On the other hand, television is a more important agenda setter for low exposure viewers. That is to say, the potency of the agenda setting effect is contingent on the particular medium (stimulus attributes). Similar results were reported by Weaver et al.

Weaver et al (1981) examined the relationship of press agenda with voters in three towns in Illinois, Indiana, and New England during the 1976 presidential election year. They recruited a panel of about 50 voters in each of the three geographic locations in January 1976. The panel members were interviewed regularly during the year. All panel members regularly used newspaper, TV or both for political news. Those voters not using newspapers or television for political information were eliminated from the panel because they could not directly be affected by the political messages from these media. Media content came from content analysis of four newspapers [The Valley News, the Chicago Tribune, the News, the Star] and the early evening news

broadcasts of three TV networks [ABC, CBS, NBC] as well as local news broadcasts.

The study found that the potency of the agenda-setting was contingent on certain stimulus and audience attributes. The nature of issue played an important role in the magnitude of the agenda setting effect. In part, media influence was found only for unobtrusive issues or those less likely to be directly experienced by voters. This suggested that "personal experience is a more powerful teacher of issue salience than are the mass media when issues have a direct impact on voters' daily lives"(Weaver et al, 1981: 541). This finding is prominent example of the inconsistency in agenda setting. As will be seen later, Iyenger & Kinder' study ( 1985) came to the opposite conclusion. It suggested that the media influence is powerful among those more likely to be effected by the problem.

The study also noted that audience attributes were an important "mediating factor." The voters least likely to be influenced by media agenda were those with more education, higher status jobs, more prior political knowledge, and more interest in the campaign .... greater knowledge and more sources of information permit a greater freedom to form independent judgements about the importance of various issues "(Weaver et al, 1981: 542). Similar results were reported by Tardy.

Tardy et al (1981) analysed the conditions under which the media and public agenda affected each other. The study interviewed 2,705 eligible voters. Fifty per cent of the sample were interviewed from September 5 to October 5, the other 50 per cent from October 6 to election day. Voters were divided into three groups:

1. Activists - those who voted in some or all presidential elections and who had participated in the campaigning.
2. Voters-those who voted in all presidential elections but did not otherwise participate in the process.
3. Inactive-those who voted in some or none of the presidential elections but did not otherwise participate in the process. Participants were asked to answer questions on a seven point scale.

The television 'News Index and Abstracts' was utilised to determine the TV agenda for the period of the study. The study was designed to test two hypotheses a) that increased political participation reduced the agenda-setting effect, and b) that increased political participation increased the influence on media agenda. The study found in part that increased political participation diminished the agenda-setting effect. This indicated that political participation was a contingent condition that affected agenda-setting. Another contingent result was reported by Iyengar and Kinder.

Iyengar and Kinder (1985) examined the effect of TV news on public agenda. In the study, the researchers were able to control the independent variable of the media agenda as it influenced the dependent variable [Public agenda], by conducting field experiments. Four experiments were conducted. In the first two experiments, participants completed a questionnaire concerning various political issues, then viewed an edited news program. Following the news program, participants completed a second questionnaire that repeated key issues from the first questionnaire. In experiments 3 and 4 participants viewed a one-hour collection of news stories taken from three American networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC.


Following the presentation, participants completed another questionnaire that covered many political issues. The result of the four experiments showed in part that:

- 1) television news altered public agenda.
- 2) television, on coverage of a particular problem, tended to be more powerful among viewers personally affected by the problem. " News about civil rights was more influential among blacks than among whites, news about unemployment was more influential among unemployed; news about social security was more influential among the elderly than among the young " (Iyengar & Kinder, 1985: 128). Erbring et al found only a modest and contingent effect.

Erbring, Golenberg, Miller (1980) introduced an audience-effects model which treated issue-specific audience sensitivities as modulators and news coverage as a trigger stimulus of media impact on issue salience issue by issue, that is to say, issue salience is influenced by individuals' sensitivity to a particular issue. The study reported only a modest and context dependent effect. Thus " 'stunningly successful' overstated this evidence considerably" (Kinder & Sears, 1985: 711). This view is consistent with the findings of Meeleod, Becker, Byrens (1974). Meeleod et al found that the effect is felt only for individuals who were motivated by their orientation to newspaper use as a conversational resource.

In terms of directionality of agenda-setting, Neuman Fryling (1985) began by suggesting four possible cause patterns that may occur in a study of agenda setting (Figure 2).

**Figure 2 Agenda - Setting : Possible Causal Patterns**



Source: Neuman, Fryling, 1985.

The study integrated a content analysis of media coverage of ten prominent political issue (Crime, Drug abuse, Energy, Inflation, Pollution, Poverty, Racial problems, Unemployment, Vietnam, Watergate) with national public opinion series data collected by the Gallop organisation.

The study found "evidence of every pattern except consistent media agenda-setting [pattern I] ... the most dominant pattern was interactive feedback. It characterised the causal pattern for the issue of drug abuse, energy, inflation, pollution, race relation, and Watergate. The rise of issue salience in public opinion was consistently ahead of the media in the case of Poverty and Vietnam. For the issue of Crime and Unemployment, issue salience varied independently in the media and public opinion" (Neuman & Fryling, 1985: 231-232).

Behr, Iyengar (1985) found mixed and inconsistent results. For the issues of energy and unemployment, television news coverage influenced public concern [Pattern I]. In the area of inflation, the public

concern influenced positively the amount of inflation coverage [Pattern II].

Funkhouser (1973) studied the dynamic of public opinion by analysing the media agenda, the public agenda and the real world. Linking media content, real world, and public agenda served to control relevant local conditions. The study focused on prominent issues in the United States during the sixties: The Vietnam war, race relations, campus unrest, inflation, television and mass media, crime, drugs, environment and pollution, smoking, poverty, sex, women's right, science and society, and population.

For the media agenda, three weekly news magazines-US News World and Report, Time and Newsweek- were content analysed for their statistical Abstracts of the United States, and Gallop was utilised as an indicator of 'realities' and public opinion respectively. The study found a strong association between media agenda and community, yet a weak association between real world indicator and media agenda (Funkhouser, 1973: 35-41). In contrast, Iyengar (1979) suggests in part that media agenda is highly sensitive to 'world cues'.

This suggest to us that the agenda-setting role of the press is a potentiality. The actualisation of such potentiality is context dependent, that is to say, there cannot be a simple relation that can subsume all components of reality. The audience's role in shaping the form of text articulation is not trivial. Audiences are not passive receivers. There is always the possibility that the reader/viewer would develop his/her own reading of the text. Tackling the issue of the whole process of actualisation, needless to say, requires not only an attention to the conditions setting the media agenda but also an attention to the

audience's interaction. However, although the latter concern is believed to be critical, it is beyond the scope of this study.

Having clarified the inconsistency which the present agenda setting theory is doomed to face and having pointed out that audience analysis is critical but not part of the scope of this study, going beyond the agenda setting is essential to understand the way the negative image of the Arabs is reproduced. To go beyond agenda setting in this respect means that the media processes have to be located as part of antecedent sets of relations that are playing effective roles in providing the form of the media position practice.

The lines that are going to be woven together, thus giving a formative perspective to the set of the media newsmaking processes, are the media foreign coverage and the type of context which that coverage finds its utmost impact of social relay around a power centre. Accordingly, it is not enough to take the news making processes as general antecedents. There has to be a sort of contextualisation that shows the contingent and particularity of the set of relations conditioning the elements of news productions. In our situation, the context of foreign coverage is differentiated followed by a depiction of the extent of effectivities of the foreign coverage in consequence of incorporating the context of national crisis. In both cases, interesting results show themselves as to how complex relations are, being the conditions shaping the media agenda.



### **3.2 The American Historical Landscape Producing Present Political Values in Interaction with the 'Other'**

To understand the form of expression of the media foreign coverage, it is necessary to have a view of the forces that the media find themselves embraced within and identifying with. As it will be clear in the argument below, the media position practices are accounted by those particular forces which are actually coming into consideration as a result of initiating a multi-perspectival examination. Such initiation is actually due to the presumption of a reality that is complex and is mobile in its 'interrelating' relations. The forces are always criss-crossed and transforming into other realms.

The starting point of our discussion is a historical detour. It maps out some key values evolving from sustainable internal values coming intact and overlapping in their interaction with international events. These historical elements are sketchy but essential to understand the present principles dictating the role of the American state relation with the Other. These culminating political and historical values structuring the American system should be taken as a derivation of complex relations. They are giving content to the American foreign relations. The distinctive feature of that derivation emerges from an increasing '*leading role*' the Americans have undertaken. This position has drawn the limits for their actions. Nevertheless, these limits are best understood as emergence of the Americans' particular internal values in their interactions with the requisites of their leading international dominance.

Prior to 1914, the global system was relatively stable and rarely called for active American participation. The relatively harmonious

world was upset in 1914 with the outset of World War I. For the first time since 1914, a major power seemed determined upon fundamental alteration of the European balance, with serious repercussions for the rest of the world.

The American involvement in the war was due in part to its view of the issue as a moral principle of democracy (Great Britain) versus dictatorship and barbarism (Germany). "Most Americans", wrote Faulkner, "felt they were fighting on the side of civilisation and liberal institutions..." (Faulkner, 1952: 667). President Wilson in a message on 2nd April, 1917 spoke directly to theme of the "aggressor," asserting that the war was caused by a territorial expansion by tyrants and that US intervention was in the course of restoration of a balance of power based on non-aggression values rather than for narrow national interests.

We have no quarrel with the German people ... it was not upon their impulse that their government acted .... It was a war determined as wars used to be determined upon the old, unhappy ways when people were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow man as pawns or tools. We have no selfish ends to serve, we desire no conquest, no dominion, we seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for sacrifices we shall freely make, we are one of the champions of mankind.

(quoted in Jones & Rosen, 1982: 48)

Wilson's approach to the peace conference after the German defeat in 1918 provides an insight into the operation of the image of the aggressor in the American world view. A mechanism that returns now and then, becoming an effective resource drawn upon to sustain a sense of international responsibility against a projected 'enemy'. That responsibility is hinged upon a revitalisation of humanistic discourse,

inducing and gendering in consequence a functionality for new emergents beyond the national level as sites of investments and belonging. Wilson attributed German aggression to dictatorship and internal tyranny and he had two objectives: establishing a democratic system in Germany and weakening the military power of Germany. The aim of these objectives was to guarantee that Germany would never again attempt aggressive expansion (Faulkner, 1952).

On the other side of the international arena, Wilson sought a new systematic guarantee against future threats to stability. The idea of collective security was founded in the form of the League of Nations. In a sense, the League of Nations furthered international relations on the principle of an alliance of major powers committed to oppose aggression. The League however had little success in fulfilling these goals. Domestic political opposition and fears of internationalism prevented the United States from supporting the League in the way that Wilson had hoped (Faulkner, 1952).

As we shall realise later, this identification with an international ethos will become an effective backdrop resource for the American political and economic machinery of intervention. Actually, the relay with the international system has extended the choices of the interventionists to further their legitimacy.

Within twenty years of the end of World War I a new aggressor emerged. In 1938 German forces under the command of Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia and Poland. As the Germans rolled over Europe, American isolationism began to give way to interventionism. President Roosevelt told the American people: "We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom"(Congressional

Record, 87, January 6, 1941: 46). Roosevelt asserted that what was truly at issue was the ability of tyrants to commit aggression.

Following the war, the United States assumed an active role in world affairs. It was involved in two wars against the spread of Communism, one in Korea and one in Vietnam. In both wars, American policy was based on four main propositions: (1) war is due to naked Communist aggression against the free world; (2) the Communist appetite for expansion cannot be appeased, (3) the US as leader of the free world has an obligation to counterweight the Communist aggressors, and (4) by fighting a small war today we avoid a bigger war later (Jones & Rosen, 1982: 49).

From these developments mentioned above, consistent themes appear to have shaped the American political thought with the 'generalised other'. The interaction between the internal and external factors in many contexts has brought forward the question of political freedom and tyranny in the American politicisation as the most articulated themes for effective public policy of intervention in the outside world. Jones and Rosen (1982) state clearly the issue that:

Freedom understood as self determination, majority rule and the right to dissent is the highest value in the hierarchy of core values. When Americans evaluate other social and political systems, the first issue they raise usually concerns freedom of speech and religion, the right to vote and tolerance of dissent. Political and religious liberty are more important than economic well being and the question of economic justice.

(Jones & Rosen, 1982: 44)

Not surprisingly, Jones and Rosen, like many others, would go further in their emphasis by excluding the economic factor in

determining the criteria of American intervention. 'The political and religious liberty are more important than economic well being and the question of economic justice'(Jones & Rosen, 1982: 44). Taking this emphasis with caution as in the actual reality the economic factor has always been embedding, one can realise some conditions of such discourse. The relative lack of concern of Americans for class injustice can be attributed to the lack of feudal experiences. The abuses of feudalism have generated a bitter heritage of class conflict in many countries. The uniqueness of the American experience made America a 'land of opportunity' where 'wealth was a direct reward for hard work and poverty the punishment for laziness' (Turner, 1954: 10). The early settlers in the New World sought religious tolerance and economic opportunity, rather than class revaluation, capitalism itself required a free market, and political self determination at least for the newcomers (Hartz, 1955).

What the historical developments illustrated above allude to is the existence of a parallelism to the individual freedom in the American international policy. This is the principle of national independence and self determination. In addition, parallel to violation of individual rights, there is the violation of territorial sovereignty and foreign interference in the internal affairs of a free nation. To the Americans, the civic freedom is threatened when uncontrolled authority expands to tyranny. International freedom is threatened when one nation or coalition imposes its will on other nations.

As we can recognise from the few examples brought to focus in the history of the American international relations, the internal and external tyranny are continuously linked in the American view. Democratic governments and free peoples are thought to be naturally

peace loving, while tyrannies and dictatorships have an innate tendency to expand beyond their own borders to make demands on their neighbours (Jones & Rosen, 1982). An unstable tyranny in one country is seen as a danger to the world order.

The image of the international aggressor is a crucial component besides the others of the American belief system (Jones & Rosen, 1982). The aggressor is always perceived as a 'bully' who uses military force to subdue Western nations. The appetite for expansion is unappeasable, success in one conquest whets the appetite for more. The bully will use propaganda and manipulation to conceal his real intention.

The only language that such an aggressor fully understands is force. If the world is to be governed by valid law and if weak nations are not to be left at the mercy of the strong, it is the responsibility of democratic states to oppose international aggressors. The United States is obliged by its historical ideals, and its position in the free world to play a leading role in guaranteeing minimum standards of international behaviour (Heuser, 1992).

The interesting element in this sort of involvement is that as America succeeded in grounding its identity as the new western superpower, the protector of the free world, western values and western economic interests, the American foreign relations have explored new terrains of active participation. The United Nations is perhaps an essential matrix the Americans found most articulative to further its interventionist orientation, excluding thus forever any attempt of a return to isolation. This is what explains the capability of connections with the international system. These connections are manifestations of power,

escape routes for the American foreign system sustained against the 'Other'.

### **3.3 Facing the Global: Interlocking the American State - Media Sites of Tensions into Different Relations**

The above section illustrates key nodes of connections that are provisional of the terms of the American foreign policy. The nodes are actually an accumulation of historical forces, acting together to produce an impact on the international affairs. Against aggression, against tyranny and dictatorship, democracy, stability, sovereignty, self determination, human rights (a more general equation of individual freedom) are just a few nodes that are reproduced as effective means of grounding the American policy at the international arena. However, one should not forget these nodes are susceptible to the intersection of forces which are part of other frameworks. This is said to remind to the reality that these nodes, while setting the parameters of the American foreign policy, are tempted to be drifted into larger functions as a result of being cut across by some other forces.

It is our belief that understanding the process of such cutting across can be accounted for unless those nodes are seen from a different perspective. The values embodying in those particular nodes cannot be located in simple terms. The values are already loci of tensions and receptive of multiple articulation. There are increasing socio- political and economic developments going beyond the previous modalities of understanding that are focused around the nation-state.

Apparently, it is not just happening in the American scene but also at a global level. It is important to indicate that the above nodes

embodying into values are more clearly to be sustained and captured by an underlying tension between isolationism and interventionism. The American international involvement has been shaped and set out by such tension. In both cases, nationalism looks to be the site of investment and struggle for both fronts. It is the stake of attraction (and compulsion).

Although there have been instantiations of universal discourses, now and then, there are no signs that such universality has been found to crystallise 'materially' beyond the interstate relations. It is said 'interstate' relations as in fact there are no such inter - 'national' relations. Having the interrelation articulated in an 'inter- nation' basis is one aspect which would make feasible a ground for materialising the process of taking off from the territory of nation-state, and thus having a probability of more loose enclosures. Such a conclusion is based on a presupposition about the nature of the relation between the state and society. Most importantly in this regard, is to look at the nature of that relation from a redefined Gramscian conceptualisation. The relation is perceived from within a binary composition, the State and civil society.

Without going into details, the basic element involved in articulating the redefinition of Gramsci's understanding is to introduce a value that can weaken the rationality of the State's intervention, and in consequence a sort of societal empowerment is achieved and sustained. Apparently, the reliance on such perspectives to establish the nature of the relation of media -state interaction with the Other has to do with more than that. It is intended to make manifest the more complex relations implied in a context of more 'incorporating relations' of the Others. The terrain of these relations is more witnessing a functionality at a more abstracted level, the Global.



Civil Society, needless to say, is a context within which a number of collective institutions are formed and interact. It comprises institutions which have the specific role of representing groups within society both in the context of society itself and in relation to the state. The central institutions of civil society (i.e. churches, universities, mass media) define the meaning and significance of events, representing social interests and articulating widely held viewpoints in relation to them. It comprises formal institutions (i.e. parties, churches, trade union, and professional body); formal institutions of a functional kind (i.e. schools, universities and mass media); and more informal social and political networks like voluntary groups. Civil Society is defined by its relation to the state. The separation of civil society from the state is widely acknowledged as a sign of modern society, in contrast to societies in which the two are fused. The most autonomous civil society is defined by how it represents society to the state, and how to deal with the pressures which arise from the state.

In the words of Shaw(1994), “Civil society is field of conflict: on one hand, civil society institutions function as the ‘outer earthwork’ of the state through which state power is legitimated in society, but on the other they are arenas in which social groups may organise to contest state power. Civil society is the prime site of hegemonic struggle between dominant and counter-hegemonic forces. The balance between state and civil society reflect the balance of struggle between social groups and civil institutions and state power, and the influence of civil society in defining the state’s own strategies in a particular way” (Shaw, 1994: 649).

Because civil society is defined by its relationship with state, the relative decline of the nation-state has been accompanied by an

increasing crisis of national civil societies. Indeed, the traditional national systems have “declined in potency and traditional institutions like parties and churches have lost support” (Shaw, 1994). In the last decade a new kind of global community has emerged, “one that has increasingly become a force in International Relations” (Frederick, 1993: 270). Similarly, Cees Hamelink sees a new phenomenon emerging in the World stage -Global civil society- From the Earth Summit to General Agreement on Trade and Trade (GATT), from the UN General Assembly to the movement of non government organizations (NGO), is becoming a force in international politics.

Therefore, there is an increasing correlation of many contemporary emergents with more abstracted forces. There is a heightened awareness of the effectivity of more global relations. Taken in an American context, the sustenance of an American intervention on the international level in the post cold war brought it, in accompaniment with other factors, to a point of being embraced by new global demands. In consequence, the tension surfacing has become between nationalism and globalism. It is a new subject of struggle, repressing for good any isolationist orientation witnessed at the American scenery.

Apparently, the American media system is part of that process. Taking Cees Hamlink point seriously that the media's role in the world scene needs to be seen from the global rather than national perspective, one cannot but exclude any trivialisation to such new orientation (see Frederick, 1993). There has to be a new paradigmatic look at the American media, an act that takes a different approach which will not restrict the discussion on what has been the sole concern of media studies. Those studies have always located their concern from within the relation of the Nation-state (particularly state- media relations) with

the Other. These will be introduced later in the discussion for their indispensability in understanding the State- media relationship with the Arabs. The present study, as discussed earlier, maintain that the American media should be approached not only from national but also global perspective.

### **3.3.a The Distancing Process: Productive Activity of Enclosure and of National Identification**

Responses within Western civil societies to global crises are obviously affected by consideration of distance. Distance is relative. It is constantly established, undermined and re-negotiated in its response to the other. In the words of Shaw (1996) “ Distance is active, something which we create in our response: there is a process of distancing. Distance is also a question, of course, of openness- or lack of openness- in our attitude toward the others problem” (Shaw, 1996: 8). Breaking distance is a crucial component to any attempt to develop a global civil society in which the globally vulnerable will be represented.

At the heart of breaking distance lies two major elements: an emphasis on the global ramifications of the conflict. That is to say, developing global community, overcoming the distance which hinders their response to people in other situations; and an emphasis on their responsibility for people in distant crises. In other words, to articulate a vision of responsible global community.

Image of people’s predicaments in other parts of the globe must be shown to other members of the global society. And their cause needs to be advocated globally. The representation of victims in distant crisis is typically indirect. They rarely communicate their own views.

Information about theme is produced by third parties. Nor do they have a direct political impact. They depend on institutions which they have not created and do not control, for the effectiveness of their representation.

The dilemma of distance and responsibility revolve obviously around the question of representation. The representation of people in distant conflict depends upon the representative activities of civil society.

The debate about global society has brought into focus the issue of emerging 'global civil society'. This raise the question as to whether institutions of national civil society can adapt to global roles or how western-based institutions can represent those suffering in distance crisis (Shaw, 1994).

Shaw(1996) argues that civil society institutions has predominately national in character, hence most civil society institutions are conditioned to dealing with wars in which 'our' soldiers are involved. This is to say that there are no divisions and debates. This is not to say that divisions and debates do not take place, Indeed, divisions and debates take place but often according to a predictable line. Patriotism/nationalism feeling give substance to such debate justifying actions which in other circumstances is not acceptable. Institutions of civil society articulate ideologies mostly in support of the national government and its allies (Shaw, 1996). The representation of people involved in distance crisis thus depends largely upon the representative activities of Western civil society institutions. It depends on the convergence of their interests with the interests, beliefs and agenda of group in western society (Shaw, 1996).

The key is that most civil society institutions, including mass media, respond to distance violence from a national society perspective rather than a global one. Put differently, most civil society institutions play a minor role in unifying world society or coping with the concept of globalisation at this point of time, they see distance crises from a national rather than a global perspective.

Merill's (1973) study is an early example out of other research done later (for instance, Traber & Davies, 1991; Malek & Leidig, 1991; Bennett & Manheim, 1993; Dorman & Livingston, 1994; Kaid et al, 1994; Susan Welch 1972; Robert Trice, 1979; Daniel Hallin, 1984; Clarence Wyatt; 1986; Edward Herman, 1985) which reveals that media converge with national perspective. The media are subordinated to the nation's basic political and social systems and ideologies. He has noted that:

Each nation's press systems and philosophy is usually very closely in step with that nation's basic political and social systems and ideology. So in one real sense every country's press system is more often than not truly a branch of government, or a co-operating part of the total national establishment (Merill, 1973: 5).

Media usually tend to perceive international events through the value lens of their society. Hence they are likely to support their country and its policies, tending to take the stand of their governments. Marlene Cuthbert concludes her study of media coverage in six countries of the 1983 invasion of Granada:

In covering the crisis in Granada, the media of each nation or region reacted from the perspective of the perceived interests of their own national system. The journalist of each media

house had to find words to report the complexity of external reality. Despite the very different pictures painted in the various regions, although there were undoubtedly individual exceptions, it seems unlikely that journalists were deliberately distorting or slanting news. But, however committed they are to truth, the journalists' very selection of facts, and choice and organisation of words, necessarily involved interpretation, and interpretation introduced different perspectives which grew out of their ideological differences.

(quoted by Traber & Davies, 1991: 7)

### **3.3.b The Politics of Crisis: An Event of Social Homogeneity?**

Gramsci (1930) views crisis in terms of conflicts between the 'representatives' and the 'represented' in society. For Gramsci, a 'crisis' of authority arises when the ruling class lose legitimacy and resort increasingly to coercive force to maintain its dominance. This means that the masses have lost faith in the ruling class and no longer believe what they used to believe previously.

More recently, Offe (1984) regards crisis as a 'processes in which the structure of a system is called into question'. One view of crisis holds that crisis endangers the identity of a system. This 'sporadic' view sees crisis as 'particularly acute, catastrophic, surprising and unforeseeable events' requiring intervention. It is, thus, seen as an event or chain of events. A 'processual' view conceives crisis at the level of mechanisms or a process that generates events. According to this perception, crisis is seen as 'developmental tendencies' that can be counteracted. Here crisis and state intervention are pitted as opposites.

The important point that needs to be said in regard to these definitions is that all of them are taken to be essentialist. That is, they

look at crises in a substantive way, though with some variations. What is more meaningful to our discussion is to look at the crisis in terms of functions and articulation. This would be a better way of detecting the politics of the term involved and thus a more concrete tracing of the functionality and effectivity of it within other perspectives taken into account in this thesis.

Following an insightful account of Bruck (1992), the crisis is looked upon here from non-essentialist perspective. Crisis does not exist in the world as such. It exists rather in discourse: "Crises are not real events, but are evaluations of the significance of what is happening. Crises are special knowledge based on perception of disruptions of existing state of affairs which construct the change as sudden ... and difficult to cope with" (Bruck, 1992: 108). Put differently, crises are specific forms of discourse which build upon knowledge of past events and specific anticipation of future consequences. Crises, in this view, are always related to specific views. These views are shaped by one's interests in events, one's degree of emotional involvement in events and ethnic-cultural background to name just a few. Crises as constructed by the media diffuse a specific point of view to create a sense of shared purpose and general interest. In this connection crises generally foster in-group solidarity and cohesion.

As realised from much literature on the United States foreign policy, the crises in the United States is a forceful site of socio-political effectivity. This comes about in continuous linkage to some particular values. Crises discourses are seen largely in terms of threat to civil freedom and international freedom. Civil freedom is threatened when the government expands without limitations extinguishing the rights of citizens. International freedom is threatened when one nation or

coalition of nations seeks to extend its power to the domination of others. In both cases, crisis discourse emerges when one power centre upsets the received 'natural' balance of forces and seek an unwarranted expansion.

Particularly, Raboy and Dagenais (1992) writing about media and crisis have considered crisis as a decisive or critical turning point, real or perceived, in the course of events. It is a critical moment in which a decisive change for the better or worse is imminent. The term is especially applied to a time of insecurity and suspense in politics or trade. A state of crisis is distinguished from its opposite, normalcy by threat or promise of change that the crisis implies. Challenges to the status quo in all societies tend to be framed in terms of crisis. By labelling a situation a 'crisis' one declares the presence of threat to the predominate order. This declaration is usually accompanied by a political positioning with respect to the change (Raboy & Dagenais, 1992). Invoking a state of crisis, in the past five decades, has been a classical machinery for legitimating then silencing media criticism, and the tendency is for media to go along with the official line especially when consensus is strong among the political elites.

### **3.3.c Comparison of Contexts of 'Crisis Mediatitics': Subordination or Potentialisation of Global Perspective?**

The post-Cold War era has seen many political articulations of crises. Of these crises which is mostly relevant for us, possibly the Gulf war could be said to have constituted a global crisis in the traditional sense of a war involving major powers and involving large parts of the World. In most other crises, Western interests have been minimally involved. Conflicts have been essentially local. Yet, some of these



crises such as Kurdistan and Bosnia, as will be shown below, have been considered as globally significant, while other crises like the Armenian - Azerbaijan conflict have not. We therefore have to ask what is the difference between these two sets of essentially local crises? The principal difference seems to be that some crises have been widely *perceived* to involve enormous suffering and violation of human rights, and this perception has been fostered by extensive global media coverage (Shaw, 1996). Shaw notes two criteria for global political crises: "Global crises may still be constituted, as was the Gulf war for the most part, by traditional criteria of conflicts of interests ... involving major powers .... They may also be constituted, however, even where these are wholly or largely lacking, if there is a world - wide perception of large - scale violation of human life and globally legitimate principles that is largely dependent on media coverage obtained" (Shaw, 1996: 4). Western intervention in global crises vary from relief and peace keeping operations to the complex Gulf war. This variation, according to Shaw, is highly related to the extent that western interests are involved.

Shaw's comparative discussion of the media's role in three crises (Kurdistan, Bosnia and Rwanda) in the post Gulf War era reveals that media coverage converged with national perspective in one crisis (Bosnia). However according to Shaw, in Kurdistan and Rwanda the case was different; global perspective intersected with media coverage of the two crises thereby weakening the fusion of media and nation-state/national perspective.

In the aftermath of the Gulf war, two Iraqi revolts against Saddam Hussein took place. The first and largest revolt erupted in the south. This revolt, its brutal suppression and the flood of refugees which followed did not constitute a global crisis. There was no serious

pressure for military intervention although American forces were nearby. The refugee crisis resulting from the Kurd revolt in the north and its suppression, on the other hand, did become a global crisis due to media pressure for intervention: "The Kurdish crisis is the only clear cut case of all the conflicts in the early 1990s in which media coverage compelled intervention by western powers. Although this crisis marked an important shift in the principles of global politics, in which sovereignty and non-intervention were subordinated to human right and international intervention, the precedent was limited" (Shaw, 1996: 156).

Three reasons contributed to the subordination of the global perspective on the first revolt and the potentialization of global perspective in the second revolt. Timing is one reason why the second revolt became a global crisis and the other did not. The first revolt erupted when coalition governments and people were celebrating the liberation of Kuwait and prospective return of their troops. "The rebels [in the south] call for assistance cut across popular feeling of relief- reflected in the media- that the war was over and politicians' calculations that this was the time to cash in on success"(Shaw, 1996: 157). In contrast, by the time the situation in Kurdistan became desperate the initial relief over the war's ending had faded and media and people were more open to consider their need for help (Shaw, 1996).

Another important factor is access. The 'unfilmability' of Basra and other southern cities was a key difference in western responses compared to Kurdistan.

The third factor is the media's difficulty in focusing on more than one crisis at a time. In July 1991, the wars of Slovenian and Croatian independence began opening a phase of wars and genocide

unprecedented in the European continent since the 1940s. A month later the failed coup against Gorbachev occurred, signaling the break-up of the USSR.

In the post-Yugoslav wars, western and UN intervention were undertaken for almost completely opposite reasons to those in the Gulf war. Whereas in the Gulf war the aim was to reverse aggression, in ex-Yugoslavia there was no aim of undoing Serbian occupation of large parts of Bosnia and Croatia. On the contrary, UN forces were established to protect UN personnel, not the civilian population let alone to reverse aggression.

Media in the United States and Britain accommodate the official line of their governments. The American media like the American government tended to be verbally supportive of the Bosnian government. Similarly, the British media often reflected their government neutrality toward aggressor and victims (Shaw, 1996). In both countries, therefore, the media like their governments did not see ex-Yugoslav wars as a global crisis. This situation would at least give a more wider spectrum for the functionality of national frame.

In late 1995 the post-Yugoslav wars turned into a global crisis. This stems from US foreign policy and the action of combatants. On the one hand, the Clinton administration seemed to have decided that further escalation of war would threaten the chance of a successful outcome of American policy in the Balkans. On the other hand, Bosnian and Croatian forces with US backing made major military gain on the ground. Media's role in these developments according to Shaw was limited "On the one hand, nothing the media had done caused the Western powers or the UN to prevent or reverse genocide on a large scale and ..., they

incorporated many of their governments' assumptions even into the language in which they reported the conflicts. With the exception of a few commentators in the broadcast and occasional contributions on television, media had hardly challenged the overall policy of the West or the UN toward ex-Yugoslav"(Shaw, 1996: 168).

In contrast to the post-Yugoslav wars, the media embraced a globalist perspective in Rwanda. Media coverage of the genocide and refugees constituted the chief pressure for intervention. Coverage of the crisis, though, presented the problem, as it had presented the Bosnian problem in purely humanitarian terms. Western governments, however, turned a blind eye. This was due mainly to lack of western strategic interests in Rwanda. The conflict between the global perspective adopted by the media and the national perspective adopted by Western governments in Rwanda suggests to us that the traditional fusion between media and foreign policy has been weakened in this case by the intervention of another factor: global perspective.

More recently, four European governments with colonial history (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) have potentialized humanitarian concerns as a legitimate cause for international intervention. The four states have established a joint intervention force for humanitarian and mission peace keeping duties in the Mediterranean. In light of the colonial history of those states in the Mediterranean, one can't help but wonder about the aims of potentializing humanitarian principles by the West?

### **3.4 Culture of Media Effectivity: Margins and Territories of its Incorporation**

Having illustrated the inescapability of global understanding in situating the American political values with the Other, there has to be a move towards a more proximal dimension. This is the dimension where dozens of research studies have been undertaken. It requires a close examination to the lines of convergence and divergence of both sides' margins of politicisation, the government and media. In the following discussion, there is an attempt to differentiate and locate the areas of added tension as a step forward to understanding the particularities shaping the American Government and the American media with respect to the Arabs.

At the International level, the relation between the media and the governmental institutions witnesses a different set of tensions. The culture of cohesion and homogeneity becomes the conditioning factor that provides the relation its specificity. Those social categories that have given a pace for media - governmental strategic game of powers at the domestic level, appears to get contracted or actually transversed into a different function. Such a context opens the way for articulating a discourse of priorities, justifying the marginalisation of some discrete principles advanced into the media profession and the relation with society. Largely, these principles have kept the truth discourse inconsistent with the democratisation as an object of investment and power relations, at each stage, a registration of tensions re-surface among the media, government, and society. This implies a continuity of politics, though always in a differential mode regulating the dispersion of power relations in between the government and the media.

Upon withdrawal of the truth discourse regulating the paces and extent of each institutional governance at the domestic level, the national discourse steps forward, initiating new terms of government-media policy orientation. With respect to the government, the circulating discourse should sustain a unifying front represented historically as a result of exceptional measures. The measures are the ones that would secure the unanimity of the State's version of intervention with the Other. The unanimity would make sense in relation with the media if the latter power relations are inscribed into the dialectical politics of identity and difference. This dialectical structuration is functioning to restore a position of media relay with the requisites of the official line of foreign affairs. A negativity that produces a sense of media identification with the dominant values of differentiation.

Apparently, the State's action of capturing the media lines of power relations has always been a concern in the light of an increased culture of media effectivity at various locations of social formations. A close look at Linsky's analysis (1986) of the domains that the American press can affect the Federal Policy Making reveals clearly a circulated culture that is producing a rationale for establishing strategies of restrain and curb.

Linsky designates five stages of the policy-making process:

- 1) Problem Identification - the period during which the issue first appears on the agenda for policy-makers;
- 2) Solution Formulae - the period when policy-makers begin and develop the possible responses;
- 3) Policy adoption - the stage at which options are assessed and a choice

agenda-setting stage stories had the same impact as policy adoption stories, and both had less impact than stories at the evaluation stage" (Linsky 1986;138-140). So, the distinctive element that Linsky affirms in the forty-three per cent of the executive officials surveyed is the large impact of the elite press on the evaluation stage of the policy making.

Apparently, Linsky's study is not the only one that perceives the media's agent-hood in the political arena. There are dozens which have expressed the reality of media effects. Nevertheless, the important element in the above discussion is not the content of Linsky's discourse. What is essential to realise is that there is a culture of media effectivity which is prompting an increasing development of strategies by many societal institutions, most importantly the governmental organisations.

#### **3.4.1 'Vietnam Syndrome': A Machine for Establishing a Strategy of Media Control**

The 'remarkable' event in American society, especially within the 'official formations', that has assembled the culture of media effectivity as a locus of ideological and material investment is the Vietnam war. The administration and military commanders seemed to be operating under the thesis that the media helped to bring about the American defeat in Vietnam more than twenty years ago (Jeffords, 1994: 40), and that an antagonistic press during the 1960s and 1970s stabbed America's will to pursue a 'noble cause' to victory. The former commander of US forces in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, for example, wrote "The attitude on the part of the American reporters (in Vietnam) undoubtedly contributed to the psychological victory to the enemy achieved in the United States." He adds : "the strategists in Hanoi indirectly manipulated our open systems, and hence our political

system" (quoted in Wyatt, 1986: 104-113). This attitude was not confined to Westmoreland.

Douglas Kinnard, an army general who served in Indochina, sent a questionnaire to all the other 173 army generals who had served there. Among the 67 percent who replied he found a negative feeling about the press. As one general put it, the media had conducted "a psychological warfare campaign against the United States' policies in Vietnam that could not have been better done by the enemy" (Jeffords, 1994: 80). Eighty-nine percent rated the press negatively, including 38 percent who said flatly that the US media was "disruptive of the United States' efforts in Vietnam" (quoted in Wyatt, 1986: 105).

The conception of the press role in Vietnam has become an axiom for most of today's American military commanders. As Drew Middleton wrote : "The armed forces emerged from the Vietnam war psychologically scarred. They were embittered by their failure to defeat the Vietnamese because of what they considered political manipulation in Washington and, above all, by the media's treatment" (Wyatt, 1986: 105). Writing about the press restrictions during the 1983 invasion of Grenada, Middleton noted, "The majors and commanders of the Vietnam war who believed the media had worked against the American command there had become influential generals and admirals determined not to expose the Grenada operation to what they continued to view as a hostile adversary" (Wyatt, 1986: 105).

These views of the media role in Vietnam have not gone unchallenged. Susan Welch examined the Indochina conflict in the early years of the conflict in four major American newspapers. She found that reporters not only relied almost solely on administration



sources, but they also accepted completely the assumptions of the administration: "...the press relied almost completely on administration sources for information which was reported. Most of the attention that the Indochina story received was from state department press releases and interviews with American officials.... In the debate (over U.S. policies) in 1954, the assumptions of the administration continued to be accepted.... Indochina was (presented as) an area vital to our interests, that was under challenge in a clear case of communist aggression that had to be stopped" (Welch, 1972: 207-231).

Similarly, Daniel Hallin pointed out that the ideological context for Vietnam in the early years of the conflict "was the political struggle of the cold war. Television did report the politician's arguments about the need to stand firm against 'communist aggression' and to prevent the falling dominoes of south-east Asia from threatening the security of the free world" (Hallin, 1984: 46).

In the latter years of the conflict, opponents of the administration policy became more visible in the news, yet the news continued to reflect "a heavy predominance of official sources" (Hallin, 1984: 46). These findings were supported by other studies of media during the latter stage of the Vietnam war. Leon Sigal, for instance, found that 75 percent of the sources used by the New York Times and Washington Post were U.S. government officials. Further, he found that 60 percent of news stories were gathered through routine-source controlled channels (Sigal, 1973). The data, then, does not support the thesis that the American media shifted towards an oppositional stance in the final years of the Vietnam war. There was certainly a shift from favourable coverage of the U.S. policy in the early years of the war to unfavourable coverage in the latter years of the conflict (Hallin, 1984: 19).

