Effects of REDD+ Governmentality: Creating an Expert Theatre whilst Limiting Climate Action

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the effects of donor-recipient power relations and knowledge politics among experts on national REDD+ processes in Malaysia, Nepal and Sri Lanka. From a poststructuralist perspective that builds on Foucauldian notions of governmentality, the thesis offers a unique insight into viewpoints of actors, representing national governments, donor agencies, multilateral institutions, and international and national civil society organisations. The thesis sheds light on the issue of power inequality between developed and developing countries that hinders the progress of REDD+ at the national level. Main findings of this thesis suggest that REDD+ in the case study countries operated as 'an expert theatre' among international and national REDD+ experts who acted as service providers to donor countries to operationalise the visions, norms and values of donors through REDD+. At the same time, the role of the central authorities in the case study countries was reduced to passive recipients of international support. As a result, the impact potential of REDD+ in the case study countries was significantly limited due to the lack of national ownership and political commitment to REDD+.

With these findings, this thesis adds to recent stocktaking studies and debates on REDD+ and the growing body of knowledge concerning the effects of power through global environmental governance, particularly from a human geographical perspective.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASEAN:	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CDM:	Clean Development Mechanism
COP:	Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
CSO:	Civil society organisations
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DRC:	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EV:	Eigenvalue
FAO:	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCPF:	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FPIC:	Free, prior and informed consent
FRL:	Forest reference level
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GHG:	Greenhouse gas emission
IPCC:	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MDGs:	Millennium Development Goals
MEAs	Multilateral Environmental Agreements
MRV	Measurement, reporting and verification
LDC	Least Developed Country
NCB:	Non-carbon benefit
NDC:	Nationally Determined Contribution
ODA:	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Q:	Q-methodology
RBP:	Results-based payment
RED:	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
SDGs:	Sustainable Development Goals
UNFCCC:	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UN-REDD:	United Nations Collaborative Initiative on REDD+
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFR:	Warsaw Framework for REDD+

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014)[1] confirms in its Fifth Assessment Report that today's level of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions due to human activities is at its highest in history. The report urges the world to take intensified action towards adapting to the expected severe and irreparable impacts of climate change and to mitigate further adverse impacts by limiting warming to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The same report (ibid., p. 24) also suggests that forestry and other land use activities accounted for 12% of global CO_2 emissions between 2000 and 2009. A more recent report by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (2018) suggests that deforestation causes nearly 20% of all global GHG emissions, which is more than that of the entire transport sector globally. The IPCC (2018) in its special report on the impacts of global warming thus suggests the chief role of afforestation and reforestation while reducing deforestation in mitigating dangerous effects of climate change globally.

This has provided the necessary context and rationale for the present effort by the international community towards the full-scale implementation of a voluntary climate change process and mechanism under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), called Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD+) (UNFCCC, 2016a). The idea of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation (RED) was first introduced as a proposal to the 11th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in 2005 by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica (Lederer, 2011; Den Besten, Arts and Verkooijen, 2014; Sills *et al.*, 2014). Over the subsequent years, RED evolved into REDD+ by adopting another 'D' to include forest degradation and the '+' to recognise the role of conservation, sustainable

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[1] IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report is expected to be finalised in 2021.

management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (Den Besten, Arts and Verkooijen, 2014)

Corbera (2012) calls REDD+ the world's largest experiment in payments for ecosystem services (PES) by which developed countries (i.e., Annex 1 countries[2] under the UNFCCC) compensate developing countries (i.e., non-Annex 1 countries[3]) for verified emissions reductions through REDD+. While noting the highly contested nature of this country classification system, REDD+ was envisioned to be a relatively simple carbon offsetting mechanism between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries when REDD+ first entered into the official negotiation process at the COP 13 in 2007 (Lederer, 2011). However, various debates had pushed for the expansion of the scope of REDD+ to encompass safeguards and a range of non-carbon benefits (NCBs), including poverty reduction, biodiversity conservation and protection of rights of forest-dependent people (Visseren-Hamakers *et al.*, 2012). Subsequently, the so-called Cancun Safeguards and provision of information on the safeguards, as referred to in the decision of the COP 16 in 2010, were adopted as one of the requirements for operationalising REDD+, and the role of 'non-carbon benefits for the long-term sustainability' was recognised as part of REDD+ by the UNFCCC (2016a, p. 24).

Since 2013, REDD+ has been operational under the UNFCCC with the establishment of the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ (WFR), concluding the negotiations on methodological and procedural requirements that began in 2007 (UNFCCC, 2016a). While participation remains voluntary, any developing countries with an operational national REDD+ strategy or action plan, national forest reference (emission) level (FRL), national forest monitoring system and safeguard information system can now claim their REDD+ results-based payments (RBPs) (UNFCCC, 2016a). REDD+ was enshrined as an integral part of the historic Paris Agreement in 2015 (UNFCCC, 2016b). To date, over fifty

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[2] These countries include the industrialised countries that were members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition.

[3] These countries include all Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and other countries that were considered still developing when the UNFCCC was established in 1992.

developing countries have indicated REDD+ as part of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC (Hein *et al.*, 2018).

1.2. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES FACING REDD+

Despite its swift progress and uptake globally, REDD+ has, however, been faced with several issues that have impeded its performance in reducing forest-related emissions (Corbera and Schroeder, 2017).   One of the issues relates to its framing that rationalises REDD+ primarily as an international policy instrument for achieving globally significant emissions reductions. This has placed a heavy emphasis on the value of carbon emissions as the primary value of forest (Corbera, 2012; Gupta *et al.*, 2012; Turnhout *et al.*, 2017). In turn, deforestation and forest degradation have been viewed as a technical problem to encourage the development of a globally scalable solution through REDD+. Because of this, context-specific political-economic factors that drive deforestation and forest degradation in the first place have not received adequate attention (Blaikie and Muldavin, 2013; Kamoto *et al.*, 2013; Vatn and Vedeld, 2013; Buizer, Humphreys and De Jong, 2014; Martin *et al.*, 2014; Mehta *et al.*, 2014).

Although combating climate change requires harmonised efforts across the globe, this global framing of REDD+ poses a challenge as reducing deforestation and forest degradation on such a scale requires the nesting of multiple scales and associated issues and needs across levels of society (Visseren-Hamakers *et al.*, 2012; Sunderlin *et al.*, 2015; Turnhout *et al.*, 2017). For instance, REDD+ must thus function not only as a cost-effective climate solution globally but also as a viable policy instrument and compensation mechanism at the national level, as well as an effective livelihood improvement strategy at the local level. As different issues and needs become prioritised by actors depending on their perspective (i.e., global, national or local), incentivising actions across scales through the global framing becomes challenging.

Precisely because of this challenge, the progress has so far been slow as efforts to operationalise REDD+ across these scales have raised the question of who benefits and who bears the real cost of REDD+ (Brockhaus, Di Gregorio and Carmenta, 2014). The tensions raised by this question also point to another, even more significant question: Can REDD+ be a global policy instrument and process that deliver a cost-effective climate solution on a global scale and at the same time support developing countries' transition towards sustainable development, as described by the decision of the COP (UNFCCC, 2016a)? This question particularly underscores whether these two aspects are mutually inclusive in the current international effort to operationalise REDD+. In this regard, REDD+ can be described as a 'climate governance experiment' (Lederer, 2012, p. 106). There have been rich debates that attempt to identify the right formula that would enable REDD+ to deliver on this two-pronged objective (Angelsen *et al.*, 2012; Brockhaus, Di Gregorio and Carmenta, 2014; Den Besten, Arts and Verkooijen, 2014; Karsenty, Vogel and Castell, 2014; Sikor and Newell, 2014; Weatherley-singh and Gupta, 2015; Dawson *et al.*, 2018).

Most recently, several stocktaking studies and debates among scholars from this perspective have focused on why the progress of REDD+ has been so slow and why it has not, thus far, been able to perform as a cost-effective climate and development solution as initially anticipated (Redford, Padoch and Sunderland, 2013; Fletcher *et al.*, 2016, 2017; Pasgaard *et al.*, 2016; Angelsen, 2017; Angelsen *et al.*, 2017; Turnhout *et al.*, 2017; Corbera and Schroeder, 2017; Lund *et al.*, 2017; Sunderlin *et al.*, 2017; Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2017). REDD+ was initially referred to as 'a low-hanging fruit' (Cosslett, 2013; Hein *et al.*, 2018). However, according to Angelsen et al. (2017, p. 718), 'major impacts [of REDD+] … are hard to document' to date, due to four attributing factors. First, REDD+ implementation has just begun for many REDD+ countries following completion of their readiness phase. Second, the failure to establish a market-based mechanism has resulted in REDD+ to depend on ODA budgets which are heavily influenced by donor conditionality with a focus on meeting specific donor interests and multiple international obligations towards sustainable development including human rights. Third, the complex political economy of forestry and other land uses has made REDD+ more challenging than initially anticipated.

Lastly, REDD+, as a PES scheme, has turned out to be conceptually flawed. This is because the anticipated level of financial compensation through REDD+ is unlikely to match foregone revenues from land-use change activities, without even considering the implementation and transaction costs of REDD+ (Lee and Pistorius, 2015; Rakatama *et al.*, 2017; Sunderlin *et al.*, 2017).

Building on this last factor, Fletcher et al. (2016) go much further to call REDD+ the latest in the line of conservation fads that builds around market-inspired instruments, which are flawed precisely because of this mismatch. Fletcher et al. (ibid., p. 675, 2017) thus urge scholars and practitioners to fundamentally rethink REDD+ as an inherently neoliberal conservation mechanism, rather than taking the current failure as 'an invitation to unveil the next silver bullet in the market-based conservation portfolio'. In a similar context, Lund et al. (2017, p. 125) describe REDD+ as part of the 'longstanding dynamics of the development and conservation industry, where the promise of change becomes a discursive commodity that is constantly reproduced and used to generate value and appropriate financial resources' from donor countries. From this perspective, scholars like Redford et al. (2013) and Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2017) suggest that these dynamics are thus driven by the need of development and conservation institutions to secure funding and that of donors to identify and finance so-called new and innovative ideas that can be scaled up and replicated around the world. These arguments also espouse the second factor, identified by Angelsen et al. (2017), concerning donor conditionality, to underscore the challenge associated with the framing of REDD+ that raises a question of its relevance across scales.

While acknowledging the complexity of these intertwining factors and divergence of opinions, scholars like Angelsen et al. (2017) and Corbera and Schroeder (2017) stress the need to realign the current approach to REDD+ instead of calling for a radical rethink of the mechanism as suggested by Fletcher et al. They urge scholars and practitioners to pay more attention to empirical evidence and learning to adequately ground REDD+ in specific national and local contexts with changing trends in international finance by moving away from the one-size-fits-all approach. In support of this view, Turnhout et al. (2017) acknowledge a

higher potential of REDD+ as a broader mechanism to deliver NCBs rather than strictly pursuing carbon benefits. They (ibid.) also caution developing countries from this perspective to pay closer attention to the costs and benefits of these approaches as they differ from country to country.

1.3. RESEARCH RATIONALE

Against the backdrop of these problematics of REDD+ brought to the fore by the above-described scholarly debates, this thesis explores the question mentioned above of whether REDD+ can achieve its two-pronged objective by nesting a diverse range of issues and needs across scales. In doing so, the thesis pays particular attention to the effects of donor conditionality, as one of the issues raised by Angelsen (2017) and the role of the development and conservation industry, as another issue raised by Lund et al. (2017), in the framing of REDD+ at the national level.

Having worked as a REDD+ practitioner through the implementation of the United Nations Collaborative Initiative on REDD+ (UN-REDD) in several REDD+ countries in Asia, the researcher has become tacitly aware of the influence of donor countries as well as that of development and conservation institutions and associated experts that operated as donor intermediaries in shaping dominant discourses around REDD+. In such discourses, there are strong effects of power that permeate from specific donor-recipient relations and the politics played by development and conservation institutions and experts, including the researcher himself (i.e., expert politics or knowledge politics among experts). These effects of power seem to have precipitously determined the scope and potential of REDD+ at the national level.

However, how these effects of power influence the current efforts to operationalise REDD+ and its potential to trigger transformational change at the national level is mostly understudied in the existing literature. While numerous studies examine similar power relations within REDD+ and their effects at the international and local levels, there are disproportionally fewer studies that

examine national REDD+ processes (including: Bushley, 2014; Somorin *et al.*, 2014; Astuti and Mcgregor, 2015; Lund *et al.*, 2017; Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2017). Even fewer of these studies investigate the effects of these power relations on REDD+ from the perspectives of actors, such as senior government representatives in countries where REDD+ is being pursued (hereafter referred to as REDD+ countries). Although the knowledge of such effects may not be new to most experts and practitioners of REDD+ like the researcher himself, who are operating at the interface between the international and national REDD+ processes, such knowledge predominantly remains tacit among these actors. Precisely because of this, there is an empirical knowledge gap that prevents a full and constructive review of the current approach to REDD+. As a result, the effects of donor-recipient power relations and knowledge politics on REDD+ are often overlooked and underestimated.

The examination of these issues from this specific angle, therefore, makes this thesis unique and offer a significant contribution to the latest 'stocktaking' debates on REDD+ to inform the realignment of the current approach to REDD+, as suggested by Angelsen et al. (2017) and Corbera and Schroeder (2017). This critical review of REDD+ is particularly timely and crucial at this juncture where many REDD+ countries have now technically entered the REDD+ implementation phase as part of their NDCs. Despite the progress in its implementation status, the level of international support for REDD+ implementation seems far below what is needed to realise its objective, mainly because of the absence of a market-based mechanism, which makes the future of RBPs highly uncertain (Angelsen, 2017). Many of these REDD+ countries have thus adopted a 'wait-and-see attitude', as described by Turnhout et al. (2017, p. 3). These circumstances put REDD+ at risk of failure as in the case of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM preceded REDD+ in paving the way for a market-based climate change mitigation mechanism under the UNFCCC but did not succeed in triggering the necessary transformation for various reasons, including its narrow focus on emissions reductions (Lederer, 2011; Neeff, Göhler and Ascui, 2014).

1.4. BASIC APPROACH OF THE RESEARCH

The approach of this research originates from the researcher's personal experiences and the review of pertinent literature that points to the empirical knowledge gap, as described above. The thesis focuses on divulging internal and subjective viewpoints of REDD+ actors at the national level to turn their tacit knowledge into an explicit, empirical understanding of the effects of donor-recipient power relations and knowledge politics on REDD+.

To enable this process, several theoretical frameworks, including the actor-network theory by Latour (2005) and theories of governmentality by Foucault (1991), both of which stem from poststructuralist origins, were considered to give the research an open-minded framework that would not be limited by 'the universality of truth and knowledge claims' of foundational positions (Popke, 2003, p. 299). Having a flexible framework was considered crucial by the researcher as the nature of the tacit knowledge would be less conventional and could even be contradictory to knowledge claims in the existing literature. Based on careful consideration, a Foucauldian governmentality framework was chosen as the theoretical basis of this research mainly because of its analytical emphasis on discourses as the primary vehicle of power and its effects that are often subtle and less visible from a distance (Foucault *et al.*, 1991). This framework was thus considered to best serve the objective of this research.

Analysing REDD+ as a form of governmentality allows the research to reveal specific ways in which REDD+ actors see, think about, problematise and act upon REDD+ and related issues in order to form themselves and others into REDD+ subjects or agents through their REDD+ processes (Dean, 2010). Based on this logic, the thesis examines the effects of power (e.g., what or who is governing and being governed, how is governing taking place) through discourses around REDD+ 'as an omnipresent dimension in human relations' (Foucault *et al.*, 1991, p. 5; Lemke, 2001). Building on this broad theoretical framework of Foucauldian governmentality, the thesis also incorporates two conceptual approaches to understand and analyse discourses to expose underlying power relations and their effects. First, an analytical framework

developed by Thompson et al. (2011) is adapted to the purpose of this research in order to expose specific elements of power and associated governmental rationalities through REDD+. Based on a review of policy documents of multilateral initiatives on REDD+, Thompson et al. (ibid.) examines REDD+ as a form of environmental governance by casting light on specific objects, subjects and processes of governance that pervade such documents. Through this analysis, they (ibid. p. 108) suggest that various tools and actors are deployed as vehicles of governance through REDD+ to underpin and legitimatise specific environmental outcomes, which are often influenced by governmental visions and structures of the 'Global North'. This approach by Thompson et al. presents a practical entry point into the analysis of power and its effects through discourses, as well as an opportunity to develop an empirical understanding of the effects of such governmental visions and structures of the Global North, as suggested by their study. This approach by Thompson et al. is thus used to develop research questions, which are presented in the next section.

The thesis also incorporates an element of scale into the research questions to examine the effects of scale on power relations among REDD+ actors and their effects. In doing so, the thesis integrates the concept of the performativity of scale (further described in Chapter Two), by Kaiser and Nikiforova (2008), in which scales are considered as performative practices within specific socio-spatial contexts, instead of treating scales in an ontological sense. This integration enables the thesis to theorise scales as part of power politics. Therefore, depending on how REDD+ actors perform scales at the national level, the performativity of scale empowers or disempowers certain groups of actors.

The thesis combines this poststructuralist framework and these conceptual approaches to meet its research aim described below.

1.5. RESEARCH AIM AND QUESTIONS

This thesis aims to examine and develop an empirical understanding of the effects of donor-recipient power relations and knowledge politics on REDD+ by

analysing the viewpoints of actors who are actively engaged in shaping discourses around REDD+ at the national level. The actors targeted in the thesis include senior government officials of REDD+ countries, representatives of multilateral institutions and civil society organisations (CSOs), many of whom also consider themselves as REDD+ experts.

To achieve this aim, the thesis draws on the conceptual framework of Thompson et al. and the concept of the performativity of scale, introduced by Kaiser and Nikiforova, as discussed above, to shed light on specific objects, subjects and processes of governance (i.e., the what, who and how of governance) and how REDD+ actors perform scales through discourses at the national level. A close examination of how these specific elements operate as the sources of power is necessary in order to understand the effects of power at the national level, as such effects are often not visible from a distance. Based on this logic, the research asks the following five specific questions to divulge context-specific and highly nuanced factors that empower or disempower particular groups of actors to delimit the scope and potential of REDD+.

- What is being governed through REDD+?
- Who is governing through REDD+?
- How is REDD+ being governed?
- Why do actors pursue and problematise REDD+ in certain ways?
- How are scales affecting the processes of REDD+?

The thesis asks these specific questions through the analysis of discourses of REDD+ actors in three case study countries. Building on the researcher's intimate knowledge of REDD+ processes in Asia, this thesis focuses on Malaysia, Nepal and Sri Lanka. They are much less studied compared to others such as Indonesia and Viet Nam, which have been focused on by numerous scholars (Pfaff, Amacher and Sills, 2013; Romijn *et al.*, 2013; Sunderlin *et al.*, 2017; Brockhaus, Di Gregorio and Carmenta, 2014; Sills *et al.*, 2014; Sunderlin *et al.*, 2014; Astuti and Mcgregor, 2015; Mcgregor *et al.*, 2015; Brockhaus *et al.*, 2016; Milne *et al.*, 2016; Sikor and Hoàng, 2016). While REDD+ may not be a strategic

tool or process for all developing countries, REDD+ needs to remain inclusive to achieve its two-pronged objective in order to avoid repeating the experience under the CDM (Neeff, Göhler and Ascui, 2014). From this perspective, developing an empirical understanding of processes in these less studied REDD+ countries is also crucial for ensuring a full and constructive review of the current approach to REDD+.

These three case study countries were selected for several reasons. At the time of this research, they had all made steady progress through their REDD+ readiness processes. These countries belonged respectively to the upper-middle income, low income and lower-middle income categories of developing countries (WB, 2017). Given these different stages of economic development and with their forests playing different and unique socioeconomic roles and functions, as well as building on historical and present contexts, these countries had approached and problematised REDD+ in notably different ways. The thesis thus uses these three REDD+ countries as its case study countries to examine the research questions mentioned above in relation to their specific social, political, economic and historical contexts, in order to shed light on the effects of donor-recipient relations and knowledge politics among experts on their national REDD+ processes.

1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This thesis is organised into eight chapters. It starts with this current chapter to introduce the research background, rationale and questions. This is followed by a review of the literature in Chapter Two, description of case study countries and research participants in Chapter Three, description of the research design and methodological approach in Chapter Four, presentation of the research findings and discussions in Chapters Five, Six and Seven and the conclusion in Chapter Eight.

Chapter Two provides a review of the literature that informs the research through analysis of the historical and present contexts in which REDD+ has been

developed as a mechanism and process of global environmental governance through the UNFCCC. Following closely the specific research aim and questions described above, REDD+ is critiqued from the perspectives of governance and governmentality, environmental justice, neoliberal environmentalism and effects of scale to establish both theoretical and methodological stances of this research.

Chapter Three presents the case study countries and describe the rationale for the choice of the countries and research participants. The research employs a case study method to examine similarities and dissimilarities between the case study countries (Cousin, 2005; Baxter and Jack, 2008).

Chapter Four describes the overall research design and methodological approach employed in this research. It explains the use of a mixed-method approach which combines poststructuralist discourse analysis and Q methodology to examine specific viewpoints or self-references of the research participants from the perspectives of governmentality and scale.

Chapter Five presents the results of Q methodological analysis, identifying the outlines of emerging discourses as 'predominant viewpoints or bodies of knowledge relative to a particular context' (Watts and Stenner, 2012, p. 42). These emerging discourses outlined in this chapter set the stage for the next two chapters.

Chapters Six and Seven provide a detailed analysis of the discourses, emerged from the previous chapter and in relation to the specific research questions. These chapters aim to identify the effects of donor-recipient power relations and knowledge politics on national REDD+ processes and how such effects have bearing on the operationalisation of REDD+ in the case study countries.

Finally, Chapter Eight summarises the findings of the research to respond to the research aim and questions by highlighting context-specific and nuanced social factors that make REDD+ problematic and add to those structural challenges, identified in the pertinent literature.

2. CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter situates this research within relevant concepts, theories and debates through the review of existing literature. The chapter is structured around the five specific research questions introduced in the previous chapter with an aim to establish relevant theoretical and methodological stances to inform the research design, methodological approach and analysis of data, discussed in the later chapters.

The chapter is organised into five main sections, excluding the introduction and conclusion sections, to situate the five specific research questions in the pertinent literature. This introduction section begins by locating REDD+ in the broad context of global environmental governance and governmentality research, and specifically within the discipline of human geography.

2.1.1. REDD+ as a Mechanism of Global Environmental Governance

Since 2007, there have been vibrant debates over the possibilities and challenges of REDD+. Two broad schools of thought generally characterise such debates. The first school warns against the potential of REDD+ to become a top-down process, while the other school focuses on the possibility of transformation in development and conservation practices through the results-orientation and safeguards of REDD+ (Corbera and Schroeder, 2017). REDD+ is fundamentally a neoliberal global policy instrument, which is founded on the concept of PES to institute 'the management of nature according to monetary values, and utilitarian principles of supply and demand' (Corbera, 2012, p. 613). This, however, raises several questions that include who determines the values of efforts and results and where it should be applied, as well as the role of the public and private sectors, as inherent to scholarly debates on the

neoliberalisation of nature (McAfee, 1999; Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010; Vatn, 2010; Dempsey and Robertson, 2012).

In consideration of these questions, if REDD+ failed to address the specific needs and priorities of REDD+ countries in the name of protecting the global environment, it could become an instrument of centralised environmental governance on a global scale (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012; Sunderlin et al., 2015). Under such conditions, the primary value of forest could also be determined based on global carbon prices that are currently standardised across sectors and sources (Gupta et al., 2012). The market-based logic of REDD+ would inevitably focus on those countries with significant forest areas with high rates of deforestation and forest degradation such as Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Indonesia as a way of merely supplying the international demand for emissions reductions (Cohen and McCarthy, 2014). Turnhout et al. (2017) thus warn that such a market-driven system of environmental governance may merely end up reinforcing historical global power relations and injustices. At the same time, scholars like Sikor and Newell (2014) suggest that this system may offer a useful global framing, for example through safeguards, to enable both public and private actors to be more attentive and responsive to environmental injustices in countries and land-use sectors where such issues are often overlooked.

These debates are also informed by the experiences under the CDM, which operated as a precursor mechanism to REDD+ under the UNFCCC (Lederer, 2011; Den Besten, Arts and Verkooijen, 2014; Neeff, Göhler and Ascui, 2014; Winkler and Dubash, 2015). The CDM was designed to offer an additional avenue for Annex 1 countries to fulfil their GHG emissions reduction commitments by generating transferable emissions reduction credits in non-Annex 1 countries through technology transfer (Kirkman et al., 2012). While the CDM was successful in mobilising a large number of carbon projects through carbonisation and marketisation, it was unsuccessful in facilitating the necessary level of capacity and technology transfer across the developing world to trigger transformational change at scale (Methmann, 2013; Neeff, Göhler and Ascui, 2014). One of the critical factors, contributing to the CDM's limited development

impact, was found in its skewed focus on GHG emissions reductions through the use of market instruments by concentrating on low-cost emissions reduction opportunities primarily in emerging economies (Methmann, 2013; Neeff, Göhler and Ascui, 2014; Winkler and Dubash, 2015). As a highly market-driven instrument of environmental governance, the CDM failed to address many critical sources of emissions that were economically less viable, as well as to benefit the majority of the developing world where both capacities and immediate emissions reduction opportunities were limited.

In this regard, one of the fundamental differences between the CDM and REDD+ is their required levels of engagement in the public sector policy domain. For REDD+, the effectiveness of environmental governance policies and measures across national and local forest and land management regimes is considered central to its success. In the case of the CDM, the question of where to reduce emissions was primarily determined by economic considerations (Lederer, 2011). In this context, the questions of where to implement REDD+ and who gets compensated for what become critical and politicised issues (Karsenty, Vogel and Castell, 2014). Particularly the role of the public and private sectors, local stakeholders and development and conservation institutions and their associated experts in the governance of REDD+ become highly contested. Precisely, because of this, REDD+ is viewed as a global-scale environmental governance experiment that attempts to nest a diverse range of issues and needs across scales (Corbera, 2012; Lederer, 2012). It is, therefore, crucial to identify the right form of environmental governance with clear visions, roles of actors and strategies to ensure that REDD+, as a global policy instrument founded on neoliberal principles, delivers its intended objective (Gupta, Pistorius and Vijge, 2016; Turnhout et al., 2017).

From this perspective, it is essential to define here what environmental governance means in this thesis. The term 'environmental governance' can be defined as any actions organised by any group(s) of state and non-state actors concerning environmental outcomes without strictly denoting actions by the sovereign state (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Reed and Bruyneel, 2010). Within environmental governance, governmental power is present in non-monolithic

and profuse forms, and therefore, power and authority in decision making and practices are diffused and dispersed throughout all layers of society (Bulkeley, 2005; Cohen and Bakker, 2014).

In an attempt to manage environmental problems that had become more global or transboundary in nature, issues of environmental governance on a global scale first entered the international agenda at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 (Cowie, Schneider and Montanarella, 2007; Ivanova, 2007). This was followed by the release of the Brundtland Commission's Report, 'Our Common Future' in 1987, promoting sustainable development, defined as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (WCED, 1987, p. 16). Through these processes, the notion of global environmental governance began to shift from the traditional 'Westphalian system of international politics, which was characterised as politics among states' to a 'multi-actor [global] governance system' (Biermann, 2004, p. 9). Such a system also accounts for interests of global civil society lobby groups, international networks of scientists, corporations and multilateral institutions under this ideology of sustainable development.

However, scholars like Redclift (2005) warn that the term, 'sustainable development' is by no means uniform and raises a question about what is to be sustained. They claim that this is because the needs of the present and future generations tend to differ across space and time depending on who defines them, and suggest that the context in which such needs are defined is never static. For example, the needs of technocrats in a developed country would be very different from those of landless farmers in an emerging economy, let alone those of their grandchildren given the fast rate of growth in such an economy. Furthermore, scholars like Tulloch and Neilson (2014) suggest that sustainable development is inherently focused on human needs, thus preoccupied with economic progress, while ecological sustainability is often relegated as a precondition for meeting the human needs. In this process, meeting the needs of one group might exclude others from meeting theirs, for example, through resource exploitation by developed economies in the developing world. The question of needs, therefore,

inevitably transforms into the question of rights and equity associated with a privatised sense of environmental use (Redclift, 2005). These politico-economic contexts and discursive ambiguity associated with the concept of sustainable development make it contradictory and contentious.

2.1.1.a. Neoliberalism in Global Environmental Governance

The paradoxical nature of the idea of sustainable development derives from its fundamental framing, which was shaped during the time of transition in the economic policy and related discourses of many Western countries from Keynesian state interventionism, focusing on social provisioning and welfare state building to neoliberal forms of governing (Springer, 2010; Tulloch and Neilson, 2014). During the 1970s and 80s when the world suffered economic recessions and political crisis, notably the 1979 energy crisis, interventionist politics in social and economic affairs were seen to have reached their limits by politicians, governments and citizens of the global North; a situation which thus gave rise to the widespread acceptance of neoliberalism and lassiez-faire economics (Springer, 2010). Despite its ambiguity and criticisms concerning its hegemonic aspects (i.e., private property rights, the utilitarian view of nature, economic self-sufficiency), the core ideology of neoliberalism is generally characterised by its emphasis on the self-regulating capacity of the market to manage and coordinate both social and economic affairs (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004; ibid.). During this period, this paradigm shift towards neoliberal policies had substantially influenced environmentalism, notably through the concept of sustainable development (Tulloch and Neilson, 2014). Underpinned by this alignment between neoliberalism and sustainable development, the natural capital framing of the environment, characterised by user fees and the polluter pays principles, has become mainstream over the subsequent decades through discourses and policies particularly in the development and conservation industry (Springer, 2010; McAfee, 2012). This framing of the environment was later reinforced by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) and initiatives such as the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (2010). However, the fundamental tensions and dichotomies between environmentalism and neoliberalism, arising from, among others, concerns about ecological limits to

growth, resource scarcity, private capital accumulation, consumerism and waste management that ultimately raise the questions of distribution and equity, have remained unresolved (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). From time to time, these tensions, resulting from the juxtaposition of these paradoxical ideologies in the framing of sustainable development, emerge through public demonstrations, some of which have turned violent, as witnessed in the 1999 protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle.

Around this concept of sustainable development, the so-called Rio Conventions, including the UNFCCC, were established through the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 (Cowie, Schneider and Montanarella, 2007; Pistorius *et al.*, 2012). The establishment of the Rio Conventions has reified the concept of sustainable development as a politically incontestable term (McAfee, 1999; Redclift, 2005). According to Redclift (ibid.), with the establishment of global environmental governance institutions to administer these conventions, environmental issues have been famed as techno-managerial rather than political issues, and addressing these issues through this particular framing has been assumed to be the vested interest of both the global North and South as it is a precondition for economic development. Building on this neoliberal notion of global environmental governance, the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 as part of the legally binding process under the UNFCCC and followed by REDD+ through the Bali Action Plan in 2007 came into being (Albrecht and Arts, 2005; Lederer, 2011). Through these processes, the institutionalisation of 'globalised eco-economic management', as described by McAfee (2012, p. 25), has sought to standardise the way nature and natural resources are viewed, notably through the sustainable development lens. Despite this institutionalised approach to global environmental governance, the fundamental issues of distribution and equity associated with the concept of sustainable development have received relatively limited attention (Redclift, 2005).

Nonetheless, this new globally institutionalised approach to environmental governance has reshaped the role of the sovereign state, as it has made way for these supra-state institutions to also play a visible role in the administration of

environmental affairs, thus making both as pertinent players in this new order (Tulloch and Neilson, 2014). From this perspective, Redclift (2005, p. 77) suggests that this has given rise to 'neo-Keynesianism for the global environment, based on planning and international intervention' by both the sovereign state and supra-state institutions. This point particularly resonates with REDD+ in comparison with the CDM as it places a strong emphasis on the role of the sovereign state in facilitating domestic policies and measures, which are technically coordinated under the UNFCCC. Precisely because of this, the issues of both neoliberalism and state-centric interventionism are present in REDD+. In this context, Nasiritousi et al. (2014) suggest that one of the most fundamental and contested issues is whether the actions of global environmental governance should focus on governmental regulations or market-based solutions. Scholars like Joseph (2009, p. 417) describe neoliberalism as fundamentally 'a process of "destatification" by introducing the norms and values of the market economy to other areas of social life through the promotion of competition, initiative and risk taking'. McAfee (1999, p. 147) also argues that the notion of global environmental governance, as framed by 'the environmental-economic paradigm' has fundamentally embodied such neoliberal principles and a sharper focus on market-based solutions to reduce the role of the sovereign state. This leaves the mechanisms like REDD+ in an uneasy position. Particularly, in relation to its safeguards, Ciplet and Roberts (2017, p. 150) warn that such a framing 'eclipse[s] or negate[s] those of precautionary and equity-based concerns', traditionally protected under liberal regimes. Dean (2014), however, argues that the role of the sovereign state as a protector of public interest by ensuring enabling policies and regulations is an integral part of neoliberalism, thus suggesting that a critical question should be how much government is too much or too little.

These multiple interpretations of neoliberalism in global environmental governance have influenced various design elements of the mechanisms like the CDM and REDD+ under the UNFCCC. For instance, little to no regulatory control was provided by central governments through establishment and implementation of CDM projects in an attempt to leverage market forces to effectively generate GHG emissions reductions on a global scale (Neeff, Göhler and Ascui, 2014).

REDD+, on the other hand, makes the role of the sovereign state much more pronounced as it aims to achieve carbon emissions reductions and removals through nationally coordinated strategies and actions by central authorities. Despite these differences in the role of the sovereign state in these mechanisms, market-based approaches and economic rationalities lie at the core of contemporary regime development in global environmental governance (Gupta and van Asselt, 2017).

2.1.1.b.   (Re)centralising Effects of REDD+ in Decentralised Global Environmental Governance

Increasing economic globalisation and its underlying neoliberal policies have underpinned decentralisation trends in environmental governance in many developing countries (Cohen and McCarthy, 2014). With regard to forest management, the late 1990s saw a significant movement globally through international support in promoting co-management of forests between state, local, market and civil society actors (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Arts, 2014). Through this, the role of the sovereign state has conceptually shifted from being the authority figure to being a co-management partner from the global perspective. However, there has been limited evidence to suggest that such devolution of power has taken place in reality (Arts, 2014; Cohen and Bakker, 2014). The role of the sovereign state in its regulatory and administrative functions has thus remained central in many developing countries (Bulkeley, 2005; Lemke, 2007). This was and continues to be at least partly because of the substantial interests of central authority and influential elites. These have kept tight control over the management of commercially valuable forests through complex bureaucratic procedures and political economies in forestry and other land use sectors (Ribot, Agrawal and Larson, 2006; Phelps *et al.*, 2010; Arts, 2014).

With the introduction of REDD+, many scholars argue that the prospect of obtaining RBPs, together with the national-level transparency requirements under the WFR, has further encouraged centralised forest management and institutional development practices in many REDD+ countries (Visseren-Hamakers *et al.*, 2012; Gallemore and Munroe, 2013; Vatn and Vedeld, 2013;

Adelman, 2015; Voigt and Ferreira, 2015). Some scholars also argue that such practices have incentivised many national and local CSOs to support the agendas of central authority (Ribot, Agrawal and Larson, 2006; Nightingale and Ojha, 2013). Similarly, several other scholars argue that international support to REDD+ countries has also produced skewed and less democratic institutional arrangements by actively supporting the engagement of like-minded national and local actors who speak for the viewpoints of donors and international institutions (Thompson, Baruah and Carr, 2011; Bushley, 2014; Astuti and Mcgregor, 2015; Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2017; Dawson *et al.*, 2018).

These centralised management practices and skewed stakeholder engagement have posed a challenge to the operationalisation of REDD+. REDD+ depends on the aggregated results of nationally and locally implemented actions through the sectors contributing to deforestation and forest degradation, and thus, cross-sectoral coordination and inclusive policy processes across scales are necessary (Angelsen *et al.*, 2012; Brockhaus, Di Gregorio and Carmenta, 2014). However, due to these persistent centralised management practices, REDD+ has not yet demonstrated much evidence of multi-level governance and intersectoral coordination (Brockhaus *et al.*, 2016). Andersen (2015) argues that these practices resonate with the inherently top-down approach under the UNFCCC that has focused heavily on meeting globally harmonised process and procedural requirements at the national level. Such a skewed focus has overlooked the need to address complex drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, which are highly context-driven, thus requiring country-specific and bottom-up strategies and actions (Pasgaard *et al.*, 2016).

According to Gupta et al. (2016), these issues are also caused by horizontal and vertical fragmentation through the institutionalisation of multi-actor processes. A range of actors representing donors, multilateral institutions, national governments, CSOs, scientific networks across scales has different interpretations of norms and values related to REDD+ to 'produce divergent realities in different contexts' (Gupta, Pistorius and Vijge, 2016, p. 370). As a consequence, REDD+ has become highly politicised and fragmented, thus limiting its scope and scale and ability to produce an overarching narrative that

can mobilise multi-sector and multi-level action in a coordinated fashion. These observations highlight the challenge as well as the opportunity of REDD+; namely to ensure inclusive environmental governance by incorporating the right mix of top-down and bottom-up approaches to demonstrate its economic efficiency and legitimacy and accountability across scales (Blok, 2010; Gupta *et al.*, 2012; Nasiritousi, Hjerpe and Buhr, 2014; Andresen, 2015).

2.1.2. Examining REDD+ through a Governmentality Framework

Issues of legitimacy and accountability are central to understanding this governance challenge facing REDD+, as power and responsibilities are diffused and dispersed among a wide range of state and non-state actors across the socio-political landscape. To examine these issues, this thesis adopts the concept of governmentality as its theoretical framework. Through this framework, REDD+ is explored as a global governmental apparatus with a set of technologies that care for 'the well-being of [global citizens] as its main raison d'etre' without discounting the legitimacy and effects of sovereign statehood' (Arts, 2014, p. 20). Burles (2016, p. 6) describes sovereign statehood in the context of governmentality as 'circular and self-justifying … and …co-extensive with the law' while '[g]overnmentality goes beyond the law [to consider] the well-being of the population'.

The French social theorist, Michel Foucault, first introduced the notions of governmentality in his lectures between 1978 and 1979 at the College de France (Foucault *et al.*, 1991). During his lectures, Foucault used the term, governmental rationality, interchangeably with the term, governmentality, to theorise activities or practices of governing, their objectives and ways in which such activities or practices are carried out not just by the state but also broadly across the society by its individual members through multiple and omnipresent ways (ibid.). The notions of governmentality thus encompass a range of rationalities: from the governmental rationality of a sovereign state and its institutions, characterised by coercion and domination, as described by Foucault in his book, *Discipline and Punish* (1995)*;* to that of modern society, which he describes as 'bio-power' or 'bio-politics' in *The History of Sexuality* (1988)*.* The

term, bio-politics is used to describe a broader and more subtle and discursive way of governing a population through the institutionalisation of social bodies such as schools, hospitals and churches that have become a fundamental aspect of the modern capitalist society (ibid.). Because of its discursive process of institutionalisation, it is intrinsically linked to the formation of truth and development of resistance (Lemke, 2001). Foucault (1980, p. 133) defines truth as 'a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements'. He (ibid., p. 133) also suggests that truth is 'in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it'. The formation and dissemination of truth through discourses are, therefore, laden with power. Such processes sanction the proponent of truth and falsify other truths in an attempt to delineate and expand the extent of the power held by the proponent within economic, institutional and political regimes of society (Foucault, 2008). From this perspective, Foucault's approach to truth is generally associated with a relativist conception of truth by which truth is considered relative to beliefs and values under different historical and cultural conditions (Tremain, 2015). Scholars like Flyvbjerg (2013) and McKenna (2015) also argue that Foucault's notion of truth aligns with a contextualist notion that considers a specific historical and cultural context in which truth is produced and disseminated, as a system of ordered procedures. These processes of truth formation and resistance to the resulting power make the notions of governmentality and their effects multidimensional and multidirectional (Foucault, 1978; Dean, 2010).

Due to his premature death in 1984, much of these notions of governmentality remains scattered across his books, lecture transcripts, essays and interviews, some of which also still remains unknown in the English world (Foucault *et al.*, 1991). Nonetheless, Foucault's theorisation of governmental rationality or governmentality has gained attraction among social science scholars, including geographers who study environmental governance, inevitably with various interpretations of Foucault's notions of governmentality (Agrawal, 2005; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006; Rutherford, 2007; Fletcher, 2010; Hobson, 2013; Methmann, 2013; Singh, 2013; Arts, 2014; Mcgregor *et al.*, 2015; Rose-redwood, 2016). For instance, Arts (2014, p. 20) describes governmentality as

the 'reason of state' in modern statehood that mobilises its citizen to act responsibly and as 'free subjects'. Contrasting this focus on sovereign statehood, Adelman (2015, p. 196) describes governmentality as mentalities of government primarily to theorise both the rationality and means of governing in the modern society where neoliberalism has become synonymous with 'laissez-faire'. It is, however, essential to note here that the term 'laissez-faire' in a Foucauldian sense is problematic in its relationship with neoliberalism. Foucault et al. (1991, p. 20) argue that state regulation is considered the necessary conditions of neoliberalism, as it 'permit[s] and facilitate[s] natural regulation' of the free market. Foucault (2008, p. 132) thus suggests that '[n]eoliberalism should not therefore be identified with laissez-faire, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention'. Another example of governmentality is provided by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006, p. 54), who describe climate discourses as bio-politics, based on which disciplining practices of authorities and agencies shape the conduct of individuals and groups by defining a new set of 'eco-knowledge' or 'truths' in a global sense.

These different focuses on rationalities have created a fruitful landscape in which to advance the notions of governmentality in an empirical sense (Rutherford, 2007). However, Rose-redwood (2016, p. 470) warns that such varied emphases on governmental rationalities (e.g., sovereign statehood, neoliberalism and formation of truths and right dispositions) also point to the problematic of shifting too quickly the focus of analysis from territory to population from the geographical perspectives. This is mainly due to the absence of a fully theorised product on governmentality by Foucault, and because of this, it is essential to note that this lack of a unified theoretical approach can be considered both a weakness and a strength of governmentality as an analytical framework (ibid.).

In this thesis, the concept of governmentality transcends the sovereign form of power to consider beyond 'what is within the competence of the state', as suggested by Foucault et al. (1991, p. 103). Under governmentality, the term 'government refers to a continuum, which extends from political government right through to forms of self-regulation, namely "technologies of the self" as Foucault

calls them' (Lemke, 2001, p. 11). By denoting the term 'government' as the management of both public and private affairs, governmentality is essentially concerned with 'the conduct of conduct' that encompasses 'government of one's self and of others' through the interaction between sovereign state power (i.e., administration and laws) and actions of individual actors within a target population (Foucault *et al.*, 1991; Lemke, 2007, p. 44). Dean (2010, p. 18) describes the conduct of conduct as:

> …any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors...

