

The Evolution of Chinese Angels: Social Ties and Institutional Development

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Informed by Mike Wright's insight on entrepreneurial finance research problems, we examine how Chinese angel finance has evolved with institutional changes over two decades. Our longitudinal cases explore the changing roles of personal ties within strengthening regulatory institutions. Rather than the diminishing role anticipated, we found that personal ties remained vital for investment decisions. Although the improved regulatory environment influenced the extent and volume of investment, encouraging greater and longer investments, personal ties still informed decisions. We conclude that angel finance practice has evolved to match the changing Chinese environment. Social ties no longer comprehensively determine investment decisions. Instead, personal ties complement the improving environment. The trust embodied in ties continues to facilitate deal-making by quick decisions and simple contracts. Importantly, we noted how trust reshaped moral hazards and agency problems through the moral obligations of ties. Thus, trust in the individual took more account of the business, but remained centred on personal integrity. We also found that ties with government officials, historically vital in uncertain environments, had become much less important as confidence in the regulatory regime improved. The paper contributes to our understanding of institutions and practices. It highlights culture's continuing role by addressing Mike Wright's concerns and using his guidance.

Introduction

Mike Wright laid much of the groundwork for venture capital (VC) enquiry in 1988 (Wright and Robbie, 1998) by identifying what was distinctive about equity risk finance, especially the problem of asymmetrical information. Wright, Westhead and Sohl (1998) argued for the critical role of angel finance as 'informal' VC, not least for stimulating a country's entrepreneurial base (De Clercq, Meuleman and Wright, 2012; Jiang *et al.*, 2014). VC is an increasingly important phenomenon, but geographically diverse (Wright *et al.*, 2005a, 2005b). Zahra and Wright (2011: 72) thus argued that 'research should address the heterogeneity of the contexts in which entrepreneurial activities take place'. Theories developed in one context may offer a poor explanation in other institutional settings (Bruton *et al.*, 2010a); research needs to be locally contextualized, but loosely coupled to

global debates (Wright, 2007). Our study is set in the context of China's remarkable growth and institutional changes (Ge *et al.*, 2017), and engages with debates about entrepreneurial practices and institutions (Estrin *et al.*, 2019).

Mike's interest in Chinese VC (Lockett and Wright, 2002) highlighted the economic importance of China and the unique context of business practices, culture and legal systems. He signalled a need to understand the vagaries of the investment process (Cumming *et al.*, 2019), especially as China becomes a mid-range economy (Hoskisson *et al.*, 2013). Moreover, Jiang *et al.* (2014), noting VC growth, commented that VC research in China remained limited. Nonetheless, Mike noted how venture capitalists' decisions were less dependent on market, product and strategy (Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 1997) and more influenced by personality and experience. Indeed, when institutions are not well developed, venture capitalists may rely

on informal institutions in relationships (Wright *et al.*, 2005a). Similarly, Batjargal and Liu (2004) recognized the importance of relationships for Chinese VC. They emphasized the significance of existing relationships or referrals. Wright (2007) observed that in a weak institutional environment such as China's, enforcing contingent contracts may be problematical, hence relationships involving trust may be a substitute.

Zahra, Wright and Abdelgawad (2014) explain that although the role of informal institutions is well recognized, their cultural foundations are often overlooked. Moreover, Bruton, Ahlstrom and Puky (2009) suggest that economies such as China's provide a natural laboratory for institutional change. Sun, Wright and Mellahi (2010) note how three decades of transition in China are characterized by gradual experimentation using a variety of pre-reform institutional legacies. Accordingly, 'A greater contribution to our understanding [of] the development of VC markets is provided by papers that have used some dimension of an institutional perspective' (Wright *et al.*, 2005a: 146). Mike also pointed out 'an under-researched area concerns the influence of institutional contexts, especially the role of social networks and cultures' (Wright *et al.*, 2005a: 135).

Our research problem

Put simply, some scholars thought that as China's formal institutions developed, the use of informal institutions (e.g. social ties) for economic exchange would diminish (Autio and Fu, 2015; Peng, 2003). However, others (Fredström, Peltonen and Wincent, 2020; Gambetta, 2000; Kim and Croidieu, 2016; Wank, 2002) challenge this. This debate, however, pays little attention to how network tie practices may also develop in a changing environment. A recurring feature of networks is how they change and develop to cope with new circumstances (Anderson, Dodd and Jack, 2010; Jack, Dodd and Anderson, 2008), including adapting to institutional changes (Anderson and Lee, 2008). The relationships between changing institutions and practices are likely to be dynamic (Hoskisson *et al.*, 2013; Wright *et al.*, 2005a) and nuanced, rather than a simple transition from informality. To understand these changes, we developed longitudinal case studies examining business angels' practices over time, arguing that

their close engagement with their investment (Bruton *et al.*, 2010b) enables a sharp personal, rather than corporate, focus on culturally informed practices (Huang, 2018). Our research problem was to establish how ties were used.

Institutional transition research proposes that informal institutions substitute for weak and inefficient formal institutions (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006; Batjargal *et al.*, 2013; Bruton, Ahlstrom and Li, 2010a). Informal institutions are relational and their ties (e.g. entrepreneur–investor ties and government connections) function within cultural environments (Ding, Sun and Au, 2014), whereas formal institutions form the regulatory environment within which informal institutions operate. Moreover, angel investors typically rely more on relational governance (Drover *et al.*, 2017; Fiet, 1995; Xiao and Steier, 2020). Xu and Meyer (2013) argued that Wright and colleagues' focus on institutional theory is a major foundation for studying transition economies. Building on this theory and the entrepreneurial finance literature (Hoskisson *et al.*, 2013), our longitudinal case studies capture changes in the role of personal network ties. Between 1990 and 2016, we followed three investment programmes. This period saw major institutional change and improvement, so we were able to establish the dynamics of personal ties and institutional change.