This shift, however, according to Hallin "seems best explained as a reflection of and in response to a collapse of consensus - especially of elite consensus - on foreign policy" (Hallin, 1984: 22). Journalist Max Frankel expressed it this way "As protest moved from the left groups, the anti-war groups, into the pulpits, into the senate - with Fulbright, Gruening and others - as it became a majority opinion, it naturally picked up coverage. And then naturally the tone of the coverage changed. Because we're an Establishment institution, and whenever your natural constituency changes, then naturally you will too" (quoted in Hallin, 1984: 21-22).

In Hallin's view, whether the media tend to be supporting or critical of U.S. policies depends on the degree of consensus those policies enjoy, particularly within the political establishment. When consensus is strong they tend to stay within the boundary of political discourse, when it begins to break down, coverage becomes increasingly more critical and increasingly difficult for officials to control (Hallin, 1984: 22-3). He adds, this does not imply that the U.S. media's role is unimportant "... it seems likely, on the contrary...that the media not only reflect but strengthen prevailing political trends, serving in a time of consensus as consensus - maintaining institutions and contributing, when consensus breaks down to a certain point, to an accelerating expansion of the bounds of political debate" (Hallin, 1984: 23).

### **3.4.2 Looking through the 'Source Interaction' Mirror for State-Media Differential Relation**

In the course of dissemination of the culture of media effectivity through the various socio- political formations, extensive media and

political studies have been conducted to show the increasing sophistication of strategies established by the State to secure media control and accommodation. In most cases, these studies built-in the problem of differential relations between the media and the government in terms of sources relations. For some, this relationship is viewed in social terms (Gans, 1979; Hess, 1981; Donohue et.al, 1973: and Goldenberg, 1976), while others see it in economic terms. (Gandy, 1982).

Although those studies are important to provide us with an understanding of basic structures dominating the source- media relations, the thesis does not resort to them except in a very minor way. The reason has to do with the reality that most of them have dealt with the source interaction domestically. To retain a specificity and contextuality of our study, it is necessary to refer to studies which have dealt with cases beyond the domestic level.

Such specific references are helpful in providing additional sensitising means of analysis to understand some local embeddings structuring the productive relations between the media and the government in relation with the 'Other'. In that manner, the analysis is transcribing those embeddings into a different contextualisation. In our case, this contextualisation is made concrete as a result of inscribing the context of foreign coverage and the context of crisis articulation. These are conditions that make manifest the specificity of the relation aimed to locate. The discussion below takes the latter context, divided into two sections, as its main focus. In the first section, some relevant themes related to source interaction in American crisis situations are drawn out from various research positions which have taken different case studies. The second section, however, preview the argument from within the research done on the Gulf War particularly.

### **3.4.2.a The Significance of Socio-Organisational Constraints**

Mark Pedelty (1996) writing about the international press corps in El Salvador points out that diplomats in the US embassy in San Salvador feed stories to reporters who are careful not to alienate these crucial sources by adding background information that might be perceived as ideological. The American embassy only provides access to certain reporters, namely those who are not going to disagree much with the State Department. A United States information service representative in El Salvador explains “ It would be stupid to say that there are no favourites. There is usually a large overlap between the journalists who are large bureau chiefs and those who are ingratiating. If the Ambassador enjoys sitting with a reporter, he will get invited back. There is no real mystery to that” ( Pedelty, 1996: 69).

In other words, there is an intersection of interests between the Embassy and the staff correspondents. Given access to the valuable quotes of embassy decision-makers, a staff correspondent returns the favour by allowing the State Department power to shape the news discourse ( Pedelty, 1996). This professional ‘exchange’ often develops into personal friendship. Bati, a Canadian reporter in El Salvador, explains that “ It is impossible to isolate your-self and not identify with the people who you quote on a regular basis” ( Pedelty, 1996: 71).

The interaction between journalists and official sources and the intersection of their interest at one point might explains, at least in part, why the New York Times coverage of Peru’s ‘Drug War’ is in line with the American foreign policy. In NYT coverage of Peru, international drug traffickers, and guerrillas are commonly referred to as narco-terrorists.

Times reporting is typical in its equation of drug traffickers with guerrillas (Quigley, 1996). One story, according to Quigley, “mentioned that US aid ‘may be used against narcotics traffickers or against their guerrilla protectors’ quoting US official who said, ‘you can’t draw a black and white line between the two’ ”(Quigley, 1990: 4). Two weeks later the Times headlined an account of an armed clash between guerrillas and US backed Peruvian forces, “US Pilots in Peru Joint Battle Against Forces of Coca Trade”(NYT, 4-12-1990).

Paletz and Entman (1981) analysed how the American press reported the rebellion in Zaire in 1978. They performed a content analysis of coverage in the Washington Post, the San Francisco Chronicle, Newsweek, and Time. The study reveals in part that in most instances the American press used official sources. That is to say, they interacted mainly with government officials. Indeed, between May 15 and May 27 the Post quoted or cited US or European officials 65 times, officials of the Mobutu government 15 times. In contrast, people from the Congo National Liberation Front, which was responsible for the rebellion, were quoted or cited 6 times. This is a ratio of 11:1 . The ratio was almost as skewed in the Chronicle (6: 1). In Time, the rebels were not used as a source even once, in Newsweek only twice (Palets & Entman, 1981). Not surprisingly, given this interaction with official sources, the press reported the events almost entirely from the vertigo of the American Capital.

Gans (1979) found that most foreign news in the American press was about England, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Israel, Egypt, USSR and mainland China. He observed that “Foreign news deals either with stories thought relevant to Americans or American interests ... or when the topics are distinctive, with interpretations that apply American values ... [For want of space, the newspapers] often limit themselves

only to the most dramatic overseas events. In addition, they tend to *follow American foreign policy*, even if not slavishly .... Foreign news adheres less strictly to objectivity than domestic news ...”(Gans, 1979: 37-38).

Dorman and Farhang (1987) examined how the American press covered Iran from 1951 to 1978 in relation to the American foreign policy toward Iran during that period. The study reveals in part that one distinctive feature of the American coverage of Iran for twenty-five years was lack of independent judgement. It accepted uncritically the assumption held by the American officials that the political aspirations of the Iranian people do not really matter (Dorman & Farhing, 1987). This suggests to us that the American journalists assimilated the frame of reference of their sources.

Tony Atwater (1987) studied the networks evening news coverage of the TWA hostage crisis. He found, in part, that the majority of hostage stories (over 65%) was filed from Washington and New York (Atwater, 1987). It is obviously easier and less costly for the three networks (ABC, NBC, CBS) to cover the crisis from that location.

Michael Suleiman's (1970) study of the American media coverage of the Middle East during the 1967 war reveals that the overwhelming majority of stories originated from the United States (66%) and Israel(18.4%). The supremacy of American and Israeli sources can be attributed to the limited access to the Arab nations which minimise the interaction between the Arab officials and the American journalists and enhance the level of interaction with Israeli sources. Journalists argue that they "... have so many restrictions there" (in Ghareeb, 1977: 138). Sanford Socolow of CBS complains that "The Arabs just don't give us

access.... The Israelis know how to feed the press” (quoted in Curtiss, 1982: 150).

A similar view has been expressed by Steve Bell of ABC “The network has a very good bureau in Tel Aviv, and the ability to satellite news directly out of Israel. But there is a continuing problem of access in Arab nations” (quoted in Curtiss, 1982: 150). Bell’s view is shared by Andrew Neil. Neil(1984) writing about the relationship between the western media and the Arabs, states “... it is my experience and the experience of my Foreign Editor; that the Middle East is the most difficult area to cover in the world and to report on accurately, with the exception of the (former) Soviet Union. The reasons for this lie principally with the governments of the area who are unwilling to allow journalists entry into their countries unless they know they are going to write favourable reports” (Neil, 1984: 109). Without going into details, it is important here to mention that the problem of access is more complicated than what these journalists are claiming the case to be. There is a very clear avoidance of foregrounding the reality of having consistent relations and values which would allow access to the Israeli side and problematize access to the Arab side. The journalists are not neutral. They are actually embedded within various discourses, practices and identity politics.

Language is another barrier. Most foreign correspondents in the Arab world, for instance, do not speak Arabic fluently. According to Martin Woollacott(1984) “The majority of staff correspondents do not have a fluent command of Arabic, or more than a limited knowledge of the region’s history. They operate ... on the basis of talking to the small minorities in each of the countries who know Western language” (Woollacott, 1984: 95).

### **3.4.2.b The Revival of Political Economy: Going Beyond the Social?**

On the other side of the various socio- organisational approaches, the political economy perspective has retained its position in the media - source interaction studies. Without going into details about its historical gains and losses, the important feature is that many current conceptualisations are orienting towards complementary relations. At the same time there is an acknowledgement of social determination, there is an account of the economic as another constraint (and even enablement) on media access to world events.

The work of Dorman and Farhang (1987) on foreign coverage, for instance, is an exemplary approach. They have found that most media can no longer afford an extensive network of foreign correspondents. According to Mort Rosenblum, by the late 1970s it cost \$ 80,000 to 140,000 to keep a single American correspondent overseas. Another source has put the cost even higher. The Time magazine's managing editor estimated that "The average cost per correspondent in 1980 will exceed \$ 200,000. This is 245 per cent higher than in 1970, when the cost per correspondent was \$ 83,000" (quoted in Dorman & Farhang, 1987: 193). A Los Angeles Times executive estimated the cost for his paper to support a foreign bureau was about \$ 150,000 a year, or about triple the cost of fifteen years ago" (quoted in Dorman & Farhang, 1987: 194). This has inevitably led to "parachute journalism" which alludes to reporters jetting from hot spot to hot spot.

Moreover, the economic constraints have contributed to the dramatic drop in the number of American foreign correspondents in the



past forty years. In the 1950s there were an estimated 2500 Americans regularly reporting from overseas. By 1975 the number of American correspondents abroad dropped to about six hundred for news media. In this context, most American dailies have come to depend increasingly on the wire services, the New York Times syndicate, and the Washington Post - Los Angeles Times service for their picture of the world. The New York Times syndicate, for instance, served in 1978 some 250 of the nation's most important dailies (Dorman & Farhang, 1987). The key point is that the interaction of most American dailies with world events is indirect via intermediary channels.

Inspired by the same principles of necessary accountability of the economic aspect in relation with the Other, Chomsky and Herman's approach (1979) appears to have a particularity in retaining an emphasis on some classical economic concerns to explain the asymmetrical government-media relationship. This approach has its own strong points. Interestingly, the emphasis on the political is a significant element in their discussions, matching some embedding principles of our discussion regarding the issue of mobilisation. At large, the recognition of the political could be said to have helped them in overcoming many weaknesses that arise from the advocacy of an economic analysis as such. This incorporation explains the grounds for nominating their approach as the 'propaganda model'. This model assumes that the media's power to manipulate public opinion will be used by elites in the pursuit of what they define as the 'national interest'. The empirical case for the propaganda model includes the observation that the US media tend to apply a 'dichotomous treatment' to coverage of international events, depending on the implications for US interests. The media, in this view, act as an instrument in mobilising support for American foreign policy. It will "... falsify, obscure and reinterpret the

facts in the interest of those who dominate the economic and political system” (Chomsky & Herman, 1979: 71).

Herman (1985) conducted a comparative analysis of a pair of events in Cambodia and East Timor and elections in EL Salvador and Nicaragua. The study sought to demonstrate that when situation arise in which ‘points’ may be scored against a foreign other, the media will frequently be active in ‘publicity campaigns’. However, when similar events occur in friendly countries the media will be apologetic and will pursue a policy of benign neglect. The study concluded that the media campaigns “embody sharply dichotomous manipulation of symbols and political agenda. These media campaigns were quite successful in scoring political points and making important ideological statements to the general public and the world at large. In these cases dissident voices in the United States were not available in any of the major media ...” (Herman, 1985: 145).

Belkaoui (1979) analysed the American press coverage of the Arab - Israeli conflict between 1966 and 1974 in terms of the manipulative model. That is to say, based on the assumption of ideological link between economic and political interests and the mainstream press. In this context, she suggests that coverage of the Middle East following the October war and oil crisis would reflect the powerful corporate oil interests’ position on the Arab - Israeli conflict. Oil companies appeals for greater co-operation with the Arab world in working to resolve the Middle East conflict. Content analysis of press coverage reveals a more favourable image of the Arabs in the post October war and oil embargo phase than in the June 1967 phase. It also shows a less favourable image of the Israelis in the October 1973 phase than in the June 1967 phase.

Chomsky and Herman (1979), Herman (1985) and Belkaoui (1979) can be seen in the context and in resonance of Gandy's traditional view of journalist - source relationship. Oscar Gandy, in his book *Beyond Agenda Setting*, reduced this social explanation to its economic consideration. Journalists work under organisational requirements and in order to reduce their uncertainty about meeting requirements, journalists enter into a relationship of exchange value with their sources.

Journalists decide whether to invest time in the pursuit of one source rather than another, based on their estimation of the probable returns such an investment will produce. Those sources who have proved their value in the past are selected over those who are either unknown or have reduced their value by providing false information, or information in a form that was not easily converted into a publishable story.

(Gandy, 1982: 11)

Gandy uses the concept of 'news subsidy' to explain how powerful sources exert influence over the news. He suggests that most of the activities carried on by official sources influence the media agenda by reducing the cost of information for news.

Gandy's point is that in a capitalist society information is a commodity and, like most commodities, when the price is lowered the amount consumed increases. When the price is raised the amount consumed generally decreases. Those with the power to control the price of information not only control its consumption, they also influence the decisions that are based on that information (Gandy, 1982: 8).

Accepting Gandy's argument does not necessary mean that the other media studies which took the social perspective do not presume an existence of a differential relationship. Actually, they did but the

conditions of this type of relationship is not reductive to economic terms. They are more tempted to build the differential relations upon an organisational perspective. The studies have shown that collaboration between communications and sources is a result of a combination of common objective, good use of media routines on the source side, and some laziness on the media side (Giebert, 1961; Gans, 1979; Hess, 1981; Ericson et al, 1987). Stephen Hess found that the Washington Press Corps preferred to rely on authorised sources rather than doing their own research. Reliance on official sources offers several advantages to journalists, first it reduces their workload, reduces the need for expensive specialists, resolves the problem of objectivity, insures a high volume of raw material for their stories, and enables journalists to establish rapport. At the same time, reliance on official sources for information makes media personnel vulnerable to manipulation or management by newsmakers (Borquez, 1993: 37).

A key element of press-source relation is the recognition of a certain symbiosis between reporters and public officials. That is to say, both sides are engaged in a process of mutual dependence in which each side uses the other to promote particular goals. Journalists need information for their stories. At the same time officials need favourable coverage and hope that their perspective will set the tone of the coverage (Bennett, 1990; Parenti, 1986; Hermann, 1982; Gans, 1979; Brown et.al, 1978; Sigal, 1973). Hence, the relationship is manipulative on both sides, that is strategical, with each side attempting to use the other for his own purposes.

However, this relationship is not empty of constraints and of uneasy moments. Borquez (1993) points out that this interactions “ does not imply the absence of tension or competition between reporters

and sources but they do emphasise that the balance of conflict and co-operation will vary over time .... Tension between reporters and officials is often a struggle over the interpretation of events or conditions” (Borquez, 1993: 38).

### **3.4.2.c The Emergence of Strategies into Structures**

Having taken into account the economic and organisational differential relations, there has to be an awareness that these relations do not surface as such. The asymmetrical relationship is not just a result of differences of allocative resources which in consequence marks the differential relation of the social position. It is also an effect of authoritative resources whereby strategy is required to sustain the position itself. The expression of that strategy is found to be in the governmental initiation of various policies that could produce active containment of media’s professional and institutional bearings.

The following few excerpts below show clearly the increasing awareness of the government for the need of a particular mode of actions in relation to the media. David Gergen, who was a member of Nixon's White House communication team, reveals :

We had a rule in the Nixon operation, that before any public event was put on his schedule, you had to know what the headline out of that event was going to be, what the picture was going to be, and what the lead paragraph would be... . One of Nixon’s rules about television was that it was very important that the White House determine what the line coming out from the President was and not let the networks determine that, not let New York edit you. You had to learn how to do the editing yourself.

(quoted in Shoemaker & Reese, 1991: 110)

What Nixon had paid attention to was invested more effectively by the Reagan Administration(1980-1988). The latter built a highly enhanced capability to use the mass media in the past decade. Moreover, President Reagan , as former president Jimmy Carter puts it, "... handled the press -and I use the word 'handled' advisedly-superbly. Based on his analysis and his advisers' analysis of what is popular and unpopular, President Reagan has been effective in emphasising those popular items in dealing with the press .... [He] has dealt with the press through very carefully orchestrated encounters and through the passing from the White House to the helicopter, back and forth, and responding to whichever questions he wanted .... His ability to emphasise or orchestrate the daily news item has been remarkably successful" (cited in Shoemaker & Reese, 1991: 156-7).

For instance, the famous tactic adopted by Reagan is the restricted access. This has included;

Providing visual opportunities of Reagan leaving for Camp David, but using the waiting helicopter to drown out reporters' questions; restricting questions during White House photo opportunities, and drastically reducing the number of press conferences and other unscripted encounters.

(Shoemaker & Reese, 1991: 109)

These realities cannot be ignored as a moment of effective reality. The government has used media routines, which form the immediate environment within which communicators do their jobs, to control the flow of information. These routines, while helping the organisation to effectively gather and evaluate its raw material, necessitate a partial view of the world and provide levers for the government to control the flow of information for their advantage.

These pressures come through briefings, press conferences, staged events, and restricted access, to name a few.

The extent to which the U.S. government will 'use' the media as a political tool is evident in the tremendous growth in press offices and communication staff in the White House, State Department and Defence Department, and the growing sophistication of press 'management' techniques since Vietnam.

The important underpinning in this respect is the conditions that have differentiated the strategy of 'press management' as a recurrent resort in the government- media relations. Before answering this issue there has to be an awareness about the context of these structures and strategies. Most of these are derived from a domestic level. The stake in this chapter is to map out those strategies from a different level. This level is an international one. Actually, these strategies, according to many researchers, are found to be more required and even more susceptible to be shackled with various elements, enhancing thus their intakes and investments.

Having had an illustrated view of the significant and variant types of studies done on foreign coverage of different crisis situations, it is worthwhile to pinpoint our focus more particularly on those studies which took the Gulf war as a case study. Even though this case has been discussed previously, (in between the Global and the National), it is looked at here from the various studies done which tackled multiple themes. This is helpful in providing us with a multiple understanding about the structures and strategies involved in the Gulf war, for the sake of remarking our position as a result. The feature that should be noted in this respect is that the literature is selective. The many aspects which

are ignored should not mean, in any sense, that they are insignificant. They are just left out for reason of interest and construction practicalities.

### **3.5 Provisions of Media Research on the Gulf War: Constituting the Repressive dimension**

In an article about ethics of Gulf war reporting, Traber and Davies argue in part that " Patriotism, is a serious impediment to international journalism in general, and to war reporting in particular. What should a journalist do if the political or economic future of his or her country is threatened, if a government has declared a war 'just', if soldiers of one's own country, risk their lives, and if huge finances have been committed for the conduct of a war? Inevitably, journalists take sides " (Traber & Davies, 1991: 7). This view is fortified by Liebes' (1992) comparative study of the Uprising and the Gulf war on US and Israeli television. Liebes found that when the journalist's own country is at war, the media is likely to subordinate the role and norm of their professional to their extra-professional roles as citizens.

Similarly, Marvin Kalb (1994), a professor of press and public policy at Harvard university, underlines the alliance of US media and government in time of war. " When America goes to war, so too does the press wrapped in flag no less proudly than the troops themselves." He adds that "during the Gulf war the press engaged in the most dangerous of professional practices, namely, patriotic journalism"(Kalb, 1994: 1).

Anchors and reporters struck up a 'we-versus-they' as a form of dialogue, which had the effect of suffocating press scepticism. We, the American and allied side; they, the Iraqi side. We 'virtuous' and united



against aggression, Saddam Hussein, portrayed as the Middle East equivalent of Adolph Hitler. As Ed Siegel of the Boston Globe puts it, "television has been giving us black-and-white stories of the forces of good vs the forces of darkness" (Kalb, 1994: 3-7).

Patriotism can also induce silence. In his article about the early stages of the Vietnam War, Michael Traber, observed that: "The self-censorship of the US media was perfect at that time. It was simply unpatriotic even to raise doubts about America's role in Vietnam or about the USA's alleged military success. While the patriotic imperative is strongest in times of international conflict- let alone war- it is one of prevailing determinants of editorial decision-making and editorial opinions in almost all media"(in Traber & Davies, 1991: 7). Not surprisingly the chief Pentagon spokesman, Assistant secretary of Defence for Public Affairs, Pete Williams, praises the media for doing a 'good' job covering the war "... the press gave the American people the best war coverage they ever had" (quoted in Small, 1994: 7). This view stems from the fact that the media abandoned its most important function during the Gulf War in pursuit of national objective: the ability to think critically and act in a detached manner.

Studies of the American media coverage of the Gulf crisis and war show that the media lined up behind the US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. Williams Dorman and Steven Livingston (1994) studied the media coverage of the early stage of the Gulf crisis. The study found that the press reported uncritically the way the American administration framed the issue. It was during this stage, for example, that the Hitler analogy was applied to Saddam Hussein with little challenge from the press. Dorman and Livingston attributed the supportive coverage of the administration views to lack of much elite debates or disagreement

within officials circles (Dorman & Livingston, 1994). Similarly, Robert Entman and Benjamin Page (1994) found that news gates became open to policy alternatives during the periods of congressional debate in November of 1990 and January of 1991. However, the news gates closed down almost completely after the congress passed a resolution supporting the administration's policy. This indicated as Bennett put it that "the quality of information record [in the case of the Gulf war] was affected by the dynamics of power between high Washington officials" (Bennett, 1994: 26).

Bennett argued that the media tended to 'index' the debate among political elite on foreign policy. When most political elite publicly supported the administration policy, the news coverage would index or reflect the amount of dissent and might offer critical information. News gate tended to open or close depending on the levels of disagreements among powerful players in policy situation on Capital Hill, the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, and other relevant forces in situations along the news beat (Bennett, 1994). Bennett's (1993) analysis of the New York Times news coverage and unsigned editorials between August 1990 and May 30 1990 validate this view. The analysis suggested that:

pro-administration voices in the news far surpassed opposition voices throughout the period, even during the time of congressional activism in November and early January. As expected under the indexing hypothesis, the foundation for the strongly supportive policy case that dominated the news was laid by the preponderance of administration sources in the developing story and the general absence of much official (in this case, congressional) opposition. To indicate how strongly the newspaper's policy content followed the using of Washington officialdom [the study] examined the content of NYT masthead editorial, those that represented the

position of the newspaper itself ... these editorials overwhelmingly supported Bush administration action in the crisis until the early-November troop build-up stirred calls in congress for caution. However, during the November period of congressional opposition, and again during the January debate over a resolution of congressional support for the war, NYT editorials turned decidedly cautionary as well, for the first time raising sustained criticisms of administration policies. We take this as confirmation of the sensitivity of the editions to the range of policy debate among key institutional decision makers and as an illustration of their concern that the newspaper should remain a player within the (often shifting) range of elite debate. (Bennett & Manheim, 1993: 336 & 341)

Once the war was underway, the press again lifted framing to official sources. Bennett et al cited three key aspects of the US government effort to manage news of the conflict. Firstly access to the news was limited, secondly the content of news was managed to "inoculate public opinion against prospective bad news in such areas as, casualties, and chemical warfare". Lastly, news cues were managed through the construction of symbols and images. These include the analogy between Saddam Hussein and Adolph Hitler (Bennett & Manheim, 1993).

Kaid et al (1994) conducted content analysis on the CNN (Cable News Network) coverage of the Gulf war. The analysis yielded 636 segments that dealt with the Gulf war during the 5:00 and 6:00 PM newscasts. The total amount of time devoted to the Gulf war during these segments was over 29.3 hours. Reaction to the war was the predominate topic in more segments than any other with 17.3% of the segments focused on this topic. The second most frequently covered topic was war updates/Military activities with 15.6%.

In terms of the tone of the coverage of various actions, the study reported an overwhelmingly negative coverage of Iraq; 66 per cent of this coverage had a negative tone. While the US Military, and the U. S. government received an overwhelmingly positive treatment of 66% and 54% respectively.

The Gannett foundation (1991) surveyed the unsigned editorial of five newspapers: the Atlanta Constitution, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New York Times and Washington Post between 1990 and 1991. The sample consisted of seven dates in which major events took place: The invasion (August 3-6 1990), deploying the troops (August 18-26,1990), doubling the Gulf troops (November 9-13,1990), final diplomatic initiatives (January 9-16),1991), first days of the war (January 17-23,1991), the imminent ground war (February 14-23, 1991). The analysis suggested that as a whole "... the editorials were respectful toward the president and generally supportive. When there was a dissent, it was usually over tactics and timing rather than goals and principles" (Gannett, 1991: 63), and that journalists and news organisations with a few exceptions lapsed into cheer, leading the war effort instead of striving for more balanced news and historical perspective.

Malek and Leidig (1991) examined the extent to which the press has fulfilled its institutionalised role of social responsibility, as a watchdog against government, in the American democratic tradition, using the Gulf Crisis as a case study. The study analysed the coverage of the Washington Post, and the New York Times of the Gulf Crisis from August 2,1990 to January 16, 1991. The study found that the sampled press not only relied heavily on official sources for information but also on the government's interpretation of the crisis thereby

promoting the idea of the 'inevitability of war'. Malek and Leidig concluded in part that " the press fell short of its historical goal. Instead of assisting the public participation in a process through the free and dynamic expression of ideas, the press served more to endorse the views of the mainstream elite. Journalists, captivated by government officials, generally seemed to refrain from actively seeking out divergent sources of the information"(Malek & Leidig, 1991: 15) .

In part, Malek and Leidig attributed the press failure to fulfil its role as a guardian of American democracy to the practices associated with the idea of objectivity which frequently result in the legitimisation of official views and more important the symbiotic relationship between media professionals and officials. One must add elite consensus which reduced drastically the ability of the media to obtain critical information. As O'Heffernan (1994) pointed out "in the case of highly popular policies like the war against Saddam, the media ability to report such information is almost eliminated. Few sources will talk regardless of their position on the issue. The objections in the Pentagon eventually silenced and the vote in congress put an end to congressional criticism" (O'Heffernan, 1994: 242).

Tamar Liebes (1992) argued that the Gulf war was 'our' war for the American media, hence the CNN framed the Gulf war within six mechanisms favouring the US version of the war story. The first four mechanisms included; keeping the other side out of sight except for Saddam Hussein as its evil symbol (excising), minimising human costs on both sides (sanitising), building up the enemy (equalising) and absence of close-up portrayals (personalising). These mechanisms "worked to mystify and attribute greater threatening power to the other side, thus equalising the protagonists' military threat and legitimising the

mobilisation of force by ... [United States] to overcome the opponent ". These as a result would end up in asymmetrical portrayal of the humanity of the two sides. The American side was personalised and thus humanised. While " the only human presence on other side was Saddam Hussein. But this was a demonic presence " (Liebes, 1992: 52). This is the fifth mechanism: Demonizing

“ The war was presented in term of good against evil. On the whole, American television adopted the president's rhetoric of a just war fought on moral grounds, in which Saddam Hussein was cast in the role of a present-day Hitler constituting a threat to the whole of the free world"(Ibid). This, noted Liebes, is more than the familiar 'good guy' standing up to the 'bad guy'; it is " a crusade against evil, to which an outraged president has rallied the support of traditional allies and potential victims" (Ibid, 52).

The sixth mechanism is contextualising: “As the conflict escalated, American television moved from the geopolitical context toward the immediacy of the frame of a military confrontation. Even the occupation of Kuwait and Saddam Hussein's human rights violations receded as the dynamics of the conflict -the ultimatums, the mobilisation, the logistics, the diplomacy, the preparations for the land war, etc., - took centre stage" (Ibid, 53) . In short, there was a clear tendency to excise the opposite side, sanitise the suffering inflicted on it, demonize the other side, and contextualise its aggressive action. In part, this led Liebes to conclude that “the luxury of the detachment offered by ideology of 'objectivity' is reserved for reporting other nations' wars rather than our own wars-when our country is at war” (Liebes, 1992: 54).

### **3.6 Ancient and Contemporary Frames of Arab-Israeli Conflict: David and Goliath; and Terrorism**

The organisational constraints on reporting new events necessitate “production of stories within a conventional wisdom or prevailing logic shared by editor and audience alike”(in Daniel, 1995: 64). Thus, the conventional wisdom is not challenged and the traditional view of the world is preserved. This reliance on a pre-existing frame, noted Daniel, is so strong that “events tend to be interpreted in light of preconceived themes .... Virtually the only way a television reporter can break the hold a story line has on his or her editors [and audience] is by bringing pictures to disprove the conventional wisdom”(Daniel, 1995: 64).

One of the most often used frames for the Middle East conflict is the biblical frame, David and Goliath (see for example Collins and Clark, 1992; Daniel, 1995). It resonates with the two predominant faiths in the West, namely Christianity and Judaism (Daniel, 1995). Such resonance gives impetus to the frame. Nevertheless, it also resonates with the Orientalist discourse. The giant Philistine invokes the Orientalist representation of the Arabs as the antithesis of civilisation. It invokes the often told Bible story of the little shepherd David, taking on the giant, Goliath. It is a manifestation of the dichotomous good/evil frameworks with overt power dimension(Collins and Clark, 1992; Daniel, 1995).

The frame establishes a monolithic we-they division of victim and victimiser. Israel has shrewdly used this frame to convey its version of the Arab-Israeli conflict story. The Arabs and Palestinians are the Goliath to the tiny Jewish state. This is evident in the following statement by Israeli Ambassador Elihu Ben-Elissar: “The Arab side has all the territories in the

world. All the riches in the world. Everything. We have got only this small, tiny territory”(quoted in Collins and Clark, 1992: 30). The Palestinians, however, argue that the roles are reversed “... we are a civilian population, totally unarmed and defenceless and we are at the mercy of the greatest war machine ...”(quoted in Collins and Clark, 1992: 30).

The American media largely told the David and Goliath story, in the pre-Intifadeh stage, from the Israeli perspective. Israel, as we shall see in chapter four, has been seen as the underdog engaged in self-defence. Indeed, 30 years ago, TV news coverage of the Six-day war was almost one-sided. As *60 Minutes*’ Mike Wallase recalls “... all of us had admiration and respect for what Israel had done. We were almost a cheering section”(in Blitzer, 1987: 5).

A more contemporary frame is terrorism. The new frame resonates with the David and Goliath frame. The point of contact between the two frames is the sharp victim/victimiser division. Israel/Palestinians used the terrorist frame to label actions done by the other side. Thus “... place blame and evade responsibility”(Collins and Clark, 1992: 30). Israel refers often to Palestinian terrorism against Israeli civilians. In contrast, the Palestinians refer to state terrorism against Palestinian civilians. Yet, terrorism story is told quite often from the Israeli perspective(see chapter 4).

The American mass media, apparently, accepted uncritically the Israeli view of terrorism. In fact as Trice (1974) notes, media coverage of the Palestinian military activities was almost limited to the frame of terrorism. Similarly, Collines and Clark (1992) note: “American media have traditionally told victimage stories from the Israeli perspective; the



Arabs are terrorists against the Jews whose historically most dramatic suffering during the Holocaust inevitably led to their desire to return to the holy land from which they had been exiled”(Collins and Clark, 1992: 28).

Daniel (1995) points out that “David and Goliath has long been the especial metaphor for the Israeli-Arab conflict ...” (Daniel, 1995: 66). In 1987, Israel’s version of the David and Goliath story, notes Daniel, clearly has been challenged by the passivity of the Intifada. The passivity of the Intifada attributed Goliath’s behaviour to Israel. Indeed, the contrast between the Israeli might and the symbolic might/rock-throwing of the Palestinians reversed the David and Goliath story: “The Intifada, especially through its compelling visual elements, forced a recontextualization of the conflict that had a fundamental impact on the [the pre Intifada Interpretation]. The obvious challenges of the Intifada footage to American conventional wisdom have not been lost on scholars or viewers; children throwing stones, or better shooting them from slingshots at adult military counteragents atop tanks effectively reverses the casting of David and Goliath” (Daniel, 1995: 68).

The way the Intifada unfolded resonate also with American political values (e.g. national independence and self determination). Daniel (1995) suggests that “The human faces of the blue-jeans-and-gym-shoe-clad teens, the screaming mother trying to protect her son or her home from the soldiers, and the proud displays of the national flag showed a side of the Palestinian character not previously portrayed. All ... suggested a nationalist struggle of an indigenous population against a repressive and superior military force, not a gang of bloodthirsty, terrorists or an overwhelming army of the Arab world determined to wreak havoc on the helpless Israeli David” (Daniel, 1995: 69). Similarly, Zahrna(1995) notes that “ Often the visual images and written

words combined to resonate with dominant American values, further enhancing the Palestinian image. For example: 'The Palestinians are turning self-reliant to defy Israeli rule' and 'searching for independence'(Time, May 23, 1988.p31). The 'self-restraint of the Palestinians' was shown in 'not a single gun has turned up in Palestinian hands'(Time, January 25, 1988, p32). During this time there were numerous personalised accounts and quotes. Some quotes were reminiscent of the American Revolution. 'it is not important whether we live or die if we do not have our rights'(Time, January 25, 1988, p40) ..."(Zaharna, 1995: 44).

### **3.7 Away from Conditions to Operative Rules: Mapping the News Values**

Finally, in the following discussion, there is an attempt to sketch out some news values which are thought to be useful later in the analysis of the case studies in chapter six and seven . These values should be taken as sort of operators which serve to index an active synthesis working in the media arena. The conditions of those syntheses are actually those multiple concerns which the thesis has postulated as routes to understand the American media politics towards the Arabs. Taken into account this consideration, the news values introduced here depart from the principles of common media studies which incorporate the values as a way into the conditions of the media structures and strategies. There is a recognition here for the immanence of the values as part of the process of operationalisation involved on both sides of the participants in this research, i.e.; the researcher and the subjects of research. Values are always already part of history.

News values serve in foreign coverage as working rules (Golding & Elliott, 1979). They are criteria of selection from raw materials, those items worthy of inclusion in the news product, and guidelines suggesting what to select, what to emphasise, and what to omit. They represent: "...qualities of events or of their journalistic construction, whose relative absence or presence recommends them for inclusion in the news product" (Golding & Elliott, 1979: 114). Needless to say, news values, as one layer, draw upon other layers.

Media scholars have identified various criteria that explain what to select from news items. It is indispensable in this respect to say that most of these studies are affected by the early study of news values conducted by Galtung and Ruge (1965). The criteria of news selections which are focused below, are derived selectively not only from Galtung and Ruge but also from recent studies. The choice of the criteria selection is dictated by how relevant they are to our study seen from a foreign coverage perspective.

The first criteria is threshold or size of an event. Events will not be reported unless they have a certain level of threshold. Events are likely to be ignored until they reach crisis proportion. An example of this criteria is the Palestinian suffering in the Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza , where events were not reported until the eruption of the Intafada in December, 1987,(see Chapter Six).

The second criteria is frequency or periodicity. This criteria relates to the time-span needed for events to unfold themselves and acquire meaning. The event must be longer than the time between two connective issues of the medium. This has led to concentration on "rapidly breaking stories in accessible places, regardless of their intrinsic importance. Long-

range development..., do not fill the bill if they lack a recent climax. [It] also fragments news presentation and usually precludes follow-through. This gives major events an unwarranted air of suddenness and unpredictability. They have neither a past nor a future - merely a brief presence in the parade of current events.”(Graber, 1989: 343). The Hostage story is a case in point: “The Iranian situation was reduced to one story, the freeing of the hostages-rather than coverage of its background and context, of the complexities of Iran, of alternative American policies ...”(quoted in Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1991: 304). Similarly Graber(1989) noted that “The dominant theme of the Iran hostage stories was that innocent Americans were imprisoned by irrational anti-American terrorists, a gross oversimplification”(Graber, 1989: 345).

The third criteria is consonance. Stories "must conform to established American stereotypes" (Graber, 1989: 335). Stories will be likely to be framed with reference to an earlier acceptable image, e.g., in the light of previous similar events. An example of this criterion is that of the anti-Vietnam war rally in London in 1968. The media concentrated on the expected violence in the rally although the rally was largely a peaceful one. In this sense, as Galtung and Ruge pointed out ‘news’ is to some extent ‘olds’.

The fourth criteria is meaningfulness. This criteria includes cultural proximity and relevance. The former suggests that in the case that an event has the cultural background of the reporter, it becomes more meaningful to him/her and thus more liable to be selected. As Galtung and Ruge have put it "the more meaningful the signal, the more probable that it will be regarded as worth listening to." Accordingly, news from culturally proximate countries has priority over news from culturally distant ones. News of the Western region has priority over that of the third world to a

Western news reporter. The latter indicates that events of far-off cultures, classes or regions will become newsworthy if they impinge upon the news gatherers' home culture (Hartley, 1982: 77). Events in the third world would be of interest to the Western news gatherers when related to the West. Herbert Gans(1979) has identified seven subjects that are covered most often. They include, in part, events that affect Americans directly in a major way like oil embargoes, American Hostages and wars. An example of this criteria is Iran and the hostage crisis when “ the Iran story became the single most intensively covered story on all three Networks and in print media” (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1990: 303).

The fifth criteria is personification. Events are likely to be seen as activities and action of individuals. In this respect, the government may often be personalised as Mr Clinton or Mr Major, etc.

The sixth criteria is elite. This news value includes two categories. The first category is elite people. The more an event concerns an elite person and nation the more probable that it will become a news item. Various studies have shown that news is dominated by elite or ‘known’ actors. These are known consistent and incumbent presidents, presidential candidates, leading federal officials, state and local officials (Gans, 1979). This does not mean that all official sources are equal, some actors and entire beats are considered more newsworthy than others; for instance, the White House receives more attention than the Department of Commerce.

This affords such actors advantages in shaping media agenda. Individuals or organisations not part of a beat face a difficult time gaining attention, and when they do receive attention, journalistic norms

of objectivity dictate that official sources be contacted to bring the story into balance.

In this way "journalistic norms and values, along with the routines of news gathering, coverage to ensure that some actors .... almost always contribute to public debate, while others find it much more difficult to participate " (Borquez, 1993: 37). Thus official sources are likely to define for journalists the range of legitimate debate regarding policy issues. But debates expand when controversy breaks down within official circles (Hallin, 1984). In this view the news gates bend to open or close depending on the level of descent among serial players in the policy situation on Capital Hill, White House, State Department, Defence Department and other relevant institutions along the news beat (Bennett, 1994).