In this context, REDD+ is primarily concerned with the actions of individual REDD+ countries from the global perspective, and hence the conduct of conduct 'takes place from a distance as the power to influence the actions of [REDD+ countries]' (Joseph, 2009, p. 415). Through the conduct of conduct, a variety of techniques and expertise are deployed in a pluralistic and deliberate manner to shape the behaviour of REDD+ countries and to rationalise and realise particular sets of norms and outcomes at the national level (Dean, 2010). From this perspective, the examination of different 'mentalities' of government which produce 'discursive 'truths' that serve as rationales for governing the self and others at the national level becomes central to understanding the issues of legitimacy and accountability through this framework (Huxley, 2008, p. 1643). At the same time, it is also essential to pay adequate attention to the rationality of resistance. As theorised through the concept of bio-politics, the conduct of conduct can also reverse its direction to become a counter-rationality or -conduct to resist the discursive domination when the original conduct exceeds social limits (Foucault, 1978; Foucault *et al.*, 1991).

According to Joseph (2009, 2010), such discursive truths are often enacted through mentalities based on pre-existing power structures, for instance, customary leadership, sovereign statehood, the liberal market order and international treaties and institutions, that have been transformed and legitimatised through historical processes. Deriving from such processes,

Foucault's notion of governmental apparatus contains mutually reinforcing elements of governmental rationality, techniques of power, representation, knowledge, expertise and modalities of action to examine how power is constructed and exercised through the conduct of conduct (Lemke, 2007). Such techniques of power, representation, knowledge, expertise and modalities of action are considered in this thesis as 'technologies of government' or power that normalises and reinforces certain norms and values to delimit what is possible and what is not within REDD+ as an apparatus of global environmental governance (Dean, 2010, p. 41). It is thus critical for this thesis to examine how specific governmental rationality and technologies of power emerge through historical processes to shape REDD+. In this respect, what Foucault (1980) calls 'genealogy', an analysis of historical contexts from the standpoint of power relations, is central to the examination of power through the discourses and practices of governing, as the formation of the political and private domains of society in which the discourses and practices occur is contingent on such contexts (Foucault, 1980; Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001; Dean, 2010). Foucault (ibid., p. 117) defines genealogy as:

> …a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.

Foucault's genealogical inquiry seeks to make conditions of domination and resistance intelligible through deconstructing accounts of history to provide an understanding of how particular rationalities, processes and mechanisms of domination and resistance have emerged to shape the conduct of our present society (Foucault, 1982).

In this context, Foucault (1980) describes the purpose of genealogical investigation as different from the emancipatory objectives embodied by Marxist theories. From a Foucauldian perspective, a genealogical investigation is less concerned with winners or losers through historical events and processes. It instead focuses on what Foucault (2008, p. 2) calls 'the art of governing' that points to both the rationalities and mechanisms of domination. Foucault (ibid., p.

35) describes this difference as 'the critique of knowledge I would propose does not … consist in denouncing what is continually…oppressive [, but] the critique I propose consists in determining under what conditions and with what effects a veridiction is exercised'. Foucault (ibid., p. 35) describes veridiction as a process that enables 'one to establish which statements in a given discourse can be described as true or false'. Through this process, the formation and dissemination of truth are used as mechanisms of domination within economic, institutional and political regimes by the proponents of truth to form the basis for the conduct of the self and others.

Foucault's genealogical investigation is thus not concerned with the general view of history often based on 'economic functionality' through which exploitation and class domination comprise as primary sources of power to be denounced (Foucault, 1980, p. 88). It instead shifts the main focus of the investigation to the specific economic, institutional and political rationalities and mechanisms of domination through a historical process or event from relative perspectives of the objects and subjects of domination to develop an understanding of the origins and inner-workings of power. According to Sembou (2011), such investigation thus may debunk conventional versions of history. For instance, the panopticon effects created by the increased role of global environmental governance institutions in monitoring developing countries' progress towards meeting international obligations reflect power relations between developed and developing countries through historical processes to support the expansion of globalisation (Shkabatur, 2011; Vallentin and Murillo, 2012). Scholars like Banerjee and Bobby (2003) and Winkler and Dubash (2015) point to a sense of resistance and criticisms that such technologies of government reinforce the hegemonic power relations rooted in colonialism. However, there is a limited understanding of conditions of domination and resistance and how they might stem from such historical processes.

2.1.2.a.   Suitability of Governmentality Framework to This Research

The governmentality framework focuses on the investigation of specific mechanisms of government by looking beyond the centrality of the state and

primacy of state power (Rose-redwood, 2016). The governmentality framework thus allows for the investigation to reveal specific governmental rationality, technologies of power and subject formation across the public and private domains of REDD+, and how they change and shift over time within and across such domains (Methmann, 2013). From this perspective, it provides a suitable theoretical framework for this research that aims to examine the construction and effects of power within these domains from multi-level and multi-actor perspectives (Brockhaus, Di Gregorio and Carmenta, 2014).

By treating both public and private affairs in a continuum and diverting the attention away from a critical review of the state and its emancipatory potential, the governmentality framework faces criticism from the perspective of a Marxist theory of the state (Kerr, 1999; Pearce and Tombs, 2013; Ioris, 2014). This is because Foucault's notions of governmentality make no clear distinction between society and the state to focus on possible conflicts between these domains and the issues of state subjugation and individual freedom (Lemke, 2007). While acknowledging this criticism, Foucault suggests to steer clear of the state-centric approach of his critics that 'deduce[s] the modern activities of government from essential properties and propensities of the state' (Foucault *et al.*, 1991, p. 4). Foucault describes this focus of state theory as an 'indigestible meal' and suggests instead to focus on the analysis of practices of governing instead (ibid.; Lemke, 2007).

Although the purpose of this is not to draw parallels between state theory and governmentality, the notions of governmentality generally refrain from the examination of power relations in terms of winners and losers based on 'the supposition of a fundamental power' of the state (Foucault, 1982), as often seen in many theorisations of the state. The governmentality framework thus provides a way to explore how power is constructed and operationalised through multiple social relations and structural forces in a non-static and non-linear manner. In this thesis that is interested in internal and subjective viewpoints of actors, including public-sector representatives from REDD+ countries, this approach to avoid considering the state as 'a "black box," a homogenous, sovereign entity' (Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2009, p. 66), is particularly crucial. Under a

Marxist theory of the state, Lemke (2001, p. 8) argues that the state and individuals are presumed as rational agents, and thus, they are often considered 'a "passive" production factor'. Such theorisation would effectively reduce the rationality and power of many actors in this thesis to 'an artificially created form of behaviour' to dismiss the role of human nature in the act of governing (ibid., p. 10).

In the analysis of governmentality, power is, therefore, conceived as something that is diffused through discourses and actions rather than something generically produced by the state or individuals or as a confrontation between individuals to directly govern actions of individuals and populations (Foucault, 1978, 2009; Dean, 2010). Foucault (1993, p. 203) describes power as 'the technologies of domination of individuals over one another [that] have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself' and therefore, power is produced through 'complementarity and conflicts between [the tactics of individuals] which assure coercion and processes'. From this perspective, Rose-redwood (2016, p. 474) suggests that the examination of power is to question empirically: 'by what means is power exercised?' Similarly, Dean (2010, p. 33) suggests that it is essential to examine 'how we govern and are governed' through those means. These aspects of power directly inform the five specific research questions in this study, as identified in Chapter One, which are designed to uncover the construction, means and effects of power in REDD+.

Several scholars have also adopted a similar approach in studying effects of governmentality in environmental governance (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001; Agrawal, 2005; Rutherford, 2007; Lövbrand, Stripple and Wiman, 2009; Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2009; Bose, Arts and van Dijk, 2012; Gupta *et al.*, 2012; Methmann, 2013; Campbell *et al.*, 2014; Adelman, 2015; Mcgregor *et al.*, 2015; Fletcher, 2017). The approach used in this research is, however, unique and novel in two respects. First, this thesis incorporates a human geography perspective into the analytical framework by introducing an additional dimension, concerning the effects of socio-spatial scale. This responds to Rutherford's (2007, p. 303) call for geographers to bring 'an analysis of spatiality, place and identity' into governmentality studies, as such a perspective had rarely been

explored. Second, this thesis sheds light on the construction and effects of power from the perspectives of actors variously representing national governments, multilateral institutions, bilateral agencies and international CSOs in national REDD+ processes. At the time of the research, very few studies had examined issues associated with REDD+ at the interface between the international and national REDD+ processes.

The following sections explore the above identified fundamental aspects of power through a governmentality lens in relation to the five specific questions of this research, described in Chapter One. The aim is to develop and elucidate the scope of analysis under each question.

2.2. WHAT IS BEING GOVERNED THROUGH REDD+?

The question of what is being governed points to an object of government, thus suggesting 'what should be governed', according to Okereke et al. (2009, p. 71). It is a question that illuminates certain practices or parts of the population that are being targeted by a particular mechanism of government (Hobson, 2013). This question thus makes a specific point of application of power visible through the conduct of conduct (Dean, 2010). As power is diffused through discourses and practices, there can be multiple objects of government in any given context, depending on the perspectives of actors which are shaped by both present and historical contexts, and such objects can be in conflict or complementary relationships with one another (Foucault, 1993, 2009; Dean, 2010).

From this perspective, the following sub-sections briefly discuss the objects of government through colonial and post-colonial forest management in Asia, and how such objects relate to the formation of objects of government through REDD+ in today's global environmental governance.

2.2.1. Objects of Government in Colonial and Post-colonial Forest Management

With the advent of colonialism, European colonial powers brought to Asia their systems of forest management that combined state control with the concept of scientific forestry (Tucker, 1987; Neumann, 1997; Saravanan, 2011; Arts, 2014; Yong, 2014). Through the colonial practices, a process of 'resourcification of nature' was established to manage high-value natural forests for economic exploitation (Gupta *et al.*, 2012, p. 728). These approaches systematically maximised forest productivity through expert-driven and institutionalised processes to meet global timber demand as well as for the public works of colonial states (e.g., construction of dockyards and railways) and curtailed traditional practices of local people (e.g., shifting cultivation) (Harper, 1997; Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001; Saravanan, 2011). These practices systematised forests as nothing more than stocks of resources to be managed based on the relationship between inputs and outputs, which was 'conceptually and operationally well-entrenched in [Western] conservationist philosophies by the early 1900s' in many parts of Southeast and South Asia (Luke, 2008, p. 8).

By the late colonial period, such management practices, although varied from place to place within colonial Asia, had successfully placed most high-value forests under strict state control and management and defined forests in both natural and political terms (Poffenberger, 2000; Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001; Nightingale and Ojha, 2013). These processes are described by Peluso and Vandergeest (ibid.) as the creation of political forests, which were deployed as a key strategy of state-making. Through the deployment of this strategy, forests were stratified, legally defined, territorialised and put under an institutionalised regime of management to limit access by local populations and their use rights (ibid.). These processes of territorialisation, legalisation and institutionalisation operated as key technologies of power to govern local populations and delimit their activities to ensure full control and authority over the management of territories and land-based resources by colonial states (Rutherford, 2007). From this perspective, the primary objects of government were the colonial territories and their land-based resources through the triad of coercive technological interventions (Peluso and Lund, 2011).

Towards the end of colonialism into the post-colonial era, the overexploitation of forest resources, elite capture and associated corruption and difficulty of managing remote areas by central authorities in parts of Southeast and South Asia led to increased local resistance that demanded decentralised forest management to meet local needs and promote locally-led conservation and sustainable use of forest resources (Poffenberger, 2000; Peluso, Kelly and Woods, 2012; Arts, 2014). Collaborative forest management regimes between the state and local populations were then introduced as a result in the early 20th century. Agrawal (2005) describes the effects of this new governmental rationality as 'environmentality' whereby environmental subjects and subjectivities are produced through what Agrawal calls 'intimate government'. Through this technology of government, local communities came to internalise the central state's visions of forest management by self-disciplining of their own conduct through their customary governance arrangements. This trend was observed particularly in parts of South Asia.

Under these decentralised arrangements, the objects of government shifted from the direct control of territories and land-based resources to the conduct of local populations through which states sought to indirectly maintain control over the territories and resources. Thus, the nature of technological interventions also shifted from direct coercive control to self-regulating forms (Poffenberger, 2000; Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001; Agrawal, 2005; Bose, Arts and van Dijk, 2012). Specific discussions on these historical contexts of forest management in the three case study countries are provided in Chapter Three. Meanwhile, this shift in the objects of government demonstrates a transition in governmental rationality from the sovereign form, relying on the direct and top-down application of power, to more indirect forms, relying on technologies of the self although the ultimate goal remained focused on maintaining territorial control (Fletcher, 2010; Burles, 2016). These new forms of governmental rationality that rely on technologies of the self provide the basis for today's global environmental governance.

2.2.2. Objects of Government in Global Environmental Governance

During the 1970s, marked by the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the focus of the global effort was to increase commitments by independent states to address ecological limits to economic growth and redress negative environmental impacts of economic activities (Meadows, 1972; Hardin, 1993; Corson *et al.*, 2015). The concept of sustainable development, linking neoliberalism and civic environmentalism to promote decentralised and privatised environmental protection, was introduced as the core ideology that underpinned such global commitments (Cohen and Bakker, 2014; Corson *et al.*, 2015; Ciplet and Roberts, 2017). Guided by this concept, the Rio Conventions were established to accelerate the institutionalisation of global environmental governance and to facilitate the management of global commons through a neoliberal framework (O'Connor, 2008; Corson and MacDonald, 2012). These Conventions have also enshrined the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' with an aim to recognise the responsibilities of developed countries for having caused historical environmental problems as well as the limited capacities of developing countries to take immediate action (Drexhage and Murphy, 2010). These concepts of sustainable development and common but differentiated responsibilities have worked as specific technologies of the self to bring together the Global North and South to increase their commitments and ambition towards global environmental governance through a neoliberal framework (Ciplet and Roberts, 2017). These technologies have made market activities an integral part of the environmental solution while recognising historical responsibilities of the Global North and development needs of the Global South within a single framework.

Under this global framework, the object of government has shifted from the territorialisation and exploitation of resources by the individual sovereign states to collective efforts among independent states to govern the global environment including forests as part of the global commons. However, under this broad object of government, efforts to elucidate precisely what aspects of the global environment are to be governed reveal tensions between neoliberalism, advocating market-based approaches, and civic environmentalism, advocating

equity and justice. Although both neoliberalism and civic environmentalism are considered the basis of sustainable development, such tensions indicate fundamental issues between the two concepts (Okereke, 2008; Ciplet and Roberts, 2017).

2.2.2.a. Tensions between Neoliberalism and Civic Environmentalism

Most notably reinforced by the findings of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity report, an array of market-based approaches have been promoted to frame certain aspects of the global environment as commodities and investment opportunities (McAfee, 1999; Corson and MacDonald, 2012; Pistorius *et al.*, 2012; Brienen *et al.*, 2015; Corson *et al.*, 2015). For instance, the carbon emissions reduction potential of forests is such an aspect, which has been widely recognised in recent years through the international climate negotiations (IPPC, 2014).

However, as a result, forests have been primarily viewed and commodified as sources and sinks of carbon emissions, which have eclipsed other aspects of forests such as the cultural and spiritual significance of forests that have limited market potential (Gupta *et al.*, 2012; Turnhout *et al.*, 2017). Critics of these market-based approaches to environmental protection have thus called into question their rationality. For example, McAfee (1999, p. 150) describes them as 'selling nature to save it'. McAfee (ibid.) suggests that the concept of market-based approaches is naïve as it places a disproportionately heavy emphasis on techno-managerial solutions, fundamentally driven by international experts and economic elites. Market-based approaches, therefore, overlook the important social and cultural aspects of the environment and rights of natural resource users.   Scholars including Banerjee and Bobby (2003) argue that such approaches reify a singular conception of sustainable development based on the Western ideas of ecological modernisation, driven by both techno-managerial and market rationales. Winkler and Dubash (2015) further suggest that such rationales are often built on the old colonial order of power.

In the context of REDD+, Gupta et al. (2012) similarly also warn against the dominant narrative of ecological modernisation that focuses on global carbon accountability through international REDD+ negotiations and debates. This narrative aggregates REDD+ countries, actors and actions and interprets any resulting efforts strictly in terms of tonnes of carbon emissions to standardise the value of forests across the developing world. It also makes forest carbon equivalent to carbon emissions from other sources in order to allow their comparability and tradability. This process enables the securitisation of carbon accountability on a global scale. It also emphasises the role of scientific and technical expertise by giving legitimacy and power to those developed countries and global environmental governance institutions with an advanced level of required expertise in carbon accounting and other related technical areas (ibid.; Methmann, 2013).

As a result, the narrative of ecological modernisation gives secondary priority to social and cultural practices and the rights of local people, as highlighted above. Fletcher (2010) claims that this neoliberalisation of environmental governance has marginalised and disenfranchised local actors through commodification and incorporation of their natural resources into the market economy. It is also well documented, for example through critiques of PES schemes, that standardised market-based valuation and commodification approaches often undermine and downplay localised valuation practices, thus making pre-existing conservation and livelihoods strategies more vulnerable to external value and price fluctuations (Corbera, 2012; Buizer, Humphreys and De Jong, 2014; Pokorny and Pacheco, 2014). Persson et al. (2014) also suggest that the market-based valuation and commodification approaches have in effect accelerated environmental degradation as it has merely displaced it geographically, for instance, from the Global North to the Global South.

These critiques of market-based approaches have enrolled multiple groups of non-state actors across scales in shaping and contesting environmental governance discourses and practices, typically in order to raise concerns about the issue of equity and justice for marginalised groups (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Corson and MacDonald, 2012; Corson *et al.*, 2015). Sikor and Newell

(2014) describe the framework of discourse concerning equity and justice in global environmental governance as global environmental justice. Global environmental justice examines not just the distribution of environmental goods and bads, but also procedural aspects to discursively examine much broader issues of rights and social justice and the underlying causes of injustice (Schlosberg, 2004, 2013; Mehta *et al.*, 2014; Sikor and Newell, 2014). Issues of global environmental justice are often multi-scalar and intergenerational and consider the effects of discourses and practices in historical, present and future contexts (Schlosberg, 2013).

For REDD+, primary areas of justice concern include RBPs, benefit sharing and safeguards in both distributional and procedural terms (Kanowski, McDermott and Cashore, 2011; McDermott *et al.*, 2012; Visseren-Hamakers *et al.*, 2012; Pasgaard *et al.*, 2016). Across these areas, the question of justice for whom has created a contested ground, as complex power relations and multiple perspectives of equity and justice across space and time often reveal various competing claims (Schlosberg, 2013). What is particularly notable is that this question of justice often becomes subsumed and artificially addressed by the proponents of ecological modernisation merely as a market risk that requires top-down and technocratic solutions (Gupta *et al.*, 2012; Methmann, 2013; Neeff, Göhler and Ascui, 2014). As a result, equity and justice are rarely treated as an independent object of government through REDD+ in its own right.

From this perspective, Cohen and McCarthy (2014) warn against the risk of accepting the global carbon accountability framing as it reifies carbon emissions as the real object of government. They claim that this draws attention away from production and consumption practices, which produce such emissions and generate justice and equity concerns in the first place. Such a framing reinforces the dominant capitalist-led valuation of nature and transfers climate responsibilities onto those developing countries with deforestation problems who often have done little to cause climate change historically (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Buizer, Humphreys and De Jong, 2014).

2.2.2.b. Recognising Multiple Objects of Government through REDD+

Despite the dominance of the ecological modernisation narrative, global environmental justice perspectives highlight the need to consider the existence of less dominant narratives, thus revealing other specific objects of government through REDD+ (Martín-López *et al.*, 2014). In this context, Laurans and Mermet (2013) highlight the need to recognise the disjuncture between experts' visions, establishing the dominant narrative at the international level, and views of other actors whose norms and values stem from more localised discourses and practices. The recognition of this disjuncture makes the supposition of this singular object of government problematic and fragile.

Some suggest that such a disjuncture has already been addressed through the REDD+ safeguards under the UNFCCC to ensure transparency, accountability and equitability in REDD+ processes (Sikor and Newell, 2014). Others, however, argue that even such efforts are primarily driven and underpinned by the proponents of the ecological modernisation narrative, thus only superficially attending to the needs and concerns of other actors particularly at the national and local levels (Blaikie and Muldavin, 2013; Kamoto *et al.*, 2013; Martin *et al.*, 2014; Mehta *et al.*, 2014).

Through their study in Indonesia, Milne et al. (2016) illustrate several localised discourses that reveal a range of specific objects of government through REDD+. Such objects include biodiversity and ecosystems through the 'environmental' discourse, carbon and related financial benefits through the 'compliance and regulation' discourse and customary rights and associated political recognition through the 'community rights and benefits' discourse (ibid.). As Blok (2010, p. 906) describes, these discourses and specific objects of government cast light on REDD+ as 'the contours of a grey box or boundary object' to accommodate diverse concerns of policymakers, political and economic elites and the civil society. From this perspective, it is useful to think of REDD+ as a 'boundary object', which encompasses multiple objects of government to highlight a range of visions, issues and solutions, pursued by a variety of actors (McDermott *et al.*, 2012; McCall, 2016; van der Sande *et al.*, 2017; Steger *et al.*, 2018).

2.2.3. REDD+ as a Boundary Object

The concept of boundary objects was first introduced by Star and Griesemer (1989) to describe scientific objects that intersect multiple social worlds to facilitate cooperative actions among them. Star and Griesemer (ibid., p. 393) describe boundary objects as 'objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites'. A boundary object is thus characterised by its ability to leverage 'action and cooperation' within its 'interpretive flexibility' (Star, 2010, p. 603). This flexibility allows for the object to 'tack back-and-forth between social worlds —to simultaneously exist in a specific state for one discipline while being universally vague across all disciplines' (Steger *et al.*, 2018, p. 154). By this, the object is both ill-structured and locally specific at the same time in its applications (Star and Griesemer, 1989; Star, 2010).

Using Star and Griesemer's (ibid., p. 411) description of the types of boundary objects, REDD+ from the perspective of global environmental governance can be described as both a 'coincident boundary' and a 'standardised form'. The coincident boundary shares a common material structure within which heterogeneous groups of actors operate autonomously, while the standardised form streamlines the ways in which information is organised and communicated across groups of actors without limiting how information is gathered, interpreted and applied (Steger *et al.*, 2018). REDD+ mobilises voluntary action by individual developing countries within its common framework, and their action is streamlined through the provisions of the WFR that lay out basic operational rules and requirements (UNFCCC, 2016a). These characteristics give REDD+ the interpretive flexibility which reserves the autonomy of individual countries to determine and undertake specific courses of action. Meinshausen et al. (2015) suggest that this is a common structure of most internationally negotiated agreements which bring 'different actors to agree on an outcome while subscribing to very different, possibly incompatible principles'.

Based on these characteristics, McDermott et al.(2012, p. 65) suggest that REDD+ being a boundary object has 'encourage[ed] a wide range of actors to design their own rules for engaging with REDD+ on the ground' while this 'widespread support masks disagreement around its priorities'. McDermott et al. (ibid.), therefore, warn that in the actual implementation of REDD+, such a unique property of REDD+ as a boundary object may be lost as actors, particularly at the national level, attempt to elucidate what exactly should be governed and who should be empowered through REDD+.

In this context, one crucial consideration regarding boundary objects is their ephemerality through their lifecycles. Depending on how they are structured, and whether their standardisation processes are managed within one discipline or across disciplines, boundary objects can transform themselves into what Star (2010) calls 'boundary infrastructures'. Boundary infrastructures have lost the interpretive flexibility of boundary objects due to excessive standardisation effects for administrative purposes, designed to 'collapse the difference between an ill-structured, shared object and a locally tailored object' across scales and scopes (ibid., p. 614). In the process of transition from a boundary object to a boundary infrastructure, '[s]tandardization seeks to reduce uncertainty and facilitate collaboration across distances and heterogeneous metrics or measurements'(Steger *et al.*, 2018, p. 155). The boundary infrastructure thus operates to adopt common standards down to the practice level to increase transparency and comparability (Star and Ruhleder, 1996). Any residual categories of information that do not fit the boundary infrastructure may emerge to form a new boundary object (Star, 2010; Steger *et al.*, 2018).

Given the dominant position of the ecological modernisation narrative, REDD+ in its transition to a boundary infrastructure would be expected to lean towards the carbon-centric, techno-managerial and market-driven approaches (McDermott, 2014; Turnhout *et al.*, 2017). However, exactly how such a transition takes place and what happens to other specific objects of government through other narratives, particularly the one concerning global environmental justice, is largely unknown and unexplored in available literature (Nielsen, 2013; McDermott, 2014). This thesis thus attempts to develop an empirical

understanding of this transition in REDD+ and what happens to less dominant ideas and priorities of actors in the process. Such knowledge contributes to on-going debates as to how REDD+ could remain flexible to meet unique national and local circumstances and needs while simultaneously operating as an effective climate change mitigation mechanism at the international level (Visseren-Hamakers *et al.*, 2012; Cohen and Bakker, 2014; Pasgaard *et al.*, 2016; Angelsen *et al.*, 2017).

2.3. WHO IS GOVERNING THROUGH REDD+?

The question of who is governing through REDD+ illuminates 'ways of forming subjects, selves, persons, actors or agents' (Dean, 2010, p. 33). Foucault (1982, p. 98) describes subjects as individuals who 'are not only … inert or consenting target [of power]; they are always also the elements of its articulation', and thus 'individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application'. Nightingale and Ojha (2013, p. 34) describe subjects as 'both the product of external influences … and the internalisation of this subjection by the subject itself'. According to Butler (2009, p. 3), a subject is 'a socially produced "agent" and "deliberator"' and 'is not a precondition of politics, but a differential effect or power'.

Subjects are thus powered over or subjugated and simultaneously empowered to exercise their power to govern others in complex ways. A subject is also in a constant state of flux depending on the specific context and space in which he or she operates. When the subject performs its role whether that be a technical expert, human rights activist or local community member, certain societal expectations of that role and its individual identity and perspective associated with that role interact to form a certain way in which the subject views the world and act upon it (Longhurst, 2000; Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008; Meah, 2014). These combined effects often form an individual into multiple subjects to shift from one to another and back simultaneously to become subjected to power and empowered to assert its authority over others.

2.3.1. Formation of Subjects through Institutionalisation of Knowledge

The discussions on ecological modernisation and global environmental justice as the two most visible narratives informing REDD+ are pertinent here to understanding processes of subject formation, through which actors become the vehicles of power. Through the international climate negotiations and debates, the narratives of ecological modernisation and global environmental justice concerning REDD+ have continuously been reproduced and expanded by various actors from sovereign state governments, multilateral institutions, the scientific community, civil society and private sector (Humphreys, 2009; Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2009; Holmgren, 2013).

The following sub-sections illustrate processes of subject formation in relation to these two narratives. Through each narrative, specific groups of actors emerge through the institutionalisation of certain types of knowledge and expertise to become dominant subjects.

2.3.1.a. Ecological Modernisation

The narrative of ecological modernisation in REDD+ relies on market-based and techno-managerial interventions to reduce forest carbon emissions in order to address climate change. The following position of the Norwegian Government, as an oil producer as well as the leading proponent of REDD+, described by Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2017, p. 483), demonstrates the central notion of this narrative.

> Norway's climate change mitigation policy has since the late 1980s been based on the principle of international cost-effectiveness. This implies that it is seen as more cost-effective to mitigate climate change in a low-cost country, rather than in an expensive country like Norway. Forest conservation has come to play a leading role in Norway's approach to mitigation in low-cost countries.

This approach fundamentally decouples environmental problems from economic growth and to an extent depoliticises such problems as individual, societal and global responsibilities, coordinated through the liberal market order and global environmental governance institutions (Soneryd and Uggla, 2015). In this

narrative, developed countries, multilateral institutions, international CSOs and associated experts in policy, scientific, technical and financial domains play central roles (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006; Nielsen, 2013; Bock, 2014; Wilson Rowe, 2015). This narrative also illuminates the power relations between developed and developing countries. According to Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006, p. 53), the 'win-win storyline' of this narrative 'underpins the experience of advanced industrialized countries [through] integrated pollution control, market-driven strategies to internalize environmental costs', while being silent on 'equity and poverty issues' of developing countries.

In REDD+, the focus of this narrative on technocratic interventions and cost-efficiency has brought professionals such as consultants and carbon accounting experts with advanced knowledge and understandings of the carbon economy and business of carbon financing to the centre of this narrative (Holmgren, 2013; Nielsen, 2013; Bock, 2014; Wilson Rowe, 2015). Many of these experts have developed their knowledge and expertise in carbon accounting and financing through the CDM. The UNFCCC COP negotiations and IPCC's scientific views on climate change have been particularly instrumental in institutionalising this narrative across scales as they have established the authoritative role of experts and developed countries in promoting and financing market-based and techno-managerial approaches (Tompkins and Amundsen, 2008; Gupta *et al.*, 2012). While these expert-style approaches and interventions are often abstract and theoretical, this narrative has been consistently (re)produced and described as a silver bullet across scales through the international climate negotiations, policy debates and country-level capacity development initiatives (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006; Redford, Padoch and Sunderland, 2013; Mcgregor, Eilenberg and Coutinho, 2015; Fletcher *et al.*, 2016; Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2017). Consequently, 'expert-style problem solving' approaches have become a norm in discussing REDD+ even at the national and local levels (Wilson Rowe, 2015, p. 69). Scholars including Bushley (2014) and Mcgregor et al. (2015) through their studies in Nepal and Indonesia suggest the influence of this narrative in essentialising the role of technical and scientific experts and their expert-style techno-managerial debates through national and sub-national REDD+ processes. This institutionalisation of the ecological modernisation narrative has

given power and legitimacy to developed countries, multilateral institutions, international CSOs and experts who are driving the production and dissemination of such market-based and techno-managerial approaches.

Fletcher (2016, p. 674) attributes the dominance and full acceptance of this narrative to an 'economy of expectations' that sells the promise of market demand and future financial benefits to legitimise its core arguments through the framework of neoliberalism. Lund et al. (2017, p. 125) similarly describe such expectations as 'a discursive commodity …to generate value and appropriate financial resources'. However, Lund et al. (ibid., p. 133) also suggest such an economy of expectations to be rather prevalent within 'the logic of the development and conservation industry', and thus also applicable to the global environmental justice narrative.

2.3.1.b.   Global Environmental Justice

The global environmental justice narrative challenges the win-win storyline of ecological modernisation by emphasising the role of stakeholders and their participation and broader socioecological functions of forests in the decision-making and implementation of REDD+ (Nielsen, 2013). This narrative brings closer attention to the potential negative externalities of the top-down, market-driven and techno-managerial approaches of ecological modernisation, often incurred by developing countries and their local communities.

Two viewpoints broadly characterise the global environmental justice narrative in REDD+. The first and most mainstream viewpoint promotes the role of international civil society networks in multilateralism and state-centric decision-making to ensure citizens' participation and democratic processes (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006). The second viewpoint is more radical and calls for the rejection and transformation of the current form of global environmental governance, founded on the global economic order and historically constructed hegemonic power relations (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006). The idea of promoting ecological democracy operates as the primary rationale of this

narrative. The promise of change through such democratic processes thus also becomes a discursive commodity through this narrative (Lund *et al.*, 2017).

The global environmental justice narrative has mainly gained its momentum since the adoption of the REDD+ safeguards by the UNFCCC COP in 2010 (Pistorius *et al.*, 2012; Wilson Rowe, 2015; Pasgaard *et al.*, 2016). Many international CSOs and their networks have since emerged at the centre of this narrative to represent diverse interests and agendas concerning equity and justice across sectors and scales. This process has also empowered national and local CSOs through their association with international CSOs and networks to establish themselves as influential subjects through national and local REDD+ processes based on their acquired knowledge and expertise of global equity and justice debates concerning REDD+ (Astuti and Mcgregor, 2015).

However, Joseph (2009, p. 420, 2010) argues that both the central rhetoric of ecological democracy and environmental justice are constituted and institutionalised by developed countries and 'Northern-dominated institutions' including CSOs and their networks that are financially dependent on donor support. These relations have created the situation in which CSOs become attuned to the preferences of donor countries and multilateral institutions in order to access finance (Thompson, Baruah and Carr, 2011; Bastakoti and Davidsen, 2015; Lund *et al.*, 2017; Dawson *et al.*, 2018). This linkage with international finance often affects CSOs' ability to prioritise real issues and needs on the ground (Blaikie and Muldavin, 2013; Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2017).

Nevertheless, the global environmental justice narrative has brought various CSOs and their international networks into the global workstream of REDD+. Through this narrative, CSO activists have established themselves as prominent subjects to pursue equity and justice through REDD+ at various levels. At the same time, this narrative highlights the influential role of donor countries and multilateral institutions in coordinating the overall direction of this workstream by financing various CSO activities.

2.3.2. Historical Power Relations Undermining the Role of REDD+ Governments as Subjects

The influential role of donor countries and global environmental governance institutions, which often act as financial intermediaries of ODA, are particularly visible through these narratives. Lemos and Agrawal (2006) suggest that this is because the basis of these narratives lies in historical power relations between developed and developing countries that go back to colonial times. Building on such unequal power relations, donor countries and their intermediaries, including bilateral and multilateral institutions and international CSOs, have favoured and empowered technical experts and CSO activists who have actively supported specific donor visions and norms. This has in many cases given even greater power and legitimacy to these non-state actors than their state counterparts from developing countries (Corbera and Schroeder, 2017). This seemingly democratising process has in fact challenged the legitimacy and role of central authorities of REDD+ countries through these narratives (Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2009).

Some scholars argue that the neoliberal framing of multilateral environmental agreements like the UNFCCC is fundamentally reflective of environmental responses of developed countries, particularly of the Western governments (Tompkins and Amundsen, 2008; Corson and MacDonald, 2012). By encircling forests and other environmental resources as the global commons, multilateral institutions have been established under the leadership of developed countries to streamline the coordination and management of the commons. Within such coordination and management practices, the ability of developed countries to influence key discourses and decisions are maintained. This approach is guided by the Hegelian notion of the state and civil society, which promotes the universality of the state and multilateral institutions as idealised and legitimate authority, rationalised by reason (Ioris, 2014). For instance, through such an approach, freedom and rights of civil society within the normalised boundaries, conceptualised as the international community, are promoted ultimately to justify the enforcement of specific policies and ideologies of developed countries and multilateral institutions within the international community (ibid.).

Within this notion, developing countries with deforestation and forest degradation challenges are framed as part of the problem to be solved rather than legitimate authorities or subjects in addressing such challenges. This notion is illustrated by the preference of donor countries to deliver funds to REDD+ countries and implement support activities through their intermediaries. This is because developing countries are often viewed by donor countries as lacking the necessary accountability and democratic processes to act as rational agents, and therefore, donors are hesitant to engage with them directly or to trust their conduct (Brunner and Enting, 2014). Winkler and Dubash (2015) suggest that because of this mistrust, the agency of developing countries is denied in practical terms by developed countries within international mechanisms like REDD+. Therefore, 'transformational change is imposed [upon developing countries] in the context of unequal power relations' (ibid., p.787). Ioris (2014, p. 7) also describes how 'the environmental branches of the state [in the developing world] are normally instigated by foreign organizations and devoid of real power to face up to politico-economic hegemonic pressures [from such organisations]'.

Neoliberalism through global environmental governance has thus brought the diffusion of power that no longer gives sovereign governments automatic accountability and legitimacy (Rutherford, 2007; Dean, 2010). As part of these processes, REDD+ has inherited and reproduced specific global hierarchies of subjects within which subjects such as donor governments, multilateral institutions, experts and CSO networks have gained increased legitimacy and influence through promotion of the narratives of ecological modernisation and also to a certain extent, global environmental justice. At the same time, this diffused power structure, built on the historical power dynamics between developed and developing countries, has left the central authorities of many REDD+ countries in a much less empowered position, compared to their non-state counterparts.

From this perspective, a question arises as these current circumstances contradict the provisions of the WFR. Under the WFR, the central authorities of REDD+ countries are expected to coordinate mechanisms, policies and measures to operationalise REDD+ (UNFCCC, 2016a). This thesis, therefore,

examines whether the current REDD+ processes provide the necessary empowerment of the central authorities in the case study countries to act as subjects in order to carry out this coordination of their national REDD+ processes. The thesis also compares such processes of empowerment to those of other actors, to develop a further understanding of subject creation and its effects through REDD+.

2.4. HOW IS REDD+ BEING GOVERNED?

Having discussed above what is being governed and who is governing through REDD+, this section now explores how the objects are being governed by the subjects (i.e., technologies of government). Dean (2010, p. 33) suggests that technologies of government enable 'specific ways of acting, intervening and directing, made up of particular types of …'expertise' and 'know-how''. Okereke et al. (2009, p. 71) suggest that technologies of government 'make rationalities 'visible' and permits their extension through time and space'. Therefore, to understand how power is constituted and being deployed through the governmentality framework, it is essential to examine 'what instruments and procedures are being used' and how they are deployed to govern the objects of government (Rutherford, 2007; Hobson, 2013, p. 60).

From these perspectives, the following sub-section identifies technologies of government that are particularly visible through the ecological modernisation and global environmental justice narratives. The section also explores ways in which such technologies operate to rationalise the conduct of the subjects in the governing of their specific objects.

2.4.1. Donor Finance and Institutionalised Knowledge as Prominent Technologies

Two technologies of government that are particularly visible through the ecological modernisation and global environmental justice narratives are donor finance and institutionalised knowledge. These technologies are closely interrelated and exert mutual influence on each other, as most technologies of

government do (Dean, 2010). Despite their mutual relationship, the extent of their individual effects and effectiveness, however, varies depending on the context in which each technology is deployed (Rose-redwood, 2016).

In the absence of other sources of REDD+ finance, donor finance has become a powerful instrument to rationalise certain rhetoric and approaches to REDD+ (Angelsen, 2017). In direct relation to donor finance, certain types of knowledge and expertise concerning REDD+, for instance, the carbon economy and customary rights, become institutionalised to produce and reinforce specific views of the world (Gupta *et al.*, 2012; Turnhout *et al.*, 2017). These technologies shape dominant policy directions, technical approaches and the conduct of subjects in REDD+ in a circular relationship (Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2017).

2.4.1.a. How Are These Technologies Deployed?

Recalling the discussion on what should be governed through REDD+, different aspects of forests such as carbon, biodiversity and customary rights are identified and pursued as specific objects of government through REDD+, depending on the discursive viewpoint. However, as donor finance materially enables the pursuit of objects, the proponents of these specific objects all strive to appeal to donors (Lee and Pistorius, 2015; Gupta, Pistorius and Vijge, 2016; Angelsen, 2017; Angelsen *et al.*, 2017). Donors also look for a new and innovative ideas, which are worth supporting and replicating as a silver bullet across scales for addressing, for example, global forest carbon emissions, biodiversity conservation needs or human rights of forest-dependent people (Redford, Padoch and Sunderland, 2013). In this context, the rationality of the development and conservation industry is intimately tied to donor finance which values and rewards promises of transformation and stories of success, underpinning specific visions of donors in managing forests as part of the global commons (Lund *et al.*, 2017; Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2017). These technologies interactively empower subjects such as donors, multilateral institutions and international CSOs through production and dissemination of truth through the institutionalisation of knowledge and donor finance. Foucault (1980, p. 34) suggests that power and knowledge are inseparably reinforcing each other

to create effects, and therefore, '[i]t is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power'.

From this perspective, it is important to consider where knowledge is produced and disseminated as truths, and who produces and disseminates such truths through the narratives of ecological modernisation and global environmental justice. In both cases, knowledge and power are primarily produced and disseminated at the international level by donor countries, multilateral institutions and international CSOs (Gupta *et al.*, 2012; Winkler and Dubash, 2015). Such truths are then disseminated downwards to the national and local levels to be established as authoritative positions, understandings and approaches to REDD+ discursively through mediums including the UNFCCC COP negotiations, IPCC's scientific view on climate change and initiatives such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) of the World Bank and UN-REDD (Tompkins and Amundsen, 2008; Blok, 2010; Wilson Rowe, 2015; Winkler and Dubash, 2015).

Such processes of knowledge production and dissemination are often guided by donors and their intermediaries and are informed by their visions and ideas of transformational change through global environmental governance (Winkler and Dubash, 2015). These technologies are also deployed by international actors on an individual basis through the mediums mentioned earlier to claim their competence and wield their influence to legitimatise their ideas and approaches (Wilson Rowe, 2015). Through these processes, certain socioecological relations are reified as the reality, norm or what Foucault (1991, p. 93) describes as 'the right disposition of things' in the governing of the global environment in a top-down manner and from the international perspective.

That being said, one can also question if knowledge and power is also produced at national and local levels and travelling upwards to influence global policy and technical debates on REDD+. Although different scholars have iteratively emphasised the importance of stakeholder engagement at national and local levels in REDD+ policy processes, there is little evidence to suggest that mainstream knowledge and power production takes place at these levels to

influence international processes (Brockhaus *et al.*, 2016; Sunderlin *et al.*, 2017; Turnhout *et al.*, 2017). Some efforts by the FCPF and UN-REDD have been recognised to create a space for national and local stakeholder engagement. Nevertheless, research evidence suggests that the rhetoric of stakeholder engagement and safeguards is often deployed as part of this top-down knowledge production and dissemination mechanism to normalise international perspectives at the national and local levels, thus operating only as a box-ticking exercise to satisfy quality control requirements of donors (Bastakoti and Davidsen, 2015; Mcgregor *et al.*, 2015; Dawson *et al.*, 2018).

2.4.1.b.   Reinforcing Unequal Power Relations through These Technologies

In such a top-down process, the image and narrative of success are arguably considered more crucial than actual results to those actors involved in the knowledge production and dissemination processes (Lund *et al.*, 2017; Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2017; Dawson *et al.*, 2018). Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2017, p. 499) suggest that:

> The 'success' of REDD in this perspective is not about realising goals, but that promises of the policy model of REDD are shared in 'epistemic communities' and with policy-making and financial support as results.

Dempsey and Suarez (2016) also make a similar observation that the rhetoric of market-based conservation has been institutionalised and legitimated through the global apparatus of conservation organisations without much evidence of capital flows through the market mechanism. Once institutionalised and legitimated, such rhetoric sets specific norms that are underpinned by a powerful coalition of subjects to antagonise and dismiss the critics of the norms and associated approaches and interventions (Brockhaus, Di Gregorio and Carmenta, 2014; Easterly, 2014; Fletcher *et al.*, 2016).

Subsequently, questions such as how best to address drivers of deforestation on the ground and to engage local stakeholders to deliver REDD+ results that also meet various local needs and provide additional benefits often become secondary (Angelsen, 2017). As these technologies are primarily deployed by

those policy actors involved in REDD+ at the international level and intermediaries of donor finance at the national level, abstract neoliberal concepts such as property rights and benefit sharing from upstream scientific and policy debates are imposed upon REDD+ countries as normative issues without appropriate localisation efforts (Lee and Pistorius, 2015, p. 16; Pasgaard *et al.*, 2016). Promoting carbon rights as part of the civil environmental justice narrative in REDD+ countries in Asia where forests are often considered public property by law is one such example (Karsenty, Vogel and Castell, 2014).

In this context, the rhetoric of transformation and stories of success, produced and disseminated as truths, often 'attain a hegemonic status [and] functions like a natural order or is institutionalised by society and becomes the 'common sense' of practitioners' at the national level (Poudel and Aase, 2015, p. 48). It is also reported that actors and practitioners at the national level often reproduce and redistribute such truths as authoritative positions through national and local REDD+ processes to wield their influence and access to donor finance (Astuti and Mcgregor, 2015; Dawson *et al.*, 2018).