China offers an interesting case. Institutional environments for the private economy and informal financial market have steadily improved, from the constitutional amendments protecting the legal right to private property to granting legal status to private investors. As Figure 1 shows, these move from permitting to promoting the private sector. We see how private finance has not only been formally recognized, but also encouraged. Over time, legislative uncertainties have reduced (Smallbone, Xiao and Xu, 2020; Xiao, 2011; Xiao and North, 2012). Moreover, the Chinese angel finance market is maturing, playing an increasingly critical role in venture creation processes (Batjargal, 2010; Batjargal *et al.*, 2013). China has seen a remarkable expansion of the private equity industry (Xiao, 2020). Indeed, China is now the largest private equity industry in the world (Zero2ipo, 2020). In 2015, the Chinese risk capital fund pool reached CNY¹ 5 trillion (including a CNY 2.2

¹Exchange rate: 1 CNY = £0.11 on 2 March 2020.



Figure 1. Illustration of improving regulatory institutions during Periods I, II and III of the late 1990s to 2016 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Note: China has issued about 65 polices and legislations at the central level supporting the private sector and investments over the studied period.

trillion government-backed pool), overtaking the USA. Moreover, the number of risk capital firms actively investing in new and young firms reached 10,000 in 2015. This remarkable expansion and maturing situation offers a dynamic context for examining process and change in angels’ practices.

In fact, we found persistent and continuing importance of entrepreneur–investor ties, but decreasing use of government connections. We saw how strong ties reduced the complexity of contracts and enabled fast deals. Moreover, the agency problem – where funded firms might pursue their own, rather than investors’, interests – was subsumed within the perceived moral obligations of ties. Put simply, investors trusted individuals to safeguard their interests. Moral hazard around investment loss was diverted into the integrity of the individual, almost regardless of how the new venture was operated. For government ties, the key issue had been about gaining access. However, the better-regulated regime reduced the need for personalized access.

Theoretically, we contribute by demonstrating that treating informal relationships as a substitute for formal obligations and contracts is misleading.

The culturally embedded obligations of strong tie relationships are too powerful and too useful to jettison for a transactional, legal agreement. Nonetheless, a more robust regulatory environment helped to create confidence in the context, whilst network ties enabled investment processes within that context. As Puffer, McCarthy and Boisot (2010) described, stronger regulation improved confidence in perceptions about investment generally, and reduced regulatory risk. Conceptually, we propose that the improved regulatory environment is structural, creating greater confidence in reduced institutional uncertainty. However, ties and relationships are processual, hence they enable and facilitate investment deals. Originally, relationships may well have substituted for legal uncertainty. But in the present, stronger legal environment relationships complement the greater structural certainty by facilitating deals on culturally informed personal obligations. Networks and ties thus simplify deal-making and work to complement improved formal institutions.

Metaphorically, in the early stages the institutional environment was a stormy sea, with unpredictable currents and capricious weather.

Network ties created a sea anchor to offer some stability in this turbulence; offering some predictability but buffeted by uncertainties. The sea has been calmed and horizons made visible. Ties are now less about weathering storms; the sea anchor has become a sail to propel the deal.

Improving regulatory institutions increased businesses' confidence generally by reducing some structural uncertainties (Smallbone, Xiao and Xu, 2020; Xiao and North, 2012). However, network ties work at a different level; they relate to individual relationships within the structure. The obligations and responsibilities of personal ties enable decision processes and are profoundly social. Accordingly, we argue that business practices remain deeply embedded in Chinese culture, where personal relationships continue to inform commercial transactions. We thus offer theoretical insights into institutional theory, addressing the ambiguity about the changing role of personal network ties within improving regulatory institutions (Peng and Zhou, 2005).

Theoretical framework: dynamics of institutional transitions and angel finance

Mike Wright firmly believed that institutions helped explain practice (De Clercq *et al.*, 2015; Estrin *et al.*, 2019). Moreover, in a conversation with Gartner and Welter (Welter, Gartner and Wright, 2016), he proposed that we also need to look at the interactions of exogenous and endogenous dimensions of contexts. For us, this signals the significance of formal institutions offering structure and informal enabling specific practices within that structure. North (1990) classically defined institutions as constraints that human beings devise to shape human interaction. Institutions take two forms: formal (e.g. laws, regulations, rules) and informal (e.g. social norms, cultures, ethics).

Baumol (1996) formalized the idea that formal institutions structure entrepreneurial practices, and there is a wealth of evidence to support this at a macro level (Harbi and Anderson, 2010). The micro dynamics of informal institutions shed light on the agency in entrepreneurial practice (Anderson and Ronteau, 2017). Moreover, cultures endorse specific practices (Anderson and Smith, 2007). Yet Bruton, Ahlstrom and Li (2010a) draw our attention to risks in attributing too much

to culture. Nonetheless, the dynamics of macro-level and micro-level institutions, as well as the relationships between personal network ties and formal contracts, are useful in explaining firm behaviours and business practices (Hitt *et al.*, 2004; Lau, Tse and Zhou, 2002; Peng *et al.*, 2009). The literature, examining contexts at the early phase of institutional transitions, notes the lack of legal protection for private property and perceived difficulties in enforcing a formal contract (Cumming, Schmidt and Walz, 2010; Peng and Zhou, 2005; Puffer, McCarthy and Boisot, 2010; Wright, Pruthi and Lockett, 2005b).