The beat offer several advantages to media personal. First, by limiting the number of contacts, it reduces their work-load. Second, it ensures a steady, predictable supply of raw material in a cost-effective way and resolves the problem of 'objective' journalism. 'Objectivity' requires that journalists present the 'facts' without passing judgement on them and that they balance viewpoints in the story. That is, journalists should reflect views expressed by 'authoritative sources'. This guarantees official sources access to media because of the formal offices they hold (Sahr, 1993). The second category is elite nations. Numerous studies showed a greater attention to elite than ordinary nations. Larson (1983 )analysed the amount of time devoted to various regions on American TV between 1976 and 1979. He found that 30 per cent of the sampled stories covered Western Europe; and 30 per cent the Middle East; compared to 19 per cent about Eastern Europe and the former USSR, and 9 per cent about South East Asia and the Pacific. (Larson, 1983).

Similarly, Gerbner and Marvanyi showed, in part, a tendency among American news-papers to devote greater attention to Western Europe, where 25 per cent of foreign news dealt with Western Europe compared to 7 per cent to the Middle East and 7 per cent to Latin America. (Gerbner et al, 1977). Robinson and Sparkles studied 25 American newspapers in 1975. They found that 33 per cent of the sampled coverage covered Western Europe; 17 per cent to South East Asia and the Middle East, and 6 per cent to Central and South America. Mishra analysed the amount of space devoted to the Middle East in five American media in 1971. The study showed that Middle East coverage amounted to only 5 per cent of the total coverage. (Mishra, 1979). Hesters, studying foreign news coverage on American Television between 1972 and 1976, found that "news from Asia, Africa, and Latin America was generally little evidenced unless US interest was directly involved" (Hester, 1978: 90).

The situation is compounded by the negativity of foreign news coverage. The structure of international news, on most counts, is devoted to war politics and foreign relations. Thus, the limited coverage of the Third World focuses on "bad" news rather than "development news." "The phrase 'no news is good news'," says Rafael Caldera, former President of Venezuela, *has become* 'good news is no news ....'" (Graber, 1989: 347).

Totarian argues that there is an acknowledged tendency among Western media to devote greater attention to the developing countries in times of disaster, crises, and confrontation (Totarian, 1977). Aggarwala concludes that most Third World News is likely to deal with such topics as disasters, wars and politics. Lent's (1973) study of foreign news in the

American media provides further evidence of the crisis orientation of news from the less-developed countries. Similarly, Golding and Elliott found that most Third World News is centred on crisis and military conflicts.

According to Galtung and Ruge, the last three criteria apply better to 'the north western corner of the world' than other regions. The typical news for Western societies, therefore, is supposed to be the elite centred in terms of people and nations, and to be negative and personalised. Galtung and Ruge speculate about the differences between this news and that in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Communist media should differ from the Western press in focusing on positive events, on structure instead of persons. News, therefore, is an ideological product and it exhibits basic philosophical differences. Negative news, for example, is worth reporting in societies that take for granted inevitable positive change. However, in cultures in which positive change is something to fight for success is news. Personalisation is an outcome of cultural idealism. Human beings are seen as the master of their destinies. In a culture with a materialistic philosophy, however, the emphasis should be on structural factors.

### **3.8 Conclusion**

In brief, two broad proximal conditions are found to be shaping media interaction with the perceived foreign Other, the Arabs. On one side, there are the situated processes and routines of the media production seen from within an interaction with the government in its relation with the Other. On the other side, at a more abstract location, there is the media's positioning into a context of national and distance



crises, cut across by an increasing circulation of globalised forms and functions.

Several nodes have woven the American foreign policy vis-à-vis the reclaimed Other. These are the internal socio-political values, the US position in the post World War II era and the globalisation in the post Cold War period. The consistency of these conditions in the American- media interaction means that the choice of a return to a policy of isolation as a solution for dismantling the conditions reproducing the negative image of the Arabs is not a logical one. The dilemma involved in this respect is that the current working frame is actually where the problem lies. The media, being part of the civil society, is nothing but an activator for supportive abroad intervention, fostering the in-group cohesion. The media subordinates its professional norms, its traditional roles as 'watch dog' and its new responsibility as a participant in a global civil society to the requirement of the perceived national interests, the Nation-state. The Vietnam war, as Hallin tells us, is a case in point. Not surprisingly, the inability of the media to get away from the present situation is a strong indication to the provisions given for the government and the pervading culture of cohesion to exploit. 'Vietnam syndrome' is a prominent example of transcriptions into various moments of investments to further the official power modality upon the media spheres of action. The net result is more fusion between civil society institutions and the nation-state, and a monologic relation with the foreign other.

The implicit assumption drawn upon and which has contributed in the selection of those above perspectives is the fact that the media has left unforeseen an opposite direction to the nation-state orientation. What is interweaving through as a possible contingent solution is the

moment of dialogic position-practices among various communities and institutions. Our attention to globalisation as an operating perspective, an additional one to the rest expressed in this Chapter and the previous one , explain the stake involved. It is our belief that globalisation could be said to have maintained an indeterminate factor, a margine where the government is less determinant, and which the media could identify with as an escape route away from the disabling burden and implications of nation-states.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **MAPPING EARLY MEDIA STUDIES ON THE ARAB IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MEDIA**

In Chapter I, I mentioned that a main objective of the present study is finding out whether the Arab-American alliance during the Persian Gulf war could have been built upon to alter the negative portrayal of the Arabs in the American media. It is important, in this respect, to bring forward the factors which have given a significance for the Arab-American alliance as a point of attention and differentiation. These factors are the emergence of particular set of relations which have well established themselves since the 1973 oil crisis issue and pre-the fall of the Soviet bloc. Distinguishably, the prevalence of negative politics of Arab representation is recorded to return to those periods.

From within that context, dozens of research studies on the Arab image in the American media have been conducted. Generally speaking, those studies have met on two basic frames. They suggest that the David and Goliath frame and terrorism frame are important ones structuring the Arab-Israeli conflict (see Chapter Three).

The Arab defeat in 1967 had rendered a harsh verdict on the Pan-Arab doctrines and Arab governments. It greatly undermined the authority and credibility of the established governments. The swift defeat, as well as the occupation of all Palestine and substantial Egyptian and Syrian territories left the nation-state in a traumatic state. In this atmosphere of official disarray, the Palestinian Resistance Movement emerged as a leading force in the Arab World. The new force soon captured the heart and mind of the Arab street, asserted itself

as a co-equal of the established regimes and claimed the exclusive right to determine the future of the Palestinian people. The established regimes had to come to terms with this fluid and popular force. They could no longer afford to ignore it.

The Americans exploited the Palestinian Resistance Movement to reproduce the negative image of the Arabs and to sustain the needed mobilisation to secure its interests in the region. The concept of arm struggle was used to deflect careful scrutiny of the American foreign policy and to mute isolationist voices.

Studies of the American media coverage of the Middle East were conducted in the context of the growing American involvement in the area. The US became increasingly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict from the 1960's onward. This involvement largely took the form of providing military and economic assistance to Israel, mediating between Israel and various Arab states( such as in 1973-1975, Kissinger's 'shuttle diplomacy', in 1977 Carter's meeting with the foreign ministers of Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan in New York and Washington. D.C., and in 1978 the Camp David meeting), and in 1982 sending US Marines to Lebanon. During this period the US foreign policy community continued to express concern about the regional stability, protection of petroleum resources, and Palestinian and Arab terrorism.

#### **4.1 Wagner: American Isolation Sustaining Previous Pro-Cons towards Arabs**

One of the earliest studies of the American media coverage of the Middle East was conducted by Charles Wagner in 1973. In the middle of

the 1960's, the United States began its swing away from the internationalism that characterised its foreign policy for over two decades. Isolation was the new mode. The mode of disengagement had become well-established in American foreign policy between 1967 and 1969. Nonetheless, the American's Middle East policy after 1967 was anything but consistent with the mood of disengagement.

In this context, Wagner (1973) examined the opinions of the New York Times (NYT), the Los Angeles Times (LAT), and the Washington Post (WP) on the Middle East from May 1967 to December 1969. The study sought to determine whether the American mood of disengagement applied to the Middle East, where the Middle East enjoyed 'special' consideration within the American press. Two content analyses were conducted. The first content analysis considered the entire editorial as the coding unit and was used to measure commitment/isolation attitudes. Each editorial was coded according to one of four commitment/isolation categories: military commitment, military disengagement, non-military commitment, and non-military disengagement. The second content analysis utilised the theme as the coding unit. Each editorial was coded according to one of sixteen commitment/isolation themes on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The study findings, however, were limited by the small number of newspapers analysed, and the narrow time frame.

Wagner found a "...generally pro-Israeli tone, but preoccupation nonetheless with the achievement of a negotiated settlement." He also found clear differences in the three newspaper orientations toward the Middle East. The LAT was advocating a better relationship with the Arab world. The NYT, on the other hand, advocated a strong military and economic commitment to Israel. "The NYT had, both qualitatively

and quantitatively, shown a larger military and non-military posture toward the Middle East," and the WP showed a more neutral position. In general, the study indicated that the three newspapers' opinions on the Middle East were responsive to specific situations:

When Israel appeared to be in imminent danger as in May 1967, newspaper opinion seemed heavily committed to Israel. After Israel's swift victory, attention and opinion soon shifted toward advocating active United States action in providing a diplomatic settlement.

(Wagner, 1969: 319)

The call for intervention when Israel is in a vulnerable position, and the call for a negotiated settlement as soon as Israel prevails (a well known American position) is consistent with previous studies on media and foreign policy. These studies, as we have seen in the previous chapter, reveal that the American media is likely to line up behind the American foreign policy objective when perceived national interests are being threatened. The American national interests are defined in part, as we have seen in chapter II, to include economic, political and military assistance to Israel. The call for intervention when Israel is in danger, and the call for negotiated settlement as soon as the immediate danger has passed is also consistent with the American 'leading role' in the post World War II era as guarantor of the standards of international behaviour.

#### **4.2 Daugherty and Warden : Crisis reproduces dualism : Israel (a Besieged State) / Arabs (Agressors)**

David Daugherty and Michael Warden (1979) examined Wagner's finding over a longer period of time. The study analysed

editorials of the New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, and the Wall Street Journal from January 1967 through December 31, 1977. The data were coded according to the topic addressed and the editorial position taken. Eight topic categories were utilised: Arab-United States Relations, Israel-United States Relations, Arab-Israeli Relations, Arab Domestic Affairs, Israeli Domestic Affairs, Arab Relations with Nations other than the United States, Israeli Relations with Nations other than the United States, and Miscellaneous. The editorial position taken was coded according to five broad categories: Supportive of Israel, Critical of Israel, Supportive of the Arab Nations, Critical of the Arab Nations, or Neutral.

The study showed that major events and states of crisis stimulate editorial attention. Editorial attention to the Middle East increased sharply in 1967, 1970, 1973, and 1977. These years corresponded to big events in the Middle East conflict: the June war, President Nasser's death, the war of attrition, the October war, and Sadat's peace initiative, respectively.

In terms of the topic addressed, the study showed that more than 50% of the aggregate Middle East editorials dealt with the conflict between Israel and the Arab nations. Analysis of the editorial position toward the Arab-Israeli conflict showed that the Christian Science Monitor was the 'most decidedly neutral newspaper' in its analysis of the Middle East dispute. In contrast, the Washington Post was the 'least likely to present neutral editorials'. Similar to the Post, the New York Times displayed criticism of the Arabs more than did the Christian Science Monitor or the Wall Street Journal. The editorial of the Wall Street Journal was highly unlikely to have taken an exclusive opinion on the Middle East conflict. Nonetheless, when it did, it was either

supportive of Israel or critical of the Arabs. Daugherty and Warden concluded that

if there was a predominant theme in the editorials, it was one urging a negotiated peace between belligerents...and while there was some evidence of a pro-Israel tone in the press, it was more evident in the overall picture than in partisan prejudice. Israel was portrayed as a besieged state and the Arabs as the aggressors. Support for Israel overshadowed Arab support in nine of the eleven years analysed. However, in 1971 and 1977 Arab support peaked and exceeded support for Israel. The first year, 1971, was Sadat's first as president of Egypt; Sadat represented a hopeful alternative to the sabre-rattling of Nasser. The second year, 1977, reflected the dramatic peace initiative of Sadat.

A predicted shift toward greater support for the Arab nations and increased criticism of Israel following the 1973 oil embargo did not occur. There was no significant difference in the editorial position between pre- and post-oil embargo years.

(Daugherty & Warden, 1979: 782)

The American emphasis on a negotiated settlement could be seen as a cover up of a particular status that the Americans are not ready for. That is to say a lack of readiness on the American part to deal with the crux of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, namely the Palestinian right to self-determination. The invariability in the American media interaction with the Arabs in the post oil embargo phase suggests to us that the American media did not miss an opportunity to initiate a new way of interacting with the Arabs. This will be illustrated in the Intifada case study (see chapter six) and the Gulf War case study (see chapter seven).

Despite the fact that researchers investigated a longer time period than other studies, the study is not without shortcomings. There were no systematic means of classifying data into one position or another and



there was no test of reliability. Finally the data does not show a relation between the position taken (neutral, Israeli supportive, Israeli critic, Arab supportive, and Arab critic) and the predominant theme in the editorials (urging a negotiated peace settlement). No themes or sub-themes were used in coding the data. A relatively more rigorous study was conducted by Terry and Mendennal of Eastern Michigan University.

#### **4.3 Terry and Mendennal; Changes in American Politics but not Axioms**

Terry and Mendennal(1979) investigated the coverage of the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Detroit Free Press in 1973. The content analysis of the three newspapers showed an increase in both features and news items from the Arab World. This, reasoned Terry and Mendennal, "...reflects added interest in [the Arab World], but also the relaxation of censorship in the Arab Nations which previously had made it very difficult for western journalists to gain entrance during war time" (Terry & Mendennal, 1979: 123).

In terms of attitude revealed, the study showed that most of the news coverage of all three newspapers were neutral; however, editorial and feature coverage showed more pro-Israeli and anti-Arab bias. The New York Times printed 73 editorials on the area, 11 percent of them were pro-Israel, and 4.1 percent anti-Arab. The Washington Post ran 48 editorials of which 19.1 percent were pro-Israeli and 2.1 percent were anti-Arab, and the Detroit Free Press published 20 editorials of which 10 percent were pro-Israeli with no anti-Arab editorials. Much of the editorial and feature coverage of the oil issue was hostile toward the Arab oil policies or stressed the primacy of US oil interests; the US support to Israel could not be dropped in face of the Arab oil threat. In

the New York Times, eight editorials (32 percent) and six features (19.4 percent) dealt with these themes and spoke of Arab 'blackmail'; the Washington Post was even more hostile to the Arab oil policies, with seven (50 percent) editorials and four (16.7 percent) features speaking against Arab policies and the oil issue. As far as the Palestinian commando activities were concerned, "the US press condemned acts of terrorism, but tended to justify Israeli actions as responses to an 'intolerable' situation" (Terry & Mendennal, 1979: 125).

This line has been an axiom for American political discourse. Consider for example a more contemporary event, the American reaction to the Israeli raid on Tunis which claimed the lives of 77 civilians. The American administration welcomed the Israeli bombing of Tunis as 'a legitimate response' to 'terrorist attacks' (Chomsky, 1988).

Terry concluded:

The most striking difference in US press coverage has been the emergence of the Palestinians as a separate and clearly defined entity. This emergence is clear, not only in editorials and features, but in news coverage as well. Commando activities have been widely condemned in all of the press coverage, but sympathy for Palestinian refugees- and Palestinians in general has remained constant and, in some cases, increased.

(Terry & Mendennal, 1979: 125)

The findings are limited by the short time-span and the relatively unsophisticated coding plan and word tabulation. In Terry's words, 'the nuances of some articles were necessarily lost because of the broad categories that are demanded by the volume of material and method' (Terry & Mendennal, 1979: 122). More over, data do not show how 'sympathy for the Palestinian ... increased'. Nor do they provide the

reasons for having sympathy toward the Palestinians stayed constant. The most comprehensive analysis of the press opinion on the Arab-Israel conflict has been conducted by Trice.

#### **4.4 Trice; Imbalanced Editorial Support in Arab- Israel Conflict**

Trice's study (1979) examined the editorial coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict by eleven prestigious newspapers from 1966 to 1974. They are the New York Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Denver Post, Atlanta Constitution, Christian Science Monitor, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Wall Street Journal, Louisville Courier-Journal, and the Dallas Morning News.

The focus of the study 'was to examine the extent to which the elite press serve as an independent source of public opinion on the Middle East'. More specifically, it aimed to find out the nature and extent of editorial attention of the sample newspapers to the Middle East conflict, and to measure and evaluate the editorial opinions concerning different parties involved in the Middle East conflict across issues and time.

The study indicated that :

The media tend to devote the greatest attention to problems when they meet the nebulous criteria for a "crisis"...(in terms of editorial opinions over issues). The Arab states did not fare as well as Israel in the competition for American editorial support. In particular, perceived Arab aggression, support for Palestinian military activities ... the 1973-74 oil price rise and embargo aroused strong criticism from US newspapers ....

It is quite accurate to say that the irregular military activities of Palestinian groups received almost universal

condemnation from prestige American newspapers. Palestinians were the target of more criticism on the issue of their commando and terrorist attacks than any other single party on any other issue that arose during the 1966-1974 period .... The United States government was able to rally editorial support for its position on most issues.... It is significant that through all these periods of crisis between successive administrations and virtually every other relevant party--Arab governments, Israel, the Soviet Union, and American pro-Israel groups--the press provided steady support for the actions of the US government .... The orientation of the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times were, overall, slightly supportive of Israel...the Christian Science Monitor and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch were the only newspapers that were "net critics" of Israel, and the Monitor was alone as a "net supporter" of the Arab states.

(Trice, 1979: 324)

These findings suggested to us a monological coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Monologue manifested itself in general support for the Israeli stand and the American foreign policy on one hand, and criticism for the Palestinian stand and the Arab governments policies on the other hand. It also represented itself in ignoring signs ( Palestinian arm struggle, oil embargo and 1973's war) of the problematicity of the American foreign policy in the region. The Palestinian arm struggle and the oil embargo were transformed into site of investment to inflict more damage to the Arab image.

#### **4.5 Suleiman and Belkaoui; October War Establishes Better Arab Exposition**

Suleiman (1974) studied the news coverage of the New York Times and five elite magazines for the Middle East during three major

crises of 1956, 1967 and 1973. Suleiman concluded that during the 1956 and 1967 wars, the pro-Israeli bias is clearly indicated.

However, it is also clear that in the press coverage of the October war a slight turn away from such stereotypes came about as the Arabs emerged as less bent on baiting Israel or seeking its destruction. Furthermore, the press displayed greater awareness of the Arab viewpoint by mentioning, relatively frequently, the Arabs' desire for peace and security and by generally justifying their actions. Their military successes also received adequate exposition and praise.

(Suleiman, 1974: 117)

Suleiman, in part, attributes the balanced coverage of the October war to the good performance of the Arab Nations in dealing with the Western press. The good performance reflected itself in giving access to western journalists and in the sophistication of presenting their case at various levels. For instance, Egypt and Syria allowed Western journalists entry visa and access to the Egyptian and Syrian side of the front lines, and the inflammatory political and military tone of the 1967 war replaced by a calm tone in the 1973 war.

Belkaoui (1978) studied the articles of four elite publications and one mass-appeal newspaper: Time, Newsweek, US News and World Report, the Sunday New York Times, and the Sunday New York Daily News. The study revealed that there was a shift in the portrayal of Arab and Israeli leaders following the 1973 war and the oil-embargo, vis-à-vis the post-1967 war:

In the 1967 phase, Israeli figures are cast as 'heroes', ... 'winners', and 'splendid performers'. Israel's political leaders are strong, decisive, and confident; their military heroes are cool, calm, legendary, and dashing handsome, and their military forces are powerful, efficient, skilful and

proud .... This image is not generally retained in the 1973 phase. The Israelis are increasingly described as angry, upset, worried, and gloomy .... While this indicates a shift toward a more negative image of the Israelis in the 1973 phase, some elements of the 'underdog' are retained along with a feeling of betrayal.

(Belkaoui, 1978: 736-737)

In terms of the Arab leaders, the attribution image associated with them was unfavourable in 1967. Arab leaders were more likely to deliver messages in an aggressive and threatening style. In 1973, however, the threatening style was replaced with a calm and moderate one. The press also identified some Arab heroes, primarily those who were moderates, especially King Hussein of Jordan and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. King Faisal was portrayed positively despite his leading role in the oil embargo. Further, the image of Nasser as the villain in 1967 was replaced in 1973 by the image of Sadat as a moderate, skilful leader.

Belkaoui attributes the shift in the news coverage of the Arabs to the "powerful corporate oil interests position on the Arab-Israeli conflict". Belkaoui's conclusion, however, does not explain the biases of most American editorial political cartoonists.

#### **4.6 Curtiss, N.A.A.A, and Terry; Cartoons portraying Arabs' Oil Blackmailing**

According to one study conducted by Curtiss, there was a great similarity between the techniques used by American cartoonists in portraying Arabs and those used in portraying anti-Jewish attitude

cartoons in Nazi Germany (in Curtiss, 1982: 154). Damon(1983) examined the cartoons related to the Middle East from 1948 to 1973. Damon's study covered four newspapers: the New York Times, Boston Globe, Christian Science Monitor and the San Francisco Chronicle. The study showed that with the exception of Carmack and LePelly of the Christian Science Monitor, all other cartoonists tended to portray Nasser negatively, criticise the UN for its criticism of Israel and stereotype Arab leaders with increasing fervour as time went by; and occasionally were mildly critical of Israel .

More recently, the National Association of Arab Americans (N.A.A.A.) analysed 75 of Herblock's cartoons in the Washington Post between 1955 and 1979. The study revealed a 'disturbing pattern of anti-Arab ...'. It also showed that there was no single cartoon critical of Israel during the period of the study (in Ghareeb, 1979: 69). Terry (1979) examined the cartoons of the New York Times, Washington Post and Detroit Free Press in 1973. The study indicated that oil was a predominant theme, especially in the Washington Post. The *Post* ran ten cartoons. All of them were against the Arab use of oil to attain political goals, showing Arab use of oil as blackmailing the US. Richard Curtiss asserted that the Washington Post's cartoonist, Herbert Block had "...waged an almost continuous one-man war against the Arabs" (Curtiss, 1983: 154).

#### **4.7 Weisman, Kern, Adams and Asi; Differentiated TV Coverage but Lack of Positive Attitude towards Arabs**

Weisman (1980) monitored the news coverage of the Middle East by the three networks during a ten-month period. In the period between

July 1980 and April 1981, thirty-eight reports were broadcasted of raids and retaliation by both Israel and the PLO. Twenty-four of them were Israeli raids on Palestinian targets in South Lebanon. Of the twenty-four reports, only three reports, for a total of a minute and ten seconds, showed pictures of the material damage of the Israeli raid. None of them showed any human casualties or suffering. In contrast, fourteen reports about Palestinian raids inside Israel were aired; eleven of them showed footage of Israeli casualties and the filmed reports totalled seventeen minutes (in Curtiss, 1982: 152). This reveals that even though there might be some balance at the surface, the essence of that coverage is imbalanced.

Kern (1983) conducted an analysis of the Middle East news coverage of CBS and ABC. The study covered the period between September 15 and October 15, 1977, at which time the American administration had started a new movement toward an international peace conference on the Middle East. Answering the question of whether television followed public policy, the study aimed to detect, firstly, the major themes of coverage and whether they coincided with the administration's position being advocated, and secondly, the time devoted to the various sources and the context within which the quotations were put.

The theme analysis showed that themes related to Israel were largely positive. They were explained in either neutral or positive terms. Most of those themes were not consistent with the Carter administration's stand, especially in the peace process. In terms of source analysis, the study revealed that "...on both networks, Israel and its foreign allies received close to as much source time as...the president and his administration.". Forty-four percent of the CBS, and 33.8% of



the ABC sources' coverage were supportive to Israel, compared to 36.9% and 23.4% for the administration. Israel's Foreign Minister, Moshe Dyan, was presented largely with supporting sources. Kern notes that "on CBS, with some 63.2 percent of Israeli government quotation coverage going to Israeli principals and supporters, the latter clearly overwhelmed the opposing source, which received 28.8 percent of the coverage and neutral sources, 7.9 percent" (Kern, 1983: 11).

In terms of Arab states, the theme analysis revealed a predominantly negative coverage. Arab foreign ministers in Washington D.C. were largely presented in an "irrational" or rejectionist mode. Even in cases where the Egyptian position was perceived by the administration as conciliatory:

at no time on either network were Egypt's policies put in the context of alternate American policies. Nor was there any suggestion of the helpful role that the administration believed the Egyptians were playing in moving the negotiations toward fruition.

(Kern, 1983: 18)

The source analysis showed a lack of proportion between the Arab and Israeli TV access to the air. The Arab governments - Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan - received 6.5% of CBS's total source coverage, and 11.7% of source coverage on ABC, with 34% for Israel on CBS, and 21.2% from ABC.

The context of Arab quotations was not "accompanied by a sizeable percentage of coverage for supportive additional sources as were the Israeli quotes" (Kern, 1983: 17). CBS devoted 8.6% to supportive sources for Arabs compared to 20.5 % for Israel, while ABC totalled 2.2% for Arab supportive sources compared to 19.2 percent for

Israel. ABC coverage, nonetheless, was most likely to be neutral with 74% of Arab state sources coverage being neutral.

Adams (1981), followed television coverage of the Middle East from 1972 through to 1980. This study revealed minimal coverage for the small Arabian countries in the Gulf. Between 1972 and 1980, they received an average of 2.59 minutes a year. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, received the highest coverage among the Arabian Peninsula countries. The predominant themes of the coverage were Saudi Arabia's moderate role in OPEC and its friendly relationship with the United States. The high coverage of Saudi Arabia might be attributed to the American view of Saudi Arabia as 'moderate' and 'friendly', and to the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia to the American policy makers.

Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the PLO received high coverage. Between 1973 and 1979, they received an average coverage of 99.15 minutes by the three networks. Egypt also received remarkable coverage between 1973 and 1980. The average coverage of Egypt jumped from 42.4 minutes in 1973 to 78.15 minutes in the 1977-1980 period.

The Arab states of North Africa - Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco -received high coverage. Most of the coverage, however, was dominated by Libya. In 1980, Libya's coverage totalled fifty minutes, exceeding coverage for the rest of the North African nations during the eight-year period between 1973 and 1980. Similar to Libya, Iraq's coverage increased substantially to 49.3 minutes in 1980 compared to an average of 2.5 minutes in 1973 to 1979.

In terms of the direction of the coverage, Adams noticed that even though there was "...more favourable treatment of Egypt and less unfavourable treatment of the Palestinians, there was only a little evidence that the rest of the Arab world received more positive coverage" (Adams, 1981: 21).

Asi (1981) traced the network's treatment of Arab governments in the pre-1973 war period, in 1977 prior to President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, and again in 1979 after Sadat's visit to Israel. The three phases reflect 'routine' Middle East news and not exclusively 'crisis' coverage.

The outcome of the study showed that Egypt received more favourable treatment in 1979 (30%) compared to 1973 when the coverage was either unfavourable (20%) or neutral (70%). In 1979, the favourable coverage jumped from 10% to 30% with no single one of the thirty-three stories being unfavourable.

The study also observed a change in the PLO coverage. The PLO was the subject of forty-nine stories in 1979 and twenty in 1977, compared to none in 1973. Analysis of these stories showed that none of the twenty stories of 1977 were favourable, 25 percent were neutral, and 75 percent were unfavourable. However, in 1979, the negative stories dropped to 35 percent and the favourable stories jumped to 10 percent. The study also found that the rest of the Arab world did not enjoy favourable coverage between 1973 and 1979. In 1977 and 1979, the ratio of favourable to unfavourable stories amounted, respectively, to 1:2 and 1:3.

#### **4.8 Theoretical and Methodological Absences of Earlier Coverage Studies**

Most studies of the Arab image in the American media, as shown above, have used content analysis. This may appear to be a shared characteristic with the present study. Having said that, however, there are crucial differences that are shaping the premise of our study. The following discussion explains these differences.

In this study the distal or ideological conditions that contribute to media content are combined with the proximal conditions. The American media interactions with the Arabs have been conditioned by news production processes and certain ideological settings. In other words, media routines, production process and ideology work together to form the media's Arab and the media's Islam. That is to say, Arab and Islam images in the American media say more about the American media and the American culture than about what is referred to as 'Islam' or 'the Arabs'. To side-step the problem of truth/falsehood in ideology, we utilised the concept of 'dialogue and monologue'.

More importantly, most previous studies have fallen into the trap of believing that reductive images can be substitute for a very complex reality, thereby repeating the errors of the media by claiming that the 'true' view of 'Islam' and 'the Arabs' is X or Y. This study, however, adopts a perspectivist point of view. It abandons the notion that there are 'real' Arabs or a 'real' Islam 'out there' to be discovered. Indeed, any talk about 'Islam' or 'Arabs' is flawed not only because it assumes that a crude generalisation could cover all the diversity and dynamism of Islam and Arab life but also because it repeats the fallacy of orientalism that alleges that Arabs and Islam are simple phenomena. That is to say,

we abandon the assumption that 'Islam' and 'Arabs' are monolithic concepts. Indeed, as clearly illustrated in Chapter Two there is many Islam(s) and many Arab(s). At large one has to be aware that the same mode that applied to the Arabs and Islam apply to the West. These two concerns constitutes a major departure from prior studies.

The present study combined content analysis with textual analysis to reveal how meaning is generated. None of the previous studies employed such a technique in a comprehensive and complex way. Moreover, it uses two case studies, namely the Intifada (see Chapter 6) and the Gulf War (see Chapter 7). These served to establish points of variability.

#### **4.9 Conclusion**

This chapter has attempted to provide a review of the relevant literature on the Arab image in the American media. The review suggests that media coverage of the Middle East was largely unflattering, one-sided and supportive of the American government position. Moreover, two frames were used to present the Palestinian-Israeli dispute: the terrorism frame and the David and Goliath frame. Furthermore, the coverage is reflective of the forces shaping the setting process. These forces, in this case, are news values, newsgathering routines and Government-media interaction. These forces, as mentioned in chapter one and three, contribute to the setting process.

The next Chapter will explain the methodology in the Intifada and the Gulf war.

**CHAPTER FIVE**  
**THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING**  
**FOR THE INTIFADA AND THE GULF WAR CASE STUDY**  
**ANALYSIS**

As we have mentioned in Chapter One, the present research utilises two case studies: the Intifada and the Gulf war. But before going any further, we will explain briefly the meaning of case study. The name of case study draws attention to the question of what can be learned from the single case. Comparison is a major option of researchers competing with learning about and from the particular case. Comparison is “a powerful conceptual mechanism, fixing attention upon the few attributes being compared and obscuring other knowledge about the case” (Stake, 1995: 342). Researchers report their cases as case that will be compared with others and/or try to provide some comparison by presenting more than one case study. The latter serves to get some idea of the range of variability in the phenomena under investigation. Some researchers, like we did, will not study a single case or comparison cases. We studied two case studies, but each case is a concentrated study into a single case. The two case studies serve to capture the latitude of variability in the Arab image in the American elite press.

Case study, needless to say, is not a methodological choice, but a choice of object to be investigated. Researchers choose to study the case, but could obviously study it in different ways (i.e. content analysis, participant observation act). Additionally, a case may be simple or complex. It may be, for instance, the Arab image in the American press during the Intifada and/or the Gulf war, or a mobilisation of scholars to study the Arab image in the American literature. It is one among others. In any given study, a researcher

that focuses on the former or the later like we did, is considered to be engaging in a case study.

An indispensable factor in understanding the case is “boundedness” (Stake, 1995: 237). The case is specific. It is a “... bounded system”, that is to say, it draws the boundaries of the study. As Robert Stake (1995) has observed “it is common to recognise that certain features are ... within the boundaries of the case. Some are significant as context” (Stake, 1995: 336-7), while others are not.

The first case study, the 1987 Intifada, serves to establish a point of reference or comparison. The choice of comparison is a result of a primary sign of change in some elements of the Arab image in the United States (i.e. Peretz, 1988, 1990; Danial, 1995). The Change pointed out the possibility of considering them as a major turning point. The crucial background embodying this establishment of that mode of comparison is that this event (the Intifada) could have become a threshold in the Arab image in the American media if it further exploited. In that sense, the study aims to find out whether the change in the American elite press treatment of the Arabs during the Intifada, as will be seen in the next Chapter, has continued during the Gulf war (Chapter Seven). The Intifada case study will draw inference about the papers attention over time and issues as well as the papers attitudes and labels used during the sample period. This entails that this case is less rigorous than the Gulf war case.

The second case study, the Gulf war, which constitute the crux of the research aims studying the portrayal of the Arabs in a segment of the American elite press during the Gulf war. The case study will draw

inferences about the types of actors quoted or referred to, labels used by the press to describe different actors, topics dominating the coverage and themes involved in the coverage of the Gulf war. Quantitative and qualitative content analyses are utilised. Therefore, the previous case study, needless to say, is less comprehensive study. It has served mainly as a reference point showing the possibility that there could be coverage that is more positive toward the Arabs, a variation that could have been a resource of difference in furthering a different style and components of media coverage of the Arab world.

The present chapter will be concerned with the definition of content analysis, with the procedures followed in coding the Intifada and the Gulf war data and finally, with the sampled newspapers selected for the two case studies .

### **5.1 Limits of Content Analysis**

Definitions of content analysis have traditionally tended to change over time. Yet there is still a constant return to a definition which equates content analysis as a scientific venture for objectivity, systematicity, and generality. Berelson (1952) defines content analysis as " a research technique for objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (Berelson, 1952: 18). According to this definition, content analysis is a research tool which should follow explicit and consistent rules and procedures to analyse quantitatively the overt content of the mass media. These findings are thus descriptive of content of communication.

In this light, objectivity is meant to be a process carried out on the basis of explicitly formulated rules and procedures. The results, accordingly,



depend upon the procedures and not the analyst. Along the same line, systematicity represents an application of a repetitive set of rules and procedures that are applied to all data being analysed. The inclusion and exclusion of data is done according to consistently applied rules. A replaceable process is expected to have explicit and general rules which apply to all units of analysis (Krippendorff, 1980; Osgood, 1958). Philip Stone (1966) articulates the definition in a similar fashion. The objectivity and systematisation, for him, are both necessary requirements not only for content analysis but also for any scientific inquiry.

Critics of scientificity, however, assert that there can be no objectivity. From this perspective there are a variety of interpretations, corresponding to the plurality of viewpoints which exist in the world. The starting point of this critique is the acknowledgement that knowledge is situational. Social scientists, hence, have to turn increasingly from the problem of correspondence to reality, to that of investigating the forces or conditions involved in the production of the form or the message. Generality stipulates that the findings have theoretical relevance. Data must be linked by some form of theory characterising the sender or receiver of the message. These three requirements are indispensable requirements to content analysis (Holsti, 1977).

Apart from these three requirements, there are two other elements of the definition which have generated considerable debate among media researchers. The first one is the manifest content and the second is the quantitative requirements. A focus on manifest content is related to the requirement of objectivity and systematicity discussed above. It ensures that replication of the same project will produce roughly similar results.

Critics argue, however, that the focus on manifest content forms an important limitation of content analysis, since the analyst is prevented from reading between the lines of media content, and is expected not to delve into the latent meaning. This view implies the recognition of individual and culture-specific interpretations of media output and contradictions about the material involved. The critics also argue that content analysis should be extended to include limited inference about those who produce the message or receive it. Osgood et al (1957) define content analysis as " ... a procedure whereby one makes inference about sources and receivers from evidence in the message they exchange". He goes on to say:

When the interest of the content analysis lies in making inferences about the source of a message, he must rely upon encoding dependencies; that is, the dependencies of message events upon psychological processes in speakers and writers. When his interest lies in making inferences about the effects of a message upon its receivers, on the other hand, he relies upon decoding dependencies; that is, the dependencies of events in listeners and readers (their meaning, emotions, attitudes, and the like) upon the content and structure of the message (Osgood et al, 1957: 35).

Budd et al (1967) make a similar case for extending the boundaries of content analysis to include inference about sources and audiences. They define content analysis as " a systematic technique for analysing message content and message handling ... the analyst is concerned not with the message per se, but with the larger questions of the process and effects of communication" (Budd et al, 1967: 2 & 4). This definition suggests that a main concern of content analysis must be drawing inferences. To safeguard against drawing invalid inferences, this trend assumes that " content analysis

data will be compared directly or indirectly with independent indices of the attributes or behaviour that are inferred from documents" (Holsti, 1977: 283).

Holsti (1977) defines content analysis as "any technique for making inferences by objective and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages" (Holsti, 1977: 283). According to this definition, inference is the main purpose of content analysis. Content analysis must be objective, systematic and relate data to some theoretical reason. Krippendorff's (1980) definition of content analysis as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context" is an improvement on Holsti's definition that does not make explicit the importance of relating the data to their contexts. This is essential if the outcome of a content analysis is to be empirically meaningful. The message, as an aggregate of symbolic communication, does not have a single meaning that need to be 'unwrapped'. Data can be approached from different angles or perspectives and all of them may be valid (Krippendorff, 1980: 22).

The second major disagreement centred around the concept of quantification. Content analysis assumes that quantity of references is a valid indicator of meaning. Critics argue, however, that quantification tells us nothing about how meaning is generated, since meaning stems from relationship (syntagm) and opposition (paradigm) rather than frequency of reference. That is to say, scientificity is not really concerned with signs and the system that ties them together. Critics also have contended that the presence or absence of an attribute in the text may be of more significance than the frequency of other characteristics.

In George's view (1959), "qualitative analysis of a limited number of crucial communications may often yield better clues to the particular intention of a particular speaker at one moment in time than most standardised techniques" (George, 1959: 7). But even studies which draw inferences from the unique aspects of each text are not simply qualitative. Rather than counting frequency, the analysts have chosen to formulate nominal categories into which one of two scores are recorded-present or absent. The results may then be reported quantitatively. For example, the number of items in which themes accrue (Holsti, 1977).

It is our view that quantitative and qualitative methods are not mutually exclusive, rather they seem to complement each other. "Qualitative and quantitative measures are now seen to be complementary not opposed. They reach into different aspects of the subject matters. So, studies are nowadays designed to allow use of more than one measure" (Carney, 1972: 53). Similarly, Holsti (1969) states that "the analysis should use qualitative and quantitative methods to supplement each other. It is by moving back and forth between these approaches that the investigator is most likely to gain insight into the meaning of this data" (Holsti, 1969: 11).

In thematic analysis, which is one major aspect of our analysis, content analysis is combined with textual analysis. The basic concern of textual analysis is how meaning is generated. Syntagmatic, paradigmatic, intertextuality, metaphor and metonyms analysis are five important ways of articulating meaning.

The Syntagmatic analysis of text looks at sequences of events that frame some kind of a narrative. Narrative has two aspects: the actual story;

and the presentation or the way in which the story is realised and organised as a particular text (Fairclough, 1995).