By this process, donor finance and institutionalised knowledge have become the significant technologies of government to underpin specific forms of governmental rationality through the ecological modernisation and global environmental justice narratives. One's ability to deploy or to have a good command of these technologies puts the subject in a position of power. Since REDD+ is a voluntary climate change mitigation mechanism under the UNFCCC, the COP decisions and WFR provide limited to no disciplinary effects, and therefore, the subjects are predominantly reliant on the deployment of these soft technologies to achieve their objects of government. In this context, this thesis attempts to empirically validate and develop an understanding of the effects of these two technologies, from the perspectives of actors at the interface between the international and national REDD+ processes.

2.5. WHY DO ACTORS PURSUE AND PROBLEMATISE REDD+ IN CERTAIN WAYS?

This section examines the reasons why the subjects pursue and problematise the objects of government in specific ways (i.e. subjectivities). Subjectivity can be described merely as the nature of the subject (Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2009). It can also be understood as the particular ways in which actors participate in the act of governing themselves and others through processes in which actors are disciplined by laws and discursively identify themselves with certain practices (Foucault *et al.*, 1991; Butler, 2010; Nightingale and Ojha, 2013). According to Dean (2010, p. 33), subjectivity determines 'distinctive ways of thinking and questioning, relying on definite vocabularies and procedures [i.e., technologies of government] for the production of truth' through a discursive process. At the core of subjectivity, 'perspectives, beliefs, desires and convictions held by individual subjects' are rationalised through specific forms of governmental rationality in an overlapping manner to guide the subject to take action (Dean, 2010; Zanotti, 2013; Bazzul, 2014, p. 422). The rationality of government thus provides the fundamental logic of action based on which the subjects participate in the act of governing (Huxley, 2008). This logic is, therefore, what allows the subjects to 'render reality intelligible' for them to take specific actions and describes reasons why the subjects act in certain ways (Rose-redwood, 2016, p. 474). Several distinct forms of governmental rationality can be identified, and such forms exist in relational contexts to discursively (re)produce one another (Foucault *et al.*, 1991; Fletcher, 2010, 2017). These forms of rationality and resulting subjectivities are interconnected and relational, but they can also be contradictory or conflicting at the same time (Foucault *et al.*, 1991; Popke, 2003; Huxley, 2008).

The following sub-sections discuss these forms of governmental rationality, which provide distinct framings of subjectivity, to explore why the subjects pursue and problematise specific objects of government through REDD+. The interconnectivity between such forms of rationality is also discussed.

2.5.1. Different Forms of Governmental Rationality Driving Action

Building on Foucault's typology of governmental rationality, Fletcher (2010, 2017) suggests five distinct forms of governmental rationality in environmental politics. Fletcher (2017) describes them as 1) Disciplinary form to create self-regulating environmental subjects through internalisation of certain norms and values; 2) Neoliberal form to bring systematic change through external incentives; (3) Sovereign form to govern through command and control; 4) Liberation form to incentivise egalitarian and democratic environmental stewardship; and 5) Truth form to govern through various perspectives of environmentalism from traditional knowledge to deep ecological understandings. This thesis adopts the first four forms of governmental rationality. This is because the thesis argues that the last form of governmental rationality based on truth is instead a fundamental mechanism of power. It is, therefore, assumed to be present in all forms of governmental rationality and not an overt aspect to be treated as an independent form of governmental rationality.

Although Fletcher (2010, 2017) suggests the independent nature of governmental rationality 'according to truth', this thesis instead considers what Foucault et al. (1991, p. 7) call 'government in the name of the truth' as the basis of all forms of governmental rationality. Foucault (1980, p. 93) describes two fundamental arts of government or mechanisms of power as 'the rules of right that provide a formal delimitation of power […and...] the effects of truth that this power produces and transmits, and which in their turn reproduce this power'. In this triad of right, power and truth, '[w]e are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth' (ibid., p.93). In this context, these mechanisms of right and truth that produce power in a circular relation also make both customary and legislative laws to allow the subjects of this power to judge, condemn and classify the objects through truth discourse (ibid.; Foucault *et al.*, 1991). These arts of government in the name of truth are also an integral part of the techno-managerial discourse of neoliberal governmentality, as well as of liberation governmentality through the production and dissemination of truth concerning democracy and hence

egalitarianism. Also, in the context of national REDD+ processes, the researcher's experience suggests that discourses concerning traditional and deep ecological knowledge are closely associated with subjects' desire to seek an egalitarian and democratic environmental outcome. For these reasons, the thesis justifies the exclusion of the truth form as an independent aspect of governmentality and therefore suggests to use this simplified typology of governmental rationality in this research.

Furthermore, these five forms of governmental rationality by no means offer a comprehensive set of analytical lenses for examining the mentalities of government or suggest to be applied as a set, particularly in the absence of a unified theoretical approach in the operationalisation of Foucault's notions of governmentality (Foucault *et al.*, 1991). The typology should, therefore, be used adaptively to best suit the context of research. Also, it is important to note here that these forms of governmental rationality are observed in an overlapping, intertwining and even contradicting manner in reality (Fletcher, 2010). For instance, the neoliberal form of governmental rationality, promoting market-based incentives through PES to instigate change in socioecological relations, still relies on sovereign and disciplinary interventions to ensure that enabling policy and regulatory conditions are in place for market-based mechanisms to function accordingly (Foucault *et al.*, 1991; Dean, 2014). Similarly, the sovereign form of governmental rationality is usually recognised in the liberation form of governmental rationality, underpinning an egalitarian and decentralised system based on traditional ecological knowledge, as such a system also relies on hierarchical customary governance practices (Agrawal, 2005). Each of these forms should, therefore, be treated only as an initial analytical lens or entry point through which to start examining the specific logic of action through a discursive process, not as a full description of the logic.

By acknowledging these characteristics, the logic of action embodied in each form of governmental rationality is discussed below.

2.5.1.a. Disciplinary Governmental Rationality

Agrawal's concept of environmentality provides the most characteristic description of this form of governmental rationality (Fletcher, 2010, 2017). Agrawal (2005) describes the processes and effects of colonial and post-colonial environmental subject creation as environmentality through his study of community-based forest management in Kumaon in northern India. The British colonial state's effort to control and limit local access to forests during the colonial period was met with fierce resistance by local communities of Kumaon till the central authority deployed a new strategy to decentralise regulatory control over forests during the late colonial period. This strategy has led to the creation of local environmental subjects through what Agrawal calls an 'intimate government' through which local communities have become the place of decision-making and enforcement of forest regulations. Although the central forest administration still guides their forest regulations, the process of self-government has created 'the greatest willingness on the part of villagers to contribute to environmental protection' (Agrawal, 2005, p. 179). This has made the practices of government an internal and socially visible process for local communities rather than a heavy-handed centrally driven process.

For REDD+, similar processes are recognised through the NDCs and the voluntary and self-reporting nature of REDD+, guided by the WFR with financial and technical support provided by Annex 1 countries and other sources (UNFCCC, 2016b, 2016a). Through these processes, REDD+ countries are assumed to be committed to internalising the globally agreed norms and practices of managing and monitoring forests and safeguarding the rights of their citizens and environmental integrity (Angelsen *et al.*, 2012; Astuti and Mcgregor, 2015). In this context, the core logic through this form of rationality is to empower developing countries and their citizens as subjects whose self-regulated conduct embraces the central vision of how emissions reductions are achieved on a global scale.

However, REDD+, being a boundary object as discussed earlier, may pose a challenge in terms of sharing a specific vision and set of norms and practices

through the process of creating an intimate government to remotely mobilise subjects into the act of governing. There are multiple and potentially competing objects of government, emerging through the narratives of ecological modernisation and global environmental justice. At a distance, such a situation may undermine the core logic of action as it may lead to the creation of multiple and potentially conflicting subjectivities pursuing different objects through the conduct of the self (McDermott, 2014).

2.5.1.b.   Neoliberal Governmental Rationality

This form of governmental rationality embodies both market logic and state interventions as a joint strategy and process to enable effective market competition, guided by the legal and institutional conditions set by the state (Joseph, 2009; Dean, 2014). What primarily underpins the narrative of ecological modernisation is this form of rationality. As an example of this form, a US- based study by Jepson et al. (2012) demonstrates that economic and technological rhetoric and solutions can, under specific circumstances, lead to the production of subjectivities in favour of an environmental policy even among subjects with fundamentally anti-environmental views. In the context of REDD+, the core logic of action through this form of rationality is to achieve global carbon accountability and transparency in a techno-managerial manner (Gupta *et al.*, 2012; McDermott, 2014; Astuti and Mcgregor, 2015).   This form of rationality, therefore, depoliticises REDD+ as primarily a technical issue and assumes that the market logic is what predominantly shapes the norms and practices of REDD+ countries and their citizens.

However, this assumption makes this form of rationality problematic as it masks the complex political economies and localised needs and circumstances facing REDD+.   The leading proponents of this form of rationality are primarily international actors including donors and multilateral institutions, and their approaches are often conceptual and theoretical, thus limiting real effects (Dempsey and Suarez, 2016; Lund *et al.*, 2017). Gupta et al. (2016, p. 368) describe such a situation as a 'technocratic and harmonious discussion among family and friends'. At the same time, this economic form of rationality also raises

a concern that its economic logic may justify sovereign power of REDD+ countries to reverse the current decentralisation trends in forest management in anticipation of large financial benefits through REDD+ (Phelps, Webb and Agrawal, 2010; Newton *et al.*, 2015; Poudel and Aase, 2015; Wilson Rowe, 2015).

2.5.1.c.   Sovereign Governmental Rationality

The concept of the political forest described by Peluso and Vandergeest (2001) characterises this form of governmental rationality where land classification, institutionalisation and (il)legalisation of certain practices are deployed as top-down injunctions to limit and control access to and use of forests to ensure full territorial control.

In REDD+, similar command-and-control systems have been deployed by some REDD+ countries to curb deforestation and forest degradation. Brazil's soy moratorium and Indonesia's moratorium on peatland and natural forest conversion for oil palm production are such examples (Persson, Henders and Kastner, 2014; Mcgregor *et al.*, 2015). The core logic of action through this form of rationality relies on the sovereign power of the state to implement state-led injunctions to address deforestation and forest degradation problems within its territorial boundaries. The scale of this form of governmental rationality is, therefore, national.

However, the lack of enforcement capacity and economic incentives and influence of powerful sectoral elites and lobby groups have often hampered the effectiveness of these top-down injunctions (Sunderlin *et al.*, 2014). Powerful influence and resources of political and economic elites involved in the agriculture sector often dwarf the level of effort through such command-and-control interventions and economic incentives of REDD+ (Salvini *et al.*, 2014; McFarland, Whitley and Kissinger, 2015). The limited effectiveness of these top-down injunctions is also due to their limited capacity to pay close attention to locally specific circumstances and to address local resistance and conflicts, often linked to tenure insecurity and local elite capture (Pfaff, Amacher and Sills, 2013; Jewitt *et al.*, 2014; Robinson, Holland and Naughton-treves, 2014).

These command-and-control injunctions may also be deployed in conjunction with the neoliberal form of governmental rationality to ensure the role of the state in managing finance and technologies (Mcgregor *et al.*, 2015).

2.5.1.d.   Liberation Governmental Rationality

This rationality relates to the concept of liberation ecology, introduced by Peet and Watt (2004, p. 434), as an approach to seek 'a more successful determination of environmental discourse by marginalized people'.   It is concerned with 'linkages of ideas, policies, and resources that are North-South, or rural-urban'(Peet and Watts, 2004, p. 112).   This rationality closely resonates with the narrative of global environmental justice.   Because of the architecture of REDD+ that relies on nationally aggregated results of local interventions to generate mitigation impacts on a global scale, historically constituted hegemonic power relations between developed and developing countries as well as between the state and their non-state actors, including local communities and indigenous peoples, are the principal emphasis of this rationality (Brockhaus, Di Gregorio and Carmenta, 2014; Bushley, 2014; Adelman, 2015; Bastakoti and Davidsen, 2015; Dawson *et al.*, 2018).

The core logic of this form of rationality is to establish a democratic and egalitarian environmental discourse concerning REDD+ through which a wide range of subjects identify and pursue more than one object of government to address multiple social needs.   From this perspective, the core logic resonates with the concept of boundary objects to carry interpretive flexibility through the pursuit of REDD+.   However, contrary to this logic, Adelman (2015) for instance argues that Annex 1 countries are instead imposing their visions and norms on non-Annex 1 countries through REDD+.   In this context, the reversibility of bio-politics, as described by Foucault et al. (1991), can trigger resistance to such a process of standardisation, which seemingly transforms the boundary object into a boundary infrastructure.   This observed notion has seemingly led to the formation of several coalitions of developing countries at the international level to address the power inequality and establish an egalitarian discourse.   Such

coalitions include the Coalition of Rainforest Nations and Regional Knowledge Network on Forests and Climate Change of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), providing support in establishing common international negotiating positions among member states and opportunities for capacity development and knowledge sharing (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013; Den Besten, Arts and Verkooijen, 2014; Giessen and Sahide, 2017). While effectively promoting democratic processes in global environmental governance through such coalitions, they also fall victim of their own internal institutionalisation processes, embodying elements of the other forms of governmental rationality (Giessen and Sahide, 2017). For instance, regional multilateral institutions like the ASEAN pass on their political and institutional agendas through their support, which often reflects their internal power hierarchies and donors' and economic trade partners' positions.

2.5.2. Intertwining Effects of These Forms of Rationality

These forms of governmental rationality provide distinct logics of action from their unique vantage points to enable subjects to act in specific ways. However, in reality, each form relates to or contains elements of the other forms to share some characteristics in their intended and unintended eventuality. One such eventuality is that all forms, including the liberation form that intends to address inequality and justice concerns, inevitably result in the creation of power relations based on which the conduct of the self and others takes place (Foucault, 1982; Dean, 2010).

These forms of governmental rationality 'operate and interconnect across levels and scales' to produce complex sets of reasons to underpin actions of subjects (Fletcher, 2017). This sheds light on the complex structures and compositions of the dominant narratives of ecological modernisation and global environmental justice. While the logics of the neoliberal and liberation forms of governmental rationality are naturally more visible and dominant as they resonate closely with these narratives, these narratives also reflect in their scopes and across scales the logics of the disciplinary and sovereign forms to varying degrees. The effects

of the intermingling of these logics on these dominant narratives at decentralised levels are often overlooked in the shadow of the more visible logics from the international perspective (Nasiritousi, Hjerpe and Buhr, 2014). Such effects make these dominant narratives less coherent and effective at the national and local levels (ibid.). From the perspectives of donors and their intermediaries who are directly involved in knowledge production and dissemination through these narratives, the singularity and coherence of each narrative are unquestionable. However, as the knowledge cascades downwards through these narratives across highly situated realities of disparate social worlds at national and local levels, the context-dependent nature of the disciplinary logic and unpredictability of the sovereign logic intertwine to create multiple versions of these dominant narratives and alter their anticipated effects (Blok, 2010). One extreme example of this is illustrated by the outright rejection of REDD+ by Bolivia in fear of the neoliberalisation of the country's natural resources through the international climate negotiations (Zimmerer, 2015). In this case, the neoliberal logic through the ecological modernisation narrative was met with the sovereign rationality at the national level to result in this unintended consequence. Joseph (2009, p. 425) suggests that this is because the universality of neoliberal rationality through global environmental governance, assumed by donors and their intermediaries, is fundamentally flawed as it does not 'operate effectively outside of the social conditions of advanced liberal capitalism'. This points the gap between the rationality and realisation (ibid., Zanotti, 2013).

From this perspective, this thesis examines how these forms of governmental rationality intertwine and influence the ways in which REDD+ is pursued and problematised by the subjects and how such ways affect the effectiveness and legitimacy of core visions that underpin the dominant narratives at the national level. This examination directly responds to the suggestion by Fletcher (2017) to develop an empirical understanding of what actually happens to these core visions when executed. In doing so, the thesis also pays close attention to the effects of scale, as Robbins (2012) and Singh (2013) urge human geographers to do so in the field of governmentality studies.

2.6. HOW ARE SCALES AFFECTING REDD+?

REDD+ is a process and mechanism that aim to coordinate actions of the subjects across scales. From this perspective, 'the ordering of space [becomes] one of the requisites for producing governmental power/knowledges', according to Rose-redwood (2016, p. 480). It is, therefore, essential to consider the effects of scale in examining how the objects, subjects and subjectivities and technologies of government are constituted across space to produce specific power dynamics and effects of governmentality. Rutherford (2007, p. 303) describes the role of scale in governmentality studies as follows:

> Applying scale to notions of rule means that we can see the ways in which the body, the household, the region, the nation, and the globe are imbricated and mutually constituted by and through the operation of governmentality.

The tendency to reify the singularity of REDD+ as a normalised set of strategies and actions from the perspectives of donor countries and their intermediaries may be justified based on the urgency of climate change on a global scale. This notion attempts to prioritise and normalise specific norms and values of forest management based on underlying power relations and assumes such norms and values to be upheld across scales. However, doing so in light of the urgent response to climate change on an almost exceptional basis deprioritises nationally and locally specific concerns, needs and rights at the same time (Schmitt, 2007; Corson and MacDonald, 2012; Burles, 2016). Together with the effects of financial incentives of REDD+, this has created (re)centralising effects on forest governance on a global scale (Kronenberg, Orligóra-Sankowska and Czembrowski, 2015; Poudel and Aase, 2015).

As Joseph (2009) suggests, this process has imposed the centrally conceived neoliberal visions, norms and values upon REDD+ countries in the name of empowerment towards achieving global carbon accountability and transparency. The effectiveness of such domination and validity of the centrally conceived ideas are often challenged by resistance and the irrationality of such ideas in the national and local contexts (Joseph, 2010). For instance, Andersen (2015) points to a disjuncture between the top-down approach to REDD+ through the

UNFCCC processes, primarily shaped by the idea of ecological modernisation and supporting science, and actual decision-making processes by REDD+ countries which are primarily dictated by political and economic feasibility. This raises a question of whether the current global efforts to rationalise and operationalise REDD+ exist merely through discursive processes at the global level without necessarily being shared or internalised at the national and local scales.

2.6.1. Poststructuralist Approaches to Socio-spatial Scale

To examine this disjuncture in relation to the effects of governmentality through REDD+, Bulkeley (2005, p. 877) for instance suggests that the term 'global' can be configured 'either as a scale of activity or as the result of the process of globalisation' to investigate the relationality of the disjuncture. However, conceptualising geographical scale in a vertical context as a nested hierarchical ordering precisely overlooks locally constituted discourses and subjectivities, responding to specific circumstances at that scale, in an attempt to trace globalised and nested effects and causal forces (Marston *et al.*, 2005; Moore, 2008; Neumann, 2009). From this perspective, Popke (2003, p. 311) suggests a poststructuralist approach to scale to deconstruct the fundamental spatial ordering to 'disrupt the metaphysics of 'ontopology', by tracing the ways in which spatial boundaries and divisions have been used to draw distinctions between self and other'. Popke (ibid., p.300) also suggests that '[f]rom a poststructuralist perspective, universal claims to knowledge and truth can become a barrier to fostering a sensitivity to difference, and thus ethics would need to find its purchase in the radical instability of meaning'.

This anti-fundamental stance of poststructuralism thus stands in comparison with dominant neo-Marxist political economic approaches to scale, established on an ontological sense of scale (Marston *et al.*, 2005; Jessop, Brenner and Jones, 2008; Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008; Moore, 2008; Neumann, 2009; MacKinnon, 2010; Cohen and Bakker, 2014; Cohen and McCarthy, 2014). Debates over the difference between the two approaches are of critical importance to human geographers in understanding and describing the world.

Moore (2008, p. 204) describes political economic approaches to scale as 'social relations of empowerment and disempowerment' that 'respond to real material processes, events and spatial formations'. Through such approaches, scales tend to be reified, essentialised and configured as ontological categories of analysis, while still being socially constructed (Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008; Moore, 2008). This tendency to reify scale as an ontological structure is particularly problematic from the poststructuralist perspective. The construction of scale is fundamentally epistemological in poststructuralist approaches (Moore, 2008). Popke (2003, p. 309) describes the poststructuralist view of space and scale as the relationship between an 'origami' and its folds:

> …space is far from a passive stage or container, but is radically open, constituted through perturbation, oscillation and movement: 'the composition of folds is not what something is, but rather what it is in the process of becoming, its becoming other, and its ceasing to be'.

Moore (2008) and Kaiser and Nikiforova (2008), therefore, suggest that the significance of scale should be studied as categories of practice as they are determined variably and fluidly through discursive practices of actors. Poststructuralist approaches treat scale as 'a representational device or discursive frame deployed by different actors and groups as they seek to gain particular forms of recognition and advantage' (MacKinnon, 2010, p. 26). Among poststructuralist approaches, Marston et al.(2005) most radically suggest the adoption of a flat ontology which horizontally instead of vertically links networks of actors and sites. This is mainly to address the verticality of scale that establishes an untenable scalar division between the global and local, which necessitates concepts such as 'scale jumping', introduced by Smith (1992), to reinforce the construction of social hierarchies. However, Collinge (2006) warns against this radical suggestion to remove the scale and structural ontology altogether without proposing a clear and convincing alternative. Other scholars also support Collinge's view by suggesting the usefulness of scale as socially constructed epistemological realities and in describing the relations between such realities and the boundary of each reality (Popke, 2003; Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008; Moore, 2008; Neumann, 2009).

From a more pragmatic vantage point, Kaiser and Nikiforova (2008) suggest an alternative solution to these issues of scale by treating 'scale as a category of practice performed by actors…', and 'place attention squarely … on the enacted discourses through which scales become'. Therefore, scale is performative. Similarly, Latour (2005, p. 183) describes that 'scale is what actors achieve by scaling, spacing, and contextualizing each other through the transportation in some specific vehicles of some specific traces…'.

2.6.2. Performativity of Socio-spatial Scale

According to Butler (2010), performativity is 'a way to think about 'effects', in particular, to supply an alternative to causal frameworks for thinking about effects'. Such effects are produced discursively and non-discursively through processes of iteration and citation, which are often unpredictable, to be subsequently sedimented as certain realities (Butler, 2009, 2010). Examples of such effects are provided by terms like 'globalisation' and 'the market economy' which have been ontologically reified through discourses as independent realities to denote a global scale, while their epistemological origins call into question their singularity as scales (Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008; Butler, 2010).

From this perspective, Kaiser and Nikiforova (2008) argue that 'scales are performed by sets of actors through the scalar stances they take within particular socio-spatial contexts as they engage in the politics of everyday life'. Campbell et al. (2014) also suggest that such politics of everyday life as performative discursively delimit access and define and communicate appropriate norms and values of certain groups of subjects and organisations. Based on such norms and values, specific knowledge, problems and solutions are constructed and presented through citational practices to become the basis of scaled identities or scalar stances of subjects and organisations (i.e., subjectivities). Longhurst (2000) describes these processes through her study in which bodies of individuals suddenly become public objects through pregnancy, as it is considered to be a public concern. Through this process, women become

subjected to conform to and internalise certain social norms and expectations, discursively sedimented over generations. Pregnant women are required by these circumstances to perform scales to be both the object of public concern and individual beings simultaneously.

Similarly, concerning REDD+, informed by the ecological modernisation narrative, REDD+ is predominantly a global issue as it provides an opportunity to cost-effectively reduce global carbon emissions through forests as they are considered part of the global commons. At the same time, it is also a process which brings to the fore the issues of equity and environmental justice historically associated with forest management for local communities and indigenous peoples through the global environmental justice narrative. Scaled identities or scalar stances of subjects through these two narratives are fundamentally different; the earlier narrative views REDD+ from the perspective of global accountability, while the latter narrative looks at REDD+ from the perspective of individual rights. However, without carefully examining this difference between these two scalar stances and their specific contexts, the significance of the latter narrative can, for instance, be quickly eclipsed by the urgency of climate change from the global perspective. The effects of the latter narrative might, therefore, be overlooked or considered secondary (Butler, 2009; Meah, 2014).

In this context, by treating scales as performative, the plurality of scalar stances taken by subjects is, therefore, recognised and considered without forcing them to conform to particular scalar hierarchies (Collinge, 2006). The examination of scale through the performativity framework thus 'allows for a much more historically contextualised and nuanced exploration of the mosaic interconnectivity among scalar hierarchies' (Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008). This approach to scale enables the examination of how scaled identities or scalar stances of subjects interact with the specific logics of governmental rationality and deployment of technologies to delimit the effects and results of governmentality.

By adopting this approach to scale, the thesis examines the effects of scale on the formation of objects, subjects and subjectivities and how REDD+ is being

pursued and problematised by the subjects at the interface between the international and national processes. In doing so, the thesis pays particular attention to how the subjects perform scales through discursive processes of REDD+ and whether their specific scalar stances or ability to perform multiple scales have empowered or disempowered the subjects in certain ways. Their ability to perform multiple scales is particularly relevant to the subjects at this interface as the international negotiations and related processes of REDD+ have been described to be particularly successful in flattening the traditional hegemonic power relations between developed and developing countries (Den Besten, Arts and Verkooijen, 2014; Wilson Rowe, 2015). Greater mobility of subjects is thus expected between the international and national processes.

2.7. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, a number of key concepts, theories and approaches have been discussed in relation to the specific research questions introduced in Chapter One. The main purpose of this chapter was to establish theoretical and methodological stances relevant to this research through the review of pertinent literature.

Table 2-1: Analytical Framework in Relation to Research Questions

Specific research question	Analytical dimension of the research	Relevant analytical dimension of governmentality from literature
What is being governed through REDD+?	Objects of government	– '…characteristic forms of visibility, ways of seeing and perceiving' (Dean 2010, p. 33) – '…what particular problems are being illuminated and what is being obscured?' (Hobson 2013, p.60) – '…the objects (what should be governed) … of government' (Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2009, p. 71)
Who is governing through REDD+?	Subjects of government	– '…ways of forming subjects, selves, persons, actors or agents' as well as 'the ways in which we are governed, the ways in which we try to govern ourselves and others' (Dean, 2010, pp. 14, 33). – '[Subjects] are not only … inert or consenting target [of power]; they are always also the elements of its articulation'. Thus, 'individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application' (Foucault, 1982, p. 98) – 'Subjects are both the product of external influences … and the internalization of this subjection by the subject itself' (Nightingale and Ojha, 2013, p. 34)

How is REDD+ being governed?	Technologies of government	– '…specific ways of acting, intervening and directing, made up of particular types of practical rationality ('expertise' and 'know-how'), and relying upon definite mechanisms, techniques and technologies' (Dean 2010, p. 33) – '…technical aspects: what instruments and procedures are being used to address the [problems]?' (Hobson, 2013, p. 60) – 'Governmental technologies "both make rationalities 'visible' and permit their extension through time and space." (Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2009, p. 71)
Why do actors pursue and problematise REDD+ in certain ways?	Forms of governmental rationality producing action or inaction.	– 'The term 'rational'… refers to the attempt to bring any form of rationality to the calculation about how to govern' (Dean, 2010, p. 18). – '…discursive dimensions of power are manifested in political imaginaries and political rationalities that guide praxis' (Zanotti, 2013, p. 288) – What 'determines the nature of "the subject" and its participation in processes of governing' (Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2009, p. 71)
How are scales affecting REDD+?	Performativity of scale	– … scale is what actors achieve by scaling, spacing, and contextualizing each other through the transportation in some specific vehicles of some specific traces… (Latour, 2005, p. 183) – '…scales are performed by sets of actors through the scalar stances they take within particular sociospatial contexts as they engage in the politics of everyday life'(Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008) – 'the scales at which people, organizations, knowledge, environmental problems and solutions, are constructed, by whom, and with what effects'(Campbell *et al.*, 2014, p. 11)

This chapter has thus explored the key ideas, theoretical foundations and bodies of knowledge concerning REDD+ through poststructuralist and Foucauldian governmentality perspectives. Table 2-1 summarises the descriptions of the analytical dimensions of governmentality discussed in this chapter and in relation to the five specific research questions. These analytical dimensions along with the research questions are used to guide the data analysis and discussions of research findings in the later chapters.

This chapter has also identified the following knowledge gaps to be explored in this thesis in relation to the five specific research questions.

What is being governed through REDD+?

The effort to elucidate precisely what should be governed and who should be empowered through REDD+ is expected to turn REDD+ into a boundary

infrastructure. An empirical understanding of how this transition takes place and its effects in REDD+ is currently limited.

Who is governing through REDD+?

The processes of subject creation and empowerment are currently understood in the literature to favour non-state actors such as experts and civil society activists rather than their state counterparts, despite the provisions of the WFR which essentialise the role of the central authorities of REDD+ countries. There is currently a limited understanding of how the central authorities of REDD+ countries perceive such processes of subject creation and empowerment and how this skewed process of subject creation affects the operationalisation of REDD+.

How is REDD+ being governed?

The power of knowledge production and dissemination by donors and their intermediaries through international negotiations, IPCC input and finance at the international level is visible. However, little is known about the effects of such power on REDD+ actors operating at the national level and how they interact with such processes.

Why do actors pursue and problematise REDD+ in certain ways?

Actions of REDD+ subjects are organised through specific forms of governmental rationality, but there is a limited empirical understanding of their intertwining effects on the ways in which REDD+ is pursued and problematised by subjects at the national level and how such ways affect the realisation and legitimacy of core visions of the dominant narratives at this level.

How are scales affecting REDD+?

There is limited knowledge of how the subjects perform scales through discursive processes of REDD+ and whether their specific scalar stances or ability to perform multiple scales have empowered or disempowered the subjects in certain ways at the interface between the international and national processes.

Having established these theoretical and methodological stances as well as knowledge gaps, the following two chapters discuss the choice of case study countries, data sources and methodological approaches of this research.

3. CHAPTER THREE: CASE STUDY COUNTRIES AND RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the case study countries as well as the informants who participated in this research and describes the rationale for their selection. The research approach and methods of data collection and analysis are discussed in Chapter Four. Several criteria were applied to select the case study countries within a broadly defined geographical focus on Asia. The research employed a case study method to conduct multiple or collective case studies and to examine similarities and dissimilarities within and between the case study countries (Cousin, 2005; Baxter and Jack, 2008). This method enables the contrasting of results within a group of case studies and also to an extent the generalisation of research findings through analytical prediction to a broader context beyond the case studies (Yin, 2006, p. 46; Baxter and Jack, 2008).

3.2. CHOICE OF CASE STUDY COUNTRIES

The research data was collected over an 18-month period between June 2015 and December 2016. During this period, several developing countries in Asia had been making steady progress towards the implementation of REDD+. Many scholars chose to study REDD+ processes in Indonesia, given the magnitude of carbon emissions generated from its land use and land use change sector (Pfaff, Amacher and Sills, 2013; Romijn *et al.*, 2013; Brockhaus, Di Gregorio and Carmenta, 2014; Sills *et al.*, 2014; Sunderlin *et al.*, 2014; Astuti and Mcgregor, 2015; Mcgregor *et al.*, 2015; Brockhaus *et al.*, 2016; Milne *et al.*, 2016). This research, however, chose to focus instead on three much less studied REDD+ countries – Malaysia, Nepal and Sri Lanka, which had also made steady progress through their REDD+ readiness processes. At the time of this research, these three countries had enjoyed to varying degrees support from the UN-REDD, which was one of the two most prominent multilateral initiatives for REDD+, supporting a wide range of countries around the world (Lee and

Pistorius, 2015).   This common thread through the UN-REDD ensured data comparability between these countries.   At the same time, it is vital to acknowledge here the difference in approach in terms of support modalities and political engagement between the multilateral initiatives and bilateral initiatives like Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative that tend to focus only on major deforesting countries like Indonesia with significantly larger financial support (Corbera and Schroeder, 2017).   This difference is likely to limit the relevance and generalisability of research findings to the case of multilateral initiatives.

The three research countries were at markedly different stages of economic development with their forests playing different social and economic roles and functions.   Based on these socioeconomic factors also influenced by their historical contexts, these countries had approached and viewed REDD+ in notably different ways.   The research thus set out to examine such approaches and views in relation to the research questions and knowledge gaps identified in Chapter Two to develop an empirical understanding of the issues facing REDD+ in these case study countries.

These case study countries share certain commonalities, found in their historical contexts of forest management that were directly or indirectly influenced by British colonial rule and practices during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These historical contexts are particularly important to this study of the effects of governmentality through REDD+, as it focuses on the examination of power through discourses and practices of governing, which are contingent on such historical contexts (Foucault, 1980; Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001; Dean, 2010).

In choosing Malaysia, Nepal and Sri Lanka as the case study countries, the historical context of forest governance was thus considered a primary criterion. This was followed by the role of forests in national development. Malaysia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka respectively belong to the upper-middle income, low income and lower-middle income categories of developing countries (WB, 2017).   These differences in their economic development status have formed different types of socioecological relations, which are highly path-dependent (Brockhaus, Di

Gregorio and Carmenta, 2014). Such relations make the role of forests in each country different; thus, providing a sound basis for understanding their unique visions and rationales for REDD+. These two criteria combined offer a distinctive window through which to recognise contextual similarities and dissimilarities for structural comparison and analysis to illustrate the issues facing REDD+.

Two additional selection criteria, namely the status of REDD+ readiness and data accessibility, were also used to ensure availability and comparability of data. The following sections provide further detail of these four selection criteria.

3.2.1. Historical Context

In all three case study countries, the effects of British colonial rule and practices have directly or indirectly shaped the structure and institutional contexts of forest governance. These contexts appear to resonate closely with their approaches to REDD+.

Both Malaysia and Sri Lanka were under direct British colonial rule during the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Moore, 1989; Peebles, 1990; Poffenberger, 2000; Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001; Jomo and Hui, 2002). Although Nepal was never under any colonial rule, it also endured the impacts of colonialism particularly in the forest-rich region of Terai along its border with India during the time of British colonial rule (Tucker, 1987). Peluso and Vandergeest (2001, p. 762) describe the creation of political forests by the British during this period as 'a critical part of colonial-era state-making both in terms of the territorialisation and legal framing of forests and the institutionalisation of forest management as a technology of state power' across colonial Asia. These processes of territorialisation, legalisation and institutionalisation were deployed to govern local populations and delimit their activities to ensure full control and authority over the management of territories and land-based resources by central authorities (Rutherford, 2007). The effects of these technologies of power are recognised in today's contexts in which REDD+ is being framed and envisioned in these case study countries.

3.2.1.a.   Historical Context of Malaysia's Forest Governance

The impact of British colonial rule on Malaysia cannot be described uniformly as it was primarily divided into British Malaya (i.e., the Peninsula states of today's Malaysia) and British Borneo (i.e., the states of Sarawak and Sabah) during this period, until the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 (Jomo and Hui, 2002). Nonetheless, Malaysia's current land administration including its forest management is broadly based on the Torrens Land Registration System, first introduced by the British in British Malaya. This has given the federal state authority the power to exercise control over all land-related policy and legal matters across the country including regulatory, land titling and registration responsibilities, while land administration has been carried out at the individual state level (MNRE, 2015).

The creation of political forests, as a state-making strategy, was particularly successful in British Malaya and provided an essential pathway toward expansion of territorial claim and jurisdiction subsequently over the entire territory of today's Malaysia. The successful implementation of this strategy gave the British full control over natural resource-based and agricultural commodities such as teak, rubber, coffee and quinine, which was a 'major prerogative of political power' for the British in the frontier economy (Harper, 1997, p. 2). British Malaya was, in fact, the most profitable colony for the British during this period, and the structure of this frontier economy laid the foundation for Malaysia's rapid economic growth in the 1970s and natural resources extraction and export-led economy (Jomo and Hui, 2002).

Malaysia's FRL (MNRE, 2015), submitted to the UNFCCC, describes its approach to REDD+ as one that focuses solely on sustainable management of production forests within its Permanent Reserved Forests, where the state authority has full jurisdictional control over commercial timber harvesting activities. This approach to REDD+ seems to directly mirror the notion of political forest and state power, established under British colonial rule through 'new enclosures, territorializations, and property regimes' to consolidate the power of federal-state authority (Peluso and Lund, 2011).

3.2.1.b. Historical Context of Sri Lanka's Forest Governance

The logic of REDD+ interventions under Sri Lanka's National REDD+ Strategy also resonates with the strategy of political forest creation employed by the British during its colonial rule over Sri Lanka. The improvement of 'forest law enforcement and monitoring' and 'forest boundary survey, demarcation and declaration' of state forest boundaries are among Sri Lanka's REDD+ interventions by which to expand its total forest coverage under state administration while enhancing its law enforcement capacity (Sri Lanka UN-REDD, 2017a).

The British employed similar technologies of state power through the creation of political forests across Sri Lanka during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Through territorialisation, legalisation and institutionalisation, the British were able to govern the entire island 'for the first time in six hundred years' by 'breaking down barriers between the Tamil and Sinhalese regions and between the Kandyan and Low-Country Sinhalese' (Peebles, 1990). Under the colonial rule, nearly 75% of the territory was placed under state control that replaced pre-colonial communal systems (Poffenberger, 2000; De Zoysa and Inoue, 2008). During this period, the establishment of plantations for a succession of cash crops, notably coffee, coconuts, tea and rubber, and timber extraction rapidly cleared vast tracts of forest (Sri Lanka UN-REDD, 2014). At the same time, a forest law and special categories of forest were introduced in conjunction with the establishment of a forest department, to restrict local access through law enforcement along state forest boundaries (Poffenberger, 2000).

Directly building on the colonial era practices, post-independent forest management in Sri Lanka was characterised by a struggle between the state power to maintain and expand the political forests and the need for local access to forest resources (Wickramasinghe, 1997). This was primarily as a result of the internalisation of the notion, introduced by the British, that rural society was incapable of rational management of their forests without state intervention by the political elites to legitimise their superior socio-political positions in decision-making (Moore, 1989). This dichotomy is still mostly relevant and remains as a

source of contention today (Sri Lanka UN-REDD, 2017a). With the advent of community forestry and collaborative forest management through international development assistance projects in the 1970s and 80s, the elite-dominated forest governance structure in Sri Lanka came under scrutiny by the international community. However, very limited authority has since been relinquished to local communities (Poffenberger, 2000; Sri Lanka UN-REDD, 2014).

3.2.1.c. Historical Context of Nepal's Forest Governance

Nepal has been considered a champion of community forestry and collaborative forest management (Brockhaus and Di, 2013; Raj *et al.*, 2013). Community forests, first established in the 1980s, cover nearly 40% of Nepal's forest today, and there are approximately 19,000 community forest user groups (Durbar, 2016). In most community forests, the state authority keeps strict control over the utilisation and use of forest resources beyond meeting subsistence needs, and community forests can thus be considered an integral part of Nepal's political forest system (Newton, Agrawal and Wollenberg, 2013).

A deep-seated division and mistrust between the state authority and local communities have existed since the start of community forestry, which have hampered its aim of effective and sustainable forest management for decades and reverberated into the country's REDD+ discourse (Malla, 2001; Paudel *et al.*, 2013; Bushley, 2014; Bastakoti and Davidsen, 2015; Paudel, Vedeld and Khatri, 2015). Such a division and mistrust over forest management and land use in general stem mainly from Nepal's historical context. During the hereditary Rana regime, which ended for democratic conversion in the 1950s, land tenancy was managed based on the 'birta' system, which provided monarchy members, officials, soldiers and social elites inter-generational land tenure, and through this feudal system, 'the patron-client relationships had established deep roots in the country'(Malla, 2001, p. 291).

During the 1950s and 60s, the enactment of laws and establishment of a Forest Department replaced this hereditary system by nationalising forests (Kanel, 2006). However, the patron-client relationships quickly found new opportunity

through building alliances with the Forest Department and later with international development agencies under the new forest management regime, particularly in the forest-rich region of Terai (Malla, 2001; Thoms, 2008; Nightingale and Ojha, 2013). Although Nepal was never under British control, Terai, located along the border with India, was extensively exploited initially during the Rana regime for the export of sal and other valuable species of wood to British India for railway construction and later by the railways for commercial purposes (Tucker, 1987). After the 1950s, the new government of Nepal was also driven by the prospect of substantial revenue generation from Terai, which has remained a significant source of revenue for the state officials and local elites (Malla, 2001; UN-REDD Programme, 2014). This is demonstrated by a significantly higher proportion of forest administered directly by the state authority in Terai, with much fewer community forests in this highly populated region than the rest of the country (Newton *et al.*, 2015).

Nepal's National REDD+ Strategy also targets Terai in order to curb the country's highest deforestation and forest degradation rates, driven by illegal logging and encroachment and high demand for fuelwood and green fodder (Durbar, 2016). The Strategy aims to increase the country's law enforcement capacity to regulate forest management practices including those of community forests, particularly in the Terai region. Nepal's REDD+ process resonates closely with the country's historical context of forest management. From this perspective, some scholars suggest that the dominant protectionist argument over Terai through the national REDD+ process overlooks the rights of local communities and reinforces the elite-driven alliances (Nightingale and Ojha, 2013; Bushley, 2014; Bastakoti and Davidsen, 2015).

3.2.2. Role of Forests in National Development

As shown in Table 3-1, Malaysia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka respectively belong to the upper-middle income, low income and lower-middle income categories of developing countries (WB, 2017). At these different stages of economic development, these countries have developed different types of socioecological

relations, which are also path-dependent. Forests, therefore, play different roles socioeconomically in these countries.

Table 3-1: Forest, Economic and Population Data

Case study location	Malaysia	Nepal	Sri Lanka
Forest area (1000 ha)[1]	22195	3636	2070
Percentage of land area (%)[1]	67.6	25.4	33
Average annual deforestation rate 2010-2015 (%)[1]	0.1	0	-0.3
Average annual forest degradation rate (%) (FRL submitted to UNFCCC)[2]	No data but considered low	25.7	No data but considered low
Population (million)[3]	30.33	28.51	20.97
Gross national income (GNI), per capita (US$) [2]	10,570	730	3,800

[1](FAO, 2015), [2] (MNRE, 2015; Durbar, 2016; Sri Lanka UN-REDD, 2017b) [3](WB, 2017)

Acknowledging the highly generalised nature of these descriptions, Nepal can be described as a country with low forest cover and a high rate of forest degradation (Durbar, 2016). Despite its successful community forestry efforts, high dependency on fuelwood for subsistence and small-scale industrial needs continues to pose a significant challenge (Southworth, Nagendra and Cassidy, 2012; Durbar, 2016). Forests in Nepal are thus most closely associated with subsistence livelihoods (Paudel *et al*., 2013; UN-REDD Programme, 2014).

Sri Lanka has low forest cover but also low rates of deforestation and forest degradation, given its long-standing forest conservation policy combined with its steady economic growth and increasingly urban population (Mattsson, 2012; Mattsson, Ostwald and Nissanka, 2013; Sri Lanka UN-REDD, 2017b). Forests in Sri Lanka are used for a more diverse range of purposes from subsistence to market-linked activities by smallholders and small-to-medium-sized enterprises (UN-REDD Programme, 2012). Home-gardens, which provide highly diverse agroforestry systems that are owned and managed by individual households, are widely maintained across the country to provide a vital source of supplementary income and livelihood strategy in Sri Lanka (Mattsson, Ostwald and Nissanka, 2013; Landreth and Saito, 2014).

The forest cover in Malaysia has been increasing for quite some time as a result of the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation that started many decades ago (Mather, 1992; Rudel *et al.*, 2017). As an upper middle-income country, forests in Malaysia are generally more directly associated with market-based economic activities at an industrial scale, mainly provided with its rich forest resources (Jomo and Hui, 2002; Yong, 2014). Poverty reduction efforts across forest-dependent communities during the 1980s particularly in Peninsula Malaysia resulted in successful diversification of rural employment outside of the primary sector, and as a result, there is a lesser local demand for forest products to meet subsistence needs today (Miyamoto *et al.*, 2014).