Personal network ties exerted some control over economic exchanges at the early phase of transitions (Peng, 2003; Xiao and Ritchie, 2009); a consequence of the weaker and more inefficient regulatory institutions (Le and Nguyen, 2009; Li and Zahra, 2012; Scheela and Jittrapanun, 2012). Such network ties are typically embedded in, and formed from, social and cultural roots (McKeever, Anderson and Jack, 2014). They create a high level of trust, cooperation and dependability (Huang, 2008; Xin and Pearce, 1996).

Scholars note how ties encourage entrepreneurs to fulfil their promises, thus managing possible opportunistic behaviours of entrepreneurs (Batjargal and Liu, 2004). Ties also compensate for the absence of reliable accounts and information asymmetry (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006; Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003; Ding, Au and Chiang, 2015). In weaker legal regimes and regulatory institutions, investors relied on ties to solve disputes and enforce agreements (Batjargal *et al.*, 2013; Trester, 1998).

Moreover, legislation-based uncertainties made entrepreneurs' network ties with government officials essential for a venture's creation, survival and growth (Anderson and Lee, 2008; Bruton, Ahlstrom and Li, 2010a; Meyer *et al.*, 2009; Peng, 2003; Peng and Luo, 2000). Government connections offer access and competitive advantage in weaker institutional environments (Li *et al.*, 2008; Zhou, 2013). Furthermore, government connections signalled positive perceptions to suppliers and clients (Wright, 2007). Studies demonstrated such connections acting as a vicarious institution and a kind of 'roof', which works to guarantee the deal in countries experiencing institutional transitions (i.e. Russia – Batjargal, 2006; Meyer *et al.*, 2009). Xiao (2011) found that these connections were included in evaluation criteria that

early-stage investors used to make investment decisions. Nonetheless, it might be expected that increasing marketization of the economy would reduce the importance of these ties (Lee and Anderson, 2007). In summary, we ask if the role of network ties has diminished or merely changed in the new stronger environment.

Research methods

We use longitudinal case studies to explore the evolution of angel finance and ties' role for developing theory. Case studies are particularly useful for developing well-grounded theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999; Yin, 1981), and Koze and Lewin (1999) suggest that longitudinal case studies provide a means of understanding the dynamics of network ties as they adapt to new circumstances. Our longitudinal case study approach enabled us to detect subtle and dynamic changes in investment processes and practices. Our research design examined changes in the use and role of ties in investment decision-making over three periods.

Time and change

We examined three consecutive periods featuring episodic changes in formal institutions (see Figure 1) and collected empirical data during each period:

- Period I (late 1990s to 2004) characterized by relatively weak regulatory institutions.
- Period II (2005 to 2009) with relatively stronger regulatory institutions.
- Period III (2010 to 2016) saw the strongest regulatory institutions.

During Period I, the regulatory framework lagged far behind growth of the private sector (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008; Tsai, 2002). Indeed, the legal rights and interests of private enterprises were not constitutionally protected by the state until 2004 (see Figure 1). There was an absence of a stable rule of law and effective enforcement regime to safeguard investments (Cardis *et al.*, 2001; De Clercq, Lim and Hoon Oh, 2013; Lu and Tao, 2013). Under such a weak legal system, individual investors played a limited angel role, typically pro-

viding small amounts of capital or credit to meet urgent needs for short-term finance, differing substantially from that in developed market-oriented countries (Hitt *et al.*, 2004). Entrepreneur-investor ties and government connections were much more important than formal contracts in determining investment decisions. A very simple agreement was commonly used to govern exchanges. Nonetheless, local government officials sometimes used their power to help young firms navigate the challenging environment characterized by the weak protection of private property and problematic enforcement of contracts (Butler, Brown and Chamornmarn, 2003; Peng, 2003; Tan, Yang and Veliyath, 2009).

Period II saw strengthening regulatory institutions with the granting of legal status to private lending companies in 2006. The state continued to issue national-level policies further promoting the development of the private sector. Provincial and local governments introduced legislation to protect businesses' legal rights and interests, and offered more support. The institutional infrastructure for angel finance improved (Lundstrom and Stevenson, 2005) so that informal finance became the main source of early and subsequent stages of growth (Tsai, 2017). Individual investors began providing longer-term risk capital; but typically, only to entrepreneurs with whom they had long-standing relationships (Xiao and North, 2012).

Period III saw the establishment of institutional infrastructure for the private economy and informal financial markets. New policies and regulations were introduced by the state to further support private investments (see Figure 1). Formal enforceable contracts became possible for investors (Xiao and North, 2018). Broadly, structural uncertainties were progressively reduced. This improved legislative environment matched the continued rapid growth of the VC industry. It also supported exits from investments (Batjargal *et al.*, 2013). Consequently, the informal financial market thrived, the volume of financial transactions increased (Tsai, 2017) and became longer-term (Xiao, 2020). Accordingly, in this more mature environment for investment, we expected to see an increase in the formality of the investment processes – such as due diligence and a reduction in the personalization of decision-making; a shift away from a personal relationship to a focus on the proposal.

Data collection

We held three programmes of face-to-face interviews (2004, 2009 and 2015–2016) with investors who had provided loans or risk capital. From these data, we developed three longitudinal cases (A, B and C). These cases are ongoing and involve a multi-year retrospective analysis. Each case included the investor, all the investments made and the entrepreneurs of the funded ventures during the periods. It is worth noting that the early investments included in this study were made in the later 1990s. In total, we held 37 interviews; 30 interviews with individual investors and 7 interviews with entrepreneurs of the investee firms.

Case A. Lao Luo (fictitious name) was born in a poor village in 1965. He left home for higher education in 1981. He then earned a Master's degree in telecommunication technology from a top university in 1988, which led to a lecturing post in another elite university. This promising career was short-lived; after 4 years he quit to start his own business in Shenzhen. This imported and sold high-end batteries to research institutes and universities. The business did really well and he quickly made his fortune. In 1998 he turned his attention to financing other businesses. Initially this involved supporting his friends running businesses in the same industry, by offering small amounts of finance. When we asked how he made such decisions, he explained that he knew the entrepreneurs, their families and business activities really well. His role was to be an angel in his community.