Paradigmatic analysis involves searching for binary opposition that generates meaning. As Alan Dundes writes, the paradigmatic analysis "seeks to describe the pattern (usually based upon a priori binary principle of opposition) which allegedly underlies the text. This pattern is not the same as the sequential structure at all. Rather, the elements are taken out of the 'given' order and are regrouped in one or more analytic schema" (in Berger, 1991: 18). The search for binary opposition stems from the fact that meaning is based upon establishing relationships, and the most important relationship in the production of meaning is opposition (Berger, 1991).

Three other important ways of articulating meaning are intertextuality, metaphor and metonymy. Intertextuality is a bridge between the material of one kind or another, such as themes and other previously created texts. In metaphor, a relationship between two things is suggested by the use of analogy and in metonymy, a relationship is suggested that is based on association, which implies the existence of codes in people's minds to enable the proper decoding to be made (Berger, 1991).

For the sake of providing certain particular application for textual analysis, it is important to go one step further in particularising these three general categories (intertextuality, metaphor and metonymy). These particularities are accounted as machinaries. They are as the following: Equation (the act of stating the equivalence of two things), Elaboration (the development of subject beyond an initial statement for emphasis),

Transformation ( the action of changing in appearance) and Subordination (the action of de-emphasising in importance).

Actually, these machinaries have to have certain content to work on. The content is usually not homogenous. It has different nature at different levels. In our case, Van Dijk's conceptualisation of themes is expressive of the content discussed above. For him, themes are heterogeneous in a sense that some would be more general than others. That is to say, there is a macro and micro themes, and each group of micro themes can be subsumed under a macro theme. These relationships can be defined by reducing information. This reduction can take place by simply delete all information that is no longer relevant to the rest of the text, take a sequence of propositions and replace theme by one generalisation. Lastly, replace a sequence of propositions/ sub themes by one macro proposition / macro theme that signify the act as a whole.

## **5.2 Procedures for Identifying and Coding the Intifada Case study**

There are many useful elements for content analysis. Yet, the aim of content analysis imposes a particular selection of units of analysis (word, item, character, time/space and theme) and focus. Items and themes were adopted as a unit of analysis. Items in this case study, unlike the Gulf war study, refer merely to unsigned editorials. The focus of this chapter is to get an empirical picture of the editorial attention and attitude of four elite newspapers toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after the eruption of the Intifada on December 8, 1987. The elite newspapers are, The New York

Times (NYT), Washington Post (WP), Los Angeles Times (LAT), and St.Louis Post-Dispatch(SLPD). The four titles were chosen firstly, because they are elite papers. The New York Times (NYT) and the Washington Post (WP) were chosen to represent the elite press on the East coast, while the Los Angeles Times (LAT) and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (SLPD) were chosen to represent the elite press on the West coast and the Midwest respectively. Lastly, the choice of the four titles was influenced by their availability to the researcher. The editions studied extend from December 8, 1987 to May 8, 1988. The former date was chosen because it witnessed the eruption of the Intifada. The latter date was chosen because of the need to limit the data to a manageable size.

It is important to note that the Intifada case study's position in this thesis is restrictive. This function has implications on the objective and the means of analysis. Primarily, at the objective level, the case study serves as a point of relevant variability with respect to the nature of American media perception towards the Arabs. It is assumed to be a background of relevance that provides a possibility for sensitising the extent and domains of transformation which could have been helpful in creating an impetus of positive investment within the context of the Gulf War's new set of relations. At the level of means of analysis, the data gathering techniques are not comprehensive in the context of their application nor in the choice and rationale of their elements. This is all related to the restrictive concerns that are mentioned above.

All unsigned editorials about the Palestinian Intifada that the four newspapers published between December 8, 1987 and May 8, 1988, were identified and coded. In each case, the title of the newspaper, the date, the

prominent issue and attitude revealed in it are coded. Four content analyses were conducted. The major units of analysis employed in this study rely chiefly on Berelso's classification. Berelson specified five major units of analysis; Kerlinger (1964) reviews them concisely:

- 1) Words--single words or symbols.
- 2) Item--" A whole production," such as an article or broadcast.
- 3) Character--" An individual in a literary production".
- 4) Space and Time--" actual physical measurement of content" such as inch of newspapers, and minutes of television time.
- 5) Theme--"often a sentence, a proposition about something" they are combined into categories of themes (p.548-550).

The first content analysis considered the entire editorial as a coding unit. Each editorial was analysed to determine its attitude toward the Palestinian Intifada according to three categories. The editorial was coded as being favorable to the Palestinians when it adopted or raised sympathy for their point of view, neutral when it presented an equivalent coverage of the Palestinians and the Israelis point view, and unfavorable when it covered asymmetrically the Palestinian point view. The direction of each editorial was identified based on the paragraph's mode of articulation. When the majority of the paragraphs in an editorial were classified in one direction, the entire editorial was likewise classified.

A second content analysis was conducted to particularize the quantity variation that can be built upon. These variations are essential aspects to build up explanatory frames that can be linked with the rest of the thesis. In this analysis, theme was utilized as the unit of analysis. Five major categories



were identified: (a) the peace process, (b) the shut down of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) office in New York, (c) Israeli handling of the Intifada, (d) the death of an Israeli teenager, and (e) the assassination of the military leader of the PLO, Khalil Al Wazir. Various themes, as shown below, were identified under each issue. These themes have served as another analytical tool to establish a point of variability/invariability in the American media coverage of the Middle East issue. All themes are derived from the content of the news events. Issues and themes are as follows:

a) The peace process

- The US should assume an active role in the peace process.
- The US should dispatch a full-time envoy to the Middle East.
- The PLO rejects Shultz's plan.
- Israel rejects Shultz's plan.
- The land for peace formula is the basis of a negotiated settlement.  
Shamir is right in demanding a longer period of semi-autonomy.<sup>1</sup>
- Shamir's reservations on the peace plan are a smoke screen

b) The shut-down of the PLO office in New York

- Breach of the US agreement with the UN.
- Congress should repeal its action.

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<sup>1</sup>Shultz's plan called for three years of semi-autonomy to the occupied territories, during which a negotiation between Israel and joint Jordanian-Palestinians begin to determine the final status of the territories.

- The basis of the decision is questionable.

#### c) Israeli handling of the Intifada

- Arab leaders, US, and Israel are responsible for Palestinian tragedy.
- The UN shares responsibility.
- The 'Iron Fist' policy.
- The unrest should be contained first.
- Israel does not lack sensitivity.
- Palestinians in the territory support the PLO.
- No serious peace without PLO participation.
- The PLO should make a gesture first.
- The rationale for sealing the territory from the press is dubious.
- Ban of cameras would not help Israel's image abroad.
- Palestinians are desperate.
- Terrorists' operation lends rationale for Israeli hard-liners.

#### d) The death of an Israeli teenager is a tragedy

- Death of 15-year-old Israeli girl  
Tirzah Porat.
- Two Palestinians were killed.
- Many Israelis use the killing as justification for more toughness.

#### e) The assassination of Khalil Al Wazir

- Khalil Al Wazir was a terrorist.
- Khalil Al Wazir was a national leader.

Killing terrorists does not solve the problem.

The results of both content analyses are complemented by a limited textual analysis. This analysis, which represents the fourth type of content analysis, is concerned with the 'significance' of some perspectives expressing the investment and struggle of certain relations ( David/Goliath and Terrorism) which find themselves functioning.

### **5.3 Coding Sheet**

All items that dealt with the Intifada were identified and coded. The coding sheet (Appendix A), then recorded the number of items being coded, the paper, date, month, year, issue, theme and direction. The coding sheet also coded the labels attributed to Palestinian actors.

### **5.4 The Analytic Means of the Gulf War Case Study**

As will be seen below, the Gulf war case study is more comprehensive than the previous one. The principal units of analysis advocated in the chapter to obtain a comprehensive analysis rely primarily on Berelson's categorization discussed previously.

Items have been adopted as a unit of analysis. Items in this study , unlike the Intifada, include unsigned editorials, syndicated columns, OP-ED Articles, Letters to the Editor, and items printed under the heading News Analysis. One's thought must acknowledge the problem of treating these

types of content as one and calling it 'press coverage'. Op-ed pieces, and news analysis or editorials, for example, may contradict each other. Having said that, the acknowledgement should not blind us from a particular propriety inherited in the content analysis itself. The propriety spoken about is the generality that gives content analysis its ground for justifications. Apparently, there is an unresolvable problem in the way the generality usually excludes the particularity. This is other than the content analysis points out in the process of generalisation the issue of recurring object irregardless of the way the object is articulated.

Each item in the period of the study was coded according to the appearance or non-appearance of actors, topics, and themes. The word 'Arab' or 'Arabs' was utilised as a key word or reference. Each item dealing with the word 'Arab' or 'Arabs' was identified and coded.

After deciding on the key words (Arab/Arabs), communication sources (NYT, WP, LAT ), units of analysis (items), and types of items as mentioned above in the operative elements of content analysis, the next question is how large should the sample be? The options that one foresees is either including all dates from January 17 to February 28, 1991 or selecting a random sample. A decision to adopt the second option is taken because, as Berelson is quite right to say, "a small, carefully chosen sample of relevant content will produce just as valid results as the analysis of a great deal more- and with the expenditure of much less time and effort" (Berelson, 1952).

The data gathering procedures which are used for this study consisted of the steps which follow:

A randomised Latin Square sample was drawn from January 17 to February 28 1991. The sample was drawn according to the following procedures:-

- A. SAS system was asked to generate 7 permutations of the numbers 1-7.
- B. A Cyclis Latin Square was adopted from the users guide.
- C. The Cyclis Latin Square was randomised by columns and rows.
- D. The sample was structured by weeks and days to insure a) equal distribution of the sample over weeks, b) no less than two days and no more than three days of each day being selected.
- E. The sample days are as follows:-

Th	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	W
17	*	*	*	21	*	23
*	*	*	*	28	29	30
*	*	2	*	4	5	*
*	8	9	10	*	*	*
*	*	16	17	*	19	*
21	22	*	24	*	*	*
28						

- F. The sample days thereby consisted of 19 days x 3 newspapers or 57 issues; this meant 19 issues of each of the three newspapers were sampled.
- G. Three issues of each paper, weekly, was felt to adequately represent the specified coverage. The rationale comes from theory and experimental studies that have used content analysis in studying newspapers. Stemple

(1952) compared samples of 6, 12, 24 and 48 issues to the average coverage of the entire year. He found that increasing the sample size beyond 12 did not produce marked differences in the results (Stemple, 1952: 334). These findings were supported by another study by Jones and Carter (1959). The study found that a sample of six issues of a daily newspaper did not differ significantly in its average from the average of the entire month.

H. A total of 274 items were identified in the sampled issues:

Paper	Issue	Item	Total
LAT	19	117	42.7
NYT	19	83	30.3
WP	19	74	27.0
	54	274	100.0

### **5.5 Coding Sheet:**

As mentioned previously, the message, as a locus of symbolic communication, does not have a single meaning that needs to be 'unwrapped'. Data can be approached from different angles or perspectives and all of them may be valid (Krippendorff, 1982). A coding sheet was designed to address the research questions raised representing the actors, labels, topics and themes that have dominated in the coverage of the Persian Gulf war. All items which mentioned the words 'Arab' or 'Arabs' were coded.

The coding sheet (Appendix B) started with the usual descriptive information about the number of items being coded (each item was given a number between 001 and 999), paper (each paper was assigned the following number, NYT (1), LAT (2), and WP (3) ), month, date, the type of item (unsigned editorial (1), Syndicated columns (2), OP - ED Article (3), Letter to the editor (4), and News analysis (5), each item that mentioned the words 'Arab' or 'Arabs' during the period of the study was identified and coded.

The coding sheet also recorded Arab and US actors (and others) quoted or referred to. This served to give an indication about the key actors in the coverage of the Gulf war. The word Arab was taken as a general term which includes various sub- categories illustrating the particularities of what constitutes the general.

The subcategorize found useful in the analysis under the word Arabs were the following:

- 1- States
- 2- Leaders
- 3- Masses
- 4- Leading govt official
- 5- Non - govt. official
- 6- Diplomat
- 7- Opposition
- 8- Army / Republican guard

US actors were divided into eight categories:

- 1- US President
- 2- US Vice President
- 3 US Secretary of State
- 4- US Congressman / Senator
- 5- US White House / State Department / Agencies
- 6- Military Figures / US Defence Secretary / Pentagon
- 7- Experts
- 8- Former Government officials

Actors were the subject of the story. They were coded as present (1) or absent (0). The essential actors to the story were coded as present, while inessential actors were coded as absent. Essential actors were defined as those doing things or being affected by events in a way that was essential to the story, where marginal actors could be omitted from the story without altering its substance. For example, 'President Mubarak arrived in Riyadh today for discussion with King Fahd'. Here, President Mubarak and King Fahd would both be coded as actors. 'President Mubarak, accompanied by his wife arrived in Riyadh for discussion ...'. Here 'his wife' would not be recorded as an actor especially if she was not mentioned again in the item being coded.

The coding sheet also contained crucial categories such as labels, topics and themes. The topics or subject matters which an item was mainly about (e.g. military, US foreign policy) was detected from the entire item. Lastly, the themes or conceptual frameworks in the item were identified and coded. The idea was to pick up a news-angle, that is to say, how a given topic is approached. Was it approached, for example, in terms of unjust



cause for military intervention, or just cause for military intervention? As already stated, data are collected from the American elite press.

### **5.6 Sampled Elite Newspapers; A Historical Preview**

As it has been noted earlier, there are commonality between the sampled elite press in the two case studies. Both cases used segment of the American elite press and both studies analysed the New York Times, Washington Post and Los Angeles Times. The only difference is that the first case study incorporated a fourth American elite paper, St Louis Post-Dispatch.

Based on a poll of newspaper publishers, Bernays (1974) presented a list of what he considered to be the elite press. The list includes the New York Times; Washington Post; Los Angeles Times; Miami Herald; Wall Street Journal; St Louis Post-Dispatch; Boston Globe; (Louisville) Courier-Journal; Chicago Tribune, and the Milwaukee Journal (Trice, 1979: 306).

An earlier list was presented by John Merrill et.al. The list includes the: New York Times; Christian Science Monitor; Washington Post; Baltimore Sun; Atlanta Constitution; Louisville Courier-Journal; New Orleans Times-Picayune; Dallas Morning News; St Louis Post-Dispatch; Kansas City Star; Milwaukee Journal; Des Moines Register; Chicago Daily News; Daily Post; and Los Angeles Times .

The elite press obviously are a selected group of the 1611 daily newspapers published in the United States to which, states Trice of Ohio

State University, "US leaders-both in and out of government-turn regularly for independent analysis of international events" (Trice, 1979: 306). Similarly, Cohen remarks that: "collectively, the elite press serve foreign policy makers in both the executive and legislative branches as a basic standard source of factual information about foreign affairs and also about political developments that are relevant to foreign policy" (Cohen, 1963: 218).

Three elite newspapers were selected for the present study: the Los Angeles Times (LAT) ; Washington Post (WP) ; and New York Times (NYT).

The New York Times and the Washington Post were selected because, according to Wall Street Journal's survey of 'High Federal Officials', they are the most widely read newspapers by the policy makers in the American capital (Hess, 1981: 25), and the Los Angeles Times because it is amongst the top four newspapers in a survey conducted by the Wall Street Journal.

#### 5.6.1 Washington Post

The Washington Post was founded by Silson Hutchines in 1877 as a Democratic newspaper. The Post was devoted to the cause of the Democratic Party (Roberts, 1977). Indeed, the first issue pledged that the Post would "...

do what it can to uphold the Democratic majority in the House and the Majestic Democratic minority in the Senate” (in Walker, 1983: 242). The paper vowed also to be “... a thorough-going newspaper ...” (Roberts, 1977: 5). In 1889, the paper was sold to Frank Hatton and Bemat Wilkins. The new owners ended the paper’s Democratic Party affiliation and promised “... a first-class paper ... without partisan bias” (Roberts, 1977: 44). In 1905, the Post was bought by John Mclean. The new owner, according to Roberts, associated the paper with sensationalism: “[He] turned the Washington Post into a second-rate newspaper” (Roberts, 1977: 132). By 1933, the paper was deeply in debt and Mclean sold it to Eugene Meyer (Merrill et al, 1978).

Meyer began the process of redemption (Roberts, 1977; Merrill et al, 1978). In doing so, he drew up set of principles:

- 1) The first mission of a newspaper is to tell the truth as nearly as the truth can be ascertained.
- 2) The newspaper shall tell ALL the truth so far as it can learn it, concerning the important affairs of America and the world.
- 3) As a disseminator of news, the paper shall observe the decencies that are obligatory upon a private gentleman.
- 4) What it prints shall be fit reading for the young as well as for the old.
- 5) The newspaper's duty is to its readers and the public at large, and not to the private interests of its owners.
- 6) In the pursuit of truth, the newspaper shall be prepared to make sacrifices of its material fortunes, if such a course be necessary for public good.
- 7) The newspaper shall not be the ally of any special interest, but shall be fair and free and wholesome in its outlook on public affairs and public men (Merrill et.al, 1978).

Within ten years the Post had become "...one of the world's ten greatest newspapers" (Merrill et al, 1978: 13).

In 1945, Meyer's son-in-law, Philip Graham became the publisher. Graham vowed "...to maintain and improve the Post's objectivity, fairness in reporting [and] independence..." (Merrill et al, 1978: 3). By 1954, the Post had become the nation's ninth largest morning newspaper (Merrill et.al, 1978: 3).

The Post's commitment to excellence has significantly influenced its foreign coverage. In the late 1950s, the paper had two Foreign Bureaux in London and in New Delhi. Thirty years later it had bureaux in Tokyo, Buenos Aires, Bonn, Jerusalem, Lusaka, Moscow, Paris, Cairo, Hong Kong, London and Central America, in addition to foreign input from AP, AFI, Sunday Times of London, and its syndicated news service with the Los Angeles Times (Merrill et al, 1978).

Circulation in 1968 was approximately 470,000 copies daily (Merrill et al, 1970). In 1978, circulation was up to 568,700 copies daily and 800,000 on Sunday (Merrill, 1978). By 1990, total circulation of the weekday editions stood at 791,000 copies, with the Sunday editions being 1,143,000 (Europa World Book, 1992: 3030).

### 5.6.2 The Los Angeles Times

The Los Angeles Times for its first 80 years or so, "...built up and perpetuated an image of stodgy Conservatism...it was generally not considered either progressive or even very fair in its editorial positions..." (Merrill et al 1978: 183). In the 1960s the paper began to change its old image by emphasis on writing and editing. In doing so the paper "Used a three-point guideline ...: 1) upgrading staff whenever possible as staffers left to retire or take other jobs; 2) seeking better talent for jobs which were not previously open" (Merrill et al, 1978: 183). In 1978, Time Magazine observed that the LAT is "one of the nation's most serious, best reported dailies" (Ibid,183).

In 1962, the paper had only one foreign correspondent; today the Los Angeles Times has nineteen bureaux in Paris, Tokyo, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico, Hong Kong, United Nations, London, Bonn, Moscow, Bangkok, Buenos Aires, New Delhi, Athens, Brussels, Cairo, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Madrid, and Nairobi. The paper supplements its overseas coverage with input from nine main news agencies and numerous syndicated services.

The national coverage has also improved significantly, with two-dozen correspondents in the Washington Bureau and domestic bureaux in six major cities, Atlanta, Chicago, New York, Houston, San Francisco and Sacramento. In 1962, the LAT and the WP developed a syndicated service to "exchange Washington, foreign, and regional interpretative news" (Merrill, 1968: 257). This service has "enhanced the serious coverage of the LAT " (Merrill, 1968; Merrill et al, 1978).

The quality of the paper's foreign and national coverage resulted in increased circulation. In 1960 the paper had a circulation of 525,000 on weekdays and 900,000 on Sundays. By 1978, the circulation had risen to 1,020,987 daily and 1,309,677 for Sundays (Merrill et al, 1978: 184). In 1990, the paper had a circulation of 1,177,000 daily and 1,530,000 for its Sunday editions (Europa World Book, 1992: 3029).

### 5.6.3 The New York Times

The New York Times was founded on September 18, 1851 by Henry Raymond. Raymond was determined from the first to make his paper appeal to the elite (Merrill et al, 1978: 269). The paper fell into deep financial crisis and was sold to Charles Miller in 1893. Miller's rescue bid failed and Adolph Simon Ochs bought the paper in 1896.

In 1935, Ochs died and his son-in-law Arthur Hays Sulzberger took over as publisher until 1962, when his son Arthur Ochs Sulzberger became the youngest publisher the Times had ever had. Arthur Ochs Sulzberger 'Punch' maintained the paper's greatness by "encouraging dynamism, change and improvement" (Merrill et al, 1978: 198). He introduced new sections for different days of the week; 'sport' on Monday, 'science, education and medicine' on Thursday, 'home' on Thursday, 'weekend' on Friday, and 'calendar' on Sunday and 'living' on Wednesday. As a result of these innovations, circulation rose to 854,000 copies daily (Merrill et al, 1978). By 1990, the paper had a circulation of 1,115,000 copies daily and 1,701,000 on Sunday (Europa World Book, 1992).

The Times foreign coverage has always been one of its strongest suits. The quality and thoroughness of the NYT coverage is achieved through a network of reporters in the world strategic centres. Thirty-two full time reporters work out of 23 bureaux, and 25 part-timers represent the paper's world-wide network coverage (World Press Encyclopaedia, 1992).

#### **5.6.4 St. Louis Post-Dispatch**

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch is published in St. Louis, Missouri in the Midwest. John Merrill (1968) considers it one of the best dailies in the United States. The paper has won the Pulitzer prize for outstanding accomplishments in journalism five times and its staff members have received an additional ten (Kurian, 1982). The Post-Dispatch's strengths are its foreign coverage and its editorials (Merrill, 1968; Kurian, 1982). The Paper consisted of several sections. Weekday editions run from 44 to 60 pages and its Sunday edition over 120 pages plus three magazine sections (Kurian, 1982).

The Post-Dispatch has a daily circulation of 350,000 and a Sunday circulation of nearly 563,000 (The Europa World Year Book, 1992).

### **5.7 Conclusion**

This Chapter has sketched out some basic arguments regarding the definition and requirements of content analysis. In the two case studies this venture matched some basic concerns relevant to the theme. The main feature of our illustration in this chapter is that the traditional way of conceptualising

content analysis lacks contextualisation as a result of putting too much emphasis on objectivity and its requirements. The way out of this dilemma is thought to be through an integrative attitude, combining quantitative and qualitative acts, put into comparative contextualisation. In this way, one would be taking a more established way for sensitising and actualising the potentialities of the problem postulated in this thesis. The content of such ventures is left for the next two chapters.



**CHAPTER SIX**  
**1987 PALESTINIAN INTIFADA: SIGNS OF DISPLACEMENT**  
**IN THE AMERICAN -MEDIA SPECTRUM?**

This Chapter<sup>1</sup> will discuss the first case study, the 1987 Intifada. But before drawing out the analysis of the case study, we will reiterate some indispensable frames which will provide a direction to the analysis that will be made in the Intifada case.

The previous studies of the American media coverage of the Arab world revealed that media coverage of the Middle East was largely one sided, and that the Palestinian-Israeli dispute was presented principally in terms of terrorism and/or a David and Goliath frame. The Palestinian Intifada, however, which erupted on December 8, 1987 as passive resistance in the occupied West Bank and Gaza strip, generated a strong impact in and beyond the Middle East (see for example Peretz 1988, 1990).

Prior to the Intifada, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute was perceived as 'our war' by the American media. The Palestinians were seen largely as terrorists and 'top dog'. In part, this led the media to abandon its role as a spectator or neutral observer. Coverage of the dispute, as we have seen in Chapter Four, tends to keep the human suffering inflicted upon the Palestinians out of sight, attributes greater threatening power to the Palestinians, demonizes their Palestinian fighters, and decontextualizes the Palestinian cause. At the same time, on the Israeli side, there is a personalisation of the human suffering (see Chapter Four). These

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<sup>1</sup> The chapter is based on an M.S. thesis presented to the Department Of Mass Communication in Southern Illinois University by the researcher (1991) .

mechanisms, needless to say, are overlapping with other lines of negative perceptions at a broader level.


The questions that weave this Chapter together are as follows: What would happen if 'our war' frame transformed into 'their war' frame? If the David and Goliath frame witnessed a transformation, what is the agent of transformation? And in what sense will it suit the prospected ends? In light of the largely passive nature of the Intifada and the harsh Israeli response, will the passive nature of the Intifada play a role in that transformation? What are the elements that encouraged a recontextualization? Will our data lend support to the view expressed by Peretz (1988, 1990) that the passive nature of the Intifada gave the Palestinians an advantage in the American media? If that is the case, what is the direction it has undertaken? Will our data substantiate Daniel's view that the perception of the Palestinian Goliath has been marginalised and driven out of sight?

This Chapter is divided into two sections: editorial attention and attitude of the four newspapers toward the Palestinian issue, and textual analysis of the main relevant themes that can be helpful in establishing an added frame to our concern.

### **6.1 Editorial Attention to Palestinian Issue over Time**

The data showed an increase in media attention to the Israel-Palestinian conflict between December 1987 and April 1988. That period corresponded to the Israeli Defence Forces' expanded use of harsh measures

against Palestinian civilians, the American involvement in the peace process, the US plan to shut-down the PLO office in New York, the death of an Israeli teenager, and the assassination of the Palestinian leader, Khalil Al Wazir, by Israeli commandos in Tunisia. (Figure 3).



Figure(3) Editorial Attention Toward the Intifada Over Time

The increase in the interest shown by the elite press toward the Intifada (December-April) can be attributed to factors within the media system and factors outside the media system, such as the change in the political climate, the renewed American involvement in the peace process and division within the Jewish community in the United States.

The trends in editorial attention to the Palestinian Intifada are related to news values and access. The increased interest shown by the elite press between December and April 1988 is related to news values. News values, as noted in Chapter Three, provide a yardstick of newsworthiness for newspeople to make consistent story selection. Threshold, conflict, personification, proximity and timeline are important criteria. The intensity of

confrontations between the Israeli army and unarmed Palestinian youths met most of the criteria of newsworthiness.

In mid January, Defence Minister Rabin called for “force, might, beating” (NYT, February 19: 1988). The NYT observed that “for more than two months of unrest, Israel has discovered harsh consequences of its occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. Some 59 Palestinians have been reported killed by the Israeli soldiers. Bone Breaking and beating are intended to teach that violence will get the Palestinians nowhere. Official harshness turn even more excessive unofficially; witness the cases of Israeli soldiers accused of burying four young Palestinians alive with a bulldozer” (NYT, February 19: 1988). Indeed, “at no other time during the twenty-one-year of occupation has the brutality of Israeli methods been more ... intensive that it has during the uprising ...” (Shehadeh, 1988: 29). According to the WP from December until April 1988, 130 Palestinians civilian died at the hands of the IDF (WP, April 8: 1988).

Shehadeh (1988) noted that by the end of the first year of the Intifada, the number of Palestinians killed, seriously injured, arrested, detained, imprisoned, deported and whose homes were demolished, exceeded by far the number in any other year since 1967. There had not been a Palestinian uprising on such a large scale since the Arab revolt of 1936-1939 against the British mandate. Peretz (1990) estimates that on average, a Palestinian a day had been killed, some 20,000 wounded and 20,000 imprisoned in 1988. More than 200 Palestinian homes were blown up, or sealed by the Israeli army. Forty five suspected Intifada leaders were deported without due process of law. Three times the number of soldiers were used to put down the Intifada as had been used to occupy the territories in 1967. The cost in 1988 of

occupation and of the suppression of the Intifada was estimated to be \$ 2-3 billion.

Access to the Occupied Territories is another important factor. It contributed to the high saliency of the Intifada coverage between December 1987 and April 1988 (see Figure 3). In this phase, the media had unrestricted access to the occupied territories. Such access enabled the media to report the 'Iron fist' policy and see the violation of the Palestinian human rights under the Israeli rule during the Intifada. Consider, for instance, CBS television footage of soldiers beating two unarmed Palestinian teensagers. In March 1988, a CBS television crew in Nablus filmed, without being seen, a sequence in which four Israeli soldiers beat two Palestinian youths who were sitting on the ground with their hands tied behind their backs. The soldiers kicked the Palestinians in the head and chest, and then beat them on the arms and legs with heavy rocks. This incident, which is to a certain extent a daily routine in the occupied territories, would not be reported had the media had no access to the area.

For many Israeli officials, the foreign and domestic media, not the occupation, were the true source of the problem. In their view, the very presence of the media incited the 'Arabs'<sup>2</sup> to 'riot'. In an editorial on the subject, the Jerusalem Post observed that those who blamed the media believed that without it: "there would be no Palestinian rebellion. Or at least, there would be no international backlash to what Israel must do to check it. Without the media, Ronald Reagan, for one, would never have learned what was going on in the territories .... What they [Likud cabinet members] would propose, presumably, is that the country, or at least Gaza and the West Bank,

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<sup>2</sup> The 'Arab' is a recurrent term used by the Israeli official discourse to avoid recognising the Palestinian national identity.

be turned into closed military zones. For as long as the present emergency lasts Israel would be spared ... the fear of a world-wide backlash calculated to delight the country's worst enemy" (quoted in Perez, 1990: 127).

One consequence of this view was the decision of the Israeli army in April 1988 to close off the 'hot spots' in the occupied territories to both Israeli and foreign reporters. This news management policy restricted media access to the territories. Thus, the control of the flow of information from the occupied territories contributed to the decline of media attention to the Intifada. Not surprisingly, in May 1988, editorial attention, as figure three shows, dropped to none compared to eight editorials in April.

Externally, media attention to the Intifada can be linked to the change in the political climate in the American capital and the need for a resolution to the problem. First,. editorial attention to the Intifada can be linked to the division within the Israeli Public, and within the powerful Jewish community in the United States. Many Israelis and prominent American Jews were alarmed by the harsh measures the Israeli army used to put down the Intifada as they undermined many of the values that the Jewish religion had stood for, for thousands of years. The Intifada brought them the intangible costs of the occupation in terms of dehumanisation and the eroding of what they saw as Israel's special moral values. The NYT wrote on the subject " 'How can I go on living here?' asked a women, a devoted Zionist and mother of three sons with army service, after seeing news of the bulldozer incident. 'What do I have in common with the people who did that?'. In Tel Aviv Wednesday 800, Israelis packed a theatre to hear cultural and intellectual leaders' pleas for peace" (NYT, February 19: 1988). Many salient American Jews sent messages to Israeli leaders and made public statements about their concern. In January 1988, Rabbi Alexander Schindler, President of the Union of the

American Hebrew congregations, sent a cable to the Israeli President Haim Herzog calling Rabin's policy of beating demonstrators "an offence to the Jewish spirit [that] violates every principle of human decency" (Morrow, 1988: 40). In February 1988, the former director of the American Jewish Committee also condemned Rabin's policy. "Using force evokes other times and places when it was used against us," he observed. The president of Hadassah, the largest women's Zionist organisations, stated that Rabin's policy "is not the Israeli way and it is not the Jewish way" (quoted in Peretz, 1990: 175). Actor and writer Woody Allen stated publicly in February 1988 that "Israel's policy defies belief .... [It is time] for all of us who are rooting for Israel ... to speak out and use every measure of pressure- moral, financial and political- to bring this wrongheaded approach to a halt" (NYT, February 28: 1988).

Second, as the Intifada gained momentum, American officials began to realise that the Intifada was not a passing phenomenon and that its implications could reach far beyond the territories, thus affecting larger US interests in the Middle East. Secretary of State George Shultz, in February 1988, reactivated the American role in the peace process in the Middle East. He visited the Middle East several times between February and April 1988 to promote yet another peace plan. The crux of the plan was land for peace. Shultz, also asserted publicly that the 'fundamental origins' of the Palestinian Intifada were 'essentially indigenous'. The statement signalled some change in the American official line which used to view the Intifada as a riot instigated by outside agitators. Not surprisingly, the peace plan offered less than what was acceptable to the majority of the Palestinians: namely the right to self-determination and the establishment of a sovereign independent state and participation in negotiations as full partners through representatives of their own choosing, that is, the PLO.

The change in the political climate extended to the US Congress. The traditionally unqualified bipartisan support for Israel in Capital Hill began to weaken as many Democrats and Republicans openly questioned policies in the occupied territories. In February 1988, a dozen members of congress met with Israel's ambassador to voice concern over the beating and shooting. In March, thirty senators from both parties sent Prime Minister Shamir a letter criticising the rejection of the US peace proposal. the Occupied Territories. In February 1988, a dozen members of congress met with Israel's ambassador to voice their concerns over the beating and shooting. In March, thirty senators from both parties sent Prime Minister Shamir a letter criticising the rejection of the US peace proposal. This lends credence to Bennett's perspective. Bennett ( 1990) argues that Mass Media " ... tend to 'index' the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about given topics" ( Bennett, 1990: 106). It is important to bear in mind, however, that Bennett's perspective does not explain to us the press coverage of the first phase of the Intifada ( Dec 1987- Jan 1988).

Press attention to the first phase of the Intifada ( Dec 1987- Jan 1988) can be understood by considering two main forces: The 'beating policy' introduced by the then Minister of Defence Rabin in mid January and Press access to the Occupied Territories. Such an access enabled the press to see the asymmetry between Israel might and the Palestinian symbolic might, regardless of the official debate, or lack of it, in the American capital. The divergence of the coverage from the official line in the first phase of the Intifada can be attributed to the press identification at that particular moment with globalisation. This is consistent with Shaw's argument with respect to other case studies illustrated in Chapter Three. The press, as will be shown



later called for reactivation of the American involvement in the peace process, and criticised Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories.

## **6.2 Differences among Newspapers Over time**


To detect the variation in attention among each of the four newspapers, it is essential to examine the amount of attention each newspaper gave to the Palestinian issue over time.

The NYT published thirteen of the twenty-four editorials published by the four newspapers about the Intifada (54%). Of the thirteen editorials, eleven were published between February and April 1988. The LAT published four editorials for 17 percent of the total coverage. All of the four editorials were also published between February and March 1988. The WP published a total of five editorials for 21 percent of the total coverage. Of the five editorials, 60 percent were published in April 1988. The SLPD paid the least amount of attention to the Palestinian Intifada with a total of two editorials (8%). The two editorials were published between February and March 1988.


These findings indicate that the forces inside and outside the media system functioned in the aggregate as well as the disaggregate level. This commonality stems from the shared organisational constraints and routines. This would hold for the editorials if they are perceived as 'reformatization' of particular news. The process of 'reformatization' is made possible from that marriage of two generic forces; the news and the editorials. Having the news as one element in that process shows that editorials are taking the news as a ground for their constitution. Being a ground would not mean that the forces ( e.g. sources' interaction) which made possible for news to emerge are

passive. Actually, there is clear evidence that the editorials did not produce a complete break from the news genres but actually captured them to different role formations. Editorial writers, like other senior journalists, have their own sources in the White House, State Department, ect. Accordingly the four newspapers, like other media organisations, did not escape from desiring routinisation to improve efficiency. Routinisation ensures that the media system will respond in predictable ways and cannot be easily violated. It forms a cohesive set of rules and become integral parts of what it means to be a media professional. These shared rules contribute to the similarities in the attention given by the four newspapers to the Intifada, over time.


At another level of analysis, commonality is related to cultural pressures. American journalists must function within the context of American political culture. Commonality is also related to political pressures. As guests in the countries from which they are reporting, foreign reporters often must do their hosts' bidding. Many of those hosts are convinced of the need to 'manage' the press.




**Figure(4)** Trend in Editorial Attention of the New York Times Over Time



**Figure (5)** Trend in Editorial Attention of the Los Angeles Times Over Time



**Figure (6)** Trend in Editorial Attention of the Washington Post Over Time



**Figure 7.** Trend in Editorial Attention of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch Over Time

### **6.3 Editorial attention to specific Israel-Palestinian Issues:**

Up to this point we have examined the variation in editorial attention to the Intifada over time. General attention, however, tells us relatively little about which issue the press emphasized or de-emphasized. This section focuses on the variation in editorial attention over issues.

The variation in the four newspapers' attentions seems to reflect a relative editorial interest in the five events that dominated the political stage at that time in the Middle East. These events included: (1) Israel's handling of the Intifada (I.H.), (2) the peace process (P.P.), (3) the shut-down of the PLO office in New York (PLO), (4) the killing of an Israeli teenager (I.T.), and (5) the assassination of the PLO military leader, Khalil Al Wazir (K.W.).


The NYT placed great emphasis on Israel's handling of the Intifada and the peace process (77%). It published five editorials on Israel's handling of the Intifada (38.5%) and five editorials on the peace process (38.5%). The shut-down of the PLO office at the United Nations and the killing of an Israeli teenager, respectively, received two editorials (15.4%), and one editorial (7.7%). [See Figure 9].

The LAT paid more attention to the peace process. It devoted two editorials to the peace process (50%), and an equal amount of attention to Israel's handling of the Intifada and the shut-down of the PLO office in New York. One editorial appeared for each one of them (25%). [See Figure 10].


The WP placed more emphasis on Israel's handling of the Intifada, with two editorials (40%) compared to one editorial on the peace process, the killing of an Israeli teenager, and the assassination of Khalil Al Wazir. [See Figure 11].

The SLPD's attention was limited exclusively to the peace process, with no single editorial dealing with Israel's handling of the Intifada or any of the other three issues. [See Figure 12].


In sum, the NYT, WP and LAT manifested a relatively greater interest in the Palestinian - Israeli dispute than did the SLPD. This variation can be attributed to the greater interest of the NYT, WP, and LAT in international news. The four newspapers also devoted more attention to the peace process and Israel's handling of the Intifada than to any other issue. This can be linked to the concern of the American administration about the peace process and the congressional support of Shultz's peace plan. The four newspapers, apparently, drew on the predominant concern in the American capital.




**Figure(9)** Editorial Attention of the New York Times Across Issues



**Figure (10)** Editorial Attention of the Los Angeles Times Across Issues



**Figure (11)** Editorial Attention of the Washington Post Across Issues



**Figure (12)** Editorial Attention of the St.Louis Post-Dispatch Across Issues

So far, we have examined the trend in editorial attention of the elite press toward the Palestinian Intifada over time and toward specific issues. The next section deals with the attitude of the newspapers toward Palestine. The attitude of the four newspapers are analyzed by using three categories: favorable, unfavorable, and neutral.



Expressions of attitude are usually categorized by analysts as favorable or unfavorable, with different writers using different labels for these categories: pro-con, positive-negative, friendly-hostile. Generally, all these pairs include a third category, neutral . . . (Budd et al, 1967: 50).

#### **6.4 Editorial Attitude Toward the Palestine Issue**

The analysis of the four newspapers' attitudes indicates that the NYT and the LAT, respectively, are the most understanding of the Palestinians in the occupied territories (61.6% and 50%), while the SLPD and WP were the least (0% and 40%). Further, the LAT and the SLPD are the least critical of the Palestinians (0%), while the WP, on the other hand, is the most critical of the Palestinians (40%) and the least likely to present a neutral stand (20%). As a matter of fact, two thirds of the unfavorable editorials appear in the WP.