These differences in the social and economic roles of forests in these case study countries provide different rationales and visions for their participation in REDD+. Such differences thus provide a vital case for comparison of their approaches to REDD+.

3.2.3. Status of REDD+ Readiness and Data Accessibility

The status of REDD+ readiness and data accessibility were applied as two basic criteria to ensure data availability and comparability.

To study the effects of governmentality through REDD+, countries with relatively advanced status of REDD+ readiness were required as the research intended to examine actors' perceptions of their national REDD+ processes based on their individual experiences.

Malaysia, Nepal and Sri Lanka were at similar stages of REDD+ readiness. At the time, these countries were advanced in terms of their REDD+ readiness processes in Asia. During the period of data collection, all three countries had made steady progress towards completing the requirements under the WFR. Both Nepal and Sri Lanka were finalising their national REDD+ strategies and FRLs for submission to the UNFCCC in 2017. Malaysia had already managed

to complete and submitted their FRL and information on the safeguards to the UNFCCC.

In terms of data accessibility, Curtis et al. (2000) suggest that data accessibility and practicality of data sampling, including language and communication factors, should not be overlooked when designing research. From this perspective, these three countries were highly suitable as the researcher had had close working relationships with key national actors involved in their REDD+ readiness processes while working as a REDD+ advisor through the United Nations. Also, most national actors in these countries were fluent in English. Therefore, there were no significant communication barriers between potential research participants and the researcher.

3.3. RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

As briefly described in Chapter One, this thesis focuses on the internal and subjective viewpoints of REDD+ actors who are involved in the national REDD+ processes of the case study countries. There are already numerous studies examining REDD+ and other related issues particularly from the perspectives of local communities while very few studies focus on the perspectives of actors at the interface between the international and national REDD+ processes. On this basis, the following research participants were selected for this study.

There were two groups of research participants. The first group of research participants were either the state or non-state actors who had actively participated in their national REDD+ processes in the case study countries. The second group of participants were recruited from donor agencies, multilateral institutions and international CSOs. These participants in the second group had also been directly or indirectly involved in the REDD+ readiness work in one or more of the case study countries. Many of them had also been linked to broader REDD+ policy debates at the international level. Table 3-2 provides general descriptions of research participants who took part in interviews or focus group for discourse analysis.

Table 3-2: Research Participant Types and Number for Interviews/Focus Group for Discourse Analysis

Country	Type of Participant	No.
Malaysia	In-depth interviews (average 1.5 hours per interview) with: - Senior government representative - National representative of the United Nations Other representatives of the federal and state governments and CSOs were also invited, but the requests were declined due to time constraints.	2
Nepal	In-depth interviews (average 1.5 hours per interview) with: - Senior government representative (a) - Representative of national CSO - National representative of a regional organisation - Senior representative of a national research organisation - National representative of an international CSO (a) Representatives of community forestry associations were also invited, but the requests were declined due to time constraints.	5
Sri Lanka	In-depth interviews (average 1.5 hours per interview) with: - Senior government representative (a) - Senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (a) One-time Focus group (2.5 hours) discussion among: - Senior government representative (b) - Senior government representative (c) - Senior government representative (d) - Senior representative of a private sector network - Senior representative of a national CSO (a) - Senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (b) - National representative of the United Nations	9
International	In-depth interviews (average 1.5 hours per interview) with: - Senior representative of a donor government (a) - Former REDD+ negotiator of a donor government - Senior regional representative of the United Nations - Former senior representative of the UNFCCC - Senior representative of a global REDD+ readiness initiative (a) - Senior executive of an international CSO *Representatives from other donor governments and multilateral organisations were also invited, but there was no response.	6
	Total	22

Table 3-3 provides general descriptions of research participants who took part in a Q-methodology survey, which followed the in-depth interviews and focus group.

Table 3-3: Research Participant Types and Number for Q-methodology Survey

Country	Type of Participant	No.

	In addition to the above-indicated interview/focus group participants: - Senior representative of a state government - National representative of an international CSO - Former private sector (timber extraction) executive *More than six additional federal and state government representatives were also invited but did not participate. Some declined as they felt uncomfortable with sharing their personal views, and the others declined due to time constraints.	5
Malaysia		
Nepal	In addition to the above-indicated interview/focus group participants: - Senior government representatives (b) - Senior government representatives (c) - Senior government representatives (d) - National representative of an international CSO (b) - Senior national representative of a global research organisation - National expert on REDD+ (a) - National expert on REDD+ (b)	12
Sri Lanka	In addition to the above-indicated interview/focus group participants: - Senior representative of a national CSO (b) - Technical staff member of a REDD+ readiness initiative *Two senior government representatives and a senior national CSO representative who participated in the focus group were invited but did not participate in this stage due to time constraints	8
International	In addition to the above-indicated interview/focus group participants: - Senior representative of a donor-funded regional programme - Senior international REDD+ expert/former representative of a donor government - Senior representative of a donor government (b) - Senior representative of a global REDD+ readiness initiative (b) - Senior global representative of the United Nations - Regional representative of the United Nations *Representatives from other donor governments and multilateral organisations were also invited, but there was no response.	11
Total		36

∗   The cases of no response or decline are discussed in Chapter Four under Positionality, Limitations and Ethical Considerations.

In each case study country, there was a national-level REDD+ readiness coordination body, assisted by a technical advisory group(s) and often soliciting input from a civil society forum(s). Such a coordination body was often chaired by a ministerial secretary-level representative in charge of coordinating the REDD+ readiness process in each country. The recruited research participants from the national level were predominantly associated with such bodies, expert advisory groups and civil society forums. Based on the researcher's own knowledge of REDD+ actors in each country, key actors from donor and multilateral agencies, international CSOs, research organisations and expert groups were also invited to participate in the research. This was combined with

a snowball sampling method as a supplementary strategy which relies on referrals by already recruited research participants to identify additional participants who were not known to the researcher (Stenner, Cooper and Skevington, 2003; Kowald and Axhausen, 2012). As seen in Table 3-2, only one focus group was conducted primarily due to a lack of time availability of many research participants. Most research participants indicated that they preferred bilateral interviews as they fit better their busy schedules. As seen in Table 3-3, most of the participants who participated in the interviews and focus group plus additionally recruited participants were then invited to take part in a Q-methodology survey, called Q sorting (details of which is provided in next chapter). Key considerations for having this relatively small sample size are also discussed in the next chapter.

Table 3-4: Demographic characteristics of research participants

Gender	%	Age Group	%	Highest level of education	%	Understanding of REDD+	%	Years involved in REDD+	%
Female	28%	31 - 40 Yrs. Old	22%	Bachelor's degree	6%	Limited Understanding	6%	Less than 2 Yrs.	8%
Male	72%	41 - 50 Yrs. Old	36%	Master's degree	66%	Good Understanding	50%	2 - 5 Yrs.	33%
		51 - 60 Yrs. Old	39%	Doctoral degree	28%	Expert in One or More Areas	44%	Over 5 Yrs.	59%
		Over 61 Yrs. Old	3%						

As illustrated in Table 3-4, over 75% of the research participants in this research were between the ages of 41 and 60, and about a third of them were women. Close to 60% of them had been involved in REDD+ for more than five years, and nearly 45% of them had considered themselves experts in one or more areas concerning REDD+. Overall, the research participants were generally well educated; 66% of them holding master's degrees and 28% of them holding doctoral degrees. Most of them held relatively senior positions in their organisations.

All research participants were provided with and agreed to the terms described in a letter of information for consent to participate in the research (Appendix One).

Several limitations and challenges faced during the recruitment of research participants, as also briefly indicated in Tables 3-2 and 3-3, are discussed in the next chapter as part of the overall limitations related to the research methodology.

3.4. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the rationale for choosing the case study countries was described based on the four selection criteria. The selection of these countries allowed for structural analysis and comparison of national REDD+ processes and associated viewpoints of actors involved in these processes. This chapter also described the recruitment of research participants and provided the brief descriptions of the research participants.

The methodological approach, including specific data collection and interpretation methods, employed in this research, as well as the limitations and challenges faced during the data collection and interpretation are discussed in the following chapter.

4. CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the overall research design and methodological approach of this research. To shed light on REDD+ actors' internal and subjective viewpoints on REDD+ through national REDD+ processes in the case study countries, a mixed-method approach was employed to combine poststructuralist discourse analysis and Q methodology to collect, analyse and interpret data.

This chapter is organised into four main sections, excluding the introduction and conclusion sections. The first section describes the overall research approach and design, followed by the description of the methodological approach in the next section. The third section describes the methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation. Finally, the last section presents the researcher's reflection on positionality, limitations and ethical issues concerning the research approach and methodology.

4.2. RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN

Informed by the discussions in Chapter Two, the overall design of this research builds on the Foucauldian notions of governmentality to examine the construction and effects of power through REDD+. From this perspective, the thesis aims to develop an understanding of how REDD+ is being pursued and problematised at the interface between the international and national REDD+ processes and how they affect the operationalisation of REDD+ at the national level. To examine the effects of governmentality through REDD+, the analytical framework (Table 2-1), introduced in Chapter Two, was developed by situating the five specific research questions in the pertinent literature (Foucault, 1982; Rutherford, 2007; Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008; Butler, 2009; Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2009; Dean, 2010; Hobson, 2013; Nightingale and Ojha, 2013; Bazzul, 2014; Campbell *et al.*, 2014). The analytical framework incorporates

scale to examine the effects of scale on the governmentality of REDD+ by approaching scale as performative from the poststructuralist perspective. As a study of human geography, analysing the effects of scale is particularly relevant to this research and contributes to the expansion of knowledge in the field of governmentality studies (Robbins, 2012; Singh, 2013).

4.3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

To examine the five specific research questions through the analytical dimensions (i.e., object, subject, technology, rationality and scale), as shown in Table 2-1, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is used to analyse data.

Poststructuralist discourse analysis, building extensively on the Foucauldian notion of discourse, is employed, as a primary method, to identify and examine the viewpoints and scalar stances of the research participants to develop an understanding of the socially contingent nature of the subjects (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002; Popke, 2003). The discourse analysis is used in conjunction with a mixed qualitative-quantitative method called Q-methodology (hereafter referred to as 'Q'), which brings together the strength of both qualitative and quantitative methods to the study of subjective viewpoints, as identified by the research participants (Brown, 1996; van Exel and de Graaf, 2005; Watts and Stenner, 2012; Matinga *et al.*, 2014). In practical terms, Q is used for the initial identification of prominent viewpoints of the research participants that typically define distinctive discourses. These viewpoints most often relate to strong opinions that are in support or critical of certain conducts of subjects. For example, such viewpoints might include strong support for REDD+ being a global scale PES among government representatives of REDD+ countries or sharp criticism by a group of international CSOs for lack of respect for the rights of Indigenous People in a REDD+ country. Q identifies these prominent viewpoints based on clusters of highly correlated research participants with similar viewpoints, derived through its quantitative method, called factor analysis, which is described in a later section of this chapter. Poststructuralist discourse analysis

is then employed to carry out an in-depth exploration of these prominent viewpoints and related more nuanced viewpoints around them to construct a deeper understanding of each discourse. This understanding is then used to develop answers for the five specific research questions. Q is thus used as a tool to aid poststructuralist discourse analysis by harnessing Q's strength to integrate a quantitative method into a qualitative study to systematically identify these prominent viewpoints at the onset of discourse analysis.

A study on public perceptions of renewable energy policy by Jepson et al. (2012) in large part informs the application of Q in this research. Jepson et al. (ibid.) apply Q to reveal the rationality of both pro-environmental and anti-environmental actors in supporting a renewable energy policy in the U.S. by outlining key discourses around the policy. Although this study by Jepson et al. provides the basis of this research for employing this methodology, their study also underscores a methodological knowledge gap in terms of how Q can be applied in tandem with discourse analysis to look beyond just outlining the main features of discourse. To address this gap, the thesis applies the above-described approach to integrate Q into discourse analysis. This mixed qualitative-quantitative approach, which draws on the strengths of both Q and poststructuralist discourse analysis, makes these two methods highly complementary, as well as unique and innovative.

4.3.1. Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis

There are two major approaches to discourse analysis - critical discourse analysis and poststructuralist discourse analysis. Each approach focuses on different aspects of discourse based on their philosophical foundations (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Fairclough, 2013; Bazzul, 2014; Flatschart, 2016). The latter approach is taken as it resonates closely with the design and methodological approach in this research.

To describe briefly, the critical discourse analysis method draws on the post-Marxist discourse theory to describe discourses as a 'structured totality' of the society as well as dimensions of economy and materialism in order to understand

the world and to arbitrate it (Fairclough, 2013; Flatschart, 2016). The poststructuralist discourse analysis method, on the other hand, takes a more dialectical approach to discourses by focusing on interactions between discourses and social and physical objects to produce meanings of social and physical phenomena (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Flatschart, 2016). Key differences between these two approaches are thus found in their analytical focus. Poststructuralist discourse analysis focuses on a broader conception of discourse to treat the use of language, objects and subjectivities as all part of the discourse in an intertwining fashion, while critical discourse analysis focuses more on the articulation of semiotic regularities denoting specific social norms and practices (Fairclough, 2013). Unlike Marxist approaches, poststructuralist discourse analysis builds on its anti-Enlightenment view of the world to refrain from determining what is right or wrong and instead attempts to provide a rather careful analysis of circumstances, producing specific social phenomena and power relations (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Dean, 2010; Fairclough, 2013). For instance, Foucault (1978, p. 96) suggests that poststructuralist approaches focus on more nuanced 'cleavages in a society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up and remolding them', rather than focusing on larger and relatively more visible social divisions.

By employing the poststructuralist discourse analysis method, discourses in this thesis are thus examined as highly context-driven processes of knowledge and power formation, resulting in specific divisions, rules and systems in each institutionalised domain within and across disciplines and scales. Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine (2008, p. 100) suggest that 'the materiality of knowledge as an instance of power' is produced through such discursive processes.

Concerning data collection under this approach, semi-structured interviews and focus groups are dominant methods, which are discussed further in the next section concerning data collection and analysis (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002; Montello and Sutton, 2013).

4.3.2. Q-Methodology (Q)

Q is an approach with a set of methods for the scientific study of subjectivity (Brown, 1980; Watts and Stenner, 2005, 2012). Q provides a unique window into human subjectivity on a particular matter through an internal frame of reference – specific viewpoints or self-references of actors – that is operant in the momentary context without claiming a static view (Stephenson, 1993; Brown, 1996; Robbins and Krueger, 2000; Thomas and Watson, 2002; Eden, Donaldson and Walker, 2005). Q uses a form of logic called 'abduction' to provide explanations for an observed phenomenon by developing a new understanding about the phenomenon beyond what is currently known, instead of either setting up a deductive hypothesis about or inductively describing it (Watts and Stenner, 2012). The abductive logic draws on the elements of deduction and induction by 1) identifying an existing theory that explains the observed phenomenon, 2) deductively deriving new insights beyond the current knowledge, and 3) inductively suggesting their meanings (De Brito and Van der Laan, 2010). Conclusions, therefore, rely on an iterative process of observation and inference to continuously seek new meanings and understandings. Table 4-1 illustrates these differences between the abductive, deductive and inductive logics.

Table 4-1: Comparison between abductive, deductive and inductive logics

	Abductive Logic	Deductive Logic	Inductive Logic
General Approach	Empirical observation deviating from previous knowledge/theory	Develop theory	Empirical observation without theory
Aim	Develop new understanding	Test theory	Develop theory
Conclusion	Suggestions for future directions, theory based on new insights	Corroboration and falsification	Generalisation

Sources: Watts and Stenner (2012), and De Brito and Van der Laan (2010, p. 863)

Q is designed to examine 'life as lived from the standpoint of the person living in it' (Brown, 1996). Based on its 'anti-essentialist approaches to subjectivity', Q contrasts with more traditional and reductionist social scientific approaches through R methods (hereafter referred to as 'R') that assume the subject's universality and rationality to reduced one's subjectivity to manageable, a priori categories (Robbins and Krueger, 2000, p. 636). According to Robbins and

Krueger (ibid., p. 637), R comprise a methodology that is 'typified by survey techniques, Likert scales, and other devices that seek to measure a person's opinions'. In R, a large select group of persons is used as a representative sample to deductively infer common characteristics of the subject population by examining correlations between variables (i.e., physical and social attributes and performance in R) among the sample group (Kim and Lee, 2015). Instead, Q is concerned with trends between subjective viewpoints of research participants to abductively construct emerging narratives (Brown, 1980; Eden, Donaldson and Walker, 2005; van Exel and de Graaf, 2005; Watts and Stenner, 2012; Wright, 2012).

Unlike R, Q requires a much smaller sample size (e.g., 30 – 60 or even smaller), as its aim is to identify shared viewpoints and disagreements among the sample population (Brown, 1980; Watts and Stenner, 2012). Variables in Q are, therefore, research participants. Q examines correlations between the research participants, rather than between their characteristics (Brown, 1980). Through factor analysis of Q, highly correlated research participants who share similar viewpoints are clustered into factors (Eden, Donaldson and Walker, 2005; van Exel and de Graaf, 2005; Wright, 2012; Živojinović and Wolfslehner, 2015). Because of this, the technique of factor analysis, used in Q, is inverted, compared to that of R. This is because Q identifies groups of correlated individuals based on their viewpoints, rather than their characteristics (i.e., physical and social attributes and performance).

Q is used in this research project for its match with the research aim to develop an understanding of the subjective viewpoint of REDD+ actors as well as its complementarity with poststructuralist discourse analysis, as described earlier. Both methods aim to capture one's view of the world that is continually being reshaped through complex dialectical interactions between discourses and social and physical objects.

4.4. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Data collection and analysis were conducted over 25 months between June 2015 and July 2017 through three intersecting stages. Qualitative data was collected through in-depth interviews and focus group in the first stage for the discourse analysis. This was done in parallel with a review of peer-reviewed journal articles and media and published reports concerning international REDD+ policy debates and REDD+ processes in the case study countries to collect additional viewpoints. Transcribed interview and focus group sessions and the selected literature and reports were then coded in relation to the analytical dimensions (i.e. object, subject, technology, rationality and scale). This stage took place between June 2015 and April 2016. The second stage during November 2015 and May 2016 focused on the discourse analysis of the coded materials to identify critical discursive elements that described specific processes of knowledge and power formation to shed detailed light on the analytical dimensions/specific research questions. During this stage, a Q set, a set of representative statements, concerning the analytical dimensions, was also produced based on the preliminary results of discourse analysis. In the third stage during June and December 2016, the research participants were invited to produce their Q sorts through the rank ordering of Q set statements according to their relative position and interpretive association with each statement. The Q sorts were then analysed, and resulting discourses were interpreted with the findings from the discourse analysis during July 2016 and July 2017 in the final stage.

4.4.1. Stage One: Data Collection through In-depth Interviews, Focus Group and Literature Review

A series of semi-structured interviews and a focus group were conducted to collect the research participants' views and opinions concerning the analytical dimensions and research questions (see Table 2-1 in Chapter Two). Semi-structured interview and discussion techniques were used to ensure that the specific research questions were explored adequately while offering a degree of flexibility to explore the research participants' deeper thoughts triggered by the questions (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). Focus group techniques allowed the

participants to explore their thoughts through exchanges of views among group members while allowing triangulation of data (Eliot & Associates, 2005; Reed *et al.*, 2009; Montello and Sutton, 2013).

Based on the specific research questions, two sets of interview questions were developed (see Appendix Two). The first set of interview questions were dedicated to those participants who were closely associated with their countries' national REDD+ processes. The second set of questions were for those research participants who were engaged in multiple national REDD+ processes from international perspectives. The difference between the two sets of questions was minor and found only in how the questions were framed and contextualised. These differentiated approaches were necessary to assist the research participants to start their thought processes in the most familiar context to explore and express their viewpoints in relation to the specific research questions. These approaches allowed the research participants to express their specific viewpoints based on their scaled identities and perspectives, as suggested by Corson and MacDonald and (2012). Campbell et al. (2014).

In framing the interview questions, the researcher's own knowledge of issues surrounding REDD+ combined with global and national perspectives from the literature review was used. For example, REDD+ negotiators' viewpoints through the COP negotiations, captured by Wilson Rowe (2015), local and national perspectives of the national REDD+ process in Nepal, captured by Bushley (2014), and Corbera's (2012) and Buizer et al.'s (2014) concerns over the valuation of nature from the scalar perspectives all provided useful input.

As introduced in Chapter Three, the researcher recruited several research participants from each case study country and the international REDD+ policy domain for this stage. All interview and focus group sessions were audio-recorded and transcribed using a verbatim transcription method with the support of a professional transcription service. The researcher assured the quality and accuracy of transcripts by going over each transcript to correct mistranscribed sections primarily due to the use of technical language and various accents spoken during the recorded sessions. About half of the interviews were

conducted via Skype as many participants had busy travel schedules, and the majority of international research participants were based in various locations around the world. The transcribed materials together with selected literature and reports, including media materials regarding REDD+ in general and the case study countries, were then coded in relation to the analytical dimensions/specific research questions, using qualitative data analysis software called MAXQDA (VERBI GmbH, 2015).

To supplement this step to gather as many viewpoints as possible, an instruction note with questions was prepared for a few participants who had volunteered to keep a short event diary during their participation in the UNFCCC COP 21 and other related meetings such as the meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and Subsidiary Body for Implementation to the UNFCCC. This supplementary data collection method was based on the concept of collaborative event ethnography, following Corson et al (2014). This method captures specific moments, tacitly experienced by actors within such events, that are mostly undocumented but shape certain power relations among actors and produce highly nuanced meanings and knowledge of the instruments of global environmental governance (Campbell *et al.*, 2014; Witter *et al.*, 2015).

However, those participants who had initially agreed to this task individually informed the researcher soon after the initiation that keeping such a diary was not possible chiefly due to their time constraints and the overwhelming atmosphere of such events. Given this, this supplementary approach was no longer pursued. A media scan during crucial events such as the UNFCCC COP meetings was instead carried out by the researcher. The participants who had initially volunteered for this task were also invited for interview upon their return from the COP and other UNFCCC REDD+ related events, but only one participant could take part in such an interview. From this process, both the scanned media reports and transcribed interview were coded with the rest of the gathered materials and provided important insights from the international decision-making processes to inform both discourse analysis and Q.

4.4.2. Stage Two: Discourse Analysis and Development of Q Set

Upon completion of the coding of the transcribed materials, literature and media reports in MAXQDA, all coded sections were exported to an Excel spreadsheet. Appendixes Three and Four provide samples of such corded sections in both MAXQDA and Excel. In Excel, all the coded sections – more than 1,400 of them – were made sortable by source and by analytical dimension/specific research question, as set out in Table 2-1 in Chapter Two. Many sections were associated with multiple analytical dimensions. Under each dimension, the coded sections were, therefore, further sub-divided by theme that best described each section (e.g., expert politics, donor power, national ownership, power of finance, and traditional power dynamics), as shown in Appendix Four. As part of this process, sections with the same or very close meanings were identified and merged where possible while also carefully ensuring not to lose nuanced positions and viewpoints of the participants and reviewed literature and reports from categorical perspectives. This filtering exercise produced a reduced set of coded sections (down to nearly 540 sections), organised into the five analytical dimensions and several sub-divisional themes. This was an initial part of poststructuralist discourse analysis to examine and identify specific characteristics and processes of knowledge and power formation. These preliminary results of discourse analysis were also used to construct a Q set by ensuring that it was 'broadly representative of the opinion domain' captured by the data (Watts and Stenner, 2005, p. 75).

Based on the recommended practices in Q, the Q set statements were selected systematically and structurally according to the analytical dimensions and specific research questions, rather than inductively based on emerging themes through the interviews, focus group and literature review (Watts and Stenner, 2005; Paige and Morin, 2014). This was to ensure that the process was not driven by bottom-up observations to provide a general description of the observed phenomena but instead guided by the logic of abduction to generate a hypothesis or 'wider explanatory theory' to explain the phenomena through a common framework (Watts and Stenner, 2012, p. 39).

Considerable time and effort were invested in making each Q set statement clear and to avoid having multiple meanings, even though the latter is considered inevitable to some extent and not a serious concern by many Q practitioners (Eden, Donaldson and Walker, 2005). Ensuring that the Q set was reasonably balanced in terms of having positive and negative statements and covered broadly the opinion domain was meanwhile very critical. As part of these efforts, external reviews of the Q set were provided by two REDD+ experts, who worked as independent consultants on REDD+ readiness activities in a number of countries. These experts were not among the research participants.

The Q set with 69 statements was developed as a result. Although opinions are divergent amongst Q practitioners, a recommended number of statements in a standard Q set ranges between 30 and 80 statements depending on the size and type of sample population (Brown, 1980; Thomas and Watson, 2002; Eden, Donaldson and Walker, 2005; Watts and Stenner, 2012; Paige and Morin, 2014). Watts and Stenner (2012) recommend having a minimum of two Q set statements per participant as a best practice to ensure that the number of participants does not exceed the number of Q set statements, considering that participants are the variables in Q. This also emphasised the need for strategic recruitment of study participants. With these in mind, thirty-six research participants, as described in Table 3-3 in Chapter Three, took part in Q sorting. This roughly translates to two Q set statements per participants as recommended by Watts and Stenner (ibid.).

4.4.3. Stage Three: Administration of Q sorts

The research participants who took part in the first step of the data collection and additional participants as described in Chapter Three were invited for Q sorting. For the administration of Q sorts, an online software programme, called Q-Sortware (Pruneddu, 2010) was used. An online sampling method was chosen as the participants were based in several countries across Asia and Europe, and many of them were often travelling for work. Challenges encountered in this

process are discussed in Section 4.5 of this chapter as part of the overall research limitations.

Over 60 potential participants were invited for Q sorting based on the assumption that some of them would not have the time or not wish to take part in the process. Thirty-six research participants completed their Q sorts. The research participants for this stage were first contacted by email, introducing this research project and describing why they had been requested to take part in the research. The initial introductory email was immediately followed by another email with an online link to a Q sort and instructions for completing the Q sort (see Appendix Five).

The participants were asked to rank-order the statements in the Q set in a Q sort grid structurally identical to Figure 4-1 below based on their subjective 'least-to-most intense expression[s]' using a normally distributed rating grid (Brown, 1980, p. 199). Appendix Five provides screenshots from Q-Sortware to illustrate how the Q sorts were presented to the Q sorters.

Figure 4-1: Normally distributed Q Sorting Grid

The use of a normally distributed (forced distribution) Q grid is a standard practice in Q as it is essentially a correlational study method. Although some may see the use of a forced distribution grid as too restrictive, 'comparisons of forced and unforced formats indicate a negligible format effect' (Stenner, Cooper and Skevington, 2003, p. 2164; Eden, Donaldson and Walker, 2005). The angle of slope of a Q sort grid is determined by how knowledgeable Q sorters may be of the subject matter. According to Brown (1980) and Watts and Stenner (2012), a flatter grid distribution requires a more opinionated and decisive judgement about each statement and is hence best suited for controversial and divisive

subject matters or expert based Q sorting. In this regard, although most research participants were either experts or very knowledgeable of REDD+, a relatively steep distribution was chosen. This approach was taken not to ignore the viewpoints of those few research participants who identified themselves as non-experts and to capture a wide range of viewpoints and perspectives as many research participants identified themselves with multiple roles and functions (e.g., several participants were national government representatives and at the same time, operating as REDD+ experts, leading technical discussions) through their REDD+ processes.

A distribution range of +5 to –5 was used based on the suggestion made by Brown (1980) in relation to the size of Q set. As seen in Figure 4-1, the Q grid is labelled with 'Most like my viewpoint' and 'Least like my viewpoint' over the guiding numbers 5 and -5 respectively. These labels were originally 'Most agree' and 'Least agree' over these guiding numbers. However, these original labels were found to be problematic based on feedback from the REDD+ experts who pilot-tested the Q sorts. These are the same experts who review the Q set. According to these experts, one could judge the Q statements either on a factual, objective or subjective ground. With the new labelling, the research participants were explicitly asked for their personal and subjective viewpoints, rather than those of the institutions they represented or based on their technical understanding. For example, with the WFR, REDD+ became technically operational with complete guidance and information requirements, but in reality, there were many unresolved issues and unclear areas, and REDD+ was far from operational in most countries.

Once the research participants had completed their Q sorts, they were asked to write down their reasons behind the selection of the statements under the guiding numbers 5 and -5, and take a quick survey regarding their age, sex, educational background, knowledge of REDD+ and general feedback (see Appendix Five, Item 4). Collecting this information was crucial in supplementing the process of factor interpretation in the next stage (Brown, 1980; Watts and Stenner, 2012; Wright, 2012).

4.4.4. Stage Four: Q analysis and Construction of Emerging Discourses through Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis

The collected Q sorts were analysed and interpreted through Q factor analysis to identify the outlines of emerging discourses. A detailed description of each discourse was then constructed based on the findings of poststructuralist discourse analysis.

4.4.4.a. Q Factor Analysis

For the analysis of the Q sorts, a freeware package called PQmethod (Schmolck, 2014) was used. Three methodological transitions took place in this stage: (i) 'from Q sorts to factors, via the correlations and factor analysis of Q-sorts'; (ii) 'from factors to factor arrays, via the weighted averaging of … factors-exemplifying Q sorts'; and (iii) 'from factor arrays to factor interpretations' (Watts and Stenner, 2012, p. 180).

First, all numerically translated Q sorts were converted into a PQmethod compatible file format, and the data distribution range (i.e., from +5 to -5) and slope angle were set in PQmethod to perform a Centroid factor analysis to extract initial factors, indicating statistically significant correlations among the entered Q sorts. Although there is another similar method called principal component analysis, Centroid factor analysis is the most preferred method among Q practitioners as it provides a degree of flexibility to allow an abductive inquiry by the researcher without immediately resulting in 'a single, mathematically best solution' (Watts and Stenner, 2012, p. 99). Each factor is expressed in terms of statistical loading, and each loading indicates the extent to which each Q sort correlates with the factor. The maximum number of extractable factors through Centroid factor analysis in PQmethod is eight factors (Schmolck, 2014). According to Brown (1980), a 7-factor solution is a generally recommended starting point informed by experience. Watts and Stenner (2012, p. 107) alternatively suggest to 'try extracting one factor for approximately 6-8 participants'. While the opinions differ slightly among Q practitioners, the key message is not to start narrowing down too quickly as by doing so, a resulting

solution might not fully benefit from 'systemic variance [in insignificant factors] that can help in improving the loadings on a major factor' (Brown, 1980, p. 223).

In Centroid factor analysis, 8, 7, 6 and 5-factor solutions were tested, and to determine which solution worked the best, three decision-making aid criteria were applied. The first criterion was an eigenvalue (EV), indicating the communality within each factor, 'by summing the squared loadings of all the Q sorts on that factor' (Watts and Stenner, 2012, p. 104). Factors with EVs of 1.00 or higher were retained. The second criterion qualified factors with at least two significant loadings with the standard error exceeding the confidence level of 99 % (P < 0.01), and the third criterion looked for factors with at least two loadings that are twice the standard error (Brown, 1980, p. 223; Watts and Stenner, 2012, p. 107).

Based on these criteria, the 8-factor solution was chosen to be the best option, which gave fewer insignificant factors. To further improve the loadings on significant factors, the eight factors were rotated in relation to their X, Y and Z axes, without changing the communality of the loadings within each factor (Brown, 1980). 'Rotation does not affect the consistency in sentiment throughout individual Q sorts or the relationships between Q sorts, it only shifts the perspective from which they are observed'(van Exel and de Graaf, 2005, p. 9). The purpose of the factor rotation was to enhance the distinctiveness of each factor by optimising the variance between the factors. The higher the variance between the factors, the more distinct each factor becomes in relation to the other factors due to increasing differences between them. There are two methods of factor rotation – by-hand and Varimax (Brown, 1980; Watts and Stenner, 2012). The by-hand rotation method is suitable when certain Q sorts are recognised to be significant from the theoretical perspective, while, for a more exploratory and inductive study, Varimax is often preferred as it allows its users first to carry out a mathematical rotation, and if necessary hand rotations can then be performed on a theoretical basis (Brown, 1980; Watts and Stenner, 2012; Wright, 2012).

In this analysis, Varimax rotation was applied to the eight factors, as there was no reason to single out any particular Q sorts on theoretical grounds. This rotation provided a final solution, having 4 of the eight factors with significantly high loadings based on the screening criteria mentioned above. Table 4-2 shows both the EV and variance estimate for each of the four factors. The variance for each factor represents the percentage of the common variance within the analysis.

Table 4-2: Final factors and their variance

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Total
Eigenvalue (EV)	2.1	2.1	2.3	1.7	8.23
Variance %	7	7	7	5	27

These four factors collectively account for 27% of the common variance within the study. What this suggests is that a third of the variables in this analysis distinctively mark the prominent boundaries and features of the four factors, while the others variably contribute to the formation of the factors in ways that are not as discriminant as the first third. This figure is slightly lower than the recommended range of 35 – 40 % as a sound solution by Watts and Stenner (2012, p. 105). However, according to Brown (2016), such a criterion provides an ill-conceived and defective assessment of the solution, since more commonly divisive topics such as gun control or abortion rights would often result in a solution with fewer factors accounting for a higher level of variance. The variance alone would thus not be a good judgement tool for determining the soundness of the solution, as it is often influenced by the nature of the study topic in Q. The low level of variance in this study is explained by the highly nuanced and context-specific opinion domain of REDD+, and the participation of multiple groups of REDD+ actors from the three different countries and international policy domain in this research. Brown (2016) therefore suggests to treat these statistical criteria only as an initial tool to bring 'statistical aspects in the data to the focus of attention, but after that, they are best disregarded' to focus on qualitative analysis and interpretation of data to abductively construct each factor. Provided these explanations, these four factors were considered a sound final solution.

4.4.4.b.   Factor Interpretation

To interpret the final factor solution systematically, not just by focusing solely on the highest and lowest ranked statements in each factor, a crib sheet approach, developed by Watts and Stenner (2012), was employed to ensure that interpretations were made 'consistently in the context of each and every factor, and …[to] help the researcher to deliver genuinely holistic factor interpretations' (ibid., p. 150). This approach is based on best practices in Q and widely used by Q methodologists as it provides the most systematic way of analysing and interpreting relevant Q set statements in each factor. Based on the factor arrays of Q set statements (see Appendix Six), a crib sheet for each factor was constructed by extracting and placing relevant statements in a structured order. The statements in each crib sheet were then interpreted based on their relative positions within the crib sheet and in relation to their positions under other factor arrays to construct a narrative for each factor. The crib sheets are presented in Chapter Five together with the interpretation of the four factors.

4.4.4.c.   Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis

The narratives emerging through the interpretation of the four factors outlined the boundaries of the four emerging discourses and their key characteristics. The findings of poststructuralist discourse analysis together with the supplementary information collected through the post-Q-sorting surveys were used to flesh out each emerging discourse to develop a fuller understanding of specific objects, subjects, technologies, forms of governmental rationality producing specific action or inaction and effects of scale that define the discourse. The results of discourse analysis concerning the four emerging discourses are provided in Chapters Six and Seven.

4.5. POSITIONALITY, LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4.5.1. Positionality

Moser (2008) suggests that the researcher's sexuality, age, social identity, education, language, ethnicity, and even emotional ability can interfere to enable or inhibit particular social science field methods. From this perspective, the researcher's unique positionality was of particular concern as the researcher was also working as a REDD+ advisor through the United Nations and had developed close working relationships with many research participants in the case study countries during the data collection phase.

The researcher initially considered an option to collect data through a third-party intermediary in each case study country. This was to address the risk of having the research participants provide information based on the professional relationships they had with the researcher, thus concerning the issue of objectivity. However, this option was outweighed by the value of the researcher's knowledge of the research participants and the case study countries. Given the methodological approaches employed in this research, it was considered critical to build on the researcher's relationships with key REDD+ actors to ensure strategic recruitment of research participants and to build on the researcher's knowledge of specific contexts to enable more in-depth exploration of the research participants' unique viewpoints (Watts and Stenner, 2012; Campbell *et al.*, 2014). Thus, the positionality of the researcher was instead considered a vital enabler of this research.

Nevertheless, taking this approach by no means meant that the issues and limitations associated with the researcher's unique positionality were addressed. For instance, the researcher's close association with the UN-REDD, on the one hand, gave access to those actors involved in the initiative, but on the other hand, may have limited his access to those actors involved in other initiatives, including the World Bank's FCPF and those of bilateral agencies. From a similar perspective, the researcher's selection of informants might have focused too narrowly on those actors within his close network, by which relevant viewpoints of some other actors outside of the network might have been missed.

4.5.2. Reflexivity

As suggested by Moser (2008), a reflexive approach was taken to move beyond the traditional social science approach that tries to maintain an artificial distance between the researcher and the researched. Flatschart (2016, p. 44) also suggests that being more reflexive allows the researcher to avoid 'epistemological dogmatism about one's own position' that ignores ontological elements. This thesis thus acknowledges the presence of inter-subjectivity between the researcher and the researched in this thesis to the extent feasible.

This was particularly important for Q. Q is often claimed to be an entirely empirical approach (Brown, 1980; van Exel and de Graaf, 2005; Watts and Stenner, 2005; Matinga *et al.*, 2014). However, 'subjective and reflective judgements' of the researcher are inevitably applied in the selection of study participants and information sources, in deciding the representativeness of a Q set, and even through factor rotations and interpretations (Eden, Donaldson and Walker, 2005, p. 417). Robbins and Krueger (2000) therefore urge human geographers using Q to adopt a more reflexive approach to overcome such a challenge, as it also enhances Q's strength of having both empirical and hermeneutic aspects combined into a single approach.

4.5.3. Limitations

The language used in the research was English. No translation service was thus required during the data collection process, as the research participants were either native English speakers or proficient in the language. Although both poststructuralist discourse analysis and Q are less concerned with semiosis or the use of language in a strict sense, the fact that both the researcher and many participants used the English language as a second language may have influenced the processes of data collection and interpretation in some ways. Some nuanced expressions and meanings might have been ignored or misunderstood by the researcher and the researched.

During the data collection phase, several individuals from the case study countries and international policy domain, who were invited for in-depth interviews, did not respond to the researcher or responded to decline the invitation due to their time constraints. As discussed above, the researcher's unique positionality may have in turn limited access to informants outside of his close network. Similarly, due to time limitations, the researcher could organise only one focus group session. Many of the invited participants were holding relatively senior positions in their organisations. They were extremely busy and often travelling. Some REDD+ experts from the case study countries, who participated in this research, also indicated that some senior government officials would not have liked to take part in such a multi-participant discussion session, in order to avoid potentially contentious situations.

The online administration of Q sorts also came with a challenge associated with a low response rate because of the difficulty of remotely explaining the subtleties of Q sorting to the participants, misunderstanding of expected tasks and limited online software functions. Over 60 potential participants were invited for Q sorting based on the assumption that some of them would not have the time or not wish to take part in the process. A total of 36 participants completed their Q sorts. However, due to a technical glitch with Q-Sortware, only thirty-one Q sorts were successfully collected. Although those participants with missing Q sorts had agreed to redo their Q sorts, the problem with the software remained for unknown technical reasons. The researcher also consulted with the software administrator, but no solutions were found. One of the participants from Malaysia, who could not complete his Q sort due to a technical problem with the software, however, provided his written input to express his view on REDD+, which was included in the discourse analysis.

Compared to the other case study countries, the recruitment of participants from Malaysia was the most problematic. Many potential participants identified through the snowball sampling method did not respond to the emails sent to them by the researcher asking for their participation in in-depth interviews and Q sorting. Several of them who responded from the central government agencies declined the researcher's request because they felt their superior or colleague

who had already been interviewed by the researcher had expressed their views adequately. Although it was explained several times to them that this was not an official inquiry by the United Nations, the researcher's unique positionality combined with his lesser familiarity with Malaysia, compared to the other two case study countries, seemed to have contributed to this situation. This challenge also highlighted both the key strength and weakness of this research that built on the unique positionality of the researcher to explore the research participants' subjective viewpoints. In Nepal and Sri Lanka, the data collection relied primarily on the researcher's knowledge of the research participants. There were more face-to-face and direct interactions with the research participants before and during the interviews, focus group and Q sorting to ensure a conducive environment for data collection in these countries. In contrast, as the data collection in Malaysia relied more on referrals through the snowball sampling method, the researcher was unable to leverage the strength of his unique positionality to gather data. Consequently, fewer participants from Malaysia took part in the research.

Lastly, there was clear complementarity between poststructuralist discourse analysis and Q, particularly as Q's strength was well demonstrated in identifying the clusters of viewpoints and delineating the boundaries and essential characteristics of emerging discourses. However, the researcher found that the data collection based on Q sorting was extremely time-consuming and cumbersome for the most research participants. Hence, reflected in the low response rate, Q might not be the best-suited method for this type of research as the majority of research participants were senior officials from public and private institutions with hectic schedules, which made it difficult for them to commit to such a lengthy and complex survey.

4.5.4. Ethical Considerations

There were no significant issues concerning the research participants' social vulnerability through their involvement in the research, as all participants were representatives of national and local government agencies, CSOs, donor and

multilateral institutions and the private sector. Nonetheless, the participants were provided with a letter or email describing the research as well as their expected role(s) in the research in order to seek their consent to participate in the research (see Appendix One). A clear data disclosure policy was provided to them to explain how their identities in any written materials, produced through the research would be protected and the use of collected information beyond the purpose of the research would be prevented to avoid any adverse effects on their professional activities and relationships.

4.6. CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented the overall research design and methodological approach, including the methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation. The issues concerning the researcher's unique positionality, limitations and ethical considerations have also been discussed.

Through poststructuralist discourse analysis, various viewpoints of the research participants regarding REDD+ in relation to the analytical framework of this research were collected and analysed. The use of Q was crucial and beneficial in providing an abductively derived structure that delineates the boundaries and key characteristics of each emerging discourse. The findings of discourse analysis provided crucial details and explanations for each identified discourse. Through this methodological approach, the complementarity of poststructuralist discourse analysis and Q was successfully demonstrated.

Findings and results of data analysis and interpretation are presented and discussed in the following three chapters. Chapter Five presents the results of Q factor analysis. Chapters Six and Seven discuss the four emerging discourses based on the findings of poststructuralist discourse analysis in relation to the analytical dimensions of governmentality and specific research questions, identified in Chapter Two.

5: CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS OF Q ANALYSIS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the four-factor solution identified through Q factor analysis. The factors reveal the 'predominant viewpoints' of the research participants, relative to the Q set (Watts and Stenner, 2012, p. 42). Each of these factors forms the outline of an emerging discourse, and this chapter thus aims to trace the outlines of the four emerging discourses and set out how they relate to the research participants and case study countries. The information presented in this chapter sets the stage for Chapters Six and Seven where the findings of poststructuralist discourse analysis are used to identify specific effects of governmentality by examining the analytical dimensions/specific research questions through these emerging discourses.

This chapter comprises three sections, excluding the introduction and conclusion sections. The first section describes the four factors identified through Q factor analysis, followed by a discussion on inter-factor relationships in the second section. The last section describes confounded subject positions, associated with multiple factors.