Case A includes five longer-term equity investments and tens of short-term investments that Luo has provided to connected ventures from the late 1990s to 2016. Table 1 summarizes the attributes and performance of those equity investments, as well as features of social ties.

Case B. Zhu Zi (fictitious name) was born in a poor village in 1963. He became the youngest lecturer on fibre-optic communications at an elite university whilst earning a Master's degree from a top university. He was quickly promoted to professor. His success in academia did not prevent him from establishing his own business in the late 1990s. He too made a lot of money quickly, dominating the Shanghai and Beijing market for imported scientific batteries. His remarkable business success made him a target investor for his family and

Table 1. Summary of Case A's longer-term equity investments from the late 1990s to 2016

INV year	Characteristics and performance of investment			Characteristics of social ties	
	Size of INV (CNY 1,000)	BS (%)	Business activities	Performance/return	Type involved
2009	2,000	20	Manufacturing blood-related products	Closure, the full amount of capital back	DEIT and GC
2011	600	5	Manufacturing optical fabric	Ongoing, good dividends	DEIT
2012	400	10	High-end battery distributor	Exited with a small return	DEIT and GC
2013	300	10	Regional distributor	Exited with a good return	DEIT and GC
2014	500	8	Manufacturing CMOS sensors	Exited with a good return	DEIT
					School mate and hometown fellow
					Former colleague and university classmate
					Former employee
					University classmate and former colleague
					University classmate

Notes: INV = investment; D/IDEIT = direct/indirect entrepreneur–investor ties; GC = government connections; BS = business shares. Tens of short-term investments made.

friends' businesses. In 2003, his nephew began a business manufacturing navigation devices and invited Zi to become a business partner. Zi told us that he felt responsible for helping the new generation of his family in their career. One interesting element of this social obligation was to accept a high level of risk in the investment. To balance this, he made several further investments, hoping that one of his investee ventures would have a successful IPO.

Case B offered eight longer-term equity investments and tens of short-term investments to connected ventures during the studied periods. Table 2 shows the attributes and performance of those equity investments, as well as features of the social ties involved.

Case C. Zhang Hong (fictitious name) had a different career path from the other cases. He was born in a city in 1964. After obtaining a first degree in telecommunication technology in 1985, he joined the Army for a couple of years, but then secured a senior position at a large state-owned telecom company in Shenzhen. This was a period of remarkable transition in China, and the opening up of opportunities in the private sector for the brave. Like many friends, he quit 'the iron rice bowl' of the state sector to begin manufacturing, producing fibre-related electricity products in the early 2000s. The business developed to become a key player in the industry. Similar to our other respondents, commercial success led to a high profile and many contracts and connections. Hong was active in the community and became well informed about what was going on, including financial needs and investment opportunities. Initially he supported friends by offering modest working capital. This led to becoming an angel investor. His approach was based on a strong belief in building strategic alliances, rather than simply investing. Accordingly, he invested in friends who were his clients and suppliers.

Case C had two longer-term equity investments and tens of short-term investments. Table 3 displays the attributes and performance of the equity investments, as well as features of social ties.

Longitudinal case study development

Figure 2 describes the case studies, 2004–2016. From previous work, we had a sample of 74

Table 2. Summary of Case B's longer-term equity investments from the late 1990s to 2016

INV year	Size of INV (CNY 1,000)	Characteristics and performance of investment			Characteristics of social ties		
		BS (%)	Business activities	Performance/return	Type involved	Links rooted	
2004	100	3	Manufacturing navigator	Exited in 2012 with full amount of capital back	DEIT and GC	University mates	
2005	500	20	Business solution	Closure with partial loss	DEIT	Former colleague and hometown fellow	
2006	800	10	Infrastructure	Closure with partial loss	GC and DEIP	Hometown fellow and family friend	
2007	1,500	5	Property development	Ongoing, with hope of getting expected return	GC and IDEIT	Family friends and school mates	
2007	1,200	9	Manufacturing energy-saving lumps	Ongoing, no dividends	IDEIT	Co-investor is a client and school mate	
2008	975	9	Manufacturing energy-saving lumps	Ongoing, no dividends	IDEIT	Co-investor is a client and university mate	
2011	300	20	Manufacturing battery	Ongoing, good dividends	DEIT	Hometown fellow and family friend	
2014	500	8	Manufacturing sensors	Exited with a good return	IDEIT	Former colleague and university mate	

Notes: INV = investment; D/IDEIT = direct/indirect entrepreneur–investor ties; GC = government connections; BS = business shares. Tens of short-term investments made.




Figure 2. Case development [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Notes: SM = senior managers; ENTR = entrepreneurs; N = number

Investors refers to the SM/ENTR who have provided equity and loans to other ventures solely/jointly by the time of interview.

Non-investors refers to the SM/ENTR who were yet to provide any finance to other ventures by the time of interview.

firms from which we selected 6 who had provided finance to other firms. These formed our original cases. We asked them broad exploratory questions: How did you know about the investment opportunity? How did you evaluate the venture and the risk? We also enquired about personal network ties: How did you know the entrepreneur? How did that influence the investment decisions? How did personal network ties work?

The 2009 interviews found that only four of the original sample continued to invest. We revisited the original themes and added the theme of experience: Tell me about the investment performance and why was this? Did your investment performance impact on new investment decisions and practices?