These findings converge with the findings of other studies of the American media coverage of the Middle East. David Daugherty and Michael Word's (1979) study revealed in part that the Washington Post was the most critical of the Arabs and the least likely to present a neutral stand on the Arab - Israeli conflict. Twenty-three percent of editorials were anti - Arab and 11.2 percent were Pro-Israel. Furthermore, the Washington Post was the least likely to exhibit a neutral stand with 57 percent of its editorials being neutral (see Chapter Four, Daugherty & Word, 1979). The second study, conducted by Jan Terry, indicated in part that 21.2 percent of the total coverage of the Washington Post was anti - Arab (see Chapter Four, Terry, 1974)

In the present study the SLPD, LAT, and NYT, respectively, are the most likely to take a neutral stand with 100% of SLPD, 50% of LAT, and 30.8% of NYT editorials falling into this category. On the whole, the four newspapers appear to be more sympathetic to the Palestinians, 50% of

editorials were favorable compared to 12 percent which were unfavorable. (see Table 2).

The favorable view of the Palestinians has challenged the Palestinian stereotype as Goliath. This change can be explained in large part by the tendency of the press to cover the Middle East from the official view point of the American capital. Journalists have drawn on and reinforced the views of the American administration and the 'official' opposition, particularly opposition party leaders in congress. Journalistic perception of foreign stories are responsive to the administration judgments. If these judgments are not disputed by other elite, they are normally accepted by journalists as authoritative (Sahr, 1991).

The Intifada is a case in point. The authoritative sources are united in criticizing the use of excessive force by IDF against the Palestinian civilians. The convergence of the American administration's view of the way Israel was handling the Intifada, with the congressional and the Jewish community's view of the issue, render the traditional David and Goliath frame problematic. Here, the new view of the Palestinians as 'underdog', however, does not eliminate the old frame, rather it coexists with it.

In this context, I would like to emphasize three issues: First, the change in the American view of the Palestinians is clearly not enough. The American administration and media are concerned first and foremost about providing Israel with a way out of what is happening in the occupied territories. This claim is based on the media support of the American peace plan (Table 3), which has failed to come to terms with Palestinian national aspirations. These aspirations include the Palestinians right to self-determination and the

establishment of an independent state in the occupied territories under the leadership of the PLO.

Our data reveal that the American administration and the American press have taken for granted many Israeli assumptions about the PLO. In the question of which side (the PLO or Israel) should move first, the administration and the media put the burden solely on the PLO. As we will see later on 'the PLO should make a gesture first' is one of the most recurring subcategory in table five (95%). Negotiating with the PLO, in the administration and media view, is a non starter until it denounces terrorism and recognizes Israel's right to exist:

Mr. Shultz has made plain- as he must in order to have any prospect of winning Israel cooperation- that there is no place at the table for an organization that practices terrorism and denies Israel's right to exist (WP, April 5: 1988).

The problem with this view lies in the fact that it can be told from a Palestinian perspective. The Palestinians can say with equal validity that they cannot sit with Shamir, Sharon or any member of the Israeli government, because of their association in the Palestinian mind with terror, and because of their denial of the Palestinian right to self-determination. This suggests to us that the change in the American view of the Palestinians was left at the surface of negative investment. It did not go deep enough to call for mutual recognition of each people's right to exist, and mutual denouncement of violence.

Second, elements of Israeli "David's" frame have remained evidently functioning in the media discourse. As the analysis of the media coverage of the death of an Israeli teenager will show, more emphasis is placed on the death of the Israeli youth compared to the death of two Palestinian civilians. Moreover, the name of the Israeli victim was reported, while the Palestinian victims

remained nameless (see Table 6). Thus, the humanity of the Israelis and the Palestinians is asymmetrically portrayed. Similarly, in the question of the international peace conference, the image of a 'tiny' nation remained evident: "Israel would be out numbered at such a conference. It deserves further guarantees such as a pledge by Washington to walk out if the conference becomes a propaganda exercise, or worse"(NYT, March 22: 1988). This is far from a unique view and indeed appears to be part of a pattern.

Third, as table 2 shows, 12% of the total coverage remained unfavorable to the Palestinians. This can be attributed to cultural forces which counter any change in the American media coverage of the Arabs. Orientalism is one manifestation of these forces. It represents a cultural archive of images providing a shared frame of reference about the Arabs. This cultural archive is skewed toward classical culture. That is to say, it sees the Arabs through classical glasses. Everything to be found in the Arab and Islamic societies is somehow a replay of the classical past. Hence, the Arab and Islamic societies are always seen out of time (see Chapter Two). It is hardly surprising that the Washington Post begins its editorial about the killing of the military leader of the PLO, Khalil Al Wazir, with Orientalist thought: "Khalil Wazir, or Abu Jihad ("father of the holy war"), lived by the gun, had one in his hand, in fact, when he was assassinated in Tunis, reportedly by Israelis" (Washington Post, April 19, 1988). This absurd equation of the military leader of the PLO with 'holy war' obscures the plain fact that the PLO is a secular organization, and that 'jihad' does not equal 'holy war'. The equation of jihad with holy war replays what Said (1978), Sharabi (1990) and others have described as an essentialist western view of Arabs and Islamic societies. Jihad in this perspective has a static and unchanging character. To us, the translation of Abu Jihad to mean the father of holy war, is a manifestation of the western perspective on the Arab and Islamic societies, which we have discussed in detail in Chapter Two. Put differently, the translation of Abu Jihad to the father

of the holy war recycle certain terms which are more situated within certain Orientalist discourse.

**Table 2: Editorial Attitude Toward the Palestine Issue**

	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Favorable</b>	<b>Unfavorable</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3</b>	
<b>NYT</b>	4	8	1	13
<b>%</b>	30.8%	61.6%	7.7%	
<b>LAT</b>	2	2	0	4
<b>%</b>	50%	50%	0%	
<b>WP</b>	1	2	2	5
<b>%</b>	20%	40%	40%	
<b>SLPD</b>	2	0	0	2
<b>%</b>	100%	0%	0%	
<b>TOTAL</b>	9	12	3	24
<b>%</b>	38%	50%	12%	

Further analysis is conducted below to particularize media attention and attitude to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The analysis focuses on the five major issues as indicated above. These issues are divided into subcategories. Both categories and subcategories are derived from the news content.

### The Peace Process

As table 3 shows the NYT (66.67% & 42.31%) and WP (28.57% & 30.8%) display a strong support for the American role in the peace process and land for peace formulae. The LAT (100%) tends to be less supportive of Shultz's plan than NYT and WP, but it shows a similar support to the land for peace formulae, which constituted the crux of the American administration's approach to the Peace Process (23.1%). The SLPD (4.76%) displays more support to activate the US involvement in the peace process than the LAT (0%) did (see Chapter Three). The articulation of the Peace Process from within the American foreign policy perspective reflects the press's tendency to support American foreign policy in the Middle East. Previous studies of the American media coverage of the Middle East issue, as we have seen in Chapter Four, have revealed a consistent support of the American foreign policy in the area.

The NYT (52.94%) places more emphasis on Israel's rejection of the exchange of peace for land. The WP (17.65%) and LAT (17.65%) places an

equal emphasis in the Palestinian as well as the Israeli attitude toward the principle of peace. The NYT (61.9%) and the LAT (38.1%) question the sincerity of Shamir's reservations on the peace plan. The two newspapers view Shamir's reservations on the Schultz peace plan as a smoke screen (see Table 3).

**Table 3: The Peace Process**

	NYT	WP	LAT	SLPD
US should assume an active role in the peace process	66.7	28.57	00	4.76
The land for peace formula is the basis of a negotiated settlement	42.31	30.8	23.1	3.85
Shultz's chance of success is minimal	00	00	100	00
The US should dispatch a full-time envoy to the Middle East	100	00	00	00
Israel rejects Shultz's plan	52.94	17.65	52.65	11.76
PLO rejects Shultz's plan	30	30	40	00
Shamir is right in demanding a longer period of semi-autonomy	100	00	00	00

Shamir's reservations on the peace	61.0	00	38.1	00
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plan are a smoke screen

### Shutdown of the PLO Office in New York

By act of Congress, the Justice Department was ordered to shut down the observer mission of the Palestinians Liberation Organization at the United Nations in New York. The American Administration, on the other hand, was opposed to closing the PLO's office in New York. The dissents or division among political elites in the American Capital shaped the coverage of the closure of the PLO's UN observer mission. Further, the administration view, as discussed below, dominated the coverage. The NYT (30.43%) and LAT (69.57%) held that the closure of the New York Office was contrary to the nation's treaty obligations with the United Nations, and called upon Congress to repeal its action (50% and 50%).

The criticism reflected the capability of the American administration to shape the media agenda. The Reagan Administration had resisted Congress on the issue. It argued that the effort to close the mission at the United Nations violated US treaty obligations. The State Department "... found out that this country's 1947 host government agreement with the United Nations precludes interference with UN-accredited missions" (LAT, March 6: 1988). On March 11, Secretary of State George Shultz condemned the congressional act as " a bad piece of legislation, one of the dumber things congress has done lately " (Editorials on File, 1988).



**Table 4: Shutdown of the PLO Office in New York**

	NYT	WP	LAT	SLPD
Breach of the US agreement with the UN	30.43	00	69.57	00
Congress should repeal its action	50	00	50	00
The basis of the decision is questionable	50	00	50	00

**Israel's Handling of the Intifada**

As table 5 shows, the NYT (88.9%), WP (48.33%), and LAT (24.99%) tended to present the Palestinians as the underdog. The three newspapers focused on the 'iron fist' policy enforced in the West Bank and Gaza. Further, the NYT (88.94% and 100%) underlined the role of the outside world in perpetuating Palestinian misery. The NYT (50%), however, and LAT (50%) showed some support for the Israeli point of view that the unrest must be put down before a peace process could start. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud bloc asserted that the Uprising would have to be suppressed before talks could begin. Further, the NYT (100%) tended to stress the suffering of the Israeli soldiers as a result of using harsh measures against the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Moreover, it underscored the PLO's participation in any peace process (100%), but it focused on, more than any other issue, the PLO's need to make a gesture first, an explicit recognition of Israel's right to exist and a clear denouncement of terrorism (95.24%).

The focus on the suffering of Israeli soldiers and the PLO's need to recognise Israel and to denounce terrorism, are related to the victim and terrorist discourses respectively. The 'suffering' of Israeli soldiers serves to transform the soldiers from victimisers to victims thereby evoking the traditional image of Israel as victim. The call for the PLO to denounce terrorism, evokes the terrorist frame.

**Table 5: Israel's Handling of the Intifada**

	NYT	WP	LAT	SLPD
Arab leaders, US, and Israel are responsible for Palestinian tragedy	88.9	00	11.1	00
The UN shares responsibility	100	00	00	00
The Iron Fist policy	26.66	48.33	24.99	00
The unrest should be contained first	50	00	50	00
Israel does not lack sensitivity	100	00	00	00
Palestinians in the territory support the PLO	100	00	00	00

No serious peace without PLO participation	100	00	00	00
The PLO should make a gesture first	95.24	00	4.76	00
The rationale for sealing the territory from the press is dubious	100	00	00	00
Ban of cameras would not help Israel's image abroad	100	00	00	00
Palestinians are desperate	50	50	00	00
Terrorists' operation lends rationale for Israeli hard-liners	00	100	00	00

### Death of an Israeli Teenager

The death of an Israeli youth and two Palestinian civilians was treated differently. Compared to the death of two Palestinians (100%), the WP gave more emphasis to the death of an Israeli teenager, Tirazh Porat (70%). Further, unlike the Israeli victim the Palestinian victims, were nameless.

The focus on the Israeli teenager vis-à-vis the Palestinian victims signifies a tendency to personalize and thus to humanize the former. Moreover, naming encourages the reader to identify with the victim. Keeping the Palestinians nameless victims, in contrast, invokes fear from the unknown. In

giving a rationale for Israeli hard liners (100%), the WP lends support to the view of seeing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from an Israeli perspective.

**Table 6: Death of an Israeli Teenager**

	NYT	WP	LAT	SLPD
Death of 15-year old Israeli girl	30	70	00	00
Death of two Palestinians	00	100	00	00
Tirazh Porat	60	40		
Many Israelis see the killing as justification for more toughness	00	100	00	00

#### The Assassination of Khalil Al Wazir

The WP tends to present the military chief of the PLO and moderate Palestinian national leader, Khalil Al Wazir, as a terrorist (100%), compared to five statements (100%) as a national leader. The NYT, LAT and SLPT do not address the assassination of Al Wazir. This seems to be consistent with the elite press attitude toward the PLO. The elite press, as indicated in chapters III and IV, tend to perceive the PLO as a terrorist organization. These findings can be explained by reference to the predominant American view of terrorism as terrorist acts done by 'them' (e.g. Palestinians, Arabs and Muslim

fundamentalists) against 'us' (e.g. America and Israel). In this context, state terrorism done by client state is anything but terrorism.

**Table 7: The Assassination of Khalil Al Wazir**

	NYT	WP	LAT	SLPD
Khalil Al Wazir was a terrorist	00	100	00	00
Khalil Al Wazir was a national leader	00	100	00	00
Killing terrorists does not solve the problem	00	100	00	00

### **6.5 Depicting and Conferring the Textual Indices**

Traditional content analysis, as discussed in Chapter Five, gives precedence to manifest content as the conveyer of meaning at the expense of latent content, and it assumes that frequencies of certain characteristics are valid indicators of meaning. To overcome these pitfalls content analysis is complemented by some limited textual analysis to show how meaning is constructed.

Textual analysis, unlike quantitative content analysis, focuses on the relationships within the text and with culture. Textual Meaning derives from

relationships, oppositions and context rather than from the quantity of references. It offers a way of analyzing, in depth, the meanings that lie within a particular text. This includes patterns of paired oppositions buried in the text and the chain of events that form the narrative.

1. **Israel's handling of the Intifada:** Israel's policy in the occupied territories generated enormous criticism from the WP, LAT, and NYT. Israel's use of massive forces; beating policy; deportation and censorship gave meaning to this criticism:

1)- The way Israel handled the Palestinian protest with military tactics and disproportionate force was bad enough. The way they were handling the aftermath with military justice and the threat of deportation is no better (Washington Post, December 31, 1987).

2)- Any army occupying foreign territory should not be expelling residents without due process, as Israel is doing in the West Bank and Gaza (Washington Post, January 5, 1988).

3)- Israeli officials responded stiffly that Israel will itself decide on what its security requires. This is a popular line in Israel, especially when foreign friends challenge the undemocratic measures it takes in the name of protecting its democracy. But it is a bankrupt line (Washington Post, January 5, 1988).

4)- Without the formality of trial or even a chance to see the alleged evidence against them, four Palestinians accused by Israel of being among the "instigators and organizers" of the riots in the occupied territories have been deported to southern Lebanon (Los Angeles Times, January 15, 1988).

5)- It would be a profound mistake for Israel to believe that it can restore order in occupied Gaza and the West Bank by resorting to brazen brutality and betraying its own values (New York Times, January 24, 1988).

6)- For Israel to bar the cameras invites comparison with South Africa and obtains only temporary relief at a harsh sacrifice of its own values (New York Times, April 5, 1988).

7)- The Israeli army has been sent door to door to beat Palestinians into submission, even if that means breaking the bones of women, children, and old men ....

Do these actions truly reflect the considered judgment of the coalition cabinet or the Israeli public? If the answer is yes, then the state that once promised deliverance to the oppressed peoples has truly lost its way (New York Times, January 24, 1988).

8)- Any fair look at Gaza, and the West Bank, shows guilt on all sides- Israel, Arab leaders, the United States and the United Nations. They have all stood by while Palestinians have been stripped of any legitimate political voice ....

And so the Palestinians of Gaza, without hope and ripe for rebellion, took to the streets. Who would do otherwise when good behavior insures only the status quo? (New York Times, January 8, 1988)

9)- The nine [Palestinians] were arrested uncharged and are to be thrown out of their homes and out of the place where their families have lived perhaps for generations (Washington Post, January 5, 1988).

10)- An occupation, no matter how it is run, builds hate and that must be terminated, and not by annexation, which some Israelis favor, but by agreement with representative Palestinians who in turn must live in peace with Israel (Washington Post, December 31, 1987).

11)- The only real chance for a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians lies in negotiating and carrying out a feasible compromise that will require each side to accept less than what its extremists insist it must have (Los Angeles Times, February 18, 1988).

12)- But if the P.L.O. were willing to make that deal [live in peace with Israel] it would be folly for Israel not to embrace it (New York Times, March 2, 1988).

Paragraph one invokes the international law discourse. It equates Israel's policy on the West Bank and Gaza strip with "disproportionate force" and "military justice and threat of deportation ...". Hence, Israel appears as the 'oppressor' rather than the underdog and in violation of the 1947 Geneva convention, which prohibits deportation of civilians from occupied territories regardless of their motive. Moreover, Israel's policy is equated with Goliath behaviour. One, however, should not lose sight of the fact that the media do not question the use of force as such. It questions the amount of force used by the Israeli troops.

Israeli policy → excessive force, military justice, deportation
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Israeli policy → Goliath behaviour
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Paragraphs two, three and four elaborate on the illegality of deportation. The West Bank and Gaza strip is a "foreign territory". Israel is violating the international law by "expelling residents without the formality of trial or even a chance to see the alleged evidence against them..." (paragraph four). Further, the view of the Israeli forces as "An army occupying foreign territory" transforms the David and Goliath frame of an underdog engaged in self-defence.

West Bank & Gaza → Foreign territory
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Paragraph three also equates the Israeli line that "Israel will itself decide on what its security requires" with bankruptcy "... it is a bankrupt line" (paragraph three).

Israeli official line → bankruptcy
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Paragraphs five, six and seven invoke the special nature of Israel's value discourse. They link the Iron Fist policy with the risk of Israel losing its own value, "it would be a profound mistake for Israel to believe that it can restore order .... by resorting to brazen brutality and betraying its own values" (paragraph five).

In paragraph seven, a process of elaboration is used to give meaning to brutality and betrayal of Israel's own values "The Israeli army has been sent door to door to beat Palestinians ... even if that means bones of women, children and the old men .... Do these ... actions reflect the considered judgement of the coalition cabinet or Israeli public? If the answer is yes, then the state that onset promised deliverance to the oppressed truly lost its way" (paragraph seven). Moreover, the paragraph questions the David and Goliath frame by plotting Israel's might against women, children and the elderly. Furthermore, it challenges some elements of the terrorist image by humanising the Palestinians. The focus on women, children and the elderly suggests a national struggle of an indigenous population rather than groups of terrorists determined to destroy the besieged Israeli David. This stands in sharp contrast to the pre-Intifada phase where the Palestinians are seen largely in terms of terrorism. One, however, needs to view this criticism of Israeli policy with caution because it reveals in our view that what is at stake are Israel's values rather than the Palestinian suffering. Another point that must be kept in mind is that criticism of Israel's violence is mild when compared with criticism of Palestinian violence which has been presented largely in terms of terrorism

Israel army VS women and children
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Paragraph six equates Israel's handling of the press with harsh consequences: "comparison with South Africa ... [and] sacrifice of its own values" (paragraph six).

Iron fist policy → Betrayal of Israel values
--

Israeli's policy in the occupied territories does not only draw severe criticism, but also seems to have generated a sympathetic coverage for the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Editorials of the elite press tend to depict the Palestinians as the underdogs, or as oppressed without hope of rising against superior military force. This interpretation of the Israel-Palestinian dispute reverses the traditional image of Israel as the besieged David facing the Palestinian and Arab Goliath.

Paragraph eight begins by blaming all sides for their lack of interest in the Palestinian problem. "Any fair look at Gaza, and the West Bank, shows guilt on all sides- Israel, Arab leaders, the United states and the United Nations." (paragraph eight). Thus, a process of elaboration is activated to give meaning to this guilt. "They have all stood by while Palestinians have been stripped of any legitimate political voice" (paragraph eight). Further, the reference to 'legitimate political voice' suggests a struggle to restore political rights and conveys a message of national aspiration.

Lack of legitimate political voice+Lack of hope → Intifada
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Lastly, all sides' indifference toward the Palestinians which the paragraph started with is linked to the Intifada "without hope [Palestinians of Gaza] took to the street, who would do otherwise when good behaviour insures only the status quo?" (paragraph eight).

Paragraph nine challenges many elements of the terrorist image by personalising and humanising the Palestinians. It refers to the Palestinians as a people with "homes and families "

Finally, the elite press calls for direct talks between Israel and representatives of the Palestinian people. The NYT even goes one step further to suggest talks with the PLO as long as it is ready to live in harmony with the state of Israel. Paragraph ten began by equating occupation with hate " An occupation ... builds hate." Hence, the occupation "must be terminated." The paragraph then explains how the occupation should be terminated " ... by agreement with representative Palestinians ..." (paragraph ten). Similarly, paragraph eleven defines the real chance for peace between Israel and the Palestinian in terms of negotiation (paragraph eleven).

Real chance for peace      —————→      negotiation
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Some elements of the old discourse, however, are still evident in paragraph twelve. The paragraph concentrates on the PLO, that is, the need to recognise Israel's right to exist: "If the PLO were willing to make that deal [live in peace with Israel] it would be folly for Israel not to embrace it" (paragraph twelve). This process subordinates the fact that Israel denies the Palestinian national and territorial identity; the Palestinian right to national independence and sovereignty; and the right to representation. That is to say, the Palestinians right to self-determination.

## 2. The peace process:

United States Secretary of States, George Shultz, arrived in Israel in February 25, 1988 to revive the long-moribund peace process. Shultz's package of proposals called for negotiations to achieve some form of interim autonomy for the occupied territories through local Palestinians elections, as well as talk to be convened by December between Israel and its Arab neighbor to discuss the territories' final status. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir insisted that Israel would never withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians rejected the plan for an obvious reason: the plan excluded their legitimate representative from the process.

The Following are examples from the editorials in the sample:

13)- The U.S. will have to put forward someone of unusual stature to promote an end to the bloodshed and revive the peace process. President Reagan isn't up to the active role played by President Carter in 1978 (New York Times, February 3, 1988).

14)- The Shultz plan, sensibly, flexibly, calls for an international conference to bless the process and legitimize the outcome of direct Arab-Israeli talks (New York Times, February 26, 1988).

15)- What is Shultz up to? Perhaps nothing more than trying to forestall the criticism that the United States hasn't done enough on behalf of a settlement (Los Angeles Times, February 18, 1988).

16)- Friends of both sides [Israel and Palestine] ought to be helping them exploit the extraordinary opportunities offered by American diplomacy now (Washington Post, April 5, 1988).

17)- The trouble [with Shamir's demand] is that the analysis seems a smoke screen for an Israeli leader who has never supported the principle of territorial compromise with any Arab neighbor (New York Times, March 22, 1988).

The NYT and the Washington Post, respectively, displayed support for the American effort to bring peace in the Middle East and the principle of exchanging land for peace (paragraphs fourteen & sixteen). The LAT tended to be pessimistic about the success of Shultz's plan to do any good (paragraph fifteen). Nonetheless, it advocated the principles of exchanging land for peace. The NYT criticized the Reagan Administration in January and February 1988 for not being active in the peace process, and called for its revival by appointing a heavyweight negotiator. As soon as Shultz's peace plan had leaked, the NYT showed strong support of the plan and insisted on the need for a full-time negotiator (paragraph fourteen). The WP viewed Shultz's plan as an extraordinary plan to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (paragraph sixteen)

Moreover, it questioned Shamir's reservations on the peace plan, defining them as " a smoke screen for an Israeli leader who has never supported the principle of territorial compromise with any Arab neighbour " (paragraph seventeen).

Shamir's reservations —————→ smoke screen
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### 3. Shut-down of the PLO office in New York:

The Congressional recommendations to close the PLO office in New York generated a storm of criticism in the NYT and LAT. As indicated earlier, the WP and SLPD did not address the issue.

For example:

18)- The move showed contempt for international law and American ideals of free speech, and Congress now reaps the humiliating rewards (New York Times, March 4, 1988).

19)- The United States is being made to look foolish before the world, with its Congress appearing scornful of the rule of law (Los Angeles Times, March 6, 1988).

20)- The law ordering the closing of the Palestine Liberation Organization's observer mission at the United Nations affronts American traditions and violates U.S. obligations as host to the U.N. .... Congress, which made the mess, is the only body that can cleanly extricate the US by repealing this bad law (New York Times, February 11, 1988).

21)- The PLO is indeed guilty of terrorism, but no one has ever accused its U.N. mission ... of violating any law (Los Angeles Times, March 6, 1988).

A predominant view held that the close of the PLO office at the United Nations is a breach of the 1947 treaty between the US and the UN, and of the principle of freedom of speech. The move is equated with contempt of "... international law" and the American ideal of free speech " (paragraph eighteen) and with being "bad law" (paragraph twenty). The critical view of the closure order, however, did not preclude the existence of elements of the old discourse. Paragraph twenty one equates the PLO with terrorism "The PLO is indeed guilty of terrorism " (paragraph twenty one). This process subordinates the fact that terror is practised by two sides and during the Intifada, the predominant terror is practised by Israel against Palestinians. It is the Palestinian village where homes are demolished, people deported, detained, imprisoned, tortured and killed.

#### 4. **Killing of an Israeli teenager:**

On April 6, 1988 an Israeli girl was killed while hiking in the occupied West Bank with a group of teenage Jewish settlers. She was initially reported to have been stoned to death by Palestinians, but it later emerged that she had been shot to death accidentally by an Israeli guard during a confrontation in which two Palestinians were also killed.

For example:

22)- A vicious encounter with Arab villagers unfolded, and she became the first Israeli civilian to die in the four-month Palestinian uprising (Washington Post, April 8, 1988).

Of the four newspapers, WP and NYT address the killing of the 15-year old Israeli girl, Tirzah Porat. The concentration on the Israeli teenager subordinates the fact that two Palestinian teenagers were killed in the same incident. It also invokes elements of the old discourse where Arab victims are sanitised while Israeli victims are humanised. Moreover, it recalls the Israeli image as helpless victims. " A vicious encounter with Arab villagers unfolded and she became the first Israeli to die ...." (paragraph twenty two). The WP tends to generate sympathy for Israel, even though two Palestinians are killed in the same incident. Further, it tends to justify a Jewish extremism.

**5. Assassination of the military leader of the PLO and Palestinian national leader Khalil Al Wazir (Abujehad):**

The WP, as indicated earlier, was the only newspaper to address the assassination of the PLO leader Khalil Al Wazir.

For example:

23)- As the No. 2 man in Yassir Arafat's PLO and the head of its main military army, he qualified as a terrorist, someone using violence indiscriminately, against civilians .... There can be no loose romanticizing about the man (Washington Post, April 19, 1988).

The WP invokes the terrorist discourse. It equates AL-Wazir and the PLO with terrorism. " As the No.2 man in Yassir Arafat's PLO and head of its main military army, he qualified as a terrorist " (Paragraph twenty three). Furthermore, a process elaboration is used to give content to being a terrorist. " [Al Wasir used] violence indiscriminately against civilians " (paragraph twenty three). This discourse obviously serves three main functions. It overlooks the fact that Israel has used violence indiscriminately against civilians. It also delegitimizes the PLO and dehumanises AL Wazir.



## **6.6 Summary and Conclusion**

In brief, evidence from the Intifada case has shown an increasing in press attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between December 1987 and April 1988. Number of editorials has increased from one editorial in December 1987, to four editorials in January 1988, five editorials in February, six editorials in March and seven editorials in April (see figure 3)

Content analysis has revealed that most of the editorials were printed in the NYT (13) followed by the WP (5), the LAT (4) and SLPD (2). Of the thirteen editorials printed by the NYT, eleven were ran between February and April 1988. The LAT printed all five editorials between February and march 1988. The WP published 60 Percent of its five editorials on the Intifada between February and March 1988.

Editorial attention to the Intifada over issues have shown that the NYT ran five editorials (38.5%) on Israel's handling of the Intifada, five editorials (38.5%) on the peace process, two editorials (15.4%) on the shutdown of the PLO office at the UN, and one editorial (7.7%) on the killing of an Israeli teenager (see figure 9). The LAT devoted two editorials (50%) to the peace process, one editorial (25%) to Israel's handling of the Intifada and one editorial (25%) to the shut-down of the PLO office in New York (see figure 10).

The WP printed two editorials (40%) on Israel's handling of the Intifada, one editorial (20%) on the peace process, one editorial (20%) on the killing of an Israeli teenager and one editorial (20%) on the assassination of Khalil Al

Wazir (see figure 11). The SLPD ran two editorials, both of them on the peace process (see figure 12).

Attitude analysis has shown that 50 percent of editorials were favourable to the Palestinians compared to 12 percent which were unfavourable and 38 percent which were neutral (see table 2).

The NYT (26.7%), WP (48.3%) and LAT (25%) tended to portray the Palestinians as the underdog. The NYT (50%), however and the LAT (50%) showed some support to the Israeli view that the Intifada must stop before a peace process could start. Further, the NYT (100%) tended to focus on the suffering of the Israeli soldiers, the PLO's need to recognise Israel and to denounce terrorism (95.24%)-see table 5.

The NYT (66.7% & 41.31%) and the WP (28.57% & 30.8%) showed a strong support for the American effort to bring peace in the Middle East and the principle of exchanging land for peace (see table 3). The LAT (100%) tended to be pessimistic about the success of Shultz's plan to do any good but it showed similar support to the principle of swapping land for peace which is the crux of the American policy (23.1% see table 3). Further, the NYT (61.9%) and the LAT (38.1%) questioned the sincerity of Israel's reservation on Shultz peace plan (see table 3).

The Congressional recommendation to close the PLO office in New York generated a strong criticism in both the NYT (30.43%) and the LAT (69.57%). Both papers argued congress to reverse its action (50% & 50%). They also questioned the basis of the decision (50% & 50% see table 4).

The WP (70%) and the NYT (30%) placed more emphasis on the death of an Israeli teenager. Further, unlike the Israeli victim the Palestinians victims were nameless (see table 6) The WP tends to portray Khalil Al Wazir as a terrorist (100%)..

In conclusion, This chapter has revealed that there is some shift in the portrayal of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute in the Intifada phase vis-à-vis the pre-Intifada phase. The Intifada is conceived as ‘their war’ for the American media .The change stems in part from the passive nature of the Intifada, the harsh measures the Israeli army used to put down the Intifada, media access during the early phases of the Intifada to the ‘hot spots’ in the occupied territories, and the American criticism of the ‘Iron fist’ policy. This finding lends support to Peretz’s analysis (Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising in 1988). Peretz argues, as we have seen in chapter three, that the eruption of the uprising as passive protest played a major role in winning the empathy of the American media.

Our data also lends a partial support to Daniel’s work in 1995 on the “Uprising and the American”. Daniel suggests that the perception of the Palestinian Goliath was challenged; the potential of military threat by the Palestinians to Israel security appeared negligible. Too, the use of harsh measures against the demonstrators resulted in a high level of criticism of Israel. Further, concepts such as ‘the end to occupation’ ‘homeland’, and ‘self-determination for the Palestinian’ precluded by the old frames, were revived and made available as elements of a new discourse .

In brief, the pre-Intifada frames of the conflict have been challenged during the Intifada. That is to say, the terrorist frame and the David and Goliath frame became displaced, though not eliminated, during the Intifada. The

Israeli-Palestinian dispute in the pre-Intifada phase was crystallized as ‘our war’ for the American media. On the contrary, the Intifada was conceived as ‘their war’.

The view of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute as ‘their war’ serves as a source of variability. It provides a more balanced coverage of the conflict. Indeed ‘our/their’ war has important effects on the dissemination of information. In ‘their war’, journalists might be inclined to observe the norm of their profession. However, when the journalist’s own country is at war, they might be inclined to subordinate the ideology of ‘objectivity’ and ‘balance’ to the welfare of their own side ( Blumier & Gurevitch, 1986; Traber & Davies, 1991; Liebes, 1992; Kalp, 1994 ).

To follow up on this study, it is essential to analyse the Gulf war. The analysis of the Gulf war which was ‘our war’ for the American media, and which witnessed an unprecedented Arab-American alliance, may enable us to find out whether the change in the American media treatment of the Arabs is a significant or minor one.

At this point we should return briefly to chapter one . In chapter one it was suggested that the American press, particularly during times of war, tend to follow the American government’s position. Hence, the key research question was whether the Arab alliance with the US particularized the generalized image of the Arab in the American media. Did the American government exploit the change in the political situation in the Gulf war? Did the American media in accordance with its social responsibility theory provide a forum for various

viewpoints ? Did it exploit the Arab-American alliance to initiate a new way of perceiving the Arabs ? This will be the focus of the next Chapter.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **GULF WAR CASE STUDY: RE-ACTIVATING THE ‘OTHERNESS OF OTHER’**

The previous Chapter set out a map of the analytical tools which are going to be applied on the relevant data regarding the problem structuring this thesis. The development of the argument in this chapter will be divided into various sections. These sections represent key analytical categories necessary for the problematization of the for-granted relations structuring the American media perception of the Arabs.

The Chapter will present descriptive and explanatory analyses of American media coverage of the Gulf war from January 16 to February 28, 1991. It will describe each of the content categories in terms of the number of items in which each occurs and then will attempt to make sense of these figures. In both analyses, two types of data are used as an indispensable resource for establishing the explanation sought for: 1) comparison of our data with other relevant empirical data and 2) excerpts of supportive evidence from other scholars.

The Chapter is divided into three sections. The first section focuses on the appearance or non appearance of Arab actors, and topics, and treats the three newspapers under study as an aggregate. This level of analysis focuses on the common conditions that would enable the appearance of common determination. In the second section, data is disaggregated to show the differences between the three newspapers put under examination. These

differences emerge from the identity of each paper which differentiate them from each other. The third section presents a thematic analysis. The thematic analysis is an added analytical perspective to allow a more detailed understanding of the ways these aggregates and disaggregates can be seen as part of another synthetic perspective, i.e. the system of cultural representation.

## **7.1 Aggregate Attention to Actors, Sources and Topics**

As mentioned above, this section treats the three newspapers as a whole. The key variables are actors, and topics.

### **7.1.1 Actors' Saliency and Overcoding Constitute Attractors for Political-Military Mobilisation**

A comparison of Iraq and the terms forming its identity with Arab states, leaders, armies and masses (Table 8, 9, 10, 11) signifies, as shown below, the problems of the coverage of the Gulf war: mobilising the home front suffocates any chance of initiating a new way of perceiving the Arabs.

**Table 8: Aggregate Attention to Arab States**

	Item No.	Percent
Iraq	205	41.33
Kuwait	139	28.00
Saudi	57	11.50
Egypt	19	3.80
Jordan	11	2.20
PLO	17	3.40
Others	48	9.68
TOTAL	496	100

Note : Item numbers total more than 274 because of multiple coding.

**Table 9: Aggregate Attention to Arab Leaders**

	Item No	Percent
Saddam Hussein	177	83.50
King Hussein	8	3.8
President Hosni Mubarak	5	2.4
King Fahd	2	.9
Amir Jabier	2	.9
Arafat	10	4.7
Others	8	3.8
TOTAL	212	100



**Table 10: Aggregate Attention to Arab Masses**

	Item No	Percent
Iraqis	52	45.6
Palestinians	37	32.5
Arab-Americans	8	7.0
Saudis	6	5.3
Kuwaitis	5	4.4
Egyptians	3	2.6
Jordanians	3	2.6
TOTAL	114	100

**Table 11: Aggregate Attention to Arab Armies**

	Item No	Percent
Iraqi	94	93
Saudi	4	4
Kuwait	2	2
Egypt	0	0
Jordan	0	0
PLO	-	-
Others	1	1
TOTAL	101	100

As table 8 shows, Iraq is the most prominent Arab state. It is mentioned in 205 items or as 41.33 percent of the total items which referred to Arab states. Apparently, the prominence of Iraq did not eliminate Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Attention to these states stems from their role in the international alliance. Kuwait (28 percent) is the site of the problem,

Saudi Arabia (11.5 percent) is the base of operations and of the alliance. To put it differently, there is a hierarchy in media attention to Arab states. This hierarchy does not stem from a moment of changing perspective towards the Arabs, but from being an emergent of objectification on the map of Western dominance and interests. Objectification in this respect ends up in devaluing the components of their active roles and their influential participation. One can argue that the focus on Iraq is natural given the media definition of the Gulf war as crisis. Our criticism, nonetheless, stems as will be discussed below from the fact that the media overlooked the change in the Arab positionality.

On the other hand, the attention to Iraq led to the marginalization of Jordan (3.4 percent), and the PLO (9.68 percent. see table 8). This would be evident if we compare our data (table 8) with Adams' data (table 12). Adams, Associate Professor of Public Administration at George Washington University, followed coverage of the Middle East nations on the three networks(ABC, NBC, CBS) between 1972-1980. Incorporating this perspective provide us with necessary tool to unravel the replacement in the American media attention to the Arabs. According to table 12, Jordan and the PLO were prominent Arab actors on network news between 1972-1980 (Adams, 1981). The table shows that the allocation of news time to Jordan and the PLO was 5.02 and 22.63 percent respectively, or 27.65 percent of all Arab states (see table 12). This suggest to us that being seen as an active threat, as strong, as proximate , and as ego relevant is essential for a high saliency foreign other.

**Table 12: Allocation of Minutes of News Time on Network (ABC, CBS, and NBC) to Arab States over the 1972-1980 period**

State	Minutes	%
Egypt	392.3	25.72
PLO	345.1	22.63
Lebanon	231.0	15.15
Syria	180.0	11.80
Saudi Arabia	114.0	7.48
Libya	78.4	5.14
Jordan	76.5	5.02
Iraq	64.7	4.24
Algeria	17.6	1.15
Kuwait	10.4	0.68
Yemen	5.0	0.33
United Arab Emirates	4.1	0.27
Oman	3.8	0.25
Tunisia	2.2	0.14
Total	1525.0	100.00

(source: Adams, 1981)

Indeed, Egypt, as table 12 shows, is the only state that received more news time (392.3 minutes) than did the PLO (345.1 minutes). However, the emphasis given to Egypt needs to be seen in consideration of Sadat's journey to Jerusalem in 1977 and Camp David summit with President Carter and Israel's Prime Minister Begin in September 1978.

The change in politics did not alter the way the Arabs are presented in the American media. Previous work on the Arab image in the American media suggests that the PLO, traditionally, is the popular 'other' for the American media and the window through which they see the Arab world (see Chapter Two and Four). The media, during the Gulf war, have utilised the same frame. This time Iraq becomes the new 'other' and the window through which they see the Arabs. The key point is that these 'components' or 'participants' inhabiting the position of Arab villain may change but the position itself in this context is likely to remain fixed.