5.2 KEY FEATURES OF FACTORS

As described in the previous chapter, the approach used here for the interpretation of these factors follows the crib sheet approach of Watts and Stenner (2012). Each factor embodies 'the weighted average of individual Q sorts significantly correlated with that factor', derived through Q factor analysis in the form of an idealised array of Q statements (West, Cairns and Schultz, 2016, p. 186). In comparison with all the other factor arrays, a crib sheet was constructed for each factor to systematically identify a set of Q statements, defining most essential characteristics of the factor. Each crib sheet, presented in this chapter, is made up of the following four groups of Q statements.

	Group 1:	Statements ranked +5 (most like my viewpoint)
	Group 2:	Statements ranked – 5 (least like my viewpoint)
	Group 3:	Statements ranked higher than +3 by the factor than by any other factor
	Group 4:	Statements ranked lower than -3 by the factor than by any other factor

A preliminary assessment identified the other Q statements that are not included in the crib sheets to be less significant particularly to define the outline and most prominent characteristics of each factor in this chapter. Nonetheless, those Q statements that were not included in the crib sheets, provided useful information in examining inter-factor relationships, presented in Section 5.2 of this chapter.

In addition, statistically distinguishing statements, which were identified by PQmethod for each factor based on confidence levels of $P < 0.05$ (95%) and $P < 0.01$ (99%), were also cross-referenced with the Q statements in each corresponding crib sheet. While the crib sheets had already captured most of the statistically distinguishing statements, a few additional statements were added to the crib sheets through this exercise.

Table 5-1. provides the brief descriptions of the four factors and identifies specific research participants whose Q sorts were significantly correlated at $P < 0.01$ with each of the factors. There were some research participants whose Q sorts were significantly associated with more than one factor, as shown in Table 5-1, and they are identified as confounded Q sorts in Q (van Exel and de Graaf, 2005). These confounded research participants are discussed in Section 5.3 of this chapter.

Table 5-1: Four Factors and Significantly Correlated Research Participants

Factor	Research participants, whose Q sorts were significantly correlated with the factor *Alphabetical signs in ( ) refer to the index in Table 3-2: Research Participant Types and Number in Chapter Three

Factor One: REDD+ won't happen, not for us, not in its current form	1. Senior government representative (a) of Sri Lanka 2. Senior representative of a private sector network, Sri Lanka 3. Senior representative of a national CSO (a), Sri Lanka 4. Senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (a), Sri Lanka 5. Technical staff member of a REDD+ readiness initiative, Sri Lanka
Factor Two: We are frustrated: REDD+ must focus on real mitigation impacts	1. Senior representative of a donor government (a) 2. Senior representative of a donor-funded regional programme 3. Senior international REDD+ expert/former representative of a donor government 4. Senior representative of a global REDD+ readiness initiative (a) 5. Senior global representative of the United Nations 6. Senior representative of a national research organisation, Nepal
Factor Three: We want REDD+, but not for emissions reductions	1. Senior government representative (a), Nepal 2. Senior government representative (b), Nepal 3. National representative of an international CSO (a), Nepal 4. National expert on REDD+ (a), Nepal 5. National expert on REDD+ (b), Nepal
Factor Four: REDD+ is a development strategy, not a technical fix for climate change	1. Senior government representative, Malaysia 2. Senior representative of a state government, Malaysia 3. National representative of an international CSO, Malaysia 4. National representative of the United Nations, Malaysia 5. Senior government representative (d), Sri Lanka 6. Former REDD+ negotiator of a donor government
Confounded Research Participants	- Between Factors One and Two - Senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (b), Sri Lanka - Between Factors Two and Three - Senior national representative of a global research organisation, Nepal - Between Factors Three and Four - National representative of a regional organisation, Nepal

As observed above in the table, these factors have quite clearly separated the research participants by country. Factor One associates closely with the research participants from Sri Lanka. Factor Two correlates with the research participants from the international domain, while one participant from Nepal whose work involved international activities on REDD+ was also associated with this factor. Factor Three is primarily linked to the Nepalese research participants. Factor Four shows a strong correlation with the Malaysian research participants while the others from Sri Lanka and the international domain are also linked to this factor.

In interpreting these four factors below, the researcher also applied his understandings and knowledge of specific country contexts based on his direct

observations during the data collection stage as well as through his professional engagement with the case study countries.

5.2.1. Factor One: REDD+ won't happen, not for us, not in its current form

As shown in Table 5-1, the Q sorts of the five participants from Sri Lanka, representing the national government, private sector, CSO network and national REDD+ readiness initiative, were strongly correlated with this factor.

This factor is characterised by a pessimistic notion that dismisses the effectiveness and impact potential of REDD+ for countries like Sri Lanka. REDD+ was observed to be a top-down and expert-driven process with notable influence from donor countries. Such a top-down and externally driven process was viewed to be problematic as it raised issues concerning equity and justice through REDD+.

Table 5-2: Factor One Crib Sheet

These research participants strongly felt that:
*Number in ( ) indicates the ranking of each statement in the factor

- Even if small developing countries were able to follow all UNFCCC negotiations consistently with firm political commitments from their leaders, their ability to influence critical decisions, regarding REDD+, would still be limited, as they are neither donors nor large forested countries. (+5)
- It is harder for middle-income countries to attract donor finance in REDD+ readiness, and even if there is a possibility, such assistance often imposes conditionalities, interfering with sensitive socio-political matters, and making it harder for the Government to accept. (+5)
- REDD+ could be problematic as funding could be limited to a benchmark cost per unit of emissions reductions achieved and thus forest countries would need to co-fund activities if abatement costs exceeded the benchmark. (+4)
- Although a good idea to rationalise REDD+ by focusing on NCBs, it is much more difficult in reality to identify and measure changes regarding NCBs in the same way carbon is being measured, and such an approach might be problematic. (+4)
- Donor countries must accept that REDD+ countries may pursue a multiplicity of ways in which to realise REDD+ and forms of REDD+, which may deviate from their narrow vision of what REDD+ should look like. (+4)
- REDD+ readiness process has contributed to forest sector capacity development through cross-sectoral analysis of issues concerning forest cover change and dialogue with the private sector, other sectors and civil society about deforestation drivers and rights, irrespective of any financial benefits. (+3)
- The national government will decide if REDD+ can be implemented and how it can be implemented in the country, not the donors, development agencies or UNFCCC COP decisions. (+3)
- Many international experts make the explanation of REDD+ unnecessarily complicated and lack adequate understanding or appreciation of nationally specific circumstances to ground their arguments and support appropriately. (+3)

These research participants did not feel that:

- COP decisions on REDD+, aiming to incentivise REDD+ countries to start their REDD+ processes, are often difficult for countries outside the inner circle of the UNFCCC negotiations to understand due to the internal politics of the negotiations. (-3)
- There is no conflict between REDD+, global consumption/production issues and neoliberal economic policies because REDD+ does not stop you from logging your forests, or from addressing your development goals. (-3)
- Developed countries may be pursuing their own interests through REDD+ but, as long as they make the financing available, as stipulated in the UNFCCC COP decisions, that would be acceptable to developing countries, and better than not having access to any finance. (-4)
- A small core group of elites who have powerful influence over the country's mainstream policy processes want to maintain the status quo in land and forest management. (-4)
- As long as there is information available to the public on how much money your country is receiving through REDD+ and where the money is being spent, the public might be able to put pressure on its own government to deliver promised changes. (-4)
- The carbon market offers the best method for allocating funding in REDD+ without too much regulatory control. (-5)
- To implement REDD+, the current legal framework must be amended to recognise forest carbon as a tradable commodity and to handle transactions of REDD+ payments through the national system. Such a decision requires careful consideration and must be based on real prospects of REDD+. (-5)

5.2.1.a.   Top-down Decision-making and Expert-driven Processes

Although the UNFCCC COP decisions were neither perceived to be difficult to follow nor to understand, key concerns focused on the fact that crucial decisions were perceived by these research participants to be predominantly made by and

for donors and powerful REDD+ countries with significant forest cover. For instance, the senior representative of a private sector network (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) argued that 'we don't make decisions, those developed countries with funding and experts do'. Similarly, there was a shared notion that more context-specific approaches and diverse forms of REDD+ should have been promoted and supported by donor countries rather than imposing their visions of what REDD+ should look like in all REDD+ countries. The senior representative of a national CSO (a) (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) argued that 'we must insist that our specific development needs must not be ignored even though it is important to tackle climate change globally'.

Furthermore, it was viewed that the top-down approach of donor countries and their intermediaries had also reverberated through the attitudes and approaches of many international REDD+ experts, engaged at the national level. International experts were observed to be imposing their global views regarding environmental governance challenges on REDD+ countries like Sri Lanka to insist on addressing issues such as elite capture, accountability and transparency in very generic terms without adequate appreciation of the country's specific circumstances. According to the senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (a) (in-depth interview, July 29, 2015), 'many issues are not coming from the country … it's driven by expert debates…they all have PhDs on something, so they have to tell us what we need to do… because [multilateral institutions] have developed some tools, so they have to sell them to us... they are often overlapping and competing'.

5.2.1.b.   Donor Conditionality Making It Difficult

This factor also raises the issue of donor conditionality and external influence as REDD+ was observed to be a donor-defined and -driven process. The senior representative of a national CSO (a) (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) argued that:

> …obviously there are strings attached to this kind of funding… because the fund is being given mostly by developed countries, those banks and donors always have an agenda…they drive developing countries to fit that agenda.

Donor conditionality and external interference were identified to be problematic, as they were observed to threaten their sovereignty over forest management and related development issues. Therefore, such a donor-driven approach had made it difficult and unattractive for 'middle-income [countries like Sri Lanka] to accept donor assistance' for REDD+, according to the national representative of the United Nations in Sri Lanka (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015). The factor underscores that merely providing REDD+ finance should not give donor countries the right to interfere and pursue their versions of REDD+ in developing countries like Sri Lanka.

5.2.1.c.   Oversimplified Solutions Ignoring Real Cost

It was also observed that REDD+ as a mechanism was presented in an overly simplistic and idealistic manner. The idealised presentation of REDD+ by donors and international experts ignored the real cost of emissions reductions incurred by REDD+ countries. The top-down and expert-driven processes of REDD+ raised environmental justice concerns associated with universalising the valuation of forests in terms of carbon and NCBs and who determined the values of those items. While it was clear that the aim of REDD+ was to remunerate positive externalities in developing countries with public and private finance from advanced economies, this factor raises a question concerning the justice of who benefits the most from REDD+. From this perspective, the senior government representative (a) (in-depth interview, July 30, 2015) argued that 'it's like we work on REDD+...for the developed nations …so more room for them to increase their emissions'. Building on this notion, this factor rejects the role of the carbon market in REDD+ without adequate regulatory control as it was observed that the market logic alone would not guarantee fair benefits for REDD+ countries like Sri Lanka. This notion also rejected the need for legal reform to accommodate emissions reductions as a tradable commodity through REDD+.

Meanwhile, despite these critical views on REDD+, some positive effects of the REDD+ readiness process including increased cross-sectoral dialogue for sustainable forest management and enhanced technical capacity in forest monitoring were noted by the Sri Lankan research participants. Nonetheless,

this factor generally illustrates the Sri Lankan participants' pessimistic views towards REDD+. These notions support the claim by Andersen (2015) that the effectiveness of international mechanisms like REDD+ is often affected by the disjuncture between its top-down approach at the international level and actual decision-making processes at the national level that may not often share the same visions and norms.

5.2.2. Factor Two: We are frustrated: REDD+ must focus on real mitigation impacts

As shown in Table 5-1, the Q sorts of the six research participants were significantly correlated with this factor. All six research participants were engaged in REDD+ internationally. Two of the participants represented bilateral development agencies, and another two of them served a multilateral institution and its project. The remaining two participants were independent experts. One of the experts also formally worked as a representative of a bilateral agency. The other expert worked primarily in Nepal but covered issues internationally.

This factor primarily captures the views of the representatives from donor and multilateral institutions and internationally engaged experts. These views illustrate their struggle in dealing with the gap between their professional beliefs and responsibility to promote REDD+ and their understanding of the ground reality by working with REDD+ countries.

Table 5-3: Factor Two Crib Sheet

These research participants strongly felt that: *Number in ( ) indicates the ranking of each statement in the factor

- Developed countries want transformational change through REDD+ financing, but considering electoral and staff rotation cycles of the government and various development challenges and needs, the timeframe in which such changes are expected is unrealistic for most countries. (+5)
- The lead national entity for REDD+ readiness is often a ministry/department in charge of forestry, which often prefers to work on technical REDD+ issues like national forest inventory rather than stakeholder engagement, social and macroeconomic issues. This poses a risk to REDD+. (+5)
- Small REDD+ countries would be better off continuing with conventional sustainable forest management efforts rather than engaging in REDD+, given their limited prospects of generating sizable RBPs and capacity limitations (e.g. financial/ human/ political). (+4)
- A small core group of elites who have powerful influence over the country's mainstream policy processes want to maintain the status quo in land and forest management. (+4)
- The ministry/department in charge of forestry, often the lead national institution for REDD+ readiness, is not the most efficient institution to address land-use pressures from other sectors (e.g., food security, GDP growth, and infrastructural needs for economic growth). (+4)
- The opportunity to access REDD+ readiness finance and donor/expert guidance often hinder the ability of small REDD+ countries with a limited carbon potential to objectively assess the role and feasibility of REDD+ in relation to their national circumstances. (+3)
- Most countries have yet to come up with ideas on how to deal with overarching market drivers of deforestation or how to provide clear incentives for the private sector to change its behaviour or invest in REDD+ compatible business models. (+3)

These research participants did not feel that:

- The process of REDD+ readiness has been instrumental in promoting civil society engagement and advocating marginalised and indigenous people's rights in forest management. (-3)
- REDD+ readiness process has contributed to forest sector capacity development through cross-sectoral analysis of issues concerning forest cover change and dialogue with the private sector, other sectors and civil society about deforestation drivers and rights, irrespective of any financial benefits. (-3)
- Levelling of power relations between developed and developing countries to directly negotiate has been recognised partly through the diminishing role of UN agencies and other inter-governmental organisations in the UNFCCC negotiations. (-4)
- The use of English language in national REDD+ policy process severely limits the opportunity for CSOs and local actors to articulate their viewpoints. (-4)
- The carbon market offers the best method for allocating funding in REDD+ without too much regulatory control. (-5)
- Without Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous Peoples, it is not possible to minimise the negative impacts or to harness the benefits from REDD+. (-5)

5.2.2.a.   Unrealistic Ambitions of Donors

Considering various governance and development challenges faced by REDD+ countries, the rhetoric and pressure for transformational change from donor countries (hence their direct or indirect employers) were observed to be unrealistic. Notably, such donor pressure was viewed to reflect unequal power relations between donor and recipient countries. These power relations put these research participants who operated at the interface between donors and REDD+ countries in a challenging position. For example, the senior representative of a donor government (a) (in-depth interview, September 24,

2015) explained that 'developing countries will have to start respecting the safeguards' in order to receive donor finance; however, he also acknowledged at the same time that such conditionality of 'development aid is cementing the old power relations' to hinder the necessary type of transformation.

5.2.2.b.   Less than Ideal Circumstances of REDD+ Countries

It was also observed that the overall governance challenges faced by REDD+ countries such as political uncertainty and weak institutional capacity had made the operationalisation of REDD+ extremely difficult. Institutional arrangements for REDD+ in particular in these countries were less than ideal for instigating the type of transformational change envisioned by these experts through REDD+. In most REDD+ countries, REDD+ readiness processes were led by national institutions, responsible for forest management.   These institutions were perceived to be more interested in and concerned with technical forestry matters such as national forest inventories than addressing drivers of deforestation and forest degradation through intersectoral policies and measures. For instance, the senior representative of a global REDD+ readiness initiative (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) argued that because of such poor institutional arrangements in many REDD+ countries, 'the real politics of deforestation is kept at a different level…so the effort lacks the necessary political engagement and commitment to address the drivers [of deforestation]'.

In addition, the effectiveness of efforts to promote stakeholder engagement and the safeguards by CSOs were viewed to be limited. This was mainly due to the fact the application of concepts such as free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) was observed to have been managed through a one-size-fits-all approach from the global perspective without the necessary contextualisation by CSOs to adapt them to specific circumstances and needs at the national and local levels. This observation supports the claim by Bastakoti and Davidsen (2015) and Dawson et al. (2018) that stakeholder engagement and the safeguards are often applied merely to meet donor requirements rather than to address concerns and risks on the ground.

5.2.2.c. REDD+ Finance Obstructing Its Strategic Application

The lack of progress was also attributed to the wide availability of REDD+ readiness finance and technical assistance to any developing countries interested in REDD+ through bilateral and multilateral support mechanisms. Such funding and assistance had inadvertently bewildered and prevented particularly developing countries with small forest cover from carefully assessing the role and feasibility of REDD+ in their national development contexts before entering into the readiness phase. This view supports the assessment by Lee and Pistorius (2015, p. 13) that 'REDD+ finance has diverted political attention away from other legitimate approaches to forest protection, in essence, "crowding out" other solutions'. Many REDD+ countries were thus observed in this factor to be interested in merely accessing REDD+ finance without necessarily viewing REDD+ as a viable long-term mechanism for their countries. As a result, the international finance and support were spread too thinly to support a large number of countries, many of which were viewed in this factor to have limited carbon potential and capacity to deliver tangible results.

5.2.2.d. Calling for a Change in Focus

Considering these challenges and concerns, the factor calls for REDD+ finance and technical support to narrow its focus on large forested countries with high capacities and political will to address deforestation problems through REDD+. For these countries, expected REDD+ revenues would be significant enough to implement strict policies and measures to curb their forest carbon emissions drastically. At the same time, according to the senior representative of a global REDD+ readiness initiative (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015), 'for the smaller countries, expected results-based payments would be so small…and have limited global mitigation impacts despite the large cost of implementing REDD+'. Therefore, countries with limited forest cover such as Nepal and Sri Lanka were observed to be better off without REDD+ to continue with the conventional sustainable forest management efforts. Despite this call to optimise the financial leverage of REDD+, it was also observed that the market logic alone would not be adequate without appropriate regulatory control.

5.2.3. Factor Three: We want REDD+, but not for emissions reductions

As shown in Table 5-1, the Q sorts of the five research participants from Nepal were significantly correlated with this factor. They represented the national government, CSOs and national REDD+ expert groups.

This factor is characterised by the frustration caused by tensions between international and national actors due to differences in how REDD+ was envisioned.

Table 5-4: Factor Three Crib Sheet

These research participants strongly felt that:
*Number in ( ) indicates the ranking of each statement in the factor

- Experts from developed countries often hold a view that REDD+ is a way to protect forests for the good of the world and a low-cost climate solution, but national stakeholders see REDD+ as an additional source of finance, and local people see it as support to their livelihood strategy. (+5)
- NCBs, values and functions of the forest should be promoted and pursued more through REDD+ as carbon prices are prone to fluctuation due to external factors thus limiting the sense of local ownership and control. (+5)
- REDD+ readiness process has so far primarily benefited (e.g., job creation) those actors linked to a broad network of experts and civil society networks with international funding. (+4)
- To implement REDD+, the current legal framework must be amended to recognise forest carbon as a tradable commodity and to handle transactions of REDD+ payments through the national system. Such a decision requires careful consideration and must be based on real prospects of REDD+. (+4)
- The process of REDD+ readiness has been instrumental in promoting civil society engagement and advocating marginalised and indigenous people's rights in forest management. (+3)
- REDD+ readiness process has contributed to forest sector capacity development through cross-sectoral analysis of issues concerning forest cover change and dialogue with the private sector, other sectors and civil society about deforestation drivers and rights, irrespective of any financial benefits. (+3)
- Access to donor finance is being offered based either on: a) a high carbon potential, or b) a high-level
- political commitment for REDD+ with enabling conditions regardless of carbon potential. (+3)
- Having a technically competent national focal point attending and contributing to the UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+ regularly is beneficial for the country, but without strategic support from policymakers and politicians that make REDD+ a national priority, no real progress will be made. (+3)

These research participants did not feel that:

- The lead national entity for REDD+ readiness is often a ministry/department in charge of forestry, which often prefers to work on technical REDD+ issues like national forest inventory rather than stakeholder engagement, social and macroeconomic issues. This poses a risk to REDD+. (-3)
- The process surrounding the formulation of the National REDD+ Strategy is very government-centric and involving primarily government agencies on environment and natural resources, while only a few NGOs and community-based organisations are even aware of REDD+. (-4)
- When a country relies on one national representative to attend and contribute to the UNFCCC negotiations, the interpretation of the UNFCCC COP decisions and guidance at the national level is strongly influenced and monopolised by one person. (-4)
- Small REDD+ countries would be better off continuing with the conventional sustainable forest management efforts rather than engaging in REDD+, given their limited prospects of generating sizable RBPs and capacity limitations (e.g. financial/ human/ political). (-5)
- Every party to the UNFCCC has an equal voice and opportunity to shape decisions collectively. The UNFCCC is a platform for negotiation and has no tradition of telling countries how they should reduce emissions or share benefits, as it is a sovereign matter. (-5)

5.2.3.a.   No Room for National Priorities

The primary aim of REDD+ under the UNFCCC is undoubtedly to generate forest carbon emissions reductions on a global scale through financial incentives (UNFCCC, 2016a). Nonetheless, the focus of international actors was observed to be too rigidly on climate change mitigation results, measured in tonnes of

carbon emissions and RBPs without paying adequate attention to its potential to deliver more context-specific benefits at the national and local levels. This supports the claim by Gupta et al. (2012) regarding the centralising effects of global carbon accountability and risk of standardising the value of forests through REDD+.

Although NCBs were considered more important in this factor, the dominant focus on carbon emissions by donors and international experts was observed to ignore or relegate the importance of NCBs through REDD+ for Nepal. The national representative of an international CSO (in-depth interview, December 2, 2015) claimed that:

> Small countries like us, Nepal, are not doing REDD+ for carbon as we have very limited potential. We are doing REDD+ for its multiple benefits to enhance our community forests, biodiversity conservation, livelihoods...

From this perspective, NCBs of REDD+ were viewed far more important for Nepal than potential REDD+ revenues. The factor also highlights a concern that the external valuation of forests from the perspective of global carbon accountability may destabilise the existing mechanisms of community and collaborative forest management through the commodification of forests in the global carbon market. According to the senior government representative (a) (in-depth interview, April 30, 2016), he explained that such external valuation could 'bring the risk of the global market into community forests' as 'the local livelihoods closely depend on forests …[so] there could be serious consequences'. From this perspective, it was also observed that a legal reform would be necessary to manage such market-related risks in REDD+ in order to protect local livelihoods from such risks.

Highlighting these concerns above, the factor urges donors and international experts to recognise the validity of Nepal's country-specific approach to REDD+. Similarly, the notion that large forested countries are most suitable for REDD+, often held by donors and international experts, was strongly contested in this factor. Such contestation highlights the singular conception of REDD+ based on the market logic from the perspective of donor countries and their intermediaries,

as also suggested by Banerjee and Bobby (2003), Bock (2014) and Winkler and Dubash (2015). Given their focus on NCBs and the enhancement of community forestry through REDD+, the current institutional arrangements for REDD+ led by the country's forestry ministry were also viewed to be appropriate, despite criticisms by donors and international experts, as illustrated by the previous factor.

5.2.3.b.   Donor Finance Shaping Discourses and Practices

Supporting the claims by Joseph (2010) and others including Thompson et al. (2011) and Dawson et al. (2018), the influence of donor finance based on the donor-recipient power relations in Nepal was observed to have shaped the discourse and practices concerning REDD+, including the agendas of CSOs. The donor finance and the influential role of donors were viewed to have significant bearing on the national REDD+ process in Nepal. The senior government representative of Nepal (a) (in-depth interview, April 30, 2016), for instance, argued that 'the donor agencies play a more dominant role in the process currently than national actors'.

Despite these critical views, the factor demonstrates the recognition that REDD+ readiness work had so far contributed to enhanced stakeholder engagement and technical capacity development in the area of forest policy in the country. Notably, the process of national REDD+ strategy preparation was observed to be handled inclusively with active stakeholder engagement, owing to having both the technically competent lead institution and focal point.

5.2.4. Factor Four: REDD+ is a development strategy, not a technical fix for climate change

As shown in Table 5-1, the Q sorts of the six participants were significantly correlated with this factor. Four of them represented the federal and state governments, multilateral institution and CSO in Malaysia. The other two research participants were one of the representatives of the governments of Sri

Lanka and an independent international expert who formerly served a donor country in the UNFCCC COP negotiations on REDD+.

This factor is also characterised by its concerns of the effects of donor conditionality and external influences that hinder the impact potential of REDD+ in middle-income countries like Malaysia with increasingly advanced economic and political structures and capabilities. The factor also illustrates the systemic shortcomings of REDD+.

Table 5-5: Factor Four Crib Sheet

These research participants strongly felt that: *Number in ( ) indicates the ranking of each statement in the factor
• REDD+ is just one piece of the broader sustainable land management and development puzzle, but many actors have viewed REDD+ in isolation and as a way to advance their own interests and agendas, which could undermine REDD+ itself. (+5)   • It is harder for middle-income countries to attract donor finance in REDD+ readiness, and even if there is a possibility, such assistance often imposes conditionalities, interfering with sensitive socio-political matters, and making it harder for the Government to accept. (+5)   • COP decisions on REDD+, aiming to incentivise REDD+ countries to start their own REDD+ processes, are often difficult for countries outside the inner circle of the UNFCCC negotiations to understand due to the internal politics of the negotiations. (+4)   • REDD+ is not the best tool for everywhere. A more focused approach is needed to understand where it can work well and why, and that would make REDD+ finance more effective. (+4)   • Experts from developed countries often hold a view that REDD+ is a way to protect forests for the good of the world and a low-cost climate solution, but national stakeholders see REDD+ as an additional source of finance, and local people see it as support to their livelihood strategy. (+4)   • The concept of addressing emissions globally obstructs the real issue of addressing deforestation and degradation, as the extent of deforestation or degradation can be politically defined and influenced to maximise the flow of REDD+ finance. REDD+ might not deliver real results. (+3)   • REDD+ readiness process has contributed to forest sector capacity development through cross-sectoral analysis of issues concerning forest cover change and dialogue with the private sector, other sectors and civil society about deforestation drivers and rights, irrespective of any financial benefits. (+3)   • Having a technically competent national focal point attending and contributing to the UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+ regularly is beneficial for the country, but without strategic support from policymakers and politicians that make REDD+ a national priority, no real progress will be made. (+3)
These research participants did not feel that:
• Local governments are concerned that REDD+ will justify centralised control over all land matters by the central government, while the central government is concerned that they will be obliged to compensate the local governments for their foregone opportunities. (-3)   • Technical issues have overshadowed the important politics of improving forest management and addressing drivers of deforestation within many REDD+ countries. Monitoring changes and managing data should just follow the political vision. (-3)

- Categorisation of stakeholders into national and international is unfair and unconstructive and seems to be rooted in historical colonial practices to classify who can provide information and who should receive it in a one-way fashion from international to national. (-3)
- The process surrounding the formulation of the National REDD+ Strategy is very government-centric and involving primarily government agencies on environment and natural resources, while only a few NGOs and community-based organisations are even aware of REDD+. (-4)
- There is no conflict between REDD+, global consumption/production issues and neoliberal economic policies because REDD+ does not stop you from logging your forests, or from addressing your development goals. (-5)
- The carbon market offers the best method for allocating funding in REDD+ without too much regulatory control. (-5)

5.2.4.a. Expert Politics Impeding Progress

While donor conditionality and interference were also observed to be the issues affecting national ownership, this factor raises knowledge politics among experts as another critical issue, impeding the progress in REDD+ at the national level. This factor underpins the claim by Wilson Rowe (2015) that international negotiations and policy debates were often used by experts to wield their influence and claim their competence through demonstration of their sophisticated ideas and approaches. Such knowledge politics among experts were viewed to have undermined the purpose and effectiveness of the UNFCCC guidance in providing clear directions and support to REDD+ countries. The national representative of the United Nations in Malaysia (in-depth interview, December 22, 2015) argued that 'the COP decisions are too technical, only understood by experts' and thus, 'it's not conducive to operationalising REDD+ on the ground'. It was observed that the expert style of debate and language used at the international level were reproduced merely at the national level to limit the scope and scale of policy debates concerning REDD+. Subsequently, it impeded the chances of having broader policy debates concerning REDD+ among a wide range of stakeholders in Malaysia.

5.2.4.b. Process of Development Not a Technical Fix

Considering these issues, the factor suggests that it is crucial for REDD+ to be framed as part of the national development process rather than a technical discourse or fix for climate change from the international perspective. Treating REDD+ as part of the overall development process was thus viewed as

necessary in bringing onboard policymakers and a broad range of stakeholders from across relevant sectors. The national representative of the United Nations (ibid.) also indicated that 'REDD+ is not seen by our [Malaysian] policymakers as an approach to sustainable development, but rather seen as simply an [international carbon] financing facility'. The senior government representative of Malaysia (in-depth interview, June 22, 2015) argued that 'we should not look at [REDD+] as a way to reduce emissions at the national level, but as a vehicle to move towards good environmental governance instead' in order for the process to be fully owned by the country and trigger transformational change. The factor illuminates this difference in framing of REDD+ to be one of the critical shortcomings, facing REDD+ at the national level.

REDD+ was thus viewed in this factor not as a panacea or silver bullet, but rather as a context-specific strategic framing tool for sustainable forest and land use management within the overall national development process. However, the knowledge of where and under which conditions REDD+ would work well and why was observed to be lacking in the international REDD+ community. According to the former REDD+ negotiator of a donor government (in-depth interview, September 24, 2015), 'opportunities to understand the politics of resources management and how best to reduce emissions in such contexts are overshadowed by the technical debates [on carbon accounting and finance]'. It was observed that having such knowledge would have allowed for more effective allocation of REDD+ finance to strategically instigate transformational change through REDD+. From this perspective, it was viewed to have been important for REDD+ not to be treated merely as a carbon financing tool, and therefore, strong reservations were expressed about the central role of the carbon market in REDD+. Supporting the claim by Cohen and McCarthy (2014), it was observed that the focusing too much on the carbon and financial aspects of REDD+ would risk masking the real cause of emissions through production and consumption practices.

Nonetheless, the factor also acknowledges some positive impacts of REDD+ processes by having increased cross-sectoral dialogue and coordination

between levels of government within the forestry sector, particularly between the state and federal governments in Malaysia.

5.3 INTER-FACTOR RELATIONSHIPS

Through the above interpretation of the factors, some notable similarities and differences between the factors have been recognised. The similarities particularly highlight mutual connections between these factors, while the differences also illuminate some areas of disagreement or tensions between the factors or different groups of REDD+ actors.

5.3.1 Shared Sentiments

The first factor, associated with the viewpoints of the Sri Lankan research participants, presents a pessimistic view on REDD+ and is most concerned with donor conditionality, limited national ownership and difficulty for middle-income countries like Sri Lanka to accept such external interference. The fourth factor, presenting the views of primarily the Malaysian research participants, also raises similar concerns regarding donor conditionality and limited national ownership. In relation to the issue of national ownership, the fourth factor also points to the overly technical nature of REDD+, hindering the necessary engagement and commitment at the political level in REDD+ countries like Malaysia.

Despite the frustration in terms of the lack of progress on REDD+, expressed in the second factor representing the views of the international experts, the other three factors acknowledge some positive impacts through their REDD+ readiness processes. Such impacts include increased cross-sectoral dialogue concerning forest management issues and enhanced forest monitoring capacity. Although all four factors questioned the overall transformational potential of REDD+ from various angles, these three factors, representing the views of the research participants from the three case study countries, recognise some capacity enhancement benefits of the REDD+ readiness work within the forestry sector.

Across all four factors, the carbon market in REDD+ without adequate regulatory control was viewed to be problematic. This was primarily due to the concerns over the ability of the market alone to respond to diverse social needs, and thus, confirming the role of regulatory control as a protector of public interest in market-based international mechanisms such as REDD+, as also suggested by Dean (2014).

5.3.2 Disagreements

Both the second and third factors, respectively representing the views of the international experts and Nepalese research participants, illustrate their frustration, caused by the differences in understanding and expectation in terms of what was to be achieved through REDD+. The second factor considers the role of REDD+ in countries with limited forest cover such as Nepal and Sri Lanka to be negligible while the third factor strongly disagrees with this view. The second factor is primarily concerned with the observed slow progress of REDD+ from the global perspective of climate change mitigation, and thus, emphasising the need for strategic and effective use of REDD+ finance to trigger the type of transformation necessary. At the same time, the third factor opposes such a view by suggesting the need for REDD+ to first serve specific national interests and needs in order for REDD+ to be able to address climate change on a global scale. The first and fourth factors also support this latter view.

Also, the use of technical and English languages in the national REDD+ processes was not considered to be a significant issue in the second factor, representing the views of the international experts. On the other hand, the technical language of experts and associated knowledge politics were identified in the other factors to be an issue contributing to the limited stakeholder engagement and political commitment to REDD+ at the national level. Some scholars like Bastakoti and Davidsen (2015) and Poudel and Aase (2015) also raise a similar concern that the language sets specific power relations that

privilege the positions of donors and experts in national REDD+ processes and ultimately limit the effectiveness of action at the national and local levels.

5.3.3 Shared Indifference

There are also some indifferent positions shared between the factors. Such positions are interpreted based on those Q statements that received a score of 0 (neutral/undecided), 1 or -1 and 2 or -2 along the Q grid scale of – 5 (i.e., Least like my viewpoint) to 5 (i.e., Most like my viewpoint).

One such position shared among all four factors is about the role of CSOs in ensuring stakeholder buy-in and supporting conflict resolution within national REDD+ processes. This was partly because there was limited progress in the implementation of REDD+ on the ground in the case study countries as their activities mostly focused on national readiness. The activities of CSOs were, therefore, primarily confined to awareness raising and representation of civil society interests through policy processes at the national level.

However, as reflected in the second factor concerning FPIC, some research participants, associated with the other factors, also highlighted their concerns regarding the role of CSOs during the in-depth interviews and focus group session. For instance, the senior government representative of Malaysia (in-depth interview, June 22, 2015) indicated that 'many CSOs do not adequately adapt those globally mainstreamed [concepts and ideas] like FPIC to the local contexts'. Because of this, she explained that they became merely a conduit for pursuing the global agendas of international CSO networks. The senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (b) in Sri Lanka (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) also indicated that 'some people in the country resent some CSOs …as they simply try to impose on people outside ideas of the Western donors, multilateral organisations or global CSOs'. From these perspectives, there was a shared notion that viewed CSOs as vehicles of the globally streamlined concerns of equity and justice, which were often constituted

by 'Northern-dominated institutions' as suggested by Joseph (2009, p. 420), without necessarily addressing the real equity and justice issues on the ground.

However, it is important to note here that individual Q sorts of those research participants, representing national and international CSOs understandably did not share this view as it would have been self-deprecating to reject their own norms, values and beliefs through their conduct.

These similarities and differences in views highlighted above are discussed further in the subsequent chapters through the examination of specific analytical dimensions.

5.3.4 Confounded Positions

Confounded Q sorts are often considered to bewilder the attempt to provide a clear description of each factor, as they can demonstrate contradictory positions by correlating with more than one factor. However, the nature of their assimilation of multiple factors may nevertheless provide useful linkages between the factors to highlight their mutual connections (Brown, 2017; Wolf, 2017). The Q sorts of three research participants, as indicated in Table 5-1, were confounded with more than one factor.

First, the confounded viewpoint of the senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (b) in Sri Lanka (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) was congruent with both the first factor, characterised by a pessimistic outlook of the Sri Lankan research participants on REDD+ and the second factor, representing the views of the international experts. He (ibid.) argued that:

> You know countries are abided by the international rules and regulations, so [the countries] are in a way being controlled…but, I feel international standards are important, and international guidelines are important… but decisions must be based on country-specific arrangements… Like the Millennium Development Goals, now Sustainable Development Goals, they are important for everybody...so our actions matter.

This was based on his observations of opportunities and challenges associated with the REDD+ process in Sri Lanka. As a development and conservation practitioner with many years of experience, managing multilateral projects, he saw the need to balance both top-down and bottom-up processes. From this perspective, he (ibid.) described REDD+ as ideal a vehicle 'to promote NCBs like biodiversity conservation, community forestry and livelihoods' in Sri Lanka within the context of national development. However, he was also frustrated with the dominant approach of international experts involved in the REDD+ in Sri Lanka that often silenced opinions of national actors. His confounded position seems to be linked to his ability to view REDD+ from both the perspectives of international experts and national actors.

Second, the confounded viewpoint of the national representative of a regional organisation in Nepal (in-depth interview, December 2, 2015) highlighted a linkage between the third and fourth factors. His views were critical of both the strict focus of the donors and international experts on the carbon aspect of REDD+ and the knowledge politics among international experts that set the power relations between the international and national actors. He (ibid.) argued that:

> …developed countries…and international consultants use the technical language and explanations to say …we must do REDD+ for the sake of the global environment …that is how they rationalise REDD+. [But]…do you think the poor countries like us can afford to think about the global environment? We can only rationalise REDD+ as we understand in the national context...

He was most concerned with the divisions between international and national actors regarding the aim of REDD+ and whether it was strictly for the international benefit for or also for the benefit of REDD+ countries and communities. This view stemmed from his position as a representative of a regional organisation, promoting REDD+ to enhance community forestry efforts. As he (ibid.) explained, '…as a national representative, my responsibility is to facilitate communication between both sides'. He found himself in a difficult position where the international approach and interest did not adequately meet the national and local interests, and thus, reconciling this difference presented a professional and personal dilemma.

Lastly, the confounded viewpoint of the senior national representative of a global research organisation, located in Nepal, related to the second and third factors. His view called for an increased international focus on large forested countries, while also advocating for the broader framing of REDD+ beyond carbon impacts. Similar to the previous confounded positions, as a national representative of a global institution, his position illustrated a split between his professional and personal views and attitudes regarding REDD+. Since this research participant did not participate in an in-depth interview or provide post-Q-sort feedback regarding this point, further analysis of his position was not possible.

5.3.4.a. Having to Reconcile Multiple Viewpoints and Stances

The researcher's observations suggest that such confounded positions are not so uncommon among REDD+ actors who are involved in REDD+ at the interface between the international and national processes. As demonstrated above, these national actors who represented international organisations shifted their stances and viewpoints, depending on whether they represented the views of their institutions or their personal perspectives as national REDD+ actors. As a result, they were often having to reconcile the differences arising from their multiple perspectives. Nevertheless, such confounded positions might have been more prevalent among the research participants as nearly half of them identified themselves as REDD+ experts who were operating at the interface that linked both the international and national processes. For instance, the senior representative of a national research organisation in Nepal (in-depth interview, August 26, 2015) argued that:

> … the clear distinction needed here is the distinction between the private voice and public voice and whether people are presenting a global view or local concern. They will tell you different things depending on where they are coming from. That is the same as talking to senior officials at the Ministry or CSO people, if you talk to him or her in private with a cup of tea or over a cold beer, the answer will be completely different than what you receive from them in the public setting.

These confounded positions thus highlight the effects of scale on the viewpoints of the research participants. Depending on how scales were performed in

relation to their professional and personal perspectives, their scaled identities and stances can shift to view and problematise REDD+ in a pluralistic and sometimes conflicting manner, as suggested by Kaiser and Nikiforova (2008) through the performativity of scale. These unique confounded positions are thus examined further in the next two chapters.

5.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented the interpretation of the four factors as the outlines and key characteristics of the four emerging discourses. Intriguingly, these emerging discourses have quite clearly grouped the research participants by country.

The first discourse, associated with the research participants from Sri Lanka, highlights its pessimistic notion that dismisses the effectiveness and impact potential of REDD+ for countries like Sri Lanka under the current global approach. This is because REDD+ was observed as a top-down and expert-driven process with notable influence from donor countries, which was perceived to be problematic as it raised historical equity and justice concerns through REDD+. The second discourse, associated with the research participants from the international domain, illustrates their struggle in dealing with the gap between their professional beliefs and responsibility in promoting REDD+ and their understanding of the ground reality that makes such beliefs and responsibility unfeasible. From this vantage point, the discourse calls for REDD+ to concentrate on large forested countries with enabling conditions in order to deliver real mitigation impacts. Directly contrasting this view, the third discourse, reflecting the views of the research participants from Nepal, underscores their frustration towards this view of international actors and their dominant influence over the country's REDD+ activities. The discourse thus urges REDD+ to be more context-specific to meet national priorities rather than merely focusing on global climate change mitigation results. Crosscutting the first and third discourses, the fourth discourse, correlated with the Malaysian research participants, also raises the concerns associated with donor conditionality and

external influences that diminish the impact potential of REDD+ in countries like Malaysia with increasingly advanced economic and political systems. From this perspective, the discourse points to a systemic shortcoming of REDD+ that views REDD+ as a technical fix, not as a development strategy.

These discourses illustrate their unique and distinct positions from one another, as well as some notable similarities between them, for example, through the problematisation of the issues concerning national ownership and external influence, as demonstrated by the first, third and fourth discourses. Also, the confounded viewpoints of the few research participants have shown the presence of hybrid viewpoints or positions that can shift between the discourses, depending on the specific scalar perspective taken by them. The researcher's observations suggest that such positions are common among national REDD+ actors, representing international organisations, as they shift their stances and viewpoints depending on whether they represent the views of their institutions or their personal perspectives as national REDD+ actors. These positions thus highlight the effects of scale on the viewpoints of the research participants.

Building on these findings, the next two chapters examine the analytical dimensions/specific research questions through these emerging discourses to identify the effects of governmentality through REDD+.

6. CHAPTER SIX: REDD+ GOVERNMENTALITY: FORMATION OF OBJECTS AND SUBJECTS AND EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGIES OF POWER

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter builds on the outlines and prominent characteristics of the four discourses (see Table 6-1) that emerged from the previous chapter to explore the first three of the five analytical dimensions of governmentality introduced in Chapter Two (highlighted red in Figure 6-1). The findings of poststructuralist discourse analysis based on the interviews, focus group and review of literature including media and published reports, are used here to develop a fuller understanding of these emerging discourses.

Figure 6-1: First three dimensions of REDD+ governmentality examined through discourse analysis

The chapter also explores the related knowledge gaps in the pertinent literature, as identified in Chapter Two. These knowledge gaps concern the process and effects of transition from a boundary object to a boundary infrastructure, whether REDD+ as a process of global environmental governance promotes the role of central authorities, as prescribed by the provisions of the WFR, and the effects of knowledge production and dissemination as a technology of power.

The examination of these analytical dimensions of governmentality provides a novel approach to understanding the construction and effects of power from the perspectives of REDD+ actors, representing national governments, donor agencies, multilateral institutions and international and national CSOs at the interface between the international and national REDD+ processes. Very few studies have focused on these aspects of power particularly from the internal and subjective viewpoints of these actors.

This chapter examines these analytical dimensions and issues within each of the four discourses through poststructuralist discourse analysis. The findings of discourse analysis are also supplemented with information based on the researcher's own knowledge and observations of the REDD+ processes in the case study countries.