Preliminary analysis of the 2004 and 2009 interviews suggested some changes to the characteristics of offers (e.g. increased amount of capital and term) and subtle changes to the influences of per-

sonal network ties for decision-making. After the 2016 interviews were conducted, the three longitudinal cases were successfully developed. It is worth noting that one case without interviews with entrepreneurs of the investee ventures was excluded.

Data analysis

Given our interest in practice and change (Figure 3), we analysed the 2004 data employing thematic analysis (Jack *et al.*, 2015). The interviewees had actively talked about network ties with either themselves or a third party, and where those ties originated. Analytical constructs of long-standing relations, high level of trust and dependability emerged from the data. Analysing the role of personal network ties in decision-making, process constructs (i.e. helping gather faithful and less biased information, confidence about reduced relational risk, ability to help deal




Figure 3. Overall data collection and analytical process [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

with legislation-related uncertainties, helping win contracts and gaining access to resources) helped us distinguish the role of entrepreneur-investor ties from government connections. When examining investment practices, items such as simple agreements, quick decisions and perception of the venture appeared. Analysis of the 2009 interview data was guided by these constructs, but looked for changes. We repeated this for the 2016 data.

Our final task transformed these data into our cases charting the evolution of practices in context (Yin, 1981). Distinctive patterns of each case emerged and were compared and synthesized to generate thematic patterns across cases (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Findings

An early, but enduring, finding was the critical role of social connections. This was explained as how culture stressed the importance of personal ties in determining responsibilities and obligations. We saw how the tie was a relationship between people, but operationalized commercially. This, we were told, is how business is done in China. We saw this

as an ‘informal’ cultural institution. The logic was that given the unpredictability of the environment, the investment was in the entrepreneur. Chinese culture imposes responsibility on the entrepreneur to fulfil his promises, regardless of how the new business fares, or how the environment changes. Reliance was placed on the individual, regardless of the formal environment.

Evolution of early-stage angel finance and embedded personal network ties

Tables 1–3 indicate a remarkable change from offering short-term lending to longer-term risk capital to early-stage ventures as the regulatory institutions improved. Nonetheless, investors clearly preferred to build a business partnership with those embedded in a long-standing network relationship. This remained largely unchanged, regardless of the improving regulatory institutions. As an informant commented about his equity investment of CNY 500,000 for 10% of the manufacturing business shares: ‘Making the decision was rather easy for me. We were university classmates and keep in touch on a regular basis.’ Looked at from a purely economic logic, this

Table 3. Summary of Case C's longer-term equity investments from the late 1990s to 2016

INV Year	Characteristics and performance of investment				Characteristics of social ties	
	Size of INV (CNY 1,000)	BS (%)	Business activities	Performance/return	Type involved	Links rooted
2014	100	5	Programming	Ongoing, no dividends	DEIT	Client and university classmate
2015	650	3	Manufacturing Z-Chip	Ongoing, good dividends	DEIT	Client and university classmate

Notes: INV = investment; D/IDEIT = direct/indirect entrepreneur–investor ties; GC = government connections; BS = business shares. Tens of short-term investments made.

long-standing relationship offers little explanation. Why should a shared academic background provide confidence for an economic transaction? We can recognize similarities to western appreciations of the value of social capital (Anderson and Jack, 2002) and how knowing the ‘other’ in exchanges eases transactions (Anderson and Hardwick, 2017; Hardwick, Anderson and Cruickshank, 2013). But the cases describe a much stronger relationship based on mutual affiliations, a ‘special relationship’ (Ding, Sun and Au, 2014; Zhao, Frese and Giardini, 2010). We propose that this is a cultural outcome of, and a social response to, China’s traditional hierarchical structure and the ensuing low-trust society described by Fukuyama (1995).

Compared to angels in developed countries, our Chinese angel investors employ close social links, associations or shared experiences, typically relating to shared elements of personal identity (see Tables 1–3): (i) school/university (i.e. former classmates); (ii) place of work (i.e. former colleagues, clients, suppliers); (iii) kinship (i.e. family friends); and (iv) home town. Investing in people with shared culturally rooted social identities suggests, regardless of transitioning regulatory institutions, the value placed on trust and dependability within a social and cultural link (Ding, Au and Chiang, 2015; Fukuyama, 1995; Huang and Wang, 2011).

Evolution was demonstrated within the deepening patterns of financial involvement. Short-term finance successfully repaid encouraged investors to explore longer-term investments. We attribute this to the similarly deepening experience of the relationship. Trust in, and experience of, the integrity of the people and trust in their capability built a strong personalized foundation for developing the informal financial market. Experienced investors started to provide equity finance to businesses, especially for high-growth firms. However, our analysis shows that for investments made before 2010, the returns and performance were not as good as investors had hoped (see Table 1). Informants suggested the major reason was sudden changes in regulatory institutions. For us, this reflection of continuing uncertainties illustrates the practical logic of investing in the relationship rather than the business.

Despite the poorer performance, in the 2010s investors continued to offer equity capital to early-stage ventures, but with a marked change towards investing in early-stage ventures within

their area of expertise. Investors A and B invested a total amount of CNY 500,000 of equity capital in a start-up producing CMOS sensors for 8% of the business shares in 2014, respectively. The two investors had previously owned businesses in the same field in the 1990s and had specific industry expertise. Investor C stated: ‘I was delighted to offer US\$100,000 for 3% of business shares to my client company producing Z-Chips in 2015’ (Case C, 2015 interview). These findings demonstrate a relationship built on shared experiences and perceptions, but extended into commercial transactions. We saw this as a trust platform which investors employed to inform decisions.

However, investors A and B were initially less selective about the type of firm and offered funding to firms operating outside their experience. Decisions were entirely based on long-standing personal relationships in 2004 to 2009. Later, advanced industry knowledge was added to the evaluation criteria (Cases A and B). Nonetheless, investor C only provided funding to firms run by his university classmates operating in the same industry (Case C). Clearly, entrepreneur–investor ties continued to be the determining factor, even as the evolution was informed by industry experience.