As shown in table 9, the sampled papers focus on Saddam Hussein. Hussein appears in 177 items or in 83.5 percent of the items that refer to Arab leaders. He is followed by Arafat (4.7 percent) and King Hussein (3.8 percent). The Pro-US leaders, however, are pushed to the bottom of the media's hierarchy of political actors; President Mubarak (2.4 percent), King Fahd (0.9 percent), and Amir Jabier (0.9 percent). Similarly, the Iraqi army (93 percent) is given more attention than any other Arab army (see Table 11). Perhaps this marginalization of Pro-US actors reflects, at least in part, news values. As discussed in Chapter Three, negativity is an important criteria in deciding if an actor is newsworthy. Hence, a perceived 'deviant' actor is apt to receive more attention than a non 'deviant' actor. Hussein, as we will see later on, is viewed as a threatening enemy possessing weapons of mass destruction.

One obviously can argue that the special attention to the subject is natural, given the media definition of war as a national and global crisis. Our judgement of imbalanced coverage rests nonetheless on the fact that the media overlooked the significant changes in the political situation in the

Arab world, where most of the Arab states joined the US led coalition in the Persian Gulf. In light of this alliance, we presume that there will be an interest in the Arabs. As we have seen above, however, data suggests otherwise (Table 8,9,10,11)

Internally, the focus on Saddam Hussein (35.52 percent) vis-à-vis the Iraqi people (9.85 percent) and the Iraqi army (9.85 percent) -see table 13- signifies the tendency of the media to personalise the war as the result of the actions of one man, Saddam Hussein.

**Table 13: Attention to Iraqi Actors**

	Item No	Percent
Iraq	205	38.83
Saddam Hussein	177	33.52
Iraq Army	94	17.80
Iraq Masses	52	9.85
Total	528	100.00

This can be related to 'personification' which refers to the tendency of the media to present events as a consequence of the actions of individuals (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). The effect of this is to flatten the actual world. It reduces the world's complexity to the actions of this man who has created all

the troubles. Of course, decisions are made by individuals who act but those acts are stripped off from any context within which the acts can take place.

Personalization of the war in the figure of Saddam Hussein serves also to dematerialise suffering of the masses and deviates public attention from the suffering inflicted on Iraqi civilians. For instance, when suffering is mentioned as result of bombing a shelter in Baghdad, the press has largely, as thematic analysis will show, blamed all the suffering on Saddam Hussein.

The data, therefore, suggests that the press focused almost entirely on Iraq and on those elements that constituted the terms of its identity formation (see table 8,9,10,11). This tendency is a repetitive example of research which has postulated the national crisis as a perspective to understand the media - war relationship. A national and distal crisis, such as war, requires mobilisation of the home front before and after the war efforts. It is not surprising that Patrick Buchanan, a syndicate columnist in the data under focus, argues that in wartime, Americans do not want objectivity: “[Americans] believe that, once U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are committed to battle, every jailbird, should back the troops” (LAT, February 17, 1991). Parallel to that, R. W. Apple Jr of the NYT, in a text which is part of our data analysis, noted “Mr Bush has sought to liken his struggle against Saddam Hussein and Iraq to that against Hitler and Germany .... Tonight, ..., the President again used language evocative of Europe in the 1930’s and 1940’s. He said ‘the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless nation’ .... What Mr Bush wants to avoid, of course, is any comparison to Vietnam, the war most vivid in current national memory, which opened grievous wounds in American body politic, ended in humiliating defeat and made many in this country reluctant ever to back

foreign wars again”(NYT, February 17, 1991). This indicates that the support of the home front is a critical element of the war effort. President Bush was keen to ensure the support of the American people and their representatives on Capital Hill.

Mobilisation demands the construction of a highly salient 'foreign other'. A highly salient 'other' is likely to be presented as an active threat, as strong, as proximate and as ego - relevant. If we go back to table 8, we find a high saliency of Iraq (41.33%) vis-à-vis the PLO (3.4%) during the Gulf war. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation in the 1972-1980 period when the PLO was perceived as a prominent foreign other, that is to say an active threat, strong, proximate and ego-relevant. If we look back again at Adams' data (1981) in table 12 we find that the PLO received 22.63 percent of the news time devoted to the Arab states as compared to 4.24 percent for Iraq. What does that mean? A foreign other needs to be seen as an active threat, as strong, as proximate, and as ego-relevant to be highly salient (see Finlay et al ,1967 for a perspective on the enemy in politics). "If an enemy is perceived as an active threat, he is viewed as engaging in activity immediately threatening, hostile to our interests, and requiring attention - activity on our part. If an enemy is perceived as strong, he is considered to have potential or actual capabilities of taking direct or indirect actions which adversely affect us, with a high probability of success unless we do something to check, equal or surpass his power. If an enemy is proximate, he is perceived as close in time, space, and meaning and there is considerable involvement, interaction, or conflict with him, contact, confrontation, or crisis may or may not be imminent, but the possibility, or the perception of its likelihood, seem high. Lastly, if an enemy is ego-relevant, the central elements of our personality, our stand and responses,

our belief systems, self image or ego - 'attitude' are affected or influenced by him or his presence" (Finlay et al, 1967: 2).

To understand the mode of the high saliency, (i.e. its value) one has to derive it from the incorporation of two other supplementary tools. These are labels and themes. They are the two spaces through which saliency comes to have a direction and tends to be embodied. This point is mentioned at this stage to suggest that saliency is a machinery for making the 'other' a possible attractor in the political-military field. There has to be another perspective to realise the value, i.e. the relation between saliency and other conditions taking place. This relation can be manifested in label and thematic analysis.

If one returns to tables 8-11, data show high saliency of Iraq and the terms constituting its identity formation (Saddam Hussien, Iraq, Iraqi masses, & Iraqi army) and show a dialectic process of vocalisation and marginalization. Acts of vocalisation work through personalization. However one has to dispel the common sense of personalization. The personalization could be done through character and scene. In our case study we have both types of acts. Personalization of character is evident in table 9 (Saddam Hussein 83.50%), and scene is evident in table 8 (Iraq 41.23%), table 10 (Iraqi masses 45.4%), and table 11 (Iraqi army 93%).

Further, in order for the Americans involved in the Gulf war to sustain a disposition of popular identification with their intervention, they have to establish the sense of 'concreteness' of the negative properties and doings of the postulated 'other'. It appears that this is done through the process of overloading the subject matter with details. The details are



affluent though not in the direction that could contextualise the issue at hand. Contextualisation, within the perspective of Self-Other and Distance Crisis, would be at the expense of proliferation of the ad hoc details which is much needed for establishing an antagonistic position worth fighting against. In this sense, the details inevitably are locked into a certain type. This type is captured by the current dominant discourse which rotates around the war discourse, particularly in its military articulation.

Not only overloading but also overcoding seems to function to maintain the mobilisation required. The former device is more meant to be a purpose for creating a sense of fear and anxiety in result of having an image of concreteness of the postulated enemy while the latter is more a matter of sustaining a capacity of control of the possible paces of discursive connections that can be made with the proliferated details. The very fact of having an overcoding process as such, shows there are extensive machineries (devices) working through to sustain an enclosure, that is, a setting of an agenda as part of what the ad hoc mobilisation requires. In this sense, there is a clear sign of repressing a new opportunity that can make a differentiation in the image of the Arabs. Accordingly, the centralisation or frontstaging, would inevitably make many historical and contextual conditions of the Gulf war redundant. These overcodings are functioning, in part, through vocalisation or elevation of Iraq and its whole chain of terms constituting its formative identity.

Such processes of overloading and overcoding are indicative of a narration. The point of contact between narration and mobility is made through simplification. Kellner points out correctly that instead of attempting to contextualize the Gulf crisis, the media " ... constructed a

highly simplistic narrative: Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait; he wouldn't leave; and war was necessary " (Kellner, 1992: 92). Thus, there is no context to understand the crisis in the Gulf, and no context to initiate a sort of change in the Arab image. The Gulf war, as we have suggested in Chapter Two, is justified by contextualising it in categories which are the results of multiple dialectical, historical and current trajectories

#### **7.1.1.a Labels: Invoking the Imaginary for Establishing Current Justification**

As table 14 shows, there are 150 labels appearing in the period of this study.

**Table 14: Labels of the Arabs During the Gulf War**

Labels	No
Brutal / Cruel / Bárbaric	35
Aggressor	28
Terrorist	18
Hitler	09
Occupier / Invader	09
Dictator	08
Ally	06
Moderate	06
Radical	05
Evil	04
Atrocities	04
Friend	04
Fundamentalists / fanatic / Zealot	03

Violent	03
Thug	02
Monster	01
Fascist	01
Victim	01
Intelligent	01
Not - Trustworthy	01
Incompetent	01
<hr/>	
Total	150

Labels are then divided into two groups. The first group (131 in total) includes brutal/cruel/barbaric (35), aggressor (28), terrorist (18), Hitler (9), occupier/invader (9), dictator (8), radical (5), evil (4), atrocities (4), fundamentalists/fanatic/zealot (3), violent (3), thug (2), monster (1), fascist (1), non-trustworthy (1), and incompetent (1). The second group (18 in total) includes ally (6), moderate (6), friend (4), victim (1), and intelligent (1). The first group, which is prominent, (88%) was applied mainly to the terms constituting Iraqi identity, particularly Saddam Hussein, while the latter group (12%) was applied to pro US Arab actors. The high saliency of the first group and the low saliency of the second group serves to reinvigorate and enhance the reproducibility of those negative elements which have had constituted one antagonising stream of Orientalism.

The form that the labels took reflects a subject attribution (i.e. Brutal, Aggressor, Terrorist, Dictator), which in the context of saliency cannot but be referring to Saddam Hussein. Two texts of our data illustrate the point. The first text, by Ernest Lefever, characterises him as " a brutal and messianic dictator with an ominous resemblance to Hitler ... " (LAT,

February 28, 1991). The second text, by New York Times editorialist A. M. Rasenthal, describes him as a 'dictator' (NYT, February 19, 1991). But in what context are these words used? One analytical tool which seems to be applicable to this question is thematic analysis. It forefronts the background or the setting of these words.

One text of our data by Charles Krauthammer argued that 'Saddamism' is worse than 'Hitlerism': "Saddamism, as the critics endlessly repeat, is not quite Hitlerism : the evil is more instrumental, the cruelty is less systematic, its power is as yet regional not global. Yet Saddam's performance since January 16, should give the sceptics a pause. His mistreatment of POWs, his unprovoked missile attacks on cities, his threats once again to use poison gas, his turning captives into human shields is rather convincing evidence that Saddam represents barbarism unusual by 20th century standards. And barbarism on the march is not barbarism to be accommodated. Our goal today, as in 1943, should be unconditional surrender" (WP, January 23, 1991).

Obviously, one cannot ignore the mobilising power of these words. They are evocative of the war against Hitler in the 1940's, a war that united the American people and ended gloriously for the coalition assembled against fascism. The issues of political freedom and tyranny in the American political values, as we have seen in Chapter Three, are the most articulated themes for mobilising the home front after US interventionist policy abroad. The word 'Hitler', nonetheless, was mentioned in only nine items. Having said that, one should not lose sight of the fact that it is at the top of the least used labels (see table 14). Moreover, the word 'terrorist' (18) evokes the Arab image as 'terrorists'. It revives the pre-Intifada image of the

Arab as 'terrorist'. The resurgence of this image illustrates that the change in the portrayal of the Arabs in the Intifada phase (Chapter Six) is not built upon. It was left at the surface of negative investment. This is not to say that the Intifada frame discussed in the previous Chapter was completely passive. The Intifada frame combined with the Arab-American alliance during the Gulf war were resisting forces. The second group of labels (12%) is just one sign of that resistance. The two most prominent labels are ally (3.99%) and moderate (3.99%). But in what setting are these two terms used? Thematic analysis, as we have suggested earlier is a relevant analytical machinery to such a question.

The New York Times in an unsigned editorial argues that " ... the political risk will be disproportionately borne by U.S. allies across the Middle East and beyond, especially if the war drags on. Arab allies faced with mounting political challenge at home, desperately want the war to end quickly." (NYT, January 29, 1991). R. W. Apple Jr in a non-editorial item writes " Experts on the region said that the participation of Saudi and Kuwaiti aircraft was a hopeful sign that Arab allies would be willing to play a full part at least in the aerial campaign, including flying missions not only over Kuwait but over Iraq" (NYT, January 17, 1991). Rowland Evans and Robert Novak argue that " ... Jordan cuts a relatively minor figure on the Middle East's post-war chess board. After Saddam Hussein is knocked out, the heavy players will be Egypt and Saudi Arabia, vying to be Uncle Sam's closest ally ..." (WP, January 21, 1991).

Another main positive label is 'moderate' (3.99%). The imprisonment of prominent Palestinian philosopher, Sari Nusseibeh, by Israel without trial was criticised and Nusseibeh was referred to by editorial

and non-editorial items as moderate. The New York Times editorialised that “ ... Mr Shamir wants to prepare a political bunker for resisting any post-war proposals for territorial compromise with *West Bank Arabs* (emphasis added). His overture to Moledet follows the jailing without trial of a prominent Palestinian moderate, Sari Nusseibeh, on implausible spy charges. Taken together, the two actions suggest a strategy aimed at strengthening Israel’s extremists and weakening moderate Palestinians” ( NYT, February 9, 1991). Anthony Lewis of the New York Times (in the data under analysis) argued that “ Shortly before midnight last Tuesday, Israeli police took Sari Nusseibeh, a prominent Palestinian moderate from his home in a Jerusalem suburb. He was told that he was being put in ‘administrative detention’- prison- for six months. .... The likely answer [ to why Mr. Nusseibeh was arrested] is straightforward. Israel’s right-wing government does not want to negotiate with Palestinians because it does not want even to talk about withdrawing from the occupied territories. The best way to prevent negotiation is to decapitate the moderate leadership” (NYT, February 4, 1991).

So far we have treated each label as a separate term (table 14). In the following discussion labels are grouped into macro categories to reveal the roles assigned to Arab actors (villain, friend or incompetent). These macro categories are derived from Orfin Klapp (1962). Orfin Klapp (1962) suggests that the press creates and alters images through the process of social typing. Klapp suggests that media portrayals of leaders type them into either 'hero', 'villain' or 'fool' roles, which significantly alter the reception of information about these leaders by the reader. These roles correspond to three themes: threat, co-operation and fool (Klapp, 1962). This can be seen clearly in the Gulf war.

**Tables 15: Regrouped Labels of the Araba During the Gulf War**

Macro Categories	%	Corresponded themes
(1) Villain : Brutal Aggressor Terrorist Hitler Invader Radical evil Atrocities Violent Dictator Thug Fanatic Monster Fundamentalist Fascist Non-Trusworth	87.3	Threat
(2) Friend Ally Moderate Friend Intelligent	12	Co-operation
(3) Incompetent	0.7	Fool

The continuum of labels from brutal to incompetence can be reduced into three macro categories: Demon / Villain (87.3 percent) which refers to

any one who misuses power over weaker rivals and victims, but threatens order and imposes his will and ideas on others even at the expense of their freedom. Stated differently, a demon is an incarnation of all evils. This category includes brutal, aggressor, terrorist, Hitler, occupier, radical, barbaric, evil, atrocities, violent, dictator, thug, fanatic, monster, fundamentalist, fascist, and non-trustworthy. Friend (12 percent) encompass four labels ally, moderate, friend and intelligent and lastly, incompetent (0.7 percent). Ostensibly, these three categories correspond to three themes: threat (87.3 percent), co-operation (12 percent), and fool (0.7 percent). The overloading of threat and the marginalization of co-operation serve to sustain mobilisation.

**Table 16: Regrouped Labels Into Macro Categories**

Macro Label	Reporter	Source
1- Demon / Villain	188	13
2- Friend	17	1
3- Incompetent	1	0

One, however, could argue correctly that the sampled papers are merely reporting terms used by sources. To overcome this problem, labels are divided into two groups: labels used by sources and labels used by reporters (see table 16). Table 16 suggests that the sampled papers went beyond reporting what sources say (13 & 1) to adopt the official terminology



(188 & 17). This can be attributed to the journalists contact with official sources. Journalists in their contact with sources tend in some cases to pick up words used by sources. Words like 'brutal' 'aggressor', 'terrorist', and 'Hitler' are used frequently by official sources. For instance, President Bush in a speech to the nation on February 15, 1991 mentioned the ' Brutal dictator in Baghdad'.

Labels, as we have pointed out earlier, are divided into two groups. The first group which constitutes the bulk of the labels ( 132 & 88%) is negative and applies to Iraq and the terms constituting its identity formation. The positive group constitutes of 18 labels ( 12%) and applies to pro- US Arab actors. Further analysis has been conducted to differentiate the two groups by item type: Editorial or non-editorial.

**Table 17a: Labels Differentiated by Item Type**

	Editorial	Non-Editorial	Total
Negative	19	113	132
%	14.4	85.6	100
Positive	2	16	18
%	11.1	88.9	100
Total			150
%			100

As table 17a shows, 16 of the positive labels ( 88.9% ) appeared in non-editorial items compared only to 2 ( 11.1%) which appeared in editorial

items. In terms of the negative group, 113 labels ( 85.6%) printed in non-editorial items compared to 19 ( 14.4%) in editorial items. A close look at the Unsigned editorial (editorial) shows a high saliency of the negative labels ( 19), compared to the positive labels ( 2). Indeed, the ratio of negative to positive labels amounted to 9.5: 1. Moreover, the four predominant negative labels are aggressor (6), cruel (6), terrorist (4) and invader (2). These four labels are resonant with the three active frames discussed in Chapters Two and Three. These frames are Orientalism (Chapter Two), terrorism, and American political values (Chapter Three). Such a resonance is not without relevance for as we have pointed out earlier, labels become effective when the cultural setting is active.

Even in the case of the positive labels (2), negative frames were creeping back in. The New York Times in a critical unsigned editorial of the arrest of Palestinian University Professor, Sari Nussibeh, by Israel referred to him as a “ Palestinian moderate” ( NYT, February 9, 1991). Yet, the same editorial denies the Palestinians’ existence by referring to them as “ ... West Bank Arabs” ( Ibid). Such reference shows the active role of a deeply rooted and effective narrative. The Palestinians are miscellaneous people on the Occupied Territories. They are Arabs but they are not Palestinians.

#### **7.1.1.b Identifying through Incorporation of a Chain of Sedimented Signifiers**

A label becomes active or influential if it is part of an engaged background of a particular history, that is to say, it resonates in our case study with the American political values and the American archives on the Arabs. What would that mean? The indispensability of not seeing the

prominent process of labelling as part of history which are derived from previous document battle with the issue of Arab labels. In this sense, a look at some of these terms signify a relation to some specific label analyses that go beyond the data of our workfield. We use only specific labels which appear still signifying the active work of history on the present labels that are part of our workfield analysis. It is worth having a close look at some of the recurring terms. These terms are selected particularly to establish the fact that they are part of a means for establishing the continuity of the mobilisation required. Apparently, on the other hand, each of these terms should not be realised as entities in themselves. Each has a potentiality to instigate a chain of other views. The chain constitutes a sort of zone neighbourhood framing the way one could understand any event. In this context, reference to other studies is indispensable to find out the repetitive correlating features with the present case study.

In table 14, the words '**Aggressor**' (28), '**Hitler**' (9), and '**Dictator**' (8), resonate with the American image of the international aggressor which is a critical component of the American belief system. The aggressor is a tyrant or dictator who has an innate tendency to expand beyond his border and to subdue his weak neighbours (see Chapter Three). Each of the terms, '**brutal, cruel, barbaric**' (35), interlock differently together. The word 'cruel / brutal' reciprocates with the word 'aggressor' (28). The two words refer, at least in part, to an actor who does not hesitate to inflict pain and suffering on those who are weak. Moreover, the labelling of action or actors as barbarian implies that these actions are " outside the realm of normal behaviour; a barbarian must be restrained or repelled. Attempts of further political explanation are beside the point because a barbarian does not understand the basic rules of human behaviour - he could not possibly

respect the protocols of diplomacy, negotiation, or discourse ... A barbarian is irrational, untrustworthy and essentially less than human. A responsible nation would be wise not to appease the uncivilised; the uncivilised must be tamed" (Artz et al, 1995: 126).

Furthermore, the focus on the word 'cruel / brutal' signifies how the media actually contributed to the continuity of the Arab stereotyping. This claim is based on the resonance of the word 'brutal' with the American image of the Arabs as 'cruel / barbaric'. Suleiman (1981) reports, in part, that 46 per cent of the sampled American public secondary school studies teachers in five states including California, viewed the Arabs as 'barbaric' (Table 17).

**Table 17: Attributes Characterising Arabs and Israelis**

	More to Israelis %	More to Arabs %	To both equally %	To Neither %	Don't Know %
Peaceful	41	7	9	25	19
Honest	9	6	13	18	25
Intelligent	39	8	26	5	21
Like Americans	50	5	8	17	21
Friendly	46	6	15	11	23
Backward	6	47	7	15	25
Underdeveloped	9	47	10	10	25
Poor	21	34	9	15	22
Greedy	9	41	20	7	23
Arrogant	11	37	19	7	26
Moderate	31	8	10	21	30
Developing	33	29	21	3	24
Barbaric	4	38	8	23	28

Source (Suleiman, 1981).

Similarly, Shelley Slade (1981) mentions the results of a telephone poll of a national sample in the autumn of 1980. The poll's results reveal, in part, that a high percentage of the respondents feel that the Arabs can be described for instance as 'barbaric / cruel' (39%) (Table 18).

**Table 18: Attributes Characterising Arabs, Mexican and Israelis**

	Arabs	Mexican	Israelis	Non of these	All of these	KD/NA
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Brave	12	8	47	8	15	15
Swarthy, Dark Skinned	39	30	4	4	26	12
Rich	69	3	12	10	3	8
Filthy, Unclean, Diseased	13	3	41	30	7	19
Cowardly	8	17	4	47	4	21
Intelligent, Competent	17	4	47	8	19	13
Incompetent, Bungling, Stupid	12	21	3	41	6	20
Barbaric, Cruel	39	7	7	28	5	17
Strong, Powerful	40	3	32	15	6	10
Involved in Prostitution, Slavery	20	2	13	25	6	28
Religious	20	11	42	2	33	6
Backward, Primitive, Uncivilised	24	31	5	24	7	14
Friendly	5	36	28	11	15	14
Weak, Powerless	6	41	5	33	2	14
Treacherous, Cunning	41	7	11	22	8	21
Mistreat Women	42	13	4	16	9	21
Largely Agricultural	7	53	27	6	5	11
Warlike, Blood thirsty	43	3	7	27	7	10
Dress Strangely	51	3	7	27	7	10
Involved in the Illegal Drug Trade	15	63	2	7	10	12
Lecherous, Sexually Immoral	11	18	1	37	5	30
Illiterate, Uneducated	22	56	2	13	8	13
Dishonest, Steal a lot, cheat a lot	18	26	2	30	8	21
Persecuted, Exploited	12	23	7	10	10	17

Source (Slade, 1981).

The study also compares American attitudes towards the Arab with attitudes towards the Mexicans. While most Americans viewed Mexicans as 'illiterate' 'involved in the illegal drug trade', 'dishonest', and 'backward', they are still seen as 'friendly' (36%). The Arabs, on the other hand, who are associated more often with characteristics connoting cruelty than with the characteristics attributed to Mexicans, are viewed as 'friendly' by only 5 percent. Perhaps enhancing the 'friendliness' of the Mexicans is the fact that 41 percent view them as 'weak'. In contrast, the Arabs are not only viewed as 'rich' by 69 percent, but as 'strong' by 40 percent and 'weak' by only 6 percent. On people not viewed as friendly in the first place, argues Slade, "wealth and strength only intensify the perception they are a threat" (Slade, 1981: 148).

In addition, Slade reports a correlation between the gender and faith of the respondents and a tendency to see the Arabs, for instance, as "barbaric". The poll's results indicated that:

women are much more likely to describe the Arabs as 'barbaric', 'treacherous', 'bloodthirsty', and 'mistreaters of women'. Perhaps due to their concern for women's liberation or for the condition of their gender abroad, 55 per cent of the women polled say that Arabs 'mistreat women', while only 45 per cent of the men believe this is to be the case ....  
[in terms of faith] ... Catholics are slightly more prone to term the Arabs 'barbaric', 'mistreaters of women', 'treacherous', and 'warlike' than are Protestant. For example 39.2 per cent of the Protestants label the Arabs 'barbaric', as opposed to 52.6 per cent of the Catholics. Perhaps sensitivity on the part of some Catholics to a perceived anti - Christian tendency Islam causes this divergence.(Slade, 1981: 143-161)

The study reveals, furthermore, the American image of the Arab States and the Palestinians. Egypt is the most popular Arab state. Sixty six percent had a high opinion of this nation. Moreover, the poll showed that 47 percent saw Egyptians as friendly, almost twice as many as termed the Saudis friendly, and two and a half times as many as termed the Palestinians, Lebanese or Arabs friendly. Noticeably, Sadat was the most popular of the Arab leaders (68 percent have a high opinion). In Slade's view, the extremely positive image of Egypt and Sadat was very likely to be due to Sadat's conciliatory attitude towards the United States.

In contrast, the PLO had the lowest popularity of the Arab political entities. Seventy two per cent of Slade's sample had a 'fairly low' or 'very low' opinion of the PLO. Similarly, the Palestinians were also unpopular among the Americans and forty nine percent had a low opinion of them. Arafat was also seen unfavourably, fifty five percent of the sample had a low opinion of the PLO leader with 31 percent having a 'very low' opinion.

If we look again at table 14, we find that the word '**terrorism**' (18), is the third most frequently mentioned label by the sampled elite press during the Gulf war (Table 14). During the Intifada the term 'terrorism' was used sixteen times (Alruwaite, 1990). An analysis of the New York Times (NYT), Washington Post (WP), Los Angeles Times (LAT) and St Louis Post Dispatch (SLPD) coverage of the Palestinian Intifada, reveals that the predominate label in the coverage is terrorist (16 see table 19). The association of the PLO with terrorism functioned to delegitimize the PLO as a political actor, and to legitimise 'counter terrorism'. The high saliency of terrorism indexes in our view, the American view of terrorism.

The important issue is that terrorism has functioned effectively as a political tool in international relations. It has become a political force that could legitimise and delegitimize the act of implementing the right to intervene the military against the postulated enemy.

**Table 19: Label used by the unsigned editorials of the NYT, WP, LAT and SLPD to describe the PLO and the Palestinian leadership from December 8, 1987 to May 8, 1988.**

Labels	NO
Terrorist	16
Coward	1
Radical	1
Violent	1
Disdain / disdainful	1
Resented	1
Moderate	1
Total	22

The word '**thug**' (2 see table 14), functioned to domesticate Saddam Hussein to the American reader. It makes Saddam Hussein comprehensible for a domestic reader. Michael Gurevitch et al (1991) point out that the 'domestication' process involves reporting international events in terms that are meaningful to domestic audience using terms that are familiar to readers and viewers (in Swanson & Carrier, 1994).

The word '**fundamentalist/fundamentalism**' (3 see table 14), evokes the image of Islamic revivalism as a threat to the Western democracy. As Wiegand and Malek (1995) have pointed out in their analysis of Islam and



Military figures, US Defence Secretary, Pentagon	35	24	58
%	59.03	40.7	100
US White House, State Department, Agencies	26	16	42
%	61.9	38.1	100
US Secretary of State	11	10	21
%	52.4	47.6	100
US Congressmen, senators	9	11	20
%	45	55	100
Experts	19	00	19
%	100	00	100
Former Government Officials	12	2	14
%	85.7	14.3	100
US Vice President	1	1	2
%	50	50	100
<hr/>			
Total	173	121	294
%	58.8	41.2	100
<hr/>			

Actors are divided into actors and sources. Sources are given the right to appear in direct discourse (e.g. quotation), and being an actor means an involvement in the event, but also means an inscription of the direct discourse into an indirect one. The data suggests that there seems to be a balance between being a source and being an actor. George Bush is a source (50.43%) and an actor (49.57%); Military figures are sources (59.3%), and actors (40.7%); the White House, the State Department and Agencies are sources (61.9) and actors (38.1%); and the Secretary of State is a source (57.4%) and an actor (47.6%).

Bush and other US officials' appearances suggest that they are considered main and legitimate definers of the terms of the event which the media could rely on. The media, thereby, present positively the administration's view. One must emphasise, this is not purely the media's

fault. The media traditionally "rely upon congress to provide performance, to raise questions about executive initiatives, and, in general to provide the other side in the legendary 'two sides of the story'" (Hess, 1981). Congress, during the Gulf crisis and war, was largely supportive of the president. Thomas Foley, speaker of the House, noted that the president had "strong across-the-board support from members of congress, both the Senate and House, Democrats and Republicans alike" (in Cook, 1994: 126). Thus, the president's view has the ability to dominate the coverage.

**Table 21: Arab Actor Quoted or Referred to**

	Source	Actor	Total
Saddam Hussein	7	170	177
%	3.95	96.05	
Arafat	3	7	10
%	30	70	
King Hussein	4	4	8
%	50	50	
King Fahd		2	2
%		100	
Amir Jabier		2	2
%		100	
Hosni Mubarak	2	3	5
%	40	60	
Total	16	188	204
%	7.8	92.2	100

A comparative analysis of US and Arab actors and sources suggests that George Bush and Saddam Hussein are dominant characters (see table 20 & 21). Bush (117 see table 20) and Saddam Hussein (177 see table 21) are the most frequently mentioned American and Arab actors. This could

Thus, it would suggest there is actually a margin that the media did not work to exploit.

### **7.1.2 Drawing out the Configurations of Topics**

Topics, as stated in Chapter Five serve as a signifier of the dominant subject matter in the Gulf war. Topic analysis is combined with thematic analysis to contextualise the coverage. The reference to thematic analysis in this stage is classificatory rather than analytical, delaying the analytical aspect to a separate section. It is worth mentioning here that the classification is accompanied with an illustration of some contextual conditions for the topics' configuration. This illustration does not apply to all the subcategorise. It all depends on the importance and relevance of the subcategorise topics chosen. The topics include; Military (158), US Foreign Policy (40), Diplomatic and Political Activities (34), Media (20), Middle East Problem (6), Arab-Arab Relations (7), Arab-American Relations (4), Public Opinion (4), Economic (4), and F.B.I. Investigation of Arab Americans (6)..

**Table 22: Main Topics**

	Frequency	Per cent
Military	158	57.66
US. foreign policy	40	14.59
Diplomatic and political activities	11	4.00
Media	20	7.30
Arab - Israeli conflict	6	2.20
Linkage in the Middle East	4	1.45
Arab - Arab relations	7	2.55
Arab - American relations	4	1.45
Arab public opinion	2	0.73
American support for the troops in the Gulf	2	0.73
Economic difficulties within States	1	0.40
Oil field	1	0.40

Initial reaction of financial markets to war	1	0.40
Oil prices	1	0.40
Environment	6	2.20
Politics within States	3	1.10
Human rights	1	0.40
F.B.I. investigation of Arab - Americans	6	2.20
Total	274	100.00

#### **7.1.2.1 Military: Primary Definer of Subject Matter**

Military (158 see table 23) is a general category which encompasses seven subcategories: (a) Armed conflict (92), (b) peace move and negotiations (34), (c) suffering (5), (d) ramifications of war (13), (f) war cost (5), (e) anti-war movement in US (4) and (h) anti - war movement in the Arab world (5). The first three categories are dominant, they account for 82.91 percent of all military topics. Hence, analysis will concentrate on these three sub-categories.

**Table 23: Military Topics**

	Frequency	Per cent
Armed conflict	92	58.2
Peace move and negotiation	34	21.5
Ramifications of war	13	8.2
Suffering	5	3.2
War cost	5	3.2
Anti-war movement in US	4	2.5
Anti-war movement in the Arab world	5	3.2
Total	158	100.00

#### 7.1.2.1.a Armed Conflict: A Pathway for Military Dictation

Approaching ‘armed conflict’ (92 items) from a military perspective reflects a particular value that stresses the military dimension of the armed conflict rather than the economic or political one. This tendency leads to more interaction with authoritative military sources. As source analysis has shown us in a previous section, military figures are the second most cited actors (35 see table 20) among American actors. Such an emergence of a fortifying relationship between the media and authoritative sources in a defined context that requires reliance on various forces, foresees the mode in which the newsmaking processes would take shape. As mentioned elsewhere, the forces that appear to dictate the terms of the coverage and its space of function are those that occupy power positions. This reflects the fact that the media function is subjected to a position that recognises its dependency. The sources function to reduce the workload, and the need for expensive specialists, to resolve the problem of journalist’s ‘objectivity’, to insure a high volume of raw material for their stories, and to enable journalists to establish support. At the same time, reliance on official sources for information makes media personnel vulnerable to manipulation or management by newsmakers (see Chapter Three).

This view converges with Hall’s view. Hall, as has been eluded to in chapter three, maintains that the dependence on official sources makes these sources ‘primary definers’ of events because they provide the media with the first definition of an event. The first or primary definition sets the boundaries for ensuing discussions by framing what the problem is. This

Those interests include a large fraction of the world's oil supply, the balance of power in an area where the Soviet Union has historical ambitions and the survival of a democratic state, Israel, which Saddam (along with many other Arab Leaders), has threatened with extinction. Moreover, Saddam has made it clear that he is prepared to advance his designs by using weapons of mass destruction and sponsoring world-wide terrorism activities. (Washington Post, op-ed, January 17, 1991)

[Bombs] are a powerful message on behalf of honourable goals.... They are to liberate Kuwait and restore its legitimate rulers; to insure stability in the region; to keep Saddam Hussein from seizing a choke-hold on the world's energy lifeline, and to emerge from the crisis in a way that establishes a resolute, decent precedent for guaranteeing collective security in the post-cold world. (New York Times, editorial, January 17, 1991)

There is no ambiguity now. All the argument, pro and con, have been argued back and forth and up and down. At this writing, the world has largely given up on the man from Baghdad. (Los Angeles Times, editorial, January 17, 1991)

By far the most important reason for exercising the military option is to uphold international law and the authority of the United Nations. (Los Angeles Times, op-ed, January 17, 1991)

#### 7.1.2.1.b Peace initiatives and negotiations: A Formula equated with 'A Cruel Hoax'

Iraq's peace plan and the Soviet's peace plan were a potentially devastating blow to the American policy towards the war, especially at the moment where it appeared that President Bush was launching a bloody ground war. It is not surprising that peace initiatives and negotiations (34

items) are discussed within military conflict; and that President Bush puts a spin on the Iraqi peace plan calling it ' a cruel hoax' while rejecting the Soviet peace plan as too little too late. This situation functions to absorb tension in the home front and to sustain domestic and global support for the war effort. It also works hand in hand with the low saliency of the Iraqi suffering discussed below to dehumanise the Iraqis.

As the ground war approached two issues dominated the coverage, Iraq's peace plan and the Soviet's peace plan. On February 15, Iraq issued a statement which for the first time acknowledged Iraq's readiness to withdraw from Kuwait as stipulated by Security Council Resolution 660 which held that Iraq should unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait. The statement included, though, demands for linkage with other issues ( e.g. withdrawal of Israel from Palestinian territories, withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon). But the key issue, as Kellner (1992) points out, was that this was the first time Iraq had ever agreed officially to get out of Kuwait. President Bush discredited the Iraqi's offer as a ploy by Saddam Hussein. The sampled elite press, as will be shown below, followed the official view in disregarding the plan.

During the next three days Iraq worked with the Soviet Union to develop a peace plan., and on February 22nd, the Soviet Union disclosed the contents of Gorbachev's peace plan to which, Moscow announced, Baghdad had responded 'positively' (Hiro, 1992). President Bush dismissed the Soviet peace proposal and offered Saddam Hussein a one-day ultimatum to 'begin his immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait'.



In their coverage of the Iraqi peace proposal and the Soviet peace plan, the elite press seemed to identify totally with the official American line. For example:

On the brink of having to fight a ground war that he finally realised he could not win, Saddam Hussein has embarked on a last-ditch effort to generate negotiations that he hopes will buy him time and ensures the survival of his army and his regime. (Los Angeles Times, news analysis, February 16, 1991)

The Iraqi statements as it stands is a ploy, if not a hoax. It is designed not for peace but for venting the pressures on him and dividing the international coalition. He has not formally renounced his annexation. He has avoided the other stipulations of U.N. resolutions. (New York Times, op-ed, February 16, 1991)

If Saddam Hussein wants peace, there are two things to do now: First, make clear that there are no conditions attached to his commitment to get out of Kuwait. Second, start getting out. (New York Times, editorial, February 16, 1991)

a pause now while Iraq regroups or reconstructs itself or seeks the political advantage it might attain by propaganda and diplomatic manipulation should not be permitted - a very little time that affords Saddam Hussein no chance to evade or tangle people up - to arrange an unconditional, immediate, quick Iraqi pullout without the heavy weaponry. (Washington Post, editorial, February 19, 1991)

There's no use getting mad at Mikhail Gorbachev and his partner, Saddam Hussein. Both are doing what comes naturally to two nervous dictators trying to get out of terminal trouble.

The Moscow - Baghdad axis, obviously and openly, is at work on a plan that would restore to the Soviet Union and Iraq, the power that both have lost in the Middle East. (New York Times, column, February 19, 1991)

#### 7.1.2.1.c Suffering: A Terrain undoing Military Action from Human Consequences

The articulation of suffering (5 items) within the military dimension raises the question as to how it comes to be discussed within a discourse of military conflict? Military actions have human consequences. These consequences are very sensitive issues. This sensitivity stems from the perceived US military experience overseas (for instance, the Vietnam war). It is, to many American military officials, the brutal image of the suffering inflicted on the Vietnamese as well as the Americans which made the American public decide that the war was not worth the human cost (Anderson, 1991). This time the Pentagon and the White House was not taking any chances. The link between military actions and their human consequences is broken (Aksay et al, 1991: 28). Indeed, victims remained unmentioned and when they did, as in the case of 'Amiriya Shelter', one is reminded that the blame rests squarely on the 'other'. The following excerpts suggest that there is a denial of US responsibility for Iraqi suffering, blaming it on Saddam Hussein. For example:

The destruction of Iraq's army and innocent civilians left in harm's way was not American strategy but Saddam's.  
(Washington Post, op-ed, February 6, 1991)

The criminal is Hussein who used the innocents as 'human armour' in an attempt to shield his war-making capacity from the allied attacks. The blood is on his hands alone. (Los Angeles Times, letter, February 17, 1991)

#### **7.1.2.2 US Foreign Policy: Projection onto the Global**

US foreign policy (40 items see table 20) is the second most frequently covered topic (14.59%). Hence, the Gulf war is seen also within the zone of international relations and globalization. The United States is urged to develop a post war long term strategy for the region. Doubts though are cast on the possibility that the new order will fulfil its idealistic expectation in a future global crisis. Moreover, it is suggested that the US focus on Kuwait comes at the expense of a more important issue, democracy in the USSR.