Table 6-1: Four Discourses Emerged from Chapter Five

Discourse No.	Main Narrative	Associated Participants
Discourse 1:	REDD+ won't happen, not for us, not in its current form	Sri Lankan participants
Discourse 2:	We are frustrated: REDD+ must focus on real mitigation impacts	International participants
Discourse 3:	We want REDD+, but not for emissions reductions	Nepalese participants
Discourse 4:	REDD+ is a development strategy, not a technical fix for climate change	Mainly Malaysian participants

This chapter is organised into three sections, excluding the introduction and conclusion sections. The first section provides an overall summary of the objects of government identified through the four discourses. The second section delves into a specific object of government that has emerged from each discourse. The third section identifies particular groups of subjects and examines their prominent characteristics in relation to specific technologies of government, working to prompt action by the subjects. The chapter attempts to shed light on problems and tensions between different objects and subjects that are arising through these discourses from the perspectives of the research participants.

6.1.1. Recalling the Definition of Object, Subject and Technology of Government

Before delving into the discussion of objects, subjects and technologies of government that have emerged through the four discourses, it is useful to recall from Chapter Two what these specific terms denote in this thesis in order to ensure the clarity of discussion in the following section.

6.1.1.a. Objects

Objects of government are understood in this thesis as 'what should be governed… of governmentality' (Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2009, p. 71). The objects typically suggest specific points of application or targets of power through the conduct of the self and others (Dean, 2010). The objects can be multiple in any given context, depending on the perspectives of actors which are shaped by both present and historical contexts (Foucault, 1993, 2009; Dean, 2010). These multiple objects of government can simultaneously be in conflict or complementary relationships with one another. The examination of objects of government, therefore, often reveal tensions between discourses and practices in terms of what different groups of actors define as specific targets of power and how such targets might differ and be pursued by these groups of actors.

6.1.1.b. Subjects

Subjects of government are defined as individuals who participate in the process of governing. Subjects 'are not only … inert or consenting target [of power]; they are always also the elements of its articulation', and thus 'individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application' (Foucault, 1982, p. 98). Nightingale and Ojha (2013, p. 34) describe subjects as 'both the product of external influences … and the internalisation of this subjection by the subject itself'. Subjects are, therefore, socially constructed agents of power (Butler, 2009).

6.1.1.c. Technologies

Technologies of government are defined as instruments of power that allow particular groups of subjects to govern the conduct of themselves and others to

realise their specific objects of government. Technologies enable 'specific ways of acting, intervening and directing, made up of particular types of …'expertise' and 'know-how'' (Dean, 2010, p. 33). Therefore, to understand how power is constituted and being deployed through the governmentality framework, it is essential to examine 'what instruments and procedures are being used' and how they are deployed to govern the objects of government (Rutherford, 2007; Hobson, 2013, p. 60).

## 6.2 OVERVIEW OF OBJECTS OF GOVERNMENT

The objects of government, identified through the four emerging discourses are found to be constructed in two interlinked levels – an overarching object, which is commonly shared among all four discourses, and specific objects, each of which is unique to the specific discourse.

In terms of the overarching object of government, there was a broad consensus among the research participants that the target of REDD+ was to govern the effects of climate change by generating emissions reductions from forests and related land use practices through international efforts.

Under this overarching object of government, a more specific object of government emerged through each discourse. These specific objects of government were concerned with precisely what was to be governed at the national level to rationalise international efforts to govern the effects of climate change through REDD+. As shown in Figure 6-2, the first discourse identified its specific object of government to be the process of environmental governance that would first and foremost ensure national ownership. The second discourse identified its specific object to be the process of carbon emissions reduction by individual developing countries while the process of national policy justification was identified as the specific object of the third discourse. Finally, the fourth discourse identified its specific object as the process of national development through REDD+ to instigate systemic change, instead of focusing on REDD+ as a carbon financing mechanism.

Figure 6-2: Multi-level Objects of Government

FIRST LEVEL: OVERARCHING OBJECT

Effects of Climate Change

SECOND LEVEL: SPECIFIC OBJECTS

Discourse 1: **Process of Environmental Governance**

Discourse 2: **Process of Carbon Emissions Reduction**

Discourse 3: **Process of National Policy Justification**

Discourse 4: **Process of National Development**

This two-level construction of objects suggests that REDD+ operated as a boundary object through these discourses to encompass multiple objects of government, which highlighted a range of visions, issues and solutions, pursued by the research participants. This supports similar claims by scholars, including McDermott et al. (2012), McCall (2016) and van der Sande et al. (2017) that REDD+ operates as a boundary object. The differences between these specific objects also reveal the tensions between the ecological modernisation and global environmental justice narratives, as discussed in Chapter Two. The specific object of the second discourse, reflecting the views of international experts, strongly resonated with the techno-managerial approach under the ecological modernisation narrative. The other three discourses, closely associated with the views from the case study countries, were primarily concerned with global environmental justice to highlight the need for greater national ownership and better contextualisation of REDD+ at the national level.

These two types of objects highlight tensions caused by the difference in the framing of REDD+ from the international and national perspectives. The earlier type viewed REDD+ predominantly as an international response to global forest carbon emissions that were contributing to climate change. In contrast, the latter type observed REDD+ as a path-dependent process of global environmental governance that raised various equity and justice concerns while acknowledging the need to address climate change. This difference in the framing of REDD+ stemmed from historically constituted power relations between developed and developing countries. The resulting tensions illuminate the issues of

accountability, legitimacy and justice within the fundamentally neoliberal domain of global environmental governance, as also suggested by Banerjee and Bobby (2003) and Winkler and Dubash (2015). This difference and associated tensions are explored further in the following sub-sections.

6.2.1. Overarching Object of Government as a Boundary Object

The effects of climate change were commonly identified as the overarching object of government through REDD+ by the research participants. They saw REDD+ as a suitable tool and process to address the effects of climate change. For instance, the senior representative of a private sector network in Sri Lanka (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) stated that 'REDD+ is a timely project because everyone is affected by climate change'. The senior executive of an international CSO (in-depth interview, November 3, 2015) also described REDD+ as 'an innovative solution for addressing climate change and sustainable forest management issues at the same time'. Similarly, the senior government representative (a) of Nepal (in-depth interview, April 30, 2016) argued that 'REDD+ is a new global climate policy framework that provides an incentive for Nepal and our forest managers to contribute to the global climate efforts'.

Beneath this broad consensus about the overall object of government, there were more specific and divergent expectations in terms of what they thought would be governed through REDD+ at the national level. These specific expectations revealed the differences between the discourses in terms of what was considered to be needed to realise the overarching object. This broad framing of the overarching object of government, encompassing a range of specific expectations, thus constituted a boundary object.

Recalling the discussion from Chapter Two, boundary objects are 'plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites' (Star and Griesemer, 1989, p. 393). However, as also discussed in Chapter Two, this often comes with the issue of transition from a boundary object to a boundary

infrastructure, which is brought through an effort to elucidate precisely what should be governed at the practice level. For REDD+, this points to the national level at which it is envisaged to be implemented. A boundary infrastructure operates to adopt common standards down to the practice level to increase its transparency and comparability (Star and Ruhleder, 1996). As explored further in the following section, REDD+, a boundary object became a boundary infrastructure as donors and their intermediaries pushed to standardise REDD+ discourses and practices at the national level from their international perspectives, which were primarily driven by the ecological modernisation narrative. In the observance of such standardisation efforts, the research participants from the case study countries were becoming increasingly concerned with equity and justice issues that arose from this transformation. From this perspective, the examination of these specific objects of government in the following section aims at developing an understanding of the process of transformation of REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure and effects of power and resistance through this process.

6.3 SPECIFIC OBJECTS OF GOVERNMENT

The following analysis of these specific objects describes how the research participants articulated what was particularly needed to be governed at the practice level in order to realise or contribute to the international efforts to govern the effects of climate change.

6.3.1 Specific Object in Discourse One: Process of Environmental Governance

This discourse is notably identified with the Sri Lankan research participants. The analysis of the interview and focus group transcripts suggests that most Sri Lankan research participants were associated with this discourse, not just among those identified through Q.

In this discourse, the specific object of government is the process of environmental governance to ensure greater national ownership. Most Sri

Lankan research participants argued that the modality of ODA through REDD+ was strongly driven by donor conditionality that often imposed top-down policy and institutional reforms by donors and their intermediaries without necessarily understanding specific national contexts and needs. From this perspective, the senior government representative (a) (in-depth interview, July 30, 2015) argued that this top-down ODA modality was 'based on the colonial principles which are all common to us in Sri Lankan historically, but it has unfortunately created a parallel system', which was not fully owned by the Government of Sri Lanka or the public. He (ibid.) also argued that as a result, many ODA-funded initiatives in the country operated almost independently of the national policy and institutional framework, as they primarily focused on meeting donor requirements rather than national needs. The overall development impact and national ownership through such support were consequently limited. At the same time, ODA-funded initiatives were still seen as a 'useful source of additional finance to fill sectoral budget deficits' in less well-financed sectors like forestry, according to the senior government representative (b) (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015).

Several Sri Lankan research participants also argued that this top-down process resonated with the UNFCCC COP negotiations on REDD+ which were observed to be dominated by donors, their intermediaries and large-forested REDD+ countries with significant donor support. According to the senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (b) (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015), 'those powerful countries are more visible in making their arguments to shape international decisions than [countries like Sri Lanka]'. '[D]eveloped countries have bigger delegations and more experts, so their negotiating power is much bigger whereas we are so small and have minimal influence', according to the senior representative of a private sector network (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015). Based on these observations, most Sri Lankan research participants argued that the process of environmental governance needed to be governed differently to enable nationally-led action based on real needs without strictly imposing international decisions, visions and norms. From their perspective, the current decisions, visions and norms reflected unequal power relations between

developed and developing countries, and they had thus felt limited ownership of these decisions, visions and norms.

These critical observations were made because the Sri Lankan research participants had initially understood REDD+ to be an innovative market-based solution that would bring fundamental change to the way in which international support through global environmental governance was provided. However, their experience through their REDD+ readiness process suggested that REDD+ had been handled instead just like any other ODA-funded development and conservation initiative in the country. In their view, REDD+ had thus turned out to be just another ODA initiative with limited interest in ensuring national ownership.

6.3.1.a   Initial Expectations for REDD+

REDD+ had initially presented a possibility to transform the traditional top-down ODA approach in the development and conservation fields in Sri Lanka. The market-based approach and incentives had been understood among the Sri Lankan research participants as a less intrusive mechanism than the traditional ODA modality, which was synonymous with donor conditionality. The senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (a) (in-depth interview, July 29 2015) argued that:

> If you asked me yesterday, I would have said REDD+ was
> revolutionary, but today I would say that REDD+ has become just
> like any other development projects in the past.

The Sri Lankan research participants had initially understood REDD+ as a global form of PES where the authority and power to determine specific terms of engagement would have rested squarely with REDD+ countries as per the international rules set out in the WFR. The international requirements for periodic reporting of forest and safeguards data under the WFR were viewed as a fair trade-off for shifting towards more nationally-led processes. According to the senior government representative (a) (in-depth interview, July 30, 2015), 'I first saw [REDD+] as a new way of dealing with external support in the forest sector as a performance-based mechanism' through which to generate and

report results as per the WFR. Notwithstanding their initial understanding, the Sri Lankan research participants argued that REDD+ turned out to be no different from the traditional ODA-funded development and conservation initiatives in the country. REDD+ instead became a performance-based aid, which reinforced the traditional ODA rationality to reproduce donor conditionality. These accounts support the claim by Angelsen (2017, p. 238) that REDD+ as a results-based aid is infused with the notion that 'aid buys reform' in the absence of market-based finance for REDD+.

Consequently, international REDD+ support initiatives such as the UN-REDD Programme in Sri Lanka reverberated strongly with the visions, norms and values of donors and international experts from multilateral institutions. According to the senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (a) (in-depth interview, July 29, 2015), the REDD+ process in Sri Lanka became a place where 'consultants, advisors and professionals of big international organisations and donors to fly in and debate about carbon monitoring and prices and how [Sri Lanka] should share the benefits' instead of focusing on how REDD+ could best serve the country to trigger the necessary transformation. He (ibid.) thus described such expert debates as 'nothing but intellectual masturbation and an expert theatre!'.

6.3.1.b   Sense of Disappointment and Pragmatism

Because of this contrast between their initial expectation of REDD+ and what was observed in reality, there was a strong sense of disappointment among the Sri Lankan research participants. They argued that the current REDD+ processes should have been more bottom-up from the individual country-level in order to make a globally significant contribution to international climate efforts. The senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (b) (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) argued in this context that 'we must work based on national mechanisms, national priorities, national systems, which could then support the international agreements and goals…not the other way around'.

At the same time, beneath this overall sense of disappointment, there was also a sense of pragmatism that accepted the unequal power relations based on Sri Lanka's need for international support and historical contexts in which such power relations were established. According to the senior government representative (a) (in-depth interview, July 30, 2015), 'of course, [the top-down process] is not fair, but since we need support, we have to depend on the UN-REDD and others'. Similarly, the senior representative of a national CSO (a) (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) argued that 'we are allowing developed countries to continue polluting, and they even set the terms of how REDD+ should be implemented in our country, but support is needed in the sector, so we have to make the best of it'.

These notions of disappointment and pragmatism highlight the Sri Lankan research participants' unique perspectives that problematised REDD+ as an externally-driven process with limited national ownership and potential to deliver meaningful impacts. Simultaneously, the Sri Lankan research participants accepted the observed reality, entrenched in the inequitable power relations between donor and recipient countries, as REDD+ was viewed as a vital source of donor finance for sectoral capacity development. As also suggested by scholars like McDermott (2014), such unequal power relations transformed REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure to impose specific visions, norms and values of donors and their intermediaries through the national REDD+ process in Sri Lanka.

6.3.2 Specific Object in Discourse Two: Process of Carbon Emissions Reduction

This discourse was strongly associated with the viewpoints of the research participants who were engaged in REDD+ internationally and represented donor agencies, multilateral institutions, international CSOs and global research networks. These research participants were often involved in REDD+ through both international and national policy processes.

For these research participants, the specific object of government was the process of forest carbon emissions reduction in individual REDD+ countries. These research participants viewed REDD+ primarily as a technical and apolitical mechanism to generate emissions reductions by addressing deforestation and forest degradation in order to control the effects of climate change on a global scale. They argued that REDD+ countries had already committed to implementing the UNFCCC and other relevant MEAs concerning forests and climate. They, therefore, argued that the international community was merely responding to their requests for support in meeting their international commitments. From this perspective, the senior representative of a donor government (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) explained that:

> In terms of reducing forest emissions and respecting the safeguards… countries have signed up for them under the relevant international conventions. It is now their obligations. [Developing] countries can access [donor] finance only if they are fully committed to them. [REDD+] thus provides a new way of binding those obligations together and supports the countries in meeting them.

The other research participants associated with this discourse also described REDD+ in a similar light. The senior representative of a global REDD+ readiness initiative (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) also argued that 'most developing countries did sign on to these conventions to say: "Okay! Forests are international public goods, so give us the money for [managing them]"'. According to the former senior representative of the UNFCCC (in-depth interview, September 24, 2015);

> The international negotiations and decisions on REDD+ are [therefore] there to provide the necessary contexts and framework to help developing countries implement REDD+ as part of their overall international obligations and commitments.

Despite these assumptions combined with the availability of international guidance and support, the research participants associated with this discourse argued that the progress towards making significant emissions reductions had been disappointingly limited. In their views, this was due to two main factors, namely the capacity limitations of REDD+ countries and effects of donor finance.

6.3.2.a   Limited Capacities and Effects of Donor Finance

Despite their international and techno-bureaucratic perspectives constituting this specific object of government, these research participants had extensive experience working with various national governments and other stakeholders in REDD+ countries, including the three case study countries. Based on their experiences, they observed that many REDD+ countries were faced with circumstances that were not conducive for efficiently generating forest carbon emissions reductions. From this perspective, the senior regional representative of the United Nations (in-depth interview, December 3, 2015) argued that 'I'm convinced that certain countries will never get ready for REDD+, including your three case study countries'. He (ibid.) explained that it was because 'our work is mainly with forest departments, typically the national lead-agencies for REDD+' which were neither strategically positioned nor interested to handle deforestation and degradation pressures, coming from other more influential sectors like agriculture and infrastructure development.

Similarly, according to the senior executive of an international CSO (in-depth interview, November 3, 2015), 'the governance [of REDD+], activities and the money are pretty much absorbed by forestry institutions [which] are not collaborative nor interested in rights and safeguards'. From these perspectives, the research participants argued that the institutional arrangements and inherent capacity limitations within such arrangements had made progress difficult. They thus argued that REDD+ should have been led instead by an agency responsible for national development planning in each country.

The research participants associated with this discourse also argued that another reason for slow progress was the unrealistic expectations and pressures on REDD+ countries by donors. Such expectations and pressures were often applied universally as donors were interested in promoting REDD+ as a widely scalable solution to ensure its cost-effectiveness, as also suggested by Redford et al.(2013). The research participants claimed that this had created competition among developing countries for donor finance.   The senior regional representative of the United Nations (in-depth interview, November 3, 2015) thus

argued that donor finance had prescribed standardised 'requirements and set terms of engagement by REDD+ countries' globally through initiatives like the FCPF and UN-REDD to make REDD+ merely an ODA financing window to serve any developing countries with forests. Furthermore, the senior representative of a global REDD+ readiness initiative (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) stated that donor finance in some ways created the situation in which REDD+ countries had to superficially fit their national circumstances around donor requirements in order to access finance. She (ibid.) described further that:

> …the donors that sit on our Policy Board [of the UN-REDD] like Norway are insisting that we do this and that …so we develop toolbox guidance and we're talking about, for example, land tenure, we're talking about social safeguards and we're going to countries and bringing a perspective in which may or may not be relevant. For instance, land tenure is rather a Western concept. Across much of developing Asia, land is often communally managed or [managed by central authorities] ... Why are we saying you have to clarify land tenure otherwise you cannot receive support?

These observations also support the claims by scholars including Karsenty et al.(2014), Angelsen (2017) and Dawson et al. (2018), suggesting that REDD+ countries and donor intermediaries often implement activities just to respond to donor requirements. The research participants argued that the expectations and pressures from donors to pursue their ambitious REDD+ visions had primarily overlooked the fact that such visions often mismatched the capacities, development priorities and political and sociocultural contexts of REDD+ countries. This mismatch had, therefore, caused implementation delays, confusion and superficial adoption of donor requirements among many REDD+ countries merely to access donor finance without due diligence to ensure their feasibility of generating significant emissions reductions through REDD+.

Furthermore, the former senior representative of the UNFCCC (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) argued that the situation was made more complicated as 'donor countries like Germany, Japan, Norway and the United States don't provide consistent and coherent visions and approaches to REDD+ given their specific individual political and economic interests'. She (ibid.) described the safeguards as an example as there were different interpretations

among donors and their intermediaries, and such multiple interpretations had further confused REDD+ countries, particularly those with multiple donors involved. While acknowledging this concern, the senior representative of a donor government (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) contested that '[having these multiple approaches] has actually been beneficial to the international community as we have been experimenting to find the best way forward although big donors would actually like to put their funds directly to where most of the forests are'. Nonetheless, he (ibid.) also agreed that such an experimental process had inadvertently created competition for REDD+ readiness finance among developing countries. The research participants associated with this discourse thus argued that this had affected developing countries' ability to objectively assess their long-term costs and benefits and their fit with REDD+ in line with their development priorities and needs, as also suggested by Lee and Pistorius (2015).

From the perspective of a REDD+ country, the senior representative of a national research organisation in Nepal (in-depth interview, August 26, 2015), who was also associated with this discourse, confirmed that:

> There is a big competition within the government to access REDD+ finance… as Nepal is very much relying on aid money… bureaucrats working closely with donors and international organisations do whatever to serve the interests of those external actors…foreign aid has shaped key policy discourse in the country.

The research participants associated with this discourse, therefore, argued that these capacity limitations faced by REDD+ countries and the effects of donor finance had severely hindered the necessary progress in REDD+.

6.3.2.b   Shifting the Focus

Building on these observations, the research participants argued that a shift would be needed to concentrate on developing countries with significant forest cover and the necessary capacity and political will to generate globally significant volumes of forest carbon emissions reductions. Without clarifying exactly which countries matched such descriptions, the senior regional representative of the

United Nations (in-depth interview, December 3, 2015) argued in this context that:

> There will only be less than a dozen countries with large forest areas that will draw sizeable benefits through REDD+ and work quite well in terms of generating [globally significant] emissions reductions.

He (ibid.) added that 'I honestly don't think others are needed to join [REDD+]'. As also suggested by Neeff et al. (2014), this was because not all countries would have significant carbon emissions reduction potential and governance capacity and conditions to implement REDD+. Interestingly, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) (2017) also indicates in its call for proposals for REDD+ RBPs that they expect roughly ten countries to meet its eligibility criteria. This may suggest the future direction of REDD+ as informed by the experimental phase of REDD+ readiness. However, this would draw REDD+ closer to the CDM to reproduce its shortcomings through REDD+ (Lederer, 2011; Methmann, 2013; Neeff, Göhler and Ascui, 2014).

This analysis of this specific object of government also illustrates the transition of REDD+ from a boundary object to a boundary infrastructure through the efforts to operationalise REDD+ based on donors' visions, norms and values at the national level. The imposition of such visions, norms and values on REDD+ countries through donor finance was observed by these research participants as the primary force to standardise the approach to REDD+. However, these research participants also observed that the effectiveness of this standardised approach was mostly limited due to the mismatch between the donor expectations and capacity on the ground. Meanwhile, given their unique positionality closely associated with both donors and REDD+ countries, the viewpoints of the research participants relating to this discourse demonstrated their ability to problematise REDD+ from multiple scaled perspectives.

6.3.3 Specific Object in Discourse Three – Process of National Policy Justification

The analysis of the interview and focus group transcripts suggests that most Nepalese research participants were associated with this discourse. This discourse is characterised by the Nepalese research participants' frustration caused by tensions between international and national actors due to differences in how REDD+ was envisioned. The specific object of government in this discourse is the process of national policy justification through REDD+ to reinforce the legitimacy and relevance of the country's forest management policy.

The Nepalese research participants argued that their national REDD+ process was being shaped predominantly by donors and experts whose visions, norms and values did not reflect the direction of forestry policy in the country. However, given Nepal's dependency on ODA as one of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), such an externally-driven process was normalised in the country. The Nepalese research participants nonetheless expressed their frustration and reservations about the effectiveness of this process. They were particularly concern about the dominant framing of REDD+ by donors and international experts with a strong focus on the technical and financial aspects of REDD+, which presented a risk of destabilising the country's semi-decentralised forest management regimes.

6.3.3.a Community Forestry and Collaborative Forest Management at the Core of Forestry Policy

Over the last century, Nepal's community forestry and collaborative forest management regimes have evolved through several successive phases of political forest development, characterised by socio-political contestation and divisions over the issue of land tenure between social and political elites and local communities (Malla, 2001; Paudel *et al.*, 2013; Bushley, 2014; Bastakoti and Davidsen, 2015; Paudel, Vedeld and Khatri, 2015). In the absence of a better alternative, the existing forest management regimes were viewed by the Nepalese research participants as the most sensible way forward to sustainably managing the country's forests. The representative of a national CSO (in-depth interview, September 14, 2015) argued that:

> Because Nepal doesn't have a strong [forestry] industry or potential, because it's all the community people [managing forests for their livelihoods]. I think community forestry presents the only possibility for Nepal.

From this perspective, the Nepalese research participants viewed REDD+ primarily as a suitable vehicle to support the current semi-decentralised and collaborative models of forest governance by focusing on the non-carbon aspect of REDD+. They argued that focusing too much on the financial aspect of REDD+ would run a risk of refuelling the historical contestation and divisions between the central authority and local communities over their rights to RBPs and land tenure since much of the forests were still centrally administered. According to the national representative of a regional organisation (in-depth interview, November 6, 2015), 'the government sees [REDD+] as an opportunity to secure outside money and to reinforce the current forest management regimes'. However, he (ibid.) argued that 'when the real money comes in, there will be a challenge…not sure it will still support local communities and current cohesion'. The representative of a national CSO (in-depth interview, September 14, 2015) also argued in a similar context that the focus on finance might 'threaten the current community forestry practices' in order for the central authority to control REDD+ revenues. In acknowledgement of this concern, the senior government representative (a) (in-depth interview, April 30, 2016) suggested that 'we must have a right approach to ensure a balance between local interests and consideration for carbon efficiency' through Nepal's REDD+ process.

Furthermore, the Nepalese research participants were also concerned about the introduction of market risks to the current forest management regimes by making forest carbon a tradable commodity through REDD+. This was because the current forest management regimes were primarily focused on meeting subsistence needs and supporting local economic activities. According to the national representative of an international CSO (a) (in-depth interview, December 2, 2015);

> Countries like Nepal are different as we have limited potential in terms of accessing REDD+ payments, and the carbon market

could present a risk to our community forests, so we need to value
REDD+ differently.

Thus, most Nepalese research participants argued that the valuation and commodification of their forests in the carbon market could undermine the existing local valuation systems and practices and expose local forest managers to market risks. That would make them vulnerable to unforeseen external changes. This supports the claims by several scholars including Buizer et al. (2014) and Turnhout et al. (2017) concerning the potential adverse effects of carbon commodification through REDD+. The senior representative of a national research organisation (in-depth interview, August 26, 2015) provided an example in this regard that 'some of the poorest communities in the country were already claiming to have protected their forests for oxygen for the global community for the future payments they were expecting'. He (ibid.) suggested that this was a good indication that the ecological modernisation narrative had already begun to shift the mentality of local people through REDD+, and the problem was how the international needs became prioritised over local ones.

Based on these two reasons, the Nepalese participants warned that the current REDD+ process, driven by donors and international experts, could make the forest management regimes in the country potentially vulnerable to market risks. At the same time, they also acknowledged the country's heavy reliance on ODA and its deep-seated influence on the country's development and conservation policies that would keep Nepal's REDD+ process path-dependent.

6.3.3.b   Limitation of Externally-driven Process

Given the crucial role and influence of ODA in the country, the effects of REDD+ operating as a boundary infrastructure were visible, as it imposed the approach to REDD+ in line with the dominant ecological modernisation narrative, supported by donors and their intermediaries. However, because REDD+ was viewed mainly in the country as another ODA initiative, primarily driven by external actors, the Nepalese research participants argued that there was a limited interest in REDD+ among the country's policymakers beyond the forestry sector. The implementation of REDD+ was thus understood to be conditional

upon availability of donor finance. According to the senior government representative (a) (in-depth interview, April 30, 2016), 'the support and dominant role of donors and development agencies make REDD+ a lesser priority among policymakers in Nepal'. Several Nepalese research participants argued that this had been the case with all the other ODA-supported initiatives in the country. The senior representative of a national research organisation (in-depth interview, August 26, 2015) also stated that this was because each ODA supported initiative was viewed as merely a source of additional finance for sector-specific activities, led by a small group of experts from government agencies in charge of the sector, elite CSOs and international actors. In line with this view, REDD+ was observed as an initiative that was primarily benefiting a small group of elite sectoral actors who are serving external visions and requirements of REDD+. This observation supports similar claims by Bushley (2014), Bastakoti and Davidsen (2015) and Dawson et al. (2018) through their studies of REDD+ in Nepal. From this perspective, the Nepalese research participants argued that for REDD+ to contribute to the overarching object of government, REDD+ would have to focus first on delivering country-specific benefits in line with its national forestry policy rather than prioritising international interests and requirements.

6.3.4 Specific Object in Discourse Four: Process of National Development

The specific object of government under the fourth discourse is the process of national development to instigate systemic change, rather than to focus on REDD+ merely as a carbon financing mechanism. This discourse strongly reflects the Malaysian research participants' viewpoints, but also include those of others who viewed REDD+ in this particular light. The analysis of interview transcripts and other personal communication materials has suggested that there are some additional research participants associated with this discourse. These additional research participants include the former senior representative of the UNFCCC and senior executive of an international CSO. These research participants were also associated with the second discourse. As discussed in Chapter Five, these additional confounded positions were expected particularly

given their involvement in REDD+ at the international and national levels. Their ability to hold multiple scaled perspectives were also recognised in the earlier discussion of the object of government concerning the second discourse.

The research participants associated with this discourse argued that the current framing of REDD+ was too narrowly focused on technical aspects of REDD+ which had turned REDD+ into a space of knowledge politics among experts and merely an international carbon financing instrument to limit its impact potential at the national level. They argued that REDD+ should have been more broadly framed in the context of national development to promote broader public debates and discussions about its role in the national development process. The former senior representative of the UNFCCC (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) argued in this context that:

> REDD+ is just one piece of a puzzle. You cannot call the puzzle REDD+. You cannot call the piece the puzzle. That is why there are different interpretations. But, to me, REDD+ will only work if the country really believes that it is part of what the government does in broader terms…otherwise, it won't be sustainable. It doesn't matter how much carbon payments they get. It will never be enough.

From this perspective, the research participants raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of the current approach to REDD+.

6.3.4.a   REDD+ Being Too Technically Focused

The current REDD+ processes were described to be overly focused on technical issues. The senior government representative of Malaysia (in-depth interview, June 22, 2015) argued that the current heavy emphasis on emissions reductions, stemming from the international negotiations, rather than addressing actual drivers of deforestation would undermine the real impact potential of REDD+, as 'volumes of emissions can easily decrease or increase depending on the forest definition used'. She (ibid.) pointed to the existing technical uncertainty of emissions measurement through international debates and certain fluidity in the country's forest classification system. The former REDD+ negotiator of a donor government (in-depth interview, September 24, 2015), who was also associated with this discourse, thus argued that 'political discussions on how to promote

better management of forests and public policy debates are far more important than technical debates on the monitoring and accounting of emissions in developing countries'. Supporting the claim by Cohen and McCarthy (2014), he (ibid.) argued that the debates on the technicality of carbon monitoring and reporting often masked the real challenge of addressing production and consumption practices that produced the emissions in the first place.

From this perspective, the former private sector executive in Malaysia (written correspondence, September 15, 2016) argued that the current framing of REDD+ had forced developing countries 'to shoulder the global emissions burden for our rich brothers in developed countries, and therefore it would only create more resistance'. Hence, he (ibid.) suggested a need for the international negotiations to focus on palpable economic development options through REDD+, rather than providing short-term financial incentives and technical assistance through RBPs and ODA. He (ibid.) warned that continuing with the current process would simply reinforce the current aid dependency of developing countries and power inequality. The other Malaysian research participants echoed this point particularly strongly that the absence of such realistic negotiations between developed and developing countries on an equal footing had limited the necessary political-level engagement of developing countries like Malaysia, which were less dependent on ODA. In fact, between 2010 and 2015, Malaysia's share of ODA globally was nearly 0%, while Nepal and Sri Lanka shared 2.2% and 1.1 % of ODA respectively during the same period (OECD, 2017).

6.3.4.b   Limitations of Experts' Knowledge Politics

As a result of the current framing of REDD+, the research participants argued that experts' knowledge politics dominated their national REDD+ processes. Precisely because of this, the research participants suggested that meaningful debates and discussions among policymakers and the public about REDD+ in the context of national development had been limited in countries like Malaysia and Sri Lanka. The senior government representative (d) of Sri Lanka (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015), who was also associated with this discourse,

claimed that the knowledge politics through international support had made REDD+ debates to a large extent inaccessible by the public in Sri Lanka. In this context, the senior executive of an international CSO (written correspondence, November 3, 2015) suggested that 'the use of technical language is a powerful exclusion tool in REDD+…it gives power to experts but drives others away'. The senior government representative of Malaysia (in-depth interview, June 22, 2015) explained that this was because 'experts' intimate knowledge of technical debates', grounded in the historical accumulation of COP decisions, was essentialised through the international climate negotiations over the years. As a result, experts with such knowledge were able to set specific terms and directions of international and national REDD+ discourses and action while others without the same level of knowledge became passive observers. This demonstrates 'the materiality of knowledge as an instance of power', as suggested by Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine (2008, p. 100). Supporting the claim by Winkler and Dubash (2015), this also demonstrates that the process of knowledge production and dissemination practices of experts through international climate negotiations and decision-making operated as a significant technology of power in REDD+. Through deployment of this technology, the international perspectives and visions, underpinned by experts, were prioritised over those at the national and local levels.

At the same time, because of this technical focus that prevented broader national development debates, the national representative of the United Nations in Malaysia (in-depth interview, December 22, 2015) claimed that REDD+ was viewed as 'nothing more than an international climate finance facility by Malaysian policymakers and senior bureaucrats'. She (ibid.) argued that precisely because of this, REDD+ was not able to find a productive way into the historically contested broader forest management debates, encompassing many socio-political tensions and highly nuanced contexts in Malaysia, as described in Chapter Three. This is also reflected in Malaysia's approach to REDD+ that avoids such contested issues over the country's forest management by strictly targeting its Permanent Reserved Forests as part of the country's public-sector forestry intervention (MNRE, 2015).

Building on these arguments, the research participants suggested that it would be essential for REDD+ to become an integral part of countries' national development processes in order to enable the type of transformation, needed to contribute to international climate efforts. As stated by the senior government representative of Malaysia (in-depth interview, June 22 2015), 'it is [for now] a unpalatable proposition for many governments as it calls for systemic transformation without a strong business case for the countries'. The effects of knowledge politics were, therefore, viewed to have shaped the REDD+ processes at the national level mainly from the international perspective without the necessary engagement by the country's political actors. In this context, the senior executive of an international CSO (in-depth interview, September 15, 2015) suggested that 'REDD+ simply became a technical process to fuel an exclusive and superficial discourse among experts'. These arguments also point to the transformation of REDD+ as a boundary infrastructure through the experts' knowledge politics, observed through this discourse.

6.3.5 REDD+ As a Boundary Infrastructure and Its Effects

The above analysis of the specific objects of government has demonstrated how REDD+ was being transformed into a boundary infrastructure in one way or another by donors, their intermediaries and associated experts. Through each discourse, the research participants identified their specific object of government as the essential element to be governed in order to realise the overarching object. However, this transformation of REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure was observed to have countered these specific objects of government to make REDD+ problematic at the national level for all four discourses (see Table 6-2).

Through the standardisation of how REDD+ should be operationalised all the way down to the practice level, the visions, norms and values of donors, their intermediaries and associated experts that focused on global carbon accountability and international obligations under MEAs took priority over country-specific contexts and needs. In this process, donor finance and the knowledge and language of international policy and scientific debates were

deployed as the dominant technologies of government. These technologies reinforced each other through discourses and practices to rationalise the positions of those subjects with access to and control of these technologies. As also suggested by scholars including Gupta et al. (2016), Angelsen (2017) and Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2017), the use of donor finance and institutionalised knowledge and expertise gave donors, their intermediaries and associated experts the necessary power and legitimacy to shape policy directions, technical approaches and practices through REDD+ in the case study countries.

Table 6-2: Summary of Specific Objects and Problematics of REDD+

Discourse	Specific Object	Problematics of REDD+
Discourse 1:	Process of Environmental Governance	• Dominance of international decision-making by donors and large forested countries. • Use of REDD+ finance and technical assistance to impose donor visions. • Issue of environmental justice: Who should benefit and who bear the burden?
Discourse 2:	Process of Carbon Emissions reductions	• Mismatch between donor visions and capacities and conditions on the ground. • Lack of real progress due to the universal application of REDD+ and limited national capacities. • Issue of effectiveness: Is it necessary to support all REDD+ countries or focus on countries with high emissions reduction potential?
Discourse 3:	Process of National Policy Justification	• Prioritisation of global objectives over national needs • Risk of destabilising existing forest management regimes through market logic and risks. • Issue of environmental justice: Is REDD+ for developing countries or to save the world?
Discourse 4:	National Development Process	• Technical debates and mechanism preventing meaningful internalisation • Effectiveness of international guidance limited by expert politics. • Issue of framing: Is REDD+ a national development strategy or instrument of global carbon economy?

## 6.3.5.a.	Dependency on ODA as a Key Factor

The level of reliance on donor finance was one of the factors that determined the degree to which each country felt the effects of standardisation. As one of the LDCs with a high level of dependency on ODA, the representative of a national

CSO in Nepal (in-depth interview, September 14, 2015) stated that 'the negative part is that developed countries want to control how we implement [REDD+],…but we need their support, unfortunately'. Hence, 'just like many other policies and strategies developed with donor funding and support facilities of the World Bank or the United Nations in the country, Nepal doesn't actually have any say in how they are shaped', according to the senior representative of a national research organisation in Nepal (in-depth interview, August 26, 2015).

In contrast, although the process of standardisation was also visible through knowledge politics among experts in Malaysia as described above, the effects of standardisation were much less significant in Malaysia as donor finance played a minor role in the country. Since such knowledge politics focused heavily on carbon monitoring and financing aspects rather than the politics of deforestation within the global market context, REDD+ remained an externally-driven technical intervention in Malaysia. Sri Lanka was somewhere between these two countries as a lower-middle income country that was increasingly becoming less reliant on ODA.

Furthermore, being involved in both the international and national REDD+ processes, the research participants associated with the second discourse also observed that the competition for donor finance had made many REDD+ countries follow donor interests to satisfy funding requirements. They argued that such requirements were often superficially met by REDD+ countries, while many deforestation challenges continued in a vacuum. As argued above by the senior representative of a global REDD+ readiness initiative (a) (in-depth interview, September 16 2015), the ways in which many REDD+ countries pursued REDD+ and international organisations provided support were dictated by 'the visions and expectations of donors which were often overly ambitious and unrealistic'.

6.3.5.b. Ignoring the Agency of Individual REDD+ Countries through Standardisation

These observations through all four discourses confirm the claim by McDermott et al. (2012) that the attempt to elucidate what exactly should be governed at the

national level transformed REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure, thus making REDD+ problematic to implement. The transformation was primarily guided by the dominant positions and viewpoints of donors, their intermediaries and associated experts, underpinning the ecological modernisation narrative, as also suggested by several scholars including McDermott (2014) and Turnhout et al.(2017). Through this transformation, country-specific visions, needs and contexts were overlooked to frame REDD+ primarily as an international response to climate change. This process had made the case study countries merely commensurable sources of forest emissions reductions through standardisation to realise the international response. As a result, this instead hindered the real impact potential of REDD+ in the case study countries as the agency of these countries had largely been ignored.

6.3.5.c.   REDD+ as Boundary Infrastructure Killed REDD+

Due to the excessive standardisation of REDD+ from the international perspective, REDD+ was unable to establish the necessary context and rationale to be considered by policymakers and the public as an appropriate strategy for addressing root causes of forest emissions in the case study countries. Instead, REDD+ as a boundary infrastructure framed the efforts of individual REDD+ countries merely as a cost of achieving global carbon accountability. This supports the claim by Gupta et al. (2012) that the dominant international approach to REDD+ frames individual countries' efforts as commensurable across the globe and in doing so ignores their differences. Although scholars including Turnhout et al. (2017) argue that such effects have not yet been observed in the absence of market-based finance under the UNFCCC, this analysis of REDD+ as a boundary infrastructure suggests that such adverse effects of the dominant international approach to REDD+ are already visible at the national level. This is because the international framing overlooked nationally and locally constituted discourses and practises in the attempt to nest actions of individual countries into the globally dominant narrative of ecological modernisation.

Supporting the claims by scholars including Laurans and Mermet (2013), Andersen (2015) and Corbera and Schroeder (2017), this analysis suggests that

the assumption of the universality of globally conceived visions, norms and values through REDD+ from the international perspective is fundamentally flawed. The efforts to standardise REDD+ discourses and practices have overlooked the necessary considerations for specific national circumstances, priorities and needs of the case study countries. As a result, it has hindered meaningful engagement by the case study countries, thus raising equity and justice concerns regarding this process from the national perspectives. Issues concerning flawed assumptions around the universality of international decisions and obligations are explored further in the next chapter through discussions on governmental rationalities and the effects of scale.

Consequently, REDD+ as a boundary infrastructure has so far been unable to promote the necessary political and public debates and discussions at the national level to instigate a meaningful transformation in case study countries. Nonetheless, as a standard ODA initiative, the research participants from the case study countries found their REDD+ readiness efforts useful in building their technical capacity within their forestry sectors.

6.4 SUBJECTS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF GOVERNMENT

Building on the analysis of the specific objects and process of transformation of REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure at the national level, this section sheds light on critical characteristics of subjects and their specific power relations, which were influenced by their (in)ability to deploy specific technologies of government.

As seen in Table 6-2, the specific objects of government and critical issues raised through the first, third and fourth discourses broadly resonated with the narrative of global environmental justice from the perspectives of the case study countries. These issues were brought to the fore by the difference in focus and priority-setting between the perspectives of the case study countries and donors. Meanwhile, the second discourse, associated with the views of international experts, sheds light on hybrid positions that framed REDD+ in the context of

ecological modernisation from the international perspective but was also concerned with the limitations of such a top-down approach at the national level. Based on these tensions between the narratives of ecological modernisation and global environmental justice, the following discussion focuses on three groups of subjects - donors, international and national experts, and REDD+ governments. Donor intermediaries are subsumed under donors and experts in this discussion as their role and behaviour are considered to resonate strongly with the visions, norms and values of donors, and their operations in practice are managed by international and national experts at the national level. These three groups of subjects were discussed by the research participants as the most critical actors through all four discourses and also best characterise the research participants.

As emerged from the previous section of this chapter, donor finance and technical knowledge institutionalised through the international negotiations and scientific debates on REDD+ are discussed in this section as the two most prominent technologies of government. These technologies were most commonly referred to by the research participants in all four discourses as the most powerful instruments to govern the conduct of themselves and other subjects, as their (in)ability to manage and deploy these technologies determined their influence as subjects.

6.4.1. Donors

In all four discourses, donor countries were identified as the most powerful subjects of government from the perspectives of the research participants as they were the most notable source of REDD+ finance. For instance, the senior representative of a donor government (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) demonstrated the dominant position of donors through REDD+ by stating that:

> This is development aid focused on making global climate impacts, so it's not that countries are required to receive it…it is up to them to demonstrate their willingness to us…

Donors' practices of fund allocation and management were viewed to have had strong bearing on national REDD+ processes particularly in the aid-dependent LDCs like Nepal. According to the representative of a national CSO in Nepal (in-depth interview, September 14, 2015), 'REDD+ in Nepal is donor-driven because…they provide finance and support, so they move us to the direction they want'. The effects of donor finance were also visible although to a lesser extent in Sri Lanka. According to the senior government representative (a) of Sri Lanka (in-depth interview, July 30, 2015), 'we need ODA in sectors like forestry since the national budget is not yet able to adequately cover all sectors'. Similarly, the national representative of the United Nations in Malaysia (in-depth interview, December 22, 2015) explained that:

> Although Malaysia as a whole does not need funding from donors, the current public spending in the area of environment is insufficient, so we require small-scale support from donors from time to time …like to develop the REDD+ strategy.

Despite their influence, there was commonly shared notion among all research participants including those who represented or had previously represented donors that the visions and approaches imposed by donors through conditionality were often incompatible with the reality on the ground. For instance, the senior representative of a donor government (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) conceded that 'development aid is cementing the historical power relations between developed and developing countries… it's not actually helping developing countries'. He (ibid.) explained that it was because international support was often supply-driven rather than need-driven but at the same time, he underscored the difficulty of addressing such power relations rooted in the historical contexts within the realm of international climate negotiations under the UNFCCC.