Enduring influence of entrepreneur–investor ties

Our analysis indicates the continuing importance and role of embedded entrepreneur–investor ties. Table 4 demonstrates how investors also employed entrepreneur–investor ties from rooted social links to understand opportunities and gather timely, accurate and useful information, regardless of the improving institutions at both macro- and micro-level. Shared views and values, social closeness, provided a basis for discussing and informing the investment opportunity as well as the potential partnership at an early stage of development; even before a venture was created. Investor A commented: ‘we knew the business idea before discussing about the investment potential since we chat about our businesses on a regular basis’ (Case A, 2015 interview). Investor B, analysing his equity investment in a business solution firm founded and run by his former colleague, who is also from the same province, stated: ‘the entrepreneur was so excited about the fast growth of his business each time chatting to me. I had learnt about the business before being invited to be a business partner and made my investment decisions quite quickly’

(Case B, 2009 interview). Ties informed investors about the project, but supported by knowledge about an entrepreneur’s family, clients, suppliers and ambitions through previous conversations. Investors believed this information –gathered through shared social links – was comprehensive, faithful and less biased for evaluating the quality of the venture and risk (Pollack and Bosse, 2014). Trust and integrity remained key, as investor A commented: ‘my investment to the venture was a convertible offer. I believe the entrepreneur would sell his properties to pay me back if things went wrong’ (Case A, 2015 interview). For us, this comment signals belief in the integrity of the individual. It clearly reduces the nature of risk and decreases uncertainty.

Shared views and values, as well as shared personal identities, worked to improve investors’ confidence. The emphasis was on trust built through entrepreneur–investor ties and less on commercial elements when making their decisions (Mitteness *et al.*, 2012, 2016). As investor B stated: ‘the offer that I made was based entirely on the entrepreneur whom I knew since we were 6 years old, and we always chat about our businesses and life’ (Case B, 2015 interview²). It reflects how bonded relationships caused investors to rely on a few key, largely personal and contextual elements rather than a full set of evaluation criteria for funding decisions. Moreover, trust in the individual becomes a heuristic means of mitigating perceived risks.

Changing influence of entrepreneur–investor ties

We note how entrepreneur–investor ties better enabled angel investors to make longer-term investments as legislation-related uncertainties reduced. Thus, we saw how legislative uncertainty had previously led to short-term investments. However, as regulatory uncertainty declined, a longer-term view became possible. We are able to conceptualize two different forms of uncertainty: first, structural uncertainty and second, behavioural or process uncertainty such as moral or performance hazard. Initially, ties addressed the risks manifest in both forms; for structural risks, the investment outcome was short-term flexibility, but as legislation became stronger, the perceived riskiness lowered, allowing a longer-term view.

²We are deeply indebted to Andrew Zacharakis and Mark Ramsdem for comments on earlier version of this article.

Table 4. Data structure and representative quotations for the role evolution of personal network ties against the improving formal institutions

Second-order codes	First-order codes and representative quotations
Direct/indirect entrepreneur–investor ties	
Process facilitation increases	<p><i>Gathering comprehensive, faithful and timely information</i></p> <p>INV: ‘the entrepreneur and I meet up and chat about our businesses on a regular basis; I knew the business quite well before the investment opportunity emerged’ (2004 interview)</p> <p>INV: ‘the entrepreneur kept telling me how well his business was doing, so I kindly knew the business when being invited to invest in this venture’ (2009 interview)</p> <p>INV: ‘the entrepreneur had informally discussed with us about the idea for starting his business, and I told him, am happy to invest’ (2016 interview)</p> <p><i>Trust and integrity</i></p> <p>INV: ‘a client of my investee venture is also my university roommate; we chat about the orders he makes’ (2009 interview)</p> <p>INV: ‘I provided CNY 2 million to entrepreneur from my home town. He said to me that he would sell his apartment in Beijing for paying me back if the business going wrong. My parents and sibling know his family for decades’ (2015 interview)</p> <p><i>Commercial platforms</i></p> <p>INV: ‘I ask my friends for short-term loans, when they are tight and tell me whom to ask. I do the same to them’ (2009 interview)</p> <p>INV: ‘any unforeseeable problems could be a major reason for a business’s failure. Investing in entrepreneurs whom I have positive perception of helps build future collaborations’ (2015 interview)</p> <p><i>Quick decision and fast payments</i></p> <p>ENT: ‘I receive a payment of short-term loans from my friends in a day or so after we have agreed’ (2004 interview)</p> <p>INV: ‘just make a transfer once a simple agreement being signed’ (2015 interview)</p>
Control mechanisms reduce	<p><i>More comprehensive due diligence</i></p> <p>INV: ‘I now only invest in well-connected businesses operating in the industry that I know well’ (2014 interview)</p> <p>INV: ‘I have learnt a lot from my investments that were either successful or [a] failure. For start-ups, the entry barriers are much higher now than it was. My perception of a venture should be based on my knowledge of a market and industry in which the venture [is] operating’ (2016 interview)</p> <p><i>Awareness of shortcomings of a simple contract</i></p> <p>INV: ‘I have exited with a very good return in 2018, but the main reason for my exit was that I did not have any influences on decision making according to the simple contract signed’ (2018 interview)</p> <p>INV: ‘occasionally I wish I added contract rights to the agreement, but it is hard to do things that like’ (2015 interview)</p>
Effect of government connections	
Reduced value	<p><i>Reduced power of explaining and enforcing legislation</i></p> <p>INV: ‘my early equity investments failed. The main reason for the failure was the sudden changes to legislations for the industry. It was beyond the entrepreneurs’ control. My connections with the authority could not help’ (2009 interview)</p> <p><i>Reduced power to make orders</i></p> <p>INV: ‘my friends who worked at a university cannot make orders themselves, unlike what they used to be’ (2012 interview)</p> <p><i>Reduced power of local authority to approval for businesses</i></p> <p>INV: ‘the business partners working for local government failed to gain approval for the use right of the land’ (2015 interview)</p> <p>INV: ‘my mate no longer helped me to win contracts because of the job mobility’ (2009 interview)</p>
Gathering structural information	<p><i>Continue to network with local government officials</i></p> <p>ENTR: ‘as always, I catch up with my friends who work for local authorities and maintain the bond. Through which, I know the latest information about policies related to the industry’ (2009 interview)</p> <p>INV: ‘I spend much less resources to network with local government now than before. Not much they can do for me’ (2015 interview)</p>