Overall, the explanatory framework established by the White House and the State Department, the just war discourse, was dominant. US policy in the Gulf is presented, largely, as a just policy with great chance of success. The American intervention, as the following excerpts and the thematic analysis will show, is depicted largely as a protection of globally shared legitimate principles. Parallel to that, Saddam Hussein is presented as a global threat (i.e. threat to world order). This situation serves to sustain a sense of global crisis, where global values are threaten, and therefore a global support for the war. For example:

Mr Bush, to us made a compelling case. There can be no question of the threat Saddam Hussein has posed to the American interest in an orderly world. Not only did he invade

a sovereign state, rape it and remove it from the map an act of total aggression .... What made that threat distinctive was the combination of his strategic location, his grandiose ambition and his ruthlessness and hatred of the West, taken together with the wealth and weaponry to fulfil his purposes. Saddam Hussein hoped and had the capacity to go on from Kuwait to destabilise and eliminate a region crucial to world equilibrium.(Washington Post, editorial, January 17, 1991)

The US - led attack in Iraq and Kuwait last night represent this nation's responsibility, for the maintenance of world order, a role we played in Korea and attempted to play in Vietnam (Washington Post, op-ed, January 17, 1991)

The initial victories of the political level are even more encouraging than the military sources on the battlefield (Los Angeles Times, news analysis, February 21, 1991).

This situation can be linked at least in part to our discussion in Chapter Three of press-source relationships. In chapter three, we maintained that the press reliance on official sources is indicative of the direction of foreign policy coverage. This is evident in the coverage of the American foreign policy in the Gulf. Table 24 shows 88.24 percent of the sources used are US government officials. This results, as thematic analysis will show, in an uncritical reporting of the administration perspective. Indeed, the uncritical coverage of the way the Bush administration framed the political and military debate can be a result of the media tendency to index a range of official debates within Washington opinion in general and congress in particular. In this view, when official disagreement is intense, information that is critical of the administration policies is more likely to become emphasised in main stream media. However when official debates are limited for any of a variety of political reasons, the resulting news

'information index' may de-emphasise critical aspects of the situation at hand (see Hallin 1986, 1991; Bennett, 1990: 232).

**Table 24: US actors quoted or referred to US Foreign policy**

	Source	Actor	Total
US President	10	2	12
Military figures / US Defence Secretary, Pentagon	1	1	2
US White House / State Department / Agencies	1	1	2
US Secretary of State	3	1	4
US Congress / Senators	1	1	2
Experts	1	3	4
Former Government Official	-	-	-
US Vice President	-	-	-
Total	17	8	25

Hence, one can argue that media coverage of the Gulf war, in part, is a result of media's dependence upon official sources and upon the 'official opposition' in providing the sources of their criticism. 'Official opposition', to be sure, is not completely shut out. 5.88 percent of sources used are from the legislative branches (see table 24). The 'official opposition', however, has largely accepted the definition of the problem as stated by President Bush. In the words of Cook (1994), "the congressional response was encapsulated by the ostensible leader of the opposition, Thomas Foley, speaker of the House who noted that the president had 'strong across - the- board support

from members of congress, both the Senate and House, Democrats and Republicans alike " (Cook, 1994: 126).

Needless to say, the percentage of official sources is an important but insufficient indicator. It should be complemented by a thematic analysis. Thematic analysis, as this thesis will show later, fortifies sources analysis. It reveals that the coverage is mainly uncritical of the official line (see thematic analysis below).

#### **7.1.2.3 Diplomatic and Political Activities: Immersion of Internationalisation**

In the context of internationalisation of the Gulf war, diplomatic and political activities (11 items) have risen alongside US foreign policy. This category (4%) includes two subcategories: Japan - American relationship (2.55%) and European - American relationship (1.45%). The focus on these two subcategories underlines the importance of sustaining the international front, particularly Japan and Europe. It also may be related to the American view of the Gulf war as a global crisis and as 'our' war. Friendly nations are expected to stand by 'our' side against global threat. In this context, it is time for 'solidarity'. Japan was criticised for debating its financial support of the US led alliance. And Germany was criticised for its 'wobbly' policy on the Gulf. Chancellor Helmut Kohl opposed an American call for a NATO resolution of support for the war effort.

Japan is criticised largely for its hesitant response to the Gulf war. For example:

An extraordinary national debate over Prime Minister Tashiki Kaifu's pledge of aid for the war against Iraq is suddenly proving to be the biggest test of Japanese friendship for the United States in many years. (New York Times, news analysis, February 8, 1991)

Perhaps the next time a global crisis erupts, Japan will respond in a manner befitting a country with its vast financial and industrial might. That is about as optimistic a conclusion as can be drawn from having observed the parliamentary and public debate here in the past few weeks over the Persian Gulf war. (Washington Post, op-ed, February 17, 1991)

Similarly Germany is criticised for its timid response to the Gulf war.

For example:

Kohl's steady drive for unification demonstrated what determined, imaginative leadership can accomplish. His wobbly course on the Gulf war makes the same point but in negative. The future of the European-America partnership that endured a half-century of cold war will be decisively affected by Kohl's choices to come. (Washington Post, column, January 29, 1991)

#### **7.1.2.5 Media: Pacifying the Resurfacing of Tensions**

The third most frequently covered topic is media (20 items see table 20). The high saliency in the category of 'media' shows the unease that the media is facing in its war coverage (76.9%, see table 25) The support of CNN/Arnett reporting from Baghdad (57.1%, see table 26) suggests some tension between the press and the military. Media includes two sub-categories of the quality of media coverage (13 items, see table 25) and the CNN/Arnett reporting from Baghdad (7 items, see table 26).

**Table 25: Quality of Media Coverage of The Gulf war**

	Supp of .	Critical of.	Critical of Neutrality	Critical of Media & Military	Total
No	1	10	1	1	13
%	7.7	76.9	7.7	7.7	100

**Table 26: CNN / Arnett Reporting from Baghdad**

	supp of	critical of	total
No	4	3	7
%	57.1	42.9	100

If we shift our focus of analysis from within the 'Media' category to the level of main topics (see Table 22) we find, however, low saliency of media (7.30%) particularly when compared with military (57.66%) and US foreign policy (14.59%). The low saliency indicates that the press did not problematize the subject matter. Lack of problematization and the dominance of the 'just war' theme, as will be seen in the thematic analysis, suggests that the press appears to have decided not to cast itself as a critic of US foreign policy and military. It acts as a team player with the government. Significantly, some media people have criticised the coverage of the war because the press failed to perform its historical role as watchdog over the government action (Arant & Warden, 1994; Raboy & Dagenais, 1992). Anthony Lewis (1991) writes that the press becomes "a clique applauding



the American generals and politicians in charge” (quoted in Arant & Warden, 1994: 25). Lewis Lapham(1991) argues that the bulk of the war coverage is “... distinguished by its historical carelessness and its grotesque hyperbole” concluding that “a servile press is a circus act, as loudly and laughingly cheered by a military dictatorship as by a democratic republic” (quoted in Raboy & Dagenais, 1992: 8). In the following section we will focus on the two subcategories and provide some thematic examples to contextualise the coverage.

#### 7.1.2.4.a Quality of media coverage of the Gulf war:

Statistics in table 25 suggest a relatively moderate volume of criticism of media coverage of the Gulf war. Items that are critical (10 items) outnumbered the supportive (1), and the critical of media 'neutrality' (1 item) and the critical of both media and military (1 item). Moreover, blame is attributed largely to the Pentagon's press restriction. This obviously overlooks the fact that the coverage, as we have discussed in Chapter Three, is a result of the interaction of various elements: foreign policy, crisis, our war/their war, self-other, values, globalization and journalist-source interaction.

For example:

I want news coverage of the war in Kuwait and Iraq that is not censored. It is the media's patriotic as well as constitutional duty to provide coverage that is guaranteed by the First Amendment .... Freedom of the press ... is about honest, accurate reporting of all sides of any issue including war, even if that reporting makes people in the Pentagon or elsewhere uncomfortable. (Los Angeles Times, letter, February 19, 1991)

Hour after hour, Americans can get something unmatched in history - an unfiltered impression of war in television's vivid colour .... But what are we learning? (Los Angeles Times, editorial, January 23, 1991)

The public needs more than rumours and official tid bits. The Pentagon's press restriction are producing instead a distorted picture of events that in turn makes impossible an informed citizenry- which is, as Jefferson wrote, the best defence of democracy. (New York Times, op-ed, January 23, 1991)

Only ABC, with 'Night line' qualifies as a network that gives us page 2. (New York Times, op-ed, February 21, 1991)

Pentagon control alone, however, could not explain, as Lewis points out correctly, the media coverage of the Gulf War. Anthony Lewis (1991) writes that “we glorified war and accepted its political premise, forsaking the independence that justify freedom of the press” (quoted in Raboy & Dagenais, 1992: 8). Similarly, Sam Donaldson of ABC criticised his peers for their war psychosis in letting objectivity vanish with the start of the air campaign (Arant & Warden, 1994).

Indeed, as we have discussed before, foreign coverage particularly during times of crisis and ‘our’ war, becomes a conduit for mobilising support for US foreign policy. When a situation is labelled as one of crisis and ‘our’ war, the gap between the role (e.g. watch dog) and norm (e.g. objectivity) of media and its practices is at its highest point (see Chapter Three).

#### 7.1.2.4.b CNN / Arnett Reporting from Baghdad:

Table 26 shows seven items related with CNN/Arnett reporting from the Iraqi capital, of which four items (57.1%) are largely supportive of CNN and its correspondence in Baghdad, and three items (42.9%) are critical. The starting point of critics is that the American media during the time of crisis has a duty to abandon neutrality. They maintain that it is the duty of the media in a time of crisis and 'our' war, to side with America. To them, balanced and impartial coverage is enough to question loyalty. US Senator Allan Simpson (R. WY), for instance, accused CNN's reporter in Baghdad, Peter Arnett of being 'a sympathiser'. Simpson also attacked CNN. He called it "ridiculous that millions of dollars were spent to bomb and sever Saddam's communication link to the outside world only to have CNN restore it" (USA Today, 13-2-1991). The two reports that infuriated Simpson and other critics are Arnett's reports on the bombing of a baby-formula factory and a civilian shelter. Arnett, claims critics, serves the Iraqi cause by recycling the enemy propaganda. Supporters of CNN/Arnett reporting from Baghdad accepted the view that Iraq manipulates the American media but insisted that the goods of reporting from Baghdad outweigh the bads. They also defend the patriotism of Arnett. For example:

On the balance the benefits of his being there outweigh the distasteful reality of Baghdad's crude and wholly unconvincing propaganda. (Los Angeles Times, editorial, January 30, 1991)

It takes more than average coverage to remain in a hostile capital, risking death from friendly fire or arrest by an

obsessively suspicious host. Mr Arnett, ... deserve praise, not opprobrium. (New York Times, editorial, January 30, 1991)

Simpson was wrong about Saddam last April, and he is wrong about Arnett now. (Washington Post, op-ed, February 10, 1991)

Is CNN an American or a world network? If an American network, why are we carrying, free of charge, the war propaganda of the enemy? ... is it the duty of American reporters in war time to be neutral and objective, or to be on the side of the U.S.A.? In war time, Americans do not want objectivity or neutrality. (Los Angeles Times, column, February 17, 1991)

#### **7.1.2.5 Middle East Problem: Decontextualisation of the Other**

As data in Table (22) shows, ten items (3.6%) were devoted to the Middle East problem, which includes two main sub-categories: Arab-Israeli conflict (2.2%) and linkage in the Middle East (1.4%). The low salience of linkage of the Middle East with the Gulf war coverage suggests that the sampled elite press failed to adequately contextualize the Gulf crisis within a broader Middle Eastern frame. As has been argued in Chapter Two, the Gulf crisis is related in many respects to three of the four dialectics discussed in chapter two (Interior and Exterior, Unification and Fragmentation, Major and Minor Traditions, Spiritualism and Materialism). For the two years prior to August 1990, for instance, the Arab world had been dominated by the lack of progress in the Arab- Israeli dispute. The Palestinian uprising from December 1987 and the PLO's concession of Israel's right to exist in November 1988 raised hopes of a breakthrough. Instead nothing happened, while the majority of the Arab states maintained

warm relations with the West. The situation did get complicated in 1989 and 1990 by an influx of Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel (Interior and Exterior).. A climate of frustration which focused on the Palestinian issue developed, one that Iraq could take advantage of (for more information see for example, Peretz, 1990; Halliday, 1991; Khalidi, 1991; Quandt, 1991; Matthews, 1993 ). In doing so, Iraq raised the banner of Arab unity (Unity and fragmentation) which is based on Arab nationalism and Islam (Major and Minor Traditions) against foreign forces (Interior and Exterior).

The next section will attempt to provide a thematic analysis to contextualise the coverage of the two subcategories

#### 7.1.2.5.a Arab - Israeli Conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict appeared in six items (2.2%), of which two items suggest that it is time for Arab - Israel peace accord and four items are critical of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhok Shamir, and Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is worthwhile here to return briefly to the American elite press attention to the Intifada discussed previously in Chapter Six. The call for an Arab-Israeli peace agreement (33.3% see table 24), criticism of Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip suggest a livelihood of the Intifada momentum. However, the low saliency of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the second case study (2.2%) indicates that the sustenance was not strong enough to combat the military discourse in the Gulf war (57.66%).

For example:

This is precisely the time ... to put before the Palestinian people a clear and magnanimous proposal. It must be a proposal whose validity and seriousness should be measured against the following criterion: If we were in the position of the Palestinians, would we accept it? (Washington Post, op-ed, February 24, 1991)

A new peace must be built and that will take political courage all around. (Los Angeles Times, op-ed, February 9, 1991)

Taken together, the two actions [taken by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir] suggest strategy aimed at strengthening Israel's extremists and weakening moderate Palestinians. (New York Times, editorial, February 9, 1991)

#### 7.1.2.5.b Linkage in the Middle East

The data shows four items are devoted to a linkage in the Middle East (Table 22). The critics of linkage outnumbered the supportive, three to one. This suggests to us that the Gulf war was not contextualized within a background of the Middle East issue.

For example:

The Iraqi Call for linkage between a resolution of the Kuwait crisis and the Arab - Israeli conflict was a logical one, not in the sense that Kuwait had anything to do with Palestinian debate, but because Palestinian and Iraq were organically linked. Their people shared a history, a language, religion and aspiration.

No sophistry could convince the majority of Arabs that their destiny and that of Israel is not objectively linked. (Los Angeles Times, op-ed, February 9, 1991)

The article by Tarbush was full of loose associations and faulty logic. (Los Angeles Times, letter, February 16, 1991)

Subordinating historical truth to personal agenda, Mohammed Tarbush constructs a strained defence of Palestinians making

common cause with Iraq. (Los Angeles Times, letter, February 16, 1991)

#### **7.1.2.6 Arab-Arab Relations: Recycling the Same Perception**

Table 22 shows that seven items dealt with the Arab-Arab relations. These items concentrated largely on the implications of the war for Arab - Arab relations, the implication of the PLO-Iraq alliance on the PLO and its leadership, and King Hussein's policies during the Gulf Crisis and war. The low saliency of Arab-Arab relations (2.55%) reveals that the subject matter was not seen as important.

For example:

As it veers toward conclusion, the Gulf war has produced new rounds, fissures and perceived betrayals that will hunt the Middle East for years to come. Deep divisions have been exposed within the Arab world between rich and poor, weak and strong, radical and traditionalists - and between unelected governments and their restless population. (Washington Post, op-ed, February 24, 1991)

The new balance of weakness favours Saudi Arabia, .... The Saudi emerging from the war as the dominant non - power in a region of shattered states. The potential for leadership in Arab affairs that has eluded the Saudis may now fall into their lap. (Washington Post, op-ed, February 28, 1991)

#### **7.1.2.7 Arab-American Relation: No Access for Alternative Readings**

Four items (1.45%) were devoted to the Arab-American relations (see Table 22). The low saliency of the Arab-American relations marginalizes an

alternative reading of the American Middle East policy. It also de-emphasises the Arabs indispensable role in the Gulf war. The reader is left largely with the Arab image as 'foreign other'. For example:

The build-up of mass Arab resentments would quickly wipe out the gains of Bush's masterful performance as commander in chief. This is one conflict where post war planning must start with the shooting, and the president has finally begun to tackle a task he obviously relishes less than leading the punitive expedition against Baghdad. (Washington Post, column, January 21, 1991)

Lasting and productive relationships are usually an outcome between peers. Disdain and resentment are the by products of a victor-vanquish relationship. Instead of battering the Arab into conformity, we may achieve far loftier goals by treating them as our equals. ( New York Times, letter, February 17, 1991)

#### **7.1.2.8 Public Opinion:**

Public opinion includes two categories, Arab Public opinion (0.73%), and American support of the troops in the Gulf (0.73%). The low recurrence of the first subcategory (2 items) may be linked to the view discussed in Chapter Two that the Arab public opinion is insignificant, while the low recurrence of the second subcategory (2) may be related to the view that the American public support the troops in the Gulf. If we shift our focus from recurrence to context, we find out that in the first subcategory the sampled press seemed to take notice of the unifying force in the region. Yet, the primary concern was the effect of these forces on the



Pro-US Arab camp. In terms of the second subcategory, the American support of the troops in the gulf reciprocates with the religious discourse. ‘... like centuries of our predecessor we dread the messenger and try to forestall him by striking bargains with the Gods’ (NYT, 1991). Alan Dundes, professor of anthropology at the University at California in Berkeley has pointed out that tying a yellow ribbon is “ related to putting the symbol of a boon to be requested at a holy place” (Ibid.).

#### 7.1.2.8.a Arab Public Opinion:

Two items covered the Arab public opinion, for example:

Saddam Hussein is proving a tough opponent who's scoring points just where it's most important for him to make them (New York Times, column, February 16, 1991).

#### 7.1.2.8.b American Support of the Troops in the Gulf:

Two items dealt with the American support of the troops in the Gulf (0.73%). This serves to sustain the support of the home front.

For example:

[Yellow ribbons] are no frivolity, American's yellow ribbons, but pleas, prayers and hopes, made visible. (New York Times, editorial, February 4, 1991)

#### 7.1.2.9 Economic: Preventing the Re-Incarnation of the Repressed

Table 22 suggests that the economic aspect is marginalized (1.45%). This obviously served to deflect attention from a key factor, as shown below, behind the American involvement in the Gulf. This process, combined with the dominance of the military discourse discussed previously and the thematic analysis discussed in the next section, functioned to underline the morality of the American policy in the Gulf. The press neglected almost totally the economic dimension of the western response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, even though the oil factor is a major determinant of that response. The US Secretary of State James Baker III, for example, told the US House of Representatives on 4th September, 1990, in unequivocal terms, that what is at stake is the world's reliance on access to the energy resources of the Gulf.

Historically, as we have pointed out in Chapter Three, the two factors which tie the western power to the region are its geostrategic position and its vast reserves of oil. The United States' concern for the region is originally due to the oil reserve and its crucial role in the development of the western industrialised economies, of the necessity to protect trade routes between Europe and the Far East, and more recently of the strategic significance of the region in the cold world war competition.

Indeed in the mid 1940s, the oil resources of the Middle East had become the most important single reason for the strategic value of the region to the United States. By 1960, Iran and the oil - producing Arab States were producing nearly a quarter of the world's output and contained two thirds of the world's known reserves (Peretz, 1983: 2).

The importance of oil has increased in the 1970s and 1980s, due to high dependency of western economies on oil. Table 27 demonstrates the crucial importance of oil to the world economy

**Table 27: Percentage Composition of World Energy Consumption, 1979-84**

year	Oil	Natural Gas	Coal	Hydra	Nuclear	Total
-						
1979	45.0	18.4	28.5	5.9	2.2	100
1981	42.4	9.3	29.2	6.2	2.9	100
1983	40.3	19.2	30.3	6.8	3.4	100
1984	39.3	19.7	30.3	6.8	3.9	100

Source (Matthews, 1993).

After the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, President Jimmy Carter declared in his 1980's state of the Union address what was to be known as the Carter Doctrine. He declared that any attempt by any external force, particularly the former Soviet Union, to extend its influence to the Gulf would be considered as a threat to the vital interests of the United States and would be repelled by all means, including military forces. He speeded up the creation of a 'rapid deployment force', transformed by the Reagan administration in the US Central Command, whose strength soon reached half a million soldiers.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait put Iraq in control of some 20 percent of the world oil reserves. Moreover, American officials were convinced that even if Iraq did not invade Saudi Arabia, threatening to do so could enable it to dictate Saudi's oil policies. Such a situation would put Iraq in control of nearly 50 percent of the world's oil reserves thus giving it a leading role in setting oil prices (Darwish & Alexander, 1991: 54).

#### **7.1.2.10 F.B.I. Investigation of Arab - Americans: Abridging Domestic Violence with Distance Violence**

During the sampling period the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) launched an interview program within the Arab-American community to gather information about domestic terrorism. The program received strong criticism. Of the six items printed about the program, five (83.3%) are critical and one (16.7%) is supportive (Table 28).

**Table 28: F.B.I. Investigation of Arab American**

	Frequency	Per cent
Critical	5	83.3
Supportive	1	16.7
Total	6	100.00

Proponents of the program evoked the Arab image as terrorist. They argue that Arab - Americans, because of their ethnicity are more likely than other Americans to know about domestic terrorism and to be in touch with terrorists. This view contributes to the continuity of the Arab stereotyping. Opponents of the program argue mainly that the program is a breach of the Arab - American civil liberties. For example:

If the activity under investigation is Iraqi-sponsored terrorism against American targets, one very logical focus of such question-asking is the Arab-American community ... because in trying to head off potential terrorist attack, [FBI] go where the ducks may be or may seek sanctuary and support. (Washington Post, op-ed, January 21, 1991)

The FBI's singling out Arab-American for antiterrorism questioning is defended by Charles M. Lichenstein and Paul M. Joyol as necessary and appropriate. I strongly disagree. No American should be signalled out for FBI questioning or investigation because of his or her ethnicity, religion or political views (Washington Post, letter, January 30, 1991).

To have FBI agents coming to the doors of Arab-Americans is the beginning of harassment and intimidation. This kind of harassment may lead to an environment where Arab-Americans are afraid to exercise their constitutional rights as Americans to speak out on issues of concern to all Americans. Every American is threatened by the singling out of Arab-Americans. If one group can be separated at a time of crisis, all groups are political victims. (Los Angeles Times, letter, January 23, 1991)

Because of my own experience [as Japanese - American] with having my citizenship questioned [during WWII], I sympathise with Arab-Americans. If each of us paused to remember history and our own feelings upon confronting discrimination, we would be able to avoid hysteria at home as war rages overseas. (Washington Post, op-ed, January 21, 1991)

The Federal Bureau of investigation, though brilliantly successful in recent years against domestic terrorism, still has something to learn about dealing sensitively with law-abiding American citizens. (New York Times, editorial, January 29, 1991)

To sum up, aggregate attention over actors and topics revealed a dialectical process of vocalisation and marginalisation. As tables 8 to 12

have shown, Iraq and the terms constituting its identity were vocalised while other Arab actors were marginalized. Similarly, military and US foreign policy were vocalised while other topics were marginalized (Table 22). The focus on a few actors and topics suggests to us that the sustenance of the Intifada momentum was not strong enough to constitute a new way of seeing the Arabs. More specifically, the concentration on Saddam Hussein and Iraq sustained the Arab image as a foreign other. Moreover, the focus on a few topics precluded any understanding of the dialectical governing the Arab history (see Chapter Two for detailed discussion of the dialectics).

## **7.2 Disaggregate Attention**

In the following analysis, media attention over actors and topics are disaggregated. Such a perspective is helpful for revealing the differences, if any, between the three newspapers. Having said that, one should keep in mind that recurrence might be the same but the approach could be different, as will be evident in the thematic analysis later on. Recurrence in the three papers, as will be shown below, was similar. But the LAT will manifest, as the thematic analysis will indicate, a more critical perspective than the NYT and the WP.

### **7.2.1 Actors**

The three newspapers gave most attention and emphasis to Iraq and those elements that are constituting the terms of its identity formation.

Saddam Hussein, Iraq, Iraqi army and Iraqi masses are the four most frequently referred to Arab actors in the three papers (Table 29, 30, 31, 32).

**Table 29: Attention to Arab Leaders**

	NYT	%	LAT	%	WP	%
Saddam Hussein	52	74.3	71.0	91.0	54	84.4
King Fahd	1	1.4	1	1.3		
Jabrer al Sabah	1	1.4	1	1.3		
Hosni Mubarak	3	4.3	1	1.3	1	1.6
King Hussein	3	4.3	2	2.6	3	4.7
Yassir Arafat	5		1	1.3	4	6.3
Others	5		1	1.3	3	3.1
TOTAL	70		78	100	64	100

**Table 30: Attention to Arab Armies**

	NYT	%	LAT	%	WP	%
Iraq	36	92.3	34	91.9	24	96
Saudi	2	5.1	1	2.7	1	4
Kuwait	1	2.6	1	2.7	-	-
Others	-	-	1	2.7		
TOTAL	39	100	37	100	25	100

**Table 31: Attention to Arab States**

	NYT	%	LAT	%	WP	%
Iraq	68	39.8	82	45.1	55	38.5

Kuwait	50	29.2	48	26.4	41	28.7
Saudi Arabia	23	13.5	16	8.8	18	12.6
Egypt	6	3.5	7	3.8	6	4.2
PLO	6	3.5	7	3.8	4	2.8
Jordon	4	2.3	4	2.2	3	2.1
Others	4	8.2	18	9.9	16	11.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

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**Table 32: Attention to Arab Masses**

	<b>NYT</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>LAT</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>WP</b>	<b>%</b>
Iraqi	15	46.9	18	40.9	19	50
Palestinians	13	40.6	16	36.4	8	21.1
Saudis	1	3.1	2	4.5	3	7.9
Egyptians	1	3.1	-	-	2	5.3
Jordanians	1	3.1	2	4.5	-	-
Arab-American	1	3.1	3	6.8	4	10.5
Kuwaitis	-	-	3	6.8	2	5.3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>100</b>

Moreover, even though the Palestinian people are the second most frequently mentioned Arab masses in the three newspapers, attention varies from WP (21.1%) on one hand, and the NYT (40.6%) and LAT (36.4%) on the other hand. This suggest that the WP marginalized the Palestinian people. This process might be related to the WP's tendency to be the least likely paper to present neutral editorial coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute (see Chapter Four and Six ).

### **7.2.2 Topics**

Table 33 reveals great similarity between the three newspapers. In fact, the three most recurring topics in the three papers are almost identical. The NYT devoted most attention to military (60.71%), followed by foreign policy (10.7%), and media (8.33%). A similar pattern is evident in the LAT attention to topics. The paper devoted most of its coverage to military (57.75%), US foreign policy (20.68%), and media (7.75%). Similarly, the

WP's topics are dominated by military (54.05%), followed by US foreign policy (9.45%), and diplomatic and political activities (5.41%), and media (5.41%) and FBI (5.41%).

**Table 33: Topics- Disaggregated by Newspaper**

	NYT	%	LAT	%	WP	%
Military	51	60.7	67	57.8	40	54.1
US Foreign Policy	9	10.7	24	20.7	7	9.5
Media	7	8.33	9	7.8	4	5.4
Diplomatic & Political Activities	2	2.4	2	1.7	7	9.5
FBI	1	1.2	1	.86	4	5.4
Arab-Israeli Conflict	1	1.2	3	2.6	1	1.4
Linkage	1	1.2	3	2.6	1	1.4
Arab-Arab relations	3	3.6	1	.86	3	4.1
Arab-American relations	2	2.4	1	.86	1	1.4
Arab public opinion	2	2.4	0	0	0	0
American supp for the troops in the Gulf	2	2.4	0	0	0	0
Economic Difficulties within states	0	0	0	0	0	1.4
Oil fields	0	0	0	0	1	1.4
Initial reaction of Financial Markets	0	0	1	.86	0	0
Oil Prices	1	1.2	0	0	0	0
Environment	1	1.2	2	1.7	3	4.1
Politics within States	1	1.2	1	.86	1	1.4
Human Rights	0	0	1	.86	0	0
TOTAL	84	100	116	100	74	100

**Table 34: Rank order of The Three Predominant Topics by Newspaper**

	NYT	LAT	WP
Military	1st	1st	1st
US Foreign Policy	2nd	2nd	2nd
Media	3rd	3rd	3rd
Diplomatic and Political Activities			2nd
FBI			3rd

From these trends, one can infer that media coverage of the Middle East is related at least in part to the standards of newsworthiness and newsgathering routines which appear to constitute a built-in tendency to provide a repetitive and unflattering image of the Arabs. They also can be related to the intersection of the Gulf war with ‘crisis’, global civil society, ‘our’ war, values, cultural archive and self-other paradigm.

### **7.3 Thematic Analysis: Differentiating the Plane of Meaning Articulation between Just and Unjust War**

In this analysis, themes are re-grouped into two macro-themes: (1) Just war and (2) Unjust war. These themes are then diversified into eleven sub-themes in total. Both themes and sub-themes emerge from the sampled content. One cannot understand the dominance of the just war discourse except through locating it in a wider context, that is to say a religious and international law context.

The notion of a 'just war' is a Christian theological doctrine dating back from St Augustine. The notion stipulates the condition of what must be met before a war can justly be entered (War-Decision Law), as well as a guide to acceptable behaviour in war (War-Conduct Law) (see for example Ramsey, 1992; US Catholic Bishops, 1992; Holmes, 1992; Matthews, 1993). These principles include seven (or more or less) criteria: Just cause; proportionality of means, discrimination, reasonable chance of success, proportionality of ends, last resort and limited war. Moreover, they are codified and expanded in theories of the international law, for example Article 47 and the Geneva convention 1949 (see for example Johnson, 1992, Matthews, 1994)

Table 35 suggests that the war is viewed largely as a just and moral war. The just war theme accounted for 71.32 percent of the two macro themes (Table 35).

**Table 35: Main Theme**

	Frequency	Percent
(1) Just War		
(a) Reasons that constitute just cause for military option	67	51.9
(b) Proportionality of means	3	2.3
(c) Discrimination	5	3.9
(d) Reasonable chance of success	7	5.43
(e) Proportionality of ends	2	1.56
(f) Limited war	6	4.67
(g) Last resort	2	1.56
(2) Unjust War		
(a) Unjust cause for intervention	18	14
(b) Unproportionality of means	6	4.7
(c) Unproportionality of ends	10	7.8
(d) Indiscrimination	3	2.33
TOTAL	129	100

As we shall see, various processes are activated to give the just war (71.32%) its force. These processes involve creating a sort of binary opposition that works through a variety of machinations. These are equalisation, subordination, elaboration, and transformation.

### **7.3.1 Just War Theme**

1. The Just War theme contains seven sub-themes:

a) Reasons that constitute cause for continued military options (just cause).

1)- Bush, to us made a compelling case. There can be no question of the threat Saddam Hussein has posed to the American interest in an orderly world. Not only did he invade a sovereign state, rape it and remove it from the map- an act of total aggression ... what made that threat distinctive was the combination of his strategic location, his grandiose ambition and his ruthlessness and hatred of the West, taken together with the wealth and weaponry to fulfil his purposes. Saddam Hussein hoped and had the capacity to go on from Kuwait to destabilize and eliminate a region crucial to world equilibrium. (Washington Post, editorial, January 17, 1991)

2)- What is distinctive about the Gulf is that an unscrupulous dictator gives every sign of wishing to exercise hegemony over a region in which vital world interests are implicated. Those interests include a large fraction of the world's oil supply, the balance of power in an area where the Soviet Union has historical ambitions and the survival of a democratic state, Israel, which Saddam (along with many other Arab Leaders), has threatened with extinction. Moreover, Saddam has made it clear that he is prepared to advance his designs by using weapons of mass destruction and sponsoring worldwide terrorism activities. (Washington Post, op-ed, January 17, 1991)

3)- [Bombs] are a powerful message on behalf of honourable goals .... They are to liberate Kuwait and restore its legitimate rulers, ... to insure stability in the region; to keep Saddam Hussein from seizing a chokehold on the world's energy lifeline, and to emerge from the crisis in a way that establishes a resolute, decent precedent for guaranteeing collective

security in the post-cold world. (New York Times, editorial, January 17, 1991)

4)- There is no ambiguity now. All the argument, pro and con, have been argued back and forth and up and down. At this writing, the world has largely given up on the man from Baghdad. (Los Angeles Times, editorial, January 17, 1991)

5)- By far the most important reason for exercising the military option is to uphold international law and the authority of the United Nations. (Los Angeles Times, op-ed, January 17, 1991)

6)- On the brink of having to fight a ground war that he finally realised he could not win, Saddam Hussein has embarked on a last-ditch effort to generate negotiations that he hopes will buy him time and ensure the survival of his army and his regime. (Los Angeles Times, news analysis, February 16, 1991)

7)- The Iraqi statements as it stands is a ploy, if not a hoax. It is designed not for peace but for venting the pressures on him and dividing the international coalition. He has not formally renounced his annexation. He has avoided the other stipulations of U.N. resolutions. (New York Times, editorial, February 16, 1991)

8)- If Saddam Hussein wants peace, there are two things to do now: First, make clear that there are no conditions attached to his commitment to get out of Kuwait. Second, start getting out. (New York Times, editorial, February 16, 1991)

b) Force being used against Iraq is not excessive (proportionality of means).

9)- The tonnage of bombs that the United States has dropped on the Iraqis is greatly exaggerated in your- front page article on the massive supply effort in the war against Iraq. (New York Times, letter, February 10, 1991)

c) Non-combatants are not the actual target of the coalition force (discrimination). For example:-

10)- The destruction of Iraq's army and innocent civilians left in harm's way was not American strategy but Saddam's.(Washington Post, op-ed, February 5, 1991)

11)- The criminal is Hussein who used the innocents as 'human armour' in an attempt to shield his war-making capacity from the allied attacks. The blood is on his hands alone (Los Angeles Times, letter, February 17, 1991)

d) U.S. policy has a reasonable chance of success (reasonable chance of success).

12)[Allied warplanes] apparently achieved a remarkable strategic and tactical surprise in their pre-dawn attack today on the military might of Iraq .... The initial victories at the political level are even more encouraging than the military success on the battlefield. (Los Angeles Times, news analysis, February 21, 1991)

13)- The war has gone better than anyone could have possibly anticipated. (Los Angeles Times, news analysis, February 24, 1991)

14)- With the start of the ground campaign, Hussein will regret that he passed up the chance to withdraw his military forces under the terms laid out by Bush, for the Iraqi leader, ultimately, will be forced to withdraw on terms imposed by the God of War. (Los Angeles Times, news analysis, February 24, 1991)

e) The good that might be achieved by the American military intervention in the Gulf outweighs the evil that would be caused by allowing the status quo to stand (proportionality of ends).



15)- The war has pushed both Israel and Iraq away from the Nuclear threshold. (Los Angeles Times, op-ed, February 22, 1991)

16)- By humbling [the Iraqi army], the allies will be positioned to achieve-directly or indirectly-the crushing of Hussein himself. (Los Angeles Times, news analysis, February 24, 1991)

f) Limits of sanctions (war as a last resort)

17)- The real question is not whether or not sanction might have worked, but whether or not the international community would have permitted them to work. Anyone...naive enough to believe [it would have worked] should not be entrusted with the fate of this nation. (Los Angeles Times, letter, February 24, 1991)

g) War aims should be limited (limited war).

18)- The proper object of this war is to deflate, not demolish Iraq and President Hussein. (New York Times, op-ed, January 17, 1991)

19)- The U.S. should seek to avoid a bloody ground war, fought for the goal of a total victory over Iraq. We should strive to limit our war aims to those set by the U.N. - the restoration of Kuwait. (New York Times, op-ed, January 17, 1991)

20)- Limiting the war serves long-term U.S. interests.... (New York Times, editorial, February 4, 1991)

The next section will focus on how meaning is articulated in these excerpts. Words, concepts and charts will be used to illustrate how meaning is constructed. Returning back to our discussion in Chapter Three, a text, as Van Dijk has pointed out, contains Micro and Macro themes. These themes

express themselves through particular machinaries. Equation, elaboration, transformation and subordination are some of the machinaries used in the following analysis.

Paragraph one begins with a binary opposition. Saddam Hussein is a threat while Bush is a defender or protector of American interests: " Mr Bush to us made a compelling case. There can be no question of the threat Saddam Hussein has posed to the American interest". The American interest is equated with order and with a concept of sovereignty.

" ... the American interest in an orderly world. Not only did he invade a sovereign state, rape it and remove it from the map ... "

American interest —————→ Order / Sovereignty
--



The invasion is equated with aggression: " ... an act of total aggression". This process obviously serves to evoke World War II discourse and the American political thoughts.

Invasion —————→ aggression
----------------------------


Furthermore, a process of elaboration was utilised to specify the content of threat : " What made the threat distinctive was the combination of his strategic location, his grandiose ambition, and his ruthlessness and hatred of the West, taken together with wealth and weaponry to fulfil his purposes".

Another process which gives “just cause” its meaning is subordination. “Saddam Hussein has ambition, wealth and weapon to fulfil his purposes” This way of postulation subordinates the fact that the United States also has ambition, wealth and weapon to fulfil its purposes


Lastly, the order which the paragraph starts with is linked to regional and world equilibrium “ ... to de-stabilise and eliminate a region crucial to world equilibrium”




In paragraph two, Saddam Hussein is presented as an equivalent to a dictator : " what is distinctive about the Gulf is that an Unscrupulous dictator..."



Another process in paragraph two is a subordination. Saddam Hussein wished to exercise hegemony over the Gulf. This subordinates the fact that the United States also wished to exercise hegemony over the Gulf. Moreover, the Gulf is presented as equivalent to world interests: " ... gives every sign of wishing to exercise hegemony over a region in which vital world interests are implicated." These interests are the world's oil supply, the balance of power, democracy, and terrorism.




Paragraph three transforms the negative aspects of bombs into a positive one: " [Bombs] are a powerful message on behalf of honourable goals". These goals resonate with order/International Law and United Nations: " They are to liberate Kuwait and restore its legitimate rulers; to insure stability in the region; to keep Saddam Hussein from seizing a choke - hold on the world's energy lifeline, and to emerge from the crisis in a way that establishes a resolute, decent precedent for guaranteeing collective security in the post - cold world".



Paragraph four shows a binary opposition. The world versus Saddam Hussein: " ... the world has largely given up the man from Baghdad "

Paragraph five links the military option with order and United Nations. In this way, there is a sort of equalisation taking place: " By far the most important reason for exercising the military option is to uphold International Law and the authority of the United Nations. "



In paragraphs six and seven the Iraqi peace communiqué is transformed into play or propaganda. The Iraqi peace statement is framed as ' a ploy if not a hoax ' and a last ditch effort by Saddam Hussein to ' buy him time '. Paragraph eight goes further to set in monologic terms to Saddam Hussein the terms of peace: " If Saddam Hussein wants peace, there are two things to do now ... "

#### b. Proportionality of means (2.3%)

A process of transformation was activated to give the proportionality of means its content: " The tonnage of bombs that the United States has dropped on the Iraqi is greatly exaggerated in your ... " (paragraph nine)

c. Discrimination (3.9%)

In paragraphs ten and eleven, civilians are not the actual target of the bombing, and blame for civilian casualties caused by the US bombs on shelter in civilian areas is shifted to Saddam Hussein, who put civilians in danger to shield his forces and manipulate the outside world "... innocent civilians left in harm's way was not the American strategy but Saddam's" (paragraph ten). "the blood is on his hands alone" (paragraph eleven).