As a result, donor visions and approaches through conditionality were often superficially adopted and implemented only to secure donor finance without being fully internalised into the case study countries' policy and institutional frameworks. The senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (a) in Sri Lanka (in-depth interview, July 29, 2015) spoke to this point that this was because 'many policy studies have been done to cover issues like land tenure

that are considered important for our headquarters experts and donors, not by Sri Lankan stakeholders'. In a similar context, the senior representative of a national research organisation in Nepal (in-depth interview, August 26, 2015) claimed that:

> Most environmental policies including the REDD+ strategy in Nepal are made primarily due to pressures from the donors and development agencies, but they are done for the donors, not for the country.

Resonating with the claims by scholars like Bastakoti and Davidsen (2015) and Dawson et al. (2018), these arguments illustrate how the imposition of donor conditionality results in superficial policies and practices at the national level only to validate the success of international support and need for their continued support from the international perspective. Such validation works to reinforce the dominant narrative of ecological modernisation within the framework of global environmental governance at the international level, as also suggested by Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2017). Precisely because of this, the real effects of such support and narrative were mainly invisible in the case study countries. Nonetheless, these accounts collectively illustrate the powerful role of donors as a group of subjects to influence the conduct of other subjects through the national REDD+ processes regardless of their impacts.

6.4.1.a. Interdependency between Donors and Their Intermediaries

Such an influential role of donors as subjects was directly underpinned by their intermediaries including multilateral institutions and international CSOs. The senior representative of a donor government (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) described that 'international organisations are mandated to manage donor finance and capacity development processes by bringing the knowledge from the global level into the national level as many REDD+ countries lack the capacity and knowledge'. Such assumptions of donors, combined with the need of their intermediaries to secure donor finance, set the agendas and shaped the ways in which international support was provided to REDD+ countries, according to the senior representative of a global REDD+ readiness initiative (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015). This supports the claims by scholars including Joseph (2010), Thompson et al. (2011) and Blaikie and Muldavin (2013) that

global environmental governance institutions like multilateral institutions and international CSOs ultimately serve the interests of donors rather than the needs of developing countries in order to access donor finance. This notion underscores the historically established interdependent relationship between donors and their intermediaries in global environmental governance as they depend on services that are provided by each other, as also suggested by Redford et al. (2013). Through this interdependent relationship, donor finance and institutionalised knowledge and expertise on REDD+ were deployed in tandem to legitimatise the positions of donors and their intermediaries in the case study countries to varying degrees.

From this perspective, the influential role of donor countries in shaping national policy processes and the conduct of their intermediaries suggest that REDD+ as a mechanism of global environmental governance is fundamentally reflective of environmental responses of donor countries. This resonates with similar claims by Corson and MacDonald (2012) that the framework of global environmental governance is essentially dominated by donor countries who are in command of global environmental governance institutions through international finance. By being an integral part of such environmental responses, experts representing donors, multilateral institutions, international CSOs as well as national CSOs and governments also played critical roles in the national REDD+ processes in the case study countries.

6.4.2. REDD+ Experts

REDD+ experts here refer to both international and national experts who were involved in the operationalisation of REDD+ at the national level. As described in Chapter Three, about half of the research participants identified themselves as experts in one or more areas related to the WFR requirements, including the development of REDD+ strategies and operationalisation of the safeguards. These research participants mainly represented donor agencies, multilateral institutions and international CSOs while a few of them represented national governments, national CSOs and other non-governmental entities.

6.4.2.a.   International Experts

Experts who represented donor agencies, multilateral institutions and international CSOs were viewed by many research participants from the case study countries as the primary vehicles of power in the national REDD+ processes. Their power and authoritative positions were established through the administration of donor finance and dissemination of the institutionalised knowledge produced through the international negotiations and scientific debates on REDD+. The senior government representative (a) of Nepal (in-depth interview, April 30, 2016) argued that 'voices and opinions of international experts and consultants were considered in many instances more important than national actors… because of what they represented [i.e., donor interest and finance]'. The senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (a) in Sri Lanka (in-depth interview, July 29, 2015) also described this specific order of power given to international experts as:

> Because it's been standard practice for years within the international cooperation. We bring international knowledge and finance, so we are automatically respected… I'm respected because I'm from a donor country, but if I were a Sri Lankan, I would have been just a young guy.

Concerning this point, the senior government representative (a) of Sri Lanka (in-depth interview, July 30, 2015) claimed that:

> It is unfortunately built in the people's mentality in the country…some of us still believe like in the colonial time: outside ideas from advanced economies, international experts are automatically considered better than our own.

This reveals that the order of power which is not just based on economics but also historically rooted in unequal power relations that go back to colonial times for countries like Sri Lanka, as also suggested by Lemos and Agrawal (2006).

Both the national representatives of the United Nations in Malaysia and Sri Lanka (in-depth interview, December 22, 2015; focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) warned against this order of power as it prevented an effective transfer of knowledge and expertise to the national level since such knowledge and

expertise often remained with international experts. They (ibid.) claimed that precisely because of this, REDD+ had remained an externally driven process that received limited attention from their policymakers. By raising a similar concern, the national representative of a regional organisation in Nepal (in-depth interview, November 6, 2015) argued that international experts were 'facipulators' not facilitators as 'they manipulated the REDD+ process to fit the agendas of donors and international organisations they represented'. He (ibid.) provided a following anecdotal account.

> I attended some meetings where a lot of Western experts were presenting…then the people from developing countries presented something that, I felt, was crucial to the meeting agenda. One of the experts quickly dismissed it and continued with the presentation of their knowledge and ideas. These Western experts encourage developing countries to participate, but I think it actually doesn't matter much …they are not interested in our input, as they believe they have the answer, not us. Many of us from developing countries also [unfortunately] believe that way.

Bastakoti and Davidsen (2015) and Dawson et al. (2018) also make similar claims that stakeholder consultations are often designed and guided by such experts simply as a box-ticking exercise to fulfil donor requirements. According to the senior executive of an international CSO (in-depth interview, November 3, 2015), such a practice of experts to dismiss the subjectivities of national and local actors often came through the use of technical English language to further reinforce this exclusionary practice on many levels. She (ibid.) argues that 'it forces people to comply with a particular way of doing REDD+, and that is the way donors and the UN support'.

Given their intermediary role to administer donor finance and to disseminate internationally institutionalised knowledge and expertise at the national level, they were one of the most influential groups of subjects in the national REDD+ processes. As recalled from earlier discussion, many of these international experts had extensive experience working with various national governments and other stakeholders in REDD+ countries. They often demonstrated their ability to problematise REDD+ from multiple scaled perspectives at the interface between the international and national REDD+ processes. Their ability to

perform scales is further examined in the next chapter. Meanwhile, another group of subjects who were also as visible as international experts were national experts.

6.4.2.b.   National Experts

In the shadow of international experts, national experts were also able to establish themselves as influential subjects. They primarily operated as technical focal points of REDD+ governments and represented national CSOs and other non-state entities. Supporting the claims by scholars like Bushley (2014) and Astuti and Mcgregor (2015), many national experts demonstrated their competence by internalising the institutionalised knowledge of REDD+ and expert-style approaches and interventions to establish a close alliance with donors, multilateral institutions, international CSO networks and international experts. In this context, the senior representative of a national research organisation in Nepal (in-depth interview, August 26, 2015) argued that:

> A lot of money has been spent in the past five or six years on REDD+ in Nepal. Who has benefited the most? Primarily consultants, experts like us...mostly national and international experts and national-level CSOs. Many of us have found jobs through this. We are the beneficiaries either in terms of income or in terms of our increased networking capacity, international training and exposure. Donor funding through REDD+ has shaped our priorities and how we work in the country.

This also supports the claims of scholars like Dawson et al. (2018) that experts from national CSOs, who would typically be voicing critical views to act as watchdogs, were instead actively supporting the implementation of those visions and norms of donors and their intermediaries. In this context, the representative of a national CSO in Nepal (in-depth interview, September 14, 2015) explained the process of subject creation for CSO representatives like himself that:

> By understanding international negotiations, decisions and updates, I gain confidence about what I say, you can say it is some sort of power. Once you have detailed knowledge, you know, comparatively more detail knowledge than others, then you of course gain confidence and make strong logic and rationale of your point in presenting your views. In that sense, you can say international knowledge and exposure give someone like me the

> power to influence the process …you become the centre point …you become influential.

This account demonstrates the integral relationship between power and knowledge as Foucault (1980) claims. It confirms the prominence of the institutionalised knowledge of REDD+ as a technology of government and describes how this technology effectively formed subjects and rationalised the action of national experts including CSO representatives through the narrative of ecological modernisation. From this perspective, the senior government representative of Malaysia (in-depth interview, June 22, 2015) who regularly attended the UNFCCC COP and other events described this technology as a significant 'source of influence and legitimacy' that enabled national experts like herself to play an influential role within the national REDD+ process. Furthermore, the researcher also observed that the ability of national experts to demonstrate their competence and fluency in the language of the institutionalised knowledge of REDD+, embodying donor visions, norms and expectations, had enabled them to establish close relationships with donors and their intermediaries and access donor finance.

This process of subject creation among national experts underscores the integrated effects of donor finance and internationally institutionalised knowledge as the two most prominent technologies of government in a mutually reinforcing relationship to give those subjects with the ability to deploy these technologies an unparalleled advantage to legitimise their action. This process of subject creation through deployment of these technologies was instrumental in the transition of REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure, as it reified the narrative of ecological modernisation as the authoritative approach to REDD+ through the national REDD+ processes in the case study countries.

6.4.3. REDD+ Governments

In contrast with the influential roles of donors and experts as subjects described above, REDD+ governments in the case study countries played a much less prominent or visible role. For example, the senior government representative (b)

of Sri Lanka (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) argued that 'foreign consultants run the policy debates instead of the Government in the country'. Similarly, the senior government representative (a) of Nepal (in-depth interview, April 30, 2016) argued that 'donor agencies and their experts tell the government what it should do… the government is trying to increase its capacity so to reduce such external influence, but it is difficult for now'.

These notions describe the role of government as passive subjects whose input and opinions were considered less significant in REDD+ processes by donors and experts. Supporting the claim by Winkler and Dubash (2015), the agency of REDD+ governments was often denied or acknowledged only superficially as a political formality by donors and international experts as they were primarily viewed to have lacked the necessary capacity to act as rational agents or subjects to address their environmental governance challenges. Instead, the central authorities of the case study countries were framed as part of the problem to be solved rather than the solution. This notion is also backed by the earlier claims by the senior representative of a donor government (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) and senior regional representative of the United Nations (in-depth interview, December 3, 2015) who respectively described the systemic capacity limitations of many REDD+ countries to justify the essential role of intermediaries such as multilateral institutions and international CSOs in providing REDD+ readiness support. In this context, the senior government representative (a) of Sri Lanka (in-depth interview, July 30, 2015) stated that 'we are all used to this system of the development industry by now… not just with REDD+ but also very familiar through the previous programs and projects'. This resonates with the claim by Ioris (2014) that the environmental governance frameworks of developing countries are often devoid of real power due to structural inequalities built into them by donor countries and their intermediaries through historical processes of global environmental governance.

In response to these disempowering situations, the governments of the case study countries primarily viewed REDD+ as a sectoral ODA initiative with limited political attention. The senior government representative (a) of Nepal (in-depth interview, April 30, 2016) claimed that since REDD+ was viewed primarily as 'a

donor-funded emission offsetting initiative for developed countries', policymakers in Nepal considered it as external to the national policy debates as it appeared to them as one of many path-dependent ODA initiatives in the country. Similarly, the national representative of the United Nations in Malaysia (in-depth interview, December 22, 2015) suggested that REDD+ did not receive a full political commitment as it failed to present its economic viability and policy potential beyond being an international carbon financing opportunity. The scope and scale of REDD+ were therefore structurally limited within the forestry sector to have little to no cross-sectoral impacts to address drivers of deforestation. These positions of the governments in the case study countries also explain why REDD+ was led by the national institutions responsible for forestry in light of the criticism regarding their institutional arrangements through the second discourse, supported by international experts.

Recalling from Chapter Two, these notions make the process of subject formation in REDD+ problematic. This process of subject formation through REDD+ had empowering effects particularly on national experts, including CSO representatives but significantly reduced the legitimacy and role of central authorities of the case study countries at the same time. Despite the empowered role of the national experts representing the lead-government agencies for REDD+ on an individual basis, the role of the national governments in the case study countries was limited to being passive recipients of international support. As a result, there was limited national ownership, which posed a significant challenge in terms of realising the envisaged role of the central authorities in coordinating the implementation of REDD+ and transparency requirements under the WFR and Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2016a, 2016b). While the capacity development effects within the forestry sector through the REDD+ readiness processes may ensure meeting various transparency requirements under the WFR and Paris Agreement on technical grounds, the lack of national ownership and political commitment to REDD+ by the governments of the case study countries suggest significant constraints for REDD+ in the future. The scale and scope of REDD+ implementation would be likely limited, as already seen through Malaysia's approach to REDD+. Because of this, it would be

difficult for REDD+ to make any significant contribution to international climate efforts or sustainable development agendas of the case study countries.

6.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the objects, subjects and technologies of government through the four discourses emerged from Chapter Five. This chapter has revealed several problematics of REDD+ which add to the growing list of issues associated with REDD+ as discussed in Chapter Two.

First, the two-level construction of objects of government has illustrated how REDD+ operated initially as a boundary object. The broad framing of REDD+ as a boundary object encompassed a range of visions and expectations described by the specific objects of government. However, this broad framing quickly disappeared through efforts by donors and their intermediaries to standardise approaches and practices at the national level in order to increase its transparency and comparability across scales. This process transformed REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure. Through this transformation, REDD+ was framed primarily as an international response to climate change, embodying the visions and expectations of donors and their intermediaries while the country-specific priorities, needs and contexts were overlooked. As a result, this framing of REDD+ failed to provide the necessary context and rationale for the policymakers and public of the case study countries to consider REDD+ as a viable development strategy. REDD+ was instead viewed merely as one of many path-dependent ODA initiatives in the case study countries to support sector-specific capacity development. The potential of REDD+ to instigate the type of transformation needed to contribute to international climate efforts was thus significantly limited in the case study countries.

Second, this process of transformation revealed the specific order of power, which stemmed from the historically constituted power relations between these two groups of countries to give donors, their intermediaries and associated experts authority and legitimacy through the national REDD+ processes.

Building on this pre-existing order of power, these subjects' ability to administer donor finance and produce and disseminate the internationally institutionalised knowledge on REDD+ played a crucial role in establishing their authoritative positions and approaches to REDD+ from their international viewpoints. Between the two technologies that reinforced each other to frame REDD+ as a technical fix to climate change, the power of donor finance was particularly visible in governing the conduct of REDD+ actors through national REDD+ processes in the case study countries to varying degrees. The level of dependency on ODA was a critical factor that determined the degree to which the power of donor finance was visible.

These technologies of government had effectively empowered donors, their intermediaries and associated international and national experts as influential subjects through the national REDD+ processes. In contrast, despite the expected crucial role of national governments of REDD+ countries to coordinate REDD+ as per the provisions of the WFR and Paris Agreement, the role of the central authorities in the case study countries as subjects was mostly absent through the national REDD+ processes. This was because the national governments were often viewed by donors and their intermediaries to have lacked the necessary capacity to act as rational agents or subjects to directly manage and coordinate the international support in operationalising REDD+. This notion was described by several research participants from the case study countries to be constituted in the discourses and practices of global environmental governance through historical processes. This was the primary factor contributing to the lack of national ownership and political commitments to REDD+ in the case study countries.

These findings from the analysis of objects, subjects and technologies of government through REDD+ suggest that the potential of REDD+ to contribute to international climate efforts or sustainable development of the case study countries was significantly limited. This was mainly due to the difference in how REDD+ as a global environmental governance process and mechanism were viewed and pursued by international and national actors based on unequal power relations.

The next chapter examines the rationality of these groups of subjects in pursuing and problematising REDD+ by comparing their unique positions and viewpoints. In doing so, how scales affected such positions and viewpoints of subjects is also examined.

7. CHAPTER SEVEN: CONFLICTING RATIONALITIES AND EFFECTS OF SCALE

7.1. INTRODUCTION

Building on the analysis of the objects, subjects and technologies of government in the previous chapter, this chapter sheds light on the remaining two analytical dimensions of governmentality (i.e., governmental rationality and the effects of scale), as highlighted red in Figure 7-1. The conflicting governmental rationalities of the central authorities of the case study countries and donors are explored to develop an understanding of the effects of governmentality through REDD+ at the national level. Informed by this discussion, this chapter also examines the effects of governmentality from the perspective of scale. While examining these two analytical dimensions, the chapter also attempts to address the remaining knowledge gaps in the pertinent literature, as identified in Chapter Two. These gaps concern the intertwining effects of various forms of governmental rationality at the practice level and how actors' ability to perform scales had led to their empowerment or disempowerment through the national REDD+ processes.

Figure 7-1: Final two dimensions of REDD+ governmentality examined through discourse analysis

This chapter is organised into two main sections, excluding the introduction and conclusion sections. The first section examines the rationalities of the central authorities of the case study countries and donors and the effects of their interactions. This is followed by an examination of the effects of scale at the interface between the international and national REDD+ processes.

7.2. CONFLICTING RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNMENT

This section compares the conflicting governmental rationalities of the central authorities of case study countries and donors to illuminate further the problematics of REDD+ at the national level. The previous two chapters have already begun to tease out these conflicting rationalities through the identification of the main discourses, objects, subjects and technologies of government associated with each discourse. This section, therefore, provides a structural comparison of these rationalities.

Before moving forward with this analysis, it is useful to recall from Chapter Two how this thesis defines governmental rationality. Governmental rationality provides the underlying logic or reason for action based on which subjects participate in the act of governing (Huxley, 2008). The logic allows the subjects to 'render reality intelligible' to take specific actions (Rose-redwood, 2016, p. 474). To examine the governmental rationality of the subjects, this thesis employs the slightly simplified typology of governmental rationality, suggested by Fletcher (2010, 2017), to focus on the disciplinary, neoliberal, sovereign and liberation forms of governmental rationality, as discussed in Chapter Two. The disciplinary form attempts to create self-regulating subjects through internalisation of certain norms and values. The neoliberal form attempts to bring systematic change through external incentives. The sovereign form tries to govern through command and control, while the liberation form looks to bring egalitarian and democratic processes through environmental governance. Subjects often embody more than one form of rationality, and thus resulting subjectivities are complex in reality (Foucault *et al.*, 1991; Popke, 2003; Huxley, 2008). Nonetheless, these forms of governmental rationality provide distinct logics of action from the subjects' unique vantage points based on which to develop an understanding of specific reasons for the subjects' action or inaction.

In the previous chapter, donors, international and national experts, and REDD+ governments were identified as the three groups of subjects whose actions were

considered by the research participants to have a significant impact on the development of REDD+ in the case study countries. Among these groups, international and national experts whose actions were underpinning donor visions, norms and values were particularly empowered to shape the national REDD+ processes, while the role of the central authorities was much less visible. The different positions of these groups of subjects were primarily based on two factors, as identified in the previous chapter. First, due to historically perceived capacity limitations of developing countries by donors, the central authorities of the case study countries were often framed by the former as part of the problem to be solved rather than the solution. Further reinforcing by this factor, international and national experts with the ability to demonstrate their fluency in the language of internationally institutionalised knowledge were able to act as direct service providers to donors to administer ODA at the national level on behalf of recipient governments. Such knowledge underpinned the narrative of ecological modernisation. Precisely because of these two factors, space was limited for the central authorities of the case study countries to engage meaningfully in the national REDD+ processes.

The impact potential of REDD+ concerning the overarching object of government through REDD+ was thus significantly reduced in the case study countries due to the lack of engagement and commitment by the central authorities. The central authorities of the case study countries viewed REDD+ primarily as an externally-driven and top-down process. They observed that the visions, norms and values of donors were imposed upon them through the use of donor finance and dissemination of internationally institutionalised knowledge of REDD+ based on unequal power relations. Such power relations were built on the disparity between developed (i.e., Annex 1) and developing (non-Annex 1) countries under the UNFCCC and associated economic exploitation through historical processes. These circumstances highlighted the two highly conflicting sets of governmental rationalities, held by the central authorities of the case study countries and donors, as described below.

7.2.1 Disciplinary and Neoliberal Rationalities of Donors

Donors promoted the adoption of techno-managerial and internationally scalable approaches and solutions to climate change based on the narrative of ecological modernisation. REDD+ comprised precisely such approaches and solutions from the vantage point of donors. As observed through the transformation of REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure, the transparency and comparability of action among REDD+ countries were the critical strategies promoted by donors in this process to mobilise global efforts, as also permeating through the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2016b). The international decisions and guidelines on transparency were institutionalised and disseminated as authoritative expertise and knowledge to guide the direction of donor finance and the conduct of REDD+ countries. Such knowledge and expertise include internationally set standards and approaches to carbon accounting and the safeguards to report on national progress. The senior representative of a donor government (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) indicated that:

> An essential part of REDD is the development of MRV system to monitor progress, which is very technical and requires quite a lot of funds. An improved system of transparency is not only of benefit to the international community but also to countries for their own development planning and for them to receive international support. However, unfortunately, the capacity is lacking in many countries, so people who are knowledgeable about such systems tend to come from the West, come from developed countries.

Similarly, the senior regional representative of the United Nations (in-depth interview, December 3, 2015) also argued that:

> REDD+ governance is about accountability, transparency, the rule of law and participation in the land use sector under the international framework. But this is not well understood by the countries we work with. This brings us back to why they need support from the UN agencies.

These arguments point to two critical assumptions that underlaid the disciplinary and neoliberal logics of donors and their intermediaries. First, REDD+ countries, as the signatories of relevant agreements and decisions under the UNFCCC, are assumed to be fully committed to operationalising REDD+ as per the WFR and

Paris Agreement. Second, REDD+ countries are assumed to generally lack the necessary capacity to meet their commitments, thus needing international assistance. Donors thus assumed firm commitments by REDD+ countries and that these countries would respond positively to financial and technical assistance to move toward meeting their commitments. As the senior representative of a donor government (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) put it, 'developing countries want financial assistance, and developed countries want performance-based action by them'. Building on these assumptions, the action of donors was rationalised to drive the creation of subjects in the case study countries through the promotion of the institutionalised expertise and knowledge of transparency and deployment of finance as the two prominent technologies of government.

However, as indicated in the previous chapter, these notions were based on the problematic assumption of the universality of internationally conceived visions, norms and values under the UNFCCC and other MEAs by donors and their intermediaries. This assumption had made the process of subject creation and the logic of action at the national level top-down to effectively ignored the agency of REDD+ countries. Furthermore, the economic inequalities between developed and developing countries and resulting power relations had concealed any flaws within this logic from the perspectives of donors, as REDD+ countries were assumed to act responsively to the promise of international finance for meeting such commitments and obligations in their countries. These issues from the perspectives of the central authorities in the case study countries are explored further in the next sub-section. Meanwhile, the disciplinary and neoliberal rationalities of donors based on these problematic assumptions had largely overlooked nationally specific equity and justice concerns in an attempt to pursue international transparency and comparability to constitute global climate efforts.

In this context, scholars like Sikor and Newell (2014) may point to the role of REDD+ safeguards for ensuring equity and justice concerns within these donor rationalities. However, supporting the claims by Blaikie and Muldavin (2012), Bastakoti and Davidsen (2015) and Dawson et al. (2018), several research

participants argued that REDD+ safeguards were often superficially and techno-managerially addressed as a requirement for donor finance in a top-down and supply driven manner merely to reinforce the narrative of ecological modernisation. For instance, the former REDD+ negotiator of a donor government (in-depth interview, September 24, 2015) claimed that:

> It was really the donors who set the safeguards. They were interested in setting high standards under the UNFCCC because they were concerned about risks in making their finance available, despite the fact this was seen as a burden by developing countries, control over what they could do.

The senior representative of a global REDD+ readiness initiative (a) (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) also argued that:

> [REDD+] countries are often faced with multiple interpretations of the safeguards by the donors and multilateral financing mechanisms from which they receive support, so the safeguards were there more to satisfy donor requirements and safeguard their investment risks, not the development of REDD+ countries.

She (ibid.) argued further that different interpretations of the knowledge of international transparency by donors and their intermediaries often subjected REDD+ countries to different sets of standards. Furthermore, according to the senior regional representative of the United Nations (in-depth interview, December 3, 2015), this highlighted the highly supply-driven approach, built into the logic of donors and their intermediaries to ignore important national contexts. He (ibid.) argued that:

> Depending on who or which donor or agency of the UN initiates support, a specific aspect of the safeguards, like the rights of Indigenous Peoples, anticorruption, or biodiversity conservation becomes prioritised over others, depending on the individual's or agency's central mandate.

These accounts collectively construct a picture wherein even the REDD+ safeguards that are commonly considered to address environmental justice concerns constituted part of the narrative of ecological modernisation through the disciplinary and neoliberal rationalities of donors and their intermediaries. Such governmental rationalities were highly reflective of specifically Western ideas of environmental justice that were founded in the liberal market order and built on unequal power relations between developed and developing countries,

as also suggested by Banerjee and Bobby (2003) and Winkler and Dubash (2015). Concerns for environmental justice were thus dealt with as a technical step towards the operationalisation of REDD+ as a market-based instrument for emissions reductions (Gupta *et al.*, 2012; Methmann, 2013; Neeff, Göhler and Ascui, 2014). The implementation of such top-down approaches and solutions necessitated the engagement of experts with advanced knowledge and understandings of such rationalities, the majority of whom inevitably came from developed countries. As a result, it had justified a singular and internationally harmonised approach to REDD+ to overlook the existence of localised and nuanced discourses and approaches to REDD+, as also suggested by Bock (2014).

These disciplinary and neoliberal forms of governmental rationality, underpinning the action of donors, were nonetheless met with subtle and discreet contestation and resistance by the central authorities of the case study countries and other national actors.

7.2.2 Liberation and Sovereign Rationalities of Central Authorities

From the perspective of the central authorities in the case study countries, the transition of REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure presented REDD+ and accompanying international support in a problematic light. Supporting the claim by Turnhout et al. (2017), this was because the disciplinary and neoliberal rationalities of donors treated REDD+ countries as merely commensurable sources of forest-related emissions reductions to constitute the necessary international efforts for addressing climate change. Several research participants from the case study countries also argued that such rationalities were particularly problematic from the perspective of their central authorities as they viewed them as the indications of exploitation of unequal power relations between developed and developing countries by donors and their intermediaries. The rationalities of donors were considered to have anchored in the power of international decisions and finance to wield their external influence over the process of REDD+ readiness and how the case study countries should meet the

international requirements under the WFR. In this process, the agency of the central authorities of the case study countries was typically overlooked as they were considered from the international perspective merely as a passive group of emissions reductions producers, thus disregarding specific national visions, priorities and circumstances. According to the senior government representative of Malaysia (in-depth interview, June 22, 2015):

> The Annex 1 countries want fast and coordinated climate actions through this, but such quick actions are not realistic for developing countries as REDD+ is concerned with complex development issues that are different from country to country.

Building on this notion, these disciplinary and neoliberal forms of governmental rationality of donors were challenged discreetly and subtly by the central authorities of the case study countries based on two grounds. First, the action of donors was built on an ill-conceived assumption that all countries had the same level of ambition to meet their international commitments and obligations under the UNFCCC and other MEAs. Second, by overlooking the national priorities and circumstances through the standardisation efforts, the liberation and sovereign forms of governmental rationality of the central authorities of the case study countries worked to counter the efforts of donors directly.

7.2.2.a. Ill-conceived Notion of International Commitments and Obligations

As indicated earlier, the assumed universality of internationally conceived visions, norms and values under the UNFCCC and other MEAs through REDD+ among developing countries was fundamentally flawed, as also suggested by Meinshausen et al. (2015). For instance, the senior government representative (a) of Nepal (in-depth interview, April 30, 2016) described the fragility of such an assumption that:

> [Our government] has signed those international agreements like the Paris Agreement, but our capacity is limited to carefully consider our obligations and responsibilities before signing. Meanwhile, donors offer specific types of support based on our international commitments and impose conditions for receiving support. As we need finance, we quickly accept and sign. But that is why these agreements often become challenging to be implemented in reality.

This account illustrates how these ill-conceived commitments were made hastily and driven by the promise of international finance, thus limiting their real impact potential on the ground. The Senior government representative (d) of Sri Lanka (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) similarly argued that such an ill-conceived notion of international commitments and obligations was founded on structural inequality which gave an unparalleled 'advantage to developed countries with more resources and capacity in international negotiations and decision-making'. She (ibid.) claimed that developing countries like Sri Lanka with limited resources were unable to cover all negotiation tracks and 'remain external to the decision-making process' while donors and those large forested developing countries with significant donor support dominated the process, thus lacking democratic considerations. The representative of a national CSO in Nepal (in-depth interview, September 14, 2015) also described international decisions and agreements under the UNFCCC as 'the narratives of the winners' by highlighting developed countries' advantage based on their financial and technical capacities in such international processes. Supporting these arguments, the former REDD+ negotiator of a donor government (in-depth interview, September 24, 2015) also indicated that it was important for REDD+ countries to 'consistently follow and participate' in these negotiations as countries would have to be 'in the inner circles of the UNFCCC negotiations' to be part of the decisions. From this vantage point, he (ibid.) described that among the case study countries, Malaysia was the only country that was in the inner circle but still not able to cover all REDD+ related negotiation tracks compared to others like Brazil. However, the national representative of the United Nations in Malaysia (in-depth interview, December 22, 2015) pointed that being in the inner circle of the international negotiations did not necessarily translate into Malaysia's commitment to REDD+. She (ibid.) explained that 'Malaysia's presence in the international negotiations was primarily because of the negotiator's personal interest and technical competency on REDD+'. This supports the claim by Wilson Rowe (2015, p. 70) that 'influence in the negotiations is possessed by the persons themselves rather than the qualities of the country they are representing'.

These arguments collectively reveal the construction of such ill-conceived international commitments and obligations that fundamentally challenges the basis of action by donors. The disciplinary rationality of donors was thus countered by the liberation rationality of the central authorities of the case study countries, claiming the lack of egalitarian and democratic processes through international decision-making. This directly supports the claim by Adelman (2015) that international commitments and obligations under the UNFCCC and other MEAs are often built based on unequal power relations between developed and developing countries. This made the implementation of these commitments and obligations problematic at the practice level as such commitments and obligations often did not reflect developing countries' real capacities, needs and circumstances.

7.2.2.b.   Discreet and Subtle Resistance by Central Authorities

The efforts to standardise discourses and practices through international support based on this ill-conceived notion of international commitments and obligations were met with subtle and discreet resistance by the central authorities of the case study countries in varying degrees. Combined with the liberation form of governmental rationality, the central authorities of the case study countries were driven by the sovereign form of governmental rationality to push back on the exploitation of unequal power relations between developed and developing countries. This was done by framing REDD+ as a standard ODA initiative or international carbon financing mechanism, external to the national development processes. For instance, the senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (b) in Sri Lanka (focus group discussion, July 29, 2015) argued that:

> REDD+ is considered nothing more than another foreign project by the Government, no different than any other donor-funded projects in the past although it sounded new and innovative at first.

The national representative of the United Nations in Malaysia (in-depth interview, December 22, 2015) also described a similar stance taken by the central authority of Malaysia that:

> Federal Government and policymakers see REDD+ as an international carbon financing mechanism like the CDM as it has not provided any solid rationale or business proposition for policy integration. Especially forest management is a historically rooted

in our colonial past, sensitive issue for Malaysia that requires a
flexible and nationally led approach.

Similarly, the senior representative of a national research organisation in Nepal
(in-depth interview, August 26, 2015) claimed that:

REDD+ readiness funding is just driving senior technical officials
from the Government and experts like us to discuss strategies for
the country. But this happens without any involvement of political
actors guiding it as part of the country's policy-making process.

Although the circumstances faced by each case study country were different due
to factors such as the level of reliance on ODA and historical socio-political
contexts, these above arguments describe the REDD+ processes in these case
study countries as insular sectoral discourses, primarily led by experts. This was
a discreet and subtle response by the central authorities of the case study
countries to the observed top-down approach of donors to wield their influence
over what was considered sovereign affairs. Separating REDD+ as a narrow
and highly focused forest sector capacity development process was also a
convenient strategy to capture donor finance and international support in
generally underfunded sectors like forestry. Illustrating this point, several
research participants from the three case study countries highlighted sectoral
capacity development benefits of REDD+ in their countries while arguing for its
limited overall impact.

This discreet and subtle resistance driven by the central authorities of the case
study countries based on their liberation and sovereign governmental
rationalities notably minimised the effectiveness and legitimacy of REDD+ at the
national level. This empirically demonstrates the reversibility of bio-politics, as
described by Foucault et al. (1991), in which case the discursive dominance of
donors and their intermediaries was subtly resisted through the counter-
rationality of the central authorities to isolate REDD+ as a sector specific activity.
The impact potential of REDD+ to contribute to global climate efforts was thus
significantly reduced as a consequence.

7.2.3 Insular Effects of Governmentality through REDD+

As a direct result of these conflicting forms of governmental rationality, the effects of governmentality through REDD+ based on the rationalities of donors were limited and isolated within the sphere of the national REDD+ discourse in each country. The subjects within this sphere were primarily international experts, representing donor agencies and their intermediaries, and national experts, representing national governments and CSOs. As recalled from Chapter Six, these national experts representing their government agencies were particularly empowered to act in this sphere as individual experts while the role of their governments was considered as passive recipients of international support.

Actions within this sphere were highly focused on meeting international REDD+ requirements as per the WFR and international commitments and obligations under the UNFCCC and other MEAs. Such actions were thus reflective of the visions, norms and values of donors and their intermediaries, which were promoted and demonstrated by the international and national experts through the national REDD+ processes, without much engagement by the central authorities of the case study countries.

The senior representatives of a REDD+ readiness initiative (a) in Sri Lanka (in-depth interview, July 29, 2015) described this sphere of REDD+ readiness at the national level as 'an expert theatre'. Similarly, the senior government representative (d) of Sri Lanka (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) described the conduct within the sphere as 'a power game among experts'. The representative of national CSO in Nepal (in-depth interview, September 14, 2015) also called it 'a very limited space of expert dialogue'. Such dialogue was also described as 'debates without the necessary grounds and contexts' by the former private sector executive in Malaysia (written correspondence, September 15, 2016). These descriptions resonate with the claim by Gupta et al. (2016, p. 368) that describes such a discourse and conduct among experts as a 'technocratic and harmonious discussion among family and friends'. Moreover, these descriptions also underscore the overall limitations of REDD+ as a governmentality process. Precisely because these effects were insular, REDD+

was unable to instigate the envisaged transformational change beyond technical forest-sector capacity development activities in the case study countries.

This empirical evidence of the limitations of REDD+ as a governmentality process nonetheless contributes to the development of knowledge in one of the future research areas identified by Fletcher (2017). This area concerns what happens to the vision of perceived powerholders at the practice level when it is pursued and executed through their dominant forms of governmental rationality. In these case study countries, the governmental rationalities of donors, as the perceived dominant subject group, were unable to create enabling conditions through the national REDD+ processes to mobilise the type of conduct, expected by donors. Contrary to Dean's (2010) suggestion pointing to governmentality effects of global governance through international laws, commitments, agreements and finance, these disciplinary and neoliberal rationalities of donors based precisely on these technologies had fallen short of meeting the desired visions of donors in the case study countries. This adds to the claims by scholars like Joseph (2009) and Zanotti (2013) that these forms of governmental rationality face issues not only when it is applied outside of social conditions of advanced liberal capitalism but also especially when applied based on unequal power relations between sovereign states. This particularly points to the power relations between developed and developing countries.

Nonetheless, the effects of governmentality based on the rationalities of donors were visible among experts within the sphere of REDD+ readiness. There were visible effects of governmentality on international and national experts as they became self-disciplined subjects through the deployment of donor finance and institutionalised knowledge production and dissemination. This was because the sphere of REDD+ readiness in the case study countries was, in fact, a mere extension of the international REDD+ discourses and practices that superficially situated itself at the national level without any meaningful engagement by the host governments. In this context, the former senior representative of UNFCCC (in-depth interview, September 24, 2015) described many of these experts found within the sphere as subjects who had been 'following the international climate finance trends since the CDM'. The senior representative of a national research

organisation in Nepal (in-depth interview, August 26, 2015) similarly argued that most experts had 'evolved within the area of conservation with donor finance over the years'. These accounts collectively add to the claims by Dempsey and Suarez (2016), Lund et al. (2017) and Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2017) that such governmentality effects within this sphere of REDD+ readiness were part of the historically established discourses and practices within the development and conservation fields that operated as an industry. These experts had long been active subjects within this industry that was in constant need of (re)producing and validating its worth through regurgitation and reinforcement of the narrative of ecological modernisation in global environmental governance, which was fundamentally neoliberal in its framing. To these experts, REDD+ was the latest trend within this industry with all familiar technologies of government and effects of governmentality.

The next section examines the effects of governmentality within the sphere of REDD+ readiness from the perspective of scale to develop an understanding of how the governmental rationalities of donors took hold on these experts.

7.3. EFFECTS OF SCALE WITHIN THE SPHERE

Recalling from Chapter Two, this thesis looks at scale as performative within specific socio-spatial contexts to understand the effects of scale based on subjects' unique views of the world. Kaiser and Nikiforova (2008), Butler (2010) and Campbell et al. (2014) suggest that iterative and discursive processes through the politics of everyday life as performative define and delimit epistemological realities that denote scales as categories of practice. Such categories are used by different subjects to discursively frame their points of view, stances and identities in relation to scales (Moore, 2008; MacKinnon, 2010).

From this perspective, the above discussions on the conflicting governmental rationalities of the central authorities of the case study countries and donors illustrate the two separate and independent realities, which view the world from either the international and neoliberal perspective or the sovereign and global

environmental justice perspective. These fundamentally different worldviews separated the international scalar stance of donors from the national scalar stance held by the central authorities of the case study countries. This incompatibility of the two worldviews significantly reduced the impact potential of REDD+ as a global carbon emissions reduction process as well as a process to contribute to the sustainable development of the case study countries. Meanwhile, international and national experts who operated in the national REDD+ processes were one group of subjects in this study that found themselves in between these two conflicting worldviews, with the ability to relate to both. This group of experts were particularly empowered as subjects through their access to donor finance and their ability to deploy internationally institutionalised knowledge to mediate between the two groups at the national level. To further understand the reasons why the effects of governmentality were limited within the sphere of REDD+ readiness, it is necessary to examine the conduct of this group of experts from the perspective of scale.

7.3.1 REDD+ as an On-going Expert Theatre

As discussed above, the sphere of REDD+ readiness in each case study country was an extension of the international REDD+ policy and scientific debates as part of the broader discourses and practices of the development and conservation fields that operated as an industry. Although this sphere of REDD+ readiness primarily took place at the national level, the discourses and practices of the national REDD+ processes led by international and national experts did not translate into the mainstream development policy debates in the case study countries. This was because of the discreet and subtle resistance by the central authorities of the case study countries as described above. The national REDD+ processes were instead mainly siloed as a technical ODA-supported initiative focusing on forestry. Many research participants argued that within this silo, their national REDD+ processes became places of knowledge politics among experts. As indicated earlier, these processes were described by some research participants as 'an expert theatre' and 'a power game among experts'.

In this insular sphere or the so-called 'expert theatre', REDD+ was described by several research participants as one of the latest trends within the development and conservation industry. Most international and national experts were thus pursuing REDD+ as the continuation of previous trends such as the CDM or community-based conservation activities within the development and conservation fields. In this context, the senior government representative (a) of Sri Lanka (in-depth interview, July 30, 2015) described that 'REDD+ is the latest trend in the development industry that we have become part of over the years, so we all know how [this industry] works and how we can play this game'. In a similar context, the former senior representative of the UNFCCC (in-depth interview, September 16, 2015) claimed that '90 per cent of us, the so-called REDD+ experts, are just moving from one topic to another depending on how sexy or how much money is in there'. Reinforcing this claim, the senior representative of a national research organisation in Nepal (in-depth interview, August 26, 2015) stated that 'around 2007 after the COP in Bali, climate and forest conservation started getting [global] attention, so many of us quickly moved into REDD+'. These accounts highlight that for most experts REDD+ was first and foremost part of their professional landscape in which they pursued their professional career and interests. The representative of a national CSO in Nepal (in-depth interview, September 14, 2015) conceded as one of such experts that 'this is why the real change is difficult' as REDD+ just like many other initiatives in the past was more concerned with knowledge production and its demonstration by experts and securing donor finance. Through this process, the production and demonstration of knowledge became an iterative exercise to meet donor interests in a circular relationship. This supports the claims by Redford et al. (2013), Dempsey and Suarez (2016) and Fletcher et al. (2016) concerning the development and conservation industry's obsession with identifying a silver bullet that discursively becomes an institutionalised solution through this circular process tied to donor finance.

7.3.1.a.   Disciplinary Effects on Experts as Professional Development

The focus on finance and knowledge through the REDD+ processes as part of the broader discourses and practices of the development and conservation industry placed those experts with the understanding of international policy

debates and national contexts in an advantageous position. They were able to act as trusted agents to support the disbursement of donor finance and to facilitate the demonstration and transfer of internationally institutionalised knowledge at the national level. This underscores the role of such experts to act as brokers to operationalise financial arrangements as donors prefer to disburse ODA support through intermediaries due to their fundamental mistrust of their recipient governments (Brunner and Enting, 2014). From this perspective, the senior regional representative of the United Nations (in-depth interview, December 3, 2015) described the unique position of such experts including himself as:

> Experts like us from the UN and others are very important because we act as a risk buffer for donors as well as a link or channel between the national and the international levels. We have unique skill sets that others working only at the international or national level do not. We can translate ideas between the two levels.

A similar role for national experts was described by the national representative of an international CSO (a) in Nepal (in-depth interview, December 2, 2015) who argued that 'we play a critical role as mediators as we help translate the knowledge from the international level into the national and local context'. These accounts describe the instrumental role of these international and national experts in disseminating the internationally institutionalised knowledge of REDD+ that was supported through donor finance at the national level.

With the knowledge and understanding of both the international and national contexts, these experts were ideal self-disciplined subjects to pursue REDD+, driven by their inherent need for professional enhancement in the development and conservation fields. These conditions explain the reasons why the disciplinary form of governmental rationality of donors resonated with these experts. Described by the concept of 'intimate government' by Agrawal (2005), as introduced in Chapter Two, these experts became self-disciplined subjects through the internalisation of the visions, norms and values of donors to participate in the act of governing at the national level. This was because they were able to identify a vested interest through their participation in the process of governing as it provided opportunities for empowerment and career

enhancement on an individual basis. As indicated earlier by the senior representative of a national research organisation in Nepal (in-depth interview, August 26, 2015) and senior representative of a REDD+ readiness initiative (a) in Sri Lanka (in-depth interview, July 29, 2015), the job creation and professional development among experts like themselves were some of the most visible effects of national REDD+ processes.

Recalling from the previous chapter, international experts were generally described as 'facipulators' by the national representative of a regional organisation in Nepal (in-depth interview, November 6, 2015) to point to the allegedly inherently biased positions of international experts underpinning the international scalar stance. Although national experts were more attentive to their national needs, priorities and circumstances, their role as experts was not so different from their international counterparts, as they also actively partook in the demonstration and transfer of international knowledge at the national level. According to the representative of a national CSO in Nepal (in-depth interview, September 14, 2015);

> REDD+ has opened a space for many [national] experts to act as influential actors to take part in bringing new international ideas into the country, and many of us have become empowered by this.