However, the processual social importance of tie obligations and responsibility continued.

Bonded relations between entrepreneurs and investors help reduce relational risk, but over time also develop trust in the capabilities of those entrepreneurs to grow the venture and achieve long-term business success. Furthermore, the nature of investment involvement extends beyond the provision of capital as a one-off event and demonstrates faith in the individual. Investor B explained, 'If this investment fails, I believe the entrepreneur would succeed in the future in which a chance of me playing a role in his business increases' (Case B, 2009 interview). This reflects a network-based investment strategy used by investors, strengthening the bonded relations in anticipation of future collaborations. The perceived benefit of embedded personal ties lies not only in the current deal, but also in future collaborations. Mutual obligations form in this network-based strategy, which is demonstrably long-term and processual. Entrepreneurs are not only socially accountable for single-event funding, but also address investors' longer-term aspirations. These responsibilities are reciprocated, leading to a robust but flexible commercial platform.

Investor B commented, 'we (my university classmates and former colleagues) meet quite often, and chat about our businesses and life' (Case B, 2009 interview). This represents a robust and enduring social platform, created from shared social and cultural links, that enables informed interaction. Such socially embedded interactions can motivate all the stakeholders to share resources (Uzzi, 1999), even allowing investors to detect any potential problems and provide relevant advice or assistance at a very early stage.

Decreased value of government connections

Under a weak regulatory framework, government connections can assist a firm by helping win contracts, obtain grants, gain approval for doing business, solve disputes and provide information (Li and Zhang, 2007; Li *et al.*, 2008; Walder and Zhao, 2006; Zhou, 2013). Moreover, well-connected early-stage ventures were perceived by investors to have a competitive advantage (Batjargal, 2010). This example shows the importance of these connections, 'I frequently offer project-based equity finance to an entrepreneur who was my former employee. He has a better chance of

winning contracts from one of my previous clients than myself, since the current senior manager of the client company is his classmate' (Case A, 2004 interview).

Government officials hold considerable power in interpreting relatively unclear policies and providing approval for businesses. Previously, even the protection of property rights needed a government official's support (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006). With stronger regulation, this power diminished. Investor B had an equity investment in a residential property development in 2007, 'I had initially considered several local officials holding a proportion of business shares as a security for my investment in the business. However, they later failed to gain approval for the real estate development on time, leading to a trapped investment' (Case B, 2015 interview). It appears that this poor equity performance resulted from the reduced power of the government connections.

As local authority control weakened, the benefits and competitive advantages of ties to officials also decreased. Investors A and B stated how sales of their high-quality batteries fell year by year because several of their university classmates no longer helped them win contracts. These classmates had moved to new positions and were now less able to influence and advise. The job changes were informed by government policy measures introduced to create a fair and competitive environment for businesses (Cases A and B, 2009 and 2015). Investor B: 'Central government tightened the legislation that strictly restrict[s] the use of farmland for residential property development in 2009, and local government officials could not approve the documents that they had promised' (2015 interview). Investor A's experience was worse: 'The founder's arrest caused my investee company to go completely wrong. He was accused of wrongdoing at his previous job as a local government official' (2015 interview). We see this diminishing competitive advantage from government ties, resulting from the stronger regulatory regime.

Interestingly, entrepreneurs of early-stage ventures continue to network with some local government officials on the basis of shared personal identities. These entrepreneurs were the first to gain information about changes to the business environment (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Zhou, 2013). Critical structural information included policy changes, amendments to legislation and government support. 'I was encouraged by my hometown

fellow who works in local government to apply for a government grant and got it' (Case A, 2015 interview). Entrepreneurs maintained connections but put less effort into maintaining and strengthening relationships. Investor B commented: 'in order to maintain a close friendship, I now offer small gifts to my classmates who work in the public sector' (Case B, 2015 interview).

Social processes and a simple contract

Despite the availability of complex legally enforceable contracts, all our informants repeatedly told us about their simple contracts. We saw this as continuing reliance on the social obligations of network ties and special relationships. We were told how regular events such as dinners, family visits, site visits and members' gatherings maintained the bond. Such links also enable investors to socialize and connect with a third party (i.e. customer or supplier). This embedded personal networking process is profoundly social. The interaction processes build strong and enduring relationships, which are much more flexible than a legal contract (Wang and Gordon, 2011). They also function as a powerful control mechanism over an investee venture (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006; Welter and Smallbone, 2008). The adaptability and flexibility helps with rectifying mistakes or misunderstandings, resolving conflicts of interest and minimizing any negative impacts. This socially embedded mechanism appears very effective in conditions of remaining uncertainty. Of course, the problems associated with strong ties and over-embedding remain. It becomes difficult to avoid obligations when these become commercially problematic. More significantly, over-embedding closes off the arrangements for outsiders. The clique becomes a powerful clan that can shut out useful new members.