Another process in paragraph ten and eleven is subordination. Indeed, the focus on whether civilians are the actual targets of the coalition force or not has pushed aside the long term effects of bombing the civil infrastructure of Iraq which is essential to sustain civil life.

Lastly, a process of equivalence is activated to give meaning to discrimination. Hussein is equivalent to a criminal: "The criminal is Hussein" (paragraph eleven).

d. Reasonable chance of success (5.43%)

A process of binary opposition is articulated in paragraph twelve, thirteen and fourteen to give meaning to a reasonable chance of success. The United States is a winner while the Iraqi people are the losers "[Allied war planes] apparently achieved a remarkable strategic and tactical surprise in their pre - dawn attack today on the military might of Iraq ... The initial victories of the political level are even more encouraging than the military success on the battlefield" (paragraph twelve). "The war has gone better than any one could have possibly anticipated" (paragraph thirteen) " The

Iraqi leader, ultimately, will be forced to withdraw on terms imposed by the God of war" (paragraph fourteen).

e. Proportionality of ends (1.56%)

In paragraphs fifteen and sixteen a process of elevation is evident. The positive ramification of going to war is emphasised : "The war has pushed both Israel and Iraq from Nuclear threshold" (paragraph fifteen). "... the allies will be positioned to achieve - directly or indirectly - the crushing of Hussein himself" (paragraph sixteen).

f. War as a last resort (1.56%)

Paragraph seventeen transformed sanction into unworkable ways to resolve the conflict: " Any one ... naive enough to believe [it would have worked] should not be entrusted with the fate of this nation" (paragraph seventeen).

g. Limited war (4.67%)

Paragraph eighteen, nineteen and twenty utilised equivalence to give content to a limited war. They equated limited war with long - term US (paragraphs eighteen and twenty), and United Nations' interests (paragraph nineteen).



### 7.3.2 Unjust War Theme

The 'unjust war' theme (28.83%) is the antithesis of the 'just war' theme. It expresses that the American cause is 'unjust' (14%), that innocent civilians are killed or will be killed (2.33%), that the use of force is unproportionate (4.7%), and that the war is not proportionate to its end (7.8%). The theme contains four sub-themes:

a) Unjust cause for military intervention in the Gulf (unjust cause).

21)- There was no good reason to go to war on January 15. There is no good reason to be at war today. (New York Times, column, February 23, 1991)

22)- Half-way around the world [our soldiers] are defending the monarchy of Saudi Arabia and fighting to restore the monarchy of Kuwait. Old King George III must be laughing up his ghostly sleeve. (Los Angeles Times, letter, February 9, 1991)

b) The military operation against Iraq does not discriminate between combatants and non-combatants (indiscrimination).

23)- I felt a sickening sense of horror as I watched the newscast showing the bombed-out bunker where hundreds of old men, women and children who sought shelter from our bombing raids in Baghdad were killed or wounded. (Los Angeles Times, letter, February 21, 1991)

24)- The United States ... is smashing the water, and sewage system ... bridges, generating stations, industrial plants, sugar refineries, flour mills, local government buildings, bus terminal.... In the cause of punishment and destruction of modern Iraq, innocents will continue to die. (Los Angeles Times, column, February 21, 1991)

25)- Thousands of Iraqi civilians are being killed each week, as 'collateral damage'. Tens of thousands are homeless, and

millions are going without food, medicine, and water. (Los Angeles Times, letter, February 21, 1991)

- c) Excessive firepower was/or might be used by the coalition forces (unproportionality of means).

26)- The conventional wisdom is that the Bush administration has ruled out [the use of nuclear weapons]. But public statements by officials have been studies in ambiguity, and all official comment on the avoidance of 'weapons of mass destruction' has been based on the assumption that the success of conventional arms would make them unnecessary. But there are disturbing signs that a large number of Americans would favour resorting to any means - even nuclear weapons - in order to prevail over continued Iraqi resistance. (Los Angeles Times, column, February 17, 1991)

- d) The harm that could be caused by the American military intervention in the Gulf is not comparable to the harm caused by allowing the status quo to stand (unproportionality of ends).

27)- Politically the war with Iraq will be the granddaddy of all Vietnams. (Los Angeles Times, op-ed, January 28, 1991)

28)- The military action of the United States has now fertilised the seeds of hate and distrust already present in the minds of Arab people. (Los Angeles Times, letter, February 8, 1991)

29)- Mr Bush and his administration have lost their sense of proportion in this war. And if the Soviet Union goes down the road to darkness, they will have lost their new world order... (New York Times, column, January 29, 1991)

30)- The long-term costs of war will affect our children's - and their children's-futures. (Los Angeles Times, column, February 10, 1991)

a. Unjust cause (14%)

Paragraph twenty one and twenty two have utilised several processes to articulate the 'unjust cause'. Paragraph twenty one equated Bush, and the cause for military intervention in the Gulf with unjust cause.

US reasons to go to war → unjust cause
--

In this view the American administration has put forward no satisfactory reason to resort to violence in the Gulf because there was no cause to be made: " There was no good reason to go to war on January 15. There is no good reason to go to war today " (Paragraph twenty one). In this context paragraph twenty two equated the monarchy of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with King George III :

monarchy of Saudi Arabia + Kuwait → King George III
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King George III's regime is known by its instability. The equation of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with King George III resonates with the Arab image as unstable regimes.

b. Indiscrimination (2.33%)

The second dimension of the 'unjust war' is related to civilian suffering. This category includes two sub-categories; civilian suffering in post- war (paragraph twenty three and twenty five), and civilian suffering in the war's aftermath (paragraph twenty four and twenty five). The former

equates the bombing of Baghdad with human suffering and death: " I felt a sickening sense of horror as I watched the newscast showing the bombed - out bunker where hundreds of old men, women and children who sought shelter from our bombing raid in Baghdad were killed or wounded" (paragraph twenty three). "Thousands of Iraqi civilians are being killed each week, as 'collateral damage' " (paragraph twenty five). Paragraph twenty four focuses on the long term effects of bombing the infrastructure of Iraq. It equates the bombing with the destruction of the civil infrastructure of Iraq which is vital to sustain civil life: " The United States is smashing the water, and sewage system ... bridges, generating station, industrial Plants, sugar building, bus terminal ... . In the cause of punishment and destruction of modern Iraq innocents will continue to die" (paragraph twenty four). " Tens of thousands are homeless, and millions are going without food, medicine, and water" (Paragraph twenty five).

#### c. Unproportionality of means (4.7%)

The third dimension of the 'unjust war' theme is unproportionality of means. Paragraph twenty six equated the force used or that might be used by the coalition forces with unproportionality of means or excessive use of military force (paragraph twenty six).

#### d. Unproportionality of ends (7.8%)

Paragraph twenty seven, twenty eight, twenty nine, and thirty equate the American military intervention in the Gulf with serious ramifications. These suggest that the 'harm' done by going to war outweigh the 'good' done

by going to war: "Politically the war with Iraq will be grand-daddy of Vietnam " (paragraph twenty seven). " [War] has now fertilised the seeds of hate and distrust already present in the minds of Arab people" (paragraph twenty eight) "... If the Soviet Union goes down the road to darkness, [Mr Bush and his administration] will have lost their new world order" (paragraph twenty nine). " The long - term costs of war will offset our children's - and their children's - futures (paragraph thirty ).

The remaining themes were too fragmentary to form a coherent and meaningful theme. For example:-

Ballistic missile defence offers United States a means of decreasing ballistic missile threats to United States and its friends and allies. (Washington Post, op-ed, January 29, 1991)

Sensible conservation and imaginative research will lessen our dependence on oil and enhance the environment. (Washington Post, op-ed, January 29, 1991)

Bangladesh does not receive any oil from Saudi Arabia or any other country on concessional terms. Bangladesh took a principled stand following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait last August and condemned the aggression. (Washington Post, letter, January 29, 1991)

The cohesion of the anti-Baghdad coalition is likely to be severely tested, particularly the core United States-Soviet alliance. (New York Times, news analysis, February 16, 1991)

Iranian President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, using personal diplomacy and carefully straddling the fence between Iraq and the allied powers in the Persian Gulf War, appears to have strengthened his hand at home and abroad with the peace initiative he introduced earlier this week. (Washington Post, news analysis, February 9, 1991)

Bush chickened out when presented with a golden opportunity to get the nation started on a meaningful energy policy.

If Bush had the courage to require more conservation and substitution-and raise gasoline taxes - America's dependence on imports, especially from unstable areas like the Gulf, could be reduced. (Washington Post, op-ed, February 28, 1991)

If the military budget is cut in accordance with the present plans, that competence will suffer and our ability to resist aggression will be hurt. (New York Times, op-ed, February 28, 1991)

Studies of past spills indicate that their effects, while shocking in the short run, are never as long-lasting as we initially fear. (New York Times, op-ed, February 9, 1991)

The combination of encouraging war news and enlightened reserve policy has stripped oil prices of the fear factor, returning them to pre-August levels. That's not likely to please the oil companies, but it is wonderful news for the economy. (New York Times, editorial, January 21, 1991)

The sounds and the costumes are the same, but there is something lacking in today's demonstrations in Washington, something different from the mass turnouts of yesterday. The passion is not there. (Los Angeles Times, column, January 21, 1991)

## **7.4 Summary and Conclusion**

To sum up the evidence from the Gulf War case it has revealed that Iraq (205 see table 8), Saddam Hussein (177 see table 9), Iraqi masses (52 see table 10), and Iraqi army (94 see table 11) are the most frequently referred to Arab actors. Label analysis has shown that Saddam Hussein was vilified as a foreign other (87.5% see table 14). Further, labels like

cruel/brutal (35) resonate with the American image of the Arabs as barbaric (46% see table 17).

Content analysis has shown also that, most of the quoted sources were American sources (58.8% see table 20). Analysis of Arab sources, in contrast, has shown that Arab actors were not defined as legitimate sources (7.8% see table 21). Further, journalists relied mostly on and interacted with American official sources/actors (260 see table 20).

Topic analysis has indicated that military (57.66% see table 22), and US foreign policy (14.59% see table 22) were the two most frequently used topics.

Thematic analysis has suggested that the sampled papers adopted the language of holiness or the American perspective on the war. For instance, it was found that the most prominent macro-theme in the coverage of the Gulf war was 'Just war' (71.32% of macro themes- see table 35).

In conclusion, the US press acted as a mobilising force during the Gulf War, by reducing a very complex issue into a simple narration of 'good' and 'evil'. It constructed a highly salient and vilified foreign other. Moreover, it focused on a few topics and themes, and marginalized others. This process served to decontextualise the coverage, justifying military intervention, and sustained public support for intervention. This, obviously, came at the expense of recuperating the Arabs. It reinstated the Arab image as 'foreign other'.

The Press' coverage of the Gulf War is a product of particular news production processes, mostly activated in a context of foreign coverage seen from a national crisis perspective. When 'consensus' is coherent, like in time of crisis, the American media become relatively closed to self critical views. When the political elites lack unity and coherence, the media reflect that disunity and become more open. Media does not escape the influence of the culture in which it operates in the selection of actors, labels, topics and themes, which are mostly uncritical of the official interpretation of the issue. Thematic analysis, though, revealed some differences between the LAT on one hand and the WP and NYT on the other hand. The LAT seemed to display a more anti-war perspective than did the Post and the NYT. This can be attributed at least in part to the geographical proximity of the NYT and WP to the policy makers in the American capital. Indeed, both papers are published in the West Coast, Washington D.C. and New York respectively. This may explain at least partially, the relatively more critical view of the war in the LAT. Organisational perspective, as discussed in chapter three, maintains that geographical proximity influences media output. Geographical proximity increases the interaction and enhances the relationship between journalists and sources. This entails in many cases seeing foreign events from the vertigo of the source.



## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

In the last two decades, a variety of studies at different academic and political institutions have been undertaken. The task was directed to clarify the ideological embeddings in the media image constitution of the Arabs. The scale and types of these studies varied at different stages in correlation to the increasing American intervention in the Arab affairs. The results of these studies, as we have seen in Chapter Four, have converged upon a basic theme that the media coverage of the Arab Middle East has always been 'monologic' and supportive of the American official stand in its brute sense.

These American media coverage studies about the Arabs had different objectives of thought and politics, expressing differently the negativity of media coverage. The present study classified those studies into three groups. The first group focused on the Arabs in general (e.g. Wagner, 1973; Suleiman, 1974; Belkaoui, 1978; Dougherty & Warden, 1979; Hudson & Wolf, 1980; Curtiss, 1982; kern, 1983). The second focused on the Palestinian in particular (e.g. Weisman, 1981). The third category attempted to find reciprocal relations between the previous two categories. It focused on both (e.g. Terry & Mendenhal, 1974; Trice, 1979; Adams, 1981; Asi, 1981). These studies, as we have mentioned in Chapter Four, correlated in due course to the increasingly American intervention in the region. Put differently, the American intervention, negativity and asymmetry were grounds which gave for those studies a chance to come about.

The contextual variations leading to different sorts of research attention appear to signify a persistence of resisting relations which could be said to have introduced a chance of change in the American perception. Although one could admit specific variation, now and then, one has to be on the guard against their recognition. This all has to do with the increasing sophistication of the American articulation (more widely the Western Bloc) in sustaining a negative reciprocity between the already negative image of the Arab and the youthful Palestinian cause. In such establishment of a binary relation, one could say that there is an extension of the margin in which the Americans can activate this ideological work. The way the Palestinian cause proceeded has provided the Americans in some sense with a displacing lever of politicisation through which stigmatisation could inflict more damage onto the Arab image.

Taking into account the above concerns, which in some respect retain resources of resistance and articulation, the present study goes further down the same road but with more emphasis on those elements that are made possible by the new contemporary emergents of the late eighties and nineties. This study has provided a descriptive and analytical picture of two case studies structured by multiple theoretical underpinnings about the relationships of Americans with the Arabs. The first case study taken into close examination is the American portrayal of the 1987 Palestinian Intifada, while the second case study is the American coverage of the Gulf war.

The 1987 Palestinian Intifada case study is incorporated to establish a point of reference. It analyses the image of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute in four of the American elite press (NYT, WP, LAT, SLPD) after the eruption

of the Intifada on December 8, 1987 on the occupied West Bank and Gaza. The Intifada case substantiates the view expressed by Peretz (1988, 1990) and Daniel (1995). One has to keep in mind, however, that our study is not identical with either Peretz's or Daniel's study. More specifically, Peretz, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Middle East Program at the State University of New York, Binghamton, approached the subject matter, for obvious reasons, from a political science perspective. He focused, partially, on the impact of the Intifada on the West including the Western media. Daniel, of the Speech and Media Studies Department at the University of Missouri-Rolla, in her part, does not provide a critical analysis of any specific instances of media coverage of the Intifada. Rather, she utilises a rhetorical and theoretical perspective to explain how the Intifada recontextualized the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how such a recotextualization influenced the American public. In our study, we used two case studies to establish a point of comparison, provided critical analysis of the press coverage of the two case studies, combined content analysis with textual analysis, differentiated between the potentiality and the actualisation of the setting process and analysed data in the context of State-Media relationships. Moreover, we employed a multi-perspective approach (crisis, 'our' war/'their' war, Global civil society/national civil society, values, cultural archive and source-media relationships) to capture the complexity of State-Media interactions.

The Intifada case study reveals that there was a shift in the coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the Intifada phase vis-à-vis the pre Intifada phase. In the pre Intifada phase, as Chapter Four indicates, media coverage was governed largely by the terrorist frame and the David and

Goliath frame. The Intifada images, however, shattered the illusion of Palestinian Goliath, and defenceless Israeli David. In brief, the Intifada transformed the media image of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Such a change, as the second and main case study will show, is proven to be too minor to constitute a new way of perceiving the Arabs.

The Gulf war is the main case study. It is actually representing the bulk work of the current concern. This case study is comprehensively focused to analyse the Arab image in three American elite newspapers (NYT, WP, LAT) during the Gulf war. Its components signify the intricate and complex power relations feeding back in reproducing the old-new Arab image as a foreign 'Other', but worse as a static formation. The analysis below will illustrate the multiple dimensions and implications of this event in coexistence with the background case study, the 1987 Palestinian Intifada.

The two events in our study are approached from within a media-government relationship. There are two broad views, as seen in Chapter Three, of media - government relationships. The first view is static, it maintains that the American media often treat similar events differently, depending upon their implications for US interests. Media, in this view, converge with US foreign policy (i.e. Herman, 1986; Herman, 1985; Herman, 1983; Chomsky & Herman, 1984). A more dynamic view stresses the constantly shifting nature of 'consensus', and the possibility for dissenting views to be heard in mainstream journalism. It also emphasises the response of media to the degree of consensus or dissent among political elites. When consensus is strong the coverage converges with the American foreign policy, when it collapses the coverage diverges with the American

foreign policy (e.g. Bennett, 1990; Curran, 1989; Hallin, 1984; Schlesinger, 1978). Media studies on the Gulf war reveal monological coverage of the war ( see Chapter Three). Traber and Davies (1991), Liebes (1992) and Klab (1994) suggest that the press coverage which falls in the nationalism/ patriotism trap is a grave obstacle to war reporting. In time of crisis and our war, media is likely to subordinate its professional principles e.g. objectivity to the requirement of national interests.

Other studies ( Dorman and Livingston, 1994; Entman and Page, 1994; Bennett, 1994, 1993; Kaid et al, 1994; Malek and Leidig, 1991; Gannett Foundation, 1991) show that the media converged with the American foreign policy in the Gulf crisis and war. The intersection of the media and foreign policy is attributed to source interaction and the media's tendency to 'index' the debate within the official circles in the American capital (see Chapter Three).

Our findings intersect with these results. The press acted as a mobilising force during the war. Yet, our study incorporated a more complex approach to capture the complexity of State-Media interaction with the Other in time of war. It went beyond nationalism, 'our war/their war' and source interaction to introduce a value that can weaken the national enclosure ie Globalisation.

One should bear in mind, in this respect, that the reference to globalisation should not imply an advocacy of it as such. One has to be aware that the current globalisation has many symptoms of asymmetrical power relations infused into the whole phenomena. Our advocacy, however, is based on a value we are carrying in consequence of the

‘postulated’ position that is put under focus and attack. Our position is to weaken the fusion between Civil Society Institutions and the Nation-State, particularly those national nodes that encourage the societal institutions (i.e. Media) into identifying with certain enclosed formations in relationship with the Other. In this respect, globalisation might function to weaken this enclosure. It is a strategic choice because we are in the phase in between, a passage way to something yet unknown. It is still a field of struggle and its content is still in the phase of imbricate intensification of contingent factors. That is why it is a strategic choice. Nevertheless, our study also activated other perspectives that added to the specificity of the cases under analysis. These perspectives are national values, cultural archive and self/other.

In our view, the media-government relationship is contingent, it depends on local analysis. Indeed, as long as there is an embedded assumption of contingency interweaving our argument, it means that there are indeterminate factors involved. In a result of conceiving reality as multiple, it is critical to incorporate more than one perspective. It is also critical to keep in mind, given the contingency of reality, things could not be recognised in advance. It is a matter of local analysis. That is to say, it depends on the intersected lines or variables at one point of time. These lines in our two case studies are crisis (Intifada and Gulf war), ‘their’ war (Intifada), ‘our’ war (Gulf war) global civil society (Intifada), civil society (Gulf war) and self/other (Gulf war).

Crisis, as we have discussed in Chapter Three, is a critical moment ‘real’ or perceived. The intersection of crisis with ‘globalisation’ and ‘their’ war produces more pluralistic coverage. American coverage of the Intifada

is a case in point. Journalistic output is relatively open to alternative viewpoints. By contrast, the intersection of crisis with civil society and 'our' war ( i.e. the Gulf war) more often provides patriotic coverage. The media acts as self-defence machinery to protect self/state from the foreign forces working against it. Hence, it establishes enclosed coverage. This mode of coverage contributes to monologic relations with the postulated 'foreign other', the Arabs. Closed or monologic coverage works by appealing to those elements people have in common as member of a particular culture, namely, values and imaginary/cultural archives. It reassures and comforts people through what they already know about the foreign Other (imaginary) and self (values). These two forces are routinely used in time of crisis and 'our' war to present the foreign other as the incarnation of evil and the self as the embodiment of good.

A more abstract proximal condition is national civil society/global civil society. The impact of globalisation on the fusion between civil society institutions and nation-state and consequently on the reproducibility of enclosures towards the Arabs, is context dependent. In time of crisis and 'our war'(Gulf war) most civil society institutions operate in the old paradigm (civil society/ nationalistic enclosures) which limits their capacity to represent those fighting and suffering in far-off wars. In times of crisis and 'their war' (Intifada), however, globalisation weakens the fusion between civil society institutions and Nation-state. This view lends credence to Shaw's viewpoint, explained in chapter three. Shaw (1996) argues that global perspective weaken the relationship between media and nation-state, thereby widening the scope of the coverage. National perspective, in contrast, enhances the relationship between media and nation-state. hence, it

produces identification with nation-state, enclosure toward the postulated foreign other and narrows the range of the coverage.

One of the linchpins for our analysis of the American media coverage of the Gulf war is the remote conditions that are structuring media representations of the Arabs. In other words, the distant forces that come together to form a western perspective on the Arabs (imaginary/cultural archive).

Western scholars have generally approached the Arab societies from an 'objectivist' or 'essentialist' perspective. If Said's point, as illustrated in Chapter Two, is taken into account one could say that the media have "... focused on large, monolithic platonic concepts such as 'Islam,' or 'the Arabs,' as if they had some unchanging existence of their own" (Said, 1977: 184). A distinctive feature of this perspective is the implicit assumption of perspectiveless knowledge. In contrast, the perspective that weaves the threads of this study together subscribes to the view that knowledge about other cultures is not 'out there'. It is an invention or active interpretation. It is a product of humanistic interpretation and each interpretation is a situational and stimulating power relationship. Indeed, the interpretation of text, which is what knowledge of other cultures is mainly based on, does not take place in a vacuum. It is a social activity and is inextricably tied to the situation out of which it arose in the first place, which either gives it the status of knowledge or rejects it as unsuitable for that status.



Knowledge about human realities is a set of representations and the source of all representations is the imaginary. Orientalism is one manifestation of the imaginary. It provides a web of representations that 'give' a unity of meaning to 'Islam,' and 'the Arabs,' That is to say, it provides the framework of images within which 'Islam' and 'the Arabs' are seen. Following Said's position (1978), even though there is an awareness of many criticism involved against it, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have, I believe that no writing, thinking, or acting on the Arabs would do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and actions imposed by the institutions of Orientalism

Western perspective on the Arab, as we have discussed in Chapter Two, has two main characteristics. It essentialises and dichotomises the Middle East, remaining generally unmindful of its own biases or the consequences of its own rhetoric and mode of discourse. This mode of thought is underpinned by stereotypical thinking which implies simplicity, rigidity and stasis. People become prisoners without realising it because the prison in which they are trapped is invisible. They are unaware that what they see is determined by what they expect to see, never responding to the 'reality' but to their view of it .

Western categorisation is based on an unquestioned assumption. It is assumed to be the thing it represents. It ignores the fact that we live in a world of constant change. It casts one's mind into fixity and inflexibility of things. Nothing remains the same in spite of its given name. The assumption that Arabs are an adversary may not necessarily be true and even if it was, the next moment it may no longer be so. The act of labelling and

stereotyping excludes other perceptions, and widens the gap between the 'map' and the 'territory'.

Arab history, we maintain, should be approached from a dynamic and complex perspective. This view, in the context of the present study, serves two important functions. It helps to break the static view of Arab history and highlights some of the elements that have been marginalised during the Gulf War. One should not lose sight of the fact that it is our position that the West should be equally approached from a non-essentialist and dynamic perspective. This view is evident in our methodological and theoretical approach. Methodologically speaking, our insistence on incorporating a local analysis which is crystallised in result of searching for a point of variability from within the historical developments of the American media would reflect our position: a non-totalising one. Such a methodological position would require resistance to any universalised way of seeing the west. However, if it happens in the interstices of the argument any universalistic manifestation has been conveyed, one should take it as a result of a strategical standpoint.

Theoretically, as we insist that the Arabs should not be looked at as totality this also applies to the West. The presumption of having a contingency involved, that is, there is a possibility of transformation, means that the Orientalism, the West and the Americans actually are not a close identity. The society is an aggregate of struggling forces which at a particular point might contribute a number of competing discourses that dominate the arena. Said was criticised for marginalising the specificity and multiplicity of the Orientalism and the West. The criticism, however, does

not undermine Said's view because first no one is outside the snap-shot limit and second Said's critics seem to misconstrue his position on both the Orientalism and the West. In the introduction of his book 'Orientalism' Said (1978) stated clearly that he has " ... begun with the assumption that the Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely *there* just as the Occident itself is not just *their* either" (Said, 1978: 4). More recently, Said (1994, 1995) reiterated his position stating that " One scarcely knows what to make of these [critics] caricatural permutations of a book that to its author and in its argument is explicitly anti-essentialist, radically skeptical about all categorical designations such as Orient and Occident ... " (Said, 1995: 331). The position of Said is consistent with what we have concluded. We went further than Said by providing an alternative reading of the Arab and Islamic history.

The American administrations have always articulated their interventions abroad from within ethical principles. They invoked internal values to sell the American adventures overseas to the public. That is to say, morality is invoked to gain approval for the American involvements back home.

The United States has always stressed idealistic objectives to mobilise and maintain public support for military intervention overseas (e.g. World War I, Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama). The strategy contains two main elements: an exaggeration of the importance of the conflict, and an emphasis on the moral imperative of US reaction. Frequently, those justifications bear little resemblance to the more plausible political and economic motive for intervention. This approach is apparent as

early as World War I. President Woodrow Wilson repeatedly insisted that the conflict is a struggle to 'make the world safer for democracy'.

Similar discourse was employed to justify militarily interventions during the Cold War era. The intervention in Korea and Vietnam were reduced to a simplistic conflict between the force of freedom and democracy in the south and a monolithic communist aggressor threatening the security of the entire free world. In 1958 President Dwight Eisenhower justified sending US marines to Lebanon in similar language. He stressed the danger of a communist take-over of Lebanon. Similarly, in the invasion of Grenada in 1983, US officials emphasised the alleged communist threat to the Caribbean region. They insisted that the intervention was essential to prevent the creation of a new Soviet puppet in the Western Hemisphere. In the invasion of Panama in 1986, the Bush administration evoked two moral motives for the invasion: bringing democracy to Panama and striking a blow against the post-Cold War bogeyman, the international drug menace.

It is hardly surprising that the same moral principles were invoked during the Gulf War. The war was packaged as a confrontation between two forces, 'good' versus 'evil'; them on the side of 'evil' and 'us' on the side of 'good'. This process served an important function for America. It induced the public to rally behind the war policy. The problem is that it helped to sustain the generalised image of the Arabs regardless of the change in the political scene represented by differences within Arab politics in the Gulf war. The passivity, to say the least, of the American government could imply that they were accomplices in sustaining the generalised image of the Arabs in the American media. In other words, the American government was more

concerned about selling the war at home than at initiating a new way of perceiving the Arabs.

Our critique of the American government's role in perpetuating the crude generalisations about the Arabs stems from the presumed strong impact of policy makers on media agenda. Government has proven, since Vietnam, its ability to 'use' media routines to shape media agenda ( Chapter Three). Such impact is magnified in time of national crisis not only because journalists take side when his/her own country is going to war but also because of their reliance on official sources (Chapters Three and Seven).

Our criticism does not just apply to the American government but also to the media. The latter missed an opportunity to exercise its own social responsibility theory and to set out a new way of dealing with the Arabs. In other words, rather than providing a new view, the press followed the government line. This tendency is highly related to some of the conditions that structured the coverage of the Gulf War. These conditions, as we have discussed in Chapter Three, were the news production process, media coverage of foreign policy, and media coverage of national crisis.

Our theoretical frameworks emphasised the proximate conditions that are shaping the media agenda. These frameworks are approached from the agenda-setting theory for three reasons. Some scholars have advocated going beyond the agenda setting. It is important to bear in mind that both sides assume explicitly or implicitly an agenda-setting effect. This does not, however, neutralise the problem of agenda-setting. One way of solving the

problem is to differentiate between the force of the message, its potentiality and its actualisation. The latter, for fairly obvious reasons, is beyond the scope of this thesis. The second reason for resorting to the agenda-setting is connected with the assumption of an ideological process working throughout the setting process. Media content is the space in which the setting process comes into contact with ideology. Ideology, as mentioned in Chapter Three, assumes falsehood versus the truth. To side-step the problem of pure false/truth in ideology we have resorted to the concepts of dialogue and monologue. If we accept Bakhtin's view, language is 'dialogue' by which he means that when we speak, what we say is both related to the past and to the utterances that we expect to make in the future. Monologue refers to any discourse which pretends to be the 'last word'. However, dialogue is a machine maintaining our openness towards multiplicity. The assumption embedding these criteria is that our relation with 'reality' is not a relation of truth. The truth is that this relation of multiplicity gives a chance for thinking (and resisting actions) to become possible. The text is the field and a territory which force us to produce thinking. The ethic of that thinking is not considering what we produce as 'truth' which we ask others to accept. Rather, the stake here is that we are trying to become an other in order to change our selves which have a tendency toward enclosures. The net result is certain production which is something new for us and for what has been analysed ( the text and the beyond). The third reason is a methodological one. The utilisation of content analysis as a data gathering method means that our attention is to detect the potentialities of public framing of news and to make limited inference about the forces structuring the setting process. These forces are media routines, foreign policy and national and distantl crisis.

The forces that are structuring the setting process is seen, thus, from a special perspective. That is to say, foreign coverage, and national and distance crisis respectively. Media coverage of foreign affairs, as discussed in Chapter Three, has largely intersected with the American foreign policy especially when the 'official' opposition converges with the administration line. Put differently, the range of acceptable voices defined by the administration and the official opposition party leadership position in congress define for the media the range of legitimate debate regarding foreign issues. Thus the potential for media to open up a public debate is contingent. When the official opposition is silent or supportive of the administration foreign policy, as in the case of the American foreign policy in the Middle East, reporters are constrained.

Government influence on media agenda and on the setting process is magnified in time of national and distance crisis. Indeed, the government has become, since the Vietnam war, an active player in media management (especially in time of war), making media routines work in its favour. That is to say, to mobilise support for the war. This includes restricting media access to the battlefield, and feeding reporters the daily news line most advantageous to its policy preferences. Journalists may try to introduce a wider perspective by turning to the official opposition in congress. If the official opposition leadership accepted the definition of the problem stated by the administration, journalists, as in the case of the Gulf war accept the official definition as authoritative. In other words, so long as the administration and the official opposition are united, US media is highly unlikely to challenge their shared view (Chapter Three). The Republican

administration and the Democrats' leadership in Capital Hill in the Gulf war have been united. This unity left the administration alone to set the boundaries of public debate and, therefore, expanded the space in which the administration could activate the ideological work.

The Arab Middle East is presented largely in conjunction with newsworthy events. It is described in geopolitical terms with the notion of American interests always in mind. The Arab World has always been seen within the context of newsworthy events that favour the United States geopolitically. More specifically, the Arab world is discussed in the American media within the framework of self and other. The 'us' versus 'them' framework grossly oversimplified the Arab culture and widened the dichotomy between the American and the Arab cultures.

This situation brings forth dozens of studies that have detailed the modes of activity of a certain relationship between the nations, the Self-Other relationship. It is a mode that mostly configures itself at moments of increasing tension and accumulated instigation of mobilisation, where it serves as a defence mechanism to protect the self from the postulated foreign threat. The inevitable structure of such a relationship is a fortification of enclosures at every social aspect towards those who are nominated as the 'Others'. Accordingly, justice, peace and other virtues which are praiseworthy and self-justifying are on 'our side'. In contrast, the 'other' become the antithesis of what 'we' stand for. Implied here is a polarisation of good and evil, and identity and non-identity.



In this context, the images we maintain of our nation are magnified, while our sins tend to be blocked. The stake involved is sustaining a measure of control and of identity restoration against designated threats. This is always established in the process of maintaining the solidarity of the home front in a way that the margins of one's power is put to unfold itself towards the 'other'. In a sense that failing to block the home front fissures could lead to reflexivity. This actually resonates with the objective of the thesis intervention.

The main objective of this intervention is sowing the seeds of those fissures in the enclosures sustained. In other words, the evaluation is made in regard to how far the power unfoldment toward the Other decreases in its movement as a result of coagulated cracks. These are actually nodes that diffract the identity away from its flight toward the Other in repetitive monological way. They call forth the moments that let the identity return to itself. A well known example of this situation might be the Vietnam syndrome.

The relationship between the Arab World and United States is highly politicised. This raises the question about the extent to which politicisation is creating cracks into the enclosures which are a result of active historical and current policy and organisational structures.

During the Gulf War, the binary machinery (us/them) which has functioned in various stages of the relationship between the United States and the Arabs did witness an unpolished blockage as a result of an active

politicisation taking place. This politicisation has manifested in building a new alliance with those who are usually categorised with multiple chains of segmentation (terrorist, filthy oil sheikh). In fact, the blockage could have weakened the way the machinery used to work. The variation embodies in the following equation. Those who are conceived as the out-group are becoming an object upon the sphere of political articulation. Such an object could give justification for inscribing 'them' into 'self'(us), or at least respect the uniqueness of each group. Yet, this was not the case during the Gulf war due to the concern with the home front. Indeed, the existence of a clearly depicted threatening enemy fostered in-group solidarity. That is to say, threats from a perceived enemy outside the group generally lead to an intensification of pressures on members, particularly in time of war. Hence, it is an effective mean of promoting internal solidarity and maintaining mobilisation.

## Appendix A

### Coding Sheet of the Coverage of the 1987 Palestinian Intifada

1- Item No	[	]1
2- Paper (code one)	[	]2
1- NYT		
2- LAT		
3- WP		
4- SLPD		
3- Year (code one)	[	]3
1- 1987		
2- 1988		
4- Month (code one)	[	]4
1- December		
2- January		
3- February		
4- March		
5- April		
6- May		
5- Date:	[	]5
6- Labels		
1- Terrorist	[	]6
2- Coward	[	]7
3- Radical	[	]8
4- Violent	[	]9
5- Disdain/Disdainful	[	]10
6- Resented	[	]11
7- Moderate	[	]12
7- Issue (code one)	[	]13
1- Israel's handling of the Intifada		
2- The Peace Process		
3- The shut-down of the PLO office in NY		
4- The Killing of an Israeli teenager		
5- The assassination of Khalil Al Wazir		
8) Direction (code one)	[	]14
1- Favourable		

17- No serious peace without the PLO participation	[	]32
18- The PLO should make a gesture first	[	]33
19- The rationale for sealing the territory from the press is dubious	[	]34
20- Ban of cameras would not help Israel's image abroad	[	]35
21- Palestinians are desperate	[	]36
22- Terrorists' operations lend rationale for Israeli hard-liners	[	]37
23- Death of 15-year old Israeli girl	[	]38
24- Tirazh Porat	[	]39
25- Death of two Palestinians	[	]40
26- Many Israelis see the killing as justification for more toughness	[	]41
27- Khalil AL Wazir was a terrorist	[	]42
28- Khalil AL Wazir was a national leader	[	]43
29- Killing terrorists does not solve the problem	[	]44

## **Appendix B**

### **Coding Sheet of the American Elite Press Coverage of the Gulf War**

1- Item No	[ ]1 [ ]2 [ ]3
2- Paper (Code one)	[ ]4
1-NYT 2-LAT 3-WP	
3- Month (Code one)	[ ]5
1-January 2-February	
4- Date	[ ]6 [ ]7
5- Type of Item (Code one)	[ ]8
1-Unsigned Editorial 2-Syndicated Columns 3-Op-ED Article 4-Letter to the Editor 5-Analysis	
6- Size in Inch	[ ]9 [ ]10 [ ]11
7- Location of the author (Code one)	[ ]12
1-United States 2-The Arab World 3-Others	

#### E- Govt officials

1- Iraq	[	]29
2- Saudia Arabia	[	]30
3- Kuwait	[	]31
4- Egypt	[	]32
5- Jordan	[	]33
6- PLO	[	]34
7- Other	[	]35

#### F- Non-Govt officials

1- Iraq	[	]36
2- Saudia Arabia	[	]37
3- Kuwait	[	]38
4- Egypt	[	]39
5- Jordan	[	]40
6- PLO	[	]41
7- Other	[	]42

#### G- Diplomats

1- Iraq	[	]43
2- Saudia Arabia	[	]44
3- Kuwait	[	]45
4- Egypt	[	]46
5- Jordan	[	]47
6- PLO	[	]48
7- Other	[	]49

#### H- Opposition

#### 9- Arab Leaders quoted [Check 1 Yes, 0 No]

1- Saddam Hussein	[	]1
2- King Fahd	[	]2
3- Amir Jabier	[	]3
3- President Mubarak	[	]4
2- King Hussein	[	]5
6- Arafat	[	]6
7- Others	[	]7

5- US Congressmen, Senators	[	]35
6- Experts	[	]36
7- Former Government Officials	[	]37
8- US Vice President	[	]38

#### 14- US actors quoted in US foreign policy topics

1- US President	[	]39
2- Military figures, US Defence Secretary, Pentagon	[	]40
3- US White House, State Department, Agencies	[	]41
4- US Secretary of States	[	]42
5- US Congressmen, Senators	[	]43
6- Experts	[	]44
7- Former Government Officials	[	]45
8- US Vice President	[	]46

#### 15- Labels [Check 1 Yes, 0 No]

Brutal / Cruel / Barbaric	[	]1
Aggressor	[	]2
Terrorist	[	]3
Hitler	[	]4
Occupier / Invader	[	]5
Dictator	[	]6
Ally	[	]7
Moderate	[	]8
Radical	[	]9
Evil	[	]10
Atrocities	[	]11
Friend	[	]12
Fundamentalists / fanatic / Zealot	[	]13
Violent	[	]14
Thug	[	]15
Monster	[	]16
Fascist	[	]17
Victim	[	]18
Intelligent	[	]19
Not - Trustworthy	[	]20
Incompetent	[	]21

#### 16- Labels applied to the terms forming Iraqi identity

	[	]11
	[	]12
Subsidiary	[	]13
	[	]14
	[	]15
Tertiary	[	]15
	[	]16
	[	]17

## 20- Theme

Main	[	]18
	[	]19
	[	]20
Subsidiary	[	]21
	[	]22
	[	]23
Tertiary	[	]24
	[	]25
	[	]26



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