Through adoption and internalisation of the internationally institutionalised knowledge, many national experts became part of this group of self-disciplined subjects tasked to pursue REDD+ in the case study countries. Many of them were empowered as subjects within a broader context of the development and conservation fields on an individual basis.

7.3.1.b.   Ability to Perform Scales as Source of Legitimacy and Power

One commonality between these international and national experts who operated as influential subjects within this sphere was their ability to relate to the two fundamentally different scalar stances; in other words, to act as brokers between the central authorities of the case study countries and donors. Their role as brokers was more focused on disseminating the international visions, norms and values at the national level than bringing national concerns and needs to the international level. The senior representative of a REDD+ readiness

initiative (b) in Sri Lanka (focus group discussion, July 23, 2015) argued that as 'we constantly learn and tell international lessons, and success stories from other parts of the world', knowledge and experience within the sphere travelled primarily in one direction, from the international policy and scientific debates on REDD+ to the national REDD+ processes. This direction of knowledge flow was set mostly by the inherent hegemonic relations between developed and developing countries through the fundamentally neoliberal framing of global environmental governance, as discussed earlier.

Despite this inherent structural power hierarchy built into the process, several research participants who identified themselves as national experts indicated that they regularly deployed this technology to legitimate their positions and arguments, as it allowed them to transcend their national scale to leverage this power hierarchy to their own benefit. For instance, the senior government representative (a) of Sri Lanka (in-depth interview, July 30, 2015), who identified himself as an expert in one or more areas of REDD+ readiness, argued that 'sometimes presenting international perspectives and approaches, as if you are from an international organisation or donor agency to the issues faced in the country allows you to weigh in on the debate'. He (ibid.) described that his ability to shift his stances from the national to international and back while participating in, for example, a stakeholder consultation meeting in Sri Lanka or an international meeting on REDD+ had allowed him to leverage legitimacy and the power of association. This ability enabled him to play his dual roles as a REDD+ expert and a government official effectively to operate between donors and his government in order to mobilise donor support for REDD+ readiness in Sri Lanka. A similar argument was provided by the senior government representative of Malaysia (in-depth interview, June 22, 2015) who also identified herself as an expert in one or more areas of REDD+ readiness. She (ibid.) claimed that her association with the IPCC as a participating scientist had increased her legitimacy and authority within the national REDD+ process as well as her ability to interact with donors on an equal footing. From the perspective of an international expert, the regional representative of the United Nations (in-depth interview, December 3, 2015) also argued that his ability to relate to the national contexts and scalar stance allowed him to 'strengthen [his] arguments when

interacting with [his] headquarters and leverage support from [his] national counterparts'.

The ability of these experts to take or relate to both the international and national scalar stances in a context-specific manner was a unique and vital skill set. These skills gave the experts a sense of power and legitimacy through the national REDD+ processes and were a significant prerogative that rationalised their active participation in the act of governing through REDD+.

7.3.1.c.   Flattening of Power Relations Among Experts

The level of influence of these experts as subjects within the sphere of REDD+ readiness was primarily determined by their ability to command the internationally institutionalised knowledge. As such, the knowledge mainly embodied the visions, norms and values of donors; its production and dissemination were both substantially influencing and being influenced by the flow of donor finance, as also suggested by scholars like Dawson et al. (2018) and Thompson et al. (2011). In this context, international experts generally had a stronger influence as subjects due to their disposition in relation to such visions, norms and values, as they often came from donor countries. For instance, the senior executive of an international CSO (in-depth interview, November 3, 2015) argued that 'those of us who happen to be from donor countries have the kind of power others from the South do not because we often act as spokespersons for the donors'. This was one factor that set an inherent power hierarchy between international and national experts.

Whilst acknowledging such inherent power relations between international and national experts, the national representative of a regional organisation in Nepal (in-depth interview, November 2, 2015) argued, however, that this process of subject creation based on international knowledge dissemination through REDD+ provided a relatively 'level playing field for many national experts'. He (ibid.) explained that this was because such knowledge in REDD+ was fairly well-structured, standardised and accessible through the COP decisions and IPCC reporting.   Through international exposure and interactions, many national experts were able to obtain and (re)deploy this technology of power within their

national REDD+ processes to become influential subjects themselves. Supporting this claim, the researcher also observed the effects of levelling of power between international and national experts at the national level, compared to other ODA-supported initiatives in the past. This was primarily because the internationally institutionalised knowledge as one of the two prominent technologies of power was highly accessible and applicable to all REDD+ countries through standardisation to transform REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure. Despite its overall adverse effects discussed in the previous chapter, REDD+, as a boundary infrastructure, had provided an opportunity for both international and national experts to interact and debate on a relatively equal basis through internalisation and strengthening of their command of the institutionalised knowledge.

Nevertheless, the observed signs of flattening power relations were only visible between international and national experts within the national REDD+ processes, while the interactions among these experts were often described as expert politics or debates among themselves. This offers empirical evidence to add to the claims by Den Basten et al. (2014) and Wilson Rowe (2015) that the effects of flattening power relations through the international REDD+ negotiations extended into the national REDD+ processes as part of the international discourse on REDD+ but limited within this sphere. At the same time, the power inequality between developed and developing countries remained as one of the most critical inhibitors of REDD+ in the case study countries while REDD+ national processes provided interesting empowerment effects, particularly for national experts.

7.3.2 Limited Effects of Governmentality

The observed levelling of the power relations between international and national experts based on the internalisation of standardised knowledge reinforces the assumption that discourses and practices within the national REDD+ processes in the case study countries were merely an extension of the international REDD+ process, underpinned by the governmental rationalities of donors. Those research participants who identified themselves as REDD+ experts were able to

negotiate best positions through the national REDD+ processes by taking the international and national scalar stances as appropriate. These experts operated as self-disciplined subjects to internalise the effects of donor finance and institutionalisation of knowledge as doing so directly served their professional interests and development.

These experts were transient subjects who had been part of the broader domain of the development and conservation fields. Their rationality was already conditioned through their long engagement in these fields. As suggested by Lund et al. (2017, p. 125), REDD+ was the new 'promise of change' that was discursively produced and promoted as a silver bullet or globally scalable solution to address climate change within the development and conservation fields that operated as an industry. These international and national experts as part of this industry happened to find themselves in a position to participate in the act of governing through REDD+ as it presented a range of professional development opportunities. The researcher's own experience as an international REDD+ expert also informed this assessment.

Meanwhile, the effects of governmentality were limited within the national REDD+ processes that operated instead as part of the international REDD+ process than the national development policy processes in the case study countries. From the perspective of the central authorities of the case study countries, REDD+ turned out to be just another path-dependent ODA-funded initiative that often came with heavy external influence.

7.4. CONCLUSION

This chapter has shed light on the effects of conflicting governmental rationalities between the central authorities of the case study countries and donors at the national level. The chapter has also examined the effects of governmentality through REDD+ from the perspective of scale.

Due to the discreet and subtle resistance by the central authorities of the case study countries to the top-down and technocratic actions promoted by donors, the effects of governmentality through REDD+ were limited within the national REDD+ processes. The centrality and power of international decisions and finance that provided grounds for action by donors were viewed problematic by the case study countries, as it was perceived to be based on the historically constituted power inequality and to ignore relevant national circumstances and the agency of the central authorities. As a result, the impact potential of REDD+ as a global carbon emissions reduction process or a process to contribute to the sustainable development of the case study countries was significantly reduced.

From the perspective of scale, these conflicting governmental rationalities of the central authorities of the case study countries and donors resulted in the creation of the two separate and independent realities. These two fundamentally incompatible worldviews separated the international scalar stance of donors from the national scalar stance of the central authorities. Due to this disjuncture between the two worldviews, the effects of governmentality through REDD+ at the national level were only limited within the national REDD+ processes. Nonetheless, the experts within these national processes found themselves mediating between the two conflicting worldviews, with the ability to relate to both. Based on this ability, these experts acted as self-disciplined subjects to support the disbursement of donor finance and to facilitate the demonstration and transfer of internationally institutionalised knowledge at the national level. The observed governmentality effects on these experts were nonetheless part of the overall conduct of the development and conservation fields that operated as an industry at the international level. The conduct of this industry is primarily driven by its need to secure donor finance through promotion and demonstration of the narrative of ecological modernisation under the inherently neoliberal framework of global environmental governance. To these experts, REDD+ was merely the latest trend within this industry with all familiar technologies of government and effects of governmentality. They actively partook in the act of governing through REDD+ because it presented various professional development opportunities on an individual basis.

These findings combined with the findings from Chapter Six have illustrated several problematics concerning the effects of donor-recipient power relations and expert politics on REDD+ in the case study countries. The final chapter provides a summary of key findings from this research project to conclude this thesis.

8. CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

8.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter concludes this thesis by providing a summary of the key findings from the previous empirical chapters concerning the research objective and specific questions, as set out in Chapter One. This thesis has achieved its primary objective, namely to empirically bring to light the effects of donor-recipient power relations and knowledge politics that are often only tacitly understood by experts and practitioners who are operating at the national level. Although such effects have significant bearing on determining the scope and potential of REDD+ at the national level, they are often not well understood outside of experts' and practitioners' networks, thus being overlooked and underestimated in reviewing the problematics of REDD+. To turn such tacit knowledge among experts and practitioners into an explicit and empirical understanding, the mixed-method analysis of the primary and secondary data gathered through the literature review, in-depth interviews, focus group and Q was conducted to examine the following five specific research questions.

- What is being governed through REDD+?
- Who is governing through REDD+?
- How is REDD+ being governed?
- Why do actors pursue and problematise REDD+ in specific ways?
- How are scales affecting the processes of REDD+?

This chapter begins by summarising the findings concerning each of these specific research questions. Based on these findings, this chapter concludes on the main question, raised in Chapter One: Can REDD+ be a global policy instrument and process that deliver a cost-effective climate solution on a global scale and at the same time support developing countries' transition towards sustainable development, as described by the decision of the COP (UNFCCC, 2016a)? The findings are also discussed in relation to the knowledge gaps in the pertinent literature identified in Chapter Two to elaborate on the contribution of

this research to global environmental governance studies and more broadly to human geography. The penultimate section also provides suggestions for future research directions, followed by the researcher's reflection to conclude this thesis.

8.2. KEY FINDINGS

The previous empirical chapters have revealed several problematics of REDD+ in the case study countries and the ways in which such problematics limited the effects of governmentality through REDD+. The following provides a summary of key findings under each of the five specific research questions and related knowledge gaps in the pertinent geographical literature.

8.2.1. What is Being Governed through REDD+?

Beneath the broad consensus among the research participants that the effects of climate change were the overarching object of government through REDD+, there were different and nuanced understandings of what was to be governed through REDD+ at the national level.

These differences related to four distinctive discourses, which reflected the diverse geographies and nationalities of participants – Malaysian, Nepalese and Sri Lankan - with the fourth being espoused primarily by a group of international experts. The first three discourses associated with the case study countries illustrated that due to their unique socioeconomic and historical circumstances, REDD+ was framed and approached slightly differently by each case study country. The Malaysian discourse suggested that in order for REDD+ to work in Malaysia, a strong business case for policy integration was needed in the context of national development to address its historically constituted socio-political and institutional fragmentation over the country's forest management. For Nepal, REDD+ presented an opportunity to support the current collaborative forest management policies to keep the historical tensions between social and political elites and local communities over forest and land management in check. The Sri Lankan discourse viewed REDD+ as an opportunity to increase national

ownership on its environmental governance processes by reducing the historical hegemony of donors as the country was becoming less dependent on ODA.

More broadly, the analysis of these discourses has also underscored the tensions between ecological modernisation and global environmental justice narratives, as discussed in Chapter Six. On the one hand, REDD+ was viewed primarily as an international response to global forest carbon emissions that were contributing to climate change from the perspective of the international experts. On the other hand, REDD+ presented issues, which were an integral part of the long-standing path-dependent process of global environmental governance from the perspectives of the Malaysian, Nepalese and Sri Lankan research participants.

This analysis has revealed that REDD+ had initially operated as a boundary object to accommodate divergent understandings and needs of the case study countries within its overall framing to appear as a broadly coherent and rational object of government. However, with efforts by donors and their intermediaries to elucidate precisely what should be governed through REDD+ at the national level, REDD+ was gradually transformed into a boundary infrastructure to adopt common standards across all levels. By being a boundary infrastructure, the interpretive flexibility of REDD+ as a boundary object was lost due to excessive standardisation effects in order to adopt common standards down to the practice level to increase the transparency and comparability of action through REDD+. This transformation reinforced the narrative of ecological modernisation underpinned by donors, their intermediaries and associated experts through REDD+ to authoritatively set REDD+ as a top-down, techno-managerial and market-driven process. This thesis has revealed that this transformation to a boundary infrastructure with internationally focused approaches was a critical factor in limiting meaningful engagement by policymakers and the public of the case study countries in their national REDD+ processes.

This analysis of what is being governed through REDD+ has provided these critical insights into how REDD+ as a boundary object transformed into a boundary infrastructure and its effects on REDD+ at the national level. The findings offer empirical evidence to support the conceptual claims by scholars like

McDermott (2014) suggesting that such transformation would follow the dominant positions and narrative of donors and their intermediaries. While supporting the suggestions by scholars like Pasgaard et al. (2016) and Angelsen et al. (2017) to keep REDD+ flexible to allow for its effective localisation, the findings of this thesis also highlight the difficulty of doing so. This is because of the inherent power relations between donors and recipient countries that can quickly transform a boundary object like REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure.

8.2.2. Who is Governing through REDD+?

There were three groups of subjects, namely donors, international and national experts, and REDD+ governments, who played critical roles in the REDD+ processes in the case study countries.

Donors were considered as the most powerful group of subjects as they were the single most important source of REDD+ finance. The role of international and national experts was also considered influential as they operated as direct service providers to donors to administer donor finance and to promote and demonstrate international decisions and knowledge on REDD+. In contrast with the visible roles of donors and experts, REDD+ governments in the case study countries played a much less prominent or visible role. This was because the central authorities of the case study countries were framed by donors as part of the problem to be solved rather than the solution, due to their perceived capacity limitations to manage their REDD+ readiness processes, as discussed in Chapter Six.

This less visible role of the central authorities of the case study countries made the operationalisation of REDD+ problematic as it contradicted with the provisions of the WFR and Paris Agreement that underscore the essential role of national governments in the coordination and implementation of REDD+ (UNFCCC, 2016a, 2016b). As discussed in Chapter Six, this empirical evidence supports the claims by scholars like Rutherford (2007) and Ioris (2014) that the fundamentally neoliberal framing of global environmental governance makes

sovereign governments in developing countries devoid of real power. The agency of the central authorities in the case study countries was largely denied or only superficially recognised as a political formality by donors and their intermediaries through the national REDD+ processes. However, precisely because of this systemic power inequality, there was limited national ownership and political commitment to REDD+ in the case study countries, which significantly reduced the potential impact of REDD+.

8.2.3. How is REDD+ being Governed?

The process of subject creation highlighted two prominent technologies of government, namely donor finance and internationally institutionalised knowledge on REDD+. These technologies reinforced each other through discourses and practices to rationalise the positions of donors and experts with access to and control of these technologies. The deployment of these technologies was instrumental in supporting the transition of REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure. Donor finance operated as a powerful instrument to underpin the rhetoric of ecological modernisation through REDD+. The production and dissemination of the COP decisions and international policy and scientific debates on REDD+ were institutionalised with the backing of donor finance to establish authoritative approaches to REDD+.

The level of reliance on donor finance was a critical factor that determined the degree to which each case study country felt the effects of these technologies. As one of the LDCs with a high level of dependency on ODA, the combined effects of these technologies were much more visible in Nepal than in the other two case study countries. While the effects of these technologies were recognised to varying extents across case study countries, the impacts of these technologies on their overall national development processes beyond REDD+ were limited. The standardised approaches to REDD+ promoted through donor conditionality were only superficially adopted by the case study countries merely to mobilise external finance for underfunded sectors like forestry. As a result, the effects of these technologies were limited in real terms to the narrow confines of

national REDD+ processes in the case study countries. These findings support and further delineate the limited effects of these technologies described by scholars like Astuti and Mcgregor (2015), Bastakoti and Davidsen (2015) and Dawson et al. (2018).

8.2.4. Why Do Actors Pursue and Problematise REDD+ in Certain Ways?

These challenges and limitations facing REDD+, as highlighted above, were a direct result of conflicting governmental rationalities between the central authorities of the case study countries and donors. On the one hand, donors promoted the adoption of techno-managerial and internationally scalable approaches and solutions through REDD+ to climate change based on the narrative of ecological modernisation. Donors assumed the universality of international decisions and obligations and that REDD+ countries with limited capacities needed financial support and technical guidance. These assumptions provided grounds for the disciplinary and neoliberal logics of donors to act through the deployment of donor finance and production and dissemination of internationally institutionalised knowledge to impose their visions, norms and values on REDD+ countries. On the other hand, the central authorities of the case study countries directly challenged such rationalities and action of donors, as they claimed that those assumptions of donors were ill-conceived and built on the structural power inequality and exploitation. As a result, the liberation and sovereign governmental rationalities of the central authorities of the case study countries worked to counter the efforts of donors by demonstrating their inaction.

Consequently, the effects of governmentality through REDD+ based on the rationalities of donors were limited within the national REDD+ processes. The subjects within this domain were primarily international and national experts and their actions were highly focused on meeting international REDD+ requirements as per the WFR. These findings directly respond to the suggestion by Fletcher (2017) to develop an empirical understanding of what happens to the vision of perceived powerholders at the practice level when it is pursued and executed through their dominant forms of governmental rationality. The disciplinary and

neoliberal rationalities of donors were viewed by the central authorities of the case study countries to have overlooked their agency and specific circumstances and needs, thus raising various global environmental justice concerns. These concerns, together with the agency of the central authorities of the case study countries, refuted the dominance of these donor rationalities at the practice level. This offers empirical evidence of the reversibility of bio-politics, as described by Foucault et al. (1991), by which the counter-rationality of the central authorities to isolate REDD+ as a sector-specific activity substantially limits the effects of donor-recipient power relations and expert politics within the sphere of REDD+ readiness.

These findings also add to the claims by scholars like Joseph (2009) and Zanotti (2013) that these rationalities of donors based on international laws, agreements and finance do not operate effectively beyond the domain of advanced liberal capitalism, especially between donors and recipient countries where power relations are unequal. Furthermore, the fact that the effects of governmentality through REDD+ were only limited within the confines of the national REDD+ processes also supports these findings as these processes were a mere extension of the international REDD+ discourses and practices, led by donors and their intermediaries. The thesis also examined these factors contributing to the limited effects of governmentality through REDD+ from the perspective of scale to develop a further understanding.

8.2.5. How are Scales Affecting the Processes of REDD+?

By looking at scales as performative, the thesis has shed light on the effects of scale on these circumstances that limited the overall effectiveness of REDD+ at the national level.

First, the conflicting governmental rationalities of the central authorities of the case study countries and of donors created two separate and incompatible worldviews which regarded the world from either the international and neoliberal perspective or the sovereign and global environmental justice perspective. The

incompatibility of the two worldviews significantly reduced the potential impact of REDD+ as it was translated into just another ODA-supported technical capacity development initiative on forestry at the national level.

Second, experts in the national REDD+ processes were one group of subjects that had experienced unique empowerment effects. Their ability to relate to both of the worldviews allowed them to act as brokers between the central authorities of the case study countries and donors and thereby to actively shape the national REDD+ processes. Experts in this thesis refer to those research participants who identified themselves as experts in one or more areas related to REDD+ readiness. In this thesis, the international experts represented donor agencies, multilateral institutions and international CSOs. The national experts mainly operated as technical focal points of REDD+ governments and representatives of national CSOs.

The discourses and practices within the national REDD+ processes were described by one of the research participants as 'an expert theatre'. In this so-called 'expert theatre', experts acted as brokers to operationalise financial arrangements as donors prefer to disburse ODA support through intermediaries due to their fundamental mistrust of their recipient governments. In negotiating the space between the central authorities and donors, the ability of these experts to take or relate to both the international and national scalar stances in a context-specific manner was a unique and essential skill set.

With the knowledge and understanding of both the international and national contexts, these experts became self-disciplined subjects to pursue REDD+, primarily driven by their inherent need for professional enhancement in the development and conservation fields. For these experts, REDD+ was simply the latest trend within the development and conservation fields with all the familiar technologies of government and the effects of governmentality. Meanwhile, the power inequality between developed and developing countries remained as a critical inhibitor of REDD+ in the case study countries. From the perspective of the central authorities of these countries, REDD+ turned out to be no different from the traditional ODA-funded development and conservation initiatives.

8.2.6. Can REDD+ Deliver on its Two-prong Objective?

Given these various effects of power, summarised above, this thesis concludes that the potential of REDD+ to contribute to international climate efforts or sustainable development has been significantly limited in the case study countries. This is mainly due to the path-dependent nature of REDD+ that builds on historically constituted unequal power relations between developed and developing countries. These power relations have inevitably led to the mismatch of expectations and mistrust between the two groups to reduce the scope of REDD+ to a sector-specific technical activity, thus limiting the effectiveness of REDD+ in addressing cross-sectoral drivers of forest change and related development challenges.

At the same time, the presence of the so-called 'expert theatre' as part of the long-standing ODA practices has often masked these inhibiting effects of power in the eyes of distant observers including those actors from donor countries, CSOs and research institutions, often operating only within the international policy domain. As a result, these subtle effects of power and expert politics become overlooked and underestimated in the review of the current approach to REDD+ that often takes place through international negotiations. The findings of the thesis thus suggest that it is crucial to pay closer attention to these subtle effects that are often only tacitly understood by experts and practitioners at the national level in future improvement debates for REDD+.

The empirical understanding of these effects, developed in this thesis, therefore, should offer valuable insight and critical addition to the latest stocktaking debates on the problematics of REDD+ as discussed in Chapter One. More explicitly, the findings of this thesis contribute to the expansion of two specific debates – the effects of donor conditionality, as suggested by Angelsen (2017), and the role of the development and conservation industry, as suggested by Lund et al. (2017), as these issues have strong bearing on determining the scope and potential of REDD+ at the national level.

8.3. THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

This thesis makes several significant theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the studies of global environmental governance and human geography. Concurrently, the approaches taken in this research project have also inevitably created several limitations, which provide essential considerations for suggesting future research directions.

8.3.1. Theoretical Contribution, Limitations and Future Directions

Responding to Rutherford's (2007, p. 303) call for geographers to bring 'an analysis of spatiality' into governmentality studies, the thesis has successfully demonstrated a novel way to incorporate the notion of geographical scale into the theoretical framework of Foucauldian governmentality to examine the effects of power through REDD+ from a human geographical perspective. By treating scales as performative through the governmentality framework, this thesis has been able to empirically theorise the notion of expert theatre as the evidence of how the performativity of scale plays a vital role in determining the scale and scope of governmental rationality. Building on this work, one potential research direction is to develop further the understanding of the effects and processes of the so-called expert theatre. In doing so, it is crucial to address one of the limitations in this research, associated with the selection of informants, as noted in Chapter Four. Mainly due to the researcher's unique positionality, relevant viewpoints of those actors outside of the researcher's close network have been inadvertently overlooked in this research. The future study should, therefore, include representatives of various donor agencies, bilateral REDD+ initiatives and central authorities, who are engaged in REDD+ but not through the UN-REDD, in order to develop a full theorisation of these expert theatre effects.

Another theoretical contribution through the governmentality approach is the theorisation of the technologies of power in the context of REDD+, namely donor

214

finance and institutionalised knowledge as the two main instruments to underpin the dominant positions and narratives of donors and their intermediaries. These technologies make specific governmental rationalities and their effects through REDD+ visible. However, the thesis also acknowledges that these technologies of power can be further broken down to develop a more detailed understanding of different types of donor finance (e.g., grant, loan, equity) and institutionalised knowledge (e.g., rule of law, science, international agreements), different ways in which such types operate as technologies, and their specific effects. From this perspective, the thesis suggests exploring further the theorisation of these technologies in this context through future research.

Particularly, concerning the effects of institutionalised knowledge, paying more dedicated attention to the effects of truth production and dissemination would have afforded more specific and valuable insights. Based on this reflection, the researcher suggests a specific area of improvement for future research. As discussed in Section 2.5, Chapter Two, this thesis has treated the truth form of governmental rationality not as an independent aspect of governmentality but rather as a fundamental mechanism of power that underpins all forms of governmental rationality. While holding to this view, the researcher suggests considering a specific focus on truth governmentality in order to explore more deeply the effects of truth as a critical element of biopower within economic, institutional and political regimes of REDD+. The researcher thus suggests a thorough investigation of the processes and effects of truth production and dissemination within each of the four forms of governmental rationality (i.e., disciplinary, neoliberal, sovereign, and liberation), adopted in this thesis. This specific focus should yield further insights into the processes of institutionalisation of knowledge, for instance, through international climate finance discourses, scientific discourses of the IPCC, traditional knowledge discourses of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues concerning REDD+, and academic discourses concerning the ideology of sustainable development, which underpins REDD+. Such an understanding of the effects of truth would shed light on specific origins and inner-workings of power within each of these regimes. This would notably expand the current understanding of how specific institutionalised knowledge production and

dissemination processes emerge, integrate and collide through national REDD+ processes to develop conditions of domination and resistance to determine the efficacy of REDD+.

While noting the lack of a unified theoretical approach to governmentality studies as both the weakness and strength (Foucault *et al.*, 1991), these theoretical contributions support the advancement of the notions of governmentality. Notably, the thesis has successfully demonstrated a new avenue through which to understand the effects of power through global environmental governance by using the governmentality framework from a human geographical perspective.

8.3.2. Methodological Contribution, Limitations and Future Directions

The use of Q through this thesis has effectively highlighted both the strength and weakness of the methodological approach used in this research. The thesis has demonstrated a fruitful way in which Q can complement poststructuralist discourse analysis. Taking a step further from the use of Q in the study by Jepson et al. (2012) as discussed in Chapter Four, Q was situated within poststructuralist discourse analysis to complement its qualitative focus and process by identifying the clusters of prominent viewpoints and delineating the boundaries and essential characteristics of emerging discourses to reinforce the interpretive ability of discourse analysis. While the complementarity of this mixed approach was demonstrated, it became clear that the data collection through Q-sorting was extremely taxing for the research participants. This experience suggests that Q is not the best-suited method for this type of research where the majority of research participants were senior officials from public and private institutions with severe time constraints.

Besides this critical constraint associated with the use of Q in this research, one possible future direction is to improve the application of this methodological approach by simplifying the process of Q sorting and narrowing the scope of analysis. For example, Q might be used in a more targeted fashion to explore deeper specific issues that emerge through poststructuralist discourse analysis.

Nevertheless, the understanding of the strength and weakness of Q in this specific context offer a significant methodological contribution to the body of knowledge concerning the use of Q in global environmental governance studies.

Lastly, the thesis also acknowledges another limitation that stems from its general use of the term 'donor finance', aggregating different types of donor finance (i.e., bilateral, multilateral, grant, loan and equity), as briefly discussed in Chapter Three. The focus of the research was primarily on multilateral finance, more specifically on the UN-REDD in the case study countries. Therefore, the findings of this thesis may, to some extent, be specific to the contexts of the case study countries and the UN-REDD, as one of many sources of donor finance available for REDD+. This highlights two areas in which the findings of this thesis might be limited, first in relation to its geographical generalisability, and second in relation to its partial relevance in terms of donor finance. However, the effects of donor finance and institutionalised knowledge through the UN-REDD, as the two main instruments of power revealed in this thesis, may also be relevant to other types of donor finance within the case study countries and in other REDD+ countries. From this perspective, as laid out as a future direction of research in the theoretical context above, the researcher also suggests analysing these different types of donor finance as well as institutionalised knowledge separately through future research to understand more deeply the effects of power associated with each type of donor finance and institutionalised knowledge and how such effects may differ from country to country based on their unique national circumstances. Developing an understanding of such differences as well as similarities would, therefore, confirm whether and to what extent the findings of this thesis would be relevant to various circumstances and spatial contexts. Besides this limitation, the thesis has nonetheless successfully revealed valuable insights into the effects of power through the processes around the implementation of the UN-REDD in the case study countries.

8.3.3. Empirical Contribution, Limitations and Future Directions

This thesis has produced empirical evidence to support several theoretical concepts within the specific context of this research. First, the thesis offers evidence of the reversibility of bio-politics, as described by Foucault et al. (1991), through REDD+. The action of donors to impose their visions, norms and values through their disciplinary and neoliberal rationalities was met with subtle and discreet contestation and resistance by the central authorities of the case study countries through their liberation and sovereign rationalities. This suggests the presence of a complex social response mechanism that alters the visions, norms and values of perceived powerholders, namely donors in this case when moving from policy to implementation. This empirical evidence also confirms the theorisation of the forms of governmental rationality by Fletcher (2017) that these forms are often operationalised in a highly intertwined manner. Due to their complex interactions, their effects are often unpredictable and different from what is envisioned originally through each form of governmental rationality. These findings suggest the need for greater attention to the intertwining effects of these forms of governmental rationality when designing global policy instruments like REDD+ that are intended for national-level implementation.

Second, through the adoption of the analytical framework, developed by Thompson et al.(2011), the thesis has empirically demonstrated that dominant discourses and actions around REDD+ are essentially infused with the visions, norms and values of the Global North to underpin and legitimatise its dominant positions. In demonstrating this knowledge, the concept of boundary objects and their transformation to boundary infrastructures, as described by (Star, 2010), provided a productive theoretical ground based on which to trace the process of standardisation of visions, norms, values and practices through the use of donor finance and institutionalised knowledge. The thesis offers empirical evidence of this transformation through REDD+ that follows the dominant positions and narratives of donors and their intermediaries.

Besides these notable contributions, the limitation of this research, concerning the small selection of informants, suggests potential future research directions to

expand the bases of evidence that support the productive use of these theoretical conceptions through REDD+ and global environmental governance studies. For instance, future research could further confirm and explore both the process and effects of the reversibility of bio-politics from the perspectives of policymakers who are not directly involved in REDD+ in the case study countries and likewise from representatives of donor countries who do not operate at the national level. Similarly, examining the process and effects of transformation of REDD+ into a boundary infrastructure from such broader perspectives would improve the knowledge and use of the concept of boundary objects as a tool to trace the effects of power through discourses around REDD+, as the focus of such discourses moves from policy to implementation.

Finally, it would be crucial for these potential research directions to consider practical strategies to reduce the adverse effects of power and standardisation through REDD+ and more broadly through global environmental governance. Such strategies should mainly focus on how global accountability and transparency measures could operate harmoniously with decentralised and context-specific approaches to serve specific national and local needs to ensure the successful operationalisation of global policy instruments like REDD+ at the national level.

8.4. CONCLUSION TO THIS THESIS

As discussed above, the thesis has made theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the studies of global environmental governance and human geography in several distinctive ways. Notably, the thesis has demonstrated a novel way to incorporate the notion of geographical scale into the framework of Foucauldian governmentality through the examination of REDD+. The thesis has also theorised donor finance and institutionalised knowledge as critical technological aspects of power in REDD+ and provided reflections on how the current theorisation of power through these technologies in this thesis may be improved through deeper examination of the effects of truth as a future direction. Methodologically, the use of Q has demonstrated a fruitful

way in which Q can complement poststructuralist discourse analysis but also highlighted its operational constraints mainly through administration of Q sorting in this type of research. Empirically, the thesis has produced evidence to suggest the presence of a complex social response mechanism that alters the visions, norms and values of perceived powerholders when moving from policy to implementation in REDD+. In this context, the thesis has demonstrated a productive way to use the concept of boundary objects and their transformation to boundary infrastructures to trace the process of transition through which dominant international discourse and actions became subtly contested and resisted at the national level.

Finally, as the researcher's personal reflection, this research was an eye-opener on many levels as I had also operated as one of the REDD+ experts within the development and conservation fields. Although the practice of categorising countries as 'developed' or 'developing' countries is a highly contested issue, this thesis has shed light on the elephant in the room, namely the issue of power inequality between developed and developing countries in instituting global policy instruments like REDD+. As a practitioner, I was tacitly aware of such power relations and their implications. However, through this research, I have been able to develop a deeper understanding and appreciation of the impact of donor-recipient power relations and the integral role of the so-called 'expert theatre' in reinforcing the power relations at the practice level.

I believe it is essential for experts in the development and conservation fields to be able to pursue various professional development opportunities, just like in any other industry. At the same time, most experts, including myself, are interested in contributing to real change through the work we do. However, it is often difficult to stop and reflect on our conduct and its impact when fully immersed into the everyday discourses and practices of these fields. It is, therefore, my hope that the findings of this thesis can provide other practitioners with an opportunity for critical reflection. After all, the experts like us are best-positioned to instigate change as we have the unique skill set to relate to both donors and recipient countries and operate as facilitators of change at the practice level.

With such reflection, these systemic issues and limitations, concerning REDD+, illuminated in this thesis should send stark warnings to the global community as it prepares to ramp up efforts under the Paris Agreement to leverage maximum contributions from individual countries around the world. More broadly, this thesis should add to the growing body of knowledge that points to the problematics within the framework of global environmental governance to collectively act as signage for a wide range of actors to re-think the future of our action, particularly in designing and implementing global policy instruments like REDD+. To do so is essential as we face the ever-expanding number of complex global environmental challenges that call for truly collective action and impact.

Appendix One: Informed Consent Sheet

UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER

Informed consent sheet

Please tick

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the study described in the participant information sheet, and that I have had the opportunity to ask questions. ✓

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, and I do not have to give a reason for this. ✓

3. I agree to take part in the study described in the participant information sheet. ✓

Please tick

	Yes	No

Include/delete as appropriate

4. I agree to the interview / focus group / consultation being audio recorded — Yes ✓ No ☐

5. I agree to the interview / focus group / consultation being video recorded — Yes ☐ No ✓

6. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in written work or reports based upon this project. — Yes ✓ No ☐

Name of Participant	21 December 2015	Signature
	Date	

Aki Kono		
Name of Researcher	Date	Signature

Stakeholder Type:	Gender:	How long have you been involved in REDD+?
_ Government	_ Male	
_ CSO (environment/social/other)	✓ Female	_ < 2yrs. ✓ 2-5yrs. _ > 5 yrs.
_ Academia (environment/social/other)	**Age:**	
_ Private Sector	_ 20-30	Have you attended
✓ Multilateral/Bilateral Agency	_ 30-40	regional/international REDD+
_ Other ( )	✓ 40-50	events in the past 5 years?
	_ 50-60	
	_ Older	_ No _ Once ✓ 1-3 times _ > 3 times

Appendix Two: Interview and Focus Group Questions

<u>Only primary guiding questions</u>

1. What do you think about REDD+? (only for those participants primarily engaged in national REDD+ processes)
2. How do you think it would work in your country? (only for those participants primarily engaged in national REDD+ processes)
3. How do you think REDD+ will work or not work, considering how the UNFCCC negotiation process is progressing? (only for those participants engaged in REDD+ internationally)
4. In your mind, what do you think are the role of small forest countries like Nepal, Sri Lanka and Malaysia (for the area dedicated for REDD+) in that?
5. Do you think REDD+ is simply about reducing emissions from land use and land use change, while helping developing countries transition towards sustainable development?
6. Literature points to the influential role of scientific and technical expertise of developed countries and international organisations like UNFCCC and IPCC in REDD+, do you think that these actors dominate the current global REDD+ discourse?
7. Do you think REDD+ promotes and supports the notion of self-regulation and self-governance among governments and stakeholders?
8. Do you think there are differences between how REDD+ is being rationalised by developing countries and at the international level?
9. Do you think those REDD+ actors (like yourself) who transcend scales between the national and international domains have a special role to play in national REDD+ policy processes?

Appendix Three: Sample of Coded Transcript in MAXQDA

Appendix Four: Sample of Coded Sections in Excel for Discourse Analysis

No	Category	Sub-category	Discourse Statement	Source Category
6		country	keep the space open for non-major forest countries to be able to participate in it, particularly from the perspective of non-carbon benefits.	& Sri Lanka
15	1.Genealogy	International voice	UNFCCC COP decisions on REDD+, and related IPCC guidance and guidelines and GCF procedures have been created for the history for winners - Annex 1 countries and some large forested countries like Brazil.	Nepal & Sri Lanka
16	1.Genealogy	Centralisation	It is difficult to change and escape from something that stems from the colonial practices and conducts based on which the current international development framework including the UNFCCC process and related REDD+ support is built, and therefore we might as well engage in REDD+, rather than not.	Nepal and Sri Lanka
26	2.REDD is	Limited impact	REDD+ will just like other development projects be requiring a long time to move to the implementation and ending up producing fabricated emission reductions in a short span of time.	Nepal & Sri Lanka
27	2.REDD is	Ownership	While the feasibility of REDD+ remains uncertain as international arrangements for REDD+ are constantly evolving, a lack of a clear vision for REDD+ and agenda at the national level hampers highly-level political and institutional commitments.	Nepal, Sri Lanka
28	2.REDD is	Stakeholder engagement	REDD+ readiness process has offered a new and effective way of bringing people together through opening up a new space for dialogue among the government and civil society beyond REDD+ technical matters.	Nepal, Sri Lanka
29	2.REDD is	Ownership	REDD+ readiness process has widen the forest sector perspective through having a cross-sectoral assessment of issues concerning forest cover change and dialogue with the private sector, other public sectors and civil society actors, and enhanced collegiality among actors.	Sri Lanka

225

Appendix Five: Q-Sorting Using Q SortWare

1. An email instruction sent to the participants

QsortWare account   Inbox - UOL   10:03 AM   QA
Online Survey on REDD+ Governance - conducted by Aki Kono
To: Aki Kono

Your private url is: https://application.qsortware.net/open/5dd6f021-649e-4ea5-876a-4efb75a4af58
Dear Participant:

Thank you for taking part in this survey (click the above link to enter the online survey). Your participation is highly appreciated as you have been carefully selected as one of the most well-informed REDD+ policy actors for this survey.

For the next 45 minutes, you will be asked to rank-order 69 short statements regarding REDD+ according to your relative agreement or disagreement and interpretive association with each statement.

One of the key characteristics of this survey is that it uses a forced distribution approach, through which you are asked to fit all the statements into the pre-determined structural order. In doing so, you are requested to apply your subjective viewpoint(s) rather than your official position(s).

Each of the 2 steps in this survey is provided with instructions at the beginning of the survey page. You will need a steady Internet connection for completing this survey.

Let's begin!

Aki Kono, Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Geography, University of Leicester, UK
ak519@leicester.ac.uk.

2. Q-Sorting Step 1 – Sorting Statements into Three Piles

227

3. Q-Sorting Step 2: Further Sorting of Statements in a Q-sort Grid

228

4. Q-Sorting Step 3: Post Q-Sorting Survey

Before leaving, please respond to the following questions.

User Information

Why do you most strongly agree with those 2 statements? :	
Why do you most strongly disagree with those 2 statements?:	
What is your age?:	21–30 yrs old
Your highest education level:	Secondary diploma
How do you rate your level of understanding of REDD+?:	Limited understanding
How long have you been involved in REDD+?:	< 2yrs
Any comments?:	

OK

their leaders, their and making it regardless of

Appendix Six: Sample Q-Factors with Corresponding Ranks Derived through PQMethod

Four factors extracted in PQMethods and their corresponding statement ranks are consolidated here in this Excel sheet for constructing crib sheets.

Item	Statement	Factor 1 Z-sore	Factor 1 Rank	Factor 1 Q-sort value	Factor 2 Z-sore	Factor 2 Rank	Factor 2 Q-sort value	Factor 3 Z-sore	Factor 3 Rank	Factor 3 Q-sort value	Factor 4 Z-sore	Factor 4 Rank	Factor 4 Q-sort value	Fctor 1 New	Factor 2 new	Factor 3 New
1	REDD+ readiness process has so far primarily benefited (e.g., job creation) those actors linked to a broad network of experts and civil society networks with international funding.	0.01	38	0	1.62	6	3	1.83	5	4	0.03	35	0	Lowest		Highest
2	Even if small developing countries were able to follow all UNFCCC negotiations consistently with strong political commitments from their leaders, their ability to influence key decisions, regarding REDD+, would still be limited, as they are neither donors nor large forested	2.67	1	5	0.57	18	2	1.11	11	2	-0.66	51	-1	5		
3	REDD+ is just one piece of a broader sustainable land management and development puzzle, but many actors have viewed REDD+ in isolation and as a way to advance their own interests and agendas, which could undermine REDD+ itself.	-0.38	46	-1	1.41	9	3	-0.34	42	-1	2.09	1	5	Lowest		Lowest
4	COP decisions on REDD+, aiming to incentivise REDD+ countries to start their own REDD+ processes, are often difficult for countries outside the inner circle of the UNFCCC negotiations to understand due to the internal politics of the negotiations.	-1.19	60	-3	-0.31	43	-1	-0.03	34	0	1.71	3	4	Lowest		
5	REDD+ debates on issues such as subsidies and opportunity costs are 'large-forested county' centric views (i.e., addressing issues with timber and agro industries) and not so helpful for small forested countries pursuing REDD+.	0.36	24	1	-0.45	45	-1	-0.8	56	-2	-1.13	62	-3	Highest		
6	REDD+ is not the best tool for everywhere. A more focused approach is needed to understand where it can work well and why, and that would make REDD+ finance more effective.	0.65	18	2	-0.7	51	-1	0.91	12	2	1.64	4	4		Lowest	
7	The opportunity to access REDD+ readiness finance and donor/expert guidance often hinder the ability of small REDD+ countries with limited carbon potential to objectively assess the role and feasibility of REDD+ in relation to their national circumstances.	-0.16	43	-1	1.23	10	3	-0.03	35	0	-0.76	54	-2		Highest	
8	The process of REDD+ readiness has been instrumental to promoting civil society engagement and advocating marginalised and indigenous people's rights in forest management.	0.41	23	1	-1.08	61	-3	1.52	7	3	0.15	31	0		Lowest	Highest
9	The carbon market offers the best method for allocating funding in REDD+ without too much regulatory control.	-2.91	69	-5	-2.02	69	-5	-1.7	66	-4	-3.58	69	-5	-5	-5	highest
10	Lessons from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) warn against using a purely carbon based valuation approach in REDD+ in order to provide space for non-major forest countries to participate in it particularly from the perspective of non-carbon benefits.	0.25	30	0	0.39	22	1	0.38	22	1	-1.06	61	-3		Highest	Highest
11	The concept of addressing emissions globally obstructs the real issue of addressing deforestation and degradation, as the extent of deforestation or degradation can be politically defined and influenced to maximise the flow of REDD+ finance. REDD+ might not deliver real	-0.4	48	-1	0.27	24	1	-0.66	50	-1	1.49	6	3	Lowest		Lowest
12	Small REDD+ countries would be better off continuing with conventional sustainable forest management efforts rather than engaging in REDD+, given their limited prospects of generating sizable results-based payments and capacity limitations (e.g. financial/ human/ political).	-1.16	59	-2	1.64	5	4	-1.92	69	-5	-0.15	43	-1		Highest	-5
13	Levelling of power relations between developed and developing countries to directly negotiate has been recognised partly through the diminishing role of UN agencies and other inter-governmental organisations in the UNFCCC negotiations.	-0.9	57	-2	-1.38	66	-4	-0.72	53	-2	-0.47	48	-1		Lowest	

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