Nonetheless, the simplicity of the contract – with its implied obligations – facilitated fast payments and deal flows. Our informants repeatedly commented: 'I do not think it is necessary to produce a contract with a long list of covenants, and I always made a transfer of the full amount of capital agreed days after a simple contract has been signed' (2009 and 2015 interviews). This is also illustrated here: 'I received the full amount of the investment capital from three business partners in a week after a simple contract signed' (Case A, 2009 and 2015 interviews). The embedded net-

work ties make a complex contract unnecessary, avoiding delays. Indeed, legal complexity might even damage the trust between entrepreneurs and investors (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006; Batjargal and Liu, 2004).

Nevertheless, there is also an awareness of the shortcomings of these simple trust-based contracts. Investor B, assessing the performance of his equity investment, stated: 'I could have received dividends by now if the entrepreneur had better managed the cash flow. I wish I had added more details about stock control to the contract' (Case B, 2015 interview). Investor A grumbled: 'I have not received any dividends from the firm run by my best friend, although the business has been doing well' (Case A, 2016 interview). Opinions about complex contracts did vary depending on business partner. Investor C, commenting on his 2014 investment, stated: 'I had a lawyer look at the contract drafted by the investee firm that is owned by Americans and operated in the US. It was new to me, but I am happy with the experience' (Case C, 2015 interview). This indicates a subtle change in investors' views over time, towards using more detailed contracts when appropriate.

This social situating of Chinese business suggests that practices may continue to differ from the USA and Europe (De Clercq *et al.*, 2006; Ding, Sun and Au, 2014; Fairchild, 2011). Although new regulations open up possibilities for more market-driven decision-making, we found a continuing reliance on personal ties. Mike Wright had suggested we look closely at the interplay of institutions, formal and informal (Wright *et al.*, 2005b). We did this and found these nuanced relationships. We argue that they are not solely market-driven practices, but seem almost determined by the cultural obligations that characterize the social ties of our investors. There are obvious advantages, but considerable problems for those lacking social connections.

One of our reviewers astutely pointed out the processes of unfolding legitimacy in our processual data. He noted how increased structural legitimacy related to change balances, in cognitive legitimacy (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Tsang (1996) had pointed out the importance of legitimacy for entrepreneurs in China's uncertain environment. Webb *et al.* (2009) describe how formal institutions confer legal legitimacy on what may have been informally cognitively legitimate in terms of values and beliefs. They propose that entrepreneurial

activities taking place in the informal economy fall within informal institutional boundaries (i.e. norms, values and beliefs). De Clercq and Vornov (2009) discuss the social construction of legitimacy (cognitive), which Anderson and Smith (2007) described as the moral space of entrepreneurship. This serves as a useful conceptual contrast to political, formal institutional legitimacy in the dynamics of China's move to a market economy.

Discussion, future direction and conclusions

Using Mike Wright's insights, we identify, chart and theorize the roles and practices of business angels' network ties in changing formal institutional environments. We found strong evidence of how profoundly social relationships shaped investors' decision-making and how they monitored the processes. The attitudes of Chinese people towards entrepreneurship became more positive as the institutional environments improved (Smallbone, Xiao and Xu, 2020). The enhanced confidence encouraged much longer-term financing and investment. This contrasts with the short-term and flexible lending of the less-regulated regime. We theorized that the evolution of angel investment practice is a response to structure, the uncertainty of what governments might do. We showed how social ties provided an effective mechanism to overcome the structural uncertainty in dysfunctional institutional environments. The obligations associated with strong ties acted as a risk-control mechanism through which opportunistic uncertainty is reduced. Investment decisions were made in the relationship, rather than in the business.

As regulatory uncertainty reduced, the role of ties and work shifted to prioritize the impact on processes rather than structure. The changing role of ties focused on opportunistic risk rather than legislation-related uncertainty. We offered evidence from the much-diminished importance of ties to government to support this analysis. This was not to say that the influence and importance of ties reduced, it merely changed. We saw more sophisticated and longer-term investments shaped by strong social ties. In evolutionary terms, the role of ties moved to more general management of the investment processes. Knowledge and experience evolved too and played a greater role. We noted how regular social exchanges, such as meetings

and family involvement – socializing, maintained obligations. What did not change was the source of the ties; links were always formed from historical affiliations, classmates or shared home towns. We criticized this as over-embedding, because it seriously restricts the range of connections.

Our overview was that these transactions demonstrate the socially embedded nature of business in China. It could be argued that ours were extreme cases of operating in conditions of uncertainty. The new ventures had no track record and the entrepreneurs were largely new to the game. The products often had novelty; markets were unclear and the angels lacked investment experience. Yet even as extreme cases, they shed light on how business processes are embedded in social relations. In such a potent mix of risk and ambiguity, with obscure outcomes, this falling back on well-established cultural norms makes good sense. Nonetheless, we saw that even when some uncertainty was removed, the socialized system of network ties and socially defined obligations moved ties from control mechanisms to being used to foster better, larger and longer deals. It appears that use of the system evolved to meet the changed circumstances. This seems to us to confirm our view of Chinese business practices as socially embedded and socially enacted.

Future research, implications and directions

We noted how the extent of uncertainty made ours an extreme case. It would be helpful to examine the role of ties in less extreme conditions. Moreover, we asserted that culture created the usefulness of these social ties. Hence it could be useful to examine finance and credit practices in different Asian contexts. This could establish the uniqueness of Chinese culture. Ours were strong ties, yet the literature suggests that weak ties bridge structural holes. Consequently, a future focus on weak tie development would be interesting. Finally, we will continue to monitor these angels in the increasing marketization and maturity of the Chinese economy. Evolution may take personal ties and networking in interesting new directions.